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**Office of the Historian
Bureau of Public Affairs
U.S. Department of State
April 2017**

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Preface

The quantity and special interest of the papers relating to Russia in the revolutionary period have made it appear convenient and proper to collect them in a special series of volumes, as has been done with the papers relating to the World War. Those for the years 1917–18 have been grouped in three volumes, each separately indexed, according to the following topical scheme.

Volume I, “Political Affairs and Diplomatic Relations,” deals with the transformations of the central government, its relations with foreign governments, and the attitude of the United States and other governments toward the successive régimes and their policies. Documents concerning primarily the discussion of war aims and general peace terms, however, are included in the supplements relating to the World War, as indicated by cross references.

[Volume II](#), “Disintegration and Foreign Intervention,” deals with the various regional movements of position to the Soviet régime and of national separatism, the military action of the Allied and American governments in different parts of Russia, and their relations with local organizations. Affairs of northern Manchuria, although outside Russian territory, are treated in connection with those of eastern Siberia, from which they are inseparable. On the other hand, Poland, being cut off from all immediate connection with Russia by the Austro-German occupation, is left to be dealt with in the supplements relating to the World War.

[Volume III](#), “Economic Relations,” treats principally of financial affairs, commercial relations, and American assistance in the operation of Russian railways, involving necessarily the Chinese Eastern Railway.

Within each topical section the papers are arranged, with few exceptions for evident special reasons, according to the dates under which they were sent; dates of receipt of incoming papers are also given whenever indicated on the original texts. An arrangement placing incoming documents chronologically in the order of their receipt, as followed in the supplements relating to the World War, would have resulted in an unintelligible confusion of events, on account of the varying and often prolonged periods required for the transmission of despatches and even of telegrams. The latter were at times relayed by other diplomatic or consular offices than the one of origin—in some cases through two or three stages—before reaching Washington. As far as practicable, the headings have been formulated to show the original source and date of each telegram so transmitted, the forwarding offices being indicated in footnotes.

All single dates, not designated old style, are according to the western calendar. Wherever dates in the documents not so designated were according to the old Russian calendar alone, the new-style date has been supplied in addition.

Diversities in translation, or choice, of the Russian terms of the period, which naturally occurred in documents written or translated by different persons, have for the most part been allowed to stand as they appear in the original papers in the files. The Russian term, *Vremennoe Pravitelstvo*, for example, used to designate the régime which succeeded the Imperial Government, is translated indifferently as “Provisional Government” and “Temporary Government.” Similarly, *Uchreditelnoe Sobranie* is rendered variously as “Constituent Assembly,” “Constitutional Assembly,” or “Constitutional Convention.” The word *Soviet* is sometimes translated as “Council” and at other times is simply used in its transliterated form; in fact, the single word “Soviet” is often used to mean “Council of Workmen’s, Soldiers’ and Peasants’ Deputies” or to designate in general the regime established after November 7, 1917. Other principal variants are as follows:

Bolshevik—Bolshevist—Maximalist

Commissar—Commissaire—Commissioner—Commissary

Commissariat—Commissary

Federated—Federal—Federative

Menshevik—Minimalist

People’s—National

Preliminary Parliament—Pre-Parliament—Provisional Council of the Republic—
Democratic Council

Socialist-Revolutionist—Social Revolutionist—Social Revolutionary

Supreme government of the northern region—Sovereign government of the
northern region

To assist identification, the spelling of Russian proper names has been harmonized, generally according to the system of transliteration now employed in the Department of State. For the names of persons of special prominence, however, preference has been given to forms commonly current, and in certain cases autograph signatures in Latin characters have determined the spelling.

The defectiveness of communications which led to the delays in receipt of documents referred to above also resulted in an unusual amount of garbling of telegrams. Since many passages would be unintelligible if printed as originally decoded, corrections have been made within the limits imposed by care to avoid possible distortions of the original meaning, and, as far as possible, on the basis of comparison with other published and unpublished documents.

Brackets, [], occurring in the text enclose editorial insertions. These are of two main types: (1) words or phrases supplied to fill in omissions or replace obviously garbled passages in telegrams; and (2) suggested corrections following words or phrases which appear to be incorrect. When there is not sufficient evidence to indicate what has been omitted or garbled, or when the words which might be suggested would so seriously affect the sense of the document that supplying them would involve more than an editorial responsibility, notice is taken of defects in

the text by the insertion, within brackets, of “omission,” “garbled groups,” or “sic.” Insignificant words are corrected or inserted without distinguishing marks.

Parentheses, (), occurring in the text are in the documents themselves. Besides their ordinary use for punctuation, these marks were also employed, in the deciphering and decoding of telegrams, to enclose words or phrases suggested by the decoders as possibly the intended readings of garbled groups which yielded unintelligible or no results. When so employed they have been allowed to stand, unless comparison with other documents showed the suggested reading to have been obviously either correct or incorrect. In the latter case the text within parentheses has sometimes been replaced by an editorial insertion within brackets.

Translations as found in the files have been revised and corrected if proved faulty by comparison with texts in the original language or other versions available, but care has been taken to avoid altering in any significant respect important texts that were acted upon or used as sources of information in their existing form.

The general principles governing the compilation and editing of these papers are stated in the preface to [*Foreign Relations, 1914. Supplement*, pp. iii–iv](#).

List of Principal Persons

- Alexeev, Gen. M. V., from March to June 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army; in September 1917 Chief of Staff.
- Armour, Norman, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Russia.
- Avksentiev, N. D., a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionist Party and Minister of the Interior in the first cabinet of Kerensky; Chairman of the first All-Russian Congress of Peasants' Deputies.
- Bailey, James G., Secretary of the Embassy in Russia.
- Bakhmeteff, Boris A., head of the Extraordinary Embassy from Russia to the United States; July 5, 1917, Russian Ambassador at Washington.
- Bakhméteff, George, from November 28, 1911, to April 20, 1917, Russian Ambassador at Washington.
- Balfour, Arthur J., British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Barclay, Colville A. de R., Counselor of the British Embassy at Washington.
- Brusilov, Gen. A. A., in 1916 Commander of the Russian offensive in Galicia; from June to July 1917 Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.
- Buchanan, Sir George W., British Ambassador at Petrograd.
- Bullard, Arthur, Director of the Russian Division, United States Committee on Public Information.
- Caldwell, John K., Consul at Vladivostok.
- Cecil, Robert, Lord, British Minister of Blockade and Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
- Cheidze, N. S., a leader of the Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party; Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; Chairman of the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.
- Chernov, V. M., a leader of the Socialist-Revolutionist Party; from May to October 1917 Russian Minister of Agriculture.
- Chicherin, George V., Acting Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, March 13, 1918; Commissar for Foreign Affairs, May 30, 1918.
- Clemenceau, Georges E. B., from November 16, 1917, to January 20, 1920, French Premier and Minister for War.
- Cole, Felix, Vice Consul (later Consul) at Archangel.
- Creel, George, Chairman of the Committee on Public Information.
- Crosley, Capt. Walter S., Naval Attaché in Russia.
- Davison, Henry P., Chairman of the War Council of the American Red Cross.
- Denikin, Gen. A. I., from April to June 1917 Chief of Staff of the Russian Army.
- Diamandi, Constantine J., Count, Rumanian Minister in Russia.
- Dukhonin, Gen. N. N., from September to December 1917 Chief of Staff of the Russian Army.
- Egan, Maurice Francis, Minister in Denmark.
- Emerson, Col. George H., in charge of the Russian Railway Service Corps.
- Francis, David R., Ambassador in Russia.

Garrett, John W., Minister in the Netherlands and Luxemburg.

Gompers, Samuel, President of the American Federation of Labor.

Goto, Shimpei, Baron, from October 1916 to April 1918 Japanese Minister of the Interior; from April to September 1918 Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Grant-Smith, Ulysses, Chargé d'Affaires in Denmark.

Guchkov, Alexander I., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of War and Navy.

Harris, Ernest L., Consul General at Irkutsk.

Haynes, Thornwell, Consul at Helsingfors.

Henderson, Arthur, member of the British War Cabinet and official of the Labour Party, sent by the British Government on special mission to Russia.

Hertling, Georg, Count von, Chancellor of the German Empire.

Hoffmann, Maj. Gen. Max, Chairman of the German delegation at Brest Litovsk until the arrival of the Foreign Secretary.

Horvat, Gen. Dmitri L., Russian Governor and General Manager of the Chinese Eastern Railway.

House, Edward Mandell, Special Representative of the United States Government.

Huntington, William C., Commercial Attaché in Russia.

Jenkins, Douglas, Consul at Riga; on special detail at Kiev; at Chita; later detailed to Harbin.

Jenkins, William L., Consul at Trebizond; at Tiflis; at Moscow; at Petrograd.

Judson, Brig. Gen. William V., Military Attaché and chief of the American Military Mission to Russia, July 23, 1917.

Kaledin, Gen. Alexis M., Ataman of the Don Cossacks.

Kerensky, Alexander F., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Justice; from May to September Minister of War and Navy; from July to November Prime Minister.

Kerth, Lieut. Col. Monroe C., Assistant Military Attaché in Russia, July 23, 1917.

Kolchak, Admiral Alexander V., leader of anti-Soviet Russian forces in Siberia.

Kornilov, Gen. L. G., Commander of the Russian southwestern front after July 19, 1917; from July 31 to September 11, 1917, Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.

Krylenko, N. V., member of the Soviet committee of three placed in charge of Military and Naval Affairs November 8, 1917; Commander in Chief of the Russian Army.

Kühlmann, Richard von, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State.

Lenin, N. (Vladimir Ulyanov), President of the Soviet of People's Commissars, November 8, 1917.

Lindley, Francis O., British Commissioner in Russia.

Lloyd George, David, British Prime Minister.

Lockhart, Robert H. B., British Special Representative in Russia.

Lvov, George E., Prince, from March to July 1917 Russian Prime Minister (President of the Council of Ministers).

Lvov, N. V., from March to August 1917 Russian Procurator of the Holy Synod.

Macgowan, David B., Consul at Moscow, on special detail to investigate the arming of war prisoners in Siberia; later detailed to Vladivostok.

Maklakov, V. A., appointed by the Provisional Government Russian Ambassador in France.

Martin, Lieut. (later Capt.) Hugh S., Assistant Military Attaché in Russia.

Masaryk, Thomas G., President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council.

Michael Alexandrovich, Grand Duke, younger brother of Nicholas II.

Milner, Alfred, Viscount, 1916–1918, member of the British War Cabinet without portfolio; 1918, Secretary of State for War.

Milyukov, Paul N., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mirbach, Wilhelm, Count von, German Commissioner in Russia; April 26, 1918, German Ambassador to the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

Morris, Ira Nelson, Minister in Sweden.

Morris, Roland S., Ambassador in Japan.

Moser, Charles K., Consul at Harbin.

Motono, Ichiro, Viscount, from November 1916 to April 1918 Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Mott, John R., General Secretary of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations.

Nekrasov, N. V., Minister of Ways of Communication in the cabinets of Prince Lvov; Assistant Prime Minister and Minister of Finance in the first cabinet of Kerensky.

Nicholas II, Emperor of Russia.

Noulens, T., French Ambassador in Russia.

Onou, C., Counselor of the Russian Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires at Washington.

Otani, Gen. Kikuzo, of the Japanese Army, senior officer of the Allied forces in Siberia.

Page, Walter Hines, Ambassador in Great Britain.

Parker, Maj. Francis Le J., Military Attaché in Russia, May 16, 1917; Assistant Military Attaché, July 23, 1917.

Phelps, Livingston, Second Secretary of the Embassy in Russia.

Pichon, Stephen, from November 16, 1917, to January 20, 1920, French Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Polk, Frank Lyon, Counselor for the Department of State.

Poole, DeWitt C., Consul at Moscow; in charge of the Consulate General at Moscow; later detailed to Archangel as Special Assistant to the Ambassador with the diplomatic rank of Counselor of Embassy.

Poole, Maj. Gen. Frederick C., commanding the British forces in north Russia.

Ray, John A., Consul at Odessa.

Reading, Earl of (Rufus Daniel Isaacs), British High Commissioner and Ambassador on Special Mission to the United States.

Ribot, Alexandre F., from March 20 to October 23, 1917, French Premier.

Riggs, Capt. E. Francis, Military Attaché in Russia, December 31, 1915; Assistant

Military Attaché, July 17, 1917.

Robins, Lieut. Col. Raymond, from December 1917 to May 1918 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Rodichev, F. I., Constitutional Democrat, member of the First Duma; Russian Minister for Finnish Affairs under the Provisional Government.

Rudzyanko, M. V., President of the Fourth Duma and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Duma which appointed the Council of Ministers (Provisional Government).

Root, Elihu, Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia.

Ruggles, Lieut. Col. James A., Assistant Military Attaché in Russia, October 25, 1917; Military Attaché, February 8, 1918.

Scavenius, Erik, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Scavenius, Harald, Danish Minister in Russia.

Semenov, Gen. Gregory, Ataman of the Siberian Cossack.

Sharp, William G., Ambassador in France.

Shingarev, A. I., Constitutional Democrat, from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Agriculture and in the following cabinet Minister of Finance.

Sisson, Edgar G., special representative in Russia of the Committee on Public Information.

Sonnino, Sydney, Baron, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Sookine, John, Secretary attached to the Russian Embassy at Washington.

Spencer, Willing, Secretary of Legation in China; later Secretary of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Japan.

Spring Rice, Sir Cecil Arthur, from April 1913 to February 1918 British Ambassador at Washington.

Stevens, John F., Chairman of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

Stovall, Pleasant A., Minister in Switzerland.

Summers, Maddin, Consul General at Moscow.

Tereshchenko, Michael I., from March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Finance; from May to November Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Thomas, Albert, French Socialist and Minister of Munitions, sent by the French Government on special mission to Russia.

Thompson, Lieut. Col. William B., in 1917 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Thomson, Alfred R., Consul at Moscow; later detailed to Irkutsk; to Omsk.

Tredwell, Roger C, Consul at Petrograd; later detailed to Vologda; to Moscow; to Tashkent.

Trotsky, L. D. (Bronstein), Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, October 8, 1917; Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, November 8, 1917, to March 13, 1918; Commissar for War and Navy, March 13, 1918.

Tseretelli, I. G., a leader of the Social Democratic (Menshevik) Party; from May to August 1917 Russian Minister of Post and Telegraph; from July to August

Minister of the Interior.

Vinaver, M. M., Constitutional Democrat, member of the First Duma.

Vopicka, Charles J., Minister to Rumania, Serbia, and Bulgaria.

Wardwell, Maj. Allen, from May to October 1918 in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Webster, Capt. William B., of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Wheeler, Post, Counselor of Embassy and Chargé d'Affaires in Japan.

Whitehouse, Sheldon, Secretary of Embassy in Russia; assigned to Stockholm January 8, 1918; later Chargé d'Affaires in Sweden.

Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States.

Winship, North, Consul at Petrograd.

Wright, J. Butler, Counselor of the Embassy in Russia.

Zinoviev, Gregory E., Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, December 13, 1917.

List of Papers

[The arrangement of this list is by chapters, the papers therein appearing chronologically under date of writing. Unless otherwise specified, the correspondence is *from* or *to* the Secretary of State or the Department.]

CHAPTER I. THE MARCH REVOLUTION—ABDICATION OF THE EMPEROR—RECOGNITION OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1056	1917 Feb. 25	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Petrograd has been placed under military law owing to disorders.	1 [<i>Pg. 1 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2</i>]
1087[?]	Mar. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Duma refuses to obey Emperor's order to adjourn; Provisional Government organized; regiments join revolutionists.	1 [<i>Pg. 1 includes portions of Doc. 1 and Doc. 2</i>]
224	Mar. 15	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Transmits statement of Russian telegraph bureau: Duma refuses to disband and appoints Executive Committee which proclaims itself the Provisional Government.	2 [<i>Pg. 2 includes portions of Doc. 2 and Doc. 3</i>]
1103	Mar. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The Emperor abdicates for himself and son in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. Revolutionary party controls Moscow.	3 [<i>Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, and Doc. 5</i>]
	Mar. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Revolutionary demonstrations actuated by bread riots and strikes; control assumed by committee of Duma forming Provisional Government.	3 [<i>Pg. 3 includes portions of Doc. 3, Doc. 4, and Doc. 5</i>]
	Mar. 18	From the Russian Ambassador	Transmits note from Milyukov, Foreign Minister, in which he pledges respect for Russia's international undertakings made by the fallen regime.	4 [<i>Pg. 4 includes portions of Doc. 5 and Doc. 6</i>]
1107	Mar. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Amazing revolution: absolute quiet. Policy of Provisional Government. Request for authority for recognition.	5 [<i>Pg. 5 includes portions of Doc. 6 and Doc. 7</i>]

234	Mar. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Proclamation of Grand Duke Michael, accepting power on condition that it is the will of the nation as expressed by Constituent Assembly.	6 [Pg. 6 includes portions of Doc. 7 and Doc. 8]
1110	Mar. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends that the United States extend financial aid to the Provisional Government.	7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10]
274	Mar. 20	From the Consul at Petrograd	Detailed account of revolutionary occurrences in Petrograd from March 4–20.	7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of Doc. 8 , Doc. 9 , and Doc. 10]
1271	Mar. 20	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to state to Foreign Minister that the United States recognizes the new Government of Russia.	12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13]
1120	Mar. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The United States is first to recognize the new Government of Russia.	12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13]
1124	Mar. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Formal presentation to Council of Ministers and declaration of recognition on part of the United States.	12 [Pg. 12 includes portions of Doc. 11 , Doc. 12 , and Doc. 13]
[Enclosure]	Mar. 25	From the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Expresses gratitude for proof of friendship extended to new democratic regime in Russia.	13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14]
657	Mar. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia	Forwards copy of note of Mar. 25 from the Foreign Minister.	13 [Pg. 13 includes portions of Doc. 13 and Doc. 14]

CHAPTER II. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: PREMIERSHIP OF PRINCE LVOV

RELATIONS WITH THE COUNCILS (SOVIETS) OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES—
EFFORTS TO CHECK MILITARY AND ECONOMIC DEMORALIZATION—THE QUESTIONS OF

CONSTITUTIONAL REORGANIZATION, LAND REFORM, AND PEACE—MESSAGES FROM THE
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1130	1917 Mar. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Provisional Government issues proclamation appealing to citizens, soldiers, and sailors to prosecute war.	15 [Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16]
1127	Mar. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Workmen and soldiers advocate abolition of classes and right of soldiers to disobey their officers. Ambassador suggests that American labor leaders send message.	15 [Pg. 15 includes portions of Doc. 15 and Doc. 16]
1138	Mar. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The problem of the restoration of discipline in the army.	16 [Pg. 16 includes portions of Doc. 16 and Doc. 17]
1291	Apr. 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits the President's message of Apr. 2 to Congress, in which he commends the democratic movement in Russia.	17 [Pg. 17 includes portions of Doc. 17 and Doc. 18]
1292	Apr. 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): from Gompers	Forwards messages from the American Federation of Labor, pleading that the Russian masses maintain their liberty rationally.	18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]
283	Apr. 3	From the Consul at Petrograd	Quotes proclamation made by the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies to the peoples of the world in the hope of provoking revolution in Germany.	18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of Doc. 19 and Doc. 20]
1299	Apr. 6	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Announces proclamation of war between the United States and the Imperial German Government.	20 [Pg. 20 includes portions of Doc. 20 and Doc. 21]
1163	Apr. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Message from the American Federation of Labor is delivered to labor leader Cheidze, to Milyukov, and to the press.	21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23]
287	Apr. 10	From the Consul at Petrograd	Excessive demands of labor. Achievements of Kerensky in conciliating rival organs of government. Aims of Provisional Government.	21 [Pg. 21 includes portions of Doc. 21 , Doc. 22 , and Doc. 23]

				23]
703	Apr. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia	New Government gains strength; is endorsed by workmen's party, which party, with the soldiers, votes to continue the war.	25 [Pg. 25 includes portions of Doc. 23 and Doc. 24]
1211	Apr. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends loan only with assurance of no separate peace and pledge of government to prosecute war. Appearance of Lenin.	27 [Pg. 27 includes portions of Doc. 24 and Doc. 25]
295	Apr. 23	From the Consul at Petrograd	All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies exerts pressure on Provisional Government and outlines program for Constituent Assembly. Lenin demands communist dictatorship.	28 [Pg. 28 includes portions of Doc. 25 and Doc. 26]
1350	Apr. 25	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): from Gompers	Message from the American Federation of Labor: America's workers urge constructive efforts in the formation of a free government.	32 [Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28]
	Undated [Rec'd Apr. 25]	From Baron Rosen to President Wilson (tel.)	Fraternal greetings from the Society for Promoting Friendly Relations between Russia and the United States.	32 [Pg. 32 includes portions of Doc. 26 , Doc. 27 , and Doc. 28]
1235	Apr. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Friendly demonstration of 50,000 people before the Embassy.	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30]
1362	Apr. 30	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The President's appreciation of message from the Society for Promoting Friendly Relations between Russia and the United States.	33 [Pg. 33 includes portions of Doc. 28 , Doc. 29 , and Doc. 30]
297	Apr. 30	From the Consul at Petrograd	Denunciation of Lenin by the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; confidence in Government expressed by wounded soldiers in convention.	34 [Pg. 34 is part of Doc. 31]
1241	May 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Crowd before Embassy extends salutation from free Russia to free America; gives assurance of no separate peace.	37 [Pg. 37 includes portions of Doc. 31 and Doc. 32]

REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT—DEMONSTRATION AGAINST THE NOTE OF MAY 3,

1917, TO THE ALLIED AND AMERICAN GOVERNMENTS—RESIGNATION OF MILYUKOV AND GUCHKOV—THE COALITION MINISTRY—OPINIONS OF AMERICAN CONSULS ON THE SITUATION

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
343	1917 May 3	From the Russian Chargé	Transmits Foreign Minister's note (sent also to Allied countries) stating that Russia will keep her pledges to her allies. Enclosure: Declaration, April 9, of Provisional Government on aims of the war.	38 [<i>Pg. 38 is part of Doc. 33</i>]
1248	1917 May 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies protests against note of May 3. Opposition thought to be led by Lenin, inspired by Germany.	40 [<i>Pg. 40 includes portions of Doc. 33 and Doc. 34</i>]
1382	May 5	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions for all consuls to report on political situation in their districts.	41 [<i>Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36</i>]
1253	May 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lenin banners destroyed in street demonstrations. Workmen's committee appeased by explanation of note of May 3.	41 [<i>Pg. 41 includes portions of Doc. 35 and Doc. 36</i>]
300	May 8	From the Consul at Petrograd	Joint meeting of Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies with Provisional Government, former denouncing note of May 3. Manifesto by the Soviet to soldiers takes authority out of hands of officers and Ministry of War.	42 [<i>Pg. 42 is part of Doc. 37</i>]
1270	May 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Suggestion that the President reply to note of May 3 and state aims of the war.	52 [<i>Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39</i>]
1286	May 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Resignation of Guchkov, War Minister.	52 [<i>Pg. 52 includes portions of Doc. 38 and Doc. 39</i>]
1288	May 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Russian press desires the President's views on objects of the war, peace without annexations or contributions, and relations with Germany.	53 [<i>Pg. 53 includes portions of Doc. 39, Doc. 40, and Doc. 41</i>]
304	May	From the Consul at	Declaration of May 9 by Provisional Government of program and foreign policy.	53 [<i>Pg. 53 includes portions of</i>

	15	Petrograd	Enclosure: Speech of Minister of War at session of the four Dumas.	Doc. 39 , Doc. 40 , and Doc. 41]
1289	May 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Resignation of Milyukov as Foreign Minister. Kerensky appointed Minister of War, Tereshchenko, of Foreign Affairs, both favoring prosecution of war.	66 [Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43]
1293	May 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soldiers fraternize with Germans. Workmen's committee declares that new Russian Government is not bound by secret agreements. Anarchy feared.	66 [Pg. 66 includes portions of Doc. 41 , Doc. 42 , and Doc. 43]
18	May 18	From the Consul General at Moscow	Causes of the revolution: ignorance and lack of patriotism of the masses; activity of Minister de Hartwig in the Balkans, etc.	67 [Pg. 67 includes portions of Doc. 43 and Doc. 44]
1299	May 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Statement of U. S. aid for Russia at meetings held by Black Sea Fleet in favor of offensive warfare.	73 [Pg. 73 includes portions of Doc. 44 and Doc. 45]
1303	May 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lvov declares that peace without annexations or contributions means more than passive defense.	74 [Pg. 74 includes portions of Doc. 46 and Doc. 47]
	May 21	From the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (tel.)	Statement of Russia's solidarity with the United States in war and in peace aims.	74
760	May 21	From the Ambassador in Russia	Transmits <i>communiqué</i> for press by Foreign Minister declaring his policy to be restoration of peace in union with Allied democracies.	75 [Pg. 75 includes portions of Doc. 47 and Doc. 48]
306	May 22	From the Consul at Petrograd	Reports the resignation of Milyukov and Guchkov. Quotes the platform of coalition ministry. Enclosure: Proclamation issued by the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies to the armies.	77 [Pg. 77 includes portions of Doc. 48 and Doc. 49]
	May 26	To the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (tel.)	The common aim of Russia and the United States to secure freedom of nations and achieve universal peace.	85 [Pg. 85 includes portions of Doc. 49 and Doc. 50]

RECEPTION OF PRESIDENT WILSON'S MESSAGE OF MAY 22, 1917, ON THE OBJECTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE WAR—THE KRONSTADT REVOLT—ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESSES OF WORKMEN'S AND SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES, OF PEASANTS, OF COSSACKS—OPENING OF THE RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN GALICIA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1348	1917 May 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	President Wilson's message on the objects of the United States in the war satisfactory.	86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]
1456	May 31	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquiry if the President's message was received and what was disposition.	86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of Doc. 51 and Doc. 52]
1460	June 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Immediate answer to the President's message imperative.	87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]
1354	June 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister requests alteration in wording of the President's message before publication. British and French messages altered.	87 [Pg. 87 includes portions of Doc. 53 and Doc. 54]
1464	June 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The President's message was not a reply but an independent communication to be made public if Russian Government does not object.	88 [Pg. 88 includes portions of Doc. 54 and Doc. 55]
1356	June 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Further explanation as to delay in publishing the President's message.	89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
[Quoted in tel.]	June 4	From the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Asks that certain passages in the President's message be changed for the sake of effect in Russia.	89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
1357	June 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits note of June 4 from the Foreign Minister.	89 [Pg. 89 includes portions of Doc. 56 and Doc. 57]
1362	June 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister desirous that nothing emanating from President Wilson discourage the Russian people.	92 [Pg. 92 is part of Doc. 58]

1364	June 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Continuing to request alteration in the President's message before publication.	93 [Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]
1369	June 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister realizes that message cannot be altered. Date for publication will be cabled.	93 [Pg. 93 includes portions of Doc. 59 and Doc. 60]
1373	June 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Communicates date set for publication of the President's message.	94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , and Doc. 62]
4958	June 8	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Asks if news agency has forwarded President Wilson's message to any country, as copies are to be recalled for alterations.	94 [Pg. 94 includes portions of Doc. 60 , Doc. 61 , and Doc. 62]
1374	June 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Publication date of the President's message. Revolt in Kronstadt.	95 [Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64]
1375	June 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Petrograd Soviet supports the Provisional Government against the Kronstadt revolutionaries. Protest of Bolsheviks.	95 [Pg. 95 includes portions of Doc. 63 and Doc. 64]
429	June 9	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Russian Minister in Sweden tells of unsettled conditions in Russia, the Kronstadt affair, and labor disturbances.	96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66]
1472	June 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The President's message will be given to the press June 10 without alteration.	96 [Pg. 96 includes portions of Doc. 64 , Doc. 65 , and Doc. 66]
4964	June 9	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	The President's message released for publication June 10, with no alterations.	97 [Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
455	June 13	From the Minister in	Russian peasant congress resolves to stop all supplies to Kronstadt unless it acknowledges Provisional	97 [Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 66 , Doc.

		Sweden (tel.)	Government.	67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
1429	June 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lenin's speech before the Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is pronounced by Kerensky the same as that of a German commander.	97 [Pg. 97 includes portions of Doc. 66 , Doc. 67 , Doc. 68 , and Doc. 69]
1442	June 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik press advocates demonstrations against the Government.	98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71]
1453	June 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	British Ambassador calls a conference of Allied representatives to consider output of munitions in Russia.	98 [Pg. 98 includes portions of Doc. 69 , Doc. 70 , and Doc. 71]
1462	July 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Demonstration against the Government is unsuccessful and anarchists are arrested. Russians gain on southeast front.	99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73]
338	July 3	From the Consul at Petrograd	Attitude toward prosecuting war shown by conventions of Cossacks and of All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Government arrests anarchists.	99 [Pg. 99 includes portions of Doc. 71 , Doc. 72 , and Doc. 73]
1531	July 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Impossible to supply information about munitions because purchase and shipments arranged by Russian agents.	106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75]
1472	July 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conference of Allied representatives consider munition situation grave, owing to poor transportation and labor demands.	106 [Pg. 106 includes portions of Doc. 73 , Doc. 74 , and Doc. 75]

CHAPTER III. THE AMERICAN AND RUSSIAN SPECIAL MISSIONS

THE ROOT MISSION TO RUSSIA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917	To the	Inquires if acceptable to send	107 [Pg. 107 includes

1315	Apr. 14	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	commission to Russia to consult as to best means of cooperation.	portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]
1202	Apr. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Officials raise no objection to suggested mission.	107 [Pg. 107 includes portions of Doc. 76 and Doc. 77]
1366	May 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Purpose of mission: to convey good will to new democracy, and to find best means of cooperating with Russia in prosecution of the war.	108 [Pg. 108 includes portions of Doc. 77 and Doc. 78]
1396	May 11	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	List of members of mission, headed by Elihu Root.	109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]
1407	May 16	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Personnel and time of arrival at Vladivostok of Root mission.	109 [Pg. 109 includes portions of Doc. 79 and Doc. 80]
1304	May 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Office would entertain mission as guests. Inquires if offer should be accepted.	110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83]
1425	May 21	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for Crane	Requests that information be sent daily to Elihu Root on S. S. <i>Buffalo</i> .	110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83]
1428	May 22	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Commissioners are representative of various elements in American democracy. Aim is to cooperate with Russia in war against autocracy.	110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of Doc. 80 , Doc. 81 , Doc. 82 , and Doc. 83]
1433	May 24	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Accepts invitation of Russian Government to entertain diplomatic mission.	112 [Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 84 and Doc. 85]
	May 24	To the Ambassador on Special Mission to	<i>Résumé</i> of conditions in Russia as reported by Ambassador: policy of Provisional	112 [Pg. 112 includes portions of Doc. 84 and

		Russia (tel.)	Government—general peace but not separate peace.	Doc. 85
[Enclosure]	May 28	From the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Expresses appreciation of the Root mission and concurs in wish for exchange of views as to means for conducting the war.	113 [<i>Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87</i>]
1455	May 31	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Prefers that only commissioners and immediate personnel be guests of the Russian nation.	113 [<i>Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87</i>]
781	June 2	From the Ambassador in Russia	Transmits note of May 28 from the Foreign Minister.	113 [<i>Pg. 113 includes portions of Doc. 86 and Doc. 87</i>]
1361	June 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reported that Russian refugees plan attack upon Elihu Root, charging that, as Secretary of State, he refused to certain Russian refugees entrance into the United States.	114 [<i>Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 87, Doc. 88, and Doc. 89</i>]
1481	June 12	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	States that in 1908 Elihu Root declined to return Pouren to Russia to be tried for a political offense and quotes the former on extradition.	114 [<i>Pg. 114 includes portions of Doc. 87, Doc. 88, and Doc. 89</i>]
1391	June 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports arrival in Petrograd of Root mission and conference with Railway Commission.	116 [<i>Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92</i>]
1397	June 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The Root mission presented to the Foreign Minister.	116 [<i>Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92</i>]
1400	June 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes his remarks introducing the Root mission to the Council of Ministers.	116 [<i>Pg. 116 includes portions of Doc. 90, Doc. 91, and Doc. 92</i>]

7	June 17	From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (tel.)	His address to the Council of Ministers.	118 [Pg. 118 is part of Doc. 93]
8	June 17	From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (tel.)	Reports German propaganda and lack of military discipline. Asks for funds for educational campaign to strengthen army morale.	120 [Pg. 120 includes portions of Doc. 93 and Doc. 94]
9	June 18	From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (tel.)	Address of welcome to the Root mission by the Foreign Minister.	122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of Doc. 94 and Doc. 95]
1420	June 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The Root mission welcomed by Russo-American committee. The Railway Commission at work in Petrograd.	125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98]
1431	June 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Admiral Glennon witnesses mutiny at Sevastopol and restoration of discipline.	125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98]
47	June 27	From the Consul General at Moscow	Account of visit of the Root mission to Moscow.	125 [Pg. 125 includes portions of Doc. 96 , Doc. 97 , and Doc. 98]
1	June 27	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for Root	The President sends congratulations on success of mission and warns against speaking of peace terms.	127 [Pg. 127 includes portions of Doc. 98 and Doc. 99]
12	July 2	From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (tel.): for McAdoo	Favors educational campaign to offset German propaganda and has published the speeches of the President and himself.	128 [Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 100 and Doc. 101]
13	July 2	From the Ambassador on Special	Reports visits of commissioners to military and naval fronts. Urges counter attack on German	128 [Pg. 128 includes portions of Doc. 100 and

		Mission to Russia (tel.)	propaganda.	Doc. 101]
1543	July 7	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The President approves in principle educational campaign suggested by Root mission.	129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104]
3	July 7	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for Root	Visit to China and Japan inadvisable in view of disturbed conditions.	129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104]
16	July 10	From the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (tel.)	Results obtained by the Root mission.	129 [Pg. 129 includes portions of Doc. 101 , Doc. 102 , Doc. 103 , and Doc. 104]
	July 10	From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Viscount Motono asks that the Root mission visit Japan.	130 [Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107]
	July 11	To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	A special mission may be sent to Japan, as it is inadvisable for the Root mission to serve in double capacity.	130 [Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107]
1580	July 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for Root	Congratulations on success of mission.	130 [Pg. 130 includes portions of Doc. 104 , Doc. 105 , Doc. 106 , and Doc. 107]
	August	From the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia	Report upon conditions and Russia's ability to continue the war, with recommendations of U. S. assistance.	131 [Pg. 131 includes portions of Doc. 107 and Doc. 108]
	Undated [Rec'd Aug. 27]	From the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia	Supplementary report: Plans for an educational campaign to strengthen the morale of the civil population and army.	147 [Pg. 147 is part of Doc. 109]

THE BAKHMETEFF MISSION TO THE UNITED STATES

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No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1231	1917 Apr. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Russia plans to send mission to the United States with Boris Bakhmeteff as chairman.	153 [Pg. 153 includes portions of Doc. 109 and Doc. 110]
1367	May 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The United States will welcome a commission from Russia.	154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112]
354	May 9	From the Russian Chargé	Transmits memorandum of mission from Russia, stating its object and that it will confer on matters pertaining to the war.	154 [Pg. 154 includes portions of Doc. 110 , Doc. 111 , and Doc. 112]
	May 28	To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Instructions to report personnel, date of departure, etc., of the Bakhmeteff mission.	155 [Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114]
213	May 31	To the Russian Chargé	Assurance of welcome for the commissioners.	155 [Pg. 155 includes portions of Doc. 112 , Doc. 113 , and Doc. 114]
	June 1	From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Reports personnel and date of sailing of Bakhmeteff mission. Anxiety allayed regarding attitude of Stevens railway commission.	156 [Pg. 156 is part of Doc. 115]
	June 15	From the Secretary of Embassy (tel.)	Arrival of Bakhmeteff mission at Seattle; its personnel; its aims as described by the chairman.	157 [Pg. 157 includes portions of Doc. 115 and Doc. 116]

CHAPTER IV. THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT: PREMIERSHIP OF KERENSKY

THE MINISTERIAL CRISIS OF JULY 1917—RESIGNATION OF THE CADET MINISTERS—THE BOLSHEVIK DEMONSTRATION—BREAKDOWN OF THE OFFENSIVE—FORMATION OF THE KERENSKY MINISTRY—THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE AT MOSCOW—THE FALL OF RIGA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1519	1917 July 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Cadet Ministers resign: causes, concessions to Ukraine, or wish to be relieved of responsibility for present situation.	159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118]
1521	July 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik demonstration follows Kerensky's order to discipline two regiments. Trotsky advocates violent measures.	159 [Pg. 159 includes portions of Doc. 117 and Doc. 118]

1528	July 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Petrograd the scene of engagements between Bolsheviks and loyal troops. Government now in control.	160 [Pg. 160 includes portions of Doc. 118 and Doc. 119]
1531	July 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quiet prevails in Petrograd, guarded by troops from the front.	161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121]
1532	July 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Other Ministers resign; Lvov remains Premier. Evidence shows Bolsheviks received German money. All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is stronger than Government.	161 [Pg. 161 includes portions of Doc. 119 , Doc. 120 , and Doc. 121]
1534	July 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks, surrendering strongholds after disorders, term the incident a proof of their power.	162 [Pg. 162 includes portions of Doc. 121 and Doc. 122]
1536	July 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky demands that workmen be disarmed. Secret manufacture of arms is reported.	163 [Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]
1538	July 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lvov resigns as Premier in favor of Kerensky. Leading Bolsheviks, including Lenin, arrested and certain regiments disbanded.	163 [Pg. 163 includes portions of Doc. 123 and Doc. 124]
1545	July 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister states that Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies yields to Provisional Government. Capital punishment restored in army.	164 [Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126]
349	July 24	From the Consul at Petrograd	Lack of power by Provisional Government. Results of Bolshevik uprising to overthrow Government and defeat its war policy.	164 [Pg. 164 includes portions of Doc. 124 , Doc. 125 , and Doc. 126]
				170 [Pg.

1551	July 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister reports the situation at the front and the arrest of Bolsheviks. Plans for Moscow conference.	170 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128
1564	July 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky empowered to appoint new Ministry. Bolsheviks prosecuted. Many desire Kerensky to be dictator.	170 [Pg. 170 includes portions of Doc. 127 and Doc. 128]
1570	July 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	New Ministry will be composed of socialists and non-socialists and will be supported by Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.	171 [Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130]
1584	Aug. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister states railroads will adopt advice of American Railway Commission. Kornilov is made commander in chief of army.	171 [Pg. 171 includes portions of Doc. 129 and Doc. 130]
	Aug. 3	From the Russian Ambassador	Foreign Minister gives assurance of continuing the war in spite of difficulties during reconstruction of army and government.	172 [Pg. 172 includes portions of Doc. 130 and Doc. 131]
1597	Aug. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky resigns because opposed to dictation by Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Kornilov grows in public esteem.	174 [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 132 and Doc. 133]
1603	Aug. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	In selecting new Ministry, Kerensky will refuse dictation by his party. Food scarcity prevails and danger of riots.	175 [Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135]
1605	Aug. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Members of Ministry named. A committee will be charged with the conduct of the war.	175 [Pg. 175 includes portions of Doc. 133 , Doc. 134 , and Doc. 135]
1600	Undated [Rec'd	From the Ambassador in	After all-night session of representatives of Duma, Ministry, Cadets, and Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, Kerensky is given	174 [Pg. 174 includes portions of Doc. 132]

	Aug. 7]	Russia (tel.)	power to form Ministry without reporting to Soviet.	and Doc. 133]
	Aug. 9	From the Secretary attached to the Russian Embassy to the Counselor for the Department of State	Sends copy of telegram from Foreign Minister announcing new cabinet and its independence from the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. A Committee of National Defense is planned.	176 [Pg. 176 includes portions of Doc. 135 and Doc. 136]
1651	Aug. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	At postponed Moscow conference called by Government, criticism of Government expected.	177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138]
	Aug. 24	From the President of the United States to the President of the Russian National Council Assembly (tel.)	Greetings to the Moscow conference of people of the United States, confident of ultimate triumph of democracy.	177 [Pg. 177 includes portions of Doc. 136 , Doc. 137 , and Doc. 138]
1663	Aug. 25	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Meeting of national conference at Moscow, called by Government, Kerensky presiding. Assistant Minister of War resigns.	178 [Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140]
1666	Aug. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Report of events in the first day's session of the national conference at Moscow.	178 [Pg. 178 includes portions of Doc. 139 and Doc. 140]
1673	Aug. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Further report on Moscow conference: Kornilov well received; Cadets will support Provisional Government.	179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , and Doc. 142]
1685	Aug. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Firmer policy in army discipline; death penalty restored in ranks.	179 [Pg. 179 includes portions of Doc. 140 , Doc. 141 , and Doc. 142]
			Presents Foreign Minister's account	180 [Pg. 180 includes

	Sept. 5	From the Russian Ambassador	of the Moscow conference: effort toward unity of parties; no doubt of continuing war.	portions of Doc. 142 and Doc. 143]
1706	Sept. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Advises Kerensky that he must restore discipline in army. Socialists demand removal of generals. Kerensky appeals for support of officers.	181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145]
1713	Sept. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik uprising is threatened. Kornilov complains he is not given power to enforce discipline in army.	181 [Pg. 181 includes portions of Doc. 143 , Doc. 144 , and Doc. 145]
	Sept. 8	From the Consul General at Moscow	Effects of the fall of Riga. Economic conditions.	182 [Pg. 182 includes portions of Doc. 145 and Doc. 146]
1722	Sept. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Exodus from Petrograd in anticipation of German approach. Retreat of Russians at Riga.	186 [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148]

THE KORNILOV EPISODE—THE DEMOCRATIC CONFERENCE AT PETROGRAD—THE SECOND KERENSKY MINISTRY—JOINT NOTE OF THE ALLIED GOVERNMENTS, OCTOBER 9, 1917—THE PRELIMINARY PARLIAMENT (COUNCIL OF THE REPUBLIC)—KERENSKY'S PRESS INTERVIEW ON RUSSIA'S PART IN THE WAR

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1726	1917 Sept. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports demand that Kerensky resign and that Kornilov be made dictator. Latter moves on Petrograd, claiming Government is agent of Germany.	186 [Pg. 186 includes portions of Doc. 146 , Doc. 147 , and Doc. 148]
1734	Sept. 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied chiefs' offer of good offices between Kerensky and Kornilov declined. Reported Sweden offers to mediate between Russia and Germany.	187 [Pg. 187 includes portions of Doc. 148 and Doc. 149]
		From the	Kornilov surrenders. Objections of	188 [Pg. 188

1738	Sept. 12	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador to press statement of Kornilov affair.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 149 and Doc. 150</i>
1745	Sept. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Action of Allied chiefs is published. Reasons given for Kornilov's failure. Workmen armed against Kornilov retain guns.	190 [Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]
1747	Sept. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky refuses party advice in forming Ministry. Army officers are killed by soldiers.	190 [Pg. 190 includes portions of Doc. 151 and Doc. 152]
1753	Sept. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky refuses to yield to Soviet and appoints Cadets to Ministry. War committee of five appointed. Soviet plans armed opposition.	191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154]
1759	Sept. 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	New Ministry to contain Cadets in spite of Soviet protests. Army is loyal to Government.	191 [Pg. 191 includes portions of Doc. 153 and Doc. 154]
	Sept. 16	From the Consul at Odessa (tel.)	Laborers and soldiers take over power at Odessa, declaring for peace.	192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156]
1760	Sept. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Provisional Government proclaims republic. Kerensky maintains his position against Soviet.	192 [Pg. 192 includes portions of Doc. 154 , Doc. 155 , and Doc. 156]
	Sept. 18	From the Russian Ambassador	Presents Foreign Minister's account of the Kornilov episode, including a statement that the Government will prosecute the war.	193 [Pg. 193 is part of Doc. 157]
724	Sept. 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): from Gompers	Message from American Federation of Labor to Russia, advising patience, and urging union of democracies against autocracy.	194 [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]
1774	Sept. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky is commander in chief. In interim before new cabinet, committee of five governs.	194 [Pg. 194 includes portions of Doc. 158 and Doc. 159]
1797	Sept. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Changes in Ministry as a concession to Soviet. Trotsky's attack on Kerensky. Proposed removal of Government to Moscow.	195 [Pg. 195 includes portions of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161]
	Sept.	From the	Kerensky and Tereshchenko will resign if Soviet dominates Ministry.	195 [Pg. 195 includes portions

1804	26	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lenin elected delegate to conference by Petrograd Soviet.	of Doc. 159 , Doc. 160 , and Doc. 161]
1808	Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits draft of note from Allied Governments to Russia urging that military situation be remedied. Requests instructions as to signing.	196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of Doc. 161 and Doc. 162]
1751	Sept. 28	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes message from Stockholm on state of anarchy in Russia and requests views.	198 [Pg. 198 includes portions of Doc. 162 and Doc. 163]
1813	Sept. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Triumph of Kerensky over Bolsheviks in national conference at Petrograd. Discussion of personnel of Ministry.	199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]
1822	Sept. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Meeting called to protest against. America's treatment of Alexander Berkman.	199 [Pg. 199 includes portions of Doc. 164 and Doc. 165]
1823	Sept. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Requests facts of Berkman's crime and prosecution, and comments on Bolshevik propaganda.	200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167]
1824	Sept. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Coalition Ministry formed in accord with sentiment of conference; Kerensky victory, Bolshevik defeat.	200 [Pg. 200 includes portions of Doc. 165 , Doc. 166 , and Doc. 167]
1754	Oct. 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquiry concerning joint note of Allied Governments will be answered at earliest moment.	201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169]
1826	Oct. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	At protest meeting resolutions adopted demanding of the United States release of Goldman and Berkman.	201 [Pg. 201 includes portions of Doc. 167 , Doc. 168 , and Doc. 169]
1834	Oct. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks withdraw from conference. Committee demands a Pre-Parliament to which Ministry shall be responsible.	202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171]
1836	Oct. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Deplorable conditions attributable to returned exiles, majority from America (among them, Trotsky), and to German propaganda.	202 [Pg. 202 includes portions of Doc. 169 , Doc. 170 , and Doc. 171]
	Oct.	From the	Ambassadors will present joint note after new Ministry is announced. U.	203 [Pg. 203 includes portions

1842	6	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	S. Ambassador not yet authorized to unite therein.	<i>of Doc. 171 and Doc. 172</i>
1843	Oct. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conference adjourns leaving differences to be adjusted by Pre-Parliament.	<i>204 [Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]</i>
53	Oct. 7	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War College Staff (tel.)	Disintegration of Government; demands of socialists; plans for Pre-Parliament; situation on Riga front.	<i>204 [Pg. 204 includes portions of Doc. 173 and Doc. 174]</i>
1767	Oct. 8	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Message from U. S. Chamber of Commerce to Provisional Government applauding democratic Russia.	<i>205 [Pg. 205 includes portions of Doc. 174 and Doc. 175]</i>
1848	Oct. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Pre-Parliament assembles; Bolsheviks in minority.	<i>206 [Pg. 206 includes portions of Doc. 175 and Doc. 176]</i>
1852	Oct. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Joint Allied note, revised, presented to Kerensky. U. S. Ambassador does not join in note.	<i>207 [Pg. 207 is part of Doc. 177]</i>
1853	Oct. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky encouraged by approval of his Ministry. Trotsky elected president of Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.	<i>208 [Pg. 208 includes portions of Doc. 177 and Doc. 178]</i>
1869	Oct. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends aid for Russia. Prominent Russians, confident of future, advocate continuance of war.	<i>209 [Pg. 209 includes portions of Doc. 178 and Doc. 179]</i>
1885	Oct. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Removal of Government to Moscow discussed.	<i>210 [Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181]</i>
1893	Oct. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Pre-Parliament opens; Kerensky not received with enthusiasm; Trotsky protests against Government.	<i>210 [Pg. 210 includes portions of Doc. 180 and Doc. 181]</i>
1905	Oct. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik outbreak expected; workmen have arms. Peasant delegate to Allied conference, Paris, declares the main question is peace.	<i>211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]</i>
	Oct. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia	Transmits text of Kerensky's appeal to the people for support: the Government's program; plans for the Constituent Assembly.	<i>211 [Pg. 211 includes portions of Doc. 182 and Doc. 183]</i>

1922	Oct. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks preparing outbreak, which Government announces intention to suppress.	214 [Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185]
[Quoted in tel.]	Oct. 27	From the Minister in Denmark to the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Germany is anxious to make separate truce with Russia if only for exchange of prisoners.	216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189]
1808	Oct. 29	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Establishment, under direction of Committee on Public Information, of cable service with Russia. Educational activities planned.	214 [Pg. 214 includes portions of Doc. 183 , Doc. 184 , and Doc. 185]
1931	Oct. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Pre-Parliament continues in session. Trotsky advocates force to depose Government.	215 [Pg. 215 includes portions of Doc. 185 and Doc. 186]
1509	Oct. 30	From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)	Quotes telegram which he sent Oct. 27 to the Ambassador in Russia.	216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189]
1935	Oct. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Believes that Bolsheviks will make no demonstration.	216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189]
1941	Nov. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	In session of Pre-Parliament Milyukov attacks Bolsheviks and the instructions given delegate to Paris conference.	216 [Pg. 216 includes portions of Doc. 187 , Doc. 188 , and Doc. 189]
1821	Nov. 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	American Federation of Labor declines to call international conference of workmen and socialists.	217 [Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191]
	Nov. 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky's press interview. Department's disapproval of newspaper headline, "Russia quits the war."	217 [Pg. 217 includes portions of Doc. 189 , Doc. 190 , and Doc. 191]
1825	Nov. 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to ascertain reliability of press interview with Kerensky regarding Russia's inactivity in war.	218 [Pg. 218 includes portions of Doc. 191 and Doc. 192]
1945	Nov. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks make unsuccessful attempt to start demonstration. Guards sent to all foreign missions.	219 [Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]

1949	Nov. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Foreign Minister may represent Russia at Paris conference. British and Italian Ambassadors apologize to Kerensky for joint note.	219 [Pg. 219 includes portions of Doc. 193 and Doc. 194]
1954	Nov. 6.	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Minister of War removed. Bolshevik papers suppressed. Kerensky addresses Pre-Parliament.	220 [Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196]
1957	Nov. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discusses Kerensky's interview on Russia's part in the war. Suggests sending U. S. troops to Russia for moral effect.	220 [Pg. 220 includes portions of Doc. 194 , Doc. 195 , and Doc. 196]
1958	Nov. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Verbatim copy of Kerensky's press interview on Russia's part in the war; also statement thereon.	221 [Pg. 221 includes portions of Doc. 196 and Doc. 197]

CHAPTER V. THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION—THE BOLSHEVIK “COUP D’ÉTAT,” NOVEMBER 7, 1917—THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1961	Nov. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks control Petrograd. Kerensky leaves to join troops.	224 [Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]
1962	Nov. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolsheviks are supported by soldiers; propose new government and peace with Germany.	224 [Pg. 224 includes portions of Doc. 198 and Doc. 199]
959	Nov. 8	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Trotsky asserts Provisional Government no longer exists. Pre-Parliament is declared dissolved.	225 [Pg. 225 includes portions of Doc. 199 and Doc. 200]
53	Nov. 8	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Government of Moscow taken over by Bolsheviks and conservative newspapers suppressed.	226 [Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202]
1964	Nov. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Winter Palace, where Ministry thought to be in session, surrenders. Soviet announces that it controls Russia.	226 [Pg. 226 includes portions of Doc. 201 and Doc. 202]
	Nov.	From the	Soviets of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies proclaim Soviets supreme.	227 [Pg. 227 includes

963	9	Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Political propaganda permitted at the front. Former Ministry arrested.	portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]
1968	Nov. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	All Ministers except Kerensky imprisoned. Petrograd Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies name Lenin, Premier, and Trotsky, Foreign Minister.	227 [Pg. 227 includes portions of Doc. 203 and Doc. 204]
1970	Nov. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky advances with troops on Petrograd. Bolsheviks take over State Bank and Foreign Ministry.	228 [Pg. 228 includes portions of Doc. 204 and Doc. 205]
1972	Nov. 10	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Release of all Ministers except two. Kerensky's nearer approach to Petrograd.	229 [Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207]
972	Nov. 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Committee of Safety and Petrograd City Duma <i>versus</i> Bolsheviks. Expectation that Kerensky will march on Petrograd.	229 [Pg. 229 includes portions of Doc. 205 , Doc. 206 , and Doc. 207]
977	Nov. 12	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	It is reported from Russia that Kerensky is in control and the Bolsheviks defeated.	230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210]
1619	Nov. 12	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Refusal of Russian diplomatic missions in western Europe to recognize Bolshevik government.	230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210]
1974	Nov. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Various reports regarding movement by Kerensky and troops toward Petrograd.	230 [Pg. 230 includes portions of Doc. 208 , Doc. 209 , and Doc. 210]
1978	Nov. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The struggle for control between Kerensky and Bolsheviks. Telegraph employees' strike. Refusal of railway union men to operate during civil war.	231 [Pg. 231 includes portions of Doc. 210 and Doc. 211]
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia to the Minister in Sweden	Reports that Bolsheviks have sent peace proposal to all countries at war.	235 [Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217]
				232 [Pg. 232]

983	Nov. 14	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Disorderly fighting in Petrograd; intrenchments against Kerensky's advance.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 211, Doc. 212, and Doc. 213</i>
1983	Nov. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky's forces near Petrograd; Bolshevik committee in command of city. Fighting in Moscow.	232 [<i>Pg. 232 includes portions of Doc. 211, Doc. 212, and Doc. 213</i>]
408	Nov. 16	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Department inquires regarding welfare of Americans in Russia.	233 [<i>Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 213, Doc. 214, and Doc. 215</i>]
1985	Nov. 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Bolshevik soldiers overcome resistance in Petrograd and Moscow. Americans advised to leave Russia. Kerensky defeated, now fugitive.	233 [<i>Pg. 233 includes portions of Doc. 213, Doc. 214, and Doc. 215</i>]
59	Nov. 17	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Moscow government seized by Bolsheviks, supported by garrison and workmen. Russia's helplessness is Germany's opportunity.	234 [<i>Pg. 234 includes portions of Doc. 215 and Doc. 216</i>]
1006	Nov. 17	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Transmits Ambassador Francis's letter reporting that Bolsheviks have sent peace proposal to all countries at war.	235 [<i>Pg. 235 includes portions of Doc. 216 and Doc. 217</i>]
1011	Nov. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.): from Representative at Torneå	Kerensky, defeated, again escapes. General Kaledin controls Don Cossack region, thereby holding coal and bread supplies.	236 [<i>Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 217, Doc. 218, and Doc. 219</i>]
1020	Nov. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.): from Representative at Torneå	Report that Kerensky will advance against Petrograd and that new revolutionary government is without support.	236 [<i>Pg. 236 includes portions of Doc. 217, Doc. 218, and Doc. 219</i>]
1024	Nov. 19	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.): from Ambassador Francis	Bolsheviks attempt to take over State Bank. Lenin made virtual dictator by Soviet committee. Peasant soldiers oppose Lenin.	237 [<i>Pg. 237 includes portions of Doc. 219 and Doc. 220</i>]
				238 [<i>Pg. 238</i>]

2001	Nov. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conference of Allies and Americans requested by Russians in order that peace aims may be announced.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 220 and Doc. 221</i>
1038	Nov. 21	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Secretary to Kerensky states he was defeated through railway-union ultimatum and that Bolshevism is controlled by Germany.	239 [<i>Pg. 239 includes portions of Doc. 221 and Doc. 222</i>]
85	Nov. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Anarchy in Moscow. German propaganda. Protection of Americans and other foreigners.	240 [<i>Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224</i>]
	Nov. 27	From the Russian Ambassador	Presents copy of unsigned telegram on general situation in Russian War Office and Army and participation of Russian delegates in Allied conference at Paris.	240 [<i>Pg. 240 includes portions of Doc. 223 and Doc. 224</i>]

CHAPTER VI. THE ARMISTICE WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS—APPEALS FOR GENERAL PEACE NEGOTIATIONS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
967	1917 Nov. 10	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Report from Russia that Soviet desires immediate peace without annexations or indemnities, will give land to peasants, and publish secret treaties, declaring them void.	242 [<i>Pg. 242 is part of Doc. 225</i>]
	Nov. 18	From the Special Representative, London, (tel.): for the President	It is urged that Allies make peace offer, basis no annexations or indemnities; Germany's refusal would be to Russia's advantage.	243 [<i>Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 225, Doc. 226, and Doc. 227</i>]
[Quoted in tel.]	Nov. 20	From the Commissar of the People for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Proposal of armistice on all fronts and opening of peace negotiations.	244 [<i>Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 228</i>]
2004(?)	Nov. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviets propose three months' armistice. Germans believed to be established in Petrograd and Moscow.	243 [<i>Pg. 243 includes portions of Doc. 225, Doc. 226, and Doc.</i>]

				227]
2006	Nov. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Forwards note of Nov. 20 from the Foreign Commissar	244 [Pg. 244 is part of Doc. 228]
2007	Nov. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied and American representatives agree to request Governments not to reply to Soviet peace proposals; certain military attaches to protest against armistice as violating London agreement.	245 [Pg. 245 is part of Doc. 229]
2024	Nov. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Trotsky's comments upon U. S. war aims and formal order to soldiers to arrange armistice after refusal of General Dukhonin to do so.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233]
1864	Nov. 24	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department's attitude, expressed to France, toward proposed Allied agreement not to recognize independently any new Russian Government.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233]
1627	Nov. 26	From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)	Germany's proposal of separate peace with Russia considered an attempt to appropriate Russian supplies with aid of Lenin.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233]
2032	Nov. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Trotsky's address declaring Russia is not bound by old treaties and proposing a general armistice.	248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of Doc. 231 , Doc. 232 , and Doc. 233]
2034	Nov. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits Trotsky's statement on proposals for a general armistice handed to Allied and American military missions and attachés.	250 [Pg. 250 is part of Doc. 234]
2037	Nov. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet negotiations to arrange armistice with Central powers and order to cease firing. General Dukhonin tries to rally the country.	251 [Pg. 251 is part of Doc. 235]
2039	Nov. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet postpones opening of armistice negotiations to await word from Allied powers and declares	252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of Doc. 235 and

			alternative will be separate peace.	Doc. 236
2040	Nov. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Forwards proposal of Foreign Commissary: Germany has consented to open negotiations for armistice and Allied Governments are again asked to take part.	253 [Pg. 253 includes portions of Doc. 236 and Doc. 237]
1875	Dec. 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to make no reply to communications from Soviet government on peace negotiations.	254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239]
	Undated [Rec'd Dec]	From the Russian Ambassador	Suggests Allies make declaration to Russian people of aims of war and of reasons against truce at present.	254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of Doc. 238 and Doc. 239]
	Dec. 2	From the Special Representative, Paris, (tel.): for the President also	The Allies will consider war aims with Russia when she has a stable government. Importance of the United States declaring unselfish motives.	255 [Pg. 255 includes portions of Doc. 239 and Doc. 240]
	Dec. 3	From the Special Representative, Paris, (tel.): for the President	British Foreign Secretary considers Russo-German armistice as contrary to treaty with Allies and of benefit to Germany only.	256 [Pg. 256 is part of Doc. 241]
2006	Dec. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Petrograd press on U. S. attitude toward Prussia. Trotsky removes Russian diplomats averse to Soviet government.	257 [Pg. 257 includes portions of Doc. 241 and Doc. 242]
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 6	From the Commissar of the People for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Postponement of peace negotiations that Allies may have time to define their attitude.	258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 243]
2072	Dec. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Forwards note of Dec. 6 from the Foreign Commissar.	258 [Pg. 258 is part of Doc. 243]
200	Dec. 11	From the Consul General at Moscow	Reports the circulation among German soldiers of an appeal by Soviet officials which Germany denounces. Quotes German protest.	259 [Pg. 259 is part of Doc. 244]

2099	Dec. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Armistice negotiations resumed, Trotsky declaring that responsibility for separate armistice rests on Allies who refuse to announce their peace terms.	260 [Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246]
224	Dec. 18	From the Consul General at Moscow	Quotes terms of the armistice agreed upon between Bolshevik Russia and the Central powers.	260 [Pg. 260 includes portions of Doc. 245 and Doc. 246]

CHAPTER VII. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SOVIET POWER

ATTITUDE OF THE AMERICAN AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TOWARD THE BOLSHEVIK REGIME—INTERVIEWS OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY ATTACHÉ AND RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE WITH TROTSKY—DECREES ABOLISHING PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF REAL ESTATE—THE BEGINNINGS OF CIVIL WAR—ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY—THE KALPASHNIKOV INCIDENT

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
	1917 Nov. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Northern army reported starving and leaving trenches. Germany has wireless connection with Russia. Lenin orders soldiers to negotiate armistice.	264 [Pg. 264 is part of Doc. 247]
2025	Nov. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Attempt is made to overthrow Lenin. Ambassador refuses guard for Embassy and recommends that the President pledge aid to Russia for clothing and food.	265 [Pg. 265 includes portions of Doc. 247 and Doc. 248]
[Enclosure]	Nov. 25	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the Chief of the Russian General Staff	States attitude of the United States regarding embargo on exports to Russia as described in press dispatch.	266 [Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249]
	Undated	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department	Forwards copy of letter of Nov. 25 to the Chief of the Russian General Staff.	266 [Pg. 266 includes portions of Doc. 248 and Doc. 249]
		From the	Elections for the Constituent	267 [Pg. 267 includes

2027	Nov. 25	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Assembly, the authority toward which all Russia has been looking.	portions of Doc. 249 and Doc. 250]
2029	Nov, 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky requests release of Russians interned in England for socialistic propaganda, and hints reprisal.	268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252]
89	Nov. 26	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Famine at front, anarchism, and German propaganda plunging country into chaos. Advises protest against present regime; rights of foreigners affected.	268 [Pg. 268 includes portions of Doc. 250 , Doc. 251 , and Doc. 252]
[Enclosure]	Nov. 27	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the Chief of the Russian General Staff	States attitude toward a general peace and U. S. policy of noninterference with politics in Russia.	269 [Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]
	Undated	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department	Forwards copy of letter of Nov. 27 to the Chief of the Russian General Staff.	269 [Pg. 269 includes portions of Doc. 252 and Doc. 253]
91	Nov. 27	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.): from Bullard to Creel	Unwise to recognize <i>de facto</i> government of Bolsheviks but reasons for refusal should be given in a public statement.	270 [Pg. 270 includes portions of Doc. 253 and Doc. 254]
2820	Nov. 28	From the Special Representative, Paris, (tel.): for the President also	Statements in American press that Russia should be treated as an enemy should be stopped.	271 [Pg. 271 includes portions of Doc. 254 and Doc. 255]
2041	Nov. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Elections for Constituent Assembly. Attitude of British Ambassador toward recognition of Soviet government.	272 [Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]
		From the		

	Nov. 30	Military Attaché in Russia to the War College Staff (tel.)	Protests against armistice Trotsky considers as interference. Attitude of British Ambassador. U. S. Attaché recommends patience.	272 [Pg. 272 includes portions of Doc. 256 and Doc. 257]
1871	Nov. 30	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to send information concerning volunteer Russian army.	273 [Pg. 273 includes portions of Doc. 257 and Doc. 258]
1873	Nov. 30	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Unwise to suggest conference with committee from Constituent Assembly.	274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261]
1874	Nov. 30	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conference of Allies and Americans to announce peace aims is impracticable. Instructions not to participate therein.	274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261]
2043	Nov. 30	From the Ambassador in Prussia (tel.)	British Ambassador asks for authority to arrange <i>modus vivendi</i> with Soviet. Former Cabinet Ministers appeal for support of Constituent Assembly.	274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of Doc. 259 , Doc. 260 , and Doc. 261]
2049	Dec. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Trotsky's comments on U. S. protest against separate peace and his threats to intern British subjects in Russia. British Ambassador abstains from recognition.	275 [Pg. 275 includes portions of Doc. 261 and Doc. 262]
882	1917 Dec. 1	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): for Colonel House	No truth in report that officials of this Government have voiced sentiments hostile to Russia.	276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of Doc. 262 and Doc. 263]
1653	Dec. 1	From the Minister in Denmark (tel.)	Suggestion that the United States make representations against recognition of Bolshevik regime by neutral nations.	277 [Pg. 277 includes portions of Doc. 263 , Doc. 264 , and Doc. 265]
			Quotes W. F. Sands on Russian	277 [Pg. 277 includes

1095	Dec. 1	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	conditions, including German intrigue and possible restoration of the Tsar.	<i>portions of Doc. 263, Doc. 264, and Doc. 265</i>
2050	Dec. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	U. S. Military Attaché recommends to Trotsky provisos in armistice to prevent transfer of German troops to other fronts and liberation of prisoners.	<i>279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267]</i>
	Dec. 1	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department (tel.)	Reports his interview with Trotsky relative to forthcoming negotiations for armistice.	<i>279 [Pg. 279 includes portions of Doc. 266 and Doc. 267]</i>
2052	Dec. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Address sent to President Wilson by Russian army committee desiring that Paris conference state war aims of Allies.	<i>280 [Pg. 280 is part of Doc. 268]</i>
2053	Dec. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	No move made toward requesting conference with committee from Constituent Assembly.	<i>281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 269, Doc. 270, and Doc. 271]</i>
2054	Dec. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions will be followed to abstain from participation in conference to announce peace aims.	<i>281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 269, Doc. 270, and Doc. 271]</i>
2056	Dec. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	British Admiral foresees danger and urges concentration of Allied nationals at Archangel.	<i>281 [Pg. 281 includes portions of Doc. 269, Doc. 270, and Doc. 271]</i>
2057	Dec. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Unofficial visit of U. S. Military Attaché to Trotsky to discuss armistice provisions. Soviet press account of interview.	<i>282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of Doc. 271 and Doc. 272]</i>
1106	Dec. 3	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Swedish press reports of departure of Russian delegates for Brest Litovsk and account of U. S. Military Attaché's visit to Trotsky.	<i>283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of Doc. 272 and Doc. 273]</i>

2061	Dec. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): from Davis to Mott	Recommends immediate statement by Allies of peace terms and immediate action by the United States toward peace.	284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]
2062	Dec. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Doubtful success of efforts to organize army. Trotsky's endeavors to secure recognition by Allied missions.	284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of Doc. 274 and Doc. 275]
2063	Dec. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	British Ambassador foresees reprisals if Russian socialists not released in England. Japanese Ambassador states views on intervention.	285 [Pg. 285 includes portions of Doc. 275 and Doc. 276]
1723	Dec. 4	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Netherland Minister at Petrograd refused to receive communication from Bolshevik government.	286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279]
1113	Dec. 4	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Advisability of Allies' using good offices with neutral powers against recognition of Bolshevik government.	286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279]
410	Dec. 5	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Russian representatives in Norway do not accept Bolshevik government. Norway will not recognize Soviet régime until the great powers do so.	286 [Pg. 286 includes portions of Doc. 276 , Doc. 277 , Doc. 278 , and Doc. 279]
2067	Dec. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Agreement of Allied missions not to recognize Soviet government; rumors concerning Constituent Assembly.	287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281]
2857	Dec. 6	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Russian Ambassador in France tells of instructions from Trotsky relative to the armistice with Germany.	287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of Doc. 279 , Doc. 280 , and Doc. 281]
1126	Dec. 6	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Interview between U. S. Military Attaché and Trotsky has caused much comment in Sweden.	288 [Pg. 288 includes portions of Doc. 281 and Doc. 282]
			The President desires that U. S.	289 [Pg. 289

1883	Dec. 6	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	representatives withhold all direct communication with the Bolshevik government.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 282, Doc. 283, and Doc. 284</i>
	Dec. 7	To the Young Men's Christian Associations	The handling of diplomatic questions in Russia should be left entirely in the hands of the Ambassador.	289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of Doc. 282 , Doc. 283 , and Doc. 284]
436	Dec. 7	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Instructions to ascertain attitude of Sweden toward recognition of Bolshevik government.	290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287]
	Dec. 7	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Russian Ambassador in Japan may be dismissed by Trotsky but Japanese Foreign Minister will continue to recognize him.	290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287]
2074	Dec. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports views concerning stability of Soviet power. Announcement relative to Constituent Assembly published by Kerensky and other former Ministers.	290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of Doc. 284 , Doc. 285 , Doc. 286 , and Doc. 287]
2080 [?]	Dec. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discusses newspaper report of relations of American Red Cross with Russian political leaders and use of money paid by Americans.	291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of Doc. 287 and Doc. 288]
1891	Dec. 8	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department prefers to have recommendations on political situation come from Ambassador.	292 [Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290]
2081	Dec. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	<i>Résumé</i> of events from Nov. 7, the beginning of the revolution and flight of Kerensky.	292 [Pg. 292 includes portions of Doc. 288 , Doc. 289 , and Doc. 290]
2083	Dec. 10	From the Ambassador in	Reports that Soviet is under control of German General Staff and that Kornilov and others are	295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of

		Russia (tel.)	assembling troops in the south. Activities of American Railway Commission.	Doc. 290 and Doc. 291
116	Dec. 11	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Nationalization of factories will cause losses to Russian and foreign owners and curtail production, to Germany's profit.	297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294]
6009	Dec. 11	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to France	Instructions to report regarding policy to be adopted by Great Britain in Russian situation.	297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294]
1159	Dec. 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Sweden will not recognize Bolshevik government before acknowledgment by Constituent Assembly. The Netherlands and Norway also unwilling to do so.	297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of Doc. 292 , Doc. 293 , and Doc. 294]
2088	Dec. 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Constituent Assembly meeting postponed by Lenin. Armistice negotiations to be resumed.	298 [Pg. 298 includes portions of Doc. 294 and Doc. 295]
1895	Dec. 12	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The U.S.S. <i>Brooklyn</i> has been at Vladivostok since Nov. 25.	287n
203	Dec. 12	From the Consul General at Moscow	By decree abolishing private ownership of real estate, landed property is handed over to committees to be used for public institutions.	299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]
7934	Dec. 12	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Attitude of British Government toward recognition of Lenin's regime and toward other factions in Russia.	299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of Doc. 296 and Doc. 297]
1166	Dec. 12	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Denmark will not recognize Bolshevik government at present.	300 [Pg. 300 includes portions of Doc. 298 and Doc. 299]
118	Dec. 12	From the Consul General at Moscow	Socialist-Revolutionists are in majority in elections. Recent decrees abolish courts, confiscate property, etc., and repudiate	300 [Pg. 300 includes portions of

		(tel.)	loans. Nationalization of factories affects foreign interests.	Doc. 298 and Doc. 299
2091	Dec. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky asserts that chief of American Red Cross in Russia praises Soviet government and states America will furnish supplies.	301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301]
2092	Dec. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Council of Commissars declare Cadet Party counter-revolutionary and arrest their central committee. Ambassador recommends appeal to Russian people for stable government.	301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of Doc. 299 , Doc. 300 , and Doc. 301]
1171	Dec. 13	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Swedish press reports whole districts throughout Russia organized against Soviet government.	302 [Pg. 302 includes portions of Doc. 301 and Doc. 302]
2100	Dec. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky discusses attitude of Allies and the United States toward Russia.	303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304]
2107	Dec. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Forwards note of Foreign Commissariat announcing it will refuse permits since embassies refuse to visa passports.	303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of Doc. 303 and Doc. 304]
212	Dec. 15	From the Consul General at Moscow	Report on political conditions in the first half of December including armistice negotiations, radical decrees, and measures to prevent convening of Constituent Assembly.	304 [Pg. 304 includes portions of Doc. 304 and Doc. 305]
7980	Dec. 15	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	If the United States takes steps to prevent recognition of Bolshevik regime by neutral powers, Great Britain will lend support.	316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308]
1906	Dec. 15	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department approves Ambassador's course and relies on his judgment in regard to remaining in Petrograd.	316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of Doc. 306 , Doc. 307 , and Doc. 308]
				316 [Pg. 316

1689	Dec. 15	To the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	No government has recognized Bolshevik regime at Petrograd.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 306, Doc. 307, and Doc. 308</i>
	Dec. 15	To the diplomatic representatives in European countries, Japan, China, and Siam (tel.)	Instructions to have no official relations with Russian diplomatic officers who recognize or are appointed by Bolshevik government.	317 [<i>Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310</i>]
2117	Dec. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky's visit to French Ambassador concerning presence of French officers with Ukrainian Army. Soviet interference with Constituent Assembly.	317 [<i>Pg. 317 includes portions of Doc. 309 and Doc. 310</i>]
2113	Dec. 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Armistice made with Germany; German commissioners may come to Petrograd. Discussion of courier service.	318 [<i>Pg. 318 includes portions of Doc. 310 and Doc. 311</i>]
1910	Dec. 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department prefers no action at present regarding appeal to Russian people for stable government.	319 [<i>Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 312, Doc. 313, and Doc. 314</i>]
1917	Dec. 20	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Red Cross members in uniform are included in instruction to U. S. representatives to withhold direct communication with Bolshevik government.	319 [<i>Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 312, Doc. 313, and Doc. 314</i>]
8035	Dec. 21	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Negotiations for release of interned Russians in England in exchange for free exit from Russia of British subjects.	319 [<i>Pg. 319 includes portions of Doc. 312, Doc. 313, and Doc. 314</i>]
2128	Dec. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports of Cossack activities; differences at Russo-German peace conference; Soviet demand for release of comrades from U. S. prisons.	320 [<i>Pg. 320 includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316</i>]
			Suggestion that chiefs of mission of belligerent countries at	320 [<i>Pg. 320</i>]

1924	Dec. 22	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Petrograd confer regularly. Instructions to take no action with Bolshevik government concerning couriers.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 315 and Doc. 316</i>
2132	Dec. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The Kalpashnikov incident: Trotsky charges Ambassador is in plot to aid Kaledin; Ambassador's denial.	321 [Pg. 321 includes portions of Doc. 316 and Doc. 317]
2939	Dec. 23	From the Ambassador in Franco (tel.)	France will not recognize Bolshevik government but will act in minor questions through its consuls.	322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , and Doc. 319]
2133	Dec. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Release of comrades in U. S. prisons demanded in anarchistic meeting, with threats against Ambassador.	322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of Doc. 317 , Doc. 318 , and Doc. 319]
2134	Dec. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Trotsky's speech on peace terms. Delegates appointed to appeal to socialists of other countries not to fight longer.	323 [Pg. 323 includes portions of Doc. 319 and Doc. 320]
1931	Dec. 24	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Questionnaire sent to consuls regarding political and military conditions, food supply, etc.	324 [Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322]
2138	Dec. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Outlines situation and suggests opening relations with Soviet in order to prevent Germany from acquiring Russian resources.	324 [Pg. 324 includes portions of Doc. 321 and Doc. 322]
2144	Dec. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador's statement and text of telegrams refuting charge of his implication, with Kalpashnikov, in plot to aid Kaledin.	326 [Pg. 326 includes portions of Doc. 322 and Doc. 323]
1938	Dec. 27	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department's appreciation of Ambassador's purpose to remain at his post.	329 [Pg. 329 includes portions of Doc. 323 , Doc. 324 , and Doc. 325]
				329 [Pg. 329

2154	Dec. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Further explanation of the Kalpashnikov incident.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 323, Doc. 324, and Doc. 325</i>
[Quoted in tel.]	Dec. 28	From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Transmits text of memorandum regarding policy of Allies in Russia which was agreed upon at Paris conference, Dec. 22.	330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327]
1946	Dec. 29	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	As to establishing relations with Soviet, Department desires continuance in course pursued in past.	330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327]
8090	Dec. 29	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Transmits memorandum of Dec. 28 from the Foreign Office.	330 [Pg. 330 includes portions of Doc. 325 , Doc. 326 , and Doc. 327]

DISSOLUTION OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY—ASSUMPTION OF DEFINITE CONTROL BY THE ALL-RUSSIAN SOVIET CONGRESS—PROCLAMATION OF THE SOVIET REPUBLIC—THE “SISSON DOCUMENTS”

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
2205	1918 Jan. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Date set for convening of the Constituent Assembly. Trotsky may attempt to lay upon it responsibility for separate peace.	331 [Pg. 331 includes portions of Doc. 327 and Doc. 328]
1343	Jan. 8	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Belgium considering relations with Bolsheviki; Italy opposed to such a move.	332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330]
1803	Jan. 9	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Statement made by Prince Cantacuzene of political, economic, and military conditions in Russia.	332 [Pg. 332 includes portions of Doc. 328 , Doc. 329 , and Doc. 330]
			Discusses advisability of recognizing	

2212	Jan. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	the Finnish, Ukrainian, Siberian, and Soviet governments. Ukrainian delegation admitted to peace conference; Finnish independence recognized by Soviet government.	335 [Pg. 335 includes portions of Doc. 330 and Doc. 331]
	Jan. 9	From the British Ambassador	Summary of the Bolshevik movement prepared by the British Embassy at Petrograd.	336 [Pg. 336 includes portions of Doc. 331 and Doc. 332]
	Jan. 9	From the British Ambassador	Great Britain will keep in touch unofficially with Bolshevik government by means of British agent now sent to Petrograd, and by new agent of Bolshevik government in London.	337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334]
1823	Jan. 14	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Establishment of relations by one of the Allies with Bolshevik government considered best way to combat German intrigue. Suggestion that the United States best suited to undertake task.	337 [Pg. 337 includes portions of Doc. 332 , Doc. 333 , and Doc. 334]
	Jan. 14	From the Consul General at Moscow to the Ambassador in Russia	Political and military conditions, food supply, Bolshevik power, etc., in central Russia, the Ukraine, and in Cossack territories.	338 [Pg. 338 includes portions of Doc. 334 and Doc. 335]
2241	Jan. 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Progress of peace negotiations. Preparations by Soviet for demonstration when Constituent Assembly meets. Socialist-Revolutionist meeting.	349 [Pg. 349 includes portions of Doc. 335 and Doc. 336]
1998	Jan. 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Great Britain concurs in plan for regular conferences of chiefs of Allied missions in Petrograd, but holds that missions may take independent action, in which Department acquiesces.	350 [Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338]
2252	Jan. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Meeting of Allied and American chiefs of missions to discuss their attendance at opening of Constituent Assembly.	350 [Pg. 350 includes portions of Doc. 336 , Doc. 337 , and Doc. 338]
		From the	Opening of Constituent Assembly:	351 [Pg. 351 includes

2253	Jan. 18	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	street disorders; Cadet members absent; Socialist-Revolutionists in majority.	portions of Doc. 338 and Doc. 339
2255	Jan. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Dissolution of Constituent Assembly forced by Red Guards and sailors. Its president criticizes Soviet government for not concluding peace.	352 [Pg. 352 includes portions of Doc. 339 and Doc. 340]
2256	Jan. 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Anarchists reply to Ambassador's protest against Soviet arrest of Rumanian Minister by counter-protest against prosecution of their comrades in the United States.	353 [Pg. 353 is part of Doc. 341]
2259	Jan. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Central Committee of Commissars states it dissolved Constituent Assembly both because it was influenced by <i>bourgeoisie</i> and did not admit that all power rests with Soviets.	354 [Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343]
2260	Jan. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Warning given of rumored attack on Embassy planned by anarchists.	354 [Pg. 354 includes portions of Doc. 341 , Doc. 342 , and Doc. 343]
2261	Jan. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Retiring of Allied chiefs to Stockholm or Christiania suggested, but opposed on ground that leaving would promote German interests.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346]
165	Jan. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Bolsheviks suppress newspaners, and in street fighting put down demonstrations in favor of Constituent Assembly.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346]
	Jan. 22	From the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Japanese Foreign Minister inquires as to U. S. attitude if Russia should send Soviet envoys to the United States and if a Russo-German peace were made.	355 [Pg. 355 includes portions of Doc. 344 , Doc. 345 , and Doc. 346]
2274	Jan. 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Belgian Minister urges public statement against separate peace. Individual Americans in relation with Bolshevik headquarters.	356 [Pg. 356 includes portions of Doc. 346 and Doc. 347]

1365	Undated [Rec'd Jan. 24]	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Rumanian, American, and French Ambassadors are denounced in Russian press for condemning-violence against Rumanian Legation.	357 [Pg. 357 includes portions of Doc. 347 and Doc. 348]
2287	Jan. 25	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Food scarcity. Opposition of factory workers to Soviet. Conditions in the Ukraine.	358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350]
2292	Jan. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Repudiation of national debt rejected by Constituent Assembly but adopted by All-Russian Soviet Congress; its enforcement in hands of Council of Commissars.	358 [Pg. 358 includes portions of Doc. 348 , Doc. 349 , and Doc. 350]
2293	Jan. 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky criticizes the United States and makes specific charges against Allies of unfriendly acts.	359 [Pg. 359 includes portions of Doc. 350 and Doc. 351]
2294	Jan. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Assumption of control by the All- Russian Soviet Congress, supplanting Constituent Assembly.	360 [Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , and Doc. 353]
1406	Jan. 29	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Quotes chief of U. S. Military Mission in Russia on probable length of Bolshevik regime and assistance advisable if military-operations are revived.	360 [Pg. 360 includes portions of Doc. 351 , Doc. 352 , and Doc. 353]
	Jan. 29	To the Ambassador in Japan (tel.)	Answers Japanese Foreign Minister's queries concerning attitude of United States toward Bolshevik envoys and toward Russo-German peace.	361 [Pg. 361 includes portions of Doc. 353 and Doc. 354]
2303	Jan. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Status of peace negotiations at Brest. Soviet hope of starting social revolution in Central empires. Scarcity of food.	362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 354 , Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356]
1423	Jan. 31	From the Minister in	Italian Chargé at Petrograd states conditions in Russia are appalling, due	362 [Pg. 362 includes portions of Doc. 354 ,

		Sweden (tel.)	to food scarcity and violence.	Doc. 355 , and Doc. 356]
2310	Jan. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet states strikers in Germany demand peace on Soviet terms, also general peace along lines of President Wilson's message.	363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358]
2038	Feb. 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department relies on judgment of Ambassador with regard to staying in Petrograd.	363 [Pg. 363 includes portions of Doc. 356 , Doc. 357 , and Doc. 358]
2039	Feb. 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Inquires if Ambassador recommends moderation of U. S. attitude towards Bolshevik regime in order not to place Embassy staff in personal danger.	364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361]
2316	Feb. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports Soviet domination spreading; German strikes; Rumanian uprisings. If negotiations end without separate peace, may recommend relations with Soviet.	364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361]
2325	Feb. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	All-Russian Congress of Soviets proclaims its policies on peace, land, public loans, secret treaties, and self-determination of peoples.	364 [Pg. 364 includes portions of Doc. 359 , Doc. 360 , and Doc. 361]
3138	Feb. 3	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Opinion of Russian Ambassador in France as to German power in Russia, Japanese intervention in Siberia, and independence of Finland.	366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of Doc. 361 and Doc. 362]
2043	Feb. 4	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to send to Department weekly <i>résumé</i> of situation.	367 [Pg. 367 includes portions of Doc. 362 and Doc. 363]
2333	Feb. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet government's refusal to release funds of missions until recognition enables them to draw on Russian funds in other countries.	368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365]

2336	Feb. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Germans purchase large interest in Russian banks. Danish and Siamese Legations invaded by Soviet authorities.	368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of Doc. 363 , Doc. 364 , and Doc. 365]
2346	Feb. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	By formal decree Russian calendar to be changed Feb. 14 to accord with western calendar. Russian Patriarch excommunicates Bolsheviks.	369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367]
6491	Feb. 7	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); <i>mutatis mutandis</i> , to France	Inquires if report is true that passports of envoys of Bolshevik government have been visaed by British representatives.	369 [Pg. 369 includes portions of Doc. 365 , Doc. 366 , and Doc. 367]
2349	Feb. 8	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Believes that anarchistic threats against Embassy should not affect Department's policy; has evidence that Lenin and Trotsky are in German pay.	370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369]
8588	Feb. 9	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	British authorities have visaed passports for Bolshevik representatives.	370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of Doc. 367 , Doc. 368 , and Doc. 369]
3177	Feb. 9	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Report is correct that France visaed passports of Soviet representatives.	371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371]
2354	Feb. 9–13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits contents of the Sisson documents tending to prove German plan to sow disorganization in Entente countries including Russia.	371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of Doc. 370 and Doc. 371]
167	Feb. 11	From the British Embassy	British unofficial relations with <i>de facto</i> Bolshevik government will protect Rumanian interests.	378 [Pg. 378 includes portions of Doc. 371 and Doc. 372]
		To the	Instructions to repeat to London for attention of Foreign Office telegram on	379 [Pg. 379 includes portions of

3165	Feb. 11	Ambassador in France (tel.)	the political situation in Russia as observed by the Russian Ambassador in France.	Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374]
2059	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Arrangements for marines to guard Embassy at Petrograd.	379 [Pg. 379 includes portions of Doc. 372 , Doc. 373 , and Doc. 374]
2365	Feb. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	International revolutionary propaganda; the Sisson documents; military situation in the Ukraine, Finland, Baltic provinces, and south Russia.	380 [Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , and Doc. 376]
2061	Feb. 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to report on conditions arising from public ownership of factories, etc.	380 [Pg. 380 includes portions of Doc. 374 , Doc. 375 , and Doc. 376]
2065	Feb. 14	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.); repeated to Great Britain, France, Japan, and China	Instructions for somewhat closer and informal touch with Bolshevik authorities, avoiding official recognition.	381 [Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378]
2074	Feb. 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to obtain further evidence in regard to the Sisson documents.	381 [Pg. 381 includes portions of Doc. 376 , Doc. 377 , and Doc. 378]

RESUMPTION OF HOSTILITIES BY THE GERMANS—REMOVAL OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY TO VOLOGDA—PRESIDENT WILSON'S MESSAGE TO THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONGRESS OF SOVIETS.
MARCH 11, 1918

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
2387	1918 Feb. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Resumption of hostilities by the Germans; fall of Dvinsk.	382 [Pg. 382 includes portions of Doc. 378 and Doc.

				379]
	Feb. 19	From the Assistant Secretary of State	French Government informs the Bolsheviks indirectly that if they resist Germany, France will help them, and inquires if the United States will do likewise.	383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381]
2395	Feb. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Germans reported moving toward Petrograd; Ambassador considers leaving with staff.	383 [Pg. 383 includes portions of Doc. 379 , Doc. 380 , and Doc. 381]
2400	Feb. 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Germans advance toward Petrograd; Soviet government demoralized. Ambassador urges that the United States assume control of Vladivostok and British and French of Murmansk and Archangel to protect supplies.	384 [Pg. 384 is part of Doc. 382]
197	Feb. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Attempt to install in Russia a democratic régime has resulted in anarchy German domination would be preferable. Intervention the only remedy.	385 [Pg. 385 is part of Doc. 383]
2402	Feb. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	German advance: French and British assist Red Guard to destroy railroad. Food scarcity, rumors of anarchism.	386 [Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385]
201	Feb. 23	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Owing to German advance on Moscow and Petrograd, many Americans leaving for Samara.	386 [Pg. 386 includes portions of Doc. 383 , Doc. 384 , and Doc. 385]
2410	Feb. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Peace terms make Russia a German province. Renews recommendation for possession of Vladivostok, Murmansk, and Archangel. Part of Embassy staff moves to Vologda.	387 [Pg. 387 includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387]
		To the Minister in Sweden	Instructions concerning measures to	387 [Pg. 387

562	Feb. 25	(tel.): for Ambassador Francis	safeguard staff and archives from falling into enemy hands.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 386 and Doc. 387</i>
2416 [?]	Feb. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	U. S. Embassy and certain missions to remove to Vologda; British and other missions to Finland or Murmansk. Japanese and Chinese troops in Manchuria.	388 [Pg. 388 <i>includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389</i>]
	Feb. 27	From the Consul General at Stockholm (tel.): from Consul Tredwell, Petrograd	Sends train east with Americans, Japanese, and Chinese, including staffs of Embassies. Ambassadors remain in Petrograd.	388 [Pg. 388 <i>includes portions of Doc. 388 and Doc. 389</i>]
	Mar. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports arrival at Vologda, where awaits developments. Many Russians prefer Germans to Soviet.	389 [Pg. 389 <i>is part of Doc. 390</i>]
	Mar. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Japanese attitude toward sending of troops to Siberia. Request for British troops in north Russia. Anti-Bolshevik sentiment in northern villages.	390 [Pg. 390 <i>includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392</i>]
	Mar. 4	From the British Chargé	Copy of message from British Foreign Office to their agent in Petrograd offering aid to the Bolshevik government against Germany and discussing Japanese intervention.	390 [Pg. 390 <i>includes portions of Doc. 391 and Doc. 392</i>]
	Mar. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Military Attaché sent to Petrograd to confer with Soviet government regarding assistance if Russo-German peace not ratified.	392 [Pg. 392 <i>includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394</i>]
	Mar. 6	From the British Chargé	Copy of message from British Foreign Office to their representative in Russia regarding lines of action which Soviet can take, including appeal for help from Japanese.	392 [Pg. 392 <i>includes portions of Doc. 393 and Doc. 394</i>]
			Resumption of hostilities in Russia by	393 [Pg. 393]

236	Mar. 7	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	the Germans despite peace signed. Refusal of Bolsheviks to demobilize Red Guard.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 394 and Doc. 395</i>
	Mar. 9 [?]	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	All-Russian Congress of Soviets may support ratification of peace with Germany as result of threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia.	394 [Pg. 394 includes portions of Doc. 395 and Doc. 396]
238	Undated [Rec'd Mar. 9]	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Press indicates Allied intervention in Siberia against German domination.	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398]
	Mar. 11	To the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Transmits President Wilson's message to the Soviet Congress, Mar. 11, expressing sympathy at this time when German power has turned back Russian struggle for freedom.	395 [Pg. 395 includes portions of Doc. 396 , Doc. 397 , and Doc. 398]
6	Mar. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet officials declare it will be necessary to resist German advance. Tokyo press states no Japanese invasion without Allied approval.	396 [Pg. 396 includes portions of Doc. 398 and Doc. 399]
	Mar. 12	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.); the same to France, Italy, Russia, Japan, and China	In response to Japanese inquiry concerning attitude of Allied powers toward Russia since signature of the Brest Litovsk peace, the United States replies it regards Russia still as an ally, although there is at present no Russian government.	397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401]
7	Mar. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky's inquiries regarding support which Allies would give in case of non-ratification of peace treaty or against Japanese invasion.	397 [Pg. 397 includes portions of Doc. 400 and Doc. 401]
		To the Consul	Instructions regarding removal of	398 [Pg. 398 includes

	Mar. 12	General at Moscow (tel.)	Consulate and commendation of work accomplished.	portions of Doc. 401 and Doc. 402]
251	Mar. 15	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Resolution adopted by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets in reply to President Wilson's message of Mar. 11.	399 [Pg. 399 includes portions of Doc. 402 and Doc. 403]
257	Mar. 15	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	The All-Russian Congress of Soviets represents only a small portion of Russian people; delegates chosen by Bolshevik leaders.	400 [Pg. 400 includes portions of Doc. 403 and Doc. 404]
10	Mar. 15	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Approves the Ambassador's decision to stay at Vologda unless circumstances prevent.	401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406]
1720	Mar. 17	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Brest Litovsk peace treaty ratified by All-Russian Congress of Soviets; repudiated by Socialist-Revolutionists. Soviet ambassador to be sent to Berlin.	401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of Doc. 405 and Doc. 406]
17	Mar. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Suggests that if American and Chinese troops enter Russia with Japanese, opposition less. Gives to press declaration that America does not recognize separate peace and is still ally of Russia.	402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408]
13	Mar. 19	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	President Wilson's message to Russian people and address to Congress adequate answer to Trotsky's inquiries as to U. S. support.	402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of Doc. 406 , Doc. 407 , and Doc. 408]
278	Mar. 20	From the Council General at Moscow (tel.)	Trotsky's statement that alliance with the United States is impossible, and comment on relations between the United states and Japan.	403 [Pg. 403 is part of Doc. 409]

CHAPTER VIII. THE CONCLUSION WITH THE CENTRAL POWERS OF THE PEACE OF BREST LITOVSK, MARCH 3, 1918

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1232	1917 Dec. 27	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Russian delegation at Brest Litovsk proposes basis for peace negotiations.	404 [Pg. 404 is part of Doc. 410]
2166	Dec. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	If the United States declines to take part in peace negotiations, a communication should be sent to Russian people in explanation.	405 [Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412]
2163 [?]	Dec. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Forwards text of Trotsky's address to the peoples and governments of Allied countries inviting them to share in peace negotiations.	405 [Pg. 405 includes portions of Doc. 411 and Doc. 412]
244	1918 Jan. 1	From the Consul General at Moscow	Report on political situation in late December; appropriation for international propaganda; peace negotiations, including German proposals and Ukrainian declaration.	408 [Pg. 408 includes portions of Doc. 412 and Doc. 413]
2172	Jan. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet officials claim to have discovered conspiracy of Germans and decide to sever peace negotiations.	418 [Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415]
2173	Jan. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Meaning of Trotsky's note to the peoples of Allied countries. Advantages for Germany of peace with Russia.	418 [Pg. 418 includes portions of Doc. 414 and Doc. 415]
2178	Jan. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Resolution adopted by Soviet Central Executive Committee and other bodies, calling upon workmen of all countries to support Russian peace terms.	419 [Pg. 419 includes portions of Doc. 415 and Doc. 416]
2180	Jan. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Peace negotiations resumed. Germany claims that the Baltic provinces desire to become German, to which Soviet takes issue.	421 [Pg. 421 includes portions of Doc. 416 and Doc. 417]
2187	Jan. 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for the President	Only hope for Russia's remaining in the war is failure of separate peace negotiations. Requests that the President appeal to Russian people.	422 [Pg. 422 includes portions of Doc. 417 and Doc. 418]
		From the	German peace commissioners refuse to	424 [Pg. 424 includes

2202	Jan. 5	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	adjourn to neutral ground as suggested by Trotsky.	portions of Doc. 418 and Doc. 419]
26	Jan. 6	From the British Embassy	British Ambassador at Petrograd reports German insistence on occupation of Baltic provinces.	425 [Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421]
2204	Jan. 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Further discussion of peace demands. Presence of Germans in Petrograd.	425 [Pg. 425 includes portions of Doc. 420 and Doc. 421]
1973	Jan. 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	President Wilson's speech to Congress, stating war aims and attitude toward Russia, to be conveyed unofficially to Trotsky and otherwise circulated.	426 [Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423]
2225	Jan. 12	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Circulation in Russian and German of President Wilson's speech to Congress.	426 [Pg. 426 includes portions of Doc. 421 , Doc. 422 , and Doc. 423]
2229	Jan. 13	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes his New Year greeting to Russian people, in which he commends President Wilson's address to Congress as outlining the peace Russia desires but now endangered by Germany.	427 [Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425]
1346	Jan. 21	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Political and territorial questions, including status of Aland Islands, discussed at peace conference.	427 [Pg. 427 includes portions of Doc. 424 and Doc. 425]
2294	Jan. 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Trotsky's departure for Brest to sign separate peace. Approval by All-Russian Soviet Congress of negotiations.	428 [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427]
2358	Feb. 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Brest negotiations terminated. Demobilization order signed by Trotsky and Russian delegation, also by Bolshevik Ukrainian delegation.	428 [Pg. 428 includes portions of Doc. 425 , Doc. 426 , and Doc. 427]
2385	Feb. 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	German statement that armistice is terminated; Soviet protest. Capture by Germans of Revel and Dvinsk.	429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc. 427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429]
2393	Feb.	From the Ambassador	Soviet offers to accept peace terms demanded at last conference. Resistance	429 [Pg. 429 includes portions of Doc.

	19	in Russia (tel.)	impossible if Germans advance.	427 , Doc. 428 , and Doc. 429]
1552	Feb. 22	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Council of Commissars protest against action of German troops after war declared ended, but must consent to German peace terms.	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431]
2061	Feb. 22	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Quotes portion of Kühnmann's Reichstag speech discussing peace treaty signed with Ukraine and peace negotiations with Russia.	430 [Pg. 430 includes portions of Doc. 430 and Doc. 431]
2405	Feb. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits text of German peace proposal of Feb. 21 to Soviet government.	432 [Pg. 432 includes portions of Doc. 431 and Doc. 432]
2409	Feb. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet Central Executive Committee approves German peace terms and notifies Berlin.	433 [Pg. 433 includes portions of Doc. 432 and Doc. 433]
1612	Mar. 4	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Peace treaty signed at Brest Litovsk, Germany refusing to stop military operations until peace signed. Turkey gains territory and petroleum center.	434 [Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435]
1624	Mar. 5	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Soviet Central Executive Committee calls meeting to discuss ratification of peace treaty. Division among Soviets on subject.	434 [Pg. 434 includes portions of Doc. 433 , Doc. 434 , and Doc. 435]
	Mar. 12	To the French Ambassador	The United States agrees in principle with protest against. Russo-German peace, but prefers not to join in iteming to uncertain conditions in Russia.	435 [Pg. 435 includes portions of Doc. 435 and Doc. 436]
259	Mar. 16	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Peace terms ratified.	436 [Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438]
2159	Mar. 19	From the Minister in the Netherlands (tel.)	Speech of Hertling in the Reichstag regarding ratification of Brest Litovsk peace, and the status of the Baltic provinces.	436 [Pg. 436 includes portions of Doc. 437 and Doc. 438]
		From the	Transmits statement concerning Russia and	438 [Pg. 438 includes

8633	Mar. 25	Ambassador in Great Britain	the German peace made public by the Supreme War Council held in London.	portions of Doc. 438 and Doc. 439]
1762	Mar. 25	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	German Government's comment on Ambassador Francis's statement to the Russian people on Russo-German peace.	439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441]
301, 303, 304, and 309	Mar. 30 and Apr. 2	From the Consul General at Moscow (tels.)	Transmits text of treaty between Russia and the Central powers, signed at Brest Litovsk Mar. 3, with supplementary agreements and appendices.	442 [Pg. 442 includes portions of Doc. 442 and Doc. 443]
57	Apr. 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discusses Russian reply to German protest against Ambassador's statement, which contained appeal to the Russian people to continue the war.	439 [Pg. 439 includes portions of Doc. 439 , Doc. 440 , and Doc. 441]
1107	Apr. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia	Encloses copies of Ambassador's appeal to Russian people to continue the war, and of Soviet Government's reply to inquiry of German Government in the matter.	440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of Doc. 441 and Doc. 442]
399	Apr. 22	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Transmits Turkish-Russian agreement supplementary to the treaty of Mar. 3.	471 [Pg. 471 includes portions of Doc. 443 and Doc. 444]
1321	Aug. 23	From the Chargé in Sweden	Transmits extracts from Swedish press giving statistics of Russia's losses in the Brest Litovsk peace.	476 [Pg. 476 is part of Doc. 445]

CHAPTER IX. THE ACTION OF THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS FOR RELEASE OF THE RUMANIAN MINISTER FROM ARREST

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
2230	1918 Jan. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Rumanian Minister and Legation arrested; Diplomatic Corps called to meet at U. S. Embassy.	477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448]
2231	Jan. 14	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Diplomatic Corps will go in body to make demand of Lenin for immediate release of Rumanian Minister Diamandi.	477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of Doc. 446 , Doc. 447 , and Doc. 448]
	Jan.	From the Ambassador	Joint visit of heads of missions to Lenin,	477 [Pg. 477]

2233	14	in Russia (tel.)	to protest violation of diplomatic immunities, and to demand liberty of Rumanian Minister and staff.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 446, Doc. 447, and Doc. 448</i>
2238	Jan. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Detailed narration of arrest and release of Rumanian Minister, also of violation of Italian Embassy Attempt on life of Lenin.	478 [Pg. 478 <i>includes portions of Doc. 448 and Doc. 449</i>]
2240	Jan. 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Press states U. S. Ambassador condoned arrest of Rumanian Minister. Quotes letter of former to latter refuting such charge.	480 [Pg. 480 <i>includes portions of Doc. 449 and Doc. 450</i>]
1999	Jan. 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department approves Ambassador's course resulting in release of Rumanian Minister.	481 [Pg. 481 <i>includes portions of Doc. 450, Doc. 451, and Doc. 452</i>]
2014	Jan. 23	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to confer with French colleague and report what steps practicable in view of reprisals against Rumanians in Russia.	481 [Pg. 481 <i>includes portions of Doc. 450, Doc. 451, and Doc. 452</i>]
2309	Jan. 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	As Rumanian Minister has been expelled from Russia, further protest appears useless.	482 [Pg. 482 <i>is part of Doc. 453</i>]

CHAPTER X. THE SOVIET REPUBLIC

INFORMAL RELATIONS WITH SOVIET AUTHORITIES—QUESTIONS OF RECOGNITION AND INTERVENTION—ATTITUDE TOWARD DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT—THE GERMAN ADVANCE INTO RUSSIA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
22	1918 Mar. 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reports arming of war prisoners at Irkutsk. Trotsky requests American officers as army inspectors and operating men and equipment for railroads.	483 [Pg. 483 <i>is part of Doc. 454</i>]
	Mar. 20	From the Chargé in China (tel.): from Ambassasador Francis	Reports that he is functioning from Vologda, the only Allied Ambassador in Russia. Requests information as to movements of Japanese and Chinese troops.	484 [Pg. 484 <i>includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456</i>]
		From the	German advance in the south secures	484 [Pg. 484

280	Mar. 20	Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	immense supplies. Practically no opposition; few Russians will fight under present regime.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 455 and Doc. 456</i>
279	Mar. 20	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	The Patriarch of Russia condemns peace treaty. American attitude will influence peasants.	485 [Pg. 485 <i>includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458</i>]
27	Mar. 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviets organize army (Red Guard) and desire to aid world-wide social revolution. Soviets ask that the United States receive economic commission.	485 [Pg. 485 <i>includes portions of Doc. 457 and Doc. 458</i>]
19	Mar. 23	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet leaders who have asked for military assistance suspected of acting on German orders to divert Entente efforts.	486 [Pg. 486 <i>includes portions of Doc. 458 and Doc. 459</i>]
21	Mar. 23	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The United States is unable to extend direct aid to Russia but desires Ambassador to reflect U. S. good will.	487 [Pg. 487 <i>includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461</i>]
38	Mar. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discussion of Sisson documents and organization of new Russian army; value of assistance to help the army turn against Germany.	487 [Pg. 487 <i>includes portions of Doc. 460 and Doc. 461</i>]
	Mar. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	French, Italian, and Serbian missions arrive at Vologda. Press states the United States will resume commercial relations with Russia despite repudiation of debts.	488 [Pg. 488 <i>includes portions of Doc. 461 and Doc. 462</i>]
303	Mar. 31	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Reports that Austrian prisoners join Red Guards; forced contributions close businesses; and railroads are demoralized. Estimates losses to Russia by peace treaty.	489 [Pg. 489 <i>includes portions of Doc. 462 and Doc. 463</i>]
52	Apr. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	In case of evidence of German control of Russian army would advise immediate intervention by the Associated Governments. Serbian troops are leaving Russia.	490 [Pg. 490 <i>includes portions of Doc. 463 and Doc. 464</i>]
1806	Apr. 2	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	The German advance into Russia and capture of Odessa. Russo-Rumanian agreement. Exchange of ratifications, Mar. 30, of Russo-German peace treaty.	491 [Pg. 491 <i>includes portions of Doc. 464 and Doc. 465</i>]
			Instructions to learn source of press	492 [Pg. 492

41	Apr. 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	statement that the United States agrees to resume commercial relations with Russia.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 465 and Doc. 466</i>
7128	Apr. 3	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	The United States grants Russian Ambassador (of Provisional Government) full cable privileges. Inquires as to British attitude.	493 [Pg. 493 <i>includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468</i>]
69	Apr. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Assistance of Allied military officers for new Russian army. Discussion of Japanese intervention.	493 [Pg. 493 <i>includes portions of Doc. 467 and Doc. 468</i>]
9351	Apr. 4	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Great Britain no longer grants to old Russian Embassy privilege to telegraph in cipher.	494 [Pg. 494 <i>includes portions of Doc. 468, Doc. 469, Doc. 470, and Doc. 471</i>]
48	Apr. 5	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador to remain in Russia so long as he can reflect friendly purpose of the United States.	494 [Pg. 494 <i>includes portions of Doc. 468, Doc. 469, Doc. 470, and Doc. 471</i>]
49	Apr. 5	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions not to protest relative to repudiation of loans nor to promise military support.	494 [Pg. 494 <i>includes portions of Doc. 468, Doc. 469, Doc. 470, and Doc. 471</i>]
7159	Apr. 6	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Inquires why British suppress code telegrams between Russian Embassy here and Russian Embassy in Paris.	495 [Pg. 495 <i>includes portions of Doc. 471, Doc. 472, and Doc. 473</i>]
315	Apr. 7	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Report of economic and political conditions; seizure of properties by Germans; hope for Allied intervention.	495 [Pg. 495 <i>includes portions of Doc. 471, Doc. 472, and Doc. 473</i>]
9388	Apr. 8	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Foreign Office will look into suppression of telegrams between Russians in Washington and Paris.	496 [Pg. 496 <i>includes portions of Doc. 473 and Doc. 474</i>]
438	Apr. 15	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Anarchism: its growth under protection of Soviet government and attempt to check it.	497 [Pg. 497 <i>includes portions of Doc. 474, Doc. 475, and Doc. 476</i>]
100	Apr. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Conflict occurs between Soviet government and anarchists with arrest of latter. Ambassador recommends aid for railways.	497 [Pg. 497 <i>includes portions of Doc. 474, Doc. 475, and Doc. 476</i>]

101	Apr. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Transmits telegram on economic and political situation from chief of American Red Cross in Russia to Red Cross official, Paris.	499 [Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478]
407	Apr. 16	From the British Ambassador	Plan for military assistance to Russia as urged by British representative at Moscow, together with preliminary guaranties.	499 [Pg. 499 includes portions of Doc. 477 and Doc. 478]
367	Apr. 17	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	The German advance into Russia. Bolshevik press comments upon relations between Japan and the Allies.	501 [Pg. 501 includes portions of Doc. 478 and Doc. 479]
9569	Apr. 18	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Discussion of suppression of telegrams between former Russian diplomatic officers.	502 [Pg. 502 includes portions of Doc. 479 and Doc. 480]
388	Apr. 20	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Informal protests to authorities in matter of forced contributions and arrests of managers of American firms.	503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482]
78	Apr. 23	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The head of the American Red Cross in Russia is requested to send certain messages through the Embassy or Consulate.	503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of Doc. 480 , Doc. 481 , and Doc. 482]
119	Apr. 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discussion of German advance and Japanese intervention. Bolshevik endeavor to create dissension between Japan and the United States.	504 [Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484]
421	Apr. 26	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes portion of Lenin's address in which he declares Soviet is dependent upon support of wage-earners in other countries.	504 [Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484]
126	Apr. 26	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Denial of knowledge of conference to promote better relations between Allies and Soviet government.	505 [Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 , and Doc. 486]

ARRIVAL OF GERMAN AND TURKISH AMBASSADORS IN RUSSIA—SOVIET REQUEST FOR RECALL OF THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
431	1918 Apr.	From the Consul General at	Transmits substance of letter of credence of German Ambassador Mirbach and reply thereto; also that of Turkish Ambassador.	505 [Pg. 505 includes portions of Doc. 484 , Doc. 485 ,

	27	Moscow (tel.)		and Doc. 486]
434	Apr. 27	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Press comments on German power in Russia. German and Turkish military gains in Russia.	507 [Pg. 507 is part of Doc. 487]
132	Apr. 29	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Public statement to refute false reports concerning U. S. policy in Russia.	508 [Pg. 508 includes portions of Doc. 487 and Doc. 488]
439	Apr. 29	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes radiogram to French Government by Foreign Commissar Chicherin, asking recall of French Ambassador.	509 [Pg. 509 includes portions of Doc. 488 and Doc. 489]
440	Apr. 29	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Endeavors of Lenin to separate Japan and the United States and to isolate France by attack on French Ambassador. Argument against recognition.	510 [Pg. 510 includes portions of Doc. 489 and Doc. 490]
99	1918 Apr. 30	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Alleged conference to promote better relations between Allies and Soviet government not known to Department.	511 [Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492]
134	Apr. 30	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Discussion of demand for recall of French Ambassador. Plans for maintaining U. S. Embassy in Russia.	511 [Pg. 511 includes portions of Doc. 491 and Doc. 492]
453	May 1	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Lenin's speech before Central Executive Committee respecting present aims of Soviet government.	512 [Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]
451	May 1	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Quotes text of radiogram from Foreign Commissariat to Germany: Protest against advance upon Russian territory by German troops assisted by Ukrainians and Finns.	512 [Pg. 512 includes portions of Doc. 493 and Doc. 494]
136	May 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet awaits recall of French Ambassador. Communication sent by Socialist-Revolutionist Party to French Socialists protesting against Soviet foreign policy.	513 [Pg. 513 includes portions of Doc. 494 and Doc. 495]
452	May 1	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Germans buy controlling interests in Russian businesses, confiscate goods; yet have difficulty in obtaining grain from peasants.	514 [Pg. 514 includes portions of Doc. 495 and Doc. 496]
			Crisis approaches in attitude of Soviet	515 [Pg. 515]

139	May 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	toward foreign missions. German invasion of Russian territory <i>versus</i> Allied intervention.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 496 and Doc. 497</i>
22	May 1	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department (tel.)	Approaching crisis between Allies and Russia owing to German pressure and loss of influence by United States. Recommends diplomatic representation in Moscow and Allied intervention.	516 [<i>Pg. 516 includes portions of Doc. 497 and Doc. 498</i>]

QUESTION OF INTERVENTION: RECOMMENDATION OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, MAY 2, 1918—STATEMENTS OF AMERICAN POLICY—INTERFERENCE WITH THE DISPATCH OF CODE TELEGRAMS OF ALLIED AND AMERICAN REPRESENTATIVES—RUSSO-GERMAN CONTROVERSIES—REPORTS OF CONDITIONS; SPEECHES OF LENIN—ACTIVITIES OF ANTI-BOLSHEVIK PARTIES—THE RECALL OF RAYMOND ROBINS, RED CROSS REPRESENTATIVE

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
103	1918 May 2	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	No effective military support possible, but no objection to military attachés' lending appropriate assistance.	517 [<i>Pg. 517 includes portions of Doc. 498 and Doc. 499</i>]
460	May 2	From the Consul General at Moscow (tel.)	Report of conditions near Vitebsk, Vyazma, Bryansk, and Petrograd.	518 [<i>Pg. 518 includes portions of Doc. 499 and Doc. 500</i>]
140	May 2	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	States that the time for intervention has arrived and outlines German influence in Russia.	519 [<i>Pg. 519 includes portions of Doc. 500 and Doc. 501</i>]
23	May 3	From the Military Attaché in Russia to the War Department (tel.)	Coded telegrams forbidden without approval of Foreign Commissariat.	522 [<i>Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503</i>]
146	May 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	His cipher messages to Department refused.	522 [<i>Pg. 522 includes portions of Doc. 502 and Doc. 503</i>]
149	May 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Chicherin declares that stopping of cipher telegrams caused by misunderstanding. Japanese Chargé advocates Allied intervention.	523 [<i>Pg. 523 includes portions of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505</i>]
	May	To the Consul at	The recall of Raymond Robins, chief of	523 [<i>Pg. 523 includes portions</i>]

22	7	Moscow (tel.): for Robins	American Red Cross in Russia.	<i>of Doc. 504 and Doc. 505</i>
108	May 8	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Statement of U. S. policy toward Russia, which will remain unaltered so long as Russia does not accept German domination.	524 [<i>Pg. 524 includes portions of Doc. 505 and Doc. 506</i>]
115	May 9	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.): for Robins	Recall of Raymond Robins, chief of American Red Cross in Russia, delayed for three weeks.	525 [<i>Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 506, Doc. 507, and Doc. 508</i>]
160	May 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Recommends preparations for intervention, referring to British opinion on intervention and German demands of Soviet that Allies evacuate Murman.	525 [<i>Pg. 525 includes portions of Doc. 506, Doc. 507, and Doc. 508</i>]
512	May 12	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Russo-German commissions provided for by Brest treaty begin work at Moscow. Press opposes German demands. Famine reported.	527 [<i>Pg. 527 includes portions of Doc. 508 and Doc. 509</i>]
3871	May 12	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Report on Russian conditions and recommendation of Japanese intervention by head of French military mission.	528 [<i>Pg. 528 includes portions of Doc. 509 and Doc. 510</i>]
520	May 15	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Lenin continues effort to embroil the United States and Japan. Soviet representative at Berlin quotes Germany's promise to treat Russia as a neutral.	529 [<i>Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 510, Doc. 511, and Doc. 512</i>]
128	May 16	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Requests Ambassador's comment on Military Attaché's telegram advocating intervention and representation at Moscow.	529 [<i>Pg. 529 includes portions of Doc. 510, Doc. 511, and Doc. 512</i>]
173	May 16	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Departure from Russia of Raymond Robins, chief of American Red Cross. Unofficial advocacy of recognition by various Americans in Russia.	530 [<i>Pg. 530 includes portions of Doc. 512 and Doc. 513</i>]
177	May 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Lenin in speech criticizes aims of warring countries and declares proletariat will rule world.	532 [<i>Pg. 532 is part of Doc. 514</i>]
175	May 17	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Ambassador Mirbach's statement to justify infringements of Brest Litovsk peace treaty.	533 [<i>Pg. 533 includes portions of Doc. 514 and Doc. 515</i>]

536	May 18	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Russo-German controversy relative to sinking of Russian fishing boats by German submarine. Provision for Soviet Ambassador at Berne.	534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of Doc. 515 and Doc. 516]
181	May 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Central Cadet Committee refuses German support, although many Russians would accept it to rid country of Bolsheviks. Central Siberian Soviet is organized.	535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of Doc. 516 and Doc. 517]
182	May 18	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Kerensky may go to England and America to ask Allied intervention.	536 [Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]
185	May 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Endeavors to prepare way for Soviet request for Allied intervention. Policy would be aided by arrival of supplies and railway men.	536 [Pg. 536 includes portions of Doc. 518 and Doc. 519]
186	May 21	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Although Russian people desire Allied intervention, formal request impossible. Urges cooperation with British and French in holding Murman.	537 [Pg. 537 includes portions of Doc. 519 and Doc. 520]
194	May 23	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	German influence over Soviet government officials. Relations of Robins and Lenin. German attempt to dispossess Allies of Murman.	538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of Doc. 520 and Doc. 521]
551	May 24	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet government protests to Germany respecting aggressions and suggests commission to settle uncertainties arising under Brest Litovsk treaty.	539 [Pg. 539 includes portions of Doc. 521 and Doc. 522]
199	May 24	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet request repeated for recall of French Ambassador. Russian Patriarch states views on Soviet. Mirbach offers German aid to conservative Russians.	540 [Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524]
549	May 24	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Socialist-Revolutionist Party in secret congress favors ending Bolshevik dictatorship and accepting Allied intervention.	540 [Pg. 540 includes portions of Doc. 522 , Doc. 523 , and Doc. 524]
552	May 24	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Germany would compel Soviet to force British and French troops out of Murman. Germany maintains right to submarine operations in Arctic Ocean.	541 [Pg. 541 includes portions of Doc. 524 and Doc. 525]
202	May	From the Ambassador in	Statement of Secretary of State concerning U. S. policy in Russia given	542 [Pg. 542 includes portions

	25	Russia (tel.)	to press together with Ambassador's statement on subject.	of Doc. 525 and Doc. 526]
210	May 27	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	The return of Robins to Moscow would indicate U. S. support of Soviet government. Chicherin apologizes for interference with cipher telegrams.	543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of Doc. 526 and Doc. 527]
213	May 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Military Attaché regrets having sent to Department message of diplomatic nature. <i>Modus vivendi</i> being established with Moscow.	544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529]
215	May 28	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet government grants to U. S. Consul at Vladivostok privilege of sending code messages. Soviet endeavors to sow discord among Allies.	544 [Pg. 544 includes portions of Doc. 527 , Doc. 528 , and Doc. 529]
535 [?]	May 28	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Mirbach aids group of moderates and reactionaries in effort to replace Bolsheviks and subserve German interests.	545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531]
576	May 29	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Mirbach's negotiations with Cadets and others to reestablish order under a civil director. Russian hope for Allied intervention.	545 [Pg. 545 includes portions of Doc. 529 , Doc. 530 , and Doc. 531]
577	May 29	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Exchange of prisoners between Russia and Germany.	546 [Pg. 546 includes portions of Doc. 531 and Doc. 532]
231	May 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Sends his press statement on policy of U. S. Government in Russia regarding the Brest peace, Russian internal affairs, and aid given.	547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534]
6230	May 31	From the Consul General at London	Transmits pamphlet entitled, <i>The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning</i> , by Litvinov.	547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of Doc. 533 and Doc. 534]
3535	June 1	From the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Archives of Russian Legation in Switzerland are sequestered by Swiss Government. Asks instructions regarding possible interview with Soviet representatives.	548 [Pg. 548 includes portions of Doc. 534 and Doc. 535]
152	June 1	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Raymond Robins, American Red Cross representative in Russia, called home by Red Cross.	549 [Pg. 549 includes portions of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537]
		From the	Activities of Czechs disturb Soviet	549 [Pg. 549 includes portions

238	June 2	Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	government, which sends troops to disarm them. Soviet government weak but faced by no organized opposition.	of Doc. 535 , Doc. 536 , and Doc. 537]
239	June 3	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Suggested instructions for Allied and American Ambassadors concerning recognition of duly elected government, should present regime collapse.	550 [Pg. 550 includes portions of Doc. 537 and Doc. 538]
2030	June 4	To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Instructions to have no relations with Bolshevik representatives.	551 [Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540]

TEMPORARY RETURN OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR TO PETROGRAD—NOMINATION OF A SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES—DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSO-GERMAN DISPUTES—ATTITUDE OF BOLSHEVIK AND ANTI-BOLSHEVIK ELEMENTS TOWARD GERMAN AND ALLIED INTERVENTION

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
1	1918 June 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet government nominates Litvinov as plenipotentiary at Washington.	551 [Pg. 551 includes portions of Doc. 538 , Doc. 539 , and Doc. 540]
2	June 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Returning temporarily to Petrograd, finds city famine stricken. Railroad engineer reports it is impossible to operate railroads under Soviets.	552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542]
5	June 6	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Allied naval officers at Murman recommend recognition of Soviet government: dangers of such step.	552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of Doc. 541 and Doc. 542]
612	June 7	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Press statements of continued military activity in Russia by Germans and of German attempts to force Allies from Murman coast.	553 [Pg. 553 includes portions of Doc. 542 and Doc. 543]
616	June 8	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Lenin advocates seizing grain from "rich" peasants. German policy said to be creation of separate governments in Russia.	554 [Pg. 554 includes portions of Doc. 543 and Doc. 544]
617	June 8	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Mirbach's complaints of propaganda by Soviet government against Germany and Foreign Commissar's reply.	555 [Pg. 555 includes portions of Doc. 544 and Doc. 545]

8	Undated [Rec'd June 9]	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Report of lamentable conditions in Petrograd brought about by separate peace.	556 [Pg. 556 includes portions of Doc. 545 and Doc. 546]
2262	June 10	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Conditions in Russia: food is scarce, workmen demand bread from peasants; freight traffic is clogged; workmen are leaving Bolshevik party.	558 [Pg. 558 includes portions of Doc. 547 and Doc. 548]
4151	June 10	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	Requests reason for stopping cipher telegram from Russian Ambassador in France to Russian Ambassador at Washington.	559 [Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549]
258	June 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Statement of principles of combination for reerection of Russia, outlining limited monarchy. Reasons for intervention. Soviet order to Czechs to disband.	559 [Pg. 559 includes portions of Doc. 548 and Doc. 549]
177	June 12	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	In the event Soviet regime falls, the United States will recognize a government representative of the people of Russia and chosen by them.	561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 550]
4530	June 13	To the Ambassador in France (tel.)	No record of cipher telegram from Russian Ambassador in France said to have been stopped by U. S. censor.	561 [Pg. 561 is part of Doc. 550]
181	June 13	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to make no reply for the present to nomination of Soviet ambassador to the United States.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
192	June 18	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	U. S. naval commander took no part in recommending recognition of Soviet régime.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
193	June 19	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions to grant visa to Kerensky if he applies for one.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]

249	June 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Political opinion in Petrograd. Formation of combination to save Russia with help of Allies or of Germany.	562 [Pg. 562 includes portions of Doc. 551 , Doc. 552 , and Doc. 553]
285	June 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Germans offer to overturn Bolshevik regime if combination group, who favor Allies, will make German alliance and compel Allies to leave Russia.	563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of Doc. 554 , Doc. 555 , and Doc. 556]
286	June 19	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Reported that Soviet government has accepted proffered German aid against Czechs and that German army will occupy Moscow.	564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , and Doc. 558]
289	June 20	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Soviet government expects no reply to notes demanding that war vessels leave. German offer of assistance against Czechs refused.	564 [Pg. 564 includes portions of Doc. 556 , Doc. 557 , and Doc. 558]
663	June 22	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Renewed movement for cooperation with Germany. Rumors of German aid against Czecho-Slovaks. Soviet efforts to obtain grain from Ukraine.	565 [Pg. 565 includes portions of Doc. 558 and Doc. 559]
668	June 25	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet, under German threat, orders Black Sea Fleet to Sevastopol but some crews destroy ships rather than obey.	566 [Pg. 566 includes portions of Doc. 559 and Doc. 560]
8459	June 27	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Kerensky's visit to America inadvisable at present time.	567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562]
	June 29	From the Assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs	Tereshchenko and other prominent Russians, as well as Kerensky, propose to visit the United States.	567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of Doc. 560 , Doc. 561 , and Doc. 562]
	July 2	From the Assistant Secretary of State to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs	The Secretary of State believes it wiser for distinguished Russians not to visit the United States at present.	568 [Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564]

1117	July 4	From the Ambassador in Russia	Soviet representative tries to learn whether the Allies and the United States will intervene. Ambassador encloses his statement of July 4 to the Russian people.	568 [Pg. 568 includes portions of Doc. 562 , Doc. 563 , and Doc. 564]
210	July 6	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Résumé of military and political information from various parts of Russia.	571 [Pg. 571 includes portions of Doc. 564 and Doc. 565]

ASSASSINATION OF THE GERMAN AMBASSADOR, JULY 6, 1918; SOCIALIST-REVOLUTIONIST
REVOLT—KERENSKY'S PROPOSED VISIT TO AMERICA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
702	1918 July 6	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Assassination of Ambassador Mirbach.	572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567]
	July 7	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Assassination of Mirbach is result of anti-German outburst by left Socialist-Revolutionists, who seize Moscow.	572 [Pg. 572 includes portions of Doc. 565 , Doc. 566 , and Doc. 567]
	July 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Socialist-Revolutionist Party admits responsibility for death of Mirbach. Bolsheviks suppress uprisings in Moscow and Petrograd.	573 [Pg. 573 includes portions of Doc. 567 and Doc. 568]
710	July 12	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Negotiations at Kiev between Milyukov and German military party for establishment of constitutional monarchy to embrace Ukraine and Great Russia.	574 [Pg. 574 includes portions of Doc. 568 and Doc. 569]
711	July 13	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Advocates intervention in Siberia to support Czecho-Slovaks and Siberian government, and to withhold Siberian grain from German use.	575 [Pg. 575 includes portions of Doc. 569 and Doc. 570]
2676	July 16	To the Consul General at London	Criticism of Litvinov's pamphlet on Bolshevik revolution. Instructions to have no dealings with Bolshevik agents in Great Britain.	576 [Pg. 576 includes portions of Doc. 570 and Doc. 571]
715	July 16	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Soviet refusal of German request for admission of soldiers to guard German Embassy at Moscow.	577 [Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]

716	July 17	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Germans withdraw request for own guard for Embassy and accept Soviet guard. Anti-Bolshevik revolt ceases except at Yaroslavl.	577 [Pg. 577 includes portions of Doc. 572 and Doc. 573]
941	Aug. 9	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Asking instructions in the case of Kerensky who has explained to Embassy his reasons for wishing to visit America.	578 [Pg. 578 includes portions of Doc. 573 and Doc. 574]
968	Aug. 10	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	British Foreign Secretary believes that reception of Kerensky by officials of Allied Governments would displease many Russians.	579 [Pg. 579 includes portions of Doc. 574 and Doc. 575]
745	Aug. 13	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Department believes that a visit from Kerensky at this time would be inadvisable.	580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577]
	Aug. 26	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Bolshevik territory tends toward absorption in German zone; American and Allied nationals should be evacuated. Reign of terror prevails in Moscow.	580 [Pg. 580 includes portions of Doc. 576 and Doc. 577]
	Sept. 5	From the Consul at Moscow	Furnishes report on external relations of the Soviet republic made by the Foreign Commissar, Sept. 2, with comments.	581 [Pg. 581 includes portions of Doc. 577 and Doc. 578]

CHAPTER XI. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
9	1918 Aug. 20	From the Consul at Moscow	Forwards text of constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, July 10, 1918.	587 [Pg. 587 is part of Doc. 579]

CHAPTER XII. THE RUSSO-GERMAN SUPPLEMENTARY TREATIES, AUGUST 27, 1918

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
9969	1918 Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Great Britain	Forwards text of Russo-German supplementary treaties.	598 [Pg. 598 is part of Doc. 580]

CHAPTER XIII. THE REMOVAL OF THE AMERICAN AND ALLIED EMBASSIES FROM VOLOGDA TO ARCHANGEL

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page

[328]	1918 July 11	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Quotes Foreign Commissar Chicherin's note urging Allied representatives to remove to Moscow, and reply, declining.	618 [Pg. 618 is part of Doc. 581]
707	July 11	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Foreign Commissariat professes to fear outbreak in Vologda and murder by Germans of an Allied ambassador.	619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of Doc. 581 and Doc. 582]
708	July 12	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Allied chiefs of mission decide not to move to Moscow. British Ambassador urges immediate sending of Allied troops to Archangel.	620 [Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584]
21	[July 19?]	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Summary of situation of Allied missions after Soviet decision for their removal to Moscow. Assassination of the Tsar.	620 [Pg. 620 includes portions of Doc. 583 and Doc. 584]
24	July 20	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Further account of attempted coercion of Diplomatic Corps for removal to Moscow.	621 [Pg. 621 includes portions of Doc. 584 and Doc. 585]
336	July 22	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Diplomatic representatives will go to Archangel, as remaining in Vologda would subject them to treatment as hostages.	622 [Pg. 622 includes portions of Doc. 585 and Doc. 586]
[Enclosure]	July 22	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador (tel.)	Urges the Ambassador to remove to Moscow, stating that to-morrow may be too late.	636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 597]
35	July 24	From the Consul at Moscow	Foreign Commissariat sets time limit for removal of Ambassadors from Vologda. Allied consuls in Moscow	623 [Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 586 ,

		(tel.)	will remain as long as possible.	Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588]
[Enclosure]	July 24	From the American Ambassador to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (tel.)	Departure from Vologda.	636 [Pg. 636 is part of Doc. 597]
[Enclosure]	Undated	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador (tel.)	Again urges the Ambassador to come to Moscow.	637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 597]
[Enclosure]	[July 24]	From the American Ambassador to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (tel.)	Diplomatic Corps reiterates request for transportation to Archangel.	637 [Pg. 637 is part of Doc. 597]
[Enclosure]	July 24	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Vice Consul (tel.)	Facilities furnished for departure of Diplomatic Corps from Vologda.	640 [Pg. 640 is part of Doc. 597]
38	July 25	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Chicherin suggests that diplomatic relations be kept up through consuls and states that Soviet government protests invasion by Anglo-French troops and Allied support of Czecho-Slovaks.	623 [Pg. 623 includes portions of Doc. 586 , Doc. 587 , and Doc. 588]
104	July 31	To the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Owing to Soviet interference with cable, Department is without knowledge of removal of Embassy and relies upon judgment of	624 [Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc.

			Ambassador.	590]
342	July 31	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Arrival at Murmansk and Kandalaksha of heads of missions. Anti-Bolshevik revolution planned at Archangel.	624 [Pg. 624 includes portions of Doc. 589 and Doc. 590]
	Undated [Rec'd Aug. 2]	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Intention to remain in Russia, at location to be determined later.	625 [Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593]
	Aug. 3	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Department approves Ambassador's decision to remain in Russia.	625 [Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593]
350	Aug. 4	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Detailed account of events leading up to departure of Diplomatic Corps from Vologda and arrival at Archangel, Murmansk, and Kandalaksha.	625 [Pg. 625 includes portions of Doc. 591 , Doc. 592 , and Doc. 593]
	Aug. 5	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Return from Kandalaksha to Archangel planned. Constitutional Assembly members proclaim new government of northern region.	629 [Pg. 629 includes portions of Doc. 593 and Doc. 594]
354	Aug. 7	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Deceitful practices of Soviet representatives. Return of Diplomatic Corps to Archangel.	630 [Pg. 630 includes portions of Doc. 594 and Doc. 595]
355	Aug. 9	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Diplomatic Corps reaches Archangel. General in command at Arcnangel holds Bolsheviks as hostages.	631 [Pg. 631 includes portions of Doc. 595 and Doc. 596]
			Forwards address to the Russian	

	Aug. 15	From the Ambassador in Russia	people by the American and Allied representatives and telegraphic correspondence between the Ambassador and the Foreign Commissar regarding departure of Diplomatic Corps from Vologda.	632 [Pg. 632 is part of Doc. 597]
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CHAPTER XIV. THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE AMERICAN AND ALLIED MILITARY MISSIONS, CONSULS, AND NATIONALS

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
[Enclosure]	1918 July 25	From the Consul at Moscow	Soviet insistence upon removal of Diplomatic Corps to Moscow.	657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 602]
[Enclosure]	July 29	From the American Consul at Moscow to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs	Requests facilities for the departure from Moscow of members of the American and Allied military missions.	657 [Pg. 657 is part of Doc. 602]
[Enclosure]	July 29	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul at Moscow	Advises against departure through Archangel, at present, of members of American military mission.	658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 602]
[Quoted in tel.]	July 31	From the Consul at Moscow	Discussion by the American and Allied representatives with the Foreign Commissar of Lenin's declaration that a state of war exists between Russia and the Allies.	641 [Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 598]
[Quoted in tel.]	Aug. 2-3	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul at Moscow	The Foreign Commissar declines to explain publicly Lenin's nonpublic utterances regarding a state of war between Russia and the Allies.	642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 598]

[Quoted in tel.]	Aug. 5	From the Consul at Moscow	Reports that Foreign Commissar to-day declares that Allied persons of official character will not be molested, and that British and French citizens were arrested in Moscow as hostages following Allied attack on Archangel.	642 [Pg. 642 is part of Doc. 598]
[Enclosure]	Aug. 5	From the American Consul at Moscow to the Swedish Consul General	Requests that, whenever it becomes necessary for the U. S. Consul to leave his post, the Swedish Consul General take over temporarily the protection of U. S. interests in the district of Moscow.	658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 602]
[Enclosure]	Aug. 5	From the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs to the American Consul at Moscow	Promises the Consul, if he remains, facilities for communicating with his Government.	659 [Pg. 659 is part of Doc. 602]
[Quoted in tel.]	Aug. 6	From the Consul at Moscow	Reports that he can no longer exercise functions, after the violation on Aug. 5 of British and French Consulates General, and will transfer interests to Swedish Consul General.	643 [Pg. 643 is part of Doc. 598]
[Enclosure]	Aug. 6	From the American Consul at Moscow to the Swedish Consul General	States that he is obliged to leave Moscow, the U. S. Consulate General being no longer secure from violation since the violation of the British and French Consulates General.	658 [Pg. 658 is part of Doc. 602]
[Quoted in tel.]	Aug. 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Japanese Consul General able to leave; British and French exposed to reprisals; U. S. Consul remaining to assist associates.	645 [Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601]
2629	Aug. 12	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Transmits reports from Consul Poole at Moscow regarding withdrawal from Moscow of American and Allied consuls, military missions, and nationals; and	641 [Pg. 641 is part of Doc. 598]

			Chicherin's note on subject.	
2643	Aug. 13	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Soviet demands guaranty that members of military missions will not take part in any act hostile to Soviet; Italians refuse.	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600]
2652	Aug. 16	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Transmits telegram of Aug. 9 from the Consul at Moscow.	644 [Pg. 644 includes portions of Doc. 598 , Doc. 599 , and Doc. 600]
2660	Aug. 16	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Difficulties of American and Allied consuls and nationals in securing safe-conducts for departure from Russia.	645 [Pg. 645 includes portions of Doc. 600 and Doc. 601]
10	Aug. 20	From the Consul at Moscow	Detention in Moscow of Allied and American consular corps and military missions. Enclosures: Communications with the Foreign Commissar thereon, and with the Swedish Consul General intrusting U. S. interests in Moscow to him.	646 [Pg. 646 includes portions of Doc. 601 and Doc. 602]
2734	Aug. 29	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Reports substance of telegrams from Consulate General at Moscow relative to free passage from Russia, through Finland, of American and Allied nationals.	660 [Pg. 660 includes portions of Doc. 602 and Doc. 603]
2711	Aug. 30	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Bolshevik decree ordering arrest of subjects of Associated Governments.	661 [Pg. 661 includes portions of Doc. 603 and Doc. 604]
2744	Aug. 30	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Arrangements made by Swedish Minister with Finnish Government for passage through Finland of Allied consulates, missions, and nationals.	662 [Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc.

				606]
1	Sept. 3	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Netherland Minister in Russia and U. S. Consul at Moscow protest against lawless course of Soviet government in detention of Allied representatives and nationals.	662 [Pg. 662 includes portions of Doc. 604 , Doc. 605 , and Doc. 606]
2770	Sept. 3	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Passage through Finland for Sweden of U. S., Italian, and Belgian consulates, military missions, and nationals.	663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , and Doc. 608]
1359	Sept. 5	From the Chargé in Sweden	Forwards protest of neutral Ministers in charge of Allied interests in Russia against new demands of Soviet government relative to free departure of Allied representatives.	663 [Pg. 663 includes portions of Doc. 606 , Doc. 607 , and Doc. 608]
986	Sept, 6	From the British Chargé	Presents copy of British protest to Soviet against attack on British Embassy and murder of attaché and of appeal to neutrals to denounce Soviet officials as outlaws.	665 [Pg. 665 includes portions of Doc. 608 and Doc. 609]
1089	Sept. 7	To the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Appreciation of Swedish assistance to U. S. Consulate General and American citizens in the interim before Norway will take over U. S. interests.	666 [Pg. 666 includes portions of Doc. 609 and Doc. 610]
5	Sept. 9	From the Consul at Moscow. (tel.)	Asylum for French and British representatives in U. S. Consulate General (division of Norwegian Legation). Imprisonment of British agent Lockhart. Massacre of Russians by Soviet government.	667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of Doc. 610 and Doc. 611]
2837	Sept. 13	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Swedish Consul General at Moscow reports that Soviet government permits Italian subjects to leave but detains British and French men of military age.	668 [Pg. 668 includes portions of Doc. 611 and Doc. 612]
		From the		

2840	Sept. 13	Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (tel.)	Report of events at Vologda after departure of Ambassador. Uprising at Yaroslavl.	669 [Pg. 669 is part of Doc. 613]
2845	Sept. 14	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Report from Moscow of the number of persons in the American, French, English, and Italian colonies and the number imprisoned.	670 [Pg. 670 includes portions of Doc. 613 and Doc. 614]
5623	Sept. 14	To the Ambassador in France (tel.): for Consul Poole	Instructions for immediate departure from Moscow with any remaining Americans.	671 [Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616]
6	Sept. 15	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Attempts to arrange departure of French and British representatives and U. S. nationals.	671 [Pg. 671 includes portions of Doc. 614 , Doc. 615 , and Doc. 616]
[1145]	Sept. 16	From the Consul General at Christiania (tel.)	It is reported from Moscow that Red Guards demand that U. S. Consulate General (division of Norwegian Legation) surrender to them French and British subjects.	672 [Pg. 672 includes portions of Doc. 616 and Doc. 617]
1581	Sept. 24	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Requests copy of report by Netherland Minister in Russia regarding conditions in Petrograd.	673 [Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620]
9	Sept. 25	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Imprisonment at Tsaritsyn of U. S. Vice Consuls, and arrest at Moscow of Y. M. C. A. official. Departure from Russia of Consul at Moscow.	673 [Pg. 673 includes portions of Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620]
	Sept.	From the	Attempt to accelerate through	673 [Pg. 673 includes portions of

	28	Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Norwegian Government departure of Americans from Russia.	Doc. 618 , Doc. 619 , and Doc. 620]
[Enclosure]	Oct. 1	From the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador	Transmits copy of report by the Netherland Minister in Russia on conditions in Petrograd: violation of British Embassy and arrest of British and French subjects.	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621]
10008	Oct. 5	From the Chargé in Great Britain	Transmits note of Oct. 1 from the Foreign Office.	674 [Pg. 674 includes portions of Doc. 620 and Doc. 621]
1216	Oct. 7	From the Chargé in Norway (tel.)	Report through Petrograd of safe departure of British and French citizens from U. S. Consulate General (division of Norwegian Legation).	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623]
2737	Oct. 12	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.): from White-house	Arrival in Stockholm from Moscow of members of American and Allied consular and military staffs; continued imprisonment of other Allied nationals.	679 [Pg. 679 includes portions of Doc. 621 , Doc. 622 , and Doc. 623]

CHAPTER XV. THE TERROR

PROTEST OF THE UNITED STATES; ATTITUDE OF ALLIED AND NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS—
PROTESTS OF NEUTRAL GOVERNMENTS AND OF THE CHIEF OF THE AMERICAN RED CROSS
COMMISSION: ANSWERS OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT—EFFORTS FOR THE RELEASE OF
HOSTAGES AND FOR RESTRICTION OF THE PRACTICE OF TAKING THEM

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
[Enclosure]	1918 Sept. 2	From the American Consul at Moscow to the	Efforts for release of women and children taken as hostages at Ufa.	680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 624]

		Netherland Minister		
	Sept. 2	From the Consul at Moscow	Forwards copy of his letter of Sept. 2 to the Netherland Minister.	680 [Pg. 680 is part of Doc. 624]
2	Sept. 3	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Campaign of terror is conducted by the Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution. Suggests joint protest by all governments or a military advance.	681 [Pg. 681 includes portions of Doc. 624 and Doc. 625]
[Enclosure]	Sept. 4	From the American Consul at Moscow to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs	Effort to restrain Bolsheviks in their campaign of terror.	683 [Pg. 683 is part of Doc. 626]
	Sept. 4	From the Consul at Moscow	Forwards copy of his note of Sept. 4 to the Foreign Commissar.	682 [Pg. 682 includes portions of Doc. 625 and Doc. 626]
4	Sept. 5	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	The Commissar of Home Affairs urges Soviets to greater deeds of violence against those who oppose Soviet rule.	684 [Pg. 684 is part of Doc. 627]
[Quoted in tel.]	Sept. 6 and 10	From the Consul General at Irkutsk to the Vice Consul at Samara (tel.)	Release of women and children held as hostages.	720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684]
5	Sept. 9	From the Consul at Moscow (tel.)	Massacre of Russian citizens by Bolshevik government continues; many shot in retaliation for attempt to kill Lenin.	685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]
7	Sept. 15	From the Consul at	Terrorism in Petrograd and Kronstadt. Efforts of Red Cross. Imprisonment of Allied nationals,	686 [Pg. 686 includes portions of Doc. 629]

		Moscow (tel.)	including Czecho-Slovaks.	and Doc. 630]
	Sept. 20	To all American diplomatic missions (tel.)	In view of campaign of mass terror, Department inquires if each government will register its abhorrence of crimes against civilization committed by Soviets.	687 [Pg. 687 includes portions of Doc. 630 and Doc. 631]
	Sept. 21	To the British Chargé	Transmits text of circular telegram protesting against terrorism in Russia and expresses condemnation of violation of British Embassy, murder of attaché, and arrest of British representatives and subjects.	688 [Pg. 688 includes portions of Doc. 631 and Doc. 632]
	Sept. 21	To the French Ambassador	Transmits, with comments, text of circular telegram protesting against campaign of terror in Russia.	689 [Pg. 689 includes portions of Doc. 632 and Doc. 633]
158	Sept. 21	From the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	British Consul, referring to murder of naval attaché at Petrograd and arrest of nationals, proposes Bolshevik leaders in Maritime Province be held as hostages and requests concurrence.	690 [Pg. 690 includes portions of Doc. 633 and Doc. 634]
2876	Sept. 21	From the Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (tel.)	Reports of slaughter of citizens by Soviet; Italian Consul General's account. Arrest of British and French representatives.	691 [Pg. 691 is part of Doc. 635]
	Sept. 23	From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs discusses U. S. protest against Russian mass terror, and British proposals of retaliation for murder of attaché.	692 [Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637]
	Sept. 24	To the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Only means to check mass terror in Russia is set forth in Department's circular telegram of Sept. 20. Instructions to repeat circular to Vladivostok.	692 [Pg. 692 includes portions of Doc. 636 and Doc. 637]
				693 [Pg. 693]

	Sept. 24	To the Consul at Vladivostok (tel.)	Instructions not to concur in British proposal to take hostages but to await Department's circular telegram of Sept. 20.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 638, Doc. 639, and Doc. 640</i>
5182	Sept. 24	From the Ambassador in France (tel.)	France will join in common declaration to Russia. Previously, by radio, France had declared Bolshevik government responsible for atrocities.	693 [Pg. 693 <i>includes portions of Doc. 638, Doc. 639, and Doc. 640</i>
[Enclosure]	Sept. 24	The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation	Switzerland, through its Minister, has already signed protest against the reign of terror in Russia. Enclosure: protest of neutrals and German Consul General to Soviet government.	697 [Pg. 697 <i>includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648</i>
	Sept. 25	From the Chargé in Siam (tel.)	Siam will, in principle, join in protest against destruction of life and liberty in Russia.	693 [Pg. 693 <i>includes portions of Doc. 638, Doc. 639, and Doc. 640</i>
	Sept. 25	To the Minister in Switzerland (tel.)	Instructions to send copy of circular telegram of Sept. 20 for presentation to Bulgarian Government.	694 [Pg. 694 <i>includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642</i>
2898	Sept. 25	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	Sweden accords with sentiments of U. S. protest against mass terror; its Minister at Petrograd has joined colleagues in note rebuking barbarity of Soviets.	694 [Pg. 694 <i>includes portions of Doc. 641 and Doc. 642</i>
2830	Sept. 26	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Denmark agrees with sentiments of U. S. protest against mass terror but fears that it might change Bolshevik attitude toward neutrals.	695 [Pg. 695 <i>includes portions of Doc. 642, Doc. 643, and Doc. 644</i>
			Haiti disposed to impress upon	695 [Pg. 695

	Sept. 26	From the Minister in Haiti (tel.)	Soviet officials the reprobation which their crimes inspire in any civilized people.	<i>includes portions of Doc. 642, Doc. 643, and Doc. 644</i>
2913	Sept. 27	From the Chargé in Sweden (tel.)	The press reports recall of decree for mass terror, Moscow, Lenin and majority of committee agreeing thereto.	696 [Pg. 696 <i>includes portions of Doc. 645, Doc. 646, and Doc. 647</i>]
2054	Sept. 27	From the Ambassador in Italy (tel.)	Italy adheres to U. S. protest against mass terror in Russia.	696 [Pg. 696 <i>includes portions of Doc. 645, Doc. 646, and Doc. 647</i>]
1180	Sept. 27	From the Chargé in Norway (tel.)	Norway, through its Chargé at Petrograd, has protested to Soviet government against continuance of murders.	696 [Pg. 696 <i>includes portions of Doc. 645, Doc. 646, and Doc. 647</i>]
4667	Sept. 30	From the Minister in Switzerland	Switzerland, through its Minister, has already signed the enclosed protest against the reign of terror in Russia. Subenclosure: protest of neutrals and German Consul General to Soviet government.	697 [Pg. 697 <i>includes portions of Doc. 647 and Doc. 648</i>]
	Sept. 30	From the Minister in Nicaragua (tel.)	Nicaragua concurs in U. S. protest against mass terror in Russia.	698 [Pg. 698 <i>includes portions of Doc. 648, Doc. 649, and Doc. 650</i>]
	Oct. 1	From the Minister in Peru (tel.)	Transmits Foreign Office reply: Peru agrees to U. S. protest against mass terror in Russia and would deny asylum to those responsible for it.	698 [Pg. 698 <i>includes portions of Doc. 648, Doc. 649, and Doc. 650</i>]
			Great Britain agrees in principle	699 [Pg.

2399	Oct. 2	From the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	with U. S. protest against mass terror in Russia but considers declaration inadvisable until Allied nationals in Russia are out of danger.	699 includes portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652]
1570	Oct. 2	From the Chargé in Mexico (tel.)	Mexico will consider what attitude it should adopt when its own agents have reported on mass terror in Russia.	699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of Doc. 650 , Doc. 651 , and Doc. 652]
	Oct. 2	From the Chargé in Japan (tel.)	Japan will gladly join in U. S. protest against mass terror in Russia.	700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655]
17	Oct. 2	From the Minister in Persia (tel.)	The Persian Chargé in Moscow will be instructed regarding protest against mass terror in Russia.	700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655]
	Oct. 2	From the Minister in the Dominican Republic (tel.)	Quotes Dominican Republic's reply protesting against terrorism in Russia.	700 [Pg. 700 includes portions of Doc. 652 , Doc. 653 , Doc. 654 , and Doc. 655]
	Oct. 3	Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State	The Chinese Minister states his Government desires to join the United States in any protests against mass terror in Russia.	701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc. 657]
	Oct. 3	From the Swedish Minister	Transmits telegrams from Foreign Commissar to Swedish Minister in Russia, threatening reprisals for alleged atrocities against men, women, and children by	701 [Pg. 701 includes portions of Doc. 655 , Doc. 656 , and Doc.

			Czechoslovaks in Samara and Ufa.	657]
	Oct. 3	From the Minister in Paraguay (tel.)	Paraguay disapproves the terrorism practised in Russia.	702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , and Doc. 659]
	Oct. 4	From the Chargé in Salvador (tel.)	Salvador will participate in protest against mass terror in Russia.	702 [Pg. 702 includes portions of Doc. 657 , Doc. 658 , and Doc. 659]
[Enclosure]	Oct. 5	From the Netherland Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Chargé	The Netherland Minister in Russia has already protested against acts of terrorism.	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of Doc. 661 and Doc. 662]
[Enclosure]	Oct. 5	From the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation	Sweden has already joined in protest to Soviet government against terrorism. Enclosure: note from Soviet Foreign Commissar to neutral representatives, declaring their note of Sept. 5 to be interference in internal affairs of Russia.	705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 663]
2876	Oct. 7	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Danish Foreign Minister suggests that the Allies and the United States associate themselves with protests already made to Soviet government against terror and against violation of British Embassy.	703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661]
2034	Oct. 8	From the Chargé in the Netherlands	Transmits note of Oct. 5 from the Netherland Foreign Minister.	703 [Pg. 703 includes portions of Doc. 660 and Doc. 661]
	Oct. 8	From the Minister in	Guatemala protests against reign of	704 [Pg. 704 includes portions of

		Guatemala (tel.)	terror in Russia.	Doc. 661 and Doc. 662]
1428	Oct. 9	From the Chargé in Sweden	Transmits statement of Oct. 5 from the Swedish Foreign Minister.	705 [Pg. 705 is part of Doc. 663]
	Oct. 9	From the Minister in Cuba (tel.)	Cuba disposed to show aversion toward reign of terror in Russia; inquires as to form of protest suggested.	708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665]
	Oct. 9	From the Minister in Venezuela (tel.)	Venezuela applauds U. S. sentiment in offering to alleviate the sufferings of the Russian people.	708 [Pg. 708 includes portions of Doc. 663 , Doc. 664 , and Doc. 665]
	Oct. 11	From the Minister in Ecuador (tel.)	Ecuador will cooperate with the United States and other republics of America in protesting against outrages in Russia.	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668]
579	Oct. 11	From the Chargé in Greece (tel.)	Greece will join in protest against Russian terrorism.	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668]
	Oct. 15	From the Honduran Minister	Honduras, deploring the terrorism in Russia, adheres to U. S. protest.	709 [Pg. 709 includes portions of Doc. 666 , Doc. 667 , and Doc. 668]
143	Oct. 15	From the Minister in Belgium (tel.)	Belgium is willing to join in protest against Russian terrorism, if the United States judges it opportune.	710 [Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670]

	Oct. 17	From the Special Agent in Serbia (tel.)	Serbia is ready to join the United States in expression of aversion to terrorism in Russia.	710 [Pg. 710 includes portions of Doc. 668 , Doc. 669 , and Doc. 670]
	Oct. 17	From the Chargé in Argentina (tel.)	Argentina, in accord with the United States, condemns terrorism in Russia.	711 [Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , and Doc. 672]
	Oct. 18	From the Minister in Panama (tel.)	National Assembly of Panama expresses disapproval of terrorism in Russia and will join the United States in protest.	711 [Pg. 711 includes portions of Doc. 670 , Doc. 671 , and Doc. 672]
	Undated [Rec'd Oct. 22]	From the Consul at Moscow	Forwards copy of protest from the chief of the American Red Cross Commission in Russia to the Foreign Commissar against extreme measures of class terror adopted by Soviet government.	685 [Pg. 685 includes portions of Doc. 628 and Doc. 629]
2986	Oct. 22	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)	Since majority of Allied subjects now released from Russia, British Government will join the United States in protest against terrorism.	712 [Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674]
[Enclosure]	Oct. 26	From the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation	Bulgaria will join the United States in expressing disapproval of reign of terror in Russia.	717 [Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680]
	Undated [Rec'd Oct. 28]	From the Consul at Irkutsk (tel.)	Efforts for the release of hostages, including women, in Samara and Ufa.	712 [Pg. 712 includes portions of Doc. 673 and Doc. 674]
535	Nov. 1	From the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Supreme government at Archangel is convinced that all nations will unite in support of U. S. protest against terrorism.	713 [Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676]

				676]
	Nov. 1	From the Chargé in Great Britain	Transmits note of Foreign Commissar to chief of American Red Cross: counter-protest against alleged atrocities committed by anti-Bolshevik forces.	713 [Pg. 713 includes portions of Doc. 674 , Doc. 675 , and Doc. 676]
2039	Nov. 5	From the Ambassador in Spain (tel.)	Quotes Foreign Office note: Spain, through its Chargé in Petrograd, has already protested against acts of violence in Russia.	715 [Pg. 715 includes portions of Doc. 676 and Doc. 677]
622	Nov. 5	From the Minister in Portugal (tel.)	Portugal approves protest against acts of terrorism in Russia.	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679]
	Nov. 7	From the Consul General at Sofia	Transmits note of Oct. 26 from the Bulgarian Foreign Minister.	716 [Pg. 716 includes portions of Doc. 677 , Doc. 678 , and Doc. 679]
1887	Nov. 22	From the Colombian Minister	Colombia is willing to join in any statement denouncing terrorism in Russia.	717 [Pg. 717 includes portions of Doc. 679 and Doc. 680]
3178	Nov. 23	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Denmark desires opinion of the United States regarding advisability of withdrawal of its representatives from Petrograd and Moscow.	718 [Pg. 718 includes portions of Doc. 680 and Doc. 681]
1242	Nov. 30	To the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Not disposed to influence Denmark with regard to continuing its representatives in Soviet Russia.	719 [Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , and Doc. 683]
	Dec. 9	To the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes telegram of Nov. 9 from chief of American Red Cross in Russia, commending efforts to procure release of hostages, especially women.	719 [Pg. 719 includes portions of Doc. 681 , Doc. 682 , and Doc. 683]

272	Dec. 31	From the Consul General at Irkutsk (tel.)	Quotes his instructions to Vice Consul at Samara regarding release of women and children held as hostages.	720 [Pg. 720 includes portions of Doc. 683 and Doc. 684]
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CHAPTER XVI. BOLSHEVIK PROPAGANDA

EFFORTS TO COUNTERACT IT AND CHECK ITS DISTRIBUTION THROUGH SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES—WITHDRAWAL OF SWEDISH AND DANISH DIPLOMATIC OFFICERS FROM RUSSIA

No.	Date	From and to whom	Subject	Page
460	1918 Jan. 10	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Agent of Bolshevik Party declares intention to spread its doctrines in Scandinavia, England, and the United States.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687]
205	Jan. 14	To the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Report that Bolshevik government has sent money to Stockholm to use for propaganda in England and the United States.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687]
71	Jan. 16	From the British Embassy	Inquires what action the United States would propose toward Bolshevik propaganda sent sealed into a country to Bolshevik government's representative.	722 [Pg. 722 includes portions of Doc. 685 , Doc. 686 , and Doc. 687]
2045	Feb. 5	To the Ambassador in Russia (tel.)	Instructions, to be repeated to consuls, for issuance or refusal of visas.	723 [Pg. 723 includes portions of Doc. 687 and Doc. 688]
1473	Feb. 11	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Arrival of Bolsheviks in Stockholm to spread propaganda in Sweden, England, and France; supply of funds.	724 [Pg. 724 includes portions of Doc. 688 and Doc. 689]
6790	Mar. 7	To the Ambassador in Great Britain (tel.)	Instructions not to visa certain passports from Russia to the United States without directions from the Department.	725 [Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691]
2932	Oct. 13	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Bolshevik literature sent to England and France for distribution.	725 [Pg. 725 includes portions of Doc. 690 and Doc. 691]
2648	Nov. 6	To the Ambassador in Great	Instructions to report measures taken by England and France to counteract Bolshevik influence.	726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693]

		Britain (tel.)		
1337	Nov. 13	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Suggestion that neutral governments be invited to break off diplomatic relations with Soviet regime and to control their banking and propaganda.	726 [Pg. 726 includes portions of Doc. 692 and Doc. 693]
3859	Nov. 20	From the Chargé in Great Britain (tel.)	Measures adopted to check spread of Bolshevik propaganda in Great Britain.	727 [Pg. 727 includes portions of Doc. 693 and Doc. 694]
1383	Nov. 26	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish representatives meet to discuss policy in regard to Bolshevism.	728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696]
1382	Nov. 26	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Great Britain, France, and Italy advise Norway to take steps to prevent spread of Bolshevism.	728 [Pg. 728 includes portions of Doc. 694 , Doc. 695 , and Doc. 696]
3233	Nov. 27	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Report that Bolshevik agents, under false Swedish passports, will be sent to Holland and Switzerland and possibly to France, Belgium, and occupied territory.	729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , and Doc. 698]
1331	Dec. 2	To the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Instructions to repeat to London and Paris, for Colonel House, telegram No. 3233 and all similar reports about Bolshevik activities.	729 [Pg. 729 includes portions of Doc. 696 , Doc. 697 , and Doc. 698]
3281	Dec. 5	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Withdrawal from Russia of Swedish and Danish diplomatic officers.	730 [Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700]
3300	Dec. 9	From the Minister in Sweden (tel.)	Order for return to Sweden of Swedes in Russia and for withdrawal of diplomatic privileges from Soviet representatives in Sweden.	730 [Pg. 730 includes portions of Doc. 699 and Doc. 700]
1451	Dec. 14	From the Minister in Norway (tel.)	Departure of Norwegian Legation from Russia expected; protest of Norwegian Bolsheviks.	731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702]
3341	Dec. 23	From the Chargé in Denmark (tel.)	Discussion of food scarcity in Russia and recommendation for intervention. Effort to spread communistic propaganda in many countries.	731 [Pg. 731 includes portions of Doc. 700 , Doc. 701 , and Doc. 702]

Russia

Political Affairs and Diplomatic Relations

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[Reception of President Wilson's message of May 22, 1917, on the objects of the United States in the war—The Kronstadt revolt—All-Russian congresses of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, of Peasants, of Cossacks—Opening of the Russian offensive in Galicia \(Documents 51-75\)](#)

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[Attitude of the American and other governments toward the Bolshevik régime—Interviews of the American military attaché and Red Cross representative with Trotsky—Decrees abolishing private ownership of real estate—The beginnings of civil war—Elections to the Constituent Assembly—The Kalpashnikov incident \(Documents 247-327\)](#)

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[Temporary return of the American Ambassador to Petrograd—Nomination of a Soviet Ambassador to the United States—Development of Russo-German disputes—Attitude of Bolshevik and anti-Bolshevik elements toward German and Allied intervention](#) (Documents 540-565)

[Assassination of the German Ambassador, July 6, 1918; Socialist-Revolutionist revolt—Kerensky's proposed visit to America](#) (Documents 566-578)

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[Efforts to counteract it and check its distribution through Scandinavian countries—Withdrawal of Swedish and Danish diplomatic officers from Russia](#) (Documents 685-702)

Chapter I. The March Revolution—Abdication of the Emperor— Recognition of the Provisional Government¹

¹ Most of the papers included in this chapter were published in [*Foreign Relations, 1917, pp. 1205*](#)²–[12](#)³; they are here reprinted for completeness of the record.

[\[1\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, February 25, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received February 26, 12.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/272

[\[2\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 14, 1917, 1 p.m. [Received March 15, 2.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/273

[\[3\] The Minister in Sweden \(Morris\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, March 15, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received March 16, 12.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/275

[\[4\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 17, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received March 18, 9 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/281

[\[5\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 17, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received March 20, 3.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/289

[\[6\] The Russian Ambassador \(Bakméteff\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington, March 18, 1917. [Received March 19.]

File No. 861.00/287

[7] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 18, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received March 19, midnight.]

File No. 861.00/284

[8] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, March 19, 1917. [Received March 20, 4 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/286

[9] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 19, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received March 20, 6 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/288

[10] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 20, 1917. [Received April 26.]

File No. 861.00/330

[11] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, March 20, 1917, noon.

File No. 861.00/284

[12] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 22, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received March 23, 5 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/294

[13] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 22, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received March 23, noon.]

File No. 861.00/296

[14] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, March 13/26, 1917. [Received May 19.]

File No. 861.00/365

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 25, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received February 26, 12.15 a.m.*]

1056. Duma meeting February 27 anticipated with great uneasiness. Concerted action effort to produce strike and lawless demonstrations. Petrograd governor posted proclamations condemning strike and stating city under military law which [will] be enforced. Have requested guard for Austrian Embassy. Street-car gossip threatening toward our successors [secretaries] who charged being German sympathizers. Populace ignorant that we still represent Austria.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 14, 1917, 1 p.m.*
[Received March 15, 2.30 a.m.]

1287 [1087?]. Unable to send a cablegram since the 11th. Revolutionists have absolute control in Petrograd and are [making] strenuous efforts to preserve order, which successful except in rare instances. No cablegrams since your 1251 of the 9th, received March 11.² Provisional Government organized under the authority of the Duma which refused to obey the Emperor's order of adjournment. Rodzyanko, president of the Duma, issuing orders over his own signature. Ministry reported to have resigned. Ministers found are taken before the Duma, also many Russian officers and other high officials. Most if not all regiments ordered to Petrograd have joined the revolutionists after arrival. American colony safe. No knowledge of any injuries to American citizens.

FRANCIS

² Not printed.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 15, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received March 16, 12.30 a.m.]

224. In case telegraphic communication is interrupted with Petrograd owing to revolution I am cabling following which appears as an official statement of Russian telegram bureau which it is stated has been taken over by the committee of the Duma and which article appears in newspapers here as coming from official Swedish telegram bureau:

People in Petrograd enraged by complete lack of organization of transportation and food distribution and disturbed for a long time have secretly grumbled against the Government which they blame for their sufferings. Government foreseeing disturbance took extensive measures to keep order. It ordered disbanding of Imperial Council and Duma but Duma decided on March 11 not obey instructions Imperial decree. They continued in session and appointed Executive Committee consisting of twelve members with Rodzyanko, president Duma, as chairman. This committee proclaimed itself the Provisional Government and sent out following proclamation:

Because of inner disorganization caused by policy of old Government Executive Committee has found it necessary to take upon itself task keeping order. Fully aware of its decision committee convinced that people and army will help in difficult task of forming new Government which can fulfil wishes of the people and gain their confidence.

Supported by the people Executive Committee has caused revolution in the capital. Garrison in Petrograd consisting of over thirty thousand men has joined revolutionary party; has arrested and imprisoned all Ministers. Duma has declared that the Cabinet does not exist. To-day, the third day of revolution, order has been quietly restored in Petrograd. Capital is in hands Duma Executive Committee supported by the troops. Deputy Englehardt, colonel in General Staff, has been appointed commandant in Petrograd. Last night Executive Committee sent appeal to population, troops, railways, banks, requesting them return to normal life.

Stockholm papers this afternoon report murder of Protopopov and Sturmer.¹

Shall I continue cabling important press items concerning Russia?

MORRIS

¹ This report proved later to be untrue, see *post*, p. 161 [*Pg. 161 includes portions of [Doc. 119](#), [Doc. 120](#), and [Doc. 121](#)*]. Protopopov was Minister of the Interior at the time of the abdication of the Tsar; Sturmer had been Premier and Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1916.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 17, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[Received March 18, 9 a.m.]

1103. Abdication of Emperor and King [acting] for himself and son officially promulgated. It advocates vigorous prosecution of the war which it fears internal turmoils threaten to affect unhappily and states:

In accordance with the Imperial Duma we have considered it well abdicate the throne of the Russian Empire and to renounce the supreme authority. Not wishing to part with our beloved son we transfer our inheritance to our brother the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich and bless [him] on mounting the throne of the Russian Empire.

Milyukov is recognized by the Foreign Office staff. High member of staff tells me Emperor's brother replied would accept Imperial office if Russia so desired and would exercise its functions under direction of representatives of the people. Workingmen's committee still inveighing against monarchy and demanding social[ist] republic. Orderly quiet prevails to-day, no dissensions reported throughout all Russia. Summers² says revolutionary party in absolute control Moscow without bloodshed.

FRANCIS

² Maddin Summers, Consul General at Moscow.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State³

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 17, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received March 20, 3.30 p.m.]

Revolutionary movement actuated by bread riots and factory strikes broke out in Petrograd on the 12th after several preliminary disturbances during the previous weeks. Disorders accentuated by street fighting between mutinous regiments and loyal troops, the latter of which soon joined the popular movement as did all regiments sent to Petrograd. Demonstration then became general against former Imperial Government and particularly against the police, army officers and officials who declined to acknowledge the new authorities. Street fighting from Monday until Wednesday with comparatively light casualties but instances of atrocious murders of former officials. No Americans reported injured.

Strong committee of Duma under leadership president of that body immediately assumed control and arraigned before it all [except?] two of former Imperial Ministry and many other officials. Official committee of twelve divided between the Duma members and Social Democrats now apparently forming Provisional Government and have appointed a new Cabinet of which Minister for Foreign Affairs is now exercising functions. City is now quiet and situation apparently under control, only menace being possible socialistic demonstrations by minority socialist group. The movement is understood to be general throughout the Empire and known to be practically unanimous in Moscow. The papers of to-day authoritatively publish abdication of Tsar on behalf of himself and his son in favor of his brother, Grand Duke Michael, who is credibly reported to have stated that he will accept the power if the people so desire.

FRANCIS

³ Sent via the Legation in Sweden.

The Russian Ambassador (Bakméteff) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *March 18, 1917.*
[Received March 19.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a communication which I have just received from the Minister of Foreign Affairs at Petrograd.

I take this occasion to renew [etc.]

G. BAKHMÉTEFF

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Milyukov) to the Ambassador at Washington (Bakhméteff)

The news sent forth by the telegraphic agency of Petrograd has already apprised you of the late events and fall of the former political régime in Russia which lamentably collapsed before the popular indignation aroused by its shiftlessness, abuses and criminal improvidence. The unanimity of resentment created among all the sound elements of the nation by the order of things now removed perceptibly lightened and shortened the crisis. All these elements having with admirable enthusiasm rallied under the flag of the revolution and the army having given it speedy and effective support, the national movement in not more than eight days has gained a decisive victory. This quick achievement happily made it possible to reduce the number of victims to proportions unknown to the annals of so far-reaching and momentous upheavals. By an act dated in Pskov March 2/15, 1917, Emperor Nicholas II renounced the throne for himself and the heir, Grand Duke Alexis Nicholaevich, in favor of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich. Upon being notified of that act, Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich by an act dated in Petrograd March 3/16, 1917, in turn declined to assume the supreme power until a constituent assembly created on the basis of universal suffrage shall have established the form of government and the new fundamental law of Russia. By the same act the Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich bade the Russian citizens, pending the final manifestation of the will of the Nation, to bow to the authority of the Provisional Government constituted on the initiative of the Duma of the state and wielding full power. The composition of the Provisional Government and its political program have been published and forwarded to foreign lands. That Government which assumes power during the gravest foreign and domestic crisis

experienced by Russia in her history is fully conscious of the immense responsibility that rests upon it. It will give its very first attention to remedying the grievous shortcomings it inherited from the past, to insuring order and tranquillity in the country, to preparing in fine the requisite conditions for a free expression of the sovereign will of the Nation as to its future fate. In the field of foreign policies, the Cabinet in which I have taken the portfolio of Minister for Foreign Affairs will continue to respect the international undertakings made by the fallen régime and will redeem Russia's word. We shall carefully cultivate the relations which bind us to the other friendly and Allied nations and we are confident that these relations will grow more intimate and stronger under the new régime established in Russia, which has determined to be guided by the democratic principles of respect due to peoples, whether small or great, the freedom of their development and the good understanding among nations.

MILYUKOV

PETROGRAD, *March 5/18, 1917.*

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 18, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received March 19, midnight.]

1107. The six days between last Sunday and this have witnessed the most amazing revolution. A nation of two hundred million people who have lived under absolute monarchy for more than one thousand years and who are now engaged in the greatest war ever waged have forced their Emperor to abdicate for himself and his heir and have induced his brother to whom he transferred the Imperial authority to accept it on condition that a constituent assembly of the people so request and when so accepted to exercise its functions under authority of the government framed by that assembly. This is official information obtained by my personal unofficial calls to-day on Rodzyanko at his residence and Milyukov, Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his office. No opposition to Provisional Government which is Council of Ministers appointed by committee of twelve named by the Duma. Absolute quiet prevails here and throughout Russia so far as known. Rodzyanko and Milyukov both assure me that the entire army accepts the authority of Provisional Government and all appearances and advices confirm same. Plan of Provisional Government is to call a constituent assembly or convention whose members will be elected by the whole people and empowered to organize a good government. Whether that will be republic or constitutional monarchy is not decided but the conclusions of the assembly will be accepted universally and enforced by the army and navy. No concerted action in diplomatic conference; no meeting held or called. It has been customary for British, French and Italian Ambassadors to call daily together at the Foreign Office and they called upon Milyukov Friday, yesterday and to-day but have not formally recognized the Provisional Government. Milyukov tells me confidentially that Buchanan has authority from his Government for recognition but is waiting till Italian and French Ambassadors are likewise authorized. I request respectfully that you promptly give me authority to recognize Provisional Government as first recognition is desirable from every viewpoint. This revolution is the practical realization of that principle of government which we have championed and advocated, I mean government by consent of the governed. Our recognition will have a stupendous moral effect especially if given first. Rodzyanko and Milyukov both assure me that Provisional Government will vigorously prosecute the war;

furthermore upon Russia's success against the Central Empires absolutely depend the salvation of the revolution and the perpetuity of the government it establishes. The third of the eight principles in the manifesto issued announcing the new ministry and signed by the president of the Duma and all of the ministers is, "abolition all class, religious and national limitations." Answer.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 19, 1917.*
[*Received March 20, 4 a.m.*]

234. Russian Legation, Stockholm, has received through official press bureau following proclamation of Grand Duke Michael Alexandrovich:

Heavy burden has been placed upon me by the will of my brother in that he transfers Imperial throne to me at time without parallel, and during internal troubles. Inspired by same thought which inspired all the people that welfare of Empire goes before all else I have firmly resolved accept highest power only on condition that this is will of our great Nation as the people should establish form of government and new constitution of Russian Empire through plebiscitum expressed by its representatives in Constitutional Assembly.

Invoking highest blessing upon you I request all subjects of Russia to submit to Provisional Government formed on initiative of Duma and having all power and authority until within short time Constitutional Assembly chosen by general, direct, equal, and secret reelection shall express the will of the people by its decision regarding form of government.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 19, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received March 20, 6 p.m.]

1110. Orderly quiet still prevails. Present eminently wise arrangement estops claims of any pretended blood successor as the Grand Duke Michael represents hereditary succession after abdication of Tsar and the Tsarevich and his qualified acceptance nullified any pretender's claims by preserving Imperial succession until the people act.

Understand that Provisional Government needs funds badly. England has been financing Russia and is likely to continue whenever Allies unitedly recognize the present Government. Assistance to meet pressing necessities would be very opportune and highly appreciated. Financial aid now from America would be master stroke.

Immeasurably important to the Jews that revolution succeed. If Jews make such advances, however, great discretion should be exercised lest revolution assume a phase which would arouse opposition to [of] anti-Semites who are numerous here.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 274

PETROGRAD, *March 20, 1917.*
[*Received April 26.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report that as a result of serious economic, political, and military disturbances, the government of this city and district has been completely assumed by an Executive Committee of the Imperial Duma, at least for the time being.

On the beginning of the week of March 4, a shortage of black bread was noticeable. This at once caused unrest among the laboring classes. All other prime necessities within the means of the working classes had already gradually disappeared as the winter advanced: meat, sugar, white flour, buckwheat, potatoes. Fish, fowls, eggs, milk, cheese, and butter, had for a long time been so expensive that they were only within the means of the very well-to-do classes. The unrest first took visible form in the outskirts and factory districts of the city Wednesday, March 7, when the workmen struck after the dinner hour and met in groups to discuss the situation.

The next day, Thursday, March 8, there were spontaneous and isolated demonstrations. In many places, a few of the working class, mostly women, tired of waiting in the bread lines in the severe cold began to cry, "Give us bread!" These groups were immediately dispersed by large detachments of mounted police and Cossacks.

March 9, large crowds of women marched to the Kazan Cathedral (opposite the Consulate) with bared heads, still crying for bread and shouting to the police, "Give us bread and we will go to work." This crowd was peaceable and was dispersed.

Saturday morning the crowds, composed of workingmen and students, visibly with a serious purpose, came from all districts to the center of the city. Besides calling for bread, these crowds shouted: "Down with the Government! Down with the Romanovs!" and occasionally, "Down with the war!" The mounted police endeavored to drive the mobs from the Nevski, the main street, but resistance was made and barricades built on the side streets. The police withdrew after firing on and charging the crowds with whips without success. Their place was taken by infantry who fraternized with the people. Announcement was made by the police that after 6 o'clock that day, all groups of persons would be fired upon. The crowds did not disperse, and street battles took place, especially on the Nevski, resulting in great loss of life.

At this time the infantry and Cossacks refused to fire on the crowds or to charge them. Towards evening a detachment of Cossacks actually charged and dispersed a body of mounted police.

Sunday, when it became known that the Emperor had prorogued the Duma and that it had refused to recognize this order, there was disorganized and sporadic fighting all over the city, with heavy loss of life. The unmounted police were withdrawn from the streets. Many regiments which had been locked in their barracks mutinied during the night, killed some of their officers, and marched to defend the Duma, which was still sitting.

By Monday the disorganized riots developed into a systematic revolutionary movement on the part of the workingmen and the constantly growing numbers of mutinied troops, to capture the city of Petrograd. The fighting moved rapidly across the city from the Duma as a center, so that by Monday night only isolated houses and public buildings, upon which machine guns were mounted, were held by the police and the few remaining loyal troops. At midnight the Duma had announced that it had taken the Government into its own hands and had formed an Executive Committee to be the head of the Temporary Government.

Tuesday and Wednesday the fighting was confined to volleys from machine guns fired by the police from the isolated house tops, public buildings and churches, and the return fire by the soldiers, such fighting continuing until all police were taken. Violence necessary in arresting Government, army and police officials, took place at this time.

During these two days the fighting around the Consulate was severe, and on several occasions it seemed as if nothing could save the Singer Building from total demolition. Machine guns were presumably being operated from points of advantage in this building by police agents, as well as from neighboring buildings, the revolutionists replying with volleys from their rifles and machine guns mounted in automobiles. At 4.30 o'clock Monday afternoon troops, always without officers, entered the building. All the business offices in it had been deserted early in the day, except the Consulate. When the soldiers reached the third floor they were shown the location of the Consulate by one of the staff. They insisted on seeing the balconies of the Consulate, and several soldiers with members of the Consular staff entered the Consulate and satisfied themselves that no machine guns were located there. No damage was done in the Consulate, but other offices and the building itself were considerably injured.

Notice was given that kerosene would be poured on the building and burned. At 5.30 o'clock the Consulate was closed after everything of importance had been placed in the safe and notices posted on all the doors, stating that the nature of the office was foreign and contained only property of the United States Government. The staff left the building under heavy fire and with a guard.

At 6.30 o'clock, when the firing had ceased, it was arranged to have a Consulate employee constantly on duty, day and night. This alone saved the Consulate from

being violated, for Tuesday and Wednesday there was no order in the city and the Singer Building was visited five times by armed soldiers, many of whom were intoxicated, looking for weapons.

A military guard has now been furnished the Consulate and the office is intact and safe for the present at least. The fact that the Consulate is not in a separate building owned by the American Government is particularly unfortunate in this city, where the question of protection of Americans is so apt to arise, and where prejudices against firms located in the same building endangers the Consulate and the lives of the staff.

The Singer Building has been under suspicion since the beginning of the war as being German, the masses believing the Singer Co. to be a German corporation.

I have had to defend the American eagle on the top of the building, as it was believed to be a German eagle and the crowd intended to tear it down until I explained in Russian the difference between the American and German eagle.

The Consulate is keeping in touch with the members of the American colony, none of whom up to the present have been injured. As the Consulate is not at all suitable for housing purposes, having no kitchen, bath or sleeping accommodations, I have notified the members of the colony that in case they are turned out of their homes or hotels or have to leave for protection, they may come to my home, which is centrally located, where I could protect them and make them fairly comfortable.

I shall make only a limited number of observations on the political situation leading up to the economic situation in this district, it being supposed that the Embassy has already cabled a report in the matter.

Immediately following the assumption of national authority by the Executive Committee of the Duma, the Council of Workmen's Deputies challenged its exclusive authority. This council is a body which existed secretly during the old régime and represented the revolutionary workmen. Spontaneously a third authority appeared in the Council of Soldiers' Deputies which soon merged with the Workmen's Council under the name of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday (the 13th, 14th, and 15th) were, up to the present, the most critical times of the revolution, when there was immediate danger of civil war in Petrograd between the Duma and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. This crisis passed however, when, late on Thursday afternoon, a provisional agreement was reached. This agreement was based on a temporary ministry chosen from the members of the Duma with a political program of eight points:

- (1) Immediate political amnesty;
- (2) Immediate freedom of press, speech, meeting, the right to strike—these rights

- to be extended to soldiers in so far as compatible with military organization;
- (3) Immediate abolition of all caste, religious and race disabilities;
 - (4) Immediate preparation for a constitutional convention to determine the permanent form of national government;
 - (5) Immediate substitution of militia with elective officers, under control of local self-governing bodies in place of the old police system;
 - (6) Election to local self-governing bodies by universal direct, equal, and secret suffrage;
 - (7) Retention of arms by the revolutionary soldiery, the soldiery not to be removed from Petrograd;
 - (8) Retention of strict military discipline during actual service with full civil freedom to soldiers when not on duty.

On the 15th of March the Emperor abdicated for himself and for his son in favor of his brother, the Grand Duke Michael. On the 16th the Grand Duke Michael declined the throne unless it should be offered him by the Constitutional Convention. This again averted further civil war as it put all parties in agreement to await the Constitutional Convention.

The old police which was maintained by the national government as a part of the Ministry of the Interior, has been replaced by the city militia, a volunteer organization under the auspices of the National Duma and the board of aldermen. It is now maintaining order throughout the city and cooperating with the commissariats in the various wards. The commissariats are under the control of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which still sits in conjunction with the National Duma.

Passport regulations for foreigners have not been changed and are controlled by a new *gradonachalnik* (chief of city or chief of police) who is now, as formerly, dependent on the Ministry of the Interior.

A new mayor has been chosen by the aldermen. He is attempting to control and improve the local food supply which is again the danger point as at the beginning of the revolution. All necessities have to be brought to Petrograd from the provinces and a serious food shortage now exists. If it is not relieved at once it will cause further serious disorders capable of developing into new revolutionary movements with greater socialistic tendencies than heretofore.

To-day, March 20, for the first time in ten days, a very few electric street cars are running but not enough to constitute a resumption of the service. The workmen have not returned to the factories as was hoped.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 20, 1917, noon.*

1271. Your 1107, March 18.^{[1](#)} Please call on Milyukov, Foreign Minister of the new Government, and ask for an appointment with the head of the Provisional Government to acquaint him with the desire of this Government to open relations with the new Government of Russia. At your interview state that the Government of the United States recognizes the new Government of Russia, and that you, as Ambassador of the United States, will be pleased to continue intercourse with Russia through the medium of the new Government.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 22, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received March 23, 5 a.m.]

1120. Your 1271 received March 22, 10 a.m. Earnest congratulations, hearty thanks. Called on Milyukov 11 a.m. who is arranging for Ambassador to meet President of Council of Ministers this afternoon. President will be accompanied by Council of Ministers and I by my staff, including military and naval attaches in full uniform. Milyukov delighted at our recognition and much pleased that we are the first. This formal presentation is my suggestion which Milyukov heartily approves saying that moral effect will be great. Workmen returning to work; tramways operating. The Government has every indication of system, having sent representative to the Embassy who said arrangements about perfected for supplying [relieving] scarcity of food through established depots and gave location of office to which the Embassy should apply if it met difficulty in procuring supplies.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 22, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received March 23, noon.]

1124. Accompanied by Embassy suite was received by Council of Ministers 4.30 p.m. After introduction by Milyukov spoke as follows:

Mr. President of the Council of Ministers, I have the honor, as American Ambassador and as representative of the Government of the United States accredited to Russia, to state in accordance with my instructions that the Government of the United States recognizes the new Government of Russia and that I, as Ambassador of the United States, will be pleased to continue intercourse with Russia through the medium of the new Government. May the cordial relations existing between the two countries continue to obtain and may they prove mutually satisfactory and beneficial.

Every Minister present except Minister of War who out of city. Milyukov replied expressing great gratification and saying it was first formal recognition of new Government; was highly appreciated and would have great moral effect, etc. Have since heard that British and French Ambassadors formally recognized Government in note sent to Foreign Office 3 p.m., but I had formally recognized Government in interview with Milyukov at 11 a.m.

American Consul, Odessa, wired 18th, received to-day:

No strikes or disturbances have occurred in connection with the establishment of the Provisional Government here.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/365

[Document 14]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 657

PETROGRAD, *March 13/26, 1917.*
[Received May 19.]

SIR: In my unnumbered despatch of yesterday,¹ the original of which was sent in pouch to Stockholm and a copy of which is in this pouch, I gave the details and sequence of my recognition on behalf of our Government of the new Government of Russia.

I have the honor to forward herewith copies of the correspondence between the American Embassy and the Foreign Office on the subject.²

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure]

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Milyukov) to the American Ambassador (Francis)

No. 5112

PETROGRAD, *March 12/25, 1917.*

MR. AMBASSADOR: By a note of the 9th/22d instant, your excellency was good enough to set forth the circumstances accompanying the recognition by the American Government of the Russian Provisional Government, that is to say: that your excellency, having received on March 9/22 instructions from your Government to formally and officially recognize this Government, was good enough to call on me at 11 o'clock in the morning of the same day to inform me of the said decision of the Government of the United States and that the same day, at half past 4 in the afternoon, having come to the Council of Ministers with the staff of the Embassy, you were officially introduced by me to the Premier as well as to the Council and were good enough on that occasion, according to the instructions of your Government, to officially communicate the news that the Government of the United States recognizes the Russian Provisional Government.

I have the honor to thank you for this courteous communication and would appreciate it if you would kindly transmit to the Federal Government the lively gratitude of the Russian Provisional Government for the proof of friendly sympathy which the United States has been good enough to extend through its decision to the new democratic régime established in Russia.

I am certain that henceforth the ties of traditional friendship which unite our countries will become still closer and imbued with greater confidence for the good of the two nations.

Be good enough to accept [etc.]

PAUL MILYUKOV

¹ Not printed.

² Note of Ambassador Francis of Mar. 9/22 not printed.

Chapter II. The Provisional Government: Premiership of Prince Lvov

Contents

Relations with the Councils (Soviets) of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies—Efforts to check military and economic demoralization—The questions of constitutional reorganization, land reform, and peace—Messages from the American Government and the American Federation of Labor

[\[15\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 23, 1917. [Received March 24, 9.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/298

[\[16\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 23, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received March 24, 9.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/299

[\[17\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, March 27, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received March 28, 2.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/306

[\[18\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, April 3, 1917.

File No. 763.72/3743a

[\[19\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, April 3, 1917.

File No. 861.00/299

[\[20\] The Consul at Petrograd \(Winship\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, April 3, 1917. [Received May 7.]

File No. 861.00/345

[21] This Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 6, 1917, 1 p.m.

File No. 763.72/3748b

[22] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 7, 1917. [Received April 8, 12.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/316

[23] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 10, 1917. [Received June 26.]

File No. 861.00/405

[24] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 4/17, 1917. [Received June 26.]

File No. 861.00/407

[25] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 21, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received April 23, 9.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/327

[26] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 23, 1917. [Received May 18.]

File No. 861.00/371

[27] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 25, 1917.

File No. 861.00/328

[28] Baron Rosento President Wilson

Petrograd, undated. [Received April 25, 1917, 6.29 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/4093

[29] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 30, 1917.

File No. 763.72/4093

[30] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 29, 1917. [Received April 30, 8.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/333

[31] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 30, 1917. [Received June 13.]

File No. 861.00/386

[32] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 1, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received May 2, 6.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/340

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 23, 1917.*

[*Received March 24, 9.30 a.m.*]

1130. Provisional Government issues a ringing proclamation addressed to citizens, soldiers and sailors, signed by President [Premier] and all the Ministers. After stating that the enemy is taking advantage of internal dissensions, and concentrating his forces to strike a terrific blow, it appeals to the pride and patriotism of all; assures soldiers and sailors that their feelings and rights will not be ignored as heretofore, and appeals to them to present an unbroken front to an advancing foe whose victory would be a victory over the new order and over liberated Russia; that the army cannot be strong without the observance of strict discipline which cannot be enforced by accidental and temporary chiefs but only by officers trained as such, who know how to lead, and who will not abandon their men in the hour of peril. It promises that former insults will not be repeated, that officers will respect the honor and personality of their soldiers, and deserve the authority exercised. The proclamation is timely, should be effective. Guchkov also issues address to army with which he is quite popular. Holy Synod also issues appeal to Orthodox Russians to support new Government.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 23, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received March 24, 9.30 a.m.]

1127. Orderly quiet still prevails. Ministry daily strengthening but is compelled to handle socialistic element carefully and danger from that source is not entirely dissipated. Socialistic and labor organizations in England and France have cabled their colleagues here, pledged submission to the new Government and respect therefor as the only advisable course now, especially for vigorous prosecution of the war. Cable from Gompers and other well-known labor leaders direct to Petrograd labor leaders, or through the Embassy if he prefers, would be opportunely helpful. Time is precious as socialistic element composed of workingmen and soldiers holding continuous meeting in the Duma are advocating abolition of classes and the right of soldiers to disobey their officers. Small bodies of armed soldiers marching orderly through the streets but seldom under the command of officers. Police supplanted by city militia. Kerensky, Minister of Justice and exceedingly popular with workingmen and socialists, is exerting powerful influence by advocating orderly conduct and respect for law. Milyukov suggests that Gompers's cablegram be addressed to N. S. Cheidze, member of the Duma and of committee which selected the Ministry.

Our first formal recognition eliciting warm commendation.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *March 27, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received March 28, 2.30 p.m.]

1138. Please cable in ample time for publication here immediately after delivery the President's message to extraordinary session. Think it would have telling effect but would consult Milyukov before formally publishing.

Five Russian regiments which for ten days have been outwardly orderly but inclined to ignore officers and defy discipline yesterday were addressed by a superior officer who after predicting revolution and eliciting applause from soldiers asked if they desired to preserve the freedom gained and upon their enthusiastic affirmative reply stated that the only way to do so was to defeat Germany and that discipline was essential to success. The officer then asked if soldiers were willing to return and received an emphatic "yes." Determination to gain victory growing stronger daily. Officers in Petrograd held large meeting attended by military attaches of Allies; all pledged best efforts. Soldiers paraded Sunday with banners calling on workingmen to resume their work and make munitions which are required. Riggs invited to visit headquarters in the field, will start on Wednesday. About one hundred thousand soldiers here all favoring revolution. Decided majority have been under control of Workmen's Committee but observing and enforcing order. Problem for ten days has been to restore discipline.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 3, 1917.*

1291. In the course of his address to Congress last night, the President said:

A steadfast concert for peace can never be maintained except by a partnership of democratic nations. No autocratic government could be trusted to keep faith within it or observe its covenants. It must be a league of honor, a partnership of opinion. Intrigue would eat its vitals away; the plottings of inner circles who could plan what they would and render account to no one would be a corruption seated at its very heart.

Only free peoples can hold their purpose and their honor steady to a common end and prefer the interests of mankind to any narrow interest of their own.

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life.

The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor.

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 3, 1917.*

1292. Your 1127, March 23. From Gompers:

On March 21 I sent the following cablegram:

WASHINGTON, *March 21, 1917.*

N. S. CHEIDZE,
Russian Duma,
Petrograd.

We rejoice with Russia's workers in their newly achieved liberty. The splendid proclamation of your Provisional Government, declaring for free speech and press and the right of workers to organize and if necessary to strike for their rights, guarantees to Russia's workers opportunity for freedom and progress and assures the new Russia her future greater glory. International labor welcomes the triumph of freedom and the downfall of despotism throughout the world.

GOMPERS

Evidently the cablegram was either not received or if received not published. Will you please have delivered and made public the following message:

WASHINGTON, *April 2, 1917.*

N. S. CHEIDZE,
Petrograd.

Representative of working people of Russia, accept this message to the men of labor of Russia. We send greeting. The newly established liberty of Russia finds a warm response in the hearts of America's workers. We rejoice at the intelligence, courage and the conviction of a people who, even while concentrating every effort upon defense against foreign aggression, have reorganized their own institutions upon principles of freedom and democracy. But it is impossible to achieve the ideal state immediately. When the right foundation has been established, the masses can daily

utilize opportunities for progress, more complete justice, and greater liberty. Freedom is achieved in meeting the problems of life and work. It cannot be established by revolution only—it is the product of evolution. Even in the Republic of the United States of America the highest ideals of freedom are incomplete, but we have the will and the opportunity. In the name of America's workers whose watchwords are Justice, Freedom and Humanity we plead that Russia's workers and masses shall maintain what you have already achieved and [go on] to practically and rationally solve the problems of to-day and to safeguard the future from the reactionary forces who would gladly take advantage of your lack of unity to reestablish the old régime of royalty, reaction, tyranny and injustice. Our best wishes are with Russia in her new opportunity.

SAMUEL GOMPERS
President, American Federation of Labor

LANSING

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 283

PETROGRAD, April 3, 1917.
[Received May 7.]

SIR: I have the honor to report further, referring to despatch No. 274, dated March 20, 1917,¹ that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has issued the following proclamation to the peoples of the world, in the hope of provoking and encouraging a revolution in Germany:

TO THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD¹

We, workmen and soldiers, united in the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, send you our warmest greetings and inform you of a great event. The Russian democracy has overthrown the ancient despotism of the Tsar and enters your comity as an equal member and a powerful force in the struggle for our general freedom. Our victory is a great victory for universal freedom and democracy. The chief support of world-wide reaction, the "*gendarme* of Europe," is no more. May the earth rest as a heavy stone on its grave! Long live freedom! Long live the international solidarity of the proletariat and its struggle for the final victory!

Our labor is not yet finished; the shadows of the old order are not yet dissipated and not a few enemies are gathering their forces against the Russian revolution. But still our conquests are enormous. The peoples of Russia will express their will in the Constitutional Convention which will be called soon on the basis of universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage. And it may be already confidently stated that a democratic republic will triumph in Russia. The Russian people has full political liberty. Now it can express its all-powerful will in its own self-government and its foreign policy. And, addressing ourselves to all peoples, exhausted and ruined in the present monstrous war, we announce that the time has come to begin the struggle against the grasping tendencies of the governments of all countries; the time has come for all peoples to take the question of war and peace into their own hands.

In cognizance of its own revolutionary strength the Russian democracy announces that it will oppose in every way the grasping policies of its ruling classes, and it summons the peoples of Europe to decisive common measures in favor of peace.

And we address ourselves to our brother proletarians of the Austrian-German coalition, and above all the German proletariat. From the first days

of the war you have been assured that in raising arms against autocratic Russia you are defending Europe against Asiatic despotism. Many of you have seen in this a justification of the support you have given in the war. Now this justification is gone; democratic Russia cannot be a menace to freedom and civilization.

We will firmly defend our own freedom from all reactionary attempts whether from without or within. The Russian revolution will not withdraw before the bayonets of conquerors, and will not let itself be put down by foreign military power. Now, we summon you; cast off the yoke of your semiautocratic régime as the Russian people has thrown off the Tsar's autocracy; refuse to be an instrument of greed and rapine in the hands of kings, landowners, and bankers; and with our friendly, united efforts we will stop the awful slaughter that is a stain on humanity and that darkens the grand days of the birth of Russian freedom.

Toilers of all countries! We extend our hands as brothers over the bodies of our comrades, over rivers of innocent blood and tears, over the smoking ruins of cities and villages, over the ruined treasures of civilization, and call on you to restore and reinforce international harmony. This harmony is the guarantee of our victories and of the full freedom of humanity.

Workingmen of the world, unite!

This a step undertaken by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies undertaken their own initiative without consulting the Temporary Government, the Duma, or the soldiers at the front. This council is under the influence of a clique of very radical socialists; who adhere to the principles of the "International" as expressed at: the Zimmerwald and Kienthal international socialist conferences.

The moderate Socialists, among whom may be included A. F. Kerensky, present Minister of among, while not openly opposing this; proclamation, deprecate the bad effect it may have on the Russian soldier and workman.

The moderate socialists have publicly called attention to the excessive demands made by the workmen in many Petrograd factories, despite the agreement of a forty-seven-hour week and arbitration courts. In some cases the workmen refuse to accept decisions rendered by these courts and do not return to work.

In numerous instances foremen, managers and directors disliked by the workmen have been expelled under threat of violence, This applies especially to foreigners.

The radicalism of the Petrograd socialists is being overbalanced, I believe, by the calm seriousness of the provinces and the armies of the west and of the southwest. Disorganization due to the revolution is greatest in and around Petrograd.

The supplying of food to the people and of fuel and materials to the factories here continues but without improvement.

I have [etc.]

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [*Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)*].

¹ The date of this appeal was Mar. 14/27.

***This Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

WASHINGTON, *April 6, 1917, 1 p.m.*

1299. You are instated to announce to the Minister of Foreign Affairs that the Congress of the United States on the 6th formally declared and the President proclaimed a state of war to exist between the United States and the Imperial German Government.

You may say to Doctor Milyukov that the United States in thus arraying itself against the greatest enemy and menace to democracy in the world does so with a feeling of confidence in the ultimate, triumph of those principles of liberty and justice which it has main tained for nearly a centuty and civilized nations lies the hope of universal peace.

You may also say that the States rejoice that the great Russian people have joined the powerful democracies which are struggling against autocracy and wish to express to the Russian nation their sincere gratification that thus a new bond of friendship is added to those which have so long united the peoples of the two countries. It is the earnest hope and expectation of this Government that a Russia inspired by these great ideals will realize more than ever the duty which it owes to humanity and the necessity of preserving internal harmony in order that as a united and patriotic nation it may overcome the autocratic power which by force and intrigue menaces the democracy which the Russian people have proclaimed.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/316

[Document 22]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *April 7, 1917.*

[Received April 8, 12.30 p.m.]

1163. Your 1292. Gompers's cable delivered to Cheidze, Milyukov and press. Think it excellent and will have good effect.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 287

PETROGRAD, *April 10, 1917.*
[*Received June 26.*]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch on the subject of "The revolutionary movement in Petrograd," No. 274, of March 20, 1917.¹ The situation in regard to the food supply of the city of Petrograd, and in regard to the supply of materials and fuel to the factories here has taken a turn for the worse in the last week. This is due to the labor situation here. There is not a branch of industry in this city in which the workmen are not making excessive demands. There is no organization among the workmen with which the employers may deal and close firm agreements. Committees elected by the workmen and arbitration courts exist in every factory (established according to the agreement between the Petrograd Manufacturers' Association and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies) but both the committees and the courts are powerless. Strikes, partial and complete, arise on the least excuse, whether the question refers to wages, hours, overtime, managers, foremen or piecework, and the decisions of the committees, factory arbitration courts, and district arbitration courts are not obeyed. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has itself issued a proclamation to the workingmen of Petrograd warning against this disorganization and against excessive demands. All the extremely radical socialists have also warned against this. The effect of the warning has been, however, very slight. On the 6th of this month the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies issued a proclamation addressed to the employers and employees engaged in the draying business, stating that there are 6,200 loaded freight cars standing in the freight yards of Petrograd waiting to be unloaded. None of the truck drivers and freight-yard stevedores will work more than eight hours a day. They also refuse to work on Sundays and holidays. The proclamation states that the shortage of bread is due to this reduction in the hours of work. It is hoped that this crisis may be relieved by the soldiers' taking up this task. Before this proclamation was issued a similar appeal was issued by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies to the journeymen bakers who also refuse to work on holidays and more than eight hours on any other day.

There has been very little work done since the beginning of the revolution. The days from March 8 to March 21 were the days of the revolution, when no work was done at all. After that time until the present there have been three Sundays, one religious holiday, and one new holiday (the 5th of April, when the 180 victims of the revolution who were selected by the workmen's organizations as most worthy of the honor, were buried in the center of Mars Field). On this day about 800,000

took part in the funeral parade which entered Mars Field at 9 o'clock in the morning and ceased after 9 o'clock in the evening. This week is the week before Easter and it is understood that the workmen have decided not to work from Thursday the 12th until Sunday the 22d, a week after Easter Sunday, inclusive, a period of 11 days. Thus, up to the present, out of the last 33 days, 18 have been holidays and the work on the remaining 15, less than half, has been extremely irregular, listless and unproductive.

It has already been mentioned that in the first days following the formation of the Temporary Government, two governments existed simultaneously, and that both claimed supreme power. These were the Executive Committee of the Duma which elected the Ministers of the Temporary Government and the Council of Workmen's Deputies, later the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. These two organs were only brought together by the action of one man, A. F. Kerensky, a presiding officer of the Council of Deputies and a member of the Duma, who joined the Temporary Government as Minister of Justice. This insured that the Council of Deputies would support the Temporary Government at least for the time being. During the last week a strong group in the Council has severely criticized Kerensky on two grounds: first, his leniency to the Imperial Family, imprisoned in the palace at Tsarskoe Selo, and second, his release of General Ivanov. Ivanov started from the front for Petrograd in the first days of the revolution with a detachment of troops to quell the insurrection. Yesterday Kerensky unexpectedly appeared in the Council of Soldiers' Deputies, then sitting separate from the workmen's section, stated his position in both these matters and put a question of confidence declaring that if the assembly did not have full confidence in him and in any measure he chose to take he would resign. He received a full and enthusiastic expression of confidence. This is very important as it forestalled what might have become an open and fatal breach between the two existing organs of government.

Kerensky also stated that the Temporary Government was about to announce its freedom from any aims of conquest or territorial aggrandizement in continuing the war. This was to reply to the widespread and successful agitation at present being waged among the laboring class by the extreme antiwar socialists demanding that the war be continued on a basis of mere defense against the menace to the accomplishments of the revolution contained in the German military spirit. The chief principles of this agitation are contained in the "Proclamation to the People of the World," already reported. These agitators are opposed to the agreement between the Allies providing for the transfer of Constantinople to Russia¹ as this would involve enslavement of the Turks. They also oppose retaking the Polish territory now occupied by the Germans. Their campaign phrase is "peace without annexation or contribution."

A special conference of great significance also took place yesterday when the soldier delegates, elected at the front, held a session with the delegates from the workmen of the munition plants in Petrograd. The soldiers put a number of

questions among which were: If the present number of workmen is not increased, will the amount of work done during an eight-hour day insure a full supply of ammunition for the army? Will work be done on holidays? Why are there 6,200 freight cars standing unloaded? Why does Petrograd not resume work at this time when it is most needed?


Explanation was made that although the workmen made excessive and disorganized demands at first the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies was now in control, that many large factories were affected by a shortage of fuel and material, that energetic measures were being taken and that the workmen's demands were not excessive in view of the hardships they suffered before the revolution.

A resolution was adopted to the effect that since the enemy was most threatening the workmen must be supplied with food, work must go on with fresh energy and without any regard whatever for the number of hours or for overtime.

The announcement of the Temporary Government hinted at yesterday by Kerensky was made public this morning. This proclamation states that the Temporary Government aims at a successful termination of the war, no acquisition of territory, no subjugation of other nations, and a guaranty to all peoples that they shall be free to determine their own destiny. The government will stand by its obligations to the Allies not forgetting, however, the rights of its own country. These principles will govern the foreign policy of the present Ministry.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

[The following documents relating to a separate peace between Russia and Germany will be found in [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, Volume I](#) 

Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (No. 1308, April 12, 1917, 5 p.m.) requesting investigation of reports of peace negotiations between Russian and German socialists and stating that "a separate peace would make impossible any assistance for Russia, financial or otherwise, from this country."

Telegram from the Ambassador in Russia to the Secretary of State (No. 1192, April 14, 1917) reporting an interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, who is "absolutely certain no possibility of separate peace," and says, "socialists here have never so suggested but that most radical faction is advocating revolution in Central Empires, deposing ruling monarchs thereof, and thereafter negotiating universal socialistic peace."

Telegram from the Minister in Sweden to the Secretary of State (No. 300, April 14, 1917) giving the Swedish telegraph bureau's account of the peace discussion in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which resulted in the adoption of a resolution approving the appeal of March 27 to the peoples of the

world¹ but declared that the war must continue until the desired terms of peace without annexation could be obtained.


Telegram from the Minister in Sweden to the Secretary of State (No. 301, April 14, 1917) giving an account by the British Minister at Stockholm of the British and French labor missions to Russia “to convince their Russian confreres that peace on any other basis than that constantly had in mind by the Allies would be against the best interests of the Russian people as well as the Allies themselves.”

Telegrams from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (No. 1321, April 16, 1917, and No. 1337, April 19) transmitted for representatives of American Jewry and for the executive manager of the National City Bank, conveying arguments against a separate peace between Russia and the Central powers.

Telegram from the Ambassador in Russia to the Secretary of State (No. 1225, April 25, 1917) containing the reply of the Russian Provisional Government to telegram No. 1321, see *supra*, which reply contained the assurance that “no Russian party, whatever its political program, has contemplated nor could contemplate the eventuality of a separate peace with the foreign aggressor.”

Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (No. 1339, April 19, 1917) requesting a report for the purpose of publication to allay apprehensions concerning the possibility of a separate peace; and telegrams from the Ambassador in Russia (Nos. 1213 and 1215, April 21) conveying positive assurances that no such possibility existed.]

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)].

 ¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. 1.

¹ Quoted in the despatch from the Consul at Petrograd Apr. 3, *ante*, p. 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of [Doc. 19](#) and [Doc. 20](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 703

PETROGRAD, April 4/17, 1917.
[Received June 26.]

SIR: In my unnumbered despatch of March 25, copy of which was sent you by both routes, Atlantic and Pacific, I gave the local situation up to that date, which included the recognition of the new Government on March 22.¹ For a week or ten days thereafter the tension continued very great, as the Council of Ministers, or Provisional Government, was trying to establish itself, but was so fearful of the consequences of a test of strength with the Workingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies that it proceeded very cautiously. The soldiers were permitted to parade with banners and bands throughout the city and the workingmen if returning to work at all were making unreasonable demands as to wages and as to hours and in some or many instances were selecting their own foremen. There has been no contest between these two authorities up to this time and I think there is likely to be none. The Provisional Government, or Council of Ministers, has been gaining strength from day to day; they have made two visits in a body to the front and at this writing the entire situation is much better than it has been at any day since March 12 when the first regiment mutinied.

Representatives of the workingmen's party and of the soldiers continue in session daily at the Duma or Tauride Palace and I think meet in the Duma Hall. On Friday last, March 31/April 13, this body passed by an overwhelming majority a resolution favoring a vigorous prosecution of the war to a successful issue and either the same day or the day after adopted another resolution endorsing the Provisional Government.

As to whether the Constituent Assembly will adopt a republican form of government or a constitutional monarchy is an open question and will be greatly influenced by the course of the war between now and the convening of that assembly. A very important duty of the Council of Ministers, or the Provisional Government, is to arrange for an election of members to this Constituent Assembly. The date or location of this assembly has not been fixed. There is a strong sentiment for having it held at Moscow instead of Petrograd, and that may become a very live issue. In fact, there are many open advocates now of removing the capital from Petrograd to Moscow. A Provisional Government has now been "in the saddle" for about one month; before many weeks pass there may be rumors started to the effect that this Council of Ministers is too long delaying a calling of a Constituent Assembly and is doing so because it desires to continue itself in

power. The general impression is that Rodzyanko is in favor of a constitutional monarchy and that Milyukov is also so inclined, but that Minister of Justice Kerensky, who is a Social Democrat and who has conducted himself most admirably, favors a republic.

While many of the restrictions on the Jews have been removed, it is still inadvisable that they should be very much in evidence as it is very easy to arouse an anti-Semitic movement in this country. A confidential cable just received from the Department concerning an American commission with a prominent Hebrew as a member thereof will be taken up by me to-morrow with Minister Milyukov and will perhaps be discussed with other members of the Ministry also.

This Council of Ministers is composed of able patriotic men among whom no clashes of interest or great divergence of opinion has yet been made manifest.

It has been my effort, and in such effort there has been no cessation, to impress upon all the importance of a vigorous prosecution of the war and to subordinate thereto all questions as to the rights of races or the recognition of classes. One cause, as I wrote the Department in more than one despatch, of the lukewarm attitude of the Imperial Ministry concerning the Avar was the fear of such a revolution after the success of the Allies as has already taken place. The Romanov dynasty and its supporters evidently saw a great curtailment of their power, if not an overthrow thereof, in the event Germany and Austria should be defeated and weakened, as there would then be no strong government left in Europe to sustain an absolute monarchy.

The Jews have undoubtedly been subjected to many injustices and unjust restrictions in Russia and all fair-minded people are pleased that most if not all of such restrictions have been removed. The prejudice against the race however has by no means been eradicated; it pervades the peasants to a wonderful extent and that prejudice will be fanned into flame by opponents of the present régime if any reason therefor is given or can be charged with any appearance of truth.


In reply to your cable concerning a separate peace received April 1/14, I cabled the result of a conference with Milyukov.¹ While I was talking with him in the Foreign Office delegations of British and French socialists were awaiting an audience and subsequently he phoned me that they had come to Russia for the purpose of advising Russian socialists to push the war vigorously and to give no thought of a separate peace as the socialists of Germany and Austria-Hungary were more devoted to their respective countries than they were to socialistic doctrines or at least were pursuing the policy of achieving a victory for the Central Empires first.

This pouch will be sent by a courier, one of the Embassy delegates who is returning to America via the Pacific; it should reach Washington not later than May 25.

I have [etc.]

DAVID E. FRANCIS

¹ Not printed; see telegram of Mar. 22, *ante*, p. 12 [*Pg. 12 includes portions of [Doc. 11](#), [Doc. 12](#), and [Doc. 13](#)*].

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, April 21, 1917, 3 p.m.
[Received April 23, 9.30 a.m.]

1211. Extreme socialist or anarchist named Lenin making violent speeches and thereby strengthening Government; designedly giving him leeway and will deport opportunely. Government reports to me personally in connection with negotiation for loan that discipline of army constantly improving. Sixty-three generals have been dismissed for inefficiency, not for sympathy with previous régime. This action by the Chief of Staff with approval of Ministry. Every discharged officer replaced by another younger and more capable, and army assured that promotion hereafter be for merit, not favoritism. Some promotions conferred officers close to Tsar whose cause they abandoned only after abdication. These statements made to me personally after my saying would recommend no loan without reliable assurance of no separate peace and pledge of government for vigorous prosecution of the war. Some Americans anxious about reported German advance on Petrograd but Ministry reassuring against such advance if attempted. Very important, however, that congestion at Vladivostok and on Siberian Railway be relieved by prompt shipment of railroad equipment and arrival of strong experienced manager. Situation offers excellent opportunity which our ablest managers should be ambitious to embrace. British Ambassador tells me unofficially that he recommends Russian Government to give us control at Vladivostok and of entire Siberian Railway. English have control at Archangel.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 295

PETROGRAD, April 23, 1917.
[Received May 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to despatch No. 274 of March 20, 1917, "The revolutionary movement in Petrograd,"¹ and to state that the All-Russian Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies adopted, after long and often stormy debate, the resolution, on the relation of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies to the Temporary Government, summarized below. The first resolution introduced into the All-Russian Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies was withdrawn after being subjected to severe criticism especially from the more extreme elements of the conference. The resolution is, in substance, as follows:

1. The Temporary Government, which arose during the progress of the revolution, has published a program-platform to which the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has given its adherence.
2. The All-Russian Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies admits that this program-platform contains the fundamental demands of the Russian democracy, and that up to the present time the Temporary Government, in general and as a whole, is carrying out this program.
3. The conference calls on the entire Russian revolutionary democracy to gather around the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as the centers of democratic organization created by the revolution, which, in alliance with other progressive forces, are capable of resisting the Imperial and the *bourgeois* counter-revolutions, and of widening and fortifying the conquests of the revolution.
4. The conference recognizes the necessity of a constant political control of, and pressure on, the Temporary Government, and on its provincial organs, in order to insure its perseverance in an energetic struggle with the counter-revolution, in decisive efforts to fully democratize Russia and in preparation for the conclusion of a general peace without annexations or contributions, based on the right of each nation to determine its own future.
5. The conference calls on the democracy to support the Temporary Government, but not to assume responsibility for the entire Temporary Government in all its acts, in so far as it labors to organize and broaden the conquests of the revolution and in so far as it bases its foreign policy on a surrender of annexationist principles.
6. At the same time the conference calls on the Russian democracy, gathering

around the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, to be ready to decisively resist every attempt made by the Temporary Government to escape the control and pressure of democracy, or to avoid putting into effect the promises contained in the program platform.

The substance of the program-platform and an account of its origin were given in despatch No. 274 of March 20, 1917.

The resolution as adopted is considerably longer and fuller than the first resolution introduced. The words "and on its provincial organs" in paragraph 4 were adopted at the insistence of the deputies belonging to the Social Revolutionary Party. The extreme socialists, Maximalists, voted for the resolution, as adopted, after the reediting of paragraphs 3 and 4 in the sense of a more clear, decisive and radical phraseology. The speech made by the representative of the majority in the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in favor of the resolution in its final form, was a strong appeal for support of the Temporary Government. Tseretelli declared that the Temporary Government had sought the assistance of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in the first moments of the revolution, and had entered into a definite contract with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, as expressed in the program-platform. This program-platform, he said, was the minimum demand of the revolutionary soldiers and workmen, that they must assist the Temporary Government in attaining this minimum and that they must not, at the present, strive for more and greater radical reforms than they could realize and make permanent. The soldiers and workmen, he said, must keep to this line of action until it should become plain that the Temporary Government ceased to represent the entire revolutionary democracy of all classes of the Russian people and represented only the selfish interests of a part of the middle class.

The attitude toward the Temporary Government, expressed in the resolution and as amplified by Tseretelli, as just explained, is the attitude now held by all fractions of the socialist element in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies except the fraction of Maximalists. The Maximalists, however, do not advocate an immediate break between the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and the Temporary Government, but insist that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should act more aggressively toward the Temporary Government and urge it to faster and more sweeping reforms, especially in the field of foreign politics. The Maximalists, for instance, demand an immediate peace conference in which the socialists' views expressed at the Zimmerwald conference should prevail, and they openly oppose the new "Loan of Liberty" on pacifist grounds. The Executive Committee of the Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has voted to actively support the loan, but the vote was not unanimous, being 21 for to 14 against.

Lenin, the anarchist-communist, whose return to Russia via France and England was not allowed by the French and English Governments, and who obtained a

laissez-passer and extraterritorial rights for himself and his party and their baggage through Germany, is now in Petrograd and is a daily contributor' to the organ of the Maximalists, but his most extreme demands, for immediate cessation of the war, disbanding of the army and distribution of its arms and ammunition among the people, overthrow of the Temporary Government and establishment of a commune and socialist dictatorship over the whole of Russia by the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, adoption instead of a parliamentary republican form of government of a republic of Councils of Workmen's and Peasants' Deputies, abolition of the police, and all existing officials, all officials to be elective and removable at their electors' will, and none of them to be paid more than the average salary of a good workman, confiscation of all lands without payment and their nationalization under the control of local peasants' deputies with separate councils of deputies for the poorest class of peasants, union of all banks in the country into one national bank under the control of the Council of Workmen's Deputies, have been decisively condemned by all the socialist parties except the Maximalists.

Before closing, the All-Russian Conference of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies adopted a number of other resolutions, most important of which is the one concerning the Constitutional Convention. This resolution declares that the convention should be called in Petrograd as soon as possible; representatives should be elected on the basis of universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage for all men and women above 20 years of age, with no qualifications regarding length of residence in a locality, and that the army should vote separately without any limitation on the preparatory political campaign in the army; that the central organ of all the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should take an active part in preparing the election law, and should control the course of the elections; that the main questions to be decided by the convention are the following: the form of government and the fundamental laws of Russia, questions of race and nationality, forms of local government, questions of international politics, democratization of the army, the land question, labor legislation, and questions regarding national economics. During the debates on this resolution it became clear that the convention is not expected to be able to meet before September and that the elections will all be held on one day except at the front, although there was a tendency among some delegates to urge that the elections in the cities, where the revolutionary and socialist workmen are strongest, should be held before the elections in the provinces so as to influence the provincial elections.

Thirteen resolutions were adopted concerning labor questions, the most striking of which are the resolutions endorsing the establishment of an eight-hour day by law everywhere in Russia, a universal minimum wage, arbitration courts in all industrial enterprises, factory and labor inspectors, imported contract labor (Chinese), unemployment and social insurance. The resolution on the land question includes a demand that all estates of more than a maximum area should

be confiscated without payment by the Constitutional Convention and distributed among the people, and that the Temporary Government should at once forbid all land deals except mortgages necessary in this agricultural season and approved by local committees, which should at once be elected by universal suffrage in all townships, counties, and provinces to settle questions of rent, wages, and other disputes regarding land. The resolution admits, however, that the final decision of the land question belongs solely to the Constitutional Convention.

A resolution containing the outlines of an organization of second All-Russian Conference was also adopted.

The food supply of Petrograd is still under normal but is not alarming at the present moment. The Temporary Government has introduced transport service obligatory on the owners of all horse and motor cars, wagons and trucks, as well as a system whereby the owners of all passenger automobiles must turn over their machines to the United Transport Division for service under its order from six to ten hours on three or less than three consecutive days. Payment is to be made for this service. The card system has been introduced for bread, flour, sugar, as well as gasoline.

Since the revolution no newspapers have appeared on Sunday afternoon or Monday morning. It is interesting to note that a certain Mikhailov, one of the most extreme and energetic of the Maximalists in Petrograd, a typesetter on the newspaper *Day* and an influential member of the printers' union, who has been extremely active, taking a strong attitude against the Temporary Government and especially supporting the printers' refusal to work on Sunday, has been found to have been regularly in the employ of the old Department of Police as a spy and *agent-provocateur* and is now under arrest.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1917.*

1350. At request of Mr. Gompers, transmit following to N. S. Cheidze:

Executive Council, American Federation of Labor, in regular session here as representatives of the labor movement of America send fraternal greetings to you and through you to all who have aided in establishing liberty in Russia. We know that liberty means opportunity for the masses, especially the workers. The best thought, hopes and support of America's workers are with your efforts to form a government that shall insure the perpetuity of freedom and protect your rights and new-found liberty against the insidious forces and agents of reaction and despotism. May we not urge you to build practically and constructively? Our heartfelt sympathy is with you in the great opportunity and work that lie before you. Samuel Gompers, James Duncan, James O'Connell, Jos. F. Valentine, John R. Alpine, H. P. Perham, Frank Duffy, William Green, W. D. Mahon, John B. Lennon, Frank Morrison, Executive Council, American Federation of Labor.

LANSING

Baron Rosen¹ to President Wilson

[Telegram]


PETROGRAD, *undated*.

[Received April 25, 1917, 6.29 a.m.]

Public meeting convened in Petrograd town hall by Society for Promoting Friendly Relations between Russia and America.² After being addressed by American Ambassador and Foreign Minister sends to you and the American people whom you represent in such noble way its fraternal greetings and expression of admiration for your constant upholding of the great principles of freedom and right. We are deeply convinced that our two countries which represent the greatest democracies of the world will remain forever closely united and work in common for the progress of humanity.

BARON ROSEN
Chairman

¹ Russian Ambassador at Washington, 1905–11.

² For the account by the Ambassador in Russia of the Russian-American meeting of Apr. 23 in the hall of the City Duma at Petrograd, mainly devoted to denunciations of the idea of a separate peace, see his telegram No. 1217, Apr. 24, 1917, [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I](#) .

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 30, 1917.*

1362. Warmly express to Baron Rosen President's appreciation of his telegraphic greetings of April 25 sent as chairman of the public meeting at Petrograd of Society for Promoting Friendly Relations between Russia and the United States. The President desires you to assure Baron Rosen of his confident trust that new Russia, imbued with the same spirit of true democracy as is the United States, will remain firm in combating the armed forces of autocracy and in insuring, by the final overthrow of military despotism, the lasting peace of the world and the universal acceptance of the principles of right and justice and the recognition of human freedom.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/333

[Document 30]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *April 29, 1917.*

[Received April 30, 8.30 a.m.]

1235. Beginning at 10 o'clock to-day there was a continuous demonstration in front of the Embassy for two hours during which a concourse of over fifty thousand people with banners and bands passed cheering the Embassy. I made five speeches which were translated into Russian. Rodzyanko was discovered in the crowd and came to the balcony on invitation and spoke. Demonstration was more enthusiastic because of threatened hostile demonstration.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 297

PETROGRAD, April 30, 1917.
[Received June 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 274, dated March 20, 1917, "The revolutionary movement in Petrograd,"¹ and to report further that one of the most favorable signs of the week was the resolution adopted by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies strongly denouncing the Maximalist Lenin and his followers, mentioning them by name as "Leninites." Lenin's propaganda was declared dangerous and counter-revolutionary. This is sure to have a most salutary effect, as it will force Lenin and his followers to openly adopt an attitude of opposition to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies thus depriving them of authority among the great mass of the workmen and soldiers. A large demonstration of the wounded and sick soldiers of the Petrograd hospitals took place Sunday the 29th, and is important as it throws a clear light on the demands and political ideas of a large part of the soldiery, which has not, like the garrison of Kronstadt, caught up, without understanding them, the mottoes and ideas of the socialist agitators. The wounded met in two of the halls of the Duma and in both places socialist members of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, who were not clear enough and definite enough in their opposition to Lenin, were forced to discontinue their speeches. The President of the Duma, M. V. Rodzyanko, was greeted with furious applause. The resolution of the meeting was in effect as follows:

1. Full confidence is expressed in the Temporary Government, which is the sole and supreme authority in the land, and in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which should exercise a control over the Temporary Government.
2. The agitation now being waged by Lenin and his followers is dangerous to the revolution, his action in traveling through Germany was an act most injurious to the Russian nation, and the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies should explain the injurious effect of Lenin's agitation to the workmen and soldiers and strive to paralyze his propaganda by every means in its power.
3. The reservists of the elder ages should be released from the army and their places filled by the members of the middle classes who are avoiding service by holding positions in the rear of the army.
4. All lands, whether belonging to the Government, the ex-Emperor, monasteries, or private owners, should belong to the Nation and should be shared among all those who can and care to work on them with their own hands.

5. All wounded who have lost either upper or lower extremities should be furnished with artificial limbs which should be renewed by the Government during the life of the wearer.

Paragraphs 6, 7, 8, and 9 include demands concerning the children of crippled soldiers.

10. Greetings are being sent to our allies and a request that they should not cease to believe that Russian army and people will continue the war, in agreement with their allies, to a victorious end.

The attitude of the newspaper, the *People's Task*, the organ of the Social Revolutionists (moderates), which is published with the collaboration of A. F. Kerensky, Minister of Justice, is becoming more and more uncompromisingly hostile to Milyukov, on the question of the aims of the war; it is claimed that Milyukov is an imperialist-annexationist, and it is demanded that he make public the treaties of alliance with France and England, that the Temporary Government take energetic steps to bring France and England to a declaration regarding the war similar to the one issued by the temporary Russian Government.

Discontent in Finland is reported in the papers. The rate of exchange, established by the Bank of Finland for the Russian ruble, has dropped from 214 to 206 in the last week. It held steady at 214 all winter, under the old régime. The bill introduced into the Finnish "Seim" (lower House) to give certain commercial and industrial rights to Russian subjects in Finland is not progressing rapidly. This bill is meant to take the place of the bill giving similar rights to Russian subjects, put in force by the old régime in violation of the legislative rights of Finland. The bill for equal rights was the cause of a good many Finnish judges and court officials, who refused to enforce it, being sent to Siberia, and was abolished by the Temporary Government along with all other laws and regulations forced on Finland in violation of its rights and privileges. Bills have been introduced providing for the reestablishment of an independent Finnish post office and currency. In many of the border towns where Russian currency has always been accepted, it is now being refused. There is also great discontent in Finland with the action of some of the sailors of the Russian Baltic Fleet who interfered forcibly in a labor dispute in Finland, forcing the manufacturers to grant an eight-hour day to their workmen. In the first business meeting of the Seim, the head of the Finnish government, Senator Tokoi, made a speech in which he declared that on the deposition of Nicholas II, the Grand Duke of Finland, all juridical connection between Finland and Russia ceased and the powers held by the Emperor passed to the Finnish Senate and Seim. This view is opposed by the Russians, who claim that the powers held by the Emperor including his rights as Grand Duke of Finland passed to the Temporary Government, which holds them temporarily until the meeting of the Constitutional Convention.

Considerable disquiet has been caused during the past week by the events connected with the journey of P. N. Perevertsev to Kronstadt, at the head of a

judicial commission under instructions from A. F. Kerensky, Minister of Justice, to investigate the officers imprisoned by the workmen and sailors, and not yet released. The commission released nine officers. A mob of workmen, soldiers and sailors at once gathered, arrested the commission and condemned them to death in an open-air meeting. The members of the Kronstadt Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies who had been working in conjunction with the commission of the Temporary Government, succeeded in protecting the lives of Mr. Perevertsev and the commission, under the condition that none of them ever return to Kronstadt. After the departure of the commission the mob rearrested the released officers, whom they wanted to execute, but were stopped after considerable difficulty by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

The question as to the support of the new "Loan of Liberty," which was decided favorably by the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, came up before the plenum of the Conference of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies on the 29th. It was decided to postpone this question for three days as the Temporary Government had announced to a representative of the Council that within three days the Temporary Government would issue a statement of the practical results flowing from the official surrender of annexationist and contributionist aims contained in the declaration of the Temporary Government in regard to the war. The Council decided to settle the question of the support of the loan in accordance with the nature of the Temporary Government's new declaration concerning the war and imperialism. This question of the loan is most important, as the loan's success among the monied classes will be fatally compromised if the workmen and soldiers aggressively oppose it. At this same meeting the Council decided to permit battalions of the Petrograd garrison to be sent to the front when their training is finished, subject to the consent of the Executive Committee of the Council.

This Consulate apprehends that it may be thought in America that the success of the revolution in Russia means that all parties are united. In my reports I have endeavored to make it clear that the movement succeeded because of the general dissatisfaction on all sides with the old Government and its system. But the old régime was thrown off before any definite plan for Russia's future was drawn up; therefore the problems ignored by the Imperial Government now confront the new.

The variance of opinion among the different parties will make the discussion of these large problems very complicated and bitter. It must not be taken for granted that the following questions are settled: distribution, government, imperial and private land, relations to Finland and other contiguous territory, national autonomy within Russia, the centralized (bureaucratic) system of administration, the internal organization of church and its relation to the government, and the racial relations between the Hebrew population and the Russian peasant and artisan classes.

If these matters are not handled expeditiously and tactfully by the Temporary Government, there is danger that the people will take the matter into their own hands locally and sporadically.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [*Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 1, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received May 2, 6.15 p.m.*]

1241. An immense crowd of enthusiastic Russians have just left Embassy where they came to extend salutation from free Russia to free America and at their earnest and repeated request, I am now expressing their greetings to their brother freemen in the United States. Speeches were made by several in the crowd and I made response thereto. All of the speakers declared that Russia would not think of making separate peace and they wished to hear no more from America about it. They request that a wreath be laid on the grave of Washington and that their best wishes for long life and happiness be conveyed to President Wilson.

FRANCIS

Reorganization of the Government—Demonstration against the note of May 3, 1917, to the Allied and American Governments—Resignation of Milyukov and Guchkov—The coalition ministry—Opinions of American consuls on the situation

[\[33\] The Russian Chargé \(Onou\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington, May 3, 1917. [Received May 4.

File No. 763.72/4389

[\[34\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, May 4, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received May 7, 12.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/343

[\[35\] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, May 5, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/349a

[\[36\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, May 5, 1917—7 p.m. [Received May 8, 4.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/350

[\[37\] The Consul at Petrograd \(Winship\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, May 8, 1917. [Received June 21.]

File No. 861.00/393

[\[38\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, May 11, 1917—7 p.m. [Received May 13, 10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/356

[39] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 13, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received May 15, 7 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/358

[40] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 14, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received May 16, 4.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/361

[41] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 15, 1917. [Received June 20.]

File No. 861.00/395

[42] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 15, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.]

File No. 861.002/46

[43] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 16, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received May 18, 8.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/363

[44] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1917. [Received June 26.]

File No. 861.00/406

[45] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 19, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received May 20, 5.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/367

[46] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 20, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received May 22, 7 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/375

[47] The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 21, 1917. [Received May 22, midnight.]

File No. 763.72/4834

[48] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 21, 1917. [Received June 26.]

File No. 763.72110/658

[49] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, May 22, 1917. [Received June 28.]

File No. 861.00/413

[50] The Secretary of State to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko)

Washington, May 26, 1917.

File No. 763.72/4834

The Russian Chargé (Onou) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

No. 343

WASHINGTON, *May 3, 1917.*¹
[Received May 4.]

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE: The Provisional Russian Government, on March 27 [old style/April 9, new style], published a manifesto to the citizens in which it set forth the views of free Russia's Government on the aims of the present war.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs directs me to communicate to you the said document and to accompany it with the following remarks:

Our enemies have lately been endeavoring to sow dissension among the Allies by propagating inane reports about the alleged intention of Russia to conclude a separate peace with the Central Monarchies. The text of the enclosed document will best refute such fabrications. The general principles therein enunciated by the Provisional Government are in entire agreement with the lofty ideas that have constantly been proclaimed to the most recent hour by eminent statesmen in the Allied countries. Those principles have also been given luminous expression in the words of the President of our latest ally, the great Republic beyond the seas. The government of the old régime in Russia assuredly was not in a position to imbibe and share those views on the liberating character of the war, the creation of a stable basis for the pacific cooperation of the peoples, the liberties of oppressed nations, etc. Emancipated Russia can now speak a language that will be understood by modern democracies and hastens to mingle her voice with those of her allies. Imbued with this new spirit of a freed democracy, the Provisional Government's declarations cannot of course afford the slightest ground for the deduction that the collapse of the old edifice means a lesser share taken by Russia in the common struggle of all the Allies. Quite to the contrary, the national will to carry on the world war to a decisive victory has been still further accentuated by that sense of responsibility which now rests upon all jointly and severally. This tendency has been rendered even more active by the fact that it is centered on the immediate task which all have so much at heart—that of driving back the enemy who invaded the territory of our fatherland. It remains understood, and the enclosed document expressly so states, that the Provisional Government, while safeguarding the rights acquired by its country, will continue the strict observance of the engagements assumed toward Russia's allies. Firmly convinced of the victorious outcome of the present war, and in perfect accord with its allies, the Provisional Government is equally sure that the problems arising out of this war

will be solved by means of the creation of a firm basis of a lasting peace and that, inspired by identical sentiments, the Allied democracies will find means of obtaining the guarantees and sanctions needed to prevent a recurrence of sanguinary conflicts in the future.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

C. ONOU

[Enclosure—Translation]

Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, March 27/April 9, 1917

The Provisional Government, having looked into the military situation of Russia, has decided in the name of its duty to the country to give the people straightforwardly the whole truth. The power that has now been overthrown left the defense of the country in a difficult and disorganized situation. Through its guilty inaction and unskilful measures it disorganized our finances, supply service, transportation, and the furnishing of the army with ammunition. It has shaken our whole economic organization. The Provisional Government, with the lively and active cooperation of the whole people, will devote its entire strength to repairing those weighty consequences of the old régime. There is, however, but little time. The blood of many sons of the fatherland has been lavishly spilt in the course of these two and one-half long years of war, yet the country is still under the power of the mighty enemy who occupies whole territories of our state and in these present days of the birth of Russian freedom, threatens us with another decisive onslaught. The defense, at any cost, of our national patrimony and the liberation of the country from the enemy who has invaded our borderlands constitute a capital and vital problem for our warriors who are defending the freedom of the people. Leaving it to the will of the people, in close union with our allies, finally to settle all questions relative to the World War and its conclusion, the Provisional Government deems it its right and duty to declare here and now that free Russia does not aim to dominate other peoples and deprive them of their national patrimony, to occupy foreign territories by force, but to establish a firm peace on the foundation of the right of peoples to determine their own destiny. The Russian people do not covet any accession of power abroad at the expense of other peoples, do not aim to subjugate or degrade any one. In the name of the higher principles of equity it has removed the shackles that weighted down the Polish people. But the Russian people do not admit that their country should come out of the great struggle debased or shaken in its vital forces. These principles will form the basis of the foreign policy of the Provisional Government, which unfailingly carries out the will of the people and safeguards the rights of our country, while abiding by the pledges given to our allies. The Provisional Government of free Russia has no right to hide the truth from the people—the state is in danger. Every element of strength must be brought into play to save it.

Let the country respond to that truth—not with a futile depression and discouragement, but with a unanimous *élan* arising out of the creation of a unified national will. It will give us renewed strength for this struggle and will secure our salvation. May the whole country, in the trying hour of ordeal, find within itself the needed strength to consolidate the freedom that has been conquered and devote itself to untiring labor for the welfare of free Russia! The Provisional Government, which has taken a solemn oath to serve the people, is firmly convinced that with the general and unanimous support of each and every one it will be in a position to fulfil its duty to the country to the very end.

PRINCE LVOV
President of the Council

¹ The date on which this note was sent out by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, for communication to the American and Allied Governments, was May 1, and it is generally referred to as of that date in historical accounts and in the discussion which followed in Russia; see despatch from the Consul in Petrograd, No. 300, May 8, *post*, p. 42 [*Pg. 42 is part of [Doc. 37](#)*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 4, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[Received May 7, 12.50 p.m.]

1248. New Government passing through trying ordeal caused by opposition of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies being dissatisfied with Minister for Foreign Affairs' note of May 3 communicated to Allied powers through Russian representatives and explaining or amplifying note of April 10[9] on ends of war. Crowds and one or two organized regiments marched streets yesterday afternoon and evening with banners calling for Milyukov's resignation and few banners demanding peace. I conferred with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War jointly 6.30 afternoon; told them unless gave better evidence of established Government must ask my Government to make specific demands before furnishing credit or supplies; that if present Government resigned or failed to assert itself would [advise] my Government to withhold all support as another revolution would result in German successes in Russia and reestablishment of monarchical government. Both assured me had no intention of resigning and that workingmen did not so desire as they knew it would mean withdrawal of our support and perhaps that of all Allies but that workingmen desired to control policy of present Government. I told them they could not so afford as such course would lose them respect of Russian people and of all their Allies as well as their own self-respect. At 10 p.m., during conference between workingmen's committee and Council of Ministers, there was demonstration around building unfriendly to Government officers but later friends of Government congregated in such numbers as to overwhelm opponents. Atmosphere seems clearer to-day. This opposition is by Lenin and his followers who I think are inspired and possibly paid by Germany. Shall cable further developments. No bloodshed.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/349a

[Document 35]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 5, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1382. Instruct all American consuls Russia to report confidentially on political situation their districts, strength and position Zemstvo organizations, movement for readjustment land ownership, peace propaganda if any, etc.

POLK


The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 5, 1917—7 p.m.*
[*Received May 8, 4.05 p.m.*]

1253. Continuing my 1248, May 4. Street demonstrations continued but eventuated in overwhelming demonstration for Ministry. Every banner favoring Lenin was destroyed when seen, evidently by action majority of citizens here [supporting] Ministry which has no opposition elsewhere in Russia. Minister for Foreign Affairs who lunched with me to-day is much elated over situation. Ministry issued another note yesterday explaining note of May 3 which explanation merely reiterates previous but has appeased workmen's committee. Will Department reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs' note May 3 reiterating Provisional Government's statement of April 10 [9] giving ends of war which communicated through Russian Embassy there or shall I reply and if so have you any suggestions in that connection?

FRANCIS

[In a telegram from the Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (No. 1385, May 7, 1917) there was transmitted a message from the American Federation of Labor to the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, arguing for an interpretation of the peace formula, "no annexations, no indemnities," in the sense of "no forcible annexations, but that every people must be free to choose any allegiance it desires," and no "punitive and improper indemnities," and warning against "international" conferences as instigated by the Kaiser. Any intent on the part of the United States to influence the form of government which Russia shall eventually adopt is disclaimed. See [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, Volume I](#) .

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 300

PETROGRAD, May 8, 1917.
[Received June 21.]

SIR: I have the honor to refer to my despatch No. 274 of March 20, 1917, "Revolutionary movement in Petrograd,"¹ and to report that as soon as the text of the note to the Allied Governments accompanying the declaration of the Temporary Government of the 10th [9th] of April² became known to the public of this city through the morning newspapers of May 3, it was evident that there would be serious and intense opposition to this accompanying note, especially from the radical socialist-pacifists. The text of the note was received in the editorial rooms of all the newspapers during the night from the 2d to the 3d of May and all the socialist organs, without exception, printed the text of the note on the 3d of May with the sharpest criticism. With one voice they declared the note to be a step backward and a slap in the face of the "Revolutionary Democracy of Russia." It must not be forgotten that in their mouths the words, "Revolutionary Democracy of Russia," refers only to the socialistic democracy, not to the democracy of all classes.

The Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies assembled at midnight of May 2, and sat until 3.30 o'clock in the morning of the 3d. It also reassembled in the forenoon of that day and called an extraordinary meeting of the full Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies for that night at 6 o'clock. At this meeting [of] the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the Executive Committee urged extreme caution and care on the Council in this matter, and requested the Council's permission to have a joint meeting-conference with the Temporary Government which would be reported to the Council before further action. This permission was granted. During this day, May 3, the Finland Regiment left its barracks and marched to the Mariinski Palace where the meetings of the Ministry are held. Soon after the Finland Regiment, the Moscow, the Kexholm and the 180th Regiments also marched toward the palace with placards inscribed, "Down with imperialistic (annexationist) policies!" "Down with Milyukov!" "Down with Milyukov and Guchkov!" These regiments had been called out by persons pretending to be authorized to do so by the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, but as soon as it became known the Executive Committee at once took measures to persuade the soldiers to return to their barracks, which they did quietly.

By nightfall the enormous square in front of the Mariinski Palace was covered with people and the Morskaya Street, leading into the square, was jammed with

paraders both for and against the Temporary Government. During this time two placards were placed on the building formerly occupied by the German Embassy, now vacant, with the inscriptions, "Hurrah for the German working class!" and "Down with Milyukov!" At 10 o'clock the joint meeting of the Temporary Government with the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Duma began. In view of the secret announcements to be made by the Minister of War and the Minister of Agriculture concerning the military and food situations, the press was excluded from the meeting. The meeting began by a declaration of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies that they had not called out the soldiers to protest against the Temporary Government.

The Minister of War announced that the situation in the army is extremely serious and that everything possible must be done at once to weld together its forces, which the events of the day would only separate and disorganize. He was followed by the Minister of Agriculture who made a short announcement that the food situation was favorable but not secure. The Minister of Finance then called attention to the danger that the day's events threatened in weakening the ties between Russia and the Allies on whom Russia is most dependent at the moment for military supplies and finances, particularly America. He also stated that the Ministry is preparing laws regarding large direct taxation and direct war tax on capital and income, but that time is needed for these measures and that a loan, whose success is put in jeopardy by the day's events, is the only possible means the Government has of raising the funds immediately needed. The Minister of Ways of Communication also made a short announcement.

After the Minister of Ways of Communication, N. S. Cheidze, President of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, stated that the note accompanying the declaration of May 1 [March 27/April 9] contains statements absolutely unacceptable to the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. The note confuses the objects of the war, he said, contains no mention of the surrender of annexations and contributions, and may give our allies an absolutely false conception of the position assumed by the democratic classes of Russia.

He was followed by I. I. Ramashvili, a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, who demanded that the Temporary Government send another note to the Allies. He stated that the present Minister of Foreign Affairs had completely failed to understand the psychology of the new revolutionary Russia, that everything in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the same as it had been before the revolution, and that the ambassadors and ministers in foreign countries had not been replaced.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, P. N. Milyukov, then spoke. He stated that the note in question was merely a note enclosing the declaration of the 1st of May [27 March/9 April], which remains the more important of the two. He reminded the

meeting that this question concerns the Allies also and must be handled most carefully, and stated that the opposition to it is based on a mistaken interpretation of its phrases and a desire to find sentiments in it which do not really exist. He further pointed out the unpleasant effect the recent events would have on the Allies, and that Mr. Ramashvilli's proposal to send a second note is utterly impossible. He continued that if Russia undertakes to act in this way with her allies, with whom she is bound by a whole series of intricate and delicate relations, she will meet with decided opposition from the Allies. He then read to the meeting a secret telegram just received.

After Milyukov's speech Cheidze and Ramashvilli stated that the facts brought before them by the members of the Temporary Government persuaded them to meet the Temporary Government half way, that the Council of "Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies" had supported the Temporary Government all the time, but that the Temporary Government must at once issue an explanation of the note of May 1.

In the debate following this announcement, I. G. Tseretelli, a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, stated that the note of May 1 was unsatisfactory in certain parts. The announcement, "War to a complete victory," contains the entire meaning which was given to the war by the overthrown Tsar. Therefore these words inevitably aroused the discontent now visible on the streets. He stated it was absolutely necessary to explain these words, so that their meaning would be perfectly and indisputably clear. He added that this explanation should be sent to the same address as was the note itself. This, he declared, was the only exit from the present crisis.

After a speech by Shulgin, a member of the Executive Committee of the Duma, V. M. Chernov, a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, demanded that the methods and personnel of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs be changed radically. It must be plainly stated that Milyukov, who has always been an advocate of certain solution of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus question, expresses only his personal opinion and not that of the Temporary Government itself.

The former member of the Second Duma, now a member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, Mr. Zurabov, stated that if the Allies were not willing to go hand in hand with Russia in the surrender of annexations and contributions, then Russia cannot continue the fight for them.

After a speech by Adzhemov, a member of the Executive Committee of the Duma, the debates were closed and the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies requested that the Temporary Government write out the text of a new declaration explaining the note of May 1.

On May 4 groups formed on the sidewalks of all the principal thoroughfares throughout the city. By 4 o'clock the workmen of many factories struck and

formed parades. These demonstrations were all hostile to the Temporary Government and bore placards and flags inscribed, "Down with the war!" "Down with Milyukov!" and "Down with the Temporary Government!" One of the largest of the parades formed on the Petrograd side and crossed the river heading for the Nevski Prospekt. This parade consisted mostly of adherents of Lenin. Among the placards and flags it bore a large black flag with white skull and crossbones. As it approached the corner of the Catherine Canal and the Nevski, going in the direction of the Mariinski Palace where the Temporary Government was supposed to be sitting, a crowd of unarmed soldiers which had formed at the corner shouted to pedestrians to support them in dispersing this procession of armed anarchists. This appeal was immediately responded to and the crowd thus gathered halted the advancing procession. Soldiers started to tear the anarchistic banners from the hands of the Leninists and some one of the workmen fired two shots, killing one noncommissioned officer and wounding a Red Cross nurse; after this the Leninites dispersed. A very large parade of Government sympathizers immediately formed and proceeded to the Mariinski Palace. In the evening about 9 o'clock a similar conflict took place between soldiers and another Leninist manifestation parade in which three persons were killed and seven wounded.

By 10 o'clock, the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which was then still sitting, issued an order forbidding all street parades and gatherings for two days and the streets were cleared by armed soldiers. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, after listening to the report of the joint meeting between its Executive Committee and the members of the Temporary Government, adopted the following resolution:

The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies greets the revolutionary democracy of Petrograd which has showed, by its meetings and parades, the intense attention it is giving to foreign politics, and the anxiety aroused by any threatened departure in the direction of the old annexationist-imperialistic policies.

The note of the Minister of Foreign Affairs dated May 1 and accompanying the declaration of April 10 [9], gave ground for such anxieties. This now forces them to express themselves before all democracies and before the entire world, regarding annexations and regarding the aims of the war in general.

The note of May 1 could only be taken as an attempt to belittle the real meaning of the declaration of April 10 [9]. Its tone, its phrases, its formulas, were all taken from the verbal arsenal of the Tsar's old diplomacy, now hated by the people. This note was such as to arouse the just apprehension that the Temporary Government intended to depart from the position assumed by the declaration of the 10th [9th] of April.

The unanimous protest of the workmen and soldiers of Petrograd has showed the Temporary Government and the whole world that the

revolutionary democracy of Russia will never permit a return to the aims and methods of the Tsar's foreign policy and that the task of the revolutionary democracy is, and will be, a ceaseless struggle for international peace.

The new explanation of the Temporary Government, demanded and called forth by this protest, and announced by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Ambassadors of the Allies, puts an end to any possible interpretation of the note of May 1 in the sense opposed to the interests and demands of the revolutionary democracy. The fact that the first step toward the international discussion of the question of the surrender of annexations and contributions has been taken must be admitted to be a great victory for democracy.

Declaring its firm determination to continue the fight for peace, the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, calls on the entire Russian revolutionary democracy to gather closer and closer around its councils and expresses the firm belief that the democracies of all the belligerent countries will break down the opposition of their governments and force their governments to commence negotiations on the basis of a surrender of annexations and contributions.

In the opinion of this consulate, the importance of the crisis just passed is not at all in the nature of the conflict or in the merits of the question as to whether the note of May 1 accompanying the declaration of April 10 [9] was, or was not, a departure from the declaration itself. The fact that stands out clearly and indisputably from the events of the 3d and 4th of May is that the Temporary Government realizes its lack of authority over the troops in Petrograd and its inability to police the city. On the day following the shooting the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies issued a manifesto to "all citizens" calling on them to maintain order, quiet and discipline. A part of the manifesto is addressed to the soldiers and reads as follows:

Comrade Soldiers: Do not go out on the streets with arms in your hands without a summons from the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Only the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has the right to make use of you. Every order for military detachments to go on the streets (except the usual parties) should be written on the letterhead of the Executive Committee, sealed with its seal, and signed by not less than two of the following members of the committee: Cheidze, Skobelev, Binassik, Filipovski, Goldman, Bogdanov. Each order should be verified by calling telephone number 104-06.

By the phrase, "except the usual parties," is meant the usual detachments sent out to guard public buildings, to drill, etc. While the order was in part meant to

prevent the calling out of troops by irresponsible persons, as occurred on the morning of May 3, it has the effect of transferring the entire garrison of Petrograd from the hands of the military authorities, the regiment commanders, the chief of the military district of Petrograd, and the Ministry of War, to the hands of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

It is considered worth while to quote here in full an editorial in the Sunday edition of the *Workmen's Gazette*. This paper is the organ of the so-called Minimalist fraction of the Social Democratic Party and stands at the left of the moderate socialists. It is distinctly opposed to the Maximalists and the Maximalist Lenin. The editorial sums up the situation very clearly.

TWO DAYS' LESSONS

Petrograd has lived through two stormy days. Mr. Milyukov's note was a match in a barrel of gunpowder. The phrase about a decisive victory was understood by the masses of workmen and soldiers in the only way it could be understood; namely, in the sense of war until a complete defeat of Germany is achieved, etc. And since this threatens to drag out the terrible war the answer to the note in the form of a demonstrative protest became not only possible but also psychologically inevitable.

Unfortunately this protest did not take the form of organized action but took form in a series of isolated parades. Further, at times, the street's protest took the form of attempts, gentle, to be sure, but attempts, to overthrow the Temporary Government. This was sure to call forth action from the other side. And in fact we saw how the march of the Finland Regiment to the Nevski and the Mariinski Palace called forth (other parties)¹ to the support of the Temporary Government. In these days the green flag of the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Cadets, or the Party of the People's Freedom), the party of the majority of the Ministers of the Temporary Government, appeared on the streets for the first time, showing that the street is beginning to free itself from the exclusive control of the proletariat.

And the crazy answer to the crazy attempt to tear down placards (bearing inscriptions calling for the overthrow of the Temporary Government) was in the nature of conscious or unconscious provocation. (The word provocation is used here to mean the work of *agents-provocateurs*.) After those shots had been fired, people went over to the support of the Temporary Government who would not support Mr. Milyukov's Dardanelles policy, and the adherents of the Temporary Government filled the central portions of the city.

It was plain to all who watched events that new forces came into being on those two days, forces that are ready to defend the Temporary Government against attacks from the left (i. e., from the socialists).

Taken by itself this is a good thing. The democracy (by “democracy” is meant socialists) can only be pleased to see a distinct force, knowing what it wants, growing up before it in place of a formless mass. This gives the democracy (socialists) a chance to estimate their strength. The existence of classes that can outline their own intentions so swiftly proves that it is no light task to overthrow the Temporary Government upheld by them. It is a task much harder than the overthrow of the old régime. The old régime was supported only by bayonets. Therefore the difficulty was to overthrow it, not to maintain power once it was overthrown. The difficulty of overthrowing the present government is of a different sort. It is very easy now to arrest and to seize power; but it is hard to hold power once it is gained. The last few days have shown that civil war would immediately follow the overthrow. Both sides would suffer by such a war and the only gainer would be the *tertium gaudens* now symbolized by the prisoner at Tsarskoe Selo.

Therefore all attempts to seize the governmental power by partial attacks is not only a crazy attempt but also a terrible crime against the revolution and against the interests of the working class which are inseparable from the revolution.

So far the editorial confines itself to a statement of the developments of the last few days. Further it goes on to state that the socialists must fight on two sides, on one side against anarcho-communism, as represented by Lenin and the Maximalists, and on the other against the advocates of the annexation of the Dardanelles as represented by Milyukov and the English and French newspapers. The paper declares that both tendencies lead toward civil war.

In another editorial in the same issue of the same paper another question is touched upon which is also most significant of the state of mind of the socialists and on which they all agree who now control the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, which is to-day the power behind the throne in Petrograd at least.

THE SOLUTION

In the declaration of the 10th of May [9th of April?], now again confirmed, it is clearly stated that the aim of free Russia is not the control over other peoples, nor the seizure of their national inheritance, nor the violent annexation of their territory, but the foundation of a permanent peace on the basis of the right of each nation to determine its own future. If the war was being waged only between Germany and Russia, then after this declaration it would rest upon Germany to say the decisive word. It would rest upon her to end the war, by announcing, in her turn, that she does not desire that Russia, in the words of the declaration of the Temporary Government, should “issue from the war humiliated and injured in her vital

strength.”

But not only Russia and Germany are opposed in this war. Almost the whole world has split into two coalitions. Beside Russia in one coalition stand England, France, Italy and other countries united by common treaties. And in the declaration of April 10 [9] the Government states that it will maintain complete faith with the obligations already undertaken toward the Allies. And it is these very obligations toward the Allies that create the greatest anxiety in the Russian revolutionary democracy at the present moment. It is impossible to close one's eyes to the fact that now that Russia has given up annexationist desires the existence of these obligations toward the Allies threatens to postpone the liquidation of the war according to the principles enunciated by the democracy (i. e., workmen, soldiers and socialists).

It would be a great mistake to propose to simply tear up these obligations toward the Allies because they were signed under the old régime. It is not the aim of the democracy to get a speedy peace for Russia but to establish as soon as possible, together with the democracies of the world, a permanent peace for the whole world. The one-sided tearing up of the treaties of alliance now would increase the split in the international democracy and would be taken by the democracies of the countries in alliance with Russia as a stab in the back.

There is only one solution; namely, that the democracies of all the countries allied with Russia should unite in a common struggle to have the treaties of alliance revised in the sense of a common surrender of annexations and in the sense of a clear statement of the conditions on which peace, based on these surrenders, could be concluded. The declaration of the Temporary Government has changed the character of the treaties of alliance with the Allies. Russia gives up annexations, and this annuls the paragraphs in the treaties which provide that the Allies should help Russia to make and maintain such annexations. This fact gives moral force to the demand that Russia should be freed from the obligation to fight for the annexationist desires of any one of the Allies. The declaration of the Temporary Government logically leads to the revision of the treaties in this sense, since obligations must be mutual. The democracy should urge the Temporary Government to maintain the dignity of Russia as a member of the coalition with equal rights.

But the methods of the revolutionary democracy of Russia are not limited by national boundaries. It should address itself to the democracies of England and France and the other countries in the belligerent alliance with Russia over the heads of all governments, bring pressure on these democracies to demand the same things at home. The efforts of the Russian democracy may be paralyzed without the active support of the democracies

of other countries. Therefore steps in this direction should be taken at once. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies must organize delegations to all these countries as soon as possible and empower them to press on the democracies of those countries in the above sense.

Simultaneously with this there should be an energetic campaign to summon an international socialist congress which would unite the democracies of all countries on a common peace platform, including neutrals as well as belligerents.

The active labors of the revolutionary democracy of Russia will strengthen its position in Russia itself and will make it the leader (in the struggle) for a permanent world peace. The active labors of the revolutionary democracy of Russia will dispel the shadow of a separate peace which cannot unite, but can only disunite international democracy. This method of international action is harder and more difficult than any other but it is the best from the point of view of the welfare of democracy.

The paper from which the editorial was taken agrees with the other socialist papers, the only difference being that some of the others adopt a violent and shouting tone, whereas the *Workmen's Gazette* is restrained in its choice of words. The danger in such editorials, which are appearing daily in all socialist organs, is that the ignorant masses, who profess socialism and follow socialist leaders, may misunderstand and apply the propositions brutally, clumsily, and immediately. The statement that the war is not being waged alone between Russia and Germany is being interpreted among the masses as meaning that if only Germany and Russia were at war a solution of the war could be easily reached at once, that it is the capitalist classes of England and France that are forcing the continuance of the war in their own selfish interests. It has been said Russia is fighting so that England may annex the German colonies. That this is the case has been preached all the time by the man Lenin and his followers. The respectable socialist papers, such as the *People's Task*, stating on its first page that it is edited "with close collaboration of A. F. Kerensky" (Minister of Justice), and such as the *New Life*, edited by Maxim Gorky, and the *Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies' News*, official organ of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, continually say and hint the same thing. The same idea is also given open and authoritative expression in the resolution of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies adopted on Saturday, May 5, regarding the new loan. This resolution states that the "Loan of Liberty" is necessary and should be supported, but it also contains the following clause:

The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies supports the loan because the loan is the quickest way to raise funds and the failure of the internal loan would place Russia in still further dependence on the imperialistic (annexationist) circles of France and England.

This distrust of the Allies and this feeling of being forced to continue a distasteful and irksome war which is being preached openly and [un]disguisedly by all the socialist organs and leaders, was the hidden cause of all the events of the 3d and 4th of May. The socialistic masses feel that Milyukov, and more indirectly the whole Temporary Government, is acceptable to the Allies and is willing, if not anxious, to force Russia to fight the Allies' battles. This belief is an imminent and tremendous danger.

The fact that extensive fraternizing between the Russian and German troops is going on at the front is being explained in the Petrograd socialist press as a sign of the truth of the words used above "that if only Germany and Russia were at war a solution of the war could easily be reached at once." The orders of General Brusilov (commander of the southwestern front), and of General Gurko (commander of the western front), condemning this fraternizing and forbidding it, are also being exploited against the Temporary Government. That the fraternizing is a fact is to be seen from General Gurko's order which begins:

The statistics of the losses from the enemy's fire prove that neighborly relations have actually arisen between our troops and the enemy on [some] sectors of the front, neighborly relations that are absolutely not to be permitted especially now when rivers of our allies' blood are flowing in the common cause of the freedom of enslaved and ruined small races ... Having reached a lull on our front the Germans are using it to free their hands for a decisive struggle with the French and English, The lull relieves the Germans of any threatened danger and enables them to concentrate their attention and their free reserves on the western front.

This order has been bitterly criticized by the Petrograd socialist press as reactionary, written in the interests of the counter-revolution, and an unwarranted excursion into politics on the part of a military commander. At the same time it demands absolute freedom of propaganda for its delegates to the front.

The political revolution was the first step and was accomplished by the democratic middle classes and the socialistic masses, the upper classes showing indifference. The social revolution now begins to be imminent.

This consulate feels that if the Temporary Government should at any time be unable to anticipate and realize fully the desires and fancies of the masses and to spontaneously offer satisfactory forms of realization—as happened on the 3d and 4th of May before the compromise was reached—it will lose its authority notwithstanding its merits.

The power which the Temporary Government now administers is fictitious to a certain extent (as explained above and especially as regards its control of the troops in Petrograd). If this power is not handled with the greatest versatility and tact it will pass to the leaders of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies

who openly profess and personify the expectations of the majority of the lower classes.

If the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies openly assumed authority it could, after street fighting, control Petrograd, but all the provinces would not support it. Secession and civil war would follow, in all probability, degenerating into anarchy in many localities.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [*Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)*].

² *Ante*, p. 39 [*Pg. 39 is part of [Doc. 33](#)*].

¹ The interpolations in parentheses stand in the text as received.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 11, 1917—7 p.m.*
[Received May 13, 10 a.m.]

1270. No reply to my 1253, May 5, 7 p.m.¹ Thomas, acting French Ambassador here, tells me he advised his Government to reply to Provisional Government's note of May 3² reiterating statement of April 10 [9] giving ends of war and thinks President Wilson, whom he considers most powerful influence in the world to-day, should also make reply. I concur because workmen's committee using "peace without victory" and other expressions in the President's address to Senate of January 22 to justify their advocacy of peace. They do not wish separate peace but desire proletariat of belligerent countries to conclude peace "without annexation or contribution" claiming such is President's position. Provisional Government contends that wrong construction is being placed on President's utterances and believes as I do that noble ends for which he is, striving can only be [obtained?] by decisive victory over Germany. I am persistently calling attention to prompt action of Congress and liberal subscription to loan as evidence that we mean prosecution of war to victorious ending. Workmen furthermore maintain that existing arrangements between Allies were effected on the part of Russia by Government which no longer exists. Thomas suggested conference between representatives here of Allied Governments for joint reply to Provisional Government but I discouraged same in absence of definite understanding between ourselves and other countries fighting Germany as such conferences likely to open discussion concerning Dardanelles and possibly Panama Canal to say nothing of problems involving annexation, restitution of territory, and indemnification. Believes reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs from President or yourself would greatly clarify situation.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 41 [Pg. 41 includes portions of [Doc. 35](#) and [Doc. 36](#)].

² *Ante*, p. 38 [Pg. 38 is part of [Doc. 33](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 13, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received May 15, 7 a.m.]

1286. Guchkov, Minister of War, resigned ostensibly on account of illness, but really because objected to workmen's committee demanding right to approve his orders. No successor yet appointed. Excellent man, resignation deplorable. Not yet public. Learned this from Ministers who attended [dinner] I gave to-night to commission going to America. Military commander Petrograd district. Kornilov, resigned yesterday for same reason. Quiet prevails but by common consent.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 14, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received May 16, 4.30 a.m.]

1288. *Russkoe Slovo*, Moscow morning daily, with circulation 1,200,000, perhaps the most influential Russian journal, desires statement or interview from the President on the following: (1) Objects of the war; (2) peace without annexations or contributions; (3) is it possible to treat with the actual German Government. Paper says will ask same questions of Lloyd George, Ribot and Italy provided President consents to make reply. If suggestion of Thomas that President reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs made in my 1270 of May 11 is followed no necessity for such interview. Received note from Thomas May 12 urging such reply from President.

Made unavailing efforts to see Guchkov all day. Rumored Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Justice will also resign but not confirmed.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 304

PETROGRAD, *May 15, 1917.*
[*Received June 20.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report further, referring to despatch No. 274, dated March 20, 1917,¹ that on May 9, 1917, the Temporary Government felt called upon to publish in all the papers a declaration setting forth the difficulties contingent upon taking over the management of the country—their original program, the reforms already adopted and put into force, and their plan for assembling the Constitutional Convention (already reported in detail).

To this point the declaration is strong and cannot but inspire admiration and confidence in the Temporary Government, which is loyal, patriotic and capable. The last paragraphs of the declaration touching on the foreign policy and the present dangers are considered so significant that they are given here in detail:

As basis of its foreign policy the Temporary Government has undertaken the surrender of attacks on the freedom of other nations and of forcibly seizing their territories, and to fight in close union with radical democracies for attaining a lasting peace, based on the self-determination of nations. Regarding what has been already accomplished the Temporary Government cannot conceal from the people those difficulties and impediments which it meets in its work. It considers it advisable to mention that lately those difficulties have increased and call forth disturbing apprehension for the future.

Called to life by a great national movement the Temporary Government owns itself to be the executor and defender of the people's will. As the foundation of a self-governing state it does not lay violence and constraint, but stands for voluntary submission of the people to the power created by them. It seeks support not in the physical but in the moral force. From the time that the Temporary Government assumed power not once has it shrunk from these principles. No blood has been shed through its fault, and it has not created a forcible barrier against the course of public thought. With regret and great danger for freedom, the hope that the growing of new social ties would unite the country is overshadowed by the process of disintegration brought about by the wreck of the old state organization. With these conditions, dismissal of the former forcible manner of administration and external artificial measures, used to uphold the prestige of the power, the difficulties of the Temporary Government threaten to be insurmountable. The elementary tendency to realize the wishes and

solicitations of each separate group and class of the population by way of seizure and declaration, threatens to ruin the interior social welding and creates a favorable ground for forcible acts, sowing wrath and enmity toward the new organization between the sufferers on one side, and for development of private aspirations and interests on the other, to the detriment of common good and for the avoiding the fulfilment of the civil duties.

The Temporary Government considers it as a duty to declare definitely and frankly, that such a position of affairs makes the management of the state very difficult and in its consequent development threatens to lead the country to disintegration and consequently to the defeat on the front. Russia has before her the terrible phantom of civil war and anarchy, and the subsequent [loss?] of freedom. There is a gloomy and mournful path, well known to history and nations, a path leading from freedom through civil war and anarchy to reaction and thence the return to despotism. This path must not be the path of the Russian people. In the name of maintaining and strengthening the freedom of the country acquired with blood and sacrifice of our best sons, the Temporary Government summons everyone to strengthen the power which realizes the defense necessary for freedom. Let all to whom the freedom of Russia is dear, support the Government by obedience and cooperation, personal participation in common work and sacrifice, and by summoning others to do likewise. The Government on its side will renew, with particular persistency, the efforts directed towards the increase of its numbers by summoning to responsible state work representatives of those active creative forces of the country, which up to now have taken no direct or immediate part in the management of the state.

Citizens of Russia! The destiny of the country is in your hands. Without you the Government is powerless. With you it will freely and resolutely lead the country towards its great future. Remember, that it is impossible to retain freedom without power, and that under the new régime the power is created and kept by yourselves, by internal discipline and by voluntary obedience. Joining the power created by you and guaranteeing to it the realization of its full rights, you will give it the necessary force and strength to overcome all difficulties and dangers standing in the path of the country. In this way only can the freedom, of Russia be carried on unchallenged and intact until the great day when the people themselves, represented in the Constitutional Convention elected by them, will sit at the helm of the state.

It is to be seriously noted that the socialists, who control all the workmen, at least of Petrograd, and through their absolute dominance in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, also control the troops in this city, have so far paid practically no attention to the United States, and have passed over her entrance

into the war in complete silence, and do not even mention her in their speeches and editorials. The ovations and demonstrations have all been made by the people of the middle classes. Neither the message of Mr. Samuel Gompers¹ nor the proclamation of the American socialists, headed and signed by Charles Edward Russell, William Walling and Ernest Poole, were printed or commented upon in any of the dozen large and small socialist newspapers in Petrograd. The effect of these two messages on the socialist classes here has been so slight that the liberal newspapers, with the exception of the conservative *Novoe Vremya*, have not commented on the two messages. ...²

On May 10 a solemn session of the members of the First, Second, Third and Fourth Dumas was held. This day, the 27th of April, old style, was the eleventh anniversary of the first meeting of the First Duma in 1906. The meeting was a celebration of this anniversary and was not a legal session.

The President of the Fourth Duma, Mr. M. V. Rodzyanko, opened the meeting, which was attended by enormous crowds of the public, many members of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, including the Executive Committee, many of the soldiers and officers from the Convention of Delegates from the Front, now sitting here. Mr. Rodzyanko gave a short historical sketch of the activities of the four Dumas. In touching upon the last days of the Fourth Duma, immediately preceding the revolution, he mentioned the attitude of united opposition to the old régime assumed by nearly all parties of the Duma, stating that this opposition was based on the conviction that the old régime could not carry the war to a successful conclusion. From this he went on to speak of the problems now facing Russia, declaring that no classes of Russian society had, at the beginning of the war, desired the conflict. He continued that neither an inglorious peace, one not measuring up to the honor and dignity of Russia, nor a separate peace, was acceptable. Such a peace, he declared, would be nothing more than a prolonged armistice. The part of his speech relating more directly to Germany is worth translation in full, as it gives a picture and illuminates an economic and sociological point which has so far not been publicly advanced in Petrograd and which was probably mentioned to combat the idea universally prevalent, or at least universally urged by Petrograd socialists; namely, the idea that it is the German government (ruling classes, *bourgeoisie*, Emperor) who are responsible for Germany's share in the war, and not the German people. Mr. Rodzyanko said:

Careful studies of the national economic interests lie at the foundation of all present-day national problems. If the objects which Germany is seeking to obtain in this war be carefully studied from this point of view it becomes at once clear, no matter how strange it may seem at first sight, that in Germany the interests of the laboring class and the capitalists and other social elements all agree in the necessity for a decisive victory. Germany can not limit the wide development of her industry. Germany lived by this

industry and it was the source of her riches. If this industry were seriously injured, Germany's economic leadership would be undermined and injury would result to the interests of the German working class, of the capitalists, and of the *bourgeoisie* which controls German commercial and industrial life. The secret cause of the support given by the German working class to the war is contained in this solidarity of interests. The German working class supports the imperialistic tendencies of its Government as sincere patriots and in the name of the real benefits which a decisive victory would bring to the Fatherland. I fear that the "Proclamation to the Peoples of the World," which is filled with the most noble humanitarian desires to end the war, will meet with a severe reception from German socialist circles which thoroughly understand the national profits to be derived from a complete victory over other races. That is why, gentlemen, I firmly and boldly maintain that the war should be carried to a decisive and complete victory by all the national strength of the Russian people in cooperation with her glorious allies.

Mr. Rodzyanko went on to state that there are rumors that the army is disintegrating, that it does not want to fight, that it is unwilling to undertake an advance, but that he could not believe these rumors because he could not believe that the Russian soldier, whom he is accustomed to honor for his courage and readiness to die, is capable of forming friendships with the enemy on the front. "My mind simply refuses to accept the thought that our brave and glorious troops can hesitate at this minute when the military situation imperiously demands that they undertake an aggressive forward movement and when our Allies are not sparing their blood to do all they can to ease our task." Mr. Rodzyanko stated his conviction that the present disorders in the army are temporary and passing in their nature.

Mr. Rodzyanko went on to recall the inherent difficulties of the task of the Temporary Government and that they can only be met if the Government has the full confidence of the people and it is not hampered or interfered with. "In giving the Temporary Government this confidence and in giving them this completeness of power we must maintain our own faith that it will carry our country to a bright future, and most important of all, to a complete victory over our internal and external enemies."

After a speech by Mr. F. A. Golovin, the President of the Second Duma, who confined himself to historical remarks concerning the activities of the Second Duma, Prince G. E. Lvov, the present Prime Minister, spoke. The first two thirds of his speech was exclusively devoted to an impassioned eulogy of the slow but sure development of the movement for Russian freedom and the part in this development played by the Russo-Japanese war and the First Duma. The latter part of his speech is given in full in enclosure 1,¹ although he only touched upon the revolution and current events in extremely general terms.

The next speech, made by Mr. V. D. Nabokov, member of the First Duma, was purely eulogistic and historical.

He was followed by Mr. M. M. Vinaver, a member of the First Duma, and a leading figure in the present Constitutional Democratic Party, or Party of the People's Freedom, the party of the present Ministers Milyukov, Shingarev, Manuilov and Nekrasov. In touching on current events he repeated that full confidence must be shown toward the Temporary Government.

Mr. I. I. Semenov, a member of the Labor Party of the First Duma, mentioned the necessity for a coalition cabinet. He was followed by L. M. Bramson, also a member of the labor fraction of the First Duma, and now active in the socialist movement in Petrograd, who stated that defense against the foreign enemy is the first duty of every Russian and denied that peace at any price is a dominant idea among the working class. He also stated that when the time comes a coalition cabinet should be formed.

Mr. Kuzmin-Karavaev, also a member of the First Duma, declared that the First Duma had been united, the revolution had been won by a united people and that the German enemy could only be defeated by Russian unity.

He was followed by Mr. V. E. Ershov, a member of the Social Democratic fraction of the First Duma, who stated that the working-class political party, like all other classes of the population, would have confidence in the Temporary Government as long as it worked in agreement with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. He further said that spreading reports of the large number of deserters does more to undermine the army than do the activities of the Social Democratic Party. "The working class strives to end the war but not by a separate peace, not by an agreement, injurious to our own interests, the interests of our allies, but by an agreement of the working classes of all nations. I greet the glorious Russian Army as the champion of the people's freedom, liberty, and I hope that it will strike off the chains not only on us Russians, but also on the working classes of all countries that groan under the yoke of capitalism." His peroration called forth a cry from a soldier in the gallery, "Thanks, comrade, in the name of the 11th Army Division."

Mr. V. V. Shulgin then spoke, as the representative of the moderate parties of the Duma. In the first part of his speech he stated that the conservatives' learned, year by year, to love and honor the Duma, and at last concentrated all their hopes on it. After the terrible tragedy of the summer of 1915 when the Russian armies retreated, this faith in the Duma became a passion. Mr. Shulgin stated that his party had feared the effects of a possible revolution on the fighting power of the army but had nevertheless taken a part in the revolution because the Duma had made the old régime's incompetency so patent. He ventured to think that the part played by the conservatives in exposing the old régime had not been less than that of the liberals and radicals. "Therefore," he said, "we can not hold ourselves aloof from the revolution, we are welded into it and are under the moral responsibility that entails."

The rest of Mr. Shulgin's speech is given in full in enclosure 2¹ because it seems to this office that it is rich with significance and represents the opinion of the entire middle class of Petrograd. In fact it represents more than the opinion of the entire middle class of Petrograd, it represents the opinion of the entire population of Petrograd except the socialists or those who are secretly working for or desire the return of the old régime. In this mass of non-socialists must be included great numbers of the working classes outside of the factories, many soldiers and the greater part of the wounded now in Petrograd hospitals. But these elements are largely silent and until May 3 and 4 made no open expression of their opinion except through the columns of those newspapers which existed in Petrograd before the revolution, or in occasional indoor rallies and meetings.

Mr. Shulgin was followed by Mr. I. G. Tseretelli, a member of the Second Duma, whose speech, given in full in enclosure 3¹ was meant as a direct answer to Mr. Shulgin. What was said by Mr. Tseretelli is extremely significant of the attitude held by the majority of the socialists in Petrograd. He is, at the moment, the most prominent member of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Mr. Tseretelli's statement that if the Temporary Government had not had the support of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in the first days of the revolution it would not have been able to meet the situation, is undoubtedly true (see despatch No. 274 dated March 20, 1917²). Although Mr. Tseretelli did not say so it is also true that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies could overthrow the Temporary Government at any moment now, if it should so desire (see despatch No. 300 dated May 8, 1917³). Mr. Tseretelli's speech is very illuminating in that it clearly reveals the socialist attitude toward the Governments of the western Allies; namely, that the Allied Governments are *bourgeois* and therefore not, in the sense used by the socialists, democratic, and that it is Russia's mission to change the character of the war, as waged now by the western Allies and America. The sentence underlined on page 6 of his speech is the keynote of the socialist attitude toward the war: "The best way to sow imperialism and barbarity in our own country is to crush the militarism of a foreign country by force of arms." Indirectly, of course, it is a complete denial of the policy of the American Government and of the mature judgment of the American people reached after two and a half years of deliberation while closely watching the nature and the course of the European war. Mr. Tseretelli's words regarding the man Lenin, too, are fraught with significance. Lenin is the man who advises the immediate overthrow of the Temporary Government and the establishment of a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry, the immediate confiscation of the landed estates without waiting for the Constitutional Convention, the spread and systematization of fraternizing between the Russian and German soldiers, the immediate publication of the treaties of alliance between Russia and England and France, the immediate revision of the banks and their being merged into one big state bank. Lenin opposes the "Loan of Liberty," declaring that funds should be obtained by confiscating money and property from

the rich. He advises that all factories be immediately seized by the workmen for their own benefit, without reference to the owners or the managing personnel. All this is said, couched in the most inflammatory language. It is Lenin's paper, the Maximalist newspaper *Truth*, that has advocated the formation of the "Red Guard" or "Workmen's Guard," an organization of armed factory workmen who marched at the head of some of the anti-Government parades on the 3d and 4th of May as well as at the head of the procession which was carrying a black flag with skull and crossbones. Only socialists are to be admitted into it. Many of the factory workers now go to and from their daily labor with guns across their shoulders and cartridges in the pouches at their belts. In several official proclamations and resolutions the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has condemned Lenin and, specifically, the "Red Guard," but in a public speech on such a solemn occasion as the meeting of the four Dumas on May 10, Mr. Tseretelli warmly defended Lenin, only making one short statement that he did not agree with Lenin. Tseretelli's final sentence in regard to Lenin amounts to a statement that if the *bourgeoisie* really agrees with Mr. Shulgin then he, Tseretelli, agrees with Lenin.

The Consulate can not forbear to mention here what it considers the gravest menace to Russia at the present time; namely, the narrow partisanship, the bigotry and fanaticism of the socialists and the socialist press. They are Jesuitical in their casuistry and supersensitive to any criticism or opposition. They will defend any statement made by any one of their number. Among themselves, of course, there are differences of opinion. Tseretelli, for instance, has many times argued long and passionately in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies against Lenin and his ideas, but he is ready to espouse the cause of Lenin against a *bourgeois* speaker. Their official acts are usually well-digested, but their utterances and writings are not so well balanced. They are incorrigibly bookish and partisan.

It is the socialist press and the socialist agitators that are responsible for the suspicion of the Temporary Government and that caused the crisis of May 3 and 4 and the ministerial crisis that is approaching. The socialists wield enormous power, infinitely more than any other party or parties in Petrograd to-day, but have been, up to the present, unwilling to accept any responsibility for that power. On account of this lack of responsibility their power has so far been used exclusively in destructive, undermining criticism of the government. They have never given the Temporary Government unconditional support. Their attitude has been, from the very first days of the revolution, that they would "support" the government "in so far" as it fulfilled the demands of "democracy." The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies officially voted to "support" the Loan of Liberty, but not one of the socialist papers or socialist organizations undertook a warm campaign in favor of the loan, except Plekhanov's organ, *Unity*, which plays a very small part in the socialist movement. Their action on any number of questions has been similar. The letter of their law has been "support," but the tone

of their utterances has universally been “suspicion.”

The sensation of the day was the speech of the present Minister of War, Mr. A. I. Guchkov. Such a vigorous utterance and such an uncompromising statement of the bitter truth, as he sees it, was unexpected. Mr. Guchkov was the President of the Third Duma, and in the Fourth Duma was chairman of the Military and Naval Committee. In this latter capacity he devoted himself to building up the military and naval power of Russia before the war, and during the war, before the revolution. To him is attributed the greater part of the credit of unmasking Myasoedov, the spy, and War Minister Sukhomlinov. He is the “biggest “man in the Temporary Government. But he is bitterly hated by the socialists and, through them, has become unpopular in the army. The speech, given in part in enclosure 4,¹ is the most important event in Petrograd since the patched-up compromise of the 4th of May.

Mr. Guchkov was followed by Mr. V. V. Evreinov, a Socialist Revolutionist of the Second Duma, who declared that Russia needs peace in order to carry out the creative work of the revolution. He qualified this statement by the proviso that the peace should not be a separate one, but must be “without annexations,” but a peace established by the “democracies of all countries.” Like the other socialists he accepts, as an axiom, the proposition that a peace on the basis of the heretofore published programs of the Allies or on the general basis of President Wilson’s messages and notes, is a peace “with annexations” and not the kind of a peace that Russia wants. Like other socialists his fundamental attitude toward the mutual relationships of the war and the revolution are diametrically opposed to the views of such men as Guchkov, Rodzyanko, Milyukov, and Shulgin. These latter believe that the reason the revolution occurred when it did was because the old régime was unable to continue the war to a victorious conclusion. The socialists do not believe this. The men above mentioned believe that Russia’s new-found freedom should first of all be used to strengthen her military power in order to win the war. The socialists are only interested in the war because it hinders the further progress of the revolution. This is the fundamental abyss existing between the two modes of thought in Petrograd to-day, and it is so fundamental, that, in the opinion of this consulate, it may be bridged but not obliterated.

Mr. N. V. Savich, a member of the Zemstvo-Octobrist fraction of the Fourth Duma, spoke of the formation of the “Progressive bloc” in the Duma before the revolution.

Mr. V. V. Volk-Karachevski, a People’s Socialist from the Second Duma, spoke in favor of a coalition ministry.

He was followed by Mr. S. I. Shidlovski, a member of the Fourth Duma, who dwelt on the effect of the “Progressive bloc” in bringing about the revolution.

Mr. V. I. Dzhyubinski, a member of the Labor fraction of the Fourth Duma, spoke in favor of a coalition, as also did Mr. I. N. Efremov, a member of the Progressive fraction of the Fourth Duma. Mr. Efremov said: “To-day in a free country, there is

no place for an irresponsible opposition. While criticizing the government the opposition should always be ready to assist the government in meeting the questions of the day.”

Mr. Efremov was followed by Mr. M. I. Skobelev, a member of the Social Democratic fraction of the Fourth Duma and one of the prominent members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, whose speech is given in full in enclosure 5.¹

That part of Mr. Skobelev’s speech in which he rejects the formula, “peace within the country for the sake of war at the front,” is a very clear example of the fundamental attitude held by the socialists toward the war. The socialists feel that the war is of secondary importance to the revolution. They feel that the war must be brought to an end as soon as possible in order to prevent its further interference with the far more important business of the revolution. This feeling clearly emerges in the sentence in which Mr. Skobelev mentions the “difficulties that the present international situation places in the way of the revolution.” To him the Great War is merely an unfortunate “international situation” whose chief significance for Russia is that it hinders the free course of the revolution. The socialists have been bitterly opposed to the war since the beginning and the first use they are making of their new freedom is to discredit the war spirit. It is in this connection that they refused to admit that the middle classes had a share in the revolution. The middle-class orators at the meeting of the Duma all spoke of the unity of the Russian people during the revolution, meaning that the middle classes desired and assisted the revolution, because, besides being desirable in general, it was desirable at that very time since the old régime was incompetent as regards the war. The socialists claim the revolution, in its entirety, for the working class and army, denying the share taken by the middle classes, and never mention the incompetence of the old régime with regard to the war.

It seems to this Consulate that the narrowly uncompromising nature of the socialist thought is most illuminatingly shown in that part of Mr. Skobelev’s speech in answer to the interruption from the floor regarding the action of the Finland Regiment in marching under arms to the Mariinski Palace where the Temporary Government was sitting. Mr. Skobelev stated, in defense of the regiment’s action, that “the troops, like all citizens, are now free to move about on the streets and express their political desires.” The implication from this is that the action of the regiment was blameless and not in the nature of an armed threat against the Temporary Government. That is the unofficial attitude and utterance of a very influential socialist. But the official attitude and utterance of the official organ of the socialist soldiers and workmen is to be seen in the decree of the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies forbidding troops to issue into the streets without the order of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, and the appeal to the people not to carry arms when parading, as such action is not in accordance with the principles of political liberty. Skobelev’s speech is, in its entirety, absolutely typical of the present

socialist psychology in Petrograd.

The last speech of the day was delivered by Mr. F. I. Rodichev, a member of the Constitutional Democratic Party (the Party of the People's Freedom), who was in all four Dumas and who is now the Commissioner of the Temporary Government for Finnish Affairs. His speech aroused the greatest enthusiasm and is a passionate expression of the views of the middle classes who are solid in their support of the Temporary Government. Mr. Rodichev's speech is given in full as enclosure 6.¹

Referring to former statements regarding a coalition ministry a letter of the Prime Minister, Prince G. E. Lvov, is given below as addressed to M. V. Rodzyanko (and N. S. Cheidze):

In the invocation of the Temporary Government published April 26 [/May 9], it is stated among other things that the Government will renew its efforts leading towards the increase of the number of its members by summoning to responsible state work representatives of those creative and active forces of the country which heretofore have taken no direct and immediate part in the government of the state.

In view of the above I addressed in the name of the Temporary Government the president of the Council of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, the member of the state Duma, N. S. Cheidze, with the request that this suggestion be brought to the attention of the Executive Committee and the party represented by the above council.

This brought forth the following indefinite decision from the Executive Committee:

The Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in their session of April 29 [/May 12] has after long debates, by a majority vote of 23 against 22 and 8 who have abstained from voting, decided against the timeliness of the representatives of the Executive Committee of the Deputies joining a coalition ministry.

This decision is not thought to be final. The adherents of a coalition ministry are confident that the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies will decide in favor of a coalition ministry. It is possible that, seeing the insignificant majority against the formation of a coalition ministry, the Executive Committee on their side will also revise the question.

The reason a coalition ministry is inevitable is that several members of the present ministry, in view of their lack of power, and the fact that their existence depends upon the will of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, will resign. Their places will be filled by members of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, and it is believed two or three new ministries will be established. In view

of the pending break, this will be the best solution, and it is believed the entire Temporary Government will not resign at once. This may delay the ever-present crisis. The masses want not separate peace, but an end of the war. A cessation of hostilities on the front now exists, and this state will continue. A Russian offensive should not be hoped for. The unofficial news from other districts is most disquieting.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

[Enclosure—Extract]

Speech of the Russian Minister of War (Guchkov) Delivered in the Duma on May 10, 1917

... Look around you, look into your own minds, and tell me whether we are not all seized with a heavy sorrow and a deathly anxiety bordering on desperation. Why has our first feeling of bright joy given place to this sorrow and anxiety? You will find the answer to this question in the manifesto of the Temporary Government (just) addressed to the people. "It is a great danger to our freedom that the growth of new social ties binding the country together does not keep pace with the disintegration caused by the fall of the old régime"—those are the careful words of the Temporary Government in describing the deathly malady which is undermining the very life of the country. Disintegration is moving faster than integration, I would add myself. This disintegration has already touched the foundations of our common life, of our human culture, and the idea of national government, without which humanity loses the traits of well-ordered cultivated society and systematic political organization and becomes a scattered, formless mass of human beings. We have not yet found, under the new conditions of our living, that life-giving source and center which could undertake a creative labor with the assistance of the organizing powers of the country. Not only is there no such center, but there are also no organizing powers. Will the country emerge from this sickly state of ferment, and when it emerges will there be permanent centers around which the new forms of our life can gather? All these are questions on which depend, not only the retention of the blessings of the revolution, but also the outcome of the war and the fate of the nation. The nation can not live in the conditions of dual government—and even many governments—and, consequently, no government—which now prevail. Our unhappy country is struggling under the unbelievably heavy burdens of heretofore unknown war and internal disorder. Only one single governmental power, united in itself, and united with the people, resting securely on moral authority and popular confidence, can create the life-giving center which will save the country.

Gentlemen, we inherited a heavy burden from the old régime. The old régime was incompetent in the affairs of peace, and proved itself to be still more incompetent in the affairs of war. The Russian nation and the Russian people paid for the sins

of the old régime by countless deaths and sacrifices. Our glorious army, defending every inch of Russian land, fought under tremendous handicaps. May everlasting fame rest on the brows of those who have fallen victims to their duty and may the everlasting gratitude of their country be the lot of those who firmly continue the struggle! And the struggle is not hopeless. One more effort, one more effort of the army and the country in the rear of the army, and the enemy will be beaten. But are we strong enough to make this effort? Perhaps the last effort? I should like to believe that we are, because all that is dear to us, everything that makes life worth living, is bound up with this. Not only Russia's existence as a nation, not only our rights and freedom won in the hard struggle, not only the blessing studiously saved up for posterity, are bound up with this, but also the honor and good name of Russia, her dignity among the nations, and our right to be proud to be Russians.

The army and the fleet greeted the revolution with joy as the salvation of Russia. From top to bottom all went over to the new régime as one man with a deep and touching belief in its creative powers. Work began with feverish energy everywhere in order to remodel the entire structure of the army and the fleet to the new principles of government and citizenship brought into Russian life by the revolution. This work was especially marked in regard to the living conditions and rules of life in the army and fleet. At one time it seemed as if our military power would be reborn with new and tenfold powers, as if a sacred enthusiasm would break forth, as if the will to victory would press on with the strength of a steel spring, as if a new, reasonable, and voluntary discipline would weld our army together in a way the old and antiquated discipline could not. It seemed as if the new, free army, born out of the revolution, would do deeds that would eclipse those of the old, enslaved, but still, still infinitely dear and glorious army of the old Russia. Gentlemen, this has not happened! We must honestly admit that this has not happened. Our military power is weakening and disintegrating! It is suffering from the same malady that the country is suffering from: dual government, many governments, absence of government—the same diagnosis and the same medicine (are needed). But the malady is especially acute in the army on account of the natural conditions prevailing in an army and necessity for a cure is especially acute. And the malady is fatally dangerous to the nation.

Are we too late with our attempts to heal the malady? I do not think we are. Will we not be too late if we delay even a little? I think we will be. That motto, "Peace at the front and war within the country," that death-bringing motto, that doctrine of international peace at any cost and civil war at any cost, which was brought to us by persons who may or may not know what they are doing, must be drowned in the compelling voice of the whole great Russian people crying: "War at the front and peace within the country!"

Gentlemen, once the whole country admitted that "our country is in danger." Gentlemen, we have moved a step forward; time waits for no one: "Our country is on the verge of ruin!"

(Cries of “True! True!” Stormy applause on all benches except the extreme left.)

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)].

¹ See *ante*, pp. 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of [Doc. 19](#) and [Doc. 20](#)] and 32 [Pg. 32 includes portions of [Doc. 26](#), [Doc. 27](#), and [Doc. 28](#)].

² The editorial article in the *Novoe Vremya* of Apr. 28/May 11 is not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

² *Ante*, p. 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)].

³ *Ante*, p. 42 [Pg. 42 is part of [Doc. 37](#)].

¹ Printed as unnumbered enclosure, *post*, p. 64 [Pg. 64 is part of [Doc. 41](#)].

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 15, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[*Received 10 p.m.*]

1289. Milyukov resigned, Tereshchenko appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kerensky appointed Minister of War. No appointment yet to Ministry of Finance or Ministry [of] Justice. Kerensky and Tereshchenko both favor vigorous prosecution of war. It is believed these appointments will result in coalition cabinet in which workmen's committee favor offensive warfare which it is thought will be waged aggressively under reformed government.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 16, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received May 18, 8.35 a.m.]

1293. Situation complicated. Conditions unsatisfactory. Kerensky appointed Minister of War because it is believed he can persuade army to fight. Position of workmen's committee is that there should be conference between Allies, as ourselves and new Russian Government are not parties to old agreements, provisions of which are secret. They do not demand that treaties be made public but that we and the new Russian Government be acquainted therewith and express our satisfaction therewith provided we subscribe thereto. They appear to mistrust Milyukov who has just telephoned me that he has resigned and will see me at his house this evening. Says no successor has been appointed. Riga Consul reports soldiers fraternizing with Germans and cannot be induced to advance but would resist if attacked. Consul, Odessa, reports sentiment strongly favors peace without annexations or contributions and that serious military operations ceased. Soldiers, laborers and students agitating land division. Considerable hostility Riga and Petrograd against England because believed standing in the way of peace. Moscow Consul reports situation precarious. Unrest growing. Conservative party element anxious and looks to the Ministry and Allies for restoration of confidence. This is most discouraging report received. Summers fears anarchy. All depends on army which appears divided. Ministry fearing majority, favors workmen's party.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 18

Moscow, *May 18, 1917.*
[Received June 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge, by transmission through the Embassy, the Department's telegraphic instruction of the 5th instant asking for information as to the political situation in this district, and to enclose herewith a copy of a preliminary telegraphic report¹ which I have sent the Embassy, in compliance with instructions.

In furnishing the Department with the information requested it will not be considered that the situation is exaggerated or that the opinions are biased. Facts are given as they present themselves, and while all freedom-loving people naturally have a tendency to see what they wish to be brought about in its most optimistic light, and are prone, in doing so, to overlook what they do not wish to come to pass, and to underestimate the underlying causes, treating the revolution from above instead of from beneath, yet in so serious a matter as that now confronting the United States it is of prime importance to know the actual condition of affairs, no matter how dark the situation may appear, and to be prepared for any emergency.

The cause of the present revolution in Russia is exactly a repetition of Spanish domination in South America: corruption and misgovernment, oppression of the ignorant and poorer classes, failure to provide for moral and material emergencies by proper education of the masses, the granting of privileges to the nobility, and a general demoralization of the people by overt acts of the educated and governing classes. The reaction will be in proportion to the corruption practised for so long, and ignorant lawlessness will be the crop of the seeds of intelligent corruption and decay. The masses of the people are not looking for independence and freedom, for the simple reason that they do not know what it means, and are too ignorant, for the moment, to be taught. Their undeveloped minds only see revenge against those whom they consider their oppressors, the confiscation of their lands and property, and anarchy. In the trains, on the trams, everywhere, one only hears the remarks: "The rich have sucked our blood for generations; it is now our turn!" The very ignorance of the masses makes it impossible to argue with them. They do not know exactly what they want in the way of political institutions. This is natural, as they are wholly uneducated. Yesterday the Government of the United States was their ideal of a free country. To-day this same Government is found to be imperialistic. Any government where there is law and order is to them autocratic.

They do not understand what they are fighting for or what they are to gain by it. They have the instinct of self-defense but certainly not patriotism. It is not their fault for they have been brought up as little more than cattle. They are consequently the victims of every demagogue who wishes to demoralize them and appeal to their passions instead of their patriotism. In this sense they are much more difficult to persuade to look at matters in a practical sense than to resort to force to satisfy their vengeance.

I have been told from authoritative sources that the commanders of the Russian regiments sent to France were told soon after their arrival there that the troops under their command were absolutely unfit, by reason of their ignorance, for modern warfare, and that they were allowed no positions of importance to be assigned to them. It is also stated that when the revolution broke out in Russia one of the regiments began to show insubordination, whereupon the French forces forced them to fight at the point of the bayonet, which was the only argument they were capable of understanding. Under these conditions they behaved themselves well.

The above is cited to show that there is serious doubt as to whether the people were prepared for so sudden a change in the Government, especially of so radical a nature as has taken place, or as to whether their untrained minds are capable of grasping the meaning of a free and democratic Government. It is more than probable that the masses do not comprehend the dangers besetting the nation, and that freedom to them is libertinism. It is useless, under the present conditions, to theorize on the results which might have been brought about, if the Government, the Church, and the higher classes had, since the liberation of the slaves, set themselves to the establishment and of giving an example of educational reform. The fact remains that this has not only not been done but the people have purposely been kept in ignorance, and the corruption in Government circles, especially in the army, navy, and administrative branches, has certainly inspired the people with lack of confidence. The time will undoubtedly come when all this mass of people will become educated and little by little work out their own destinies, forming a great nation. At present radicalism has gone to the brink of anarchy and further steps in this direction will plunge the country into chaos and civil war. To avert this and to oblige the people to realize their obligations towards the Allies and the danger from the enemy is the momentous task which now confronts the Temporary Government.

It is not to be understood that the masses of the Russian people cannot, in time, and with systematic education, equal in intelligence and patriotism, any other nation. The idea meant to be conveyed is that as an actual fact they are not, for the moment, favored by these conditions, through no fault of their own. If education had been commenced at the time of the liberation of the serfs the position in the world of a large percentage of the Russian people would be vastly different from what it is at present, the land would be more intensively cultivated and distributed, and industries of all sorts would be more common and productive.

The majority of the people would then have something to lose by anarchy and would oppose it and demand a stable and free government. As it is, the great mass has nothing whatsoever to lose by a chaotic state of affairs.

As a result of the Japanese war the soldiers and sailors and the people in general lost all confidence in the Government and its corrupt agents. The revolution of 1905–6 was the result, and the people gained a certain foothold by the establishment of the Duma. The war was unpopular, and the country unprepared for it. It was, however, an educator, and the beginning of the downfall of the present dynasty. The present war found the country also unprepared, though vast sums had been voted, especially since the threatening attitude of Germany and Austria-Hungary at the time of the annexation to the latter of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for placing the army and navy on a war basis. The squandering and pilfering of this money, instead of its employment for the purposes for which it was destined, brought the present Minister of Foreign Affairs (just resigned), Milyukov, into disfavor with the Government on account of his violent opposition thereto. It seems that the Japanese war failed to teach a lesson which, if it had been profited by, would have greatly changed the present chaotic condition of the country. Russia, through its Minister in Belgrade, M. de Hartwig, a rabid Panslavist, precipitated the conflict for which the Central powers were so eager, and sent an army into the field without arms and ammunition.

Russia's diplomacy has always been as clumsy as that of Germany, and about equal to the existing system of Government. The real backbone of the country, the conservative landowning class, systematically refused to enter either Government or diplomatic service, and regarded both local and foreign representatives as sinecures. M. de Hartwig, however, was an exception to the rule, and was boldly championed by the people, though he was working in direct opposition to Sazonov, the Prime Minister, and feeling his power with the people his policy in the Balkans precipitated the Turkish war, and had it not been for the intervention of the great powers, the question of the Dardanelles would have then and there been solved, and the split between the allied Balkan nations avoided. But M. de Hartwig possessed two ambitions which were ultimately destined to plunge all Europe in war; namely, to humiliate Austria-Hungary, and to panslavize the Balkans and the Slavic provinces of the Dual Empire, thereby extending Russia's sphere of influence (the vanguard of annexation) straight through to the Adriatic. But he was human and, being so, committed a great mistake in championing the cause of Serbia against Bulgaria, forcing that latter and stronger country to seek an alliance with the Central powers. Serbia insisted on occupying western Macedonia which, in population at least, was purely Bulgar. In the treaty of 1912, signed by the several nations leagued against Turkey, and instigated by De Hartwig, this section of the Balkans was assigned to Bulgaria, while Serbia was to have what is known as Old Serbia embracing the rich valley of the upper Vardar River and the prosperous city and old capital of Serbia, Uskub, now called Skoplje, as also the Sanjak of Novibazar, being further assured that at the proper moment

she would be supported morally and materially in occupying Bosnia and Herzegovina and obtaining an outlet to the Mediterranean either on the Dalmatian coast or to the south of Scutari, at either one of which places the Danube Adriatic Railway, to be constructed with Russian capital, was to have its terminal.

But the thirst for conquest and the formation of a greater Serbia, a greater Bulgaria, a greater Montenegro, and a greater Greece, led Serbia to break with Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. The latter country, assailed on all sides by Turks, Rumanians, Greeks and Serbs, was forced to surrender, but the peace of the Balkans was disturbed forever. Bulgaria threw in its lot with Austria and Germany, while Greece fell away from its alliance with the Serbs, leaving the latter isolated. In this De Hartwig's policy was destructive, as it was he who instigated the Serbs to break with the Bulgars, considering the former as more Slavonic than the latter, and consequently more apt to coincide with Russia's policy against Austria.

Having committed this error the Minister set himself deliberately to the task of disintegrating Austria-Hungary, and of using the Serbian Government, absolutely subservient to him, for that purpose. The Central powers were aware of all this and when the Archduke was assassinated, naturally took advantage of the opportunity to throw the responsibility of the conflict on Serbia and began the war. Either Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism was to rule in the Balkans.

Russia came to the assistance of Serbia, as was expected, and was followed by other nations of the Triple Alliance. Russia's duty therefore towards the Allies in fighting the war to a finish is greater than any other country, as the conflict began in her interests. To ask for peace now, or to refuse to fight and leave the struggle to those who came to her assistance at a perilous time, cannot be countenanced. If the Japanese war was unpopular the present one, on the contrary, appealed to the great mass of the people, and had the old régime been prepared and prosecuted the campaign with vigor, the disorganization now existing, owing to defeats and retreats, would have been avoided. Even though unfit for modern warfare and clumsy, yet in numbers alone would the army have forced its way to the front. The beginning was the psychological moment for the Russian triumph. Lack of arms and ammunition prevented it, and this fact, together with corrupt and German-paid ministers and officers, disseminated dissatisfaction and discouragement in the ranks of the army. This soon brought on insubordination and finally degenerated into the present dangerous state, the discontent and loyalty of the army being openly undermined by German agents working with the knowledge and consent of the Government. If the situation at the front existed even in form until the revolution began, it was due to the efforts of the educated classes and the nobility who struggled against the Government itself in many instances to furnish food and supplies to the army, either individually, collectively, or through the Zemstvos.

There is no doubt that the mobilization of the greater part of the nation's strength, a certain amount of travel and contact with other elements and classes, opened the eyes of the erstwhile ignorant peasants and has given them a little learning which has proven indeed a dangerous thing, for it has been misdirected. Their undeveloped minds were an easy target for *provocateurs* at home and abroad, and the corrupt state of affairs flagrantly visible to their eyes, and continual reverses due thereto, only aggravated the situation. Discouragement led to a general feeling of revolt towards those who had brought the disasters on the country, and having only a veneer of knowledge of the causes and of those responsible therefor, they confounded the guilty with the guiltless, and are endeavoring now to tear down all form of government and establish a reign of anarchy and ignorance. The tottering Temporary Government is unable to enforce order and discipline, and *provocateurs* of all sorts, German-paid agents, anarchists and criminals let loose from prisons, and lawless elements of every nature are hard at work cementing the state of anarchy which is commencing and which will end in civil war unless stopped. The great mass of the Russian people seem to be forming themselves into two groups, the one for, and the other opposed to organized government. Very few indeed of the educated class sympathized with the old régime, and welcomed the downfall of the dynasty, strong in the conviction that intelligent and patriotic men like Milyukov and Guchkov would be supported in the formation of a free and democratic government. But they had underestimated the ignorance of the people as a mass and the evil effects of the *provocateurs*, and when the crisis came the soldiers and workmen, instead of ranging themselves on the side of law and order, practically placed the Temporary Government under house arrest and disregarding the interests of the country and the perils to which it was subjected, initiated a régime of insubordination, anarchy, and persecution far greater than ever existed before, disintegrating instead of cooperating, destroying without constructing. One idea and one alone seems to possess them; namely, the plunging of the country into anarchy.

This state of chaos is complicated by the lack of national patriotism. A Pole cares nothing for Russia. He is before all a Pole and in defense of Poland may and doubtless will do heroic deeds. The same is so with the Finns, the Lithuanians, the Bessarabians, the small [Little] Russians, Baltic Province Germans, Jews, Tatars, etc., etc. They are continually pulling against the National Government and fomenting class interests. The same is true to a great degree with the Russians proper. The workmen are not striving to build up a country. They are, first of all, caring for their own interests, and in doing so are willing to sacrifice country, honor and all. The same is true with the peasant and other social classes. Russia, as a nation, seems to occupy but little their thoughts.

There are enclosed herewith a number of clippings (translations) from the local press which show the disturbed condition of the country.¹ The articles are selected from the best writers of the most serious papers and reflect the state of anarchy into which the state is rapidly drifting. Especial attention is called to the last

enclosure No. 11.¹ From fear of the Workmen's and Soldiers' Party the press refused to give publicity to the article, but it was printed in pamphlet form and distributed around the streets in great numbers. Though fiery in its tone it outlines, nevertheless, the situation as it exists and prophesies the final result of a continuance on the part of the workmen and soldiers of their policy of disintegrating the nation for selfish purposes.

In the above report on the conditions in this jurisdiction I have confined myself strictly to the causes and effects of the revolution. The political disturbances in Petrograd. the conduct of the workmen and soldiers' deputies, the rise and fall of the cabinets in rapid succession, the speeches in the Duma, and the present position of the Temporary Government, have all been described by the Embassy and the Consulate in Petrograd, and to dwell on same would only be a duplication of work.

The Consulate General will continue from time to time to advise the Department of the labor and other questions as they arise. The situation is serious and bids fair to grow worse. But little, if any, help can from now on be expected from the army, while on the other hand strikes and internal disorder may cause civil war.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 19, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received May 20, 5.55 p.m.]

1299. Situation assuming different phase daily, but withal clarifying. Navy been from the beginning most recalcitrant element. Baltic Fleet insubordinate and defiant. Black Sea Fleet which loyal, courageous, sent delegation here which held public meeting to-day in circus auditorium where thousands assembled and I attended but was only Ambassador present. Serbian, Rumanian Ministers there, but other missions represented, if at all, by subordinates. Representative of fleet made eloquent talk declaring against separate peace and favoring offensive warfare, which most enthusiastically received. I was given first loge and spoke. Said America had begun to assist Russia notwithstanding German efforts to produce impression that Russia negotiating separate peace, which America disbelieves. Stated furthermore that we cooperate with all fighting against Germany, greatest foe of democracy, and consider this a struggle for human rights. Also expressed hope that as internal dissensions adjusted by formation of coalition ministry and representation therein of creative forces of the revolution and the country, Russia would now present an unbroken front and wage an aggressive warfare. My remarks quite responsively received. Absolute quiet prevails in Petrograd and disturbances rare elsewhere. Kerensky as Minister of War has issued order directing all soldiers to return to their regiments and declaring that all who do not return by May 29 will be considered as deserters.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, May 20, 1917, 8 p.m.
[Received May 22, 7 a.m.]

1303. To-day's papers report new Ministry meeting: support generally. The *Pravda*, organ of Leninists, however, more aggressive in opposition than was to former Ministry. Other socialistic organs cautiously advocate support of new Cabinet, even Maxim Gorky's organ, *New Life*, which was hardly less antagonistic to former Ministry than Leninists. These socialistic organs advise workmen's committee to continue existence as creative organ of revolution. Milyukov's organ, *Rech*, gives new Ministry guarded support and publishes reports of disturbances throughout country. Prince Lvov, president of Council of Ministers, interviewed, states that controlling force of country was becoming governing organ and thus necessitated reorganization of Ministry in order to give responsibility to real power and adds must be no talk of half confidence or half obedience to new Government, whose first aim is to reestablish strength of army. Says moreover that Ministry's declaration of peace without annexations or contributions does not mean only passive defense, and deplores present suspension of offensive which has given German Chancellor grounds for stating that separate peace with Russia is possible, to Russia's disgrace.

Demands of Workmen-Soldiers' Deputies to know objects of war before resuming hostilities and learn provisions of existing treaties not surprising, as committee represents the real power which made possible consummation of revolution. "Annexations and contributions "easily confounded with restitution and indemnities, as I stated in speech yesterday, but such questions should be relegated to peace conference. Important to sustain new Ministry as it is most potential influence in repressing and preventing lawlessness which manifesting itself in some sections.

FRANCIS

***The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to
the Secretary of State***

[Telegram—Translation]

PETROGRAD, *May 21, 1917.*
[*Received May 22, midnight.*]

In taking over the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I hasten to say to you how highly the whole Russian democracy is inspired with the sentiment of full solidarity with the great Republic which true to its traditions of liberty has espoused the cause of the coalition for the defense of justice and right. Like the United States, emancipated Russia is not seeking conquest or any covetous end in the present contest. The war is carried on to secure the freedom of nations and achieve universal lasting peace effectively guaranteed against all later attack. I am glad to find that those lofty principles which were so eloquently formulated in America are striking a warm unanimous echo in free Russia now mistress of her destinies.

TERESHCHENKO

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 760

PETROGRAD, *May 21, 1917.*
[Received June 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith in duplicate a translation of a *communiqué* given to the Russian press under date of May 6/19, 1917, by Mr. Tereshchenko, recently appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Russian Government.

As I have previously reported by cable, Mr. Tereshchenko has only recently assumed this portfolio, having been transferred from the Ministry of Finance. This is the first declaration of his policy and, in view of the still unsettled condition of affairs, it is impossible for me to forecast what effect this enunciation may have upon public sentiment.

In this connection and of possible assistance in appraising the class of Russian society which Mr. Tereshchenko represents, the Department may find of interest his biographical statement which I had the honor recently to transmit to the Department.¹

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Translation]

Statement issued to the Russian press by the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko), May 6/19, 1917

You ask what is my program? You can read it in the declaration of the new Provisional Government called to power by free Russia. This program is short, but significant; namely, the reestablishment as early as possible of universal peace: a peace which aims neither at domination over other peoples, nor a seizure of their national patrimony, nor a taking by force of foreign territories, a peace without annexations or indemnities, based on the principle of the rights of peoples to dispose of themselves, a peace concluded in close and indissoluble union with the Allied democracies. Free Russia, like every country which has made a great renovating revolution, is moved by two motives profoundly idealistic. The first is an aspiration to give a just peace to the entire world, not to injure any nation, not to create after the war a hatred, an estrangement which remains always when one nation comes forth from the struggle enriched at the expense of the other nations, when the latter are crushed and obliged to accept humiliating conditions of peace.

We have seen a sad example of that in 1870. The wounds dealt to France by Germany remained open for forty-five years. The hope of the people of Alsace-Lorraine for a better future is not dead up to the present and they have now a right to hope for the realization of their ideal. Outrage and injustice are not forgotten, violence creates hatred. Liberated Russia does not wish that either for herself or for others.

The second motive is the consciousness of its ties with the Allied democracies, consciousness of the duty which these ties have imposed on her. Revolutionary Russia cannot and ought not to break these ties sealed by blood; for her it is a question of revolutionary honor which is so much the more precious to her now. The great revolution which stirred the public ocean to its greatest depths could not but influence the army, which was unable to immediately accommodate itself to the suddenly changed state of affairs. At the same time the democracy of the west continued to accomplish with tenacity its warlike work which was for us a powerful aid. The Allied armies of whom the great mass is composed, as with us, of peasants and workmen, carried on without stopping the struggle against the enemy, diverting his strength and by their heroic effort are saving the Russian revolution from an external defeat. The success of the Russian revolution is also bought by their blood; it is with a sentiment of profound satisfaction that I must state that in free Russia in spite of a divergence of opinions of the democratic parties, there has not been a single party, a single organization, as there was in reactionary Russia, which would have made a propaganda for a separate peace. I know, however, that there exists a question capable of stirring the emotions of the numerous groups of the Russian democracy, that is the question of the treaties concluded by the old Russian régime. This question stirs up the passions. But I believe nevertheless that I ought to touch upon this question, expressing my entire and true opinion, for the Russian people has the right to expect and expects that the Provisional Government should only tell it the truth. The Russian democracy is afraid that bound by these old treaties it will be made to serve purposes of annexation which are foreign to it. This disturbs its revolutionary confidence, diminishes its spirit and enthusiasm. That is why demands for the immediate publication of all the treaties concluded by the old régime are being made. I think that in this case the sentiments which bring forth these demands are highly humanitarian, but I am convinced that the question is raised in an entirely erroneous manner and that should be understood by the Russian democracy.

It ought absolutely to understand that in the name of the safety of the Russian revolution and the Allied democracies, the immediate publication of the treaties is equivalent to a rupture with the Allies and will result in the isolation of Russia. Such an act will necessarily bring on a separate situation and for Russia will be the beginning of a separate peace. But it is exactly this which the Russian people repudiates with all its force and not only by a feeling of honor. It understands that the international war can only be ended by an international peace. It is only this peace which could guarantee this justice, this right of the people to dispose of

themselves which is ardently desired by liberated Russia. Other ways must be chosen, for new Russia must look forward and not backward. Now the world at war is confronted by some new facts; namely, the great Russian revolution and the entry into the war of the great American Republic, which hailed with enthusiasm the Russian revolution and has united itself without hesitation to the Allies after the disappearance of Russian absolutism. We must” start from these facts and these facts cannot but be counted on by the Allied democracies. Personal intercourse with representatives of the western democracies, as for example, Mr. Thomas, makes near and clear to all the aims which are now placed before Russia and before the world as a result of the Russian revolution. In basing oneself on this intercourse I notice the growth of a reciprocal confidence with the Allies which will permit the Russian Government to undertake preparatory measures for an agreement with the Allies on the basis of the declaration of March 27/April 9, and I will apply every effort to hasten the process of *rapprochement* of mutual understanding and agreement. But to attain this aim with success free Russia must prove that she is accomplishing faithfully her fundamental engagement that she has taken towards the Allies, the engagement of united struggle and mutual help.

She must inspire an unlimited confidence in herself and prove that her idealism is not derived from weakness and that she renounces annexations not because she cannot realize them but because she does not desire them. It is precisely the reason why in the name of the demands of the democracy, in the name of a peace rapid and just, it is necessary to recreate the military power of new Russia, to strengthen it by all the force of her revolutionary enthusiasm and to prove really the existence of this force. The Russian Army proved its heroism, its great self-denial, even when it was sent to the field of battle by the old régime. At present being subjected only to a discipline freely accepted it must understand and understands that it is struggling for what it holds most dear, for the integrity and the safety of its freed country aspiring to a new life. It understands also that a defeat will annihilate this liberty and this new life. And that ought to be the only aim to animate it. It is ridiculous in fact to speak at the present moment of the annexationist plans of the Allies as of a real menace to peace, just when Russia, Belgium, France and Serbia are themselves occupied in whole or in part by the enemy. Now it can only be a question of an active defense with a view to defending the national independence and liberty. As for the future the Allied democracies in their evergrowing confidence must count with the desire and tendency of all. It is not for nothing that Russian liberty comes to the world and that its consequences and influences are spreading in a large and powerful wave across the civilized world. That is all that I can say for the moment in regard to what will serve me as a basis for my activity and the measures that I propose taking.

¹ Not printed.

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 306

PETROGRAD, *May 22, 1917.*
[Received June 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to report further, referring to my despatch No. 274, dated March 20, 1917,¹ that on May 14 A. I. Guchkov, Minister of War and Navy, resigned, sending the following letter to the Prime Minister, Prince Lvov:

Seeing the condition in which the power of the Government is now placed, and particularly the power of the Minister of the Army and Navy over the army and fleet, conditions which I am unable to change and which threaten the defense, freedom and even the existence of Russia with fatal consequences, I can no more conscientiously continue my duties as Minister of War and Navy and share the responsibilities for the heavy sin which is being carried on against the fatherland. I therefore request the Temporary Government to release me of these duties.

This resignation brought forth the following declaration from the Temporary Government:

On account of A. I. Guchkov's resignation as Minister of War and Navy and the motives given for such a decision, the Temporary Government wish to state that their view on the present political position as set forth in the invocation to the people, published April 26 [/May 9], 1916 [1917], was acceptable to Mr. Guchkov. In this invocation the Temporary Government declared to the country quite openly, and [in] definite terms, that the state was in danger and that for its salvation all the vital forces of the country must be brought into motion and full confidence manifested. At the same time the Government have unanimously decided to do their utmost in order to summon to their number those creative forces which heretofore have taken no part in the responsible state work. Not awaiting the settlement of this question Mr. Guchkov has found it practicable to relieve himself of his responsibility for Russia's destiny by resigning (alone) from the Temporary Government.

Seeing clearly those dangers which stand now before Russia after the shock she has experienced, the Temporary Government do not feel that they have the right to discard their burden, and will remain at their posts.

The Temporary Government believe that, after the new representatives of the democracy will be summoned to the responsible state work, the unity

and fullness of the power in which the country will find its salvation will be restored.

Guchkov not being versed in military and naval affairs was not sufficiently firm during the first days that the Temporary Government was in power, and the army and navy, where too much liberty cannot be given, got beyond his control.

On May 15 P. N. Milyukov, Minister of Foreign Affairs, resigned, stating that he could not continue with a Ministry whose views were so different to his own. Milyukov is a brilliant man, and well known abroad, especially in America, but at the time when the eyes of all were fixed on him, looking to a declaration of foreign policy, he exhibited little tact and was severely criticized for not making his statements more clear so that they might have been readily understood by the workmen and soldiers. It was, however, hoped that Milyukov would not leave the Ministry but he refused the Ministry of Education which was offered to him.

On May 15 it was feared that the entire Temporary Government might resign, which would have precipitated a new crisis, but on that day it was definitely understood that A. F. Kerensky, then Minister of Justice, would be appointed Minister of War and Navy and that M. I. Tereshchenko, then Minister of Finance, would be appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Coalition Government formed May 19,¹ 1917:

Minister of Labor, M. I. Skobelev
Minister of Justice, I. N. Perevertsev
Minister of Agriculture, V. M. Chernov
Minister of Provisions, A. V. Peshekhonov
Minister of War and Navy, A. F. Kerensky
Minister of Social Security, Professor D. I. Shakhovskoi
Minister of Finance, A. I. Shingarev
Minister of Post and Telegraph, I. G. Tseretelli
Minister of Trade and Industry, A. I. Konovalov
Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. I. Tereshchenko
Minister of Ways of Communication, N. V. Nekrasov
Minister of Education, A. A. Manuilov
State Auditor, I. V. Godnev
Chief Procurator of the Synod, V. N. Lvov
Minister of the Interior and Prime Minister, G. E. Lvov

The following members are socialists: Skobelev, Chernov, Peshekhonov, Kerensky, Tseretelli. All the others are liberals (*bourgeois*).

The above-named Government was formed after four days of almost continual sitting of the Temporary Government and members of the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. The chief point of discussion at these conferences was the phrase, "Peace without annexations and contributions."

The following declaration was then published:

DECLARATION OF THE (COALITION) TEMPORARY GOVERNMENT²

Reformed and strengthened by new representatives of the revolutionary democracy, the Temporary Government declares that it will resolutely put into life ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity under the guise of which the great Russian revolution has been made. The Temporary Government is especially united by the following platform which sets forth its plan of future activity:

1. In the foreign policy the Temporary Government renounces, in accordance with the people, all thought of a separate peace, and openly undertakes as its aim the attaining of universal peace in the shortest possible time. The basis of this peace will be neither the ruling of other nations, nor the taking of their national property, nor the forcible appropriation of foreign territories—a peace without annexations or contributions on a basis of the self-determination of nations. Being strongly confident that, with the fall of the Tsar's régime in Russia and the establishment of democratic principles in the policy of the interior as well as in the foreign policy, a new factor for aspirations towards a lasting peace and fraternity of nations has been created for the Allied democracies. The Temporary Government will undertake preparatory steps for an agreement with the Allies, based on the declaration of the Temporary Government of March 27 [/April 9].
2. Being confident that the defeat of Russia and her Allies would not only be the beginning of a great calamity for the people, but that it would also delay or make impossible the conclusion of an universal peace on the above-stated principles, the Temporary Government strongly believes that Russia's revolutionary army will not admit that the German army should destroy our allies on the west and then fall upon us with the whole strength of their arms. The main task of the Temporary Government is to strengthen the principles of democracy in the army, and to organize and strengthen its fighting force for defense as well as for offense.
3. The Temporary Government will resolutely and infallibly struggle with the economic difficulties confronting the country by a further development and organization of the state and public control over production, transportation, exchange, and distribution of provisions.
4. Measures regarding full protection of labor will receive a further energetic development.
5. The settlement of the question of the transition of land to the workingmen (peasants) will be left for the Constitutional Convention. In the meantime the Temporary Government will take all necessary measures, in order to obtain the greatest production of flour for the country, which is in great need, and in order to regulate the use of the

land in the interests of the country's economic development and of the working population.

6. Desiring to reform the financial system along democratic lines, the Temporary Government will give special attention to the increase of the direct taxation of the wealthy classes (the inheritance tax, the taxation of the war superprofits, property tax, etc.).
7. Work regarding the introduction and strengthening of democratic institutions of self-government will be continued with the utmost persistence and rapidity.
8. The Temporary Government will also do their utmost to arrange an early convocation of the Constitutional Convention in Petrograd.

Undertaking as their aim a resolute realization of the above program, the Temporary Government categorically states that success in its work is possible only under the condition that it has the full and absolute confidence of the whole revolutionary people, and the possibility to realize the complete power which is so necessary for the strengthening of the conquests of the revolution and for further development.

Addressing all citizens with a decisive and persistent appeal to maintain the unity of power, embodied in the Temporary Government, it adds that for the salvation of the country it will undertake the most energetic measures against all counter-revolutionary movements, as well as against anarchistic, antireligious, and violent acts, which might disorganize the country and create a good ground for a counter-revolution. The Temporary Government believes that in this way it will meet the decisive support of everyone to whom the freedom of Russia is dear.

(Signatures)

Just before being appointed Minister of War and Navy, Kerensky, then the only socialist member of the Cabinet, made a speech before the soldiers' convention of delegates from the front in which he repeated Guchkov's statement, given in last week's report, that the country is on the verge of ruin, that too many people were acting like rebellious slaves rather than like free citizens, and that he regretted that he had not died two months ago when he believed that Russia had ideals and would live up to them.

It is very significant that in the Ministry above named there are Ministers of Provisions and Social Security (charity) but no Minister of Munitions and the Ministry of War and the Ministry of Navy have been given to one person. Out of the myriad of banners and placards exhibited during demonstrations not one reads, "Hurrah for Russia!"

It has been stated that out [one] of the causes of the length of the discussions was due to a declaration made by Mr. Shingarev that he would leave the Ministry entirely unless he were made Minister of Provisions. The socialists absolutely

refused to accede, and unconditionally demanded this portfolio. This incident is already being exploited in the socialist press against the Constitutional Democratic Party (Party of the People's Freedom), to which Mr. Shingarev belongs, asserting that this middle-class party wanted that portfolio in order to protect the grain dealers and landowners. If the socialist who is now Minister of Provisions adopts radical measures (as he may on the basis of the Government grain monopoly law), there is sure to be serious friction within the Ministry; and the bitterness of the press, that is toned down for the time being, will break out again. Every moment of friction and disagreement within the Ministry brings the dictatorship of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies nearer. It is significant that in entering the Ministry the Executive Committee of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies did not insist on an equal division of portfolios by number. They feel that five socialists, with the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies behind them, have as much power in the coalition as the ten liberals, which is true.

Milyukov and Guchkov resigned because Russia's foreign policy and the condition of the army were the first problems to arise. The new declaration of the coalition Ministry contains definite proposals affecting the Ministry of Finance which may soon bring that ministry into prominence. Questions that vitally interest the workmen, peasants and soldiers may arise at any moment and have an effect on other ministries.

After the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies issued its socialist-pacifist "Proclamation to the Peoples of the World"¹ the minds of the army and the people of Russia were almost exclusively occupied in discussing this document which they believed would precipitate an armistice. The socialists put all the emphasis of their widespread spoken and written agitation on how to end the war quickest, while the liberals emphasized how to end the war best. As Mr. Milyukov says in his speech of explanation, given in full in enclosure 1,² the soldiers "imagined that all these pacifist tendencies and manifestoes were equivalent to an armistice and that there was no more need of fighting." The speech of Kerensky in the convention of delegates from the front, referred to earlier in this despatch, the appeal "To the Armies" issued by the Council of Workmen's and Soldier's Deputies on May 15, and the actual appointment of Kerensky to be Minister of War and of the Navy were all intended to counteract this illusion of the soldiers for which the socialist-pacifists are themselves responsible.

In giving the full text of the "Proclamation to the Armies" issued by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, a commentary has been added² because the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is to-day the only institution the overwhelming mass of the soldiers respect, and to show that the socialist leaders of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies are bound and fettered by their doctrinaire socialism and ingrained pacifism, to such an extent that in issuing this document they made a hearty patriotic appeal with one hand, and weakened it with the other.

The soldiers' primitive way of thinking will not be able to follow the subtle reasoning of the document and will only be impressed by the catchwords shown below.

It begins by a general statement that the present régime must work hand in hand to overcome the crime and neglect of the old régime, a statement that no Russian party contradicts to-day, and then at once plunges into the narrowly partisan and violent phraseology of the extreme socialist-pacifists: "The working class did not begin the war. The war was begun by the Tsars and capitalists of all countries." This is the tone set in the opening words of the proclamation and runs through all the rest—the tone of Zimmerwald and Kienthal, which is condemned in all countries except Russia as a pro-German tone.

The good effect of such bold phrases as the one, "Can it be possible we have overthrown Nikolai only to fall at the feet of Wilhelm?" is ruined by the two following paragraphs with the frequent repetition of the phrase, "We are leading you to peace."

The further facts that Messrs. Skobelev and Tseretelli, who are now in the coalition Ministry, are adherents of these ideas, and that the first paragraph [paragraph 1] of the new declaration of the Temporary Government contains the phrases, "The Temporary Government—openly undertakes as its aim the attaining of universal peace in the shortest possible time," and "The Temporary Government will undertake preparatory steps for an agreement with the Allies based on the declaration of the Temporary Government of April 10 [9]," lead this Consulate to believe that the motto of the day here, "stiffen the army," was launched in a way that paralyzes its effect at the very outset.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

[Enclosure—Translation]

Proclamation Issued by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies

TO THE ARMIES

Comrades, soldiers at the front!

We hereby make a warm appeal to you in the name of the revolutionary democracy of Russia.

Yours is a heavy task. You have paid a dear price, a price of blood, for the crimes of the Tsar, who sent you to fight and left you without arms, ammunition or food. For it is a fact that the privations you now suffer were caused by the Tsar and his satellites. And the revolution has a hard task before it to bring order out of the chaos left behind by the Tsar's robbers and executioners.

The working class did not want the war. It did not begin the war. The war was

begun by the tsars and capitalists of all countries. Every additional day of the war is an additional day of sorrow and suffering for the people. When it threw off the yoke of the Tsar the people's first task was to put an end to the war.

The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies sent a proclamation to the peoples of the world, calling on them to end the slaughter. The Council sent this proclamation to the French and to the Germans and to the Austrians.

Russia is waiting for an answer to this appeal.

But remember that our appeal will be worth nothing if Wilhelm's regiments crush Russia before our brother workmen and soldiers in other countries respond.

Our appeal is worth no more than an empty sheet of paper if all the strength of revolutionary Russia does not stand behind it and if Wilhelm triumphs on the ruins of Russian freedom. The ruin of Russian freedom would be a frightful calamity, impossible to make good again, not only for us but for the working-classes of the entire world. Comrade soldiers! Defend revolutionary Russia with all your strength!

The workmen and peasants of Russia are yearning for peace with all their souls. But the peace that is to come should be a peace set by the agreement of the people of the whole world. What will happen if we work for a separate peace? What will happen if the Russian Army sticks its bayonets into the ground to-day and declares that it does not want to fight any more and that what goes on in other parts of the wide world does not concern it?

What will happen will be this. After crushing our allies in the West, German imperialism will throw all its strength against us. The German Emperor, the German landowners and capitalists, will put their foot on our neck, will seize our cities and villages and burden us with a contribution.

Can it be possible that we have overthrown Nikolai only to fall at the feet of Wilhelm?

Comrade soldiers! The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies is leading you to peace by a different way. We are leading you to peace by calling on the workmen and peasants of Germany and Austria to rise in revolution.

We are leading you to peace by forcing our government to surrender annexationist policies and demanding the same surrender from our allies.

We are leading you to peace by calling an international conference of the socialists of the whole world to rebel against war. Time is needed for the people of the world to awake. Time is needed for them to rise and force with iron hands their tsars and capitalists to peace. Time is needed for the working class of all countries to unite with us to fight mercilessly against bandits and robbers.

But remember, comrade soldiers, that time will never come unless you hold back the enemy, or if your ranks are trampled under foot and the breathless body of the Russian revolution lies inert at Wilhelm's feet.

Remember, comrades, at the front, in the trenches, you are guarding Russian liberty. Your blood is not defending the Tsar nor his Protopopovs or Rasputins, nor the riches of the landowners and capitalists. You are defending the revolution, you are defending your brothers, the workmen and peasants. May that defense be worthy of its aim and the sacrifices you have already made! The front can not be defended by merely sitting motionless in the trenches. There are times when the enemy's attack can only be foiled by attacking him.

There are times when humbly waiting to be attacked is equivalent to awaiting death. There are times when an attack is the only way to save yourselves from death and to save your brothers on other parts of the front.

Remember this, comrade soldiers. You have sworn to defend Russian liberty and do not refuse to attack when it is demanded by the fortunes of war. The freedom and fate of Russia are in your hands.

Beware of traps and treachery while defending them. The fraternizing that is going on at the front may easily be turned into a trap. Revolutionary troops can fraternize but with whom? With another army that is also revolutionary, that has also decided to die for peace and liberty. But at the present the armies of Germany and Austria are not such armies, no matter how many honest and awakened individuals may be in them. Those armies are still following the lead of Wilhelm and Karl, the landowners and capitalists are still fighting for annexations, robbery and violence. In those armies the military staff will only make use of your good faith and the blind obedience of its own soldiers.

You go out of the trenches to fraternize with an open soul and officers of the enemy's General Staff, disguised as privates, come out to meet you.

You talk simply and guilelessly with the enemy and during that time his superiors take photographs. You cease firing in order to fraternize and during that time artillery is being moved about behind the enemy's trenches, fortifications are being built, troops are being moved.

Comrade soldiers! You will not secure peace by fraternizing nor by the silent treaties which are concluded at the front between companies, battalions, regiments. The triumph of the revolution and universal peace is not to be gained by a separate peace, nor by a separate armistice. The people who assure you that fraternizing is the way to gain peace are luring you to your own ruin and the ruin of our liberty. Do not believe them.

The road to peace is a different one. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has pointed that road out. Follow it. Throw aside everything that weakens your fighting power, everything that brings dissolution and falling spirits into the army. Your fighting strength is helping the cause of peace. The Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies can only carry out its revolutionary work and develop its struggle for peace if it can rely on you and that you will not allow Russia to be crushed militarily.

Comrade soldiers! Not only the workmen and peasants of Russia, but also the workmen and peasants of the entire world are looking at you with confidence and enthusiasm. Soldiers of the revolution! You are going to be worthy of that confidence, knowing that your work of fighting is helping the cause of peace.

You will accomplish your military duty in the name of the happiness and freedom of revolutionary Russia and in the name of the fast-approaching brotherhood of man.

¹ *Ante*, p. 7 [Pg. 7 includes portions of [Doc. 8](#), [Doc. 9](#), and [Doc. 10](#)].

¹ In the *Delo Naroda* of May 6/19, the list of the new ministry is dated May 5/18 and is followed by the declaration.

² A translation of the first two paragraphs of this declaration, together with the introduction and conclusion, was received from the Russian Embassy, as telegraphed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, May 8/21 (File No. 861.00/362½). According to an attached memorandum, dated May 26, this copy was furnished at the personal request of the Assistant Secretary of State, who had learned of the communication unofficially; the Embassy declined to present it officially because it had no instructions to do so.

¹ Quoted in despatch No. 283, Apr. 3, *ante*, p. 18 [Pg. 18 includes portions of [Doc. 19](#) and [Doc. 20](#)].

² Not printed.

² Not printed.

The Secretary of State to the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 26, 1917.*

I have received with gratification your excellency's telegram of the 21st instant¹ advising me that the Russian democracy is inspired with the sentiment of full solidarity with the United States, which, you aptly say, has espoused the cause of the Entente Allies for the defense of justice and right.


The war is carried on, as you say, to secure the freedom of nations and to achieve universal lasting peace. To attain these ends the democracies of the world must band together to guarantee each other against unprovoked attack by conscienceless autocrats who employ themselves in weaving intrigue and laying schemes for the aggrandizement of power and the promotion of personal ambition at the expense of their own peoples and of defenseless nations as well.

The present business is to defeat the designs and machinations of the German autocratic Government. To accomplish that result the United States will apply all of its physical, moral and intellectual forces, and I am happy to feel assured that the great democracy of Russia will keep step with us until our common aims shall be successfully accomplished.

ROBERT LANSING

¹ *Ante*, p. 74 [Pg. 74 includes portions of [Doc. 46](#) and [Doc. 47](#)].

Reception of President Wilson's message of May 22, 1917, on the objects of the United States in the war¹—The Kronstadt revolt—All-Russian congresses of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, of Peasants, of Cossacks—Opening of the Russian offensive in Galicia

¹ The message, transmitted by telegram No. 1426, May 22, 1917, to the Ambassador in Russia, is printed in [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I](#).

[\[51\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, May 31, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received June 3, 9.15 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5173

[\[52\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, May 31, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5171b

[\[53\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, June 2, 1917, 11 a.m.

File No. 763.72/5171d

[\[54\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, June 3, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received June 6, 10 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/5170

[\[55\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, June 3, 1917, 11 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5173

[\[56\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, June 4, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received June 7, 6.10 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5177

[57] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 4, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received June 6, 6 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5175

[58] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 5, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received June 9, 11.15 a.m.]

File No. 763.711/5238

[59] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 5, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received June 9, 9.20 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5231

[60] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 6, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received June 10, 5 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5248

[61] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 7, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received June 9, 5 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5213

[62] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, June 8, 1917, 7 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5241c

[63] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 8, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received June 12, midnight.]

File No. 861.007384

[64] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 9, 1917. [Received June 12, 12 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/385

[65] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, June 9, 1917, 11 a.m. [Received June 10, 7.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/381

[66] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 9, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5213

[67] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, June 9, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5269c

[68] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, June 13, 1917. [Received June 14, 3 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/387

[69] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 23, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received June 26, 7.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/398

[70] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 27, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received June 30, 10.55 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5630

[71] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, June 30, 1917, 1 p.m. [Received July 2, 12.45 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5638

[72] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 2, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received July 8, 11 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/418

[73] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 3, 1917. [Received August 2.]

File No. 861.00/1724

[74] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, July 3, 1917, 5 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5638

[75] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 5, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received July 10, 8.30 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/5796

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 31, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 3, 9.15 a.m.]

1348. Your 1426 informally communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs May 25.²

He said that British and French replies had been received but thought publication unwise and had asked alterations. Formally transmitted President's reply to Minister for Foreign Affairs 29th with the request that I be informed of its publication in time for simultaneous publication in America. He called to-day, said replies of Great Britain and France unsafe for publication because of annexation references and would probably affect injuriously work Minister of War now performing at front, but President's reply satisfactory and would submit all replies to Council of Ministers.

Publishing to-day statement concerning Stevens commission³ wired by Washburn with prefatory statement by myself. Secretary's note concerning diplomatic commission will be printed to-morrow.⁴

Industrial conditions unsatisfactory. Workingmen making exorbitant demands, such as "entire net profits," and in some instances, "entire gross receipts."

FRANCIS

² See footnote 1.

³ Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia, of which John F. Stevens was chairman.

⁴ See telegram No. 1428 of May 22, *post*, p. 110 [Pg. 110 includes portions of [Doc. 80](#), [Doc. 81](#), [Doc. 82](#), and [Doc. 83](#)].

File No. 763.72/5171b

[Document 52]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1456. Department's 1426, May 22, noon.⁵ Have you received Department's No. 1426, May 22, noon? What is disposition of Provisional Government concerning publication of communication? Telegraph reply.

LANSING

⁵ See footnote 1.

File No. 763.72/5171d

[Document 53]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 2, 1917, 11 a.m.*

1460. Most urgent. Department's 1426, May 22, noon,^{[1](#)} and 1456, May 31, 6 p.m., concerning presidential communication. Immediate answer imperative. Report date and hour of receipt of No. 1426.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 86 [Pg. 86 includes portions of [Doc. 51](#) and [Doc. 52](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 3, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received June 6, 10 p.m.]

1354. Answering your 1456, May 31, just received. My 1348, May 31, explained situation. Conferred with Minister for Foreign Affairs May 30, when he stated President's reply unobjectionable and publication thereof only awaiting British and French replies which had been submitted but returned after conference for alteration as both replies contained statements likely to arouse objections and Minister for Foreign Affairs thought advisable to publish all replies simultaneously. Conferred with the Minister for Foreign Affairs again June [2] when after profusely apologizing and receiving from me affirmative reply to his question whether I desired him to be entirely candid he said that as every utterance of President Wilson is read with interest and exerts wide influence in Russia he suggested that the President's communication omit statement, "war begun to go against Germany," as Minister of War wants to have argument to solidify and inspire army that Germany's success is threatening if not imminent, which President's expression tended to counteract. Furthermore, suggested that references to "readjustments" might properly be omitted but after some further talk voluntarily offered to send suggestions in writing to Embassy by midnight. Not receiving same I found him to-day at President of Council's residence conferring with President of Council and Minister of War who returned from front this morning. He apologized for not complying with promise and said was now conferring concerning Allies' replies on objects of war and would call at Embassy June 4, 11 a.m., and give result. That is present situation.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has been also acting Minister of Finance until to-day and is mentally and physically exhausted. Told me confidentially that Minister of Finance [Trade] and Industry had resigned through difference with himself as Minister of Finance, he as Minister of Finance advocating that differences between employers and employees be adjusted by local arbitration committee with Russian delegation as final arbitrator and that such rule be applied to all such controversies but Minister Trade and Industry maintained that each dispute be considered by Government and settled on its merits. [Supposition] is that Konovalov, late Minister Trade and Industry, desired resign since Milyukov left. Minister for Foreign Affairs says British reply been altered on request three times;

that French answer been altered twice and now awaiting return of Thomas for third alteration. Provisional Government has delicate, difficult task to maintain itself and hopes we can consistently [omission].

I think our expression should carefully guard against increasing their obstacles. Shall cable advice to-morrow after seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs who says Minister of "War much pleased with his word from front and sends warm greeting. When control and discipline of army restored, industrial problems will be much easier of solution.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 3, 1917, 11 p.m.*

1464. Do not understand your telegram 1348, May 31, 5 p.m., referring to Department's 1426.

[No.] 1426 was sent by the President independently and not at the suggestion of any one. If it is supposed that it was sent by agreement that other powers would also send similar messages the supposition is entirely wrong. Furthermore the statement as to replies of Great Britain and France being unsafe but President's "reply" satisfactory and statement that Minister of Foreign Affairs "would submit all replies to Council of Ministers" are not understood, as President's message was not a reply to any communication.

Please explain to Minister of Foreign Affairs that President's message is in no sense a reply to anything but is a wholly spontaneous and independent communication which it is desirable to make public here as soon as possible provided Russian Government has no objection to publication.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 4, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 7, 6.10 a.m.]

1356. Answering your 1460, June 2, 11 a.m., received to-day. Your 1426 [received] May 27 [25?], and communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs same date, 9 p.m., at the Embassy to which he came by my request *en route* to Council of Ministers which meets every night. Your instruction was to confer concerning propriety of giving same simultaneous publicity. Minister for Foreign Affairs took verbatim copy of President's message to Council of Ministers but said reply already received from England and France had been returned for alteration as their publication would have disquieting effect here. Not hearing from Minister for Foreign Affairs I sent him official verbatim copy May 29 and asked when same would be published as desired give out message simultaneously there. He told me while lunching at the Embassy May 30 that wished publish simultaneously with our message the reply from England and joint reply from France and Italy on same subject. I cabled situation in my No. 1348, May 31, 6 p.m. Endeavored to make appointment with Minister for Foreign Affairs June 1 but Minister for Foreign Affairs said impossible and fixed hour for 3.30 p.m., June 2. Cabled you result of that conference in my No. 1354, June 3, 9 p.m.; 10 a.m. to-day Minister for Foreign Affairs telephoned postponing conference previously fixed for 11 a.m. to 4 p.m. Shall cable result to-night. Your No. 1456, May 31, 6 p.m., received June 3.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 4, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received June 6, 6 a.m.]

1357. My No. 1356 explains situation. Just returned from conference with Minister for Foreign Affairs who handed me the following communication which he termed personal, unofficial, but knows I am transmitting in full:

June 4, 1911.

MY DEAR AMBASSADOR: May I take the liberty to address to your excellency a request in connection with President Wilson's last note you were good enough to transmit to the Russian Provisional Government. I would like to be entirely frank with you and in talking as a diplomatist to a diplomatist to use the language of a friend to a man whom I have long been accustomed to appreciate very highly and to esteem sincerely.

You know that a halo surrounds President Wilson's name in Russia. You know what an admiration and what sympathies have been created by his first note among Russias' democracy when they had not yet won their freedom. After that note the whole Russian democracy saw clearly and openly declared, what they had already felt before; namely, that President Wilson was at the present moment the chief and principal statesman able to lead mankind effectively to a just peace of the whole world. His further attitude as well as the present [omission] and magnanimous action of the United States in defense of the right have strengthened still more our deep regard for him as a statesman. The friendship and intimacy of the United States great democracy are of infinite value for us and we should much regret if any of the President's intentions or words were to be misunderstood or misinterpreted.

Such a misinterpretation would be especially pernicious at the present moment when Russia is passing through a great crisis and all the efforts of the Provisional Government tend to lead the country out of this state and while as you certainly know there are people who, be it consciously or unconsciously, maliciously or conscientiously, are striving by every means to undermine the authority of the Provisional Government and to push the

nation off the road the Provisional Government intends to lead her along.

The Provisional Government have good, reasons to hope that the Russian Army will very soon be able to regain possession of itself; that its painful inaction will cease and that they will again become an active and useful force in the common struggle side by side with the democracies of the West. Every thought of the Provisional Government is directed to this aim for the sake of upholding Russia's honor, the preserving the sacred trust to the Allies and lastly the saving of Russia's democracy itself.

All other aims are subordinated to this one; for this the Provisional Government are ready for their part for the utmost sacrifices and in this regard they firmly count upon President Wilson's deep intelligence and magnanimous support.

Such an aid coming from the President at the present moment would be invaluable for the Provisional Government as well as for the whole of Russia; far more valuable even than his promise to assist her with money and munitions which are to us of the utmost importance and value.

From this point of view I take the liberty to touch a few passages in President Wilson's note. I quite agree with all his considerations giving proof of his usual shrewdness of analysis and perspicuity but considering the state of nervous excitement that prevails in Russia, considering the existence of misinterpreters who are ever ready to do their destructive work, I am afraid some passages of the note may be misunderstood. This would give rise to disputes in the democracy that could bring confusion into the army which during the next few weeks will have to concentrate all its attention and will on the single point of preparing the offensive.

Your excellency will be good enough to find annexed a copy of the three passages of the note I am alluding to and which in my opinion may give rise to misunderstanding.

Please excuse the trouble I am causing you and the President. I have had to trouble the British Ambassador thrice for exactly similar reasons. I beg you to believe me! when I say that my only leading motive for doing so is my ardent desire to give Russia's free people the possibility and the power necessary for a vigorous and resolute pursuit of the struggle for the liberty and independence of all the democracies, in close and indissoluble union with them.

Believe me [etc.]

MICHAEL TERESHCHENKO

The passages alluded to are paragraph 2 beginning, "The war has begun," ending, "men they are using."¹ Ministry endeavoring restore discipline by making impression that German success [threatening] and avoidable only by Russia's

offensive. Second passage begins, “The ruling classes in Germany,” ends, “from ever happening again,” about twenty-two lines.² Third passage in last paragraph begins, “and unless we pour out,” ends with words, “guarantee of justice and security.”³ Minister for Foreign Affairs says while thoroughly agreeing with President, Government is preparing for offensive and wishes to avoid everything likely to arouse political discussions, especially in army, and fears “that status must be altered” may be construed as meaning conquest or dismemberment. Also looks with suspicion on “the day has come to conquer” in last passage. His objections in my judgment exaggerated but think we should not give Russia any excuse for not beginning offensive.

Brusilov to-day made commander in chief, Alexeev coming to Petrograd as member of Advisory Council. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Kerensky promises begin offensive within two or three weeks and Kerensky himself tells me if not done cable you that army conditions rapidly improving. Minister for Foreign Affairs says England cheerfully alters her communication in accordance with his suggestions and expects altered reply by June 6. Minister for Foreign Affairs expedites this cable.

FRANCIS

¹ The war has begun to go against Germany, and in their desperate desire to escape the inevitable ultimate defeat those who are in authority in Germany are using every possible instrumentality, are making use even of the influence of groups and parties among their own subjects to whom they have never been just or fair or even tolerant, to promote a propaganda on both sides of the sea which will preserve for them their influence at home and their power abroad, to the undoing of the very men they are using.

² The ruling classes in Germany have begun of late to profess a like liberality and justice of purpose, but only to preserve the power they have set up in Germany and the selfish advantages which they have wrongly gained for themselves and their private projects of power all the way from Berlin to Bagdad and beyond. Government after government has by their influence, without open conquest of its territory, been linked together in a net of intrigue directed against nothing less than the peace and liberty of the world. The meshes of that intrigue must be broken, but cannot be broken unless wrongs already done are undone; and adequate measures must be taken to prevent it from ever again being rewoven or repaired.

Of course, the Imperial German Government and those whom it is using for their own undoing are seeking to obtain pledges that the war will end in the restoration of the *status quo ante*. It was the *status quo ante* out of which this iniquitous war issued forth, the power of the Imperial German Government within the Empire and its widespread domination and influence outside of that Empire. That status

must be altered in such fashion as to prevent any such hideous thing from ever happening again.

3 ... and unless we pour out the blood and treasure now and succeed, we may never be able to unite or show conquering force again in the great cause of human liberty. The day has come to conquer or submit. If the forces of autocracy can divide us, they will overcome us; if we stand together, victory is certain and the liberty which victory will secure. We can afford then to be generous, but we cannot afford then or now to be weak or omit any single guarantee of justice and security.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 5, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received June 9, 11.15 a.m.]

1362. Your cipher telegram 1464, June 3, 11 p.m., just received. Immediately phoned Minister for Foreign Affairs for audience. Will come to the Embassy 6 this afternoon. Explained over phone that the President's message addressed Provisional Government and not reply to any communication but sent absolutely independently. He immediately asked if President advised of contents of his personal note to me of June 4 which transmitted verbatim in my 1364 [1357] June 4, 6 p.m. When answered affirmatively he remarked that same objections obtained to anything emanating now from President and stated enthusiastically that conditions improving so rapidly in army sincerely hoped nothing be said or done to interfere as to-day's advices still more encouraging. No formal conference between Allied representatives concerning replies but know that British Ambassador and Henderson submitted to London yesterday third draft of note concerning objects of war. Also know that Italian Ambassador and Thomas, acting French Ambassador, framing note on the same subject and having great difficulty in satisfying Minister for Foreign Affairs and their own countries concerning arbitral court and contributions. His approving of the President's message May 30 and suggesting alterations therein June 2 demonstrates sensitiveness of the Ministry. Minister for Foreign Affairs sincerely desirous that nothing will lessen welcome to Diplomatic Commission which left Vladivostok evening June 3 due Petrograd about June 12 and says was planning to publish President's note on commission's entering European Russia. Was flattering myself that President's message partly due to my 1253, May 5, 7 p.m., and 1270, May 11, and 1288, May 14,¹ as it so thoroughly met what I thought were requirements. President's plan, however, was better as it prepared way for arrival of Diplomatic Commission. Cable again after seeing Minister for Foreign Affairs.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, pp. 41 [Pg. 41 includes portions of [Doc. 35](#) and [Doc. 36](#)], 52 [Pg. 52 includes portions of [Doc. 38](#) and [Doc. 39](#)], and 53 [Pg. 53 includes portions of [Doc. 39](#), [Doc. 40](#), and [Doc. 41](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 5, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received June 9, 9.20 a.m.]

1364. Minister of Foreign Affairs just left Embassy. Says Allies much annoyed at Italy's action in declaring Albanian independence under Italian protectorate. Is much more elated, however, at improved conditions in army but still thinks publication of the President's message would interfere with very satisfactory progress in improvement. Very desirous President should see unofficial letter transmitted verbatim in my 1357, June 4, 6 p.m. Requests message be not published there until date fixed here and promises to name before June 12 a date for release. Thinks immaterial but considered message reply to Milyukov note although addressed Provisional Government and states Government, which is Council of Ministers, felt highly complimented therefor. Explains commending message May 30 and suggesting alterations June 2 by saying conditions such May 30 as not affected by message but showed such decided improvement June 2 that feared betterment would be impaired by its publication. Realizes is asking much in requesting delay in publication which if granted I think should be satisfactory without any alteration except "war has begun to go against Germany," omission of which would not materially affect paragraph which excellent as is entire message.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 6, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received June 10, 5 a.m.]

1369. United Press representative here says President's message available in New York and only awaits release for publication and has so informed Foreign Office. Minister of Foreign Affairs tells me he now realizes message cannot be altered and will inform me afternoon of 7th when will be given to press here which date I shall immediately cable. Since learning message not in reply to Milyukov note seems inclined to publish without waiting for British, French, and Italian replies to that note. Delay in publication has only served to increase public interest in the President's message.

In yesterday's conference Minister for Foreign Affairs said Government had ordered dismissed from army two regiments which had failed to obey orders to go to front and had directed that the names of all members thereof be stricken from the rolls and read in all the camps and that such members and all dependent on them be deprived of participation in pensions or other emoluments and honors granted to soldiers and their families. This first decisive manifestation of authority gratifying; indicates Ministry becoming surer of its power, He also said that Guchkov, former Minister of War, is organizing proprietors of industries, or what socialists call *bourgeoisie*, meaning owners of industries and employers generally.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/5213

[Document 61]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 7, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received June 9, 5 a.m.]

1373. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me President's message will be given out Saturday evening, printed in morning papers June 10, without alteration of course unless previously authorized which I think advisable as he quite reconciled and message admirable. Says Rosen not connected with Government but he has appeared to be. Minister for Foreign Affairs and the president of Council of Ministers whom I saw both [elated] over improved conditions.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 8, 1917, 7 p.m.*

4958. Ask British authorities to ascertain if Reuter or any other news organization has forwarded presidential communication to Russia to any other country or agency, to be held for release. If so, have Reuter or other agency recall all copies. The message is in the hands of Reuter through an error here. The communication will not be published until certain important alterations are made.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 8, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[Received June 12, midnight.]

1374. British reply finally shaped to conform to Government's wishes and French reply which I think French Government refused to alter [to] be printed morning of June 9. Italy made no reply. President's message following morning without alterations unless you positively order otherwise.

Government gaining confidence and courage. Minister for Foreign Affairs says order concerning two regiments mentioned in my telegram No. 1369¹ [to be carried out] 9th instant. Kronstadt, fortified island near Petrograd, acknowledged fealty to Provisional Government June 6 after a month of insubordination; reconsidered 7th instant and declared its independence. Has area about two square miles. Population 30,000, including 20,000 sailors in mutiny. Government ordered connection severed. Will treat sailors as rebels. Only four school ships there; war vessels of Baltic Fleet at Heltmen [Helsingfors] and Riga. Rosen's letter without impression here.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 93 [Pg. 93 includes portions of [Doc. 59](#) and [Doc. 60](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 9, 1917.*

[*Received June 12, 12 p.m.*]

1375. Petrograd Council Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies after heated, protracted discussion last night sustained Provisional Government by vote of 580 to 160 passing resolution containing the following:

Kronstadt revolutionaries will be branded as traitors and apostates to Russian democracy unless they immediately and unconditionally recognize the authority of the Provisional Government.

Minister of Labor and Minister Post and Telegraph participated, supporting resolution. Extreme socialists, called Bolsheviks, fought bitterly, asserting if resolution passed would cause killing of four hundred naval officers now in prison at Kronstadt by [sailors].

General Gurko commanding northern front demoted to division commander when offering resignation because dissatisfied with regulations promulgated by new Minister of War. Resignation refused and Gurko told that only his previous record prevented his being degraded to common soldier. Such ministerial decrees demonstrate growing strength of Ministry. Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has membership of 2,750 selected on basis of one member for every hundred workmen and one member for every military company. Members not chosen for definite term but removed whenever they displease their constituents. Similar council in every Russian manufacturing city.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *June 9, 1917, 11 a.m.*
[Received June 10, 7.30 a.m.]

429. In informal conversation with Russian Minister who has recently been appointed as Russian Ambassador to Spain, I am informed that conditions in Russia are in a very unsatisfactory shape. I also learn through prominent Russians and others who pass through Stockholm daily that there is little cohesion in the Russian Government and there is a great deal of segregation in different parts of the country, such as has been manifested by the recent Kronstadt affair. In Kronstadt the people disacknowledged the authority in Petrograd and local committees assumed control themselves over this district. Now however through official representatives who had been sent from Petrograd cooperation has again been established and Kronstadt now acknowledges the Petrograd Government. There are labor disturbances and general unsettled conditions both economic and otherwise throughout the country and conditions are growing more grave.

MORRIS

File No. 763.72/5213

[Document 66]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1917, 3 p.m.*

1472. Your 1373, June 7, 8 p.m. President's communication being given to press for publication morning papers June 10 without alteration. The President desires me to express to the Provisional Government of Russia his gratification at the way it has received his communication and is especially pleased that the Russian authorities appreciate the spirit which inspired it.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/5269c

[Document 67]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1917, 3 p.m.*

4964. President's communication to the Provisional Government of Russia as you now have it may be published in newspapers of Sunday morning, June 10. There will be no alterations. You may inform press bureau that Reuter's and other agencies may release for morning papers of June 10.

LANSING

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *June 13, 1917.*

[*Received June 14, 3 p.m.*]

455. Swedish telegram bureau publishes telegram from Petrograd to-day that congress composed representatives of peasants throughout Russia at special meeting to discuss Kronstadt events with thousand votes against five adopted resolution as follows:

Congress wants bring to attention inhabitants Kronstadt that all supplies to Kronstadt will be stopped if they do not immediately unite with Russian democracy and acknowledge Provisional Government at Petrograd.

Resolution urges Government demand complete submission from Kronstadt and in case of opposition adopt stringent measures to defeat all attempts at separate peace. Peasant congress promised support Government against Kronstadt.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 23, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 26, 7.50 a.m.]

1429. In congress of Councils of Workmen and Soldiers in session here Lenin made impassioned speech yesterday advocating general peace without annexations or contributions. Thereupon Kerenskyspoke stating in beginning that he would repeat Lenin's speech; reading from manuscript he expressed Lenin's utterances in substantially same terms and then announced that he had been reading from an intercepted radio signed by Leopold of Bavaria commanding German forces. Decided sensation produced. This is another proof that Bolsheviks maintained by German money which Russian Government believes but hesitates to charge in the absence of convicting proof.

Bolsheviks, as extreme socialists called, had arranged peaceful demonstration for 2 o'clock to-day to express hostility to the Provisional Government but the demonstration was abandoned when Provisional Government prohibited assembling of crowds and is sustained therein by Congress of Workmen and Soldiers. Prohibitory order of the Government stated that if violence offered severe measures would be used.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 27, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 30, 10.55 a.m.]

1442. Just conferred with President of Council of Ministers concerning July 4 celebration. He approves on principle but will submit to Council of Ministers and communicate their wishes Friday. Says conditions so unsettled cannot tell to-day whether such assemblage be advisable week hence. Bolshevik organs advocating assemblages for protesting against Provisional Government which prohibits such on streets. Quiet prevails to-day. *Pravda*, main Bolshevik organ, to-day calls for demonstrations of opposition to Provisional Government for July 1. Please cable immediately of what Government accomplished toward prosecution of war. Does constitutionalist [selective service] act give President power to assign conscripted to any duties other than military?

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 30, 1917, 1 p.m.*
[Received July 2, 12.45 a.m.]

1453. British Ambassador writes calling conference of Allied representatives on July 4, 5 p.m., on request of Henderson to consider “effect of present industrial conditions on output of munitions in Russia “which Henderson considers “sufficiently grave to render desirable an exchange of views between the Allied representatives.” Have notified British Ambassador cannot attend at time fixed and suggested change to 3d or 5th. He replied Henderson fixed date, absent now, would be informed of my inability to attend on his return. Please cable immediately any information bearing on the subject, what munitions are we furnishing, when shipped.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 2, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received July 8, 11 a.m.*]

1462. Yesterday's demonstration against Provisional Government disappointing to projectors. Cossacks and loyal soldiers at 3 this morning arrested 68 anarchists who had undisputed possession of Durnovo Palace two months and who last evening compelled prison keeper to release several criminals. This by order of Provisional Government. Enthusiastic impromptu demonstration now being held incited by decisive victory for Russian forces on southeast front, 9,000 prisoners taken. Outlook for Government more encouraging than for weeks past.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 338

PETROGRAD, *July 3, 1917.*
[Received August 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the All-Russian Convention of Delegates from Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has adopted a resolution on the war corresponding in all details to the mood and program outlined by Mr. Dan in the speech mentioned in despatch No. 335 of June 26, 1917,¹ given there in enclosure No. 2.

This resolution is obligatory on the present Temporary Government, as the *bourgeois* ministers must either carry out the desires of the soldiers and workmen (as Mr. Tereshchenko is already doing) or else resign and thus replace the present masked dictatorship of the proletariat by an open dictatorship of the proletariat. The resolution is a clear and emphatic statement of the present intentions of the all-powerful soldiers and workmen, gathered in a convention which is now the national parliament or congress of Russia. First of all, it adopts the fundamental attitude of the pro-German Zimmerwald conference in refusing to pay any heed to where the guilt for the origin of the war lies. (Paragraph 1: "The present war broke out on account of the imperialistic tendencies of all countries. ...") Secondly, it is not a statement as to how the war should be continued but entirely a statement as to how the war should be ended. (Paragraph 2: Entire [paragraph], and especially the words: "It [the war] distracts the country's attention from the labor of fortifying the liberties newly won." Also paragraph 3: ... "The struggle for the quickest possible conclusion of the war is the most important current task of the revolutionary democracy.") Thirdly, it gives up all idea of ending the war by defeating the Central powers. (Paragraph 4: "For the war to end by the crushing of one of the two groups of belligerents would cause new future wars and would even further deepen the differences between peoples and bring them to complete exhaustion, hunger and ruin." And paragraph 6: ... "The war can only be ended by the united efforts of the democracies of all countries. ...") Fourthly, it means that it is the intention of the Russian soldiers and workmen to end the war, if they can, by arousing the workmen and soldiers of the Allied countries against their present governments so that the English, French, Italian and American Governments will be forced by the workmen's and soldiers' organizations to adopt the Russian plans, in the belief that when this is done the German and Austrian workmen and soldiers will act accordingly. (Paragraph 6: "An appeal to the democracies of all nations urging them to accept the slogan 'peace without annexations or contributions on the basis of each nation's right to determine its own future' and to put pressure to bear on their respective governments along this line.") The

encouragement of the revolt against the majority government in England, France, Italy and America is held to be necessary because the recent notes from the first three countries, in answer to the Russian note, and President Wilson's message to the Russian people, are considered unsatisfactory, imperialistic. (Paragraph 6: "The latest announcements of their respective governments put the Russian revolution in an extremely difficult position.")

The situation created by this resolution is, therefore, that while the Temporary Government, at the bidding of the workmen and soldiers, puts what pressure it can on the Allied Governments, the convention itself undertakes to influence those governments from below (paragraphs 9 and 10) through the respective populations, and calls on the official Russian Government to assist in this work to the extent of assuring the free passage of socialist delegations between Russia and the other Allied countries.

Thus the encouragement of revolt and revolution in Allied countries is a plank in the platform of the convention.

Mr. Dan remarked that the capitalistic governments are only open to arguments when force may be brought to bear and that therefore the efficiency of the Russian Army must be maintained in order to impress France, England, Italy and America. This was not, however, included in the resolution.

That the convention believes its policy will be successful, and that it can bring about general peace regardless of the English, French, Italian, Japanese and American Governments, is shown by paragraph 6, section 2, stating that the international socialist conference which is to be called by the "revolutionary democracy of Russia" will outline "final peace terms, and ways and means of realizing these final peace terms."

The final paragraph, paragraph 12, which reads, "In particular the convention deems that the question as to whether an aggressive forward movement of the army should be decided purely on strategical grounds," is really a declaration that the *status quo* on the front should remain the same as at present unless the Germans attack. Any unprovoked forward movement of the army against the Germans would be deemed a political imperialistic move until the Allies have been brought into full accord with Russian workmen and soldiers. This confirms the truce at the front for an indefinite time, unless a reaction or counter movement takes a firm hold.

The resolution on the war adopted at the Cossack Convention is a very different document. Its first words are: "The first Cossack Convention holds that an immediate and decisive aggressive forward movement of the army is the only way to attain the peace which is so needed for national constructive labor." It then continues: "The war must be carried on to such a victory as will assure a full mutual agreement with the Allies, and make it possible to conclude peace based on the full right of each nation to determine its own future, without violent annexations, and without punitive contributions." This is the war-peace program

of the middle classes of Russia to-day. As has been noticed, the workmen and soldiers have no war program, only a peace program.

The resolution on the war proposed to the All-Russian Convention by the Maximalists (socialist-pacifists), the party of Lenin, the party with which Robert Grimm worked most intimately during his stay in Russia, differs mainly in violence of language rather than in principle from the resolution adopted by the All-Russian Convention. The first paragraph of the Maximalists' resolution reads:

The official announcements of the English and French Governments published May 23, in answer to the notes of the Temporary Government, the annexation of Albania by Italy and the violence done to Greece by the Anglo-French capitalists, show again and again that the *bourgeois* classes of the "Allied countries" do not want to adopt the slogan "peace without annexation or contribution" "on the basis of each nation's right to determine its own future.

The second paragraph of the Maximalists' resolution declares that the—

policy of the coalition Temporary Government, promising to lead the country to peace by means of diplomatic negotiations with the imperialistic Governments of France and England in order to influence these Governments to surrender their annexationist program, has undergone a complete fiasco.

Mr. Dan practically said this himself in reporting the resolution adopted. The resolution repeats this in a milder way in demanding wide thoroughgoing changes in the personnel of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Corps, and in demanding more energetic direct action on the part of the convention itself.

The contrast between the Cossack resolution and those of the All-Russian Convention and the Maximalists is clear. The All-Russian Convention and the Maximalists want no aggressive forward movement now, as it would be sacrificing Russian blood to further the selfish aims of the Allies. An aggressive forward movement may not be possible until the Allies are forced to change their war aims by the socialist-pacifist minorities in their respective countries. This of course with the provision that the Central Empires do not, in the meantime, also change their war aims, in which case there should be an immediate peace conference.

The Maximalists, of course, differ from the majority of Minimalists and Socialist Revolutionists in the All-Russian Convention, in that they demand that the ten *bourgeois* ministers still in the coalition Government resign, whereas the majority in the convention demand only that the Government take more energetic measures. If the ten *bourgeois* ministers do not resign it can only be because they are now reconciled to the policy of the All-Russian Convention toward the Allies, or despair of combating it. As a matter of fact it cannot be combated until the present dictatorship of the socialist-pacifist Zimmerwald proletariat is broken.

The resolution, in paragraph 4, goes so far as to admit that a “separate peace would strengthen one of the belligerent groups,” but the leaders of the convention do not hesitate to prolong the “separate truce.”

The understanding the ignorant masses of soldiers place on the present policy of the All-Russian Convention and the Temporary Government toward the Allies and regarding peace, is vividly shown in the resolution adopted by the Russian “Territorial Committee of the Army, Navy and Workmen for Finland,” representing the Russian soldiers, sailors and workmen quartered in Finland. This resolution reads in part:

The territorial committee declares that the refusal of the Allied Governments to accept the peace platform of the Russian democracy makes it impossible for the Russian democracy to continue further united political and strategical cooperation with the Allies. The new confirmation of the annexationist Allied Governments puts them in the same class with our enemies, the imperialistic Governments of Germany and Austria. ... The first result of the Allied Governments’ refusal to accede to the demands of the Russian democracy should be a complete break with them.

A similar resolution was passed by the joint committee of seven warships (cruisers and battleships) lying at Helsingfors, protesting against sending Russian troops to France until France accepts Russian slogans. A resolution of the Union of Soldiers and Sailors calls for the confiscation of foreign banks and the expulsion from Russia of foreign capitalists. ...

The great demonstration set by the All-Russian Convention for Sunday July 1, that brought terror to the hearts of the Petrograd populace who left the city in great numbers for the day, passed off quietly, as any other great parade might have, except in two instances where banners for the Temporary Government were torn with the natural resulting confusion. The convention had no intention of organizing a parade until it became known, during the night of June 22, that the Maximalists were secretly preparing a grand armed demonstration against the counter-revolution, the Temporary Government and the war. After the uncompromising embargo laid on this Maximalist demonstration by the majority of the convention, the convention found itself so placed that it was forced to organize a manifestation of some sort to escape the accusation of being itself reactionary. This it did in the last three days of the week of June 24.

The Maximalists were in the majority, as most of the parties supporting the Temporary Government, including the Cossacks, determined at the last moment not to parade, and the enormous number of placards they had carefully prepared for the workmen and radical troops to carry gave the entire parade a color strongly at variance with the ideas of the convention majority. Every tenth placard bore the legend, “Down with the counter-revolution!” The other placards read, “Down with the Temporary Government!” “Down with the ten capitalist Ministers!” “Down

with the war!” “All power to the Councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies!” and the whole propaganda of the Maximalists was summed up in the many placards, “Bread, peace and liberty!”

In spite of the ban laid by the convention majority on the bearing of arms in the parade, the anarchists, who appeared in far greater numbers than ever before, had an armed guard around each of their black banners. Several such banners bore a skull and crossbones and the legend, “Death to the capitalists!”

After the parade a body of anarchists went to the Kresty prison on the Viborg side and demanded the release of certain anarchists and Maximalists, as well as several other radicals arrested on charges of being German spies. The head of the prison released the men. At the same time a jail delivery took place at the transfer prison and 480 prisoners awaiting transfer to other prisons and courts escaped. The anarchists and Maximalist crowd proceeded to the Villa Durnovo with the freed persons. In the meantime the Temporary Government issued strict orders to the Minister of Justice, who at once proceeded to the villa with troops and Cossacks under the personal command of the Commander in Chief of the Petrograd Military District. The Minister demanded the immediate surrender of the escaped convicts, which was refused. The matter was then handed over to the military. The Commander in Chief of the Petrograd District then demanded the surrender, which was also refused. The troops then forced an entrance into the villa through the back windows. A bomb was thrown at them but it failed to explode. An anarchist committed suicide and sixty anarchists and Maximalists were arrested, including the escaped prisoners.

This is the first time that force has actually been used by the Temporary Government, and the act met with universal approval from all sides except from the Maximalists. On the day after (Monday), workmen and soldiers, and representatives of Maximalist organizations, in small groups, went to the Tauride Palace to the room of the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, demanding the release of the anarchists and Maximalists and announcing the beginning of partial strikes in many factories. A committee was formed for the purpose of obtaining the release of all those arrested, except those under a criminal charge, in twenty-four hours.

This evidence of a stronger attitude on the part of the Temporary Government, made possible by the assured support of the Cossacks, is the only means of averting the openly talked-of counter-revolution.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

[Enclosure]

1. The present war broke out on account of the imperialistic tendencies of the ruling classes of all countries in their effort to seize new markets and submit small and backward countries to their economic and political influence.
2. It leads to the complete economic exhaustion of all countries and peoples and it brings the Russian revolution to the verge of ruin. By swallowing up millions of lives and billions of the national treasure it threatens to further intensify the disorganization inherited from the old régime by Russia, and it brings with it hunger, and it distracts the country's attention from the labor of fortifying the liberties newly won.
3. The All-Russian Convention of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies recognizes, therefore, that the struggle for the quickest possible conclusion of the war is the most important current task of the revolutionary democracy. This task is made important both by the interests of the revolution and by the eagerness of the working classes of all countries to put an end to the mutual slaughter and again establish their brotherly union in order to fight together for the complete freedom of humanity.
4. The All-Russian Convention recognizes: (1) that for the war to end by the crushing of one of the two groups of belligerents by the other would cause new future wars and would even further deepen the differences between peoples and bring them to complete exhaustion, hunger and ruin; (2) that a separate peace would strengthen one of the belligerent groups, make it possible for it to attain a decisive victory over the other group, increase the annexationist appetites of the ruling classes, fail to free Russia from the claws of world imperialism, and hinder the international union of the working classes, and therefore the convention categorically rejects any policy that is, in practice, directed toward a separate peace, or the threshold to a separate peace—a separate armistice.
5. An attempt on Russia's part to attain the peace program she desires by means of a break with the Allies and a declaration of war against all Europe would mean the final ruin of Russia.
6. In view of the fact that the war can only be ended by the united efforts of the democracies of all countries, the convention states that it is necessary (1) for the democracy of Russia, through its empowered agent, the All-Russian Convention of Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, to address an appeal to the democracies of all nations, urging them to accept the slogan "peace without annexations or contributions, on the basis of each nation's right to determine its own future" and to put pressure to bear on their respective governments along this line; (2) for the revolutionary democracy of Russia to work toward the earliest possible reestablishment of the International, the earliest possible summoning of an international socialist conference to reestablish the international solidarity of the working class, the outlining of final peace terms, and ways and means of realizing these final peace terms; (3) for the revolutionary democracy of Russia to draw the attention of the democracies of all belligerent powers to the fact that their insufficiently energetic opposition to the latest announcements of their respective governments about the

- annexationist objects of the war puts the Russian revolution in an extremely difficult position and hinders the international union of the working class.
7. In order to realize the above aims it is necessary to send delegates to the Allied and neutral countries immediately and to invite delegates to Russia from the socialists of all tendencies from these countries.
 8. The convention decisively protests against the difficulties that the imperialistic governments have put in the way of these delegations.
 9. Recognizing the fact that the temporary revolutionary government has based its foreign policy on the peace program adopted by the Russian democracy, the convention holds it to be necessary for the government to take all the steps it can, and as soon as possible, in order to bring about the adherence of the countries allied to Russia to this program.
 10. The convention holds it necessary for the government to undertake all possible steps now in order to bring about the revision of the treaties with the Allied Governments along the line of a decisive surrender of annexationist desires. It is necessary to renew the personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Diplomatic Corps by democratizing them as soon as possible, so as to successfully carry out the foreign policy adopted by the Russian democracy.
 11. The convention announces that until the war is ended by the international efforts of democracy, the Russian revolutionary democracy is bound to take every possible measure to strengthen the fighting power of the army and its ability to undertake both defensive and offensive action, because the wreck of the Russian front would be equivalent to a defeat administered to the Russian revolution and a heavy blow to the entire international democracy.
 12. In particular, the convention deems that the question as to an aggressive forward movement of the army should be decided purely on strategical grounds.

¹ Not printed. Dan, a leader of the Social Democrats (Mensheviks), was reporter for the executive committee on the resolution defining the attitude of the congress toward the war.

File No. 763.72/5638

[Document 74]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 3, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1531. Your 1453, June 30. Impossible to supply information regarding munitions furnished to Russia or time shipped because purchase made by Russian agents and shipment arranged by them.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 5, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received July 10, 8.30 p.m.*]

1472. Just attended, at British Embassy, conference of Allied representatives called by Henderson to consider munition situation in Russia which he thinks grave. Root, Bertron attended. Conditions attributable to inefficient transportation and excessive labor demands. Henderson, Root will present situation to Minister for Foreign Affairs to-morrow and report to conference, adjourned to 7th. Understand Government will request Embassy to name American representative on Russian foreign supply commission to determine necessities and sequences thereof. England, France been represented six weeks. Root and I think America should be represented thereon and will assign Judson thereto if Scott approves and you do not object. Scott, Judson, Michie, Parker now at front return 8th.

FRANCIS

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[100] The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

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[101] The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 2, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received July 10, 6.23 p.m.]

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[102] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

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[103] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, July 7, 1917, 5 p.m.

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[104] The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

Vyatka, July 10, 1917, 8 a.m. [Received July 12, 9.50 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5809

[105] The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, July 10, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received 12.43 p.m.]

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[106] The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Wheeler)

Washington, July 11, 1917, 4 p.m.

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[107] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, July 18, 1917, 5 p.m.

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[108] Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia to the Secretary of State

File No. 763.72/6430^{1/2}

[109] Supplementary Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to

Russia to the Secretary of State

Secretary Lansing's personal file: Russia—American Diplomatic Mission
In the possession of the Department of State.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 14, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1315. Discreetly ascertain from Milyukov if it would be acceptable if this Government should send a commission of distinguished Americans to consult with the Russian Government as to the best means of cooperation and to convey a message of good will from the United States. If such a commission would be acceptable also discreetly ascertain whether it would be wise to have a prominent Hebrew a member of the commission and whether the question as to this Hebrew's being orthodox or unorthodox is material. Answer as soon as possible.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, April 19, 1917, 7 p.m.
[Received April 22, 8 a.m.]

1202. Your 1315 received 17th. Milyukov, who talks to me with great freedom, says no objection to matter suggested nor any objection to element mentioned in last paragraph, and that either kind of such element equally acceptable. Following is my personal view on this subject:

Such commission should be very discreet and give attention first and mainly to successful prosecution of war, exercising care in giving expression to views concerning internal affairs. Present government is provisional and its main duty, after waging war with vigilance, is arranging for election of Constituent Assembly which will determine character of permanent government. Milyukov and Rodzyanko who were for constitutional monarchy are now reported to favor republic. Kerensky is leader of republican sentiment. Such issues, however, should be subordinated to vigorous prosecution of war, success of which not only affects us materially but will prove most potential influence for a republic. Council of Ministers is working harmoniously, effectively and to satisfaction of great majority. Working-men's and Soldiers' Deputies have passed a resolution overwhelmingly, emphatically favoring Provisional Government. Do not understand me as objecting to such a commission. With proper precautions its effect would be beneficial. Commendation of our prompt and first recognition still expressed from every section and its opportuneness was extremely fortunate as, in judgment many, myself included, it came at a most critical time for Provisional Government and established a precedent which other governments were compelled to follow, consequently we should be careful to avoid anything likely to detract from a good record. President Wilson's allusions to Russian revolution and people made deep impression and have greatly augmented republican sentiment.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram—Extract]¹

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1917, 1 p.m.*

1366. ... I would further point out that we are sending to Russia and to no other country at the present time a commission of prominent men because of the intense sympathy of the American Government and people for the great nation which has become a democracy. The commission will be headed by Honorable Elihu Root, a most distinguished statesman, who is devoted to the cause of political liberty and to the sovereign rights of the people. It is the primary purpose of this commission to convey to the Russian Government the friendship and good will of this nation and to express the confident hope that the Russian people, having developed a political system founded on the principle of democracy, will join with the free people of America in resisting with firmness and fortitude the ambitious designs of the German Government which by force, intrigue and deception they are striving to attain. The commission will further be charged with the duty of finding the most efficient means of cooperating with the Russian Government in the prosecution of the war with the united purpose of accomplishing the overthrow of military autocracy, which menaces human liberty and all democratic institutions. ...

LANSING

¹ Printed in full in [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I](#) .

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 11, 1917.*

1396. Following are the members of the commission to Russia:

Elihu Root, of New York, ex-Secretary of State and of War, and former Senator from New York;

Charles R. Crane, of Chicago, retired manufacturer now in Russia;

John R. Mott, general secretary of the international committee of Young Men's Christian Associations;

Cyrus McCormick, president of the International Harvester Co.:

Samuel R. Bertron, a prominent banker of New York;

James Duncan, second vice president of the American Federation of Labor;

Charles Edward Russell, journalist and author and authority on socialistic matters;

Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, chief of staff of the United States Army;

Rear Adm. James H. Glennon, the American Navy's foremost ordnance expert.

Further details and personnel of staff of commission will be sent to you later with time of departure and arrival in Petrograd. Announcement of personnel is being published here.

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 16, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1407. Following is official list of Special Diplomatic Mission of United States:

Elihu Root, ambassador extraordinary of the United States of America on special mission; John R. Mott, Charles R. Crane, Cyrus H. McCormick, Samuel R. Bertron, James Duncan, Charles Edward Russell, envoys extraordinary of the United States of America on special mission; Maj. Gen. Hugh L. Scott, chief of staff, military representative of the President of the United States of America, on special diplomatic mission, with rank of minister; Rear Adm. James H. Glennon, naval representative of the President of the United States of America, on special mission, with rank of minister; Col. R. E. L. Michie, aide to General Scott; Col. William V. Judson, military attaché to the special diplomatic mission; Lieut. Col. Bentley T. Mott, aide to Mr. Root; Surg. Holton C. Curl, U.S.N., with rank of lieutenant commander; Lieut. Alva D. Bernhard, aide to Admiral Glennon; Basil Miles, secretary to mission; Maj. Stanley Washburn, assistant secretary to mission; F. Eugene Prince, civilian aide and interpreter to mission; James E. McKenna, Clyde S. Stilwell, James F. O'Rourke, Jay Keegan, Duane E. Washburn, Walter W. King, and George D. Gregory, clerks to mission; Sergt. Paul Z. Randolph, orderly; George E. Long, messenger; James Dooley, valet.

If any preparations are to be made for meeting mission at Vladivostok you may advise Russian Government that they will land there about May 28.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/4811

[Document 81]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *May 20, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received May 22, 7 a.m.*]

1304. Just learned from Minister for Foreign Affairs that Diplomatic Commission arrive Vladivostok about June 1. He regrets impossible to send a representative of Foreign Office to meet same but says Russia expects to entertain commission as its guests from arrival Vladivostok until departure from country. Shall I accept? Minister cabling to same effect through Russian Embassy there.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/4749

[Document 82]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 21, 1917, 7 p.m.*

1425. For Crane:

Important that Mr. Root should understand Russian situation at time of his arrival at Vladivostok. Can you arrange with Ambassador and Russian Government for you send daily wireless to S. S. *Buffalo* covering important war news including especially all movements and significant expressions in Russia?

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 22, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1428. You may state to the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the information of his Government that the High Commission now on its way from this country to Russia is sent primarily to manifest to the Russian Government and people the deep sympathetic feeling which exists among all classes in America for the adherence of Russia to the principle of democracy which has been the foundation of the progress and prosperity of this country. The High Commissioners go to convey the greetings of this Republic to the new and powerful member which has joined the great family of democratic nations.

The commissioners, who will bear this fraternal message to the people of Russia, have been selected by the President with the special purpose of giving representation to the various elements which make up the American people and to show that among them all there is the same love of country and the same devotion to liberty and justice and loyalty to constituted authority. The commission is not chosen from one political group but from the various groups into which the American electorate is divided. United, they represent the Republic. However they may differ on public questions, they are one in support of democracy and in hostility to the enemies of democracy throughout the world.

This commission is prepared, if the Russian Government desires, to confer upon the best ways and means to bring about effective cooperation between the two Governments in the prosecution of the war against the German autocracy which is to-day the gravest menace to all democratic governments. It is the view of this Government that it has become the solemn duty of those who love democracy and individual liberty to render harmless this autocratic Government whose ambitions, aggressions, and intrigues have been disclosed in the present struggle. Whatever the cost in life and treasure this supreme object should be and can be attained only by the united strength of the democracies of the world, and only thus can come that permanent and universal peace which is the hope of all people.

To the common cause of humanity which Russia has so courageously and unflinchingly supported for nearly three years, the United States is pledged. To cooperate [with] and aid Russia in the accomplishment of the task, which as a great democracy is more truly hers to-day than ever before, is the desire of the

United States. To stand side by side, shoulder to shoulder, against autocracy will unite the American and Russian peoples in a friendship for the ages.

With this spirit the High Commissioners of the United States will present themselves in the confident hope that the Russian Government and people will realize how sincerely the United States hopes for their welfare and desires to share with them in their future endeavors to bring victory to the cause of democracy and human liberty.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/4811

[Document 84]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 24, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1433. Your 1304. You may accept invitation of Russian Government to entertain Diplomatic Mission from time of its arrival until departure, and you will express this Government's hearty appreciation of the great courtesy extended.

LANSING

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root)¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, May 24, 1917, 7 p.m.

Francis cables May 19 situation assuming different phase daily. Navy most recalcitrant element. Baltic Fleet insubordinate and defiant, but Black Sea Fleet loyal, and sent delegation to Petrograd which held public meeting attended by thousands. Absolute quiet Petrograd and disturbances rare elsewhere. Kerensky issued orders that all soldiers who fail return will be considered deserters. Swedish telegram bureau, Petrograd, telegram May 21 said reconstructed Provisional Government has agreed on following fundamental lines for future activity:

No separate peace, but general peace without conquering of other nations, without annexation or payment damages and based on right of nations govern themselves. Democratizing of army, but increasing military efficiency. Control of production transportation exchange distribution foodstuffs. Measures protect labor. Increase agriculture by giving land to laborers. Reformation financial system by direct taxes on rich. Energetic measures against attempts counter-revolution. Constituent Assembly to be called in Petrograd soon as possible. Lvov gave out long statement on Russian policy saying first duty Russia to consolidate fighting strength and to assist allies; Russia desires speedy peace but cannot permit territory lost through negligence former Russian regime to remain under Prussian militarism nor can Russia remain indifferent to fate of Belgium, Serbia, and Rumania. Belgian Foreign Minister received following from Russian Foreign Minister:

Russia will continue to pursue this war, not for the purpose of conquest or envy, but to assure all nations the right to shape their own affairs and to assure a peace guaranteeing against new attacks.

LANSING

¹ Sent to the U. S. S. *Buffalo*.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1455. Please express again to the Russian Government the Department's very deep appreciation of their great courtesy in extending the invitation to the American commission to be the guests of the Russian Government during their stay in Russia. At the same time please say that the Department would prefer that, after the arrival of the party in Petrograd, the guests of the Russian Government should be limited to the commissioners and their immediate personnel, and that the interpreters and clerks should not be included in the list of guests of the nation. This would limit those becoming the guests of the Russian Government to about fifteen persons.

Please explain this arrangement to Mr. McKenna, the disbursing officer of the commission.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 781

PETROGRAD, *June 2, 1917.*
[Received June 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a copy of a translation of a note from the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs, dated May 15/28, 1917, in which, acknowledging my communication to him relative to the arrival in Russia of the Special Diplomatic Mission headed by the Honorable Elihu Root, the appreciation of the Russian Government is set forth in terms that will undoubtedly prove as gratifying to the Department as to this Embassy.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the American Ambassador (Francis)

No. 104/12

PETROGRAD, *May 15/28, 1917.*

MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 13/26 instant, in which you transmitted to me the eloquent declaration of the American Government regarding the arrival in Russia of the Extraordinary Mission.

While expressing to your excellency deep gratitude for this information, I feel constrained to tell you how much the Russian Government appreciates the recognition of Russia's services in the world war which is set forth in this note, and how gladly it concurs with the wish of the American Government to arrange for the mutual exchange of views regarding the best means for conducting the war against the principles of militarism and autocracy which have been established in the country of our adversaries, and constituting a serious menace to the liberty of all nations. I hasten to assure you that the Russian Government and all the Russian people are preparing the heartiest welcome to the Extraordinary Mission of the President which is coming hither from the great transatlantic Republic which, throughout all its history, has been reared on the lofty democratic principles of liberty, equality and justice.

Accept [etc.]

File No. 763.72/5239

[Document 88]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 5, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[*Received June 9, 11.50 a.m.*]

1361. Hear that Russian refugees returning from America, planning to inspire attack upon Root charging that as Secretary of State he refused to permit certain Russian refugees to enter United States. Please cable facts. American Consul, Vladivostok, wires Diplomatic Commission arrived morning of June 3; left same afternoon, due Petrograd about 12th.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 12, 1917, 5 p.m..*

1481. Your 1361, June 5, 5 p.m. When the Root commission was preparing to leave, some newspaper stories appeared here charging that Mr. Root assisted in extraditing Russian political offenders. I assume your report may originate from the same sources. The Department has no information regarding Mr. Root's connection with refusal to permit Russian refugees to enter the United States. That matter, bearing on immigration, was never under Mr. Root's charge when he was Secretary of State. As to extradition of Russian political offenders, Mr. Root as Secretary of State took clear and unequivocal position. In the Pouren case, which came before him in 1908, Mr. Root stated, in a letter to Mr. Schiff, of New York, dated October 16, 1908:

You doubtless know that an extradition case is a judicial proceeding in which testimony is taken before a committing magistrate whose decision is reviewed by the Secretary of State. In this case no substantial evidence was produced before the committing magistrate to show that the offenses charged against Pouren were political, and the magistrate accordingly decided against Pouren. If the State Department had acted in the case, it would have been obliged to decide that the magistrate's decision was correct upon the evidence before him and to issue a warrant for Pouren's extradition.

In view, however, of the public statements that Pouren was merely a political offender, instead of an adverse decision a careful inquiry was made and upon its appearing that there was substantial evidence which had not been produced before the magistrate, tending to show that Pouren's acts were political, the magistrate was directed to reopen the case and give Pouren's counsel an opportunity to introduce such evidence.

You will perceive that the delay in deciding the case has been altogether favorable to Pouren, and for the purpose of giving him an opportunity to prove his real defense which he failed to prove originally.

Of course you will understand that there is not the slightest idea of returning any one to Russia or to any other country to be tried for a

political offense.

Secretary Root declined to issue a warrant for the surrender of Pouren to Russia, and Pouren was discharged from the custody of the committing magistrate.

On January 14, 1909, the American Federation of Labor submitted to President Roosevelt in a letter signed by Mr. Gompers, John Mitchell, and other members of the executive council of the Federation, a memorandum on the Pouren extradition case and certain Mexican extradition cases, with the request that the President safeguard the right of asylum in the United States. This letter being submitted to Secretary Root, he advised the President January 16, 1909, that—

The treaties and statutes of the United States contain adequate provisions for safeguarding the right of asylum for political refugees. Every specific case mentioned in the memorandum is covered by such provisions of treaty and statute. In each specific case where a demand for extradition is made by a foreign country and the person demanded claims to be a political refugee, there is always a question of fact raised as to whether the assertion of political character is true or not. This question under the laws of the United States is to be decided judicially in the first instance by a United States commissioner acting as a magistrate and proceeding upon evidence taken under oath, and in the second instance, by the Secretary of State, reviewing the decision of the commissioner upon the evidence. If the question of fact is determined in favor of the person demanded, the law forbids his extradition and protects him in his right of asylum. If the question of fact is decided against the person demanded, his extradition is required by law because there is no right of asylum in his case.

LANSING

File No. 763.72/5328

[Document 90]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 13, 1917.*

[*Received June 16, 7 a.m.*]

1391. Diplomatic Commission arrived. All well. Much pleased with experience thus far. Had long conference with Railway Commission which taking hold earnestly, working wisely, diplomatically and will accomplish much if Government permits.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/5347

[Document 91]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 14, 1917.*
[*Received June 17, 11 p.m.*]

1397. Presented Diplomatic Commission Minister Foreign Affairs, All commissioners comfortably located Winter Palace. Shall present them formally to Council of Ministers, evening 15th. Everything working satisfactorily.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 14*[15], 1917.
[Received June 19, 2.20 p.m.]

1400. Following are my remarks introducing Diplomatic Commission to Council of Ministers this evening:

Mr. President and members of the Council of Ministers, Excellencies: I salute you on the rounding out of three months of arduous duties devoted to the welfare of your country. Just ninety days ago to-day on March 2/15 the Council of Ministers was named. The intervening ninety days are red-letter days not only in the history of Russia but also in the struggle for freedom throughout the world. Your responsibility has been tremendous, your labors have been overwhelming, your trials applying [appalling] but you have nobly risen to all requirements and merit the gratitude and affection of your countrymen. No correct history can be written on the struggle for freedom in Russia which will not devote a volume at least to the first ninety days of the revolution of 1917, and that volume will bear worthy tribute to your ability, your self-sacrifice, your courage, and your patriotism.

This is the second time I have had the distinction of appearing before your honorable body. The first was less than one week after your organization when as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States I formally and authoritatively recognized the new Government of freed Russia. To-day I come in the same official capacity to present to you a High Commission appointed by the President of the United States and consisting of seven civilians, the Chief of Staff of the United States Army, and an Admiral of the United States Navy. This commission has journeyed twenty thousand miles, or three quarters of the circumference of the earth, to extend to Russia the greetings of one hundred million freemen, to express their good will and to ask how they can most effectively cooperate against a common enemy to the end that the liberty which they have enjoyed for a century and a half and the freedom into which liberated Russia has come may be secured for living generations and for generations to come.

This commission is composed of patriotic unselfish Americans who represent every party organization in the United States and every phase of political belief. There are no classes in our country. There are no rulers there: no sovereign but the will of the people. There is constituted authority but those chosen to administer it are trustees of the sovereign will, and wield no power other than in accordance with that will. These honorable commissioners are familiar with our governmental fabric; they know the sentiment of America and reflect the spirit of her people. The foundation stone of our institutions is government by consent of the governed, the superstructure is universal education, the crowning arch equality of opportunity. The sentiment of our people is love of liberty and sincere sympathy with the oppressed; the spirit of to-day is one of service. The whole country has been electrified by the burning words of President Wilson and all of the people are enthusiastically responding to his appeal to "act, think and speak together."

Moved by such sentiments and thoroughly imbued with the spirit of service these Americans have cheerfully responded to the call of President Wilson and are here to perform an important duty. I feel it a great honor to present this Special Diplomatic Commission of the United States to the Provisional Government of Russia.

Permit me to introduce to the Council of Ministers the distinguished chairman of the High Commission, Honorable Elihu Root, former Secretary of War, former Secretary of State, former Senator of the United States, always a true American.

President of Council of Ministers, Minister Foreign Affairs and Chairman Root lunched with me to-day, conference quite satisfactory. Mott and Crane dined with me yesterday. Minister Finance, Bertron and McCormick lunch with me to-morrow. Minister War, Scott and Glennon lunch with me Sunday, Duncan and Russell Monday to meet socialistic members of Ministry. Have adopted this plan being most effective. Furthermore no official life here. Socialistic papers still criticizing President's message.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 17, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received June 19, 7 a.m.*]

7. Mr. Root's address to Council of Ministers Friday, June 15:

Mr. President and members of the Council of Ministers, the mission for which I have the honor to speak is charged by the Government and the people of the United States of America with a message to the Government and the people of Russia.

The mission comes from a democratic Republic; its members are commissioned and instructed by a President who holds his high office as Chief Executive of more than one hundred million free people by virtue of a popular election in which more than eighteen million votes were cast and fairly counted pursuant to law by universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage.

For one hundred and forty years our people have been struggling with the hard problems of self-government. With many shortcomings, many mistakes, many imperfections, we have still maintained order and respect for law, individual freedom and national independence.

Under the security of our own laws we have grown in strength and prosperity but we value our freedom more than wealth. We love liberty and we cherish above all our possessions the ideals for which our fathers fought and suffered and sacrificed that America might be free. We believe in the competence and power of democracy and in our heart of hearts abides a faith in the coming of a better world in which the humble and oppressed in all lands may be lifted up by freedom to a heritage of justice and equal opportunity.

The news of Russia's new-found freedom brought to America universal satisfaction and joy. From all the land sympathy and hope went out towards the new sister in the circle of democracies and this mission is sent to express that feeling. The American democracy sends to the democracy of Russia greeting, sympathy, friendship, brotherhood, and Godspeed.

Distant America knows little of the special conditions of Russian life which

must give form to the Government and to the laws which you are about to create as we have developed our institutions to serve the needs of our national character and life. So we assume that you will develop your institutions to serve the needs of Russian character and life. As we look across the sea we distinguish no party and no class; we see great Russia as a whole, as one mighty striving and aspiring democracy; we know the self-control, the essential kindliness, the strong common sense, the courage and noble illustrations of Russian character; we have faith in you all; we pray for God's blessings upon you all; we believe that you will solve your problems, that you will maintain your liberty, and that our two great nations will march side by side in the triumphant progress of democracy until the old order has everywhere passed away and the world is free.

One fearful danger threatens the liberty of both nations—the armed forces of military autocracy are at the gates of Russia and of her allies. The triumph of German arms will mean the death of liberty in Russia. No enemy is at the gates of America but America has come to realize that the triumph of German arms means the death of liberty in the world; that we who love liberty and would keep it must fight for it and fight now when the free democracies of the world may be strong in union and not delay until they may be beaten down separately in succession.

So America sends another message to Russia; that we are going to fight and have already begun to fight for your freedom equally with our own and we ask you to fight for our freedom equally with yours. We would make your cause ours and our cause yours and with common purpose and the mutual helpfulness of firm alliance make sure the victory over our common foe.

You will recognize your own sentiments and purposes in the words of President Wilson to the American Congress, when, on the 2d of April last, he advised the declaration of war against Germany. He said:

We are accepting this challenge of hostile purpose because we know that in such a government (the German Government) following such methods we can never have a friend; and that in the presence of its organized power always lying in wait to accomplish we know not what purpose there can be no assured security for the democratic governments of the world. We are now about to accept the gage of battle with this natural foe to liberty and shall if necessary spend the whole force of the nation to check and nullify its pretensions and its power. We are glad, now that we see the facts with no avail of false pretense about them, to fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world and for the liberation of its peoples, the German peoples included; for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience. The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon

the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves; no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

And you will see the feeling towards Russia with which America has entered the great war in another clause of the same address. President Wilson further said:

Does not every American feel that assurance has been added to our hope for the future peace of the world by the wonderful and heartening things that have been happening within the last few weeks in Russia? Russia was known by those who knew it best to have been always in fact democratic at heart, in all the vital habits of her thought, in all the intimate relationships of her people that spoke their natural instinct, their habitual attitude towards life. The autocracy that crowned the summit of her political structure, long as it had stood and terrible as was the reality of its power, was not in fact Russian in origin, character, or purpose; and now it has been shaken off and the great, generous Russian people have been added in all their naive majesty and might to the forces that are fighting for freedom in the world, for justice, and for peace. Here is a fit partner for a league of honor.

That partnership of honor in the great struggle for human freedom the oldest of the great democracies now seeks in fraternal union with the youngest.

The practical and specific methods and possibilities of our allied cooperation the members of the mission would be glad to discuss with the members of the Government of Russia.

Root

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, June 17, 1917, 8 p.m.
[Received June 20, 21, and 24.¹]

8. Party all well. Mission received Friday evening by Premier and Council of Ministers composing entire Provisional Government. Mission introduced by Ambassador Francis; address by mission to Government made by Ambassador Root; reply in behalf of Government made by Tereshchenko, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Address and reply will be cabled. Conversations with heads of separate departments regarding needs have begun. Arrangements made under which General Scott of military staff is about to visit General Staff and front and Admiral Glennon of naval staff to visit Black Sea and Baltic Fleets and Archangel. We were met at Harbin by a delegation from the Chinese Foreign Office, charged to accompany us to the Manchurian frontier, as a mark of courtesy. They brought pressing [invitation from] Wu Ting-fang, Minister for Foreign Affairs and acting Prime Minister, to visit Peking on our return. The Rumanian Minister has presented urgent invitation that we visit [Rumania]. If, as seems probable, the mission visits Kiev and Odessa, a visit to Rumania would require only a slight detour and may think it worth while. They are suffering under great misfortune and need encouragement and help. They have probably about 250,000 effectives. Thomas, French Minister of Munitions, has been to Jassy and makes a good report of their military condition. It may be important to keep up that end of the Russian line and for the United States to know what is necessary for that purpose.

We shall probably finish here in from ten days to two weeks more. Important, therefore, that question of visiting Japan, which we talked about in Washington, and these invitations from China and Rumania be decided speedily. As to China and Rumania we will reply here when advised of your wishes. If we are to visit Japan of course original communication between Foreign Offices will be necessary.

Conditions here critical. General St. Petersburg opinion very pessimistic; industrial and financial conditions bad; Provisional Government seems secure; no visible agitation against it at present. Government very confident of pulling the country through. Fundamental military trouble is: soldiers have interpreted new freedom as meaning that every man could do as he pleased to refuse spoken orders from anyone. Accordingly authority of officers has been repudiated and

military discipline has practically failed. The soldiers do not understand at all the importance to their country of maintaining the war and all along, the line have simply been unwilling to fight. [Demoralization] has been aided by a tremendous German propaganda through fraternization of troops at the front and thousands of German agents throughout the country who swarmed across the border immediately after the revolution. They are aided by the extreme socialists who are for peace at any price and very active. Still there are some evidences of returning discipline. Some organizations have declared in favor of fighting and strong effort is proceeding quietly to induce troops to obey an order to advance. Minister of War has issued order warning deserters to return under penalty of loss of right to vote and participate in the distribution of land. We think the people of Russia, particularly the soldiers, are going to decide whether Russia stays in the war and we have got to get at them in some way. Communications to the Government do not reach the real difficulty. The mission is taking steps for the immediate distribution of information which will cost about \$100,000. Please call Secretary McAdoo's attention to conversation with Mr. Bertron and me before we left Washington.

On this subject it will not belittle us to draw immediately \$100,000. We all agree that the business of disseminating information should be taken up on a much larger scale. At least \$5,000,000 could be expended to the greatest advantage in this way. That would be less than the cost of maintaining five American regiments and the chance of keeping 5,000,000 Russians in the field against Germany is worth many times five regiments. It will mean a supply of newspapers, printing and distribution of posters, leaflets and pamphlets, employment of numerous lecturers and moving pictures to go about the front. This work to be done with the approval of Russian Government and not to be conducted in the name of the United States. We particularly recommend the establishment upon the Russian front of Y.M.C.A. stations similar to those on the French and English fronts, until recently on the Austrian front, just beginning on the Italian front, and in Mesopotamia, and along the lines planned for the American Army as authorized in Executive order signed by the President on April 27, 1917. These establishments have reading rooms, provisions for reading aloud to illiterate soldiers, lecture rooms, and temporary arrangements for moving pictures. There are two thousand of these establishments with the British Army all thronged by soldiers. They afford opportunities for access to the minds of the soldiers. These should be financed by the United States but that fact probably not made public until after they are established and understood. Mott thinks he can obtain twenty Americans now in Europe to inaugurate plan promptly pending the securing and training adequate number. Same sort of work is now being done on considerable scale in prison camps with great success. Very desirable indeed to send here immediately as many moving pictures as possible showing American preparation for war, battleships, troops marching, factories making munitions, and other things to carry to the mind the idea that America is doing something. These poor fellows have been told that no one is really fighting except Russian soldiers and they

believe it. The British have recently been sending out similar moving pictures with very good effect, but everything has been done on too small a scale to deal with the great masses of people who must be assimilated. I am [of opinion] Washburn's health is such that it would have [fatal effect to] consign [assign him to] publicity work here. Admirable as he would be we have no right to ask him to commit suicide. Please say to the President that we have found here an infant class in the art of being free containing one hundred and seventy million people and they need to be supplied with kindergarten material; they are sincere, kindly, good people but confused and dazed. Say to him also that his message about the aims of the war was highly satisfactory to everybody here who really wanted to continue the war against Germany and unsatisfactory to all pro-Germans and internationalists.

Root

¹ In three sections.

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 18, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 20, 2.30 a.m.]

9. Reply delivered in English of Minister of Foreign Affairs Tereshchenko to Ambassador Root's address to the President and Council of Ministers Friday evening, June 15, 10 p.m., in the Mariinski Palace. There were present the members of the Provisional Government, the Ambassador and staff of the American Embassy, and the members of the Special Diplomatic Mission with their aides and secretaries.

It is a great honor for me to have the pleasure of receiving this High Commission which is sent by the American people and their President to freed Russia and to express the feelings of deep sympathy which the Provisional Government, representing the people of Russia, have towards your country.

The event of the great revolution which we have achieved makes allies of the oldest and the newest republics in the world. Our revolution was based on the same wonderful words which first were expressed in that memorable document in which the American people in 1776 declared their independence. Just as the American people then declared, "We hold these truths to be self-evident [that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed ... But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government] and to provide new guards for their future security." So the Russian people, which for centuries have been enslaved by a Government which was not that which the feeling of the nation wishes or wanted, have so declared and shaken off the fetters which bound them; and as the wind blows away the leaves in autumn so the Government which has bound us for centuries has fallen and nothing is left but the free Government of the people.

So the Russian people now stand before the world conscious [of] their strength and astonished at the ease with which that revolution happened, and the first days of our freedom indeed brought surprise to us as well as to the rest of the world, but the day which brought the revolution was not only a day which brought freedom, for it brought us face to face with two enormous problems which now stand before the Russian people, and these problems are the creation of a strong democratic force in the interior of Russia and a fight with the common foe without, with that foe which is fighting you as well as us and which is now the last form and last strength of autocracy, and it was with a feeling of gladness that we found you on the side of the Allies and that after our revolution there was no autocracy among those with whom we found ourselves fighting. We found with joy that in the high, lofty motives which have impelled your great Republic to enter this conflict there is no strain of autocracy or spirit of conquest, and our free people shall be guided by those same high, lofty motives and principles.

And now let us stand together for we pursue the same endeavor in the war and in the peace which is to follow. We representatives of the Russian nation who have been placed at its head to lead the Russian nation through its hardships on its way to freedom, following these principles which have always brought a nation from complete slavery into complete freedom, are confident we shall find the way which will lead us side by side, not only the Russian peoples but its allies, along that way which will bring us to future happiness.

The revolution of Russia was not only a change in the interior situation of [our] Government, it is a moral factor which shows the will of the Russian people in its endeavor to secure liberty and justice, and these elements the Russian people show and wish to show, not only in their internal affairs which we ourselves have to lead and in which we wish to be guided by these principles, but also in our international relations and in our international policy.

This war, which was brought upon us three years ago and which the Russian revolution found when it entered the struggle of free nations, left but one door for us to enter, and by that door we have entered and we shall continue in the path. These Russian people strive to [for] the end of militarism and to [for] a durable peace which would exclude every violence from whatever side it may come and all imperialistic schemes whatever their form may be. The Russian people have no wish of conquest or domination and are opposed to those ideas in others and first of all they will not allow any of those imperialistic desires which our enemy has formed, manifest or hidden, to come to good in whatever sphere he may have planned them, political, financial or economic. This constitutes the firm will or what Russia has to guard herself against.

There is also a second great thought which was expressed by that memorable document by which the nation of the United States and its people at the day of their independence declared their desires and wishes and which says that nations should have a right to show themselves the way they wished to go and to decide for their future, and this high principle the Russian people have accepted and consider that it must guide their politics, and they consider also that all nations, however small or great, have the right to decide what their future will be and that no territory and no people can be transferred from one country to another without their consent like things. Human beings have the right to say for themselves what they shall do and whose subjects they shall become.

I am happy to see you and happy to say that there is no idea or factor of a moral or material kind to divide us or to prevent us from being hand in hand across the Pacific. These two great people, the free people of Russia and the free people of America, the great people of the United States who, as the oldest, strongest and purest democracy, hand in hand will show the way that human happiness will take in the future.

Allow me, therefore, to greet you, to welcome you in the name of my colleagues and of our Government which represents our people and to say how happy we are to see you here.

Root

File No. 763.72/5445

[Document 96]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 21, 1917.*
[Received 10.50 p.m.]

1420. Diplomatic Commission given hearty welcome this afternoon by Russo-American committee. Speeches made by representatives of Government and by representatives of twelve municipalities and commercial organizations, also by Root and myself. Commission going Moscow to-night.

Railway Commission working diligently. Will meet Minister Ways
Communications at Embassy evening 22d. Stevens improving but slowly.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 24, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received July 1, 3 p.m.*]

1431. Glennon returned from Sevastopol where arrived when mutiny incited by Kronstadt sailors was at its height. All officers were deprived of swords and side arms. Glennon made two speeches which had excellent effect. Subsequently mutineers rescinded objectionable resolutions, restored all officers to authority except Admiral Kolchak who came here on order Minister of War to explain why needless loss. Discipline restored in Black Sea Fleet, Glennon goes Archangel to-night. Russell here. Remainder commission Moscow returning to-morrow. Unusually quiet yesterday. Session of the conference to-day.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 47

Moscow, *June 27, 1917.*
[Received August 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Special American Diplomatic Mission to Russia visited Moscow June 22–24, 1917.

In the local preparations for the visit a very cordial interest had been manifested by public officials and many public-spirited citizens. Despite the very short time elapsing between the receipt of information as to the definite time of the visit and the arrival of the mission, these officials and citizens made plans and perfected arrangements for its members to meet the most influential and representative groups in the community. Cooperation between these Moscow officials and citizens and the American Consulate General was at all times cordial and effective.

The mission arrived at 2 p.m. on Friday, June 22, by special train from Petrograd, the members making the trip being Messrs. Root, Crane, McCormick, Mott, Duncan, and Bertron, and General Scott. The party also included Col. R. E. L. Michie, aide to the General Staff, Col. C. Bentley Mott, aide to Mr. Root, and Basil Miles, secretary of the mission. It was accompanied by the Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry, V. V. Preelyaev.

At the railway station the mission was met by the Commissaire and the Mayor of Moscow, citizens representing various public organizations, and by the American Consul General with members of the staff of the Consulate. Speeches of welcome were made by the Commissaire, Mr. N. M. Kishkin, and the Mayor, Mr. N. I. Astrov. A brief response was made by Mr. Root for the mission.

The members of the mission were then taken to the Kremlin, much courtesy and kindness being shown them by the commander of the Kremlin, Prince Odoevski-Maslov.

Later in the afternoon they visited the Committee of General Organizations, where addresses were made by Mr. S. I. Prokopovich, chairman of the meeting, Dr. B. I. Shbankov, Mr. Grigoriev and Mr. S. I. Tretyakov. Mr. Root's speech to the committee was listened to with great interest.

In the evening the mission was received at a meeting of the City Duma. Addresses were made by the Mayor, Mr. N. I. Astrov; Mr. N. I. Guchkov, representing the Russian-American Chamber of Commerce; Mr. G. A. Alexeev, representing the Union of Russian Zemstvos; Mr. B. M. Ovchinnikov, representing the Union of Cities and Zemstvos; and Mr. Bubnov, representing the Council of Soldiers'

Deputies. Following the address of the Mayor, Mr. Root delivered the main speech of the mission in Moscow. It was greeted with much enthusiasm and applause, and there are many evidences of the deep impression it has made upon the community.

On Saturday, June 23, the mission visited the War Industrial Committee, the Union of Cities and Zemstvos, the National Bank, the Bourse Committee, and various factories working on war materials.

On Sunday, June 24, after being taken on an excursion to Sparrow Hills, the mission attended a concert at the Synodal Institute, the music being provided by one of the finest ecclesiastical choirs in Russia, and by a group in peasant costumes which sang Russian folk songs.

The special train carrying the mission back to Petrograd left Moscow on Sunday evening.

Attached hereto are copies of articles and editorials which appeared in the local newspapers, each one being accompanied by a translation according to the literal text.¹

To those who devoted much time and effort toward extending the hospitality of the city, who are at the head of organizations visited, or who showed special courtesies to the mission, I have addressed letters expressing the appreciation of the Consulate General. They are: the Mayor, Mr. N. I. Astrov; the Commissaire, Mr. N. M. Kishkin; the commander of the Kremlin, Prince Odоеvski-Maslov; the president of the War Industrial Committee, Mr. P. P. Ryabuzhinski; the president of the National Bank, Mr. M. P. Avsarkisov; the president of the All-Russian County Union, Mr. N. N. Chmelev; the president of the Bourse Committee, Mr. S. N. Tretyakov; the regent of the choir at the Synodal Institute, Mr. N. M. Danilin.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

¹ Not printed.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 27, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1. For Root:

The reports received of the addresses by the commissioners and of the very favorable impression made are most gratifying and the President desires me to express his satisfaction at the success which is meeting your efforts. If there was doubt of the genuine desire of this country to see the Russian democracy achieve its aims, your convincing presentation of the sympathetic attitude of the American people has removed it.

The President, while extending his congratulations to the commission on the skilful manner in which they are performing a difficult task, suggests that it is not advisable for members of the commission to speak of the terms of peace or of settlement which will be insisted on by the United States. The President is himself reserving all such utterances until very different circumstances arise, and hopes that you will pursue the same policy.

The matter of establishing an efficient agency for publicity is receiving careful consideration in view of your recommendations as to its desirability.

LANSING

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 2, 1917, noon.*
[Received July 5, 6.10 p.m.]

12. For McAdoo:

It is the unanimous opinion of commission that an extensive educational publicity campaign be undertaken in Russia with the approval of Russian Government and to be supervised by Ambassador Francis in order to offset extensive and very dangerous German propaganda. This is absolutely essential in our judgment and even though costly is the best possible contribution that America can make. Please recall my conversation with you in regard to this subject and give us prompt answer as arrangements should be made here before our departure on the 9th. Failing to receive authority to draw for \$100,000 preliminary expenses we have assumed personal obligation for more than \$30,000 in order to make public the President's utterance and Senator Root's address. Please read our cable to Lansing of 18th and to-day and give us prompt and definite answer. Bertron.

Root

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State


[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 2, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[Received July 10, 6.23 p.m.]

13. Party all well. Opportunities for more complete understanding in every direction have multiplied and have been utilized. General Scott and military officers visiting Russian southwest front and will answer Rumanian invitation with expression of good will.¹ Admiral Glennon returned from Black Sea and Archangel and now with Baltic Fleet. Hope for answer to our cable of June 17² before we leave here July 9, especially regarding Japan and publicity. Have assumed personal liability for expense necessary to bring President's utterances among other important matters to knowledge of Russian public. Without this they would have been practically unknown. I beg you to realize that Germany is now attacking Russia by propaganda and is spending millions, at least a million dollars monthly, to capture the minds of the Russian people. Germany expects to succeed; can be prevented only by active and immediate counter attacks by the same weapons.

Please advise us if *Buffalo* has acknowledged direction to meet us at Vladivostok July 17.

Root

¹ See [Foreign Relations, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. 1](#) .

² *Ante*, p. 120 [Pg. 120 includes portions of [Doc. 93](#) and [Doc. 94](#)].

File No. 763.72/5693

[Document 102]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 7, 1917, 3 p.m.*

1543. Inform Bertron that his 12, July 2, to Mr. McAdoo has been referred to this Department by President. President approves in principle of educational publicity campaign and authorizes expense \$30,000 already incurred. The question of further outlay and a comprehensive plan is receiving the careful attention of the Department which will advise you definitely at an early date.

POLK

File No. 763.72/5425

[Document 103]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 7, 1917, 5 p.m.*

3. For Mr. Root:

Referring your 8, June 17, 8 p.m.^{[1](#)} In view of disturbed conditions in the Far East Department considers it inadvisable for you to visit China or Japan, and will be glad to have you return to the United States direct via Vladivostok.

POLK

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 120 [Pg. 120 includes portions of [Doc. 93](#) and [Doc. 94](#)].

The Ambassador on Special Mission to Russia (Root) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VYATKA, *July 10, 1917, 8 a.m.*
[*Received July 12, 9.50 a.m.*]

16. Left Petrograd Monday evening July 9 with general expressions of appreciation and satisfaction by Russians in and out of Government and resident Americans over work accomplished by mission. We feel that we have contributed materially to strengthening the Provisional Government and improving morale of people and army. The situation is certainly much more hopeful and stable than it was when we arrived. Due Vladivostok July 19, new style. Party all in best of health. Crane and Judson remaining in Russia.

Root

File No. 763.72/5785

[Document 105]

The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *July 10, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received 12.43 p.m.]

Viscount Motono unofficially asks me to let you know that if it is convenient and agreeable for Root and his party to visit Japan on the way back to the United States it would be a gratification to both the people and the Government of Japan. Personally he expressed a very keen hope that this could be arranged. Mr. Root's party are expected to arrive Vladivostok 17th instant.

WHEELER

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan
(Wheeler)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 11, 1917, 4 p.m.*

Your July 10, 7 p.m. Please inform Viscount Motono that the American Government highly appreciates his cordial intimation that the Government and people of Japan would be glad to receive a visit from Mr. Root and party if convenient and agreeable to them. The American Government regrets that in view of the fact that the mission was appointed for the sole purpose of visiting Russia, it does not seem advisable to have its members serve in a double capacity, the more so as this Government has in mind the appointment of a mission to Japan especially selected for that purpose which, if agreeable to the Imperial Japanese Government, it is hoped will be able to visit Japan after the return home of the Japanese mission to the United States.

POLK

File No. 763.72/5809

[Document 107]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 18, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1580. For transmission by wireless to Root:

Department has read with genuine satisfaction your telegram of July 10, 8 a.m., and has made known its contents to the President and the Secretaries of War and Navy. The Department feels confident that the efforts which you have made will materially aid in improving the situation in Russia and congratulates you and your associates on the feeling of cordial appreciation which appears to be felt in Russia for the work which you have done there.

POLK

Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia to the Secretary of State

SIR: The Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia, commissioned May 14, 1917, beg leave to report:

The mission left Washington May 18, sailed from Seattle May 20 on the U.S.S. *Buffalo*, Commander A. W. Hinds commanding, and arrived at Vladivostok, Siberia, May 21/June 3.

We were received at Vladivostok by several officers of the Russian Government charged to escort and care for us during our visit to Russia, by the American Consul, Mr. Caldwell, and by Lieut. E. F. Riggs, military attaché in Russia, representing the American Ambassador, Mr. Francis. Here Maj. Stanley Washburn joined the mission as assistant secretary.

A special train was in waiting with very commodious and well-fitted cars adequate for the comfortable accommodation of the entire party. Upon landing we were met by the local committee of the city of Vladivostok, and by a committee representing the soldiers stationed at that point. These committees made somewhat formal addresses to the mission, which appeared to combine a desire to be polite to the visitors and a desire to be informed as to the object of the mission. We responded briefly to the apparent satisfaction of the committees.

We subsequently ascertained that a considerable number of Russian refugees of the extreme socialist type returning from America a few days before had endeavored to induce the soldiers and citizens in Vladivostok to prevent the mission from proceeding to Petrograd but had been defeated in the Citizens' and Soldiers' Committees.

It appeared that the Provisional Government, established in Petrograd upon the downfall of the autocracy in the revolution of March 1917, had not succeeded in fact to the centralized power of the old bureaucratic government, but that extraordinary decentralization had followed the revolution. The city of Vladivostok was under the control not of officers authorized by the Government of Russia but of a committee selected by the people of the city. The large force of soldiers stationed at that point were under the control not of their own military officers, nor of the War Department at Petrograd, but of a committee selected by the rank and file, and this committee, composed in the main of common soldiers, gave orders to both soldiers and officers. This condition existed all over Russia. Public civil affairs and military affairs as well were being directed by tens of thousands of separate committees, having no established relations with each other and practically acknowledging little or no right of control on the part of the

Petrograd government. The utility of the central government in operating the machinery of general administration appeared to be recognized, but each separate committee exercised the right to do as it chose, while if a committee failed to act where action was necessary, or took the most wrong-headed and most absurd course conceivable, the central Government had for the time being no power to require action or to prevent action. Indeed, the general interpretation of the new-found freedom among the Russian people appeared to be that each individual was entitled to do whatever he himself wished to do, free from any control to which he personally did not consent. Notwithstanding this extraordinary condition of government good order prevailed in Russia, rights of person and of property were generally respected, and crime whether of violence or otherwise, either in the cities or the country, was not more frequent than would have been natural in so great a population under any government.

We left Vladivostok in the afternoon of May 21/June 3, and arrived at Harbin, Manchuria, in the afternoon of the following day. There we were welcomed by General Horvat, the governor of the Chinese Eastern Railroad and commander of the Russian forces upon the railroad concession from the Chinese Government to that railroad company. We met there the Commission of American Railway Experts, of which Mr. Stevens was the chairman, and held a conference with them as to the results of their observations up to that time and as to future cooperation in attaining the objects which we agreed upon as being desirable. At that point also we were welcomed to the territory of China by a deputation from the Chinese Government, composed of gentlemen from the Peking Foreign Office and the local Tao-Tai, who under the direction of their government, escorted us on the train through Mongolia and Manchuria to the Siberian border at Manchuria Station. Mr. Wang, the head of this deputation, was the bearer of a letter to Mr. Root from Mr. Wu Ting-fang, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs and Acting Prime Minister, containing a very polite invitation to visit Peking. This letter, with Mr. Root's reply, is annexed hereto for the files of the State Department.¹ Any subsequent further reply was prevented by the revolution which occurred in Peking before we left Petrograd.

We were joined at Ekaterinburg by Mr. Basil Miles as secretary. We reached Petrograd Wednesday, May 31/June 13, and were met at the station by many members and officers of the Provisional Government, and by Ambassador Francis and his Embassy staff, and were escorted to the Winter Palace where the mission was quartered during its stay in Petrograd, and where every possible care was taken for our comfort and convenience. Mr. Crane joined the mission on our arrival at Petrograd.

On Thursday, June 1/14, the members of the mission were formally presented by Ambassador Francis to Mr. A. Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, at the Foreign Office. On Friday evening, June 2/15, the mission was formally received by the Council of Ministers, Prince Lvov, the President of the Council, presiding. The mission was introduced with an appropriate speech by Ambassador

Francis, the message from the United States was delivered in an address by Mr. Root, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tereshchenko, replied for the Provisional Government. Copies of this address and of Mr. Tereshchenko's reply are annexed to this report.¹

As it was apparent that time had not sufficed under the new régime for the establishment of means of communication with the Russian people, through the press or otherwise, by which the great body of the people, either at their homes or in the army, might be correctly informed of governmental proceedings in Petrograd, we caused to be translated into Russian and distributed a million copies of this address and reply. The distribution was made through the instrumentality of a small organization which had been created for such purposes by British and French officials in Petrograd with the assistance of representatives of the American Embassy, the cost having been defrayed by the British and French.

We also arranged for the distribution of great numbers of copies of the President's message upon "the aims of the war" and of the President's Flag Day speech, which had just been received by the American Embassy. The distribution of these documents up to the time of our leaving Petrograd had reached the number of about 500,000 each. In order to entitle the United States to these services and similar services in the future, we took the responsibility of a contribution to the expenses of the organization equal to contributions already made by Great Britain and France.

After our reception by the Council of Ministers the members of the mission entered upon a series of conferences with the separate departments of the Russian Government, for the purpose of ascertaining the most pressing needs of Russia for the conduct of the war and explaining the facilities of the United States for supplying such needs, and thus arriving at the best ways in which the two countries could cooperate as allies.

A report by Major General Scott upon military needs will be made to the War Department, and a copy is annexed hereto.¹ This report is the result of extended conferences between General Scott and his military assistants and the Russian General Staff, and the information upon which the report is based was reinforced by actual inspection of conditions upon the Russian front from Tarnopol to Rumania made by General Scott, Colonel Judson, Lieutenant Colonel Michie, Lieutenant Colonel Mott and Major Parker, military attaché of the Petrograd Embassy. In this tour of inspection the General and his assistants had the opportunity of actually observing the Russian advance of June 18/July 1 in front of Tarnopol.

A report upon naval needs by Admiral Glennon will be made to the Navy Department and a copy is annexed hereto.¹ The information received by Admiral Glennon from the naval authorities in Petrograd was supplemented by a visit upon his part and by Lieutenant Bernhard, his aide, to the Black Sea Fleet at Sebastopol,

to the Baltic Fleet at Helsingfors and Revel, and to the port of Archangel on the White Sea.

The Department of Finance undertook to give a comprehensive statement of all the financial needs of Russia in a long series of interviews with Mr. Bertron and Mr. McCormick, and in many documents and statements furnished to them, and a report upon this subject by Mr. Bertron and Mr. McCormick is annexed hereto.¹

While these conferences were proceeding the members of the mission sought to obtain a correct understanding of actual conditions in Russia by a great number of interviews with people of all occupations and political and business relations. In this manner they secured statements of fact and expressions of opinion from as many different points of view as possible. For this purpose separate members of the mission made appointments and had conversations with members of all political parties: members of the Duma; members of the original revolutionary government established by the Duma; members of the old bureaucratic government; members of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; Cossacks; common soldiers and sailors; members of Soldiers' and Citizens' Committees; military and naval officers; peasants; merchants; bankers; manufacturers; priests and members of the Orthodox Greek Church and of the Old Believers' Church; Roman Catholics and Protestants; laborers in the factories and their employers; moderate socialists; extreme internationalists and anarchists; Zemstvo workers and members of War Aid Committees; and diplomatic and military officers of Allied countries, including Mr. Arthur Henderson of the British Cabinet and Mr. Albert Thomas of the French Cabinet. Special inquiry and consideration were given to the morale of the army, its causes and the means by which it might be favorably influenced. The results of these interviews were presented and compared in daily meetings of the mission.

It soon became apparent that the fundamental material need of Russia for the prosecution of the war was the need of improved transportation. All possible supplies to Russia during the war are now seriously limited both by the scarcity of bottoms for delivery of material by sea at Russian ports and by defective transportation on land within Russia.

In January–February 1917, before the revolution, a commission of experts from the Allied countries, of which Lord Milner was the chairman, met in Petrograd in conference with the experts of the Russian Government, and thoroughly discussed the whole subject of material supplies. The various departments of the Russian Government presented requests for supplies amounting to about fourteen million tons. Owing to the deficiency in ocean tonnage then existing these claims were reduced to about four million tons, the articles to be included being carefully arranged in an order of precedence based upon the necessities of military and naval operations. The decrease of tonnage caused chiefly by the destruction of ships by submarine warfare has been so great since that time that the Allies have been able to furnish less than one half the four million tons agreed upon in

February. The destruction of merchant ships still continues and it will be a considerable period before new construction can be relied upon for any substantial increase of carrying vessels. Any supply of materials by America to Russia during the present war will accordingly be restricted not so much by the limitations of money or credits with which to pay for these supplies, not so much even by the productive capacity of American manufactories, but by the very narrow limits of tonnage available for the carriage of supplies of all kinds to meet the pressing wants of all the Allied countries in Europe, including Russia. When account is taken of the requirements especially for the transportation of food to England and France, of coal to France and Italy, and of steel in various forms for use in the manufacture of munitions and in railroad building to practically all the countries engaged in the war, it is evident that the supplies to be actually furnished by the United States to Russia can not possibly be more than a small part of the total amount called for.

The difficulty in land transportation affords an equally great obstacle to the furnishing of supplies from abroad to Russia, and is in one way even more serious than the lack of shipping, for it interferes and threatens to interfere still more seriously with the utilization of Russia's internal resources. The chief avenues of normal communication between Russia and the western world, the Black Sea, across the western frontier, and through the Baltic ports, are cut off by the war. Russia has remaining the port of Vladivostok on the Pacific and the port of Archangel on the Arctic Ocean. Another road running to a port on the Gulf of Kola, and known as the Murman line, has recently been constructed but is not yet completed or in full operation. The Archangel line succeeds in transporting a moderate amount of material landed at that port, but the port of Archangel is closed by ice during six to seven months of the year and after about ten weeks from this time will no longer be available until next summer. The railroad from Vladivostok to Petrograd and Moscow is between five and six thousand miles in length, and this road, commonly known as the "Trans-Siberian," has been so far unable to handle the materials unloaded at Vladivostok that over 700,000 tons of freight are now piled up in that city awaiting transportation. This freight includes great quantities of war munitions, railroad iron, motor cars, agricultural implements, barbed wire and other articles much needed in Russia, but which can not be utilized because they can not be transported to the places where they are needed. This accumulation in Vladivostok was not decreasing at the time of our arrival, for the regular train service over the Trans-Siberian was no more than sufficient to carry away freight equivalent to the continuing deliveries at the port.

The railroad system of Russia labors under two primary difficulties. The first is defective organization. The organization and the methods of operation were the growth of ordinary easy conditions of peace under which time was of little consequence. There was little or no competition among private owners to spur them on to labor-saving and time-saving improvements, and upon the state-owned roads, which constitute the greater part of the whole system, there was

under the old regime a very low degree of governmental efficiency in railroad management. The old methods have continued notwithstanding the war and the question whether radical reforms necessary to produce a substantial increase of efficiency can be made effectual under the existing political conditions in Russia furnishes a problem yet to be solved.

Another great difficulty under which the railroads labor is that during the three years of war the rolling stock has been to a great extent worn out; about 40 per cent of the locomotives in the country are idle awaiting repairs, and this number is probably being increased at a rate not fully counterbalanced by the progress of repairs.

The effect of these conditions upon the internal movement of products in the country is very serious, not only upon the Trans-Siberian, but throughout Russia. In some parts of the country there is a surplus of food, in other parts there is a scarcity; and the difficulty of supplying food to the larger cities and to the army at the front during the approaching winter may well give rise to serious apprehension. There are said to be several million tons of coal already mined awaiting transportation in the Donets Basin while munition factories and other factories in other parts of the country, and in some cases quite near the coal fields, are running at half-time or closing entirely on account of want of fuel.

In an interview between Mr. Root and General Scott, Mr. Tereshchenko, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, General Brusilov, the Commander in Chief of the Armies, and General Lukomski, Chief of the General Staff, at the General Staff Headquarters at Mogilev, June 13/26, the most urgent appeals were made by both of the Russian generals for all possible assistance in this matter of transportation. This subject, of course, has been fully studied by the Commission of Railway Experts, of which Mr. Stevens is the head, and they have made numerous recommendations to the Department of Ways of Communication which, we understand from the members of the Stevens Commission, have been generally assented to by the department. In the interview at General Staff Headquarters already mentioned we arranged with General Brusilov and General Lukomski for a meeting between them and the Railway Commission and the Minister of Ways of Communication, in order that the military needs for improved transportation might be urged directly by the generals upon the railroad officials and experts. That tentative arrangement was communicated by us to the Stevens Commission and by Mr. Tereshchenko to the Department of Ways of Communication.

We also sought in ways not open to the Commission of Railway Experts to aid in securing action upon their recommendations. Mr. Russell and Mr. Duncan, who had established relations of confidence and esteem with the workmen and the moderate socialists in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, and generally with the members of that Council, explained to them very fully the importance of speeding up work in the railroad repair shops, and the necessity for that purpose that the workmen should consent to work in two or three shifts. They

secured the adherence of the Council to this proposition and their influence upon the workmen in favor of the increase of effectiveness in the way proposed. These services on the part of Mr. Russell and Mr. Duncan extended also beyond the scope of railroad repairs and were made applicable to the speeding up of work in the munition factories generally and in the production of other war necessities.

Through the Minister of Foreign Affairs we urged that effective action along the lines of the Railroad Commission's recommendations should not be left as merely a departmental matter in the Department of Ways of Communication, but should be made a matter of governmental policy with the whole weight and momentum of the Provisional Government brought to bear in making the proposed reforms effective. We were able to bring to the aid of this suggestion to the Provisional Government a consensus of opinion on the part of all the Allied countries represented in Russia through a meeting which was held in Petrograd June 22/July 5. This meeting was called at the British Embassy by the British Ambassador, Sir George Buchanan, for the purpose of considering the effect upon the Russian war situation of the inability of the Allies to transport to Archangel the amount of material provided for by the Milner commission before mentioned. There were present the British Ambassador, the Honorable Arthur Henderson of the British Cabinet, then on special mission to Russia, the French Charge, the Italian Ambassador, the Japanese Ambassador, the Rumanian Minister, the Portuguese Minister, the Belgian Minister, the American Ambassador Mr. Francis, Mr. Root and Mr. Bertron, and various technical experts of the different countries. The conclusions of this meeting were embodied in a paper framed by a committee, of which Mr. Bertron was a member, and this paper as an *aide-mémoire* was handed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs in an interview had with him by Mr. Henderson and Mr. Root on the following day. This interview resulted in a proposal by the Minister of Foreign Affairs that a standing commission be organized to be composed of himself and the ambassadors and ministers of the different powers furnishing munitions to Russia, together with such technical experts as were desired, to hold regular meetings at stated intervals for the purpose of discussing and considering the questions relating to the supply of munitions, etc. On the following day this proposition was agreed to by all the representatives of the Allied powers in a meeting adjourned from the meeting of July 5. The *aide-mémoire* which was left with Mr. Tereshchenko is annexed hereto.¹

The grave conditions already described and others which will be mentioned presently impressed upon the mission the conviction that questions as to the particular supplies which America might furnish to Russia for use in the war were only a part, and not the most important part, of the broader and more serious question: whether Russia could continue to carry on the war—whether the Russian Army could be kept in the field.

This is not a question of separate peace. We are satisfied that the Provisional Government of Russia intends to continue the war and has no intention to make a

separate peace. The question is whether that Government will have the power to continue the war. This depends upon the continued existence of the Government itself and upon its ability to keep in the field, or put into the field, an adequate army which will fight in response to its directions, and to feed, supply and transport such an army. The ability to do these things depends upon the continued working of the industrial system of the country and the support of the people.

Under the old régime Russia had reached a very critical condition. The war had lasted much longer than was anticipated. The provision made for it was, to a great extent, exhausted; the country was on the verge of bankruptcy, and any and all attempts by individual members of the Government to improve conditions were frustrated by divided councils and the more or less covert opposition of officials in sympathy with Germany, or, in some cases there is reason to believe, in the pay of Germany. This condition and the failure of the bureaucracy to govern effectively, in great part, explains the extraordinary ease with which the dethronement of the Tsar and the expulsion of his government were effected. The revolution was made in Petrograd by a comparatively small number of active opponents of the autocracy who had secured cooperation of the soldiers forming the garrison at that point. The rest of the country took little or no part in the active steps but with great unanimity adhered to the revolution when the Tsar had abdicated. The change found the people of the country divided, roughly speaking, into two classes. There was a small class who had long been actively attacking the old government; most of its members came within the general description of socialists, including, however, widely different types of socialists. Some of them believed that the pathway to real liberty lay through the immediate destruction of all capitalism; that is to say, their idea was that the revolution should destroy the whole industrial system of Russia and put an end to the possession of private property both in land and in chattels. Some of them were internationalists and believed in the universal organization of the proletariat of the world as a substitute for the existing national system. Their idea was that the revolution should not build up Russia as a nation, but should devote its strength to destroying all other national organizations in order that all peoples might be fused in a single organization in which there should be no nations and no private capital. Some of them, however, believed that the revolution should, in the first instance, establish the democracy of Russia upon a sound national basis. All of them were active and aggressive, and they felt that their efforts and their sacrifices had made the revolution, and therefore they were entitled to direct the revolutionary government. None of them had had any experience in the actual testing of their theories in real life. The other class included the great mass of the people of Russia, most of whom were the landowning peasantry. With the exception of a few able and courageous men, trained for the past dozen years in the discussions of the Duma, they were wholly unaccustomed to any part in the government of the country. They had been accustomed to receive orders and to obey them; not to form, or express, or act upon their own political opinions. They had no institutions through which to carry on the government of the country; they had no real

knowledge of the workings of such institutions, and no habits of thought adapted to devise such institutions. Where all laws had rested upon the authority of the Tsar, the repudiation of that authority seemed to leave the laws without sanction or moral obligation. Authority was gone; leadership of opinion was unknown; and a condition of vast bewilderment, confusion and ineffective discussion resulted.

Into this condition was thrust a great German propaganda. Thousands of German agents swarmed across the border immediately after the revolution. They made common cause with the internationalists and extreme socialists who sought to destroy industrial and national Russia. They stirred to activity all the pro-German sympathizers in the country; they spent money like water in the secret purchase of adherents; they bought and established newspapers; they distributed literature in enormous quantities; they sent out an army of speakers to harangue the crowds in the cities and towns; they traversed the country and sought to make the simple-minded peasants believe that they had only to stop fighting and take possession of all the land in Russia to live in affluence forever after; they incited the workingmen to make demands far in excess of the entire profits and capital of the enterprises in which they were engaged, with a view to seizing upon the mines and factories for themselves. The German troops in the trenches, under German orders, offered friendship to the Russian soldiers; fraternized with them; taught them to think that the war was not theirs but the Tsar's, and that the Tsar being gone, there was no occasion for further fighting; they directed the new sense of freedom among the soldiers of the Russian Army to the repudiation of the authority of officers and the abandonment of all discipline; they appealed powerfully to the love of peace which is natural to a democracy, and to the weariness of war which the Russians felt in common with all the other peoples of Europe. Among the results of the thus created conditions was great decrease in industrial efficiency. At the time when the mission reached Russia the output of the mines and manufacturing establishments of the country, including munition works, had fallen to about one half the normal output, while the cost of production had increased in about the same ratio. The peasants, absorbed by a new interest in public affairs, had planted much less than the normal area and were holding back the crops already harvested instead of bringing them out to be sold for rubles of greatly reduced purchasing power. The transportation system became still more ineffective because of the decline of discipline among the railroad employees, and because the stations and the trains were crowded with masses of soldiers passing to and fro, not under orders but in accordance with their own will, compelling the trains to move as they wished. The desertions from the army ran into millions; discipline practically disappeared; and a general unwillingness to fight any more prevailed among the troops.

We annex hereto a copy of a speech made by the Assistant Secretary of War of Russia, Colonel Yakubovich, on the 26th [25th] of May, 1917, which gives a striking and authentic account of military conditions at that time.¹

It is manifest that these conditions could not continue permanently. They had to

change in one direction, leading into complete demoralization and the inevitable possession and control of the country by Germany, or in the opposite direction, leading to restored discipline and subordination to central authority under competent governmental control. Much progress has been made recently towards establishing such control by the process which will now be described.

Immediately before the revolution of March 1917 the Russian Duma was in session. The Tsar ordered its dissolution and the Duma refused to obey the order. This refusal precipitated the revolution, and the Government which succeeded to the Government of the Tsar consisted of ten men selected by the Duma to be the heads of the great executive departments of government. After this act the Duma ceased to meet and it never thereafter took any official step. At the same time there came into existence in Petrograd a voluntary body of about 2,500 members called the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, selected or purporting to be selected in one way or another by various soldiers' and workingmen's organizations or groups. This body contained the most active revolutionists and many of the extreme socialists, as well as many moderate socialists. It had at the outset the practical adherence of the great body of the Petrograd garrison, and although it was without any official status or responsibility, it had a greater power to exercise force at that particular time and place than the Provisional Government established by the Duma. The Provisional Government had taken possession of the machinery of administration but had no power to enforce its decrees. It had at its command no army, no police force and no effective control of public opinion. The Council of Deputies, on the other hand, had control of a military force, effective at the seat of government, but it had no machinery or competency to carry on government. About the time this Special Mission left America an agreement was effected between these two bodies under which the number of ministers in the Provisional Government was increased to fourteen, several of the leading ministers resigned and the vacancies were filled by the appointment of five socialists selected by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Among the socialist Ministers were Messrs. Kerensky, now Minister of War; Tseretelli, now Minister of Posts and Telegraphs; and Skobelev, Minister of Labor. Among the old Ministers who remained and who may, in a general way, be described as conservatives, were Prince Lvov, who had been and continued as President of the Council; Mr. Tereshchenko, who had been Minister of Finance and became Minister of Foreign Relations; and Mr. Nekrasov, who is now Minister of Justice.¹ About the time of the mission's arrival in Russia the voluntary Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies was practically superseded by an All-Russian Council of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, which was in a rough way elected from all parts of the country. This body gradually assumed more positive functions in relation to government; it developed a sense of responsibility to assist rather than to interfere in carrying on the Government; it was more conservative than the Petrograd Council of Deputies had been; it discussed questions of governmental policy more soberly and intelligently; its declarations of policy had more authority; and the Provisional

Government sought and acquired its confidence and support. In a series of votes majorities were secured of about four to one in favor of the Government. The minority upon all these votes was composed of the extreme and destructive socialists. Shortly before we left Petrograd the All-Russian Council of Deputies adjourned, leaving an Executive Committee of 250 to act in its place.

The policy of the Provisional Government was to pursue a course which by its moderation and patience would satisfy the moderate socialists in the Council of Deputies and gradually separate them from the extreme and irreconcilable socialists, commonly described as "Maximalists" or "Bolsheviks." This policy has apparently been successful. With the support of the majority of the Council of Deputies the Temporary Government acquired control of the great majority of the Petrograd garrison, and the Maximalists were left alone without the power to control or overthrow the Government in Petrograd by the use of force. Thus established the Provisional Government has now become possessed of power to enforce its decrees. It has made strenuous efforts on the one hand to restore normal industrial activity by the reasonable settlement of labor disputes, and on the other to restore the fighting spirit of the army by counteracting the German propaganda. Mr. Kerensky, the Minister of War, has proved to be a most powerful advocate in his appeals to the soldiers, and he has succeeded in making a very great improvement in discipline and in the fighting spirit of the troops. The substitution of General Brusilov as Commander in Chief of the Armies in place of General Alexeev was probably not due so much to a comparison of military merits, which are very high in both cases, as to the fact that General Brusilov is very popular indeed with the army and has great influence with the soldiers as a brilliant and successful military leader. It is probably not far wrong to say that the real objective of the advance which was begun by General Brusilov on June 18/July 1 in front of Tarnopol was really the Russian rather than the Austrian Army, and that the purpose was rather to restore the fighting power of the Russian Army as a whole than to destroy the fighting power of the Austrian Army. That purpose has been to a very great extent accomplished, although there are certain organizations which are practically under German control and which can not be relied upon.

It is the unanimous opinion of the mission that the Russian people have the qualities of character which will make it possible to restore discipline, and coherent and intelligently directed action, both in military and in civil life, notwithstanding the temporary distressing conditions already described, which are not the result of weakness or fault in the Russian people but are the natural and inevitable results of the conditions under which the people were held before the revolution, the misgovernment of the bureaucracy, and the astounding suddenness with which the country was deprived of its accustomed government. The Russians have natural self-control and kindly consideration and respect for the rights of others; they are naturally law-abiding and they have extraordinary capacity for united action. That capacity has been shown in their local self-

government, in the Zemstvo Unions, in the success of the Narodny or People's Banks, and in many cooperative organizations for manufactures and for the sale of products. When they have once learned to apply their qualities in the field of national government, we have little doubt that they will be able to establish and maintain successfully free self-government on a great scale. Such a development, however, cannot be accomplished in a day; time is essential; but they are moving now with a rapidity which is quite extraordinary.

The members of the mission considered that not merely sympathy for the Russian people but the plain policy of the United States required that they should give such aid as was in their power to this process of reintegration of government in Russia.

The members of the mission agreed in a course of action which should tend towards the accomplishment of three objects:

- (1) To encourage hope and faith in the success of the effort of the Russian people to create and maintain adequate free self-government;
- (2) To inspire confidence in the Provisional Government and an appreciation of the fact that the progress towards order lay through the maintenance of that Government; and
- (3) To promote a realization of the fact that the effective continuance of the war was the only course by which the opportunity for Russia to work out the conditions of her own freedom could be preserved from destruction by German domination.

The members of the mission undertook to follow this course by great numbers of public speeches and a multitude of private interviews. A certain division of labor was naturally developed. Mr. Mott and Mr. Crane addressed themselves especially to the Russian Church, both the Orthodox Church, the Old Believers' Church, and other religious bodies, with most gratifying results; and upon this a special report is appended.¹ Mr. Russell addressed himself to the moderate socialists, Mr. Duncan to the laborers, who were eager to learn about the methods of successful labor organizations in the United States; special reports by them are also annexed hereto.¹ Mr. Bertron and Mr. McCormick addressed themselves to the bankers and business men; General Scott to the soldiers; Admiral Glennon to the sailors; Mr. Root to the persons concerned in Government and quasi-governmental and public organizations. The most important public speeches were reported, translated and published in various forms. A great many of the less important speeches were not preserved. The most important of the speeches made by Mr. Root, Mr. Mott, Mr. Russell and Mr. Duncan, so far as they were preserved, are annexed to this report.¹

The mission feels that its efforts have not been without effect; that it succeeded to some degree in bringing to bear upon conditions in Russia the moral force of the hundred million people in the United States who are known to have achieved and maintained their own liberty, and in giving strength and confidence to the

elements of Russian life which were struggling towards order and the effective prosecution of the war; and that they have contributed something towards the unquestionable progress which has been made in Russia towards effective government.

We wish to express our most grateful appreciation of the aid cooperation and friendship of the Ambassador to Russia, Mr. Francis, and his entire Embassy staff. The jealousy which so often exists in a mild form between regular and special missions to the same country was entirely absent in this case. Nothing could be more generous and kindly than the attitude and action of the Ambassador and his staff towards the Special Mission. The policy of the mission already described was the policy of Mr. Francis, the methods which it pursued were the methods of Mr. Francis; and the two missions worked together with entire harmony, mutual helpfulness and frankness of intercommunication to accomplish a single end.

The mission will not here repeat the recommendations which it has made from time to time by cable from Petrograd in regard to specific material aid to Russia. It is the understanding of the Russian Government that actual negotiations regarding credits and the specific form and direction of such material aid as the United States may be able to give to Russia shall proceed at Washington. We accordingly refrain from further specific recommendations until advised as to the particular requests which may have been made through the Russian mission now in Washington headed by Professor Bakhmeteff.

Upon the policy of giving substantial aid to Russia in a large way, both in supplies and in credits, and in the moral support which these would involve, our conclusions are:

- (1) That with such aid there is a strong probability of keeping Russia in the war and the Russian Army in the field until a general peace can be made upon terms satisfactory to the United States and its Allies;
- (2) That there is little prospect that Russia can be kept in the war and the Russian Army in the field without such aid;
- (3) That the benefit of keeping Russia in the war, and its army in the field will be so enormous that the risk involved in rendering the aid required should not be seriously considered.

There are two quite distinct possibilities to be hoped for. One is, that the Russian Army may be restored to its former effectiveness as an active, striking force and may be able to take its full part in the general strategic cooperation of the Allies, driving at the eastern front of the Central powers, while the other Allies drive at the other fronts. The other is, that the Russian Army may be enabled merely to maintain its defensive, keeping the Central powers out of Russia and requiring them to maintain continuously a large force upon their eastern front. If only the second of these possibilities is accomplished, the advantage to the United States and its Allies would be so great as to justify the expenditure by the United States of

the largest sums which it can possibly devote to that purpose.

Soon after our arrival in Petrograd the mission received an urgent request to visit Rumania. Being without instructions upon that subject, General Scott, by request of the mission, took advantage of his visit to that part of the Russo-Rumanian front which is in Rumanian territory, to make to the Government of Rumania a respectful acknowledgment of the invitation, and at the same time to observe the military conditions in that country. The letter General Scott presented to the King and Queen of Rumania on behalf of the mission is annexed hereto, and his observations on the conditions which he observed are embodied in a separate report, a copy of which is also annexed.¹

The mission wishes to make acknowledgment to the Navy Department for the services rendered by Commander Hinds of the U. S. S. *Buffalo* in transporting the mission to Vladivostok and back to Seattle; to the staff with which the mission was supplied by the State Department for their faithful and devoted services; to the American Consuls, Mr. Caldwell at Vladivostok, Mr. Moser at Harbin, Mr. Winship at Petrograd, Mr. Summers at Moscow, and Mr. Willoughby Smith of Tiflis, who kindly joined us at Petrograd, for their effective and active assistance in these cities.

And the mission especially desires that the Government of the United States may appreciate the warmth of hospitality and the solicitude of attention and care with which the Provisional Government of Russia and its civil, military, and naval officers treated the mission during the entire period of its visit from its landing at Vladivostok on the 3d of June until its sailing from that port on the 21st of July.

The farewell correspondence between the mission and the Foreign Office is appended.¹

Respectfully submitted.

August 1917.

ELIHU ROOT

H. L. SCOTT

S. A. BERTRON

JAMES DUNCAN

CHARLES EDWARD RUSSELL

JOHN E. MOTT

CYRUS H. McCORMICK

O. H. GLENNON

¹ Not printed.

¹ *Ante*, pp. 118 [Pg. 118 is part of [Doc. 93](#)] and 122 [Pg. 122 includes portions of [Doc. 94](#) and [Doc. 95](#)].

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ In the ministry as published in *Izvestia* Aug. 7 Nekrasov became Minister of Finance, see also *post*, p. 178 [*Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 139](#) and [Doc. 140](#)*]; for his post in the coalition ministry see *ante*, p. 79 [*Pg. 79 is part of [Doc. 49](#)*].

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

Supplementary Report of the Special Diplomatic Mission to Russia to the Secretary of State²

[Extract]

PLANS FOR AMERICAN COOPERATION TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THE MORALE OF THE CIVIL
POPULATION AND THE ARMY OF RUSSIA

I. PLAN TO PROMOTE AN EDUCATIONAL CAMPAIGN

1. AIM

To influence the attitude of the people of Russia for the prosecution of the war as the only way of perpetuating their democracy.

2. CONSIDERATIONS EMPHASIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF SUCH A CAMPAIGN

Germany has been and is waging an able propaganda in Russia to weaken and destroy the fighting spirit of the people. We found evidences that this effort is generously financed, that it is conducted on a large scale, and that it has been most effective. It can be counteracted and overcome only by means of an adequate campaign of education.

There is in operation in Russia to-day no really adequate plan designed to counteract the efforts put forth by Germany to poison opinion and to paralyze action. There are commendable efforts both on the part of individual Russians and of certain of the Allies but none of these activities singly or all of them combined are capable of meeting the need.

We came to the conclusion, after examining all that is being done, that if the situation is to be met and met in time the United States must take the matter in hand. America has the necessary resources. America has evolved the most effective methods. America has available men trained for such educational work.

There has been no time when American cooperation in this sphere would count so much in Russia as the present. Owing to the prompt initiative of President Wilson in recognizing the Provisional Government and owing to the visit and the work accomplished by the Special Diplomatic Mission, America just now has most favorable access to Russia. Russia is ready to listen to America, and is eager to learn from her. Moreover, the present is incomparably the most critical period from a military point of view. The liberties of Russia—all that the Russian revolution has made possible—are endangered by Germany.

From the point of view of winning the war, it is vitally important that Russia be kept in the war, and, to this end, that her people shall be led to realize vividly what

is at stake, and that they shall be inspired with hope in the successful outcome of the struggle. If, through our failure to keep alive the interest of the Russian people and to maintain among them a realizing sense of the significance of the sacrifices already made, Russia should lose heart and virtually be eliminated from the war, the consequences will be most serious.

Russia is possibly the most isolated nation among all the Allies. This is due to her geographical position and the very poor means of communication with the outside world. It takes a longer time to receive letters and periodicals in Russia from the other Allies than is the case with any other Allied country. Moreover, the Russian press has the most meager and unsatisfactory foreign cable service. Germany has so clouded the waters of the press in the Scandinavian countries that little light of the kind most needed comes from Russia's nearest and most accessible neighbors.

The plans we propose call for an expenditure the first year of approximately \$5,500,000. Members of our mission were told by those who are in a position to estimate facts that Germany has spent in her propaganda of intrigue in Russia since the revolution 48,000,000 rubles, or \$3,000,000 a month. It is estimated that it costs the Allies \$10,000,000 to keep one regiment one year at the front. The proposed campaign of education is directed to helping to develop a spirit which will hold on the eastern front 640 regiments of over 3,000 men each. The combined daily expenditures of the Allies have amounted to over \$75,000,000. This vast outlay is devoted almost exclusively to providing for the *material* factors essential to the proper prosecution of the war. Is it not desirable to devote the relatively small sum suggested to insure the larger conservation and exercise of the *moral* factor in that area of the war where the situation is so critical?

America, as well as Russia, has much at stake. If Russia can be helped to hold her armies in being and to keep her men in the trenches, it will make it necessary that the enemy countries maintain on the eastern front over 140 divisions of troops. This has a most direct bearing on the extent of the exertions and sacrifices of America in the war.

The Russian civil and military authorities assured us that they would welcome and give every facility to any efforts which America might put forth in the direction of wise educational effort.¹

3. PRINCIPAL MEANS OR METHODS TO BE EMPLOYED

- (a) Establishment of a modern news service designed to furnish news to all periodicals throughout Russia. This agency would specialize on American news. Nothing corresponding to this now exists. It would be necessary to have in Petrograd an American general manager and two American assistants to select the news from America and in Russia to be used, a worker in America to gather and forward the right kind of American news, a staff of five Russian writers and translators, also an efficient office force.
- (b) Large use of effective pamphlets and leaflets. There is no land in the world

where the thirst for literature dealing with current questions is greater to-day than it is in Russia. This is, of course, due to the revolution. Among those who can read there is only one activity which is more in evidence, and that is talking. Large use should be made of pictures or illustrations in connection with the new printed matter. Arrangements should be made with the news kiosks throughout the country to slip these leaflets into all papers sold.

- (c) A well-managed film service would also accomplish in Russia more than in any other land. The experience of the British has pointed the way to a wide use of this means. The following classes of films should be prepared and used: war films; films of American life in the country, in manufacturing centers, and in commerce; American comic films; and above all, film stories of a patriotic character and especially illustrating the struggle for democracy. For the proper handling of this agency there would be needed an American manager and an assistant, also at least five well-qualified traveling men to introduce and supervise (not operate) the service. They would see that all centers are supplied with news films.
- (d) Special advertising, particularly by means of illustrated colored posters, is a means well fitted for Russia. Experience in connection with floating their different loans confirms the usefulness of this plan. To accomplish the best results there should be in charge an expert American advertising man with a good assistant.
- (e) The most popular method for influencing Russian opinion is that of speech. Therefore, large use should be made of well-qualified speakers or teachers. Why should there not be a carefully selected body of hundreds of able Russians going as teachers about the towns and villages as well as among the millions of men under arms? These speakers or teachers could be brought together in large groups or companies for the purpose of preparation for their work and of unifying its impact.

II. PLAN TO STRENGTHEN THE MORALE OF THE ARMY—IMPORTANCE, PRACTICABILITY, AND URGENCY OF THIS UNDERTAKING

Russia has called to the colors since the war began not less than 13,200,000 men. This constitutes the largest army assembled by any one nation in the history of the world. Of this vast number it is estimated that fully 2,000,000 have already been killed or have died as the result of wounds or diseases occasioned by the war. Another 2,000,000 are to-day prisoners of war in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey. Another 2,000,000 may be classified as permanently ineffective, chiefly those who have been seriously mutilated in warfare or shattered by disease. This leaves 7,200,000 men as comprising the total strength of the Russian army of to-day. Some authorities whom we consulted give a somewhat lower figure, but more would place it even higher. Of this army of to-day probably 2,100,000 are to be found in the seventy corps on the European front and the five on the Asiatic front; 1,000,000 in the depots or reserves; 1,000,000 in connection with garrisons and communications—thus leaving a little

over 3,000,000 in training, on leave, or otherwise not immediately available for military operations, but potentially a most important asset. On this vast host of Russian men and boys rests the tremendous responsibility of maintaining and pressing the war on the long-drawn-out eastern front. The effectiveness and faithfulness with which they perform this critical duty will determine, far more largely than we in America have realized, the extent of the exertions and sacrifices, and the laying down of life and substance, of the American people in connection with the great struggle. Whatever can be done, therefore, to insure and develop the highest working efficiency and truly triumphant spirit of the Russian soldiers has a most direct, practical, and vital bearing on the destiny of America and the other Allies.

That there is imperative need of instituting measures for rendering practical service to the millions of Russian men and boys under arms or in uniform there can be no question in the mind of any one who has first-hand knowledge of conditions. This need existed before the Russian revolution. A similar need had been recognized in all the other Allied armies, and with greater or less thoroughness was being met; but, notwithstanding the most helpful activities of such agencies as the Zemstvo unions, there has been lacking in the Russian army from the beginning an agency to specialize on the physical, mental, social, and moral betterment of the men as has been done in so many of the other countries by the Young Men's Christian Association. The Russian revolution has greatly accentuated the need. From the nature of the case the minds of multitudes of Russian soldiers have been more or less absorbed with the political and social issues thrust upon them by the revolution. Moreover, the subtle, able forces of German intrigue have taken advantage of these unsettled conditions and have waged a really masterly propaganda among large numbers of the troops in the garrisons, in the training camps, and, to a larger degree than might be thought possible, at the front. As one studies these troops wherever they are congregated throughout Russia or Siberia, at the front or at the base, one is impressed by the vast numbers who either are not occupied at all with activities related to the war or are devoting themselves to aimless and unprofitable political discussion. The practical problem, stated in a sentence, is: Shall these millions of young men and boys in garrisons, in reserve camps, and at the fighting front spend the five or more leisure hours which they have each day in idleness or in unprofitable or weakening agitation, or shall they devote these spare hours to healthful physical and social recreation, growth in knowledge and working efficiency, and unselfish service to their fellowmen? This war has shown the supreme importance of morale. Napoleon went so far as to maintain that morale counts for an army as three to one. How important it is that everything possible be done during these coming months to improve the morale, to strengthen the discipline, and to raise the spirit of our comrades in Russia.

The marvelous success achieved by the Young Men's Christian Association in the British, Canadian, and Australasian armies not only on the west front, but also in

Egypt, Mesopotamia, Saloniki, and on the Gallipoli Peninsula, in the wonderful French army, as well as in the newly forming American army, has demonstrated the adaptability of this organization for meeting the situation in Russia. We are glad to state that even before we arrived in Russia some of the American Association secretaries, who have long been at work there in the prisoner-of-war camps, had become so impressed by the need and by the urgency of the situation that they, without knowledge of each other's action, had already inaugurated work among the Russian soldiers at a number of points as widely separated as Petrograd on the west, Tomsk and Irkutsk in Siberia, and Tashkent in Turkestan. These efforts met with the instant and enthusiastic approval of both soldiers and officers. To promote recreation and the physical conditioning of the men, football, volley ball, track athletics, relay races, and aquatics had been introduced. The educational work included language schools, courses for other useful studies, libraries, reading rooms, lectures, and moving picture shows. Wise use was being made of high-grade theatrical plays. The musical features of the work were also most welcome. The moral life of the soldiers received sympathetic and careful attention. Wherever possible, the men were being enlisted in unselfish service among their fellows. As we studied these experiments we asked ourselves the question. Why is not this work reproducible throughout the entire Russian army?

In order to ascertain whether the Russians would welcome American cooperation through such an agency as the Association, we had interviews with a number of persons. We discussed the matter at length with Prince Lvov, the former Premier, and found him most intelligently sympathetic. Mr. Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, responded heartily to the suggestion. We had but a short conference with the Minister of War and Marine, Mr. Kerensky (the present Premier), and arranged to go into the subject more fully with him at his leisure, but he had not yet returned from the front when we were obliged to start back to America. Other members of the War Ministry, however, have indicated to us their hearty approval. The Chief of the General Staff assured us that he and his colleagues would welcome the help of this American Association. Many of the Soldiers' Deputies, as well as other soldiers, were interviewed and brought together in groups for consultation. They assured us of their earnest cooperation.

All our investigations convinced us that the soldiers of Russia present to America possibly the largest single opportunity to help which has come to us during the war. Here is a field that stretches one-third of the way around the world. It involves literally millions of men and boys—nearly as many as to-day are serving in the combined armies of Britain, Canada, America, and France. It is wide open to our friendly approach. It is a most responsive field. At many points the Russian army reminded us quite as much of older boys as of mature men, and these hosts of boys, and the men too for that matter, can be led anywhere by workers of warm hearts, wise heads, and unselfish spirit. They are most responsive to kindness. Very many of them are eager for self-development and are truly idealistic. To deal in any worthy or adequate way with this boundless opportunity means that we

must send over to Russia as soon as possible at least two hundred of the best qualified workers whom we can find. The difficulties which await these workers are so subtle and serious that we should send only men of established character, of rich experience, and of undiscourageable enthusiasm. It may be found wise and practicable to establish a language school where all of these workers can spend at least a short period on arriving in Russia, although a man should begin his study of the Russian language the day he decides to enter this field. For every American secretary there should be two or more Russian workers.

It would be difficult to overstate the urgency of this extraordinary situation. The late autumn and the winter months will constitute the most critical testing period. If these men can be afforded pleasant and profitable occupation during this trying time it will insure conservation of probably the greatest single asset of the Allied cause; whereas, if through the influence of counter-revolutionary forces, of German intrigue, and of disintegrating habits of dissipation and idleness, the great Russian army should be permitted to dissolve or be riven with seams of weakness, the most disastrous consequences will follow. Just now America, as no other nation, holds the key to the situation. Her prompt recognition of the revolutionary government and her genuine and expressed desire to do anything in her power to help Russia, make the Russian people peculiarly hospitable to American ideas and workers. It is well for us to keep reminding ourselves that the Russians have long been fighting our battles for us, and this at a terrific cost. Anything which we find it possible to do in the way of giving money to extend a great, practical, unselfish ministry of this kind we should promptly do. ...

¹ In the possession of the Department of State.

² Undated; enclosed as a printed circular in a letter of Aug. 27, 1917, from Secretary Lansing to the President. See also *post*, p. 214 [*Pg. 214 includes portions of [Doc. 183](#), [Doc. 184](#), and [Doc. 185](#)*].

¹ In a letter to the Secretary of State, June 29, 1917, Maj. Stanley Washburn, assistant secretary of the Special Diplomatic Mission, wrote:

We returned yesterday from General Headquarters where I had an hour's private conversation with General Brusilov on a number of subjects. I took up with him especially America's publicity in the army. ... General Brusilov has approved all of the forms of publicity in the army which I have been anxious to have established there. This includes eight or ten complete moving-picture outfits with lecturers that shall constantly travel about in the army explaining America's resources and illustrating America's preparedness and intention to support Russia to the end of the war. Besides this there should be vast numbers of pamphlets, speakers, posters, and other forms of publicity. The General says that he will receive personally whomever we appoint head of our publicity bureau here and go over in

detail with him all of these plans for spreading the American idea in the Russian army and he will give his full authority and backing to see that the same are carried out in the most efficient and effective way.

The Bakhmeteff mission to the United States

[110] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, April 28, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received April 29, 5.25 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/4137

[111] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, May 1, 1917—4 p.m.

File No. 763.72/4137

[112] The Russian Chargé (Onou) to the Secretary of State

Washington, May 9, 1917. [Received May 10.]

File No. 763.72/4531

[113] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Wheeler)

Washington, May 28, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 763.72/5078d

[114] The Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé (Onou)

Washington, May 31, 1917.

File No. 763.72/4531

[115] The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, June 1, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received June 1, 5.50 p.m.]

File No. 768.72/5059

[116] The Secretary of Embassy (Caffery), temporarily in the United States, to the Secretary of State

Othello, Wash., June 15, 1917. [Received June 16, 9 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/5334

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *April 28, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received April 29, 5.25 p.m.]

1231. Milyukov tells me informally that Russia has decided to send commission to America earliest possible date. Chairman will be Boris Bakhmeteff, Assistant Minister of Trade and Industry, who is well acquainted with America where was connected with Russian commission until November last, not related to present Ambassador. Other members of the commission will be high officials representing Ministries War, Ways of Communication and Trade and Bakhmeteff has been tendered ambassadorship to America, so Milyukov tells me, but Minister of Trade and Industry objects to his leaving. Bankhmeteff has just called says he will undoubtedly go as head of commission on confirmation and vested with ambassador's powers but will soon return. My judgment is that he will be Ambassador and that he will be most capable one, this however is unofficial.

Bourse gazette says American commission will be Boot, chairman, Straus, Hurley and Morgenthau. Reuter says commission will consist of three or four members with staff of secretaries and assistants but gives no names except Charles Crane. He is here, has many influential acquaintances, familiar with conditions. There is no social official life here. Ministers meet daily remaining in session after midnight working assiduously, having refused all social invitations including from myself to whom they profess to feel very close. Reports come to me of nervousness among people generally, many of the wealthier classes leaving Petrograd. I do not anticipate excesses but they are rumored and if should come very likely be directed against Jews first.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/4137

[Document 111]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 1, 1917—4 p.m.*

1367. Your 1231, April 28. Please say to Milyukov that this Government will be delighted to receive commission from Russia, and that it is believed that good results would follow from the visit of the commission at as early a date as possible.

LANSING

The Russian Chargé (Onou) to the Secretary of State

No. 354

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1917.*
[*Received May 10.*]

EXCELLENCY: Referring to my verbal communication of May 7 instant, I have the honor to transmit herewith to your excellency a memorandum relative to the Extraordinary Embassy which the Russian Provisional Government proposes to send to the United States.

Accept [etc.]

C. ONOU

[Enclosure—Memorandum]

Extraordinary Embassy from Russia to the United States

The object of the Special Mission is to express the gratitude of the Provisional Russian Government for the initiative taken by the great Allied Republic in the official recognition of the democratic régime which has been established in Russia.

Prof. B. A. Bakhmeteff, Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry, shall be placed at the head of the Extraordinary Embassy which will include special delegates of the Ministries of War, Commerce, Finance and Foreign Affairs. Mr. J. Korostovets, ex-Minister in Peking, is designated as delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The special mission, composed thus of competent delegates of different departments, will be empowered to confer and to negotiate with the Government of the United States on military, naval, financial and railway matters, pertaining to the present world war. The detailed list of the members of the Extraordinary Embassy, the time of the departure from Petrograd and the route which will be chosen shall be communicated later.

File No. 763.72/5078d

[Document 113]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Wheeler)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 28, 1917, 6 p.m.*

Russian commission to United States reported intending to sail Yokohama for Seattle June 1. Please advise of departure, personnel of commission and port of destination.

LANSING

The Secretary of State to the Russian Chargé (Onou)

No. 213

WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1917.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 9th instant transmitting a memorandum relative to the Extraordinary Embassy which the Russian Provisional Government proposes to send to the United States. It is noted from the memorandum that the object of the Special Mission is to express the gratitude of the Provisional Russian Government for the initiative taken by the United States in the official recognition of the democratic regime which has been established in Russia; that the members of the Extraordinary Embassy consist of Prof. B. A. Bakhmeteff, head of the mission, and special delegates of the Ministries of War, Commerce, Finance, and Foreign Affairs; and that Mr. J. Korostovets, formerly Russian Minister at Peking, is designated as delegate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It is further noted that the Embassy will be empowered to negotiate with the Government of the United States on military, naval, financial and railway matters pertaining to the present world war.

I have the honor to assure you in reply that the Extraordinary Embassy of Russia will be received with welcome by the President, Government and people of the United States and that after it shall have been received by the President this Government will be happy to negotiate with it on the subjects mentioned in your memorandum.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

The Chargé in Japan (Wheeler) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *June 1, 1917, 6 p.m.*

[*Received June 1, 5.50 p.m.*]

Your telegram of May 28, 6 p.m. Russian Extraordinary Mission to the United States, dispatched pursuant to decree of April 25 [/May 8?] of the Provisional Russian Government, consisting of 47 persons, including 10 ladies, 6 of whom are members, sail by *Empress of Japan* June 2 arriving Vancouver 13th. Mission is headed by Bakhmeteff, accredited Ambassador to United States, who is accompanied by his wife and whose personal staff consists of Sookine, representative of the Foreign Office and secretary of the mission, Messrs. Omelchenko and Karpovich and Baron Gunsburg, secretaries, and Dubasov, aide-de-camp. Principal members are Lieutenant General Roop, representative of Russian General Staff, Captain Leadingoff, his aide-de-camp, Colonel Oranovski, representative of Ministry of War for Munitions and Supplies; Professor Lomonosov of the Petrograd Polytechnic Institute, representative of Ministry of Ways of Communication, and Kupryanov, his assistant; Professor Borodin, representative of Ministry of Agriculture; Novitski, representative of Ministry of Finance, and his assistants, Pertsov and Puskarev; Sergievski, representative of Russian press. Bakhmeteff is charged with negotiations for war loan; Lomonosov's [group] are railway experts and engineers and will negotiate for accessories and rolling stock; Borodin's group will purchase agricultural machinery. Lincoln Steffens, American correspondent, accompanies party. Full personnel has been transmitted to Russian Embassy, Washington. Whole number traveling first class, no servants. Mission prefers to take Canadian Pacific route to Chicago via Portland and asks that Russian Embassy be communicated with and if any arrangements have been made for them as to routing, purchase of tickets, berths, etc., they be instructed by wire at Vancouver. They bring large quantity of governmental printed matter and moving pictures for Red Cross for which they request customs facilities at frontier.

Members of commission inform me that in Petrograd and on the line anxiety exists as to attitude of Stevens commission, reports that it was to "run" Trans-Siberian Railway having caused resentment against [foreign] intrusion. Bakhmeteff shared this anxiety. I assured him commission came representing the President and the people of the United States with idea only of placing its railway knowledge and experience in transportation problems at the disposal of Russian

people to use or reject as their judgment may dictate. He expressed satisfaction and sent telegrams to subvert any unfavorable impression for local publicity along the route in advance.

WHEELER

The Secretary of Embassy (Caffery), temporarily in the United States, to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

OTHELLO, WASH., *June 15, 1917.*
[Received June 16, 9 a.m.]

Mission arrived this morning Seattle and now *en route* Chicago. Ambassador Bakhmeteff expresses to me his pleasure in being on American soil and states that he looks forward with much pleasure to his stay in this country. The Ambassador advises that his Government attaches the very greatest importance to the work and cooperation of the two special missions now in Russia and United States respectively. He says that the Russian Government considers that the aims and ideas of the two countries in this war are identical; that the relations should be of the closest kind and that the cooperation of Russia and America will have great influence on the future politics of the world. The Ambassador says that he wishes to emphasize that his Government regards the work to be accomplished by his mission to be of the utmost importance. Mr. Bakhmeteff feels that he understands America and American institutions and people and that this knowledge will aid him materially in conducting negotiations here; that Russia is looking to United States aid along different lines, notably financial, railroads, agriculture, munitions and supplies, that the heads of the technical bureaus under him will take up these questions; that the Provisional Government feels that it can look more to the United States than to any other country for the proper assistance in developing a new democracy; that he does not underestimate the difficulties of the situation but believes that with sympathy and understanding much progress can be accomplished.

The Provisional Government appointed Mr. Bakhmeteff head of the Extraordinary Mission as the political representative of all factions of the Provisional Government and at the same time desired to have him received as Ambassador Resident at Washington until such time as a permanent Ambassador may be appointed. With this end in view he bears with him letters of credence in addition to special powers to treat of special subjects.

General Roop, representative of the Russian General Staff and Army, is a Lieutenant General in rank. He ranks next to the Ambassador. Professor Lomonosov, chief of the railway mission, has power in the United States of Minister of Communications; Professor Borodin, who was a professor in the Agricultural College at Petrograd, is interested in studying agricultural problems;

Colonel Oranovski of the artillery is vice president of the munitions committee in New York and is interested in munitions and supplies; Mr. Novitski, chief of the Credit Bureau of the Ministry of Finance, will take up financial matters; Mr. Sookine of the Foreign Office is diplomatic secretary of the mission.

The ladies of the party will leave the train at Harrisburg and go direct to New York, are not coming to Washington. The following members of the mission will remain in Washington: the delegates from the Foreign Office; the delegates from the War Office; the delegates from the Ministry of Finance; the representatives of the press and special attaché. The following will go to Washington for the official reception, remain a few days and then go to New York where they will be located: Professor Lomonosov, Borodin, Colonel Oranovski. The other members of the party will travel direct to New York with the ladies of the party.

Recommendations for house in Washington following: Ambassador, General Roop, Lomonosov, Borodin, Oranovski, Novitski, Sookine, Karpovich, private secretary to Ambassador, Dubasov, aides-de-camp, Captains Shutt, Martinov.

Rank of chief members of party after Ambassador: General Roop, Lomonosov, Borodin, Oranovski, Novitski, Sookine, Dubasov, Shutt.

The mission desires that General Khrabrov, president of the Committee of Munitions and Supplies in New York, join the mission in Washington.

Following changes original list: Nos. 5, 19 and 32 did not arrive. No. 18 should read Sergievski. No. 28 should read Mrs. Oranovski with son. Following additions to list: Mrs. Lipits, wife of a Russian officer now in this country; also two sailors and one valet.

The Ambassador requests especially that his thanks be conveyed for the manner of his reception in this country.¹

CAFFERY

¹ The mission reached Washington on June 19 and on July 5 was converted into an ordinary Embassy through the presentation by Mr. Bakhmeteff of letters of credence as permanent Ambassador. Papers relating to the ceremonial aspects of the reception of the mission are not printed.

Chapter IV. The Provisional Government: Premiership of Kerensky

Contents

**The ministerial crisis of July, 1917—Resignation of the Cadet¹
Ministers—The Bolshevik demonstration—Breakdown of the offensive
—Formation of the Kerensky ministry—The National Conference at
Moscow—The fall of Riga**

¹ Constitutional Democratic Party (Konstitutsionno Demokraticeskaya Partiya).

[117] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 16, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received July 18, 9.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/421

[118] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 17, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received July 23, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/427

[119] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 18, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received July 23, 3.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/426

[120] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 19, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received July 23, 2.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/425

[121] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 19, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received July 23, 4.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/429

[122] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 19, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received July 23, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/428

[123] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 20, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received 11.22 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/424

[124] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 20, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received July 24, 9 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/430

[125] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 23, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received July 25, 4.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/432

[126] The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 24, 1917. [Received August 28.]

File No. 861.00/477

[127] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 24, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received July 26, 7.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/433

[128] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 27, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received July 30, 5.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/440

[129] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, July 30, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received August 1, 4 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/452

[130] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 1, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received August 3, 1 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/456

[131] The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Acting Secretary of State

Washington, August 3, 1917. [Received August 6.]

File No. 763.72/6203

[132] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 3, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received August 7, 7.45 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/460

[133] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, undated. [Received August 7, 1917, 7.45 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/459

[134] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 5, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received August 6, 11.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/461

[135] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 6, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received August 7, 10.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/462

[136] The Secretary Attached to the Russian Embassy (Sookine) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)

Washington, August 9, 1917.

File No. 861.00/469

[137] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 22, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received August 25, 5 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/475

[138] The President of the United States to the President of the Russian National Council Assembly

Washington, August 24, 1917.

File No. 861.00/474

[139] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 25, 1917—6 p.m. [Received August 28, 2.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/476

[140] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 26, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received August 29, 2 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/479

[141] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 27, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received August 30, 7.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/481

[142] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, August 30, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received September 1, 7.20 a.m.]

File No. 861.13/1

[143] The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/488

[144] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 5, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received September 8, 7.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.51/202

[145] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 6, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received September 8, 10.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/492

[146] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 8, 1917. [Received October 22.]

File No. 861.00/594

[147] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 8, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received September 11, 5.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/495

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 16, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received July 18, 9.05 a.m.]

1519. Reported that four Cadet Ministers resigned, Minister of Finance, Minister of Ways of Communication, Minister of Education and the Minister of Public Welfare. Asked audience with the Minister for Foreign Affairs but office replied he was sick at home thereupon telephoned residence and the reply was Minister too ill to see me but would to-morrow morning. Cause attributed is that Minister of War, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Posts and Telegraphs who returned yesterday from Ukraine had granted that province concessions with which Cadet Party unable to agree. Understood Minister of Ways of Communication after resigning from the Ministry will leave Cadet Party and be reappointed to Ministry. Council of Ministers will meet this evening to consider situation. Real difficulty appears to be that Cadet Ministers wish relief from responsibility of situation which becoming critical on account of food scarcity and workmen's refusal to work.

Later. Afternoon papers report Ministry had all-night session which Kerensky came from front to attend, returning to front 8 this morning after saying, "Cadet Ministers stabbed Russia in the back while fighting enemy at our gates." Cadets dominated by Milyukov.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 17, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received July 23, 5.05 a.m.]

1521. Last evening began demonstration by workmen and soldiers under inspiration of Bolsheviks against Provisional Government ostensible grievance being Kerensky's order for demobilization two regiments at front because refuse to obey orders. Crowds of armed and unarmed persons marched through streets finally assembling at Duma where were addressed by Cheidze, counseling moderation and advising disbandment, but such advice received coldly, whereupon Trotsky, the exiled Russian taken from *Christianiafford* and detained at Halifax in April, aroused great enthusiasm by advocating violent measures. Motors of Ministers commandeered and efforts made to arrest Lvov and Kerensky but latter had departed for front. Four Cadet Ministers resigned. Remaining Ministers offered to transfer Government to Soldiers-Workmen who declined expressing preference for coalition government. Lvov then outlined policy on which demanded concurrence and furthermore required resignation of Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, whom he terms suspicious character trying to get connection [appointed?] Minister for Foreign Affairs. Large crowd assembling at Duma composed of workmen and disloyal soldiers; rumors of Cossacks' being summoned; some firing last night and reported casualties but nothing definite is known; none yet today. More later.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 18, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received July 23, 3.50 a.m.]

1528. Just had conference with Minister for Foreign Affairs whom trying to see since Monday morning. He states Government now in control of city through loyal troops. Drove through assemblage of about five hundred going to and returning from Foreign Office. Says army corps starting from front this evening for Petrograd. City under control of insurgent soldiers and workmen since evening of the 16th until this morning. And [street?] fights last evening but fatalities few, casualties unknown. One engagement near Embassy resulted in defeat and complete rout of about one hundred Cossacks who attacked insurgents armed with machine guns, twenty or thirty horses killed but few men. Cossacks loyal and this experience prompts them to aggressive action. Proclamation of Provisional Government promulgated yesterday prohibiting assemblages on the streets totally ignored.

Minister of Foreign Affairs says four ministerial vacancies will not be filled until order entirely restored. Executive Committee of All-Russian Council of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants [’ Deputies] also issued proclamation condemning street assemblages and appeal to soldiers to remain in barracks unless ordered out by proper authority. [Think] that the committee’s support of Government seems essential to its continuance and think outcome will be arrangement between remainder of Ministry and such committee.

In conference with Minister for Foreign Affairs told him would recommend no further assistance until stable government formed which would prosecute war and that if Government fails to suppress this lawlessness with determination and with force, if necessary, it will forfeit the respect of the Russian people as well as Allies. He agreed thereto and says that Government will surely assert itself.

An Embassy secretary at noon to-day saw five [anarchists] distributing their literature about three blocks [from] French Embassy arrested by soldiers; literature destroyed and anarchists severely beaten which good indication.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 19, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[*Received July 23, 2.50 a.m.*]

1531. Quiet prevailed throughout yesterday and last night. Loyal troops arrived from front, number unknown. Are now surrounding palace on other side Neva which been headquarters Bolsheviks and which near Peter Paul prison where Sturmer, Protopopov and others confined.¹ Reported that prison garrison will aid Bolsheviks if resistance offered but uncertain.

FRANCIS

¹ See *ante*, p. 3 [Pg. 3 includes portions of [Doc. 3](#), [Doc. 4](#), and [Doc. 5](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 19, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[*Received July 23, 4.30 p.m.*]

1532. Comptroller, an Octobrist, and Minister of Justice, socialist, resigned leaving only eight in the Ministry, of which five are socialists; namely, Ministers War, Agriculture, Labor, Post [and] Telegraph and Foodstuffs. Three others are Procurator Holy Synod, independent conservative; Minister of Foreign Affairs, who says is radical, and that means between Cadets and socialists, but no regular party organization; and Prince Lvov, affiliated with Cadets but not in accord with Milyukov, Cadet leader, was chosen President of Ministry because he was the president of Zemstvo Union and of high character. Following departments without head: Finance, Justice, Ways of Communication, Trade and Industry, Education, Public Welfare, Comptrollership. Have asked conference with President of Ministry but was informed he is inaccessible to-day, will receive me 2 to-morrow afternoon.

Socialist Minister of Justice resigned because divulged evidence showing Bolsheviks receiving German money which soldiers wished kept secret. No reason assigned for Comptroller.

All-Russian Congress of Workmen, Peasants, Soldiers[' Deputies], which adjourned recently and left committee in charge, called to meet Petrograd July 28. This organization appears stronger than Government. Bolsheviks [comprise?] workmen and soldiers but only twilight zone between them and anarchists whom all parties condemn. Cheidze is president of Petrograd Council, also president of All-Russian Congress of Councils of Workmen, Peasants and Soldiers[' Deputies].

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 19, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received July 23, 5.05 a.m.*]

1534. Continuing my No. 1531. Bolsheviks surrendered palace which were occupying, after slight resistance, many Bolsheviks taking refuge in Saints Peter and Paul Fortress which troops from front surrounded. As troops advanced white flag raised, fortress surrendered, conditions, if any, unknown, peaceably. Disorder beginning evening 16th continuing thirty-six hours was complete surprise to the Government which offered no resistance, made no effort preserve order. Planned and executed by Bolsheviks as "peaceful demonstration of power" which they claim was successful. One report gives killed 470, of which 70 Cossacks, but think both overestimated as collisions only six, of short duration. Quiet now prevails. Ministerial vacancies unfilled. Probably awaiting convention of Russian Councils of Workmen and Soldiers called for 28th.

Executive Committee of Russian Councils of Workmen and Soldiers and of Council of Peasants ['Deputies] strongly condemn outbreak.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 20, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[Received 11.22 p.m.]

1536. Kerensky returned from front last evening much angered by Bolshevik outbreak, having tendered his resignation on learning thereof; resignation not accepted; if should be, would be fatal to Provisional Government. Trust will not be insisted on. Understand he demands that workmen be disarmed which is essential to maintenance Provisional Government. Reported that workmen seized factory, have been manufacturing arms for themselves. Many workmen in citizens' clothes carrying arms were in Bolshevik manifestation and are in all street parades.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 20, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received July 24, 9 a.m.]

1538. Most satisfactory interview with Prince Lvov who says retiring because program adopted means socialistic government although claimed not. Main objection to agrarian feature which he says impracticable, says retired suggesting Kerensky as successor because program adopted can be executed only by Kerensky who accepts Presidency. Nekrasov, former Minister of Ways of Communication, becomes Minister of Justice; Demidov, Minister of Public Welfare.¹ Other vacancies unfilled but Lvov says no more socialists will be named than Sufficient to preserve proportion adopted when coalition Ministry formed, which six socialists, nine non-socialists. Lvov much pleased, saying while new Ministry was short-lived the elimination of Bolshevik faction eradicated German influence and insures success to revolution. Lvov says leading Bolsheviks including Lenin arrested, publication of *Pravda* stopped and all regiments taking part in demonstration of July 17 being disbanded by regulars from front who are here in sufficient numbers and with proper spirit to execute orders of the Ministry. He said that regiments being disbanded number 70,000 members but no resistance to disbanding and disarming order being offered. Lvov is a patriot and I complimented him sincerely on four months of service. He accepted office reluctantly, relinquishes resignedly, saying ready to obey his country's call if made again.

Went from Lvov to Minister of Foreign Affairs whom I found in conference with several colleagues whom he left to receive me. He asked me about conditions in Petrograd and I replied that I had called to learn same from him to report to my Government. He remarked situation quite satisfactory and when I asked, in every respect, he told me Kerensky would take charge of situation and reluctantly informed me that Lvov would probably resign this evening when Kerensky be made President and Nekrasov, Vice President. Never told him had seen Lvov. These changes in Ministry absolutely secret and probably will not be given out until tomorrow noon. Lvov said Germans broken through Russian line at southwest front but Government had broken through German line in Petrograd which would greatly enthuse army, meaning German intrigue obliterated. Told him food situation great menace, he replied would improve as Bolsheviks had

intentionally made food scarce. Another crisis past and atmosphere clearer.

FRANCIS

¹ In the ministry as published in *Izvestia* Aug. 7 Nekrasov became Minister of Finance, see also *post*, p. 178 [*Pg. 178 includes portions of [Doc. 139](#) and [Doc. 140](#)*], and Demidov did not receive an appointment.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 23, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received July 25, 4.30 p.m.*]

1545. Extreme quiet still prevails here. Minister of Foreign Affairs states Workmen-Soldiers fully recognize Provisional Government ascending [ascendancy] and capital punishment restored in army for desertion, disobedience. Reported Russian losses 50,000 prisoners, many large cannon, because soldiers refused to fight through Bolshevik influence. Such impression greatly weakens Workmen-Soldiers' influence.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Petrograd (Winship) to the Secretary of State

No. 349

PETROGRAD, *July 24, 1917.*
[Received August 28.]

SIR: I have the honor to report, following despatch No. 342 dated July 10, 1917,¹ that the resignation of the four Ministers belonging to the Cadet Party, Constitutional Democratic Party or Party of the People's Freedom, was not the cause of the recent mutinous uprising of the more violent elements in the Maximalist wing of the Social Democratic Party (Bolsheviks). This uprising was originally planned to occur on the 10th/23d of June, and after the failure of the plan then it was not dropped but merely postponed. As a first step it was planned to gain control of the Workmen's Section of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies in which the Maximalists already had one third of the votes. Under the excuse of organizing a "fight against the counter-revolution" a special meeting of the Workmen's Section was called for Saturday, July 14, and all Maximalist deputies were ordered to be present under penalty of at once having their places filled by others. This meeting was postponed until Monday night and by keeping the meeting posted as each body of troops issued into the street under arms and exaggerating their numbers the Maximalists strove to carry their resolution demanding that the All-Russian Convention of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and the Convention of Peasants' Deputies take all government authority into their own hands, and choosing a committee of twenty-five to act in the name of the Workmen's Section in contact with the Executive Committees of the two All-Russian Conventions. The Socialist Revolutionists and the Social Democratic Minimalists had left the meeting in a body and after their departure the resolution was carried.

This was the parliamentary political maneuver, based on the street meeting of the Maximalist soldiers. Both were intended to force the hands of the Soldiers' Section of the Petrograd Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies.

It was a fortunate coincidence for the Maximalists that the Cadet Ministers unconsciously played into the hands of the Leninites by their resignation, which became known only late Monday afternoon as there are no newspapers either Sunday afternoon or Monday morning. This gave the Maximalist conspirators a clear twenty-four hours in which to work, unhindered by publicity and without being forced to take published facts into account. The Monday afternoon papers containing the news of the Cadets' resignation did not appear until 5 o'clock, while trucks filled with armed civilians and soldiers with rifles and machine guns were on the streets before 6 o'clock. The banners carried bore old legends, "Down with

the ten capitalist Ministers!” “All power to the Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies!” together with new legends, “Down with Kerensky!” “Immediate peace!” and “War against war!” Not until late that night did the Maximalist leaders call for the overthrow of the six (ten minus four) capitalist Ministers. Whereas the “fight against the counter-revolution” was the excuse for the meeting of the Workmen’s Section, the Maximalist troops were aroused by the protest of the Guard Grenadier Regiment’s reserve battalion here against the disbandment of the regiment itself at the front, for its open opposition to Minister Kerensky and the advance now under way on the southern front. By 8 o’clock the streets were being traversed by armed trucks, and armed soldiers and workmen of the Maximalist Red Guard were walking through the city in groups and singly. During this night there was bloodshed. During Tuesday large bodies of troops and sailors from Kronstadt and near-by garrison towns arrived in Petrograd, and bloodshed was frequent. Not until Tuesday night did the authorities undertake to disarm the automobiles and armed parties or to suppress the robbing and wrecking of stores on the Nevski. By Wednesday morning, however, the armed automobiles had all been captured. By Thursday the last nests of the mutineers were taken, namely the Peter and Paul Fortress and the near-by palace belonging to the *ballerina* Kshesinskaya, which was the headquarters of the “Organization for Propaganda among the Soldiers” of the Maximalists.

The first and most significant point regarding the events of Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday is that since the revolution the Temporary Government has not had the police power in its own capital as has been several times pointed out in these despatches.

The second is that the Temporary Government did not know what armed support among the troops quartered in the city it could rely on.

Thirdly, the organization actually wielding the police power, namely the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, was paralyzed at first both because it itself did not know what actual armed support among the troops it could rely on and because of its doctrinaire policy of moral suasion. The position of the Minister of Justice on this question, to be mentioned later, is profoundly significant.

The Maximalist meeting was essentially an uprising against the majority in the All-Russian Convention of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, and against its policy of using active, aggressive, military force against Germany. And on Tuesday a crowd of mutineers attempted to wreck the counter-reconnaissance (anti-spy, military secret service) bureau of the General Staff. “Down with Kerensky!” and “Immediate peace!” were the chief motives actuating the soldier mutineers from the disaffected regiments of Petrograd and the Kronstadters. Firing was early opened on the staff buildings opposite the Winter Palace. The Maximalist street orators agitated openly in favor of extreme internationalism, declaring that workmen have no home country and that the advance was a crime against the

German “comrades.”

This mutiny might have occurred at any time since the advance began and if it results in teaching the thousands of the rank and file of the moderate socialists whose representatives form the majority in the All-Russian Convention that Lenin and the Maximalists are pursuing a line of action welcome to and partially organized and financially supported by Germany, it will have been wholly beneficial. Heretofore the moderate socialists, while of late more and more disagreeing with the Maximalists, have nevertheless admitted them to all their deliberations and have defended them against the accusations of being pro-German hurled at them by the middle-class and patriotic socialist press.

The seizure of the Kshesinskaya Palace; the seizure of the editorial rooms of the newspaper *Truth*; the arrests of the Maximalists, Badaev, Simensohn, Kozlovski, who has been a prominent member of the commission to call the Constitutional Convention; the arrests of the Maximalist leaders, Trotsky and Kamenev; the order to arrest Lenin and Zinoviev and the seizure of documents in Lenin's apartments; the transfer of seized documents to the counter-reconnaissance bureau, and the formation of a socialist investigation committee to probe the charges of being a German agent now openly made against Lenin; and the Government's decision to inflict punishment up to three years penitentiary on all persons publicly inciting to violence or refusing to obey the legal commands of the authorities and to bring insubordinate troops to trial for treachery are very favorable signs. On the other hand the summons addressed to the populace by the Executive Committees of the All-Russian Conventions not to repeat the statement that Lenin *et al.* are German agents until the Socialist Party committee has ended its investigation; the fact that the investigation was intended to be a narrow party affair rather than a matter for the prosecuting attorney; and before the arrest orders were issued the actual release of the immense majority of the mutineers, all point to an insufficient realization on the part of the Socialist Party leaders outside the Ministry that such half measures in this wholesale mutiny as were taken in the previous cases of several mutinies, will only lead to repetitions.

The events of the 16th, 17th and 18th of July are the third time the Maximalists have attempted to overthrow the Temporary Government. The first was on the 4th and 5th of May when the Temporary Government was supported by the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. The second was the fiasco armed parade planned for the 23d of June, when the Temporary Government contained representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Each time the mutiny against the *bourgeoisie* and the moderate socialist majority has been stronger and stronger until this time the Executive Committees were for a time imprisoned in the Duma buildings by the mutinous mob and the Minister of Agriculture, the socialist Chernov, was actually captured and roughly handled.

That Kerensky, now Prime Minister in the cabinet that is socialist in all but name, has officially branded the Maximalists as German agents, in orders to the army

and the fleet, is an entirely hopeful sign. Even more encouraging is his decision to bring to justice all members of the Maximalist ship crews who were active in the recent mutiny as well as the Kronstadt leaders.

RESULTS OF THE MUTINY

The immediate result of the mutiny has been to bring about two of those things for which it was planned.

One of these was the transfer of “all power to the Councils of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies.” This transfer is due to the mutiny in the sense that the mutiny in Petrograd, and its results at the front, such as the insubordination of the 607th Mlynovski Regiment and others, make an almost dictatorial government necessary. Such dictatorial power can only be wielded by a socialist government. As has been indicated many times in these despatches, at no time since the revolution has the Temporary Government, as such, ever been wholly in power, and it could never be in power, and exercise police military power, as such, as long as it contained *bourgeois* elements.

The reconstruction of a government without *bourgeois* elements, or only with such elements as have entirely surrendered to the socialist trend (such as Tereshchenko), is dictated by the necessity for a powerful government. The *bourgeois* Minister of Ways of Communication, Mr. Nekrasov, although extremely radical, was forced to introduce the “recall” principle for railroad officials, since he could not wield strong authority. But the socialist Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Mr. Tseretelli, by virtue of being a socialist chosen by the Ail-Russian Convention of Workmen’s and Soldiers’ Deputies, was able to absolutely forbid any introduction of the “elective” or “recall” system in regard to post-office and telegraph management. Similarly only a socialist government can exercise repressive power without precipitating civil war.

In this sense the mutiny has been entirely beneficial in that it would seem that henceforth there will be a strong government, not afraid to use force.

The introduction into Petrograd of healthy elements from the army at the front is a result the ringleaders of the mutiny did not plan. The preponderance of a democratic military spirit in Petrograd, to control and overrule the doctrinaire socialist-pacifist fanatics in the committees of the various socialist councils and conventions will probably introduce an element of stability that has heretofore been lacking.

Although the bodies of Cossacks and other troops from the front were fired on several times on the 20th, and the affrays took on serious proportions, their presence is welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the population, and will exercise an immensely steadying influence.

The second result of the mutiny, and a result that was undoubtedly planned and desired by its instigators, has been to create disorder, doubt and dissension in the rear of the army, and to hinder the progress of the “Loan of Liberty.” The 16th,

17th and 18th had been set for an energetic advertising campaign for the loan and the booths erected throughout the city are still standing vacant and unfinished. The mutiny has successfully undone much of the internal economic and financial rehabilitation that has been under way since the All-Russian Convention closed.

A further evil result of the mutiny lies in the excuse it gave the Social Democratic majority in the Finnish Seim to pass its law declaring Finland's independence of Russia in all respects except as to foreign affairs and the military necessities of the war.

The Minister of Justice has resigned, but it is impossible to ascertain from the contradictory statements made by him and by the other Ministers why Mr. Perevertsev claims he is resigning because he was not allowed to use the force he wished to use against the Maximalists who deliberately flouted the court decrees evicting them from the Kshesinskaya Palace, and the anarchists who seized the Villa Durnovo and who made the raid on the printing office of the *Russian Will*. The other Ministers state his resignation is due to his lack of initiative in conducting the eviction and in repressing the anarchists. These conflicting declarations show the internal chaos that has lately prevailed among the members of the Ministry.

Part of the controversy turns on Mr. Perevertsev's publication of part of the documents incriminating the Maximalists of acting for the German General Staff.

Mr. Perevertsev claims he informed the soldiers who were "strangely neutral" during the mutiny, in order to arouse them to save the Temporary Government from overthrow. At the moment the socialist Ministers were imprisoned at the Duma Palace by mutineers and Messrs. Tereshchenko and Nekrasov were absent, so that he felt he must get the hesitating soldiers to act against the mutineers immediately.

It is undoubtedly true that much of the garrison was "neutral" until the exposure, but it is also true, as Messrs. Tereshchenko and Nekrasov state, that after the *exposé* of secret documents, the incriminated persons should have been immediately arrested.

I have [etc.]

NORTH WINSHIP

¹ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 24, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received July 26, 7.30 a.m.]

1551. Minister of Foreign Affairs just left Embassy, says news from southwest front still bad but arresting Bolsheviks when found and rigorously enforcing death penalty in the army. Says Provisional Government just decided to permit no one to enter Russia for three weeks unless bearing diplomatic passport, and planning an all-Russian meeting at Moscow Sunday 29th when Kerensky will appeal to patriotism of Russian people. Proposes taking to Moscow entire Duma and Russian Council Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants convening Petrograd 28th. Quiet here.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 27, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received July 30, 5.30 a.m.]


1564. Kerensky empowered to appoint new Ministry, having received resignations of all present Ministers with the possible exception of Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, who least acceptable. This after several days' effort by Ministers to fill vacancies. Several present Ministers probably reappointed including Tereshchenko and Tseretelli. This action taken last evening not yet public.

By appointment made yesterday, had forty minutes conference to-day with Kerensky who occupying Winter Palace and physical appearance much improved since sojourn at front. Says conference mentioned your 1580 [1574], July 18 [16], 9 p.m.,¹ never contemplated in Petrograd but meeting of socialist leaders of Allied countries be held London August 10 to arrange international socialist conference. All conferences especially socialistic should be discouraged, certainly in Russia.

Funeral services of Cossacks killed in outbreak July 17 be held at St. Isaac's to-morrow. Bolsheviks arranged similar ceremonies for their victims but same prohibited.

Kerensky says Bolsheviks being prosecuted severely here and same cleaning-out process begun at front. Many expressing desire that Kerensky assume dictatorship but think that improbable.

FRANCIS

 ¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *July 30, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received August 1, 4 p.m.]

1570. Kerensky went to front Saturday, returns this evening when expected to announce new Ministry, composition of which unknown, possibly undetermined, but subject of much conjecture. Will number 15, 6 socialists, 9 non-socialists, but Cadets, whom Kerensky consulted, consented to participate in coalition Ministry provided Ministry is non-partisan and will enact no new legislation before Constituent Assembly convenes and provided furthermore Ministry excludes Chernov who is president of Social Revolutionist publications, writer and talker, returned exile after many years' sojourn in Paris. Rumored also that socialists interdicted selection of Milyukov and Shingarev. Tell McAdoo shall advise about advances immediately upon Ministry organization. Quiet political effect here. Workmen, soldiers, also peasants understood willing to accept Kerensky's ministry on the above conditions but no formal action taken by them. Under previous Ministry Kerensky, Skobelev, Tseretelli, Chernov, Peshekhonov, socialist Ministers, reported semiweekly to Council of Workmen-Soldiers which was thereby given semi-official recognition. Tereshchenko accompanied Kerensky to front consequently likely to be reappointed.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 1, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received August 3, 1 p.m.]

1584. Conferred with Tereshchenko, Foreign Office, 10 o'clock, and Kerensky, Winter Palace, 12 o'clock. Both interviews encouraging. Former stated Kerensky had decided to put railroads under military control and adopt recommendations American Railway Commission; Kornilov supplanted Brusilov as commander in chief because firmer, having already shot one hundred and forty odd men, including one general, for disobedience; new Ministry will be selected to-day, announced to-morrow; Chernov remains temporarily and Cadets accepting three or four portfolios.

Kerensky says psychology of situation improving. Russia resolved on prosecuting war vigorously. Morale of the army better under Kornilov's command, calling him the man of confidence, appears physically fit. Replying to my statement that you desired full information about developments, he said America less interested in defeat of Germany than Russia because further removed consequently less subject to danger. Says Germans probably capture Jassy, possibly Riga but not Petrograd. Talked quite frankly and said would see me whenever desired. When I remarked that there were some in America who doubted Russian determination to prosecute war, made impatient but pleasant gesture and expression indicating no room under the circumstances for such doubt and said under all circumstances America should extend financial and material aid even with closed eyes.

Court martial [possible omission] both Ministers with menace of food scarcity, food conditions growing daily worse and absolute necessity prompt remedy. Provisional Government issues to-day address to all "at this time when new and great calamities have fallen to the lot of Russia we consider it necessary to clearly and definitely expose our views." Referring to difficulties encountered within and without and saying it enters upon fourth year of war undaunted thereby it calls upon citizens of Russia to be steadfast saying: "We know that on the outcome of this struggle depend our liberty and the liberty of humanity." States temporary retreat of the army will not prevent another advance after reorganization and renovation. States, "No difficulties will cause Russia to give up her steadfast determination to carry on the war until the complete triumph of the ideals proclaimed by the Russian revolution."

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Acting Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *August 3, 1917.*
[*Received August 6.*]

MR. ACTING SECRETARY OF STATE: I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia to the Government of the United States:

At a moment when new and grave misfortunes are striking Russia we consider it our duty to give to our allies, who have shared with us the burden of trials in the past, a firm and decisive expression of our point of view regarding the pursuance of the war. The greatness of the task of the Russian revolution has determined the amplitude of the commotion which it caused in the life of the state. Reorganization in the face of the enemy of our entire governmental system could not be effected without serious perturbations. Nevertheless, Russia, convinced that there were no other means of salvation, has pursued in accord with the Allies a common action on the front.

Fully conscious of the difficulties of the task, Russia has assumed the burden of conducting active military operations during reconstruction of the army and of the Government. The offensive of our army, which was necessitated by the strategical situation, encountered insurmountable obstacles both on the front and in the interior of the country. The criminal propaganda of irresponsible elements was used by enemy agents and provoked mutiny in Petrograd. At the same time part of the troops on the front, seduced by the same propaganda, forgot their duty to the country and facilitated the enemy's penetration of our front.

The Russian people, stirred by these events, has manifested its unshakable will through the Government created by the revolution. The revolt was crushed, its originators brought to justice. All necessary steps have been taken at the front for restoring the combative strength of the army.

The Government intends to bring to a successful end the task of consolidating a power capable to resist against all dangers and to guide the country in the path of the revolutionary regeneration. Russia will not suffer

herself to be deterred by any difficulty in carrying out the irrevocable decision to pursue the war to the final triumph of the principles proclaimed by the Russian revolution.

In the presence of the threat of the enemy the country and the army will continue with renewed courage the great labor of restoration and, on the threshold of the fourth year of the war, of preparation for the coming campaign.

We firmly believe that the Russian citizens will combine all efforts to fulfil the sacred task of defending their beloved country and that the enthusiasm which lighted in their hearts the flame of faith in the triumph of liberty will direct the whole invincible force of the revolution against the enemy who threatens the country.

We know that our liberty as well as all mankind's is dependent on the issues of that struggle.

The new trials which crime and treason have imposed on us can only reenforce, still more, the consciousness that the Russian people has of the necessity of consecrating, in a supreme effort, all forces and the whole of its resources for the salvation of the country. Strengthened by this consciousness, we are convinced that the retreat of our armies will be only temporary and that it will not prevent them, after being reconstructed and regenerated, to renew, when the hour will strike, their march forward in the name of the defense of the country and liberty, and that they will victoriously complete the great work for which they were compelled to take up arms.

Accept [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
C. ONOU

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 3, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received August 7, 7.45 a.m.]

1597. General Gurko commanding western front before revolution and two months thereafter arrested Petrograd to-day where ordered by Government from Caucasus. Letter found dated March 19 written by Gurko to Emperor expressing fealty after abdication and after Gurko sworn to support Provisional Government.

Efforts to fill Ministry vacancies with representative Cadets fruitless. Kerensky resigned last evening whereupon four other Ministers including Tereshchenko resigned but all resignations subsequently withdrawn. Just left Minister of Foreign Affairs who says Kerensky again resigned 5 o'clock because cannot form Ministry unless given unquestioned authority therefor. Council meets 9 o'clock to consider resignation. Kerensky coming midnight to ascertain result. He says socialists and non-socialists claim his services essential to Government but if absolute power not given him must withdraw and permit them to settle differences. Socialistic Ministers including Kerensky have been reporting semiweekly to Council Workmen-Soldiers which is embarrassing and objectionable to Kerensky, arrived where must decide whether quit Ministry or break with his Social Revolutionary Party. Above program indicates has elected latter course. It has public sentiment and army will sustain him therein. Many exaggerated reports concerning number shot at front for disobedience. Kornilov growing in public estimation and considered by many stronger than Kerensky.

Tereshchenko says will advocate Ministry of five members including commander in chief of the army and another general, leaving department business for chiefs without voice in determining policies. More later.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *undated*.

[*Received August 7, 1917, 7.45 a.m.*]

1600. Continuing my No. 1597. Kerensky's resignation presented to the President counselors last evening as contemplated who without formally acting thereon called a conference at Winter Palace where Duma and Ministry and Cadets and Workmen-Soldiers all represented by their leaders. Numerous speeches showed serious emergency prevailing. Erdelli, prominent general at front, killed by his own men.¹ Milyukov advocated giving Kerensky authority to select Ministry. Continued speaking until 7 this morning when adjourned after giving Kerensky, who did not attend, full power to form Ministry, which he now attempting. Kerensky was given like authority last week but he and other socialist Ministers were then compelled to report to Council Workmen-Soldiers, and if that still obtains this authority will avail nothing.

FRANCIS

¹ See next document.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 5, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received August 6, 11.05 p.m.*]

1603. Kerensky returned 7 last evening and now engaged in selecting new Ministry in which all parties be represented. He has not decided to have absolute break with his party but reassured necessity therefor and will take first step in refusing to submit to its dictation in selecting Ministry. Cadets agreed to representation in the Ministry after Milyukov conferred with Kerensky last evening. Such Ministry will be stronger than its predecessor which is step forward but no Ministry can be formed that will be impervious to attack if bread riots occur and such are likely if food scarcity not relieved. The very fact that able men are now criticizing openly Council of Workmen-Soldiers indicates improved public sentiment as few if any have had such courage heretofore.

Guchkov returned from front and advises will call on me tomorrow. Understand his reports concerning conditions in army rather discouraging. Erdelli not killed but wounded.

Quiet here.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, August 6, 1917, 7 p.m.
[Received August 7, 10.20 p.m.]

1605. Understand Ministers selected not yet announced. Kerensky, President and Minister of War; Tereshchenko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Chernov likely to remain Minister of Agriculture. Kerensky apparently breaks with Workmen-Soldiers, who will be led by Tseretelli who quits Ministry. Yurenev, Minister of Ways of Communication, whom Stevens likewise thinks good appointment.

Above from Minister of Foreign Affairs who says war committee of five members assisted by Commander in Chief Kornilov were about to be named and especially charged with conduct of war. Five are Kerensky, Nekrasov, Tereshchenko, Savinkov, Assistant Minister of War, and Avksentiev, Minister of the Interior, also president of Peasant Congress. Savinkov considered iron man who will mercilessly suppress Bolshevik outbreaks if they occur.

FRANCIS

The Secretary Attached to the Russian Embassy (Sookine) to the Counselor for the Department of State (Polk)

WASHINGTON, August 9, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. POLK: I have the honor to send you herewith for the information of the Department of State a copy of a telegram which has been received from Petrograd concerning the internal situation in Russia.

Believe me [etc.]

SOOKINE

[Enclosure—Telegram]

The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the Ambassador at Washington

PETROGRAD, August 7, 1917.

The prolonged Cabinet crisis has ended by the formation of the new Cabinet, the names of the members of which have been published. The leading features of this Cabinet are the entrance of representatives of the Constitutional Democrats, the strengthening of the moderate and patriotic Social Revolutionists, such as Savinkov and Avksentiev, and the retirement of Tseretelli as the result of which shall be the independence of the Government from the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. Tseretelli insisted upon this change because by remaining outside of the Cabinet he will doubtless be able to defend the Government's measures before the democratic bodies more energetically.

The debates in the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and the resolutions adopted indicate the council's intention to support the authority.

A number of features of the resolution indicate that the council has at present taken a defensive position and is afraid of possible attacks on the organs of the revolutionary democracy. The future course of the Government can be determined by separate statements of Kerensky and by the composition of the Cabinet. The main question is the reestablishment of the army's fighting power. Very essential in this respect is the entrance into the Government of Savinkov as acting chief of the Ministry of War, owing to his definite stand for most decisive steps for the salvation of the front.

The order of the Government work has been changed.

The formation of a Committee of National Defense is planned, in which the Ministers Nekrasov, Avksentiev and myself as well as Savinkov shall enter, and which body is to decide all questions relating to war.

At the same time general meetings of the Government shall be held less frequently than formerly. Owing to explanations given by General Kornilov concerning his conditions under which he would assume the general command of the armies, a full understanding has been reached between him and the Government, and he has already taken up his functions.

TERESHCHENKO

File No. 861.00/475

[Document 137]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 22, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received August 25, 5 p.m.*]

1651. Postponed Moscow conference begins on August 25, called by Provisional Government. Thinking of attending myself if [expedient]. Prophecies that conference will be severely critical of Provisional Government's failure to give strong administration and may result in military dictatorship in which event Bolsheviks will rebel and blood follow. Conditions at front reported to be improving.

FRANCIS

The President of the United States to the President of the Russian National Council Assembly¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *August 24, 1917.*

I venture to take the liberty to send to the members of the great council now meeting in Moscow the cordial greetings of their friends, the people of the United States, to express their confidence in the ultimate triumph of ideals of democracy and self-government against all enemies within and without, and to give their renewed assurance of every material and moral assistance they can extend to the Government of Russia in the promotion of the common cause in which the two nations are unselfishly united.

WOODROW WILSON

¹ Generally known as the Moscow conference. This telegram was transmitted through the Embassy in Russia.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 25, 1917—6 p.m.*
[*Received August 28, 2.45 p.m.*]

1663. There is universal interest in Moscow conference convening to-day. Decided against attending because feared presence there would be misunderstood as no colleagues going. American Consul Moscow instructed keep me advised of proceedings which promise discord, possibly bitterness. Conference called by Provisional Government, Kerensky presiding. Cadets under Milyukov leadership will criticize Government because disappointing in restoring army discipline and has failed to protect industrial interests being unduly influenced by socialistic sentiment. Kornilov visited Petrograd 23d and Minister for Foreign Affairs says perfect understanding obtains between Kornilov and Kerensky. Savinkov, executive Minister of War under Kerensky, resigned which is generally regretted, as strong character, relentless in enforcing orders. Minister for Foreign Affairs says confidentially Savinkov's resignation result of efforts to create difference between Kornilov and Kerensky. Ministers left for Moscow conference yesterday.

Petrograd press states we have loaned England additional \$50,000,000 making total to Allies \$2,000,000,000, of which Russia's portion, according to my advices, only \$175,000,000, or about 9 per cent. Is that correct? Tell McAdoo am awaiting reply.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 26, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received August 29, 2 p.m.]

1666. First day Moscow conference devoted to speeches of ministers. Kerensky, presiding, delivered impassioned speech advocating prosecution of war stating Provisional Government will report its trusteeship to Constituent Assembly which meets November 28 and will resist with force all previous efforts to supersede it. Nekrasov, Minister of Finance, made notable speech showing deplorable condition Russian finances, admitting governmental expenses since revolution far exceeded those of predecessor and asserted that appeals made to Minister of Finance so enormous that no government could satisfy. Minister of Trade and Industries spoke impressively. Chernov, Minister of Agriculture, attended but speechless thus far. Minister for Foreign Affairs goes Moscow to-night. Nekrasov returning Petrograd. Guchkov, former Minister of War, Shidlovski, leader of progressive bloc Duma and others comment unfavorably on Kerensky's speech. Kornilov arrives Moscow to-night, speaks tomorrow. Cadets and industrial representatives have held preliminary conferences in Moscow. Will later address conference which promises continue several days.

Quiet here but Bolshevik demonstration feared. Attempts thereof in Moscow yesterday failed.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 27, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received August 30, 7.30 a.m.*]

1673. Your 1648 of the 24th received to-day and forwarded Moscow.¹ Think President's salutation opportune, concise, remarkably well expressed.

Nekrasov just left Embassy, says Tereshchenko who is in Moscow telephoned that Kornilov spoke to-day very satisfactorily, well received, and will have good effect throughout country, removing anticipations of difference between Kornilov and Kerensky, claims he, Kerensky and Tereshchenko had known since the 23d that Kornilov loyal to Provisional Government. Says Cadets resolved last night to support Provisional Government and conference will adjourn evening 28th after forty speeches limited ten minutes each. Says furthermore Assistant Minister of War told him confidentially wished Bolsheviki had made outbreak as was thoroughly prepared therefor. Very quiet here.

FRANCIS

¹ Transmitting the President's telegram of Aug. 24, *ante*, p. 177 [*Pg. 177 includes portions of [Doc. 136](#), [Doc. 137](#), and [Doc. 138](#)*].

File No. 861.13/1

[Document 142]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *August 30, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received September 1, 7.20 a.m.*]

1685. Minister for Foreign Affairs who just left Embassy tells me death penalty restored in ranks by Council of Ministers and will be promulgated soon. This shows response to my suggestion that Government should now adopt firmer policy in regard to army discipline and extreme socialism which advocates peace and thereby making more difficult vigorous war prosecution.

FRANCIS

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following telegram was left at the Department of State on September 5, 1917, by the Secretary attached to the Russian Embassy (Sookine):]

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the
Ambassador at Washington*

PETROGRAD, August 19/September 1, 1917.

In convoking representatives of all organizations to the Moscow conference in the hope of finding support of all vital elements of the country, the Provisional Government was conscious of the difficulties it would have to surmount' in creating a general national unity of such heterogeneous forces. The first day of the conference seemed to justify these fears. The declaration of the Government evidenced that it had to take an attitude of compromise manifesting a certain weakness, owing to the necessity of seeking a medium path and was received coldly, especially by the right wing of the conference, which had formed in advance an irreconcilable opposition. This group consisted principally of members of the four Dumas and of representatives of commerce and industry, as well as a part of the army representatives. It was headed by the Constitutional Democrats.

The second day revealed the deepness of divergencies of the different currents; after the speech of General Kornilov the chief question became what measures should be taken for the strengthening of the army's fighting power. On this subject, as well as concerning questions of the general political and economic situation, a real struggle took place between the Constitutional Democrats and the more conservative elements on one hand, and the representatives of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and socialist parties on the other. Noteworthy is the fact that the Cadets led the attack; whereas, the left spoke in a conciliatory tone, realizing its weakness as a result of the utter failure of the policy of the Council of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies. The leader of the left, Tseretelli, deliberately offered to enter an agreement with the opponents. Whereupon, Milyukov gave an uncertain answer, evading any conflict with his old position. Nevertheless, at the end of the second day it became apparent that the most acute-moments had been overcome and that there could be no possibility of a rupture.

The third day, which began by bitter discord in connection with General Alexeev's speech, who was attacked by representatives of the army's

committees, finally led to an even greater unity of views than had been attained on the day before.

The declaration of the commercial and industrial group, which had theretofore acted in unity with the Cadets, turned out to be more conciliatory, as also did the speech of Ryabuzhinski, whose opposition before the conference had been very bitter. On behalf of the commercial and industrial group, Bublikov declared they were willing to come to an agreement with the left and thereupon shook hands with Tseretelli, rousing thereby enthusiastic ovations on the part of the entire audience. This spirit was reenforced by the conciliatory speech of Plekhanov.

In general, one can state that if the conference did not lead to full unity, nevertheless, without doubt, its results are very satisfactory. For the first time has the whole nation spoken and the extreme currents met with the definite wish of the majority to come to an understanding. The general tone and character of the speeches were imbued by the endeavor of creating one general national unity. All the orators spoke of the "Mother Country," and not a single doubt was expressed as to the necessity or possibility of waging war. The principal subject was how best to organize the nation's defense and the differences were not in the aspiration, but only in the means of attainment. Nevertheless, if the results of the conference did prove to be favorable to the Government, such results did not encompass a complete victory. But these negative features are counterbalanced by the great effort to general national unity which originated at the conference. I consider it necessary to absolutely deny the rumor spread by certain sources that there is divergency of views between the Government and the Commanders in Chief. In view of the present exceptionally complex conditions, the Government deems it impossible to effect any changes in the commanding personnel, in consideration of any particular political views whatsoever.

TERESHCHENKO

File No. 861.51/202

[Document 144]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

PETROGRAD, *September 5, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received September 8, 7.30 a.m.*]

1706. ... Internal situation again threatening. Extreme socialists more aggressive demanding removal of generals, claiming threatened counter [-revolution?] justifies same. Had interview with Kerensky yesterday, endeavored to impress upon him necessity for restoring discipline; to-day he promulgates proclamation appealing for support of officers which first word utterances by him in that line.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 6, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received September 8, 10.55 a.m.*]

1713. Nervousness increasing. Rumors of Bolshevik demonstration for Sunday, 9th. If it materializes army less reliable than two weeks ago. Some predictions that Government go Moscow in three weeks but if Bolshevik demonstrations dominate city, departure be sooner. Rumanian Minister returned from headquarters says Kornilov complains that Government regulations concerning restoration of [death penalty] handicap his command of situation while Minister for Foreign Affairs contends Kornilov given full authority under regulations approved by Kornilov. Others assert neither Kornilov nor any one able to command sufficient power to enforce discipline and that German advance, if made, be unsuccessfully resisted if at all. If German fleet captures Revel, as possible or probable, panic will ensue here and perhaps riots.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, *September 8, 1917.*
[Received October 22.]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department in regard to the impression made by the fall of Riga on patriotic and conservative people in Moscow.

Russians as a rule do not give any outward indication of distress in case of national affliction. From the bearing of the crowds on the streets it would be difficult even for the most experienced resident to guess whether military news was favorable or unfavorable. Rarely are there any indications that the people who proceed in the usual way about their affairs or their amusements are giving any thought to matters that go on outside of their immediate circle. The fall of Riga was no exception. At a time when it was uncertain whether the Russian Army would rally at new positions between Riga and Pskov, the subjects of most interest to the people of this city were the difficulties of procuring food supplies, as reflected in lengthening queues, complaints over the curtailment of the bread allowance, and disorderly searches for concealed stores of provisions and other articles of secret traffic.

In this, as in similar cases, the visible reaction almost seems to be in inverse ratio to the weight of the blow. The public mind seems to take refuge in insensibility. In private circles there is of course more expansiveness, but even there one notices the same tendencies as in public, and there is a rapid adjustment to the lower level of the national fortunes. The breach at Tarnopol was accepted, and the loss of Riga has already been accepted, as events that could not be averted and that can not be mended. The "nothing matters" stage was reached, in the attitude of the average man toward the war after the loss of Przemyśl. The Brusilov advance of 1916 revived interest in the war for a brief season. There was no general interest in the effort of the present year.

Thoughtful opinion must be looked for in the conservative newspapers with established subscription lists, such as the *Ruskiya Vedomosti* and the *Russkoe Slovo*, of this city. The former has a limited circulation among the professional, university and Zemstvo circles, in short, it appeals to the more intellectual people of Russia. The *Russkoe Slovo* has the largest circulation of any Russian newspaper, perhaps exceeding that of any other newspaper in the world except one or two published in France. It is representative of patriotic business men and of the broad masses of the educated people, and is usually regarded as the voice of the Russian *bourgeoisie*. It will be sufficient to refer to their columns in the

present instance.

The military expert of the *Ruskiya Vedomosti* pronounces the loss of Riga and the line of the Dvina as the greatest misfortune in a strictly military sense that has befallen Russia during the last two years of the war. Attention is directed to the importance of the Dvina as a barrier on the road to Petrograd, and to the command of the Gulf of Riga that goes with possession of the city of Riga, and the restriction of the sphere of action of the Russian Navy that must inevitably ensue. Colonel Clergé, the military expert of the *Russkoe Slovo*, shares these views, which seem to be convincingly commonplace.

After the breach at Tarnopol there were appeals in the press, and in the several councils that represent radical democratic and socialist sentiment, to abandon sloth and partisanship, to subordinate personal and class interests to the public good, in the face of national peril. This was of course the keynote of the Moscow National Conference. The fall of Riga offers a similar occasion for exhortation, but the national stolidity has lamed even the patriotic pen. Warnings and pleas are now set to a lower key. Despondency has chilled even the most ardent. In the issue of September 4 the *Ruskiya Vedomosti* in an editorial asks when there will be a turn of the road. Referring to the short-lived hopes inspired by the cessation of fraternization across the lines and the beginning of the drive through southwestern Galicia, this newspaper registers the successive steps of social and political disorganization and seems to look for renewed agitation against the Government on the part of the more radical socialists. In conclusion it returns to the elementary truth that no change for the better can be expected until the Government exercises the authority vested in it and ceases to look for approval and sanction from the enemies of order.

More mature reflections are set forth in the leading article of to-day. "As a great power, Russia no longer exists," begins this editorial. "In its place there is a harrassed and enfeebled country threatened by three enemies: the enemy invading its soil, chaos within and hunger." It is then asked whether the country would not be wiser to admit its inability now to keep its contract with its allies, instead of waiting for further calamities. The necessity of reducing the army to smaller dimensions is resolutely asserted. The editorial thus continues:

But with a reorganized army we must resist the conqueror; our Government must be a Government of national defense; it can make peace only in agreement with our allies. Suppose that this way lie further, grave defeats; suppose that we shall have to remove the capital. Did not the French Government remove to Bordeaux in the autumn of 1914? And would not a separate peace bring us more suffering, more shame, more humiliation, greater losses than these military defeats? When the war ended we should be not merely powerless, we should be despised and isolated. Possibly we should not even be invited to the Peace Congress. And if invited, who would pay attention to what we said? Russia might be

changed again into Muscovy, and burdened with foreign debt and ruinous commercial treaties. ...

The *Russkoe Slovo* and the other Moscow newspapers circulating among the middle classes content themselves for the present with stressing the demands of the National Conference for a strong government of national safety and the cooperation of all classes with it in the work of national defense.

The attitude of the radical elements seems to be most accurately shadowed forth in the assertions of army committees, in contradiction to General Kornilov and Assistant Minister of War Savinkov, that the army on the Dvina did its entire duty and only yielded to overwhelming pressure; in the exclusion of *bourgeoisie* newspapers from sale at the front; and in orders to prohibit the newspapers from discussing the war or printing private correspondence or information about it which does not coincide entirely with official news and comment. Whether there is concealed beneath this attempt to suppress information as to the real state of the army a desire to restore it to health and vigor while it was screened from observation, may be doubted; in any case the near future should tell.

The alleged counter-revolutionary conspiracy has been treated by the conservative Moscow press with contemptuous indifference. The brief notices about it let the reader understand that this affair is regarded as a counterweight to the reintroduction of capital punishment.

Meantime the economic situation is growing steadily worse. Murmurs and minor riots on account of lack of bread are noted all over the country. One of the most disquieting symptoms is the disposition of local food-supply committees to follow the example of the food-supply agents of the old régime in looking after local interests to the neglect of national. A result of this is a tendency to minimize the really excellent harvest in order that the demands made by the consuming provinces on the producing provinces may be lessened. Prohibitions of export from one province to another have never been repealed, and are often enforced. Trade in foodstuffs has been driven underground. With plenty in the country and large hidden stocks in Moscow, the daily allowance of bread has been cut down to less than half a pound avoirdupois. The Government, however, refuses to consider the repeal or the amendment of the present maximal grain prices, which are admittedly unremunerative. Requisitions supported by force are being tried hesitatingly and plans are mooted to introduce a barter of textiles and other manufactured articles for grain. In the present scarcity of manufactures and the diminishing output of factories, it is believed that it will be necessary to resort more and more to force to induce the peasants, who do not care to accumulate more of the depreciating currency, to part with their grain. In this case a war of the village against the city is to be feared. The *Russkiya Vedomosti* states that armed detachments, sent out in the province of Nizhni Novgorod to search for grain, were confronted with thousands of men, women and children and that the soldiers refused to fire upon them. Similar conditions are reported from Kazan.

Food-supply commissioners are received with hostility and in some cases are beaten. As this newspaper adds:

The village refuses to sell its grain at maximum prices two or three times under the costs of production. It does not wish to provide grain for the city where the “*bourgeoisie* lives and where the workingman, after his eight” hours of labor, sits down to smoke a cigar.”

Truth requires the correction that the eight-hour work day has been in many cases materially reduced. The largest department store in Russia, in this city, is open only from about 10 o'clock to 11.45 o'clock, and from 2 o'clock to 3.45 o'clock. The managers of this store were driven by pressure, exercised in part by the Government, to submit to all the demands of their employees. All the manufacturers that are making manful efforts to keep their works going in order that the country may be supplied with necessities and that the workingmen may be employed, are meeting with difficulties. They are pressed with repeated demands for wage enhancements and have as much to contend with in the sphere of discipline as the officers of the army. In one American works a foreman was ridden out on a barrow a few days ago after a court of arbitration had upheld him against all complaints on the part of the employees, and the manager who tried to save him this humiliation was threatened with instant death.

In general there is no appreciation on the part of the working-men of the necessity of earning wages. Either there is assumed to be an unlimited fund, public, corporate or private, to be drawn upon, or no thought is taken at all, demands being supported by threats and in some cases by violence.

In these circumstances, unless there is a change for the better, there will be not only hunger but unemployment this winter,

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 8, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received September 11, 5.40 a.m.*]

1722. Less tension yesterday and to-day but outgoing trains full to capacity and many planning to leave Petrograd through anticipation of Germans coming, and probable food scarcity. German army advance discontinued but whether temporarily only is uncertain. Workmen-Soldiers adopted resolutions appealing to all to defend Russia from invader and claim army fought well at Riga, and that contrary reports politically inspired by officers. Fact remains that Russians were superior in numbers and equally well equipped but retreated. Think be no Bolshevik disturbances to-morrow, Government assuring me by note and will suppress same if occurs.

FRANCIS

The Kornilov episode—The Democratic Conference at Petrograd—The second Kerensky ministry—Joint note of the Allied Governments, October 9, 1917—The Preliminary Parliament (Council of the Republic)—Kerensky's press interview on Russia's part in the war

[\[148\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 10, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received September 12, 7.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/501

[\[149\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 11, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received September 15, 1.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/507

[\[150\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 12, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received September 16, 6.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/515

[\[151\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 13, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received September 15, 2.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/517

[\[152\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 14, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received September 15, 2.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/519

[\[153\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, September 15, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received September 17, 1.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/520

[154] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 16, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received September 18, 3.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/523

[155] The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State

Odessa, September 16, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received September 18, 11.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/525

[156] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 16, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received September 19, 10.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/527

[157] The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/533

[158] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, September 18, 1917.

File No. 861.00/533a

[159] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 19, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received September 21, 8 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/531

[160] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 24, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received September 26, 11.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/551

[161] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 26, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received September 30, 9.30 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/557

[162] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 27, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received September 30, 10 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/559

[163] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, September 28, 1917, 3 p.m.
File No. 861.00/547

[164] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 28, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received October 2, 4.30 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/562

[165] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 29, 1917. [Received October 3, 12 noon.]
File No. 861.00/564

[166] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 29, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received October 3, 11.40 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/565

[167] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 30, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received October 5, 12.35 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/568

[168] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, October 1, 1917.

File No. 861.00/559

[169] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 1, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received October 5, 11 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/567

[170] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 4, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received October 7, 10.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/572

[171] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 4, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received October 6, 2.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/571

[172] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 6, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received October 7, 3.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/570

[173] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 6, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received October 9, 12 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/575

[174] The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War College Staff

Petrograd, October 7, 1917. [Copy received from War Department October 15.]

File No. 861.00/618

[175] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, October 8, 1917.

File No. 861.00/574a

[176] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 8, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received October 11, 5 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/577

[177] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 9, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received October 11, 4.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/578

[178] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 9, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received October 11, 9 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/579

[179] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 15, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received October 19, 6.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/587

[180] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 19, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received October 23, 3.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/596

[181] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 21, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received October 26, 12.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/607

[182] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 24, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received October 26, 6.25 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/610

[183] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 26, 1917. [Received November 27.]

File No. 861.00/725

[184] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 27, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 2, 6.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/615

[185] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, October 29, 1917, 5 p.m.

File No. 763.72/7506a

[186] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 29, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 4, 4.45 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/621

[187] The Minister in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, October 30, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received October 31, 1.10 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/915

[188] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, October 30, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received November 4, 5.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/619

[189] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 1, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 6, 2 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/622

[190] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 2, 1917.

File No. 861.00/611

[191] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 2, 1917, 1.27 p.m.

File No. 861.00/621a

[192] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 2, 1917, 8 p.m.

File No. 763.72/7576b

[193] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 2, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 4, 12.01 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/620

[194] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 4, 1917, 6 p.m. [Original not received. Copied from
confirmation.]

File No. 861.00/622^{1/2}

[195] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 6, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 7, 11.25 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/627

[196] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 6, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 8, 6.40 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/7628

[197] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 10, 1917. [Received November 18, 3.20 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/7759

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 10, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received September 12, 7.15 p.m.]

1726. Late at night Saturday Lvov, former member of Ministry as Procurator of Holy Synod, arrived Petrograd, representing Kornilov, demanded of Kerensky abdication of Provisional Government and that Kornilov be made temporary military dictator with Savinkov Minister of War and Kerensky Minister of Justice. Kerensky, after confirming Lvov's representing Kornilov, removed the latter and appointed present Chief of Staff, Lukomski, who declined, stating his acceptance might result in civil war and opening front to Germans, and conclusion of separate peace. Kerensky then appointed Klembovski, now commanding Riga front, who is reported to have also declined. Four o'clock this morning Kerensky received advices from Kornilov refusing to recognize removal, assuming military dictatorship and stating had ordered four divisions cavalry to capture Petrograd and arrest Provisional Government as agents of German General Staff. Savinkov in command of Petrograd which has been declared under martial law and in state of siege. Railroad conveying Kornilov cavalry and artillery has been torn up about forty versts distant. Provisional Government says 80,000 troops here but Minister for Foreign Affairs says same disorganized and will not kill Russians unless it be their own officers. Not positively known which side Savinkov favors.

I have missed no opportunity to urge President and Vice President of Council of Ministers and Minister for Foreign Affairs to restore army discipline. Provisional Government and socialists will claim that object of this counter-revolution is restoration of monarchical government but leaders of movement claim its object is to save country and prevent disgraceful surrender to Germany.

British Ambassador [omission] calls meeting Diplomatic Corps British Embassy 5 o'clock.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 11, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received September 15, 1.05 a.m.]

1734. Meeting of the Diplomatic Corps attended by all chiefs of missions. British Ambassador stated had called meeting at suggestion Minister for Foreign Affairs who said Petrograd be besieged, consequent scarcity food, likely to cause bread riots and communist excesses and while not outrightly advising departure insinuated such course be wise. All chiefs expressed intention remaining but when French Ambassador suggested offering services of Diplomatic Corps for mediation some neutral chiefs objected whereupon meeting adjourned. Meantime British Ambassador announced would be meeting of Allied chiefs immediately. Such meeting convened British Embassy and after conferences decided offer services to mediate between Government and Kornilov. British Ambassador presented action to Minister for Foreign Affairs who expressed appreciation but said such services not required now but if hereafter available would be used.

Kornilov issued proclamation appealing for support stating Lvov came to him as emissary of Kerensky and when approached Kerensky September 9 was conveying Kornilov's reply. Kerensky and Kornilov in proclamations over respective signatures charge each other with German alliance or inclinations. Kornilov's troops approaching Petrograd after repairing demolished railroads. Government preparing to offer resistance. Military attaché, naval attaché both think Kornilov will dominate situation after ineffectual resistance if any. Seems unavoidable.

Morning press says Sweden has offered to mediate separate peace between Russia and Germany. Is this true?

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 12, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received September 16, 6.30 a.m.]

1738. Yesterday witnessed active preparations by Provisional Government for defense of Petrograd and reports that Kornilov's forces were advancing on the city. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me 10th that he was sincerely unable to state with confidence which side would win. On hearing compromise effected I telephoned Minister for Foreign Affairs who said no truth in the report but that Provisional Government gaining strength hourly. At 1 o'clock British Ambassador telephoned me replying to my inquiry that action of the Allied representatives should be in afternoon papers. At 9.30 p.m. I received autographic note from British Ambassador stating Minister for Foreign Affairs objected to "mediation" in resolution of Allied ministers because it placed Kornilov on a par with Government but Minister for Foreign Affairs would make statement in morning press stating position of Allied representatives and their efforts toward "clearing the situation." Statement of Minister for Foreign Affairs in the morning papers to-day unsatisfactory to me and bulletin of [Workmen-] Soldiers on the same subject was decidedly objectionable as I am informed stated Allied representatives thought "Kornilov's victory would mean disruption of the alliance and defeat of Allies." Met British, Italian, and French Ambassador Foreign Office 12.30 to-day when French Ambassador presented statement for Minister for Foreign Affairs to give to the press. My three colleagues approved but I requested time for consideration and suggested that British Ambassador reconvene Allied representatives to which he agreed for 2.30 p.m. I went to British Embassy time fixed, meeting only British, French, and Italian Ambassadors, British Ambassador not having invited any others, and told them statement approved by them at Foreign Office unsatisfactory to myself and insisted upon action of Allied representatives being given to press. That was finally agreed to with "mediation" omitted and British Ambassador now at Foreign Office having agreed to tell Minister for Foreign Affairs that Allied Ambassadors will give aforesaid statement to press if Minister for Foreign Affairs declines to do so.

Alexeev accepted appointment as commander in chief from Kerensky, having declined same Monday.¹ Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Kornilov asked Kerensky 3.30 a.m. to-day to whom he should surrender. Alexeev accepted

appointment 8.30 a.m. to-day and was long-distance telephoning with Kornilov when Minister for Foreign Affairs told me this. Minister for Foreign Affairs says resigned Sunday and will insist upon acceptance thereof unless army discipline restored immediately. Kornilov's failure strengthens Provisional Government and if army discipline not immediately restored then Russian participation in war futile if continued. Minister for Foreign Affairs says military men will be appointed Ministers War and Marine; claims that admirals of Black Sea and Baltic Fleets loyal to Government; also commanders of the western front, Rumanian front, and Caucasian front together with commanders of Petrograd, Moscow, Kiev, Odessa and all other military districts. Kornilov and commanders southwest front with their chiefs of staff and chairman ways of communication at front are disloyal.

My objection to being misrepresented was on principle, in addition to aversion for having credit for assisting in establishing situation which may possibly result disastrously to Russia's continuance in war. Condition not hopeless but would be much stronger if compromise had been effected and contending elements united for vigorous action.

Military attaché, naval attaché, express confidence in Alexeev but both greatly disappointed at Kornilov failure.

FRANCIS

¹ For the appointment of a commander in chief, see also the telegram from the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sept. 13, *post*, p. 193 [*Pg. 193 is part of [Doc. 157](#)*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 13, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received September 15, 2.45 p.m.*]

1745. All quiet. Tension lessening. Fear of hostilities about dissipated, but Bolshevik outbreak feared as 50,000 guns given workmen when Kornilov attack anticipated.

Minister for Foreign Affairs gave to the press action of Allied representatives which published to-day.

Kornilov demanding conditions before surrendering. Bolshevik sentiment and some Ministers demanding death penalty for Kornilov who been strongest advocate of its restoration. Alexeev appointment most acceptable to officers and conservative non-socialistic element. New Ministry forming under Kerensky which generally thought be exclusively socialistic but my information from reliable private source is that Cadets and industrial interests will have representation therein and be stronger than its predecessor. Kornilov's failure attributable to bad advice, misinformation, improper methods, inopportuneness. Good soldier, patriot, otherwise inexperienced. Government was badly frightened and may profit by its experience.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 14, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received September 15, 2.45 p.m.*]

1747. Fear my cables filed daily delayed but Minister for Foreign Affairs assures me same have been dispatched regularly since 11th. Considering situation grave have requested British, French and Italian Ambassadors come to Embassy 3.30 p.m. for conference. Krymov¹ suicided last night. Military officers generally uneasy; two at Helsingfors, eight at Viborg, including two generals, killed by soldiers.

Kerensky visited by Soviet delegation which demanded no Cadets in the Ministry. Minister for Foreign Affairs says Kerensky replied would form Ministry as thought best.

FRANCIS

¹ General Krymov was one of the supporters of General Kornilov.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 15, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received September 17, 1.10 p.m.]

1753. Minister for Foreign Affairs just informed me that Kerensky decided not to yield to demands of Soviet and has appointed Cadet members to the Ministry. Further says Soviet planning armed opposition to Government having wired army to fight Kerensky's orders and has requested fleet to come to Petrograd. Special war committee appointed to take charge of situation pending installation of new Ministry. That committee composed of Kerensky, Tereshchenko, Nikitin, former Minister Posts and Telegraphs, Verkhovski, Minister of War, and Verderevski, Minister of Marine. New Ministry proposed comprises socialists slightly in majority. Soviet reported to have told Kerensky that no socialists be permitted to serve in the Ministry with Cadets. Armed test of strength apparently impending and fighting liable to begin at any moment. Officers naturally timid as their killing continues. Fifteen or twenty reported killed at Viborg and bodies thrown into sea.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 16, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received September 18, 3.15 p.m.*]

1759. Situation calmer but tension still great. Minister for Foreign Affairs says new Ministry be announced Tuesday or Wednesday containing Cadet representation notwithstanding Soviet patronizers [protests] and threat to prohibit its members serving with Cadet validity [Ministers]. Minister for Foreign Affairs says army loyal to Provisional Government which accounts for Bolsheviks not having already made outbreak. Rodzyanko coming to Embassy 2 o'clock, Japanese Ambassador coming 4 o'clock, Minister for Foreign Affairs coming 6 o'clock, at their own suggestions.

Russian General Staff disturbed because heard large number German officers arriving in Sweden. Have telegraphed to Morris for information. Can you give any?

Soviet organ announces Provisional Government proclaimed republic and war committee will administer Government until action of Democratic All-Russian Congress called for September 25 in Petrograd but Minister for Foreign Affairs just told me Provisional Government does not recognize congress which called solely by Soviet.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Odessa (Ray) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ODESSA, *September 16, 1917, 6 p.m.*

[*Received September 18, 11.40 p.m.*]

On receipt of the news of conflict between Kornilov and Kerensky a revolutionary committee composed of laborers and soldiers took over the power here, the general commanding Odessa acceding to this. These *de facto* authorities have since declared themselves in favor of peace even at the cost of a break with the Allies and last night voted lack of confidence in the head of the Provisional Government on account of his army policy and organized to-day a peace parade. So far there have been no serious disorders although there are several small strikes on.

RAY

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 16, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received September 19, 10.30 a.m.]

1760. Rodzyanko, Guchkov and Japanese Ambassador who visited the Embassy this afternoon separately by appointment each expressed confidential opinion that in contest between Government and Soviet latter will succeed. I disagreed as believe Government will command loyalty of decided majority of the army. Minister for Foreign Affairs just left Embassy says test of strength with Soviet will result in decided victory of Government and I so believe. Says new Ministry will have no Soviet members consequently Government confident of its position. Kerensky firmly maintains his position and is entitled to great credit therefor having severed associations of lifetime.

Provisional Government has proclaimed republic thus preventing any charge or suspicion of Kerensky's contemplating dictatorship. May not announce Ministry before Saturday and likely to announce therewith removal of capital to Moscow, not that Petrograd likely to fall but will be within war zone, furthermore surrounding influences of Moscow less Bolshevik. This is confidential view of Minister for Foreign Affairs. Diplomatic Corps would accompany Government to Moscow.

FRANCIS

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following telegram was left by the Ambassador at the Department of State on September 18, 1917:]

*The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs (Tereshchenko) to the
Ambassador at Washington*

PETROGRAD, September 13, 1917.

The action of General Kornilov is definitely liquidated; bloodshed has been avoided, the troops sent by Kornilov to Petrograd having refused to advance against the Provisional Government and having declared their loyalty to the latter. Kornilov has consented to surrender to General Alexeev, who has left for the general headquarters. The generals who participated in the uprising will be brought to justice. It seems evident that an important part in these happenings is due to misunderstanding and confusion provoked by the participating of various unfortunate intermediaries between the army headquarters and the Government; special culpability lies on the advisers who surrounded General Kornilov. At the present moment complete quiet has ensued and order has been restored except certain movements among the Cossacks, headed by General Kaledin on the Don, which do not promise to be of any consequence. The new Government has been organized as follows: Kerensky, remaining Minister-President, is appointed Commander in Chief, such a nomination being necessary to appease democratic element and soldiers. The military operations will be practically conducted by General Alexeev, who is appointed Chief of Staff. A series of new nominations in the army are being made, which show the decision of the Government to reestablish order in the army. General Verkhovski is appointed Minister of War and Admiral Verderevski, Minister of Navy. In the rest of the Cabinet changes will be made. The following have definitely left the Cabinet: Chernov, several of Cadet Ministers and Nekrasov. Kishkin and representatives of the industrials will enter the Cabinet. I tendered my resignation simultaneously with the other Ministers; the question of my remaining in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not yet decided. The new Government has to face the task of preventing agitation, disorder and conflicts in the army, which could arise as a result of the distrust towards the commanders. In view of that most energetic measures will be adopted; at the same time the declaration of state of war in Petrograd and Moscow is involving the application of all regulations reestablishing order in the rear of the army. At the present

moment, as a result of the Kornilov movement, the influence of the Bolsheviki has increased. They are now demanding the release of the persons arrested on the 18th of July. Nevertheless the position of the Government, after the victory, is strengthened; that enables to apprehend the possibility of opposing most energetically the activities of the Bolsheviki. In general one must consider that the sad events of the last days having been brought to a prompt solution, they did not weaken Russia in the fight against the external foe and have simultaneously manifested unity of desire and general striving to concentrate all forces in that fight so as not to be distracted from that main task by interior struggles and discord; whatever attempts from any side should be made in the future to disrupt the political course adopted by the Government, one can expect that such attempts will meet with united opposition throughout the country. The Government on its part will strenuously follow the path of prosecuting the war at any cost and will carry out with renewed energy the task of reconstructing the army.

TERESHCHENKO

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 18, 1917.*

724. Samuel Gompers transmits following message to Russia:

The soul of American labor and democracy beats in unison with the spirit and aspirations of Russia's people. Our people and our democratic Republic realize the difficulties with which the Russian people are confronted in establishing a government founded upon the consent of the governed and carrying the aspirations of the people into concrete effect. May I therefore not urge Russia's workers, the Russian people, while insisting upon their rights, protecting and promoting their interests and welfare, they will be patient and forbearing in the effort now being made to give to Russia a definite permanent democratic government.

The democracies of the world are united in a life and death struggle to crush autocracy, imperialism and militarism; to make universal justice and international peace the attribute and blessing of humanity. Samuel Gompers.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 19, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received September 21, 8 a.m.]

1774. Quiet here but tone of Minister for Foreign Affairs less confident than yesterday. Told me regiment marching to station to leave for front carried banner opposing Provisional Government and favoring Soviet; said regiment not disturbed but projected destination changed. Furthermore said understood Tseretelli reported to favor Soviet ministry but had not so informed him. Minister for Foreign Affairs continues expressing confidence in Government ability to suppress Bolshevik outbreak which he says likely to occur. Minister for Foreign Affairs said 16th confidentially new Ministry be announced Saturday when conclusion of Provisional Government to move capital to Moscow be also announced. To-day said no time fixed for either announcement but vacancies in the Ministry be filled on Kerensky's return Friday. Kerensky is President Ministry and Commander in Chief army. Been at the front with Minister of War and Minister of Admiralty since 17th; they, with Minister for Foreign Affairs and Nikitin, constitute committee five who are administering Government. Do not anticipate Soviet ministry but if should assume control Chernov or Tseretelli would be President unless Kerensky yields to Soviet which Minister for Foreign Affairs says will not do. In the first event Tereshchenko be removed, in the latter, would resign. Possibly if the Soviet dominates Petrograd and Provisional Government departs for Moscow may be two councils of ministers. Portion Embassy staff somewhat nervous but I think unnecessarily. Minister for Foreign Affairs promises one or more special trains for the Diplomatic Corps if Government goes to Moscow.

Just received American papers giving account of my attempted assassination, also presence in Sweden; both absolutely untrue. Have not been absent day since January when in Moscow four days.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 24, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received September 26, 11.35 p.m.]

1797. Unconfirmed rumors that conference postponed until 15th. Minister for Foreign Affairs whom I saw 1 o'clock said conservative sentiment in Soviet growing, Bolshevik power diminishing. Nikitin only democrat appointed, Minister of the Interior becoming Minister of Post and Telegraph, also member of war committee with Kerensky; Tereshchenko, Minister of War, Minister of Marine. This considered concession to Soviet. Trotsky, returned exile from America, imprisoned since July 18, released, made violent attack on Kerensky in Petrograd Council of Workmen-Soldiers. Kerensky returns to-morrow but will not attend conference. If conference indorses Provisional Government situation clarified, if otherwise clash may ensue and possibly present Government officials may go to Moscow claiming right to transfer Government. In such event Soviet likely to announce new ministry of its members. If such conditions obtain my present feeling is to remain in Petrograd keep you advised of developments. Kerensky and Tereshchenko are only surviving Ministers of original Provisional Government and authority of present Ministry to remove capital not unquestionable if new government organized by Soviet represents will of Russian democracy as they claim.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 26, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received September 30, 9.30 a.m.*]

1804. Papers announce that Tereshchenko has resigned. I have just left him. He states that he has told Kerensky who returned yesterday he would not serve if Ministry dominated by the Soviet and said that Kerensky would do likewise. Said that Kerensky feared conflict, but replied that he did not know when asked if meant armed conflict. When asked if army would obey Soviet or the Provisional Government, replied that if the Soviet dominated by Bolsheviks army would follow Kerensky, but if conservative sentiment prevails in the Soviet did not know which side the army would follow. I think Verkhovski important factor will follow will of conference. Minister of Foreign Affairs expects that moderation will control national conference assembling to-morrow with 1,600 members. Kerensky will ask to address conference but will not speak if Lenin is a member as Lenin charged with treason for inciting disturbance of July 17 and been fugitive since that date. Lenin elected delegate from Petrograd Soviet which controlled by Bolshevik sentiment. Moscow removal dropped until after conference whose action awaited by all factions.

Finland declared independence, called Parliament for 28th, of which Russian Government plans to prevent meeting. Minister of Foreign Affairs says learned from English sources German fleet of sixty-four ships comprising eleven dreadnoughts, thirty transports with cruisers, torpedo-boat destroyers, etc., left Danzig 24th headed north, destination unknown.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 27, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received September 30, 10 p.m.*]

1808. About three weeks ago British Ambassador received from his Government draft of note to Russian Government with suggestion that it should be signed by Allied representatives. It appears that British Ambassador conferred with French Ambassador who submitted amended draft which was presented to British Ambassador, Italian Ambassador and myself, but as Kornilov movement had just begun matter was dropped until to-day when British Ambassador [invited] French Ambassador, Italian Ambassador and myself to a conference and submitted draft of note. Substance as follows:

The Allied powers cannot help being extremely preoccupied by the actual situation in Russia. The energy displayed by the Russian Government in avoiding civil war shows that this Government is aware of the danger and that it has decided to face it. The peril is however far from being avoided. There is not an hour to lose nor an effort to neglect if one wishes to avoid a catastrophe which would render the issue of the war uncertain, would in any event put it back in increasing the sacrifices and would risk preventing the annihilation of this German militarism which is still more dangerous to the new Russian Republic than to the other democratic states whose organization has been tested by time.

The Allied Governments cannot disguise the fact that recent events have thrown doubts on the power of resistance of Russia and on her ability to continue the struggle. They might soon find themselves confronted by a trend of opinion which would put on trial their responsibility concerning the utility of the considerable sacrifices in arms, munitions and material of every kind granted so liberally to Russia while they would be reproached with not having reserved them for the western front when [where] the wish to conquer appears without faltering.

To restore confidence to this opinion and to give to the Allied Governments the power of acting efficaciously with a view to reassuring it the Russian Government ought to show by immediate acts its resolve to employ without hesitation all the proper methods to remedy the situation in question, to

revive discipline and the true military spirit amongst the fighting troops, and to assure the regular operation of the public services, and order at the front as at the rear.

The Allied Governments count on the Russian Government's not failing in its task whose accomplishment faced with decision and firmness can alone assure the future of the Russian Republic and prevent it from succumbing to the open or indirect attacks of the enemies of every true democracy.

The Russian Government on its side can be certain that in entering upon this path it will have as in the past the full support of faithful allies permeated with the same democratic spirit and resolve to continue for their part the struggle with the energy and spirit of sacrifice of which they have given so many proofs since the day when they entered the struggle by the side of Russia for the defense of the preservation of nations when the German attempt against the right of peoples was revealed in the attack which was directed first of all against the Slav nation.

Please instruct concerning my joining in such a note, also whether such joint action should be confined to Ambassadors above mentioned or should include Japanese Ambassador and Ministers of Allied countries. British Ambassador thinks better confine signatures to the foregoing Ambassadors. Three above named have authority to sign or are given full discretion but do not know whether would take action without myself. Note framed by French Ambassador. Above is already translated. Will not be presented until Government organized as no one can foretell action of national conference now assembling. Two organizations claiming right to [control]. In such event representatives of Allied countries might possibly disagree. When I recommended prompt recognition of Provisional Government in my No. 1107, March 18,¹ had not consulted any colleague but avoided doing so not only because I desired to be first but wished to avoid probable delay as situation was critical. Conditions are different now when think representatives of Allied countries should confer before [addressing] any government whose right is contested by opposition worthy of consideration. Please hasten reply which expect October 1.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 5 [Pg. 5 includes portions of [Doc. 6](#) and [Doc. 7](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 28, 1917, 3 p.m.*

1751. The Department is in receipt of following telegram dated September 25, from American Minister, Stockholm:

I wish to call your attention to the state of affairs which is quickly developing in Russia. I am informed by reliable people who are daily coming to Sweden from all parts of Russia that the conditions there have been growing constantly worse until there exists to-day a condition of what one could call anarchy. There is no cohesion between the Government and the people and no respect is shown towards the Government. There are innumerable divisions of the administration and various groups striving for various indefinite objects. I could enumerate a great many crimes and horrible conditions that are constantly being perpetrated throughout Russia without the Government's being able to rectify conditions or punish the offenders. I am informed that the future holding together of the military is very problematical and cannot be depended on; also that discipline and law is lacking in the army and there is little respect shown by the men toward their superiors. This state of affairs which has been in evidence for some time past has been gradually growing worse and it is fast becoming a matter of most grave and serious moment.

The Russian Ambassador at Madrid has just resigned on the basis that he could not work for or be connected with a Government which cannot enforce law and order. I was confidentially informed of this by his sister yesterday.

Department will be pleased to receive your comments on this message.

LANSING

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 28, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received October 2, 4.30 p.m.]

1813. First day's conference proceedings witnessed decided triumph Kerensky who spoke as comrade unofficially. Given ovation on entrance, frequently applauded, often interrupted by Bolsheviks whom he condemned severely charging with responsibility for army demoralization and general deplorable situation. Explained satisfactorily charge of connection with Kornilov plot. No hostile demonstration except angry threats to eject from conference a Bolshevik who interrupted Kerensky. Bolshevik sentiment largely in the minority estimated about fourth of membership. Separate meetings of groups to-day, conference reconvening to-morrow noon when expected to (vote?) and adjourn.

Council of Ministers announced appointments for two vacancies, will announce two others to-morrow, all non-Soviets, notwithstanding conference may pass resolution concerning personnel of Ministry. Tseretelli specially advocated coalition Ministry with Cadet representation. Chernov advocated coalition Ministry with the Cadets excluded. Minister of War spoke, was well received, good impression. Bolsheviks supported Soviet ministry. Minister of Foreign Affairs still says won't remain if Soviet sentiment dominates Ministry or if Government not strong. Says that Finland situation bad as army and fleet refusing to obey order of the Government to prevent Diet meeting. Governor General of Finland will prevent such meeting if he can command sufficient civil force therefor. Movement of German fleet unknown. Aeroplane attacks on Petrograd expected next week but Minister of Foreign Affairs says that defense therefrom much strengthened.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/564

[Document 165]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 29, 1917.*
[*Received October 3, 12 noon.*]

1822. Following is being placarded about the city:

PROTEST MEETING

“Free “America wants to execute a Russian emigrant, revolutionist Alexander Berkman. All the soldiers and workers of Petrograd must attend a mass meeting which will be held in Cirque Moderne on Sunday, September 17 [/30] at 7 p.m. to find out how this “free” country deals with its revolutionists. Admittance free.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 29, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received October 3, 11.40 a.m.*]

1823. Quiet to-day but Minister for Foreign Affairs says Bolsheviks circularizing workmen and Bolshevik soldiers directing delegations be sent to conference and protest against counter-revolutionary sentiment which seems prevailing there. This may produce clash as workmen have [not] returned arms as commanded but Minister of Foreign Affairs says Government confident can suppress outbreak and such is also feeling of Minister of War who lunched at the Embassy to-day. Cabled you *en chair* placarded notice of protest meeting to-morrow evening concerning America's treatment of Alexander Berkman of which I have notified Foreign Office. Notice unsigned being evidently work of Bolsheviks. Cable immediately about Berkman's crime and prosecution.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 30, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received October 5, 12.35 a.m.*]

1824. Yesterday's conference session without disturbance. Most speeches advocated coalition Ministry which is decided sentiment of conference. Conference continues to-day, to-morrow, possibly longer. Minister of Foreign Affairs lunched at the Embassy to-day, says Ministry formed and to be announced Tuesday. He, Kerensky, and present Minister of War, Minister of Marine, remain. New Ministry has sixteen members, of whom six are socialists including Kerensky but none are Soviet socialists. Of remaining ten four are Cadets by affiliation but not acting as such. Konovalov returns as Minister of Trade and Industry. Kerensky is political Vice President; Tretyakov economic Vice President; Nikitin, Minister of the Interior; Malyantovich, Minister of Justice. Last two are Socialists.

Finland situation continues bad, Minister of Trade and Commerce sending cavalry and artillery there.

Kerensky has decided victory, Bolsheviks emphatic defeat in conference. Tereshchenko influence strong [in] formation of Ministry but he did not attend conference nor did any ambassadors.

Commander sent fifty bicycle soldiers and armored motor cars to the Embassy this morning. Commanding officer says that he has orders to prevent demonstration on streets where gatherings. Minister for Foreign Affairs says that protest meeting not permitted because of law prohibiting hostile expressions toward the Allies. Some of posters signed "Anarcho-Syndicalists" and "the American *bourgeoisie*" indicating "this free country" in line. Expect no danger or demonstration. Military guard not requested, sent voluntarily by Government.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/559

[Document 168]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 1, 1917.*

1754. Your 1808, September 27, received late night of 30th. The matter will be taken up and reply given at earliest moment.

POLK

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 1, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received October 5, 11 a.m.]

1826. Protest meeting held last evening as advertised, attendance variously estimated from two thousand to eight thousand. Two violent speeches made by Shatov, returned exile from America. Minister for Foreign Affairs now says did not mean meeting would be prevented in enclosed hall but that street demonstrations would be dispersed of which none occurred. Soldiers and armored motor left Embassy 11 p.m. after meeting adjourned, two soldiers remaining throughout night. Resolutions adopted send "Fraternal greeting to Goldman and Berkman and all those who in 'free' America fight for social revolution," and in the name of free speech and free press demand, "Immediate release of our revolutionist friends and abolition of all provocative measures of the United States Government against internationalists." Similar resolution passed by Kronstadt meeting. Resolution addressed to Councils of Workmen and Soldiers and to central committees thereof for presentation to our Government. Understand will be presented to me also but if by officers or committee of anarchist meeting shall not receive committee or resolutions.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 4, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received October 7, 10.50 a.m.*]

1834. Conference adjourned 5 a.m., Bolsheviks having angrily withdrawn. Kerensky notified presidium in the afternoon through Tseretelli that he would appoint a coalition ministry regardless of conference action whereupon indignant resolution passed and Bolsheviks threatened that their reply to such action would be demonstrations on Petrograd streets. Ministry not formally announced but composition known. Minister of Foreign Affairs unexpectedly went to Moscow last night. Kerensky now in Winter Palace conferring with committee from the conference which demanding Pre-Parliament to which the Ministry be responsible until Constituent Assembly. Ministry willing to accept Pre-Parliament if they are permitted voice in its composition.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 4, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received October 6, 2.10 p.m.]

1836. Answering your 1751 repeating cable from American Minister, Stockholm. My daily cables have advised of the general situation and of developments as they occurred if affecting same. Numerous outbreaks, some outrages, many defiances of authority, frequent acts of insubordination, have marked the progress of revolution, but not surprising when we consider the expanse of the country, inadequate, inefficient transportation, unsatisfactory communication by post and wire of 180,000,000 people oppressed by absolute monarchy for thousand years. Russians are devoted to the land, naturally quick to comprehend and act. Masses are deficient in education, superstitious and inclined to [omission], but kind-hearted with good impulses and require guidance. Socialists making supreme effort to put their principles into operation, taking advantage of war leaders of extreme factions, are assisted by German money in abundance. Russian population comprises Caucasian, yellow and Semitic races as classified here and composed of seventy-four nationalities. Problem extremely difficult but not insoluble. Deplorable conditions mainly attributable to returned exiles, majority from America, Trotsky being most troublesome. Great need for discreet propaganda to influence Russian sentiment, restore army morale and correct erroneous impressions concerning America. Protest meeting Thursday was German propaganda; best speaker Shatov who said America dominated by capitalists and laborers more oppressed there than here; called President Wilson an emperor and free America a travesty. My sympathy with Russia deep, sincere and my conviction strong that the country will survive ordeal and be safe for democracy if we and other Allies are patient and helpful. It may cost some bloodshed; perhaps property losses by those who never earned their possessions but such on the other hand will owe nothing to such Russians as the Ambassador to Spain who deserted his country when his services most needed. These people realize that separate peace or German success spells loss of liberty gained by revolution which was precipitated by fear and suspicion on their part that deposed monarchy was planning separate peace under German influence.

Just learned that another protest meeting on Berkman case planned for Putilov ammunition works Sunday afternoon with same speakers. Unquestionably

German propaganda.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 6, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[*Received October 7, 3.55 a.m.*]

1842. Awaiting reply to my 1808, September 27, 11 p.m.^{[1](#)} New Ministry will be announced to-day or to-morrow to which opposition unlikely, after which Allied Ambassadors will present to the Government joint note of the character outlined. They will act jointly October 9, without me unless I am authorized to unite therein.

FRANCIS

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 196 [Pg. 196 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 6, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received October 9, 12 p.m.]

1843. Conference adjourned finally last night before hearing report from delegation appointed to confer with Provisional Government, evidently anticipating satisfactory agreement but leaving differences if any to be adjusted by Pre-Parliament which now in session. Unable to find Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day although I telephoned often to the Foreign Office and residence. He told me yesterday would not return to Foreign Office until Ministry announced and not then if Ministry exclusively socialist nor if Ministry dictated by Soviet.

Tseretelli gained most credit in conference, exerting most influence if not controlling its proceedings notwithstanding Cheidze president. Understanding thought to exist between Tseretelli and Kerensky. Latter's personality made a deep impression on the conference when he addressed it first day.

FRANCIS

The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War College Staff

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 7, 1917.*

[*Copy received from War Department October 15.*]

53. Gradual disintegration of power of Government in all directions. Anarchy nearer daily; strikes and threats of strikes everywhere, including railroads where general strike imminent unless unreasonable demands accepted. Revolts in Turkestan: Don Cossacks refuse to quell, saying have been long enough alternately police force and accused of treason. Finnish Senate has prepared project practical independence Finland. Russian custodian recently refused to execute orders Kerensky to oppose alleged Finnish Diet.

Democratic Convention adjourned, having inaugurated a Parliament to which Ministry responsible; upon its expiration, Constitutional Assembly. Relations between such Pre-Parliament, which met yesterday, and Ministry not determined. Kerensky seems to have submitted convention, of which Tseretelli most influential member, to Pre-Parliament. No *bourgeois* in convention but number will be admitted to Pre-Parliament.

All elements in Russia but socialists are cowed. Bolsheviks and anarchists, calling other socialists counter-revolutionists and condemning convention of which they constituted large minority, are, through Petrograd Soviet, calling conference of city Soviets which will be Bolshevik. Bolsheviks desire peace, separate or otherwise; distribution of land, and giving factories to workmen; all immediately. Other socialists wish immediate general peace and gradual realization socialist economic program. Political conditions overshadow everything, but economic and financial disaster hastening on.

Paper money reduced in size to facilitate more rapid printing.

Anti-American meetings occur. Bolsheviks regard American institutions as capitalistic and anti-democratic.

On Riga front German infantry divisions reduced from 18½, September 20, to 15½ now. Germans appear to rely again mainly on propaganda which enormous. Bolshevik ideas growing in army. Lynching of officers continues.

German fleet with transports reported still at sea in Baltic Sea.

Cabling above to Pershing.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 8, 1917.*

1767. You may transmit without comment the following message from the president of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States to the Provisional Government. Copy of resolutions mentioned will be forwarded by pouch.

Please convey to the people of free Russia the sentiments of profound emotion and admiration with which the half million business men of America represented by the nine hundred commercial organizations composing the Chamber of Commerce of the United States have welcomed the rise of a new and democratic Russia. The Chamber of Commerce of the United States is itself a democratic institution whose fundamental policies are controlled absolutely by referendum votes of all its members. Only recently by such a referendum vote this organization, by an overwhelming majority, declared the principle that war profits of all kinds should be limited by the Government. This declaration means that American business men and manufacturers are opposed to the making of vast fortunes in war supplies at the expense of the people. This democratic and self-governing organization regards the Russian revolution as an epoch-making event in the world's history and also as the most heartening development of this terrible world conflict. It is now holding a war convention at Atlantic City attended by delegates representing commercial organizations in every state of the United States of America. The purpose of this convention is by common counsel in conference with officials of our Government to determine in what directions business and industry may exert still greater effort to assist in destroying autocratic military power and to win the war. The delegates at this convention beg you, Mr. Ambassador, personally, to assure the Provisional Government and all the people of Russia not only of the whole-hearted support of the hundreds of thousands of American business men whom they represent but also of their confidence in the purpose of Russia to secure permanent victory over the autocratic militarism of Germany and thus assure the triumph of the principles of the revolution in extending democratic ideals throughout the world.

I am forwarding by mail a series of resolutions passed at this war

convention which embody the deepest sentiments of respect and disinterested emotions of sympathy which the upward struggle of the free Russian people has aroused among the business men of America whose opinion is voiced by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. Rhett, President, Chamber of Commerce of the United States.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 8, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received October 11, 5 a.m.*]

1848. After conference finally adjourned evening of 5th its delegation conferred throughout the night with the Provisional Government. Pre-Parliament, or Democratic Municipal [sic] Council as now designated, assembled in the City Duma, elected Cheidze president and recessed to wait report of delegation appointed by conference. After six hours' continuous session agreement reached which reported to Democratic Council and after hours of discussion extending throughout the night such agreement adopted morning of 7th by vote 109 to 85, abstaining 21. Agrees to total membership 308, of which *bourgeois* 125, Bolsheviks 66, which consider a victory for Government. Power of council or Ministry's responsibility thereto not clearly defined. Personnel of Ministry which will be announced to-morrow is the same as cabled in my 1824, September 30, 7 p.m. Tereshchenko, who tendered his resignation and was not visible 6th or 7th, is in Foreign Office to-day but says his continuing in the Ministry conditioned on his having no responsibility for internal conditions and devoting attention exclusively to foreign relations. Quiet here.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 9, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received October 11, 4.05 p.m.]

1852. Yesterday afternoon British Ambassador telephoned would present joint note to Government to-day as President and Minister for Foreign Affairs going to Stavka¹ to-night and would present same without me if would not accompany them. I replied could not go without instructions, having submitted matter to my Government and been advised of its receipt. See Department's No. 1754, October 1.²

Early to-day Minister of Foreign Affairs telephoned would receive me 12.30 instead of 1 p.m. as heretofore. While going Foreign Office in automobile met British Ambassador, Italian Ambassador, French Ambassador, walking therefrom conversing intently evidently not seeing me as did not salute. Was promptly admitted on arriving at Foreign Office and hurriedly told by Minister for Foreign Affairs that Kerensky had just left Winter Palace to call upon me and express appreciation of my not accompanying Ambassadors in delivering joint note which contained nothing new and which President considered "tactless." Requesting the Minister for Foreign Affairs to telephone Embassy to tell President when calling that I would return in five minutes immediately started, arriving Embassy at 12.50 p.m., and learned that the President had been to the Embassy and that on learning Ambassador absent left his card without any message. Note was revised and somewhat softened but was formally presented and probably published as such was intention of British Ambassador.

Following is translation:³

The Allied powers, without wishing to mix in the internal affairs of Russia, cannot help being preoccupied with the effects which a prolongation of the state of crisis might have on the general situation from the military and diplomatic point of view.

The energy displayed by the Russian Government in avoiding civil war shows that this Government is aware of the danger and that it has decided to face it. The peril is, however, far from being-banished. There is not an hour to lose, if one wishes to avoid a catastrophe which would render the

issue of the war uncertain, or would at the least retard the hour of victory while increasing the sacrifices already so considerable which the peoples of the Entente have endured; there is not an effort to neglect to annihilate this militarism of the Central Empires which is still more formidable to the young Russian Republic than to the other democratic states whose organization has been tested by time.

Recent events have thrown doubts on Russia's power of resistance and on the possibility of continuing the struggle. The Allied Governments might soon find themselves confronted by a trend of opinion which would put on trial the responsibility concerning the utility of the considerable sacrifices in arms, munitions, material of every kind accorded without counting to Russia while they would be reproached with not having reserved them for the western front where the wish to conquer appears without faltering.

To restore confidence to this opinion and to give to the Allied Governments the power of reassuring it, it behooves the Russian Government to show by acts its resolve to employ all proper means to revive discipline and true military spirit among the fighting troops, at the same time that it will insure the operation of the public services and the reestablishment of order at the front as at the rear.

The Allied Governments count on the Russian Government's not failing in its task whose accomplishment faced with decision and firmness can alone assure the future of the Russian Republic and prevent it from succumbing to the open or indirect attacks of the enemies of every true democracy.

The Russian Government on its side can be certain of thus assuring itself of the entire support of faithful allies imbued with the same democratic spirit and resolved to continue for their part the struggle with the energy of which they have given so many proofs. The past is a sure guarantee of the future for Russia who has seen enter the liberty of nations the Allied armies, at the moment when the ambitions of German hegemony were unmasked by the attack which was directed first of all against the Slav people, as well as at the moment when the threatening pressure of the enemy weighed heavily on the Russian southwestern front.

Above for information. British Ambassador asked me by telephone if Kerensky called at the Embassy. I replied: "Yes, but I did not see him and he left no message." He said three Ambassadors had presented note to Kerensky who apparently not pleased and would not let them talk to him after receiving note.

FRANCIS

¹ The Stavka, or staff headquarters, was at Mogilev.

² *Ante*, p. 201 [*Pg. 201 includes portions of [Doc. 167](#), [Doc. 168](#), and [Doc. 169](#)*].

³ See *ante*, p. 196 [*Pg. 196 includes portions of [Doc. 161](#) and [Doc. 162](#)*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 9, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received October 11, 9 p.m.*]

1853. Kerensky left for front accompanied by Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of War, Minister of Marine without again calling at the Embassy. Evidently considers himself master of situation, encouraged by approval of his selected ministry by Democratic Council and by failure of Bolsheviks to make outbreak. Trotsky, ablest, most courageous Bolshevik, elected president Petrograd Council of Workmen-Soldiers which organization Bolsheviks dominated as evidenced by Trotsky's election and adoption of resolution condemning coalition Ministry. Tereshchenko was potent in the meeting between Ministry and conference delegation speaking candidly, emphatically, defiantly when tendering resignation and declining responsibility for consequences of Soviet domination threatened. Government can suppress but Government is acting discreetly in making no effort to imprison or punish its critics or influence and is given due credit therefor. [Omission] if Bolsheviks make outbreak, as in such event might be unable to command sufficient force.

Railroad strike becoming failure: another Kerensky achievement. Outlook much improved in my judgment. Much pleased with Congress action. Should like President's message or substance thereof.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 15, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received October 19, 6.40 a.m.*]

1869. Minister for Foreign Affairs told me confidentially to-day that had secret conference yesterday afternoon with fourteen prominent Russians, including two Ministers, others representing parties and important interests, object being to learn candid opinion of conditions and whether same irreparable. Gave me their names and I know them to be well-poised leaders. Says, with the exception of two, all while deploring situation, expressed confidence in immediate future and all without exception advocated continuance of war.

This confirms my own convictions which have often cabled. Told him Russians are quick to comprehend and to change views when convinced that interests of country so require and revulsion against Bolshevism not unlikely in the near future. Minister of Foreign Affairs has grown rapidly and is admittedly strongest member of Ministry except Kerensky, who returns from front Wednesday having recovered from slight illness. We must continue to extend assistance to Russia, otherwise disaster will result, but do not advise granting all her requests without examination and discrimination. In extended conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day he did not mention last demand for \$235,000,000. Cannot see Minister of Finance to-day but shall to-morrow and report.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/596

[Document 180]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 19, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received October 23, 3.30 p.m.*]

1885. Press states Government going to Moscow and interviews with two Ministers so indicate. Minister of Foreign Affairs says removal not fully determined but the question be decided to-morrow on the return of Kerensky from the north front and insinuates that conclusion be influenced by Council of Russian Republic which meets tomorrow. Reported Soviet will not permit Government to leave Petrograd and if necessary will stop all trains.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 21, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received October 26, 12.05 p.m.*]

1893. Attended the opening Council of Republic yesterday. Practically all diplomatic missions represented by their chiefs. Kerensky taking the chair received respectfully not enthusiastically. Delivered successful patriotic address asking the support of council in difficult task praising the valor of the fleet in the recent engagement, rather disparaging discipline of army but declares that it will never be broken by force. Speech uninterrupted, heard attentively, often applauded by the *bourgeoisie*, seldom by the Bolsheviki. Personnel of membership with the *bourgeoisie* numbering 167 of 555 total which is larger proportion than they will have in the Constituent Assembly. Mother-of-revolution Breshkovskaya presided after Kerensky and spoke at length. Avksentiev elected permanent president, delivered acceptable address complimenting Allies causing ovation which was acknowledged by chiefs remaining including myself, British, Italian, and French Ambassadors having left. I departed after the Ministry left. Later Bolsheviki through Trotsky protested against Government and against council and sixty bolted amidst jeers of the council. Government removal unmentioned, probably be considered in closed session 24th to which the council adjourned.

Rumanian Minister called to-day, deeply concerned at the growth of peace sentiment here; says even permeates Council of Ministers which I doubt.

Bolshevik protest opposed to Moscow removal. Papers say Bolshevik outbreak probable.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 24, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received October 26, 6.25 p.m.]

1905. This cablegram pertains to conditions and may contain several subjects. Kerensky's speech in council yesterday eloquent, patriotic but was attacked by press because not firmer and charged as a step backward from his position at Moscow where he said that he and Kornilov both favored discipline restoration. His claim that the Russian Army freest in the world unbelieved but freedom of army undesirable if not imbued with fighting spirit. Am following Council of Republic proceedings closely and told Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day that thought council potentialities for good are great and merited careful cultivation.

Bolshevik demonstration fixed for November 2. [?] thousand workmen reported to have arms, organized and ready to obey Bolshevik call. Doubtful whether Government can command men to suppress outbreak which not certain to occur; similar plans heretofore not executed.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says council address on foreign relations postponed until Saturday. Skobelev named also by committee of All-Russian Council of Peasants as the only peasant delegate to Allied conference at Paris. He stated in speech to the committee that "fundamental task of representatives of democracy at the conference is to advance at all costs the cause of peace. The Allies must honorably and openly set forth the conditions upon which they are ready to make peace." Stated furthermore conference should receive definite expressions from the Allies concerning annexations and contributions and the right of peoples to [determine] themselves. After affirming that the question of peace is seriously confronting all belligerents admitted "unfortunately our internal weakness renders our position at the conference held a difficult one." Said shame of unacceptable peace would throw Russia back many years and such should be avoided by revolutionary departments who should state why Russia fights and for what she is ready to stop the war.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

PETROGRAD, *October 26, 1917.*
[*Received November 27.*]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith enclosed, as a matter of information and probable interest to the Department, copy of the translation of an appeal, dated September 25/October 10 [8], by A. Kerensky, Russian Prime Minister, issued to the Russian people for their support.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure—Translation]

Declaration of the Russian Provisional Government, September 25/October 8, 1917

Our country is again experiencing grave trouble. In spite of the speedy suppression of the Kornilov uprising, the¹ shock occasioned by him is menacing the very existence of the Russian Republic.

Anarchy is reigning in the country; the pressure of the external enemy is increasing; counter-revolutionary elements are raising their heads, in the hope that the protracted crisis of authority, coupled with the feeling of exhaustion in the country, will help them to kill the freedom of the Russian people.

Great is the responsibility which the Provisional Government bears before the people in its mission to lead the country safely to the Constituent Assembly. This responsibility is lightened only by the profound belief that, united by a common desire to save the country and preserve the achievements of the revolution, representatives of all classes of the Russian people will understand their common aim of helping the Provisional Government to create an authority capable of practical work and able to solve the principal questions of the nation and to lead it without further trouble to the Constituent Assembly, the meeting of which must not be postponed for a single day.

Although supreme authority in the solution of all the great problems upon which depend the welfare of the Russian people must belong to the Constituent Assembly, the Provisional Government considers it its duty to strain all its efforts in the satisfactory solution of a series of measures of prime necessity.

In the firm conviction that only a general peace can give our great country an

opportunity for developing all its creative forces, the Provisional Government will continue to pursue its active foreign policy in the spirit of the democratic ideals announced by the Russian revolution. Acting in full agreement with our Allies the Provisional Government will take part at the coming conference of Allied countries, where Russia will be represented by a person enjoying the full confidence of the democratic organizations. At this conference our representative will endeavor, in addition to coming to an agreement with our Allies regarding our common war aims, to effect an agreement with them on the basis of the principles announced by the Russian revolution.

While striving for peace, the Provisional Government will exert all its efforts towards the protection of the Allied cause, towards the defense of the country, and a firm resistance to all attempts to force a foreign will on Russia, and towards expelling the enemy from the country.

In its endeavors to increase the fighting strength of the army, the Provisional Government will work along democratic lines. The choice of a commanding staff well prepared technically and answering the requirements of modern warfare, and at the same time devoted to the republican order, and working in close cooperation with the army committees will be made the basis in the organization of the army. By these means will be paved the way towards the establishment of military discipline, without which a powerful army is unthinkable. An exact definition of the rights and duties of the army committees will be announced in a separate decree, which will lend them due firmness. One of the measures necessary to raise the fighting strength of the army is to decrease the number of mobilized men at the expense of the rear organizations which have unduly grown, by discharging first of all the older soldiers.

The desire to preserve the country from further economic difficulties and to diminish the heavy burden lying on the shoulders of the laboring elements of the country, prompts the Provisional Government to take the following measures, supplementing and developing what has already been done by the Government:

The Provisional Government will endeavor to fix firm prices on the main products of industry, regulating at the same time the mutual relations between capital and labor particularly as to wages and working time. Cooperative societies will be widely utilized in the preparation and distribution of foodstuffs and manufactured articles. The private commercial apparatus will be widely utilized for the same purpose under direct state control. State control will be introduced over the industry with the participation of representatives of the capitalists and the working classes who will be entitled to intervene in the management of industrial concerns for the purpose of increasing production. Labor exchanges and conciliatory boards will receive further development for the purpose of protecting the right of workers in all branches of industry to coalesce and at the same time protecting the technical staffs from arbitrary action.

Preliminary measures for gradually demobilizing industry and for diminishing

suffering from inevitable unemployment, and, in particular, a plan for social work intended to remedy the damage inflicted by the war, will all receive due attention.

The solution of the land problem will be effected under the direct supervision of the local committees, to which will be transferred all lands of agricultural value, without, however, violating the existing proprietorship. The land committees will be entrusted with the full exploitation of such lands, in order to save the national wealth from further disorganization.

The Provisional Government proposes to undertake a revision of inheritance taxation, taxes on surplus incomes and on luxuries, to introduce a tax on property, to increase the existing indirect taxes and to introduce new sources of income in the form of financial monopolies.

The democratic legislation in local government will be further developed, gradually handing over to the municipalities the management of all matters of a local character.

Measures guaranteeing to the nationalities the right of self-government will be enacted by the Constituent Assembly. The Government will take steps to secure for the national minorities the right to use their own language in schools, law courts, in municipal institutions, and in communication with state institutions.

The Provisional Government is fully aware that all these aims cannot be achieved in the short period remaining before the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. But the initial steps in the realization of these aims will help to lighten the task of the Constituent Assembly and will give the Government effectual support in its active defense of the country and the restoration of the national economic life, as well as in its resolute fight against counterrevolution and anarchy, which are ruining the country and the revolution.

In this struggle, as well as in all its undertakings, the Government will act in close cooperation with the democratic organizations, seeing in such cooperation the most effective means for the solution of the problems before the country.

To insure the Government contact with the organized forces of the country, and thereby to gain the necessary strength and firmness, a Provisional Council will be formed, to act until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly. The council will be representative of all the elements of the country and will also contain the delegates selected by the Democratic Congress. The council will have the right to address interpellations to the Government and to receive replies within a definite period, to work out legislative measures and to consider all those questions which will be referred to it by the Provisional Government or which may arise out of its own initiative. The Provisional Government will consider it its duty to consider in all its actions the national importance of the council until the time when the Constituent Assembly will give to all elements of the country full and perfect representation.

Firmly standing in support of this program which expresses the hope of the whole people, the Government invites all the citizens to immediate and active

preparation for the Constituent Assembly. The Government hopes that all the citizens will unite around it for common work in the name of the fundamental and prime questions of our time—the defense of the country from the external enemy, the restoration of law and order, and the safe conduct of the country until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly.

A. KERENSKY
Prime Minister

¹ Maxim Gorky's *New Life*.

File No. 861.00/615

[Document 184]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 27, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received November 2, 6.55 a.m.*]

1922. Bolsheviki preparing outbreak for the 2d when National Soviet Congress assembles Petrograd. Quiet here, no manifestations of uneasiness notwithstanding rumors that the workmen armed organized and will have material assistance from Kronstadt. Another rumor that first Bolshevik act will be arrest of Provisional Government and their incarceration.

Papers contain numerous accounts of depreciations committed on railroads and throughout interior by the Bolsheviki. Government has announced intention to suppress Bolshevik manifestation peacefully or otherwise.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *October 29, 1917, 5 p.m.*

1808. As result of special report made at request of President by Root mission on return to Washington, there will be established, under direction Bureau of Public Information here: (1) a war cable service from New York to Vestnik Agency, Petrograd, approximating 1,000 words daily, service already begun; (2) moving-picture service on large scale, 75,000 feet of films already prepared will be shipped shortly with machines and operators; (3) possible encouragement of lecture bureau and pamphlet lecture program on large scale; (4) extensive Y.M.C.A. program, 200 secretaries in all, of whom 70 already in Russia or *en route*, will be under immediate direction of Harte, who sails about November 10. ...

Sisson, representing Bureau of Public Information, now sailing for Petrograd to study conditions and report regarding immediate realization of three features as enumerated. He represents Creel, who has been personally charged by President with direction of this undertaking. Y.M.C.A. program under exclusive control of Mott at New York. Sisson should be assisted in every way to make his work effective and insure sound understanding on his part of existing conditions.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 29, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received November 4, 4.45 a.m.*]

1931. Minister of Foreign Affairs addressed Council of Republic this afternoon and all Allied Ambassadors attending. Speech mainly on economic lines appealing to Russian pride and interest opposing separate peace or any peace reflecting on Russia. Received by Bolsheviki with indifferent coolness, elicited some applause from the right and center but not discussed, as debate thereon fixed for 31st.

Quiet here. Some doubt Bolshevik demonstration materializing November 2. All-Russian Council Workmen-Soldiers, also of Peasants, passed resolution against same. Trotsky, president of Petrograd Council Workmen-Soldiers, advocating demonstration and use of force, if necessary, to depose present Government, saying that Russian naval officers propose general peace on the lines of Skobelev [instructions] and if accepted, army will know for what it is fighting.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *October 30, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[*Received October 31, 1.10 a.m.*]

1509. Since I felt certain it would be in harmony with the Department's ideas, I have ventured to telegraph as follows to the Embassy at Petrograd:

October 27, 4 p.m. According to information received Germany is keen to make a separate peace with Russia, if only a temporary one, of sufficient duration, it is frankly said, for the exchange of prisoners after which she is indifferent as to Russia's attitude. Her present intention is undoubtedly to make Russia pay for [what] she and her allies may lose elsewhere.

The Red Cross Conference between Russia, Rumania and the Central powers, now in progress here, is being used to cover the exchange of officers on various pretexts in case a temporary peace should not be arranged. The subject of a peace has been broached in the conference but it is mere discussion, not [authorized] at least not openly.

Does the Department desire that we should send them cipher copies of the Legation's telegrams to the Department relative to the conference?

AMERICAN LEGATION

File No. 861.00/619

[Document 188]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *October 30, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received November 4, 5.35 a.m.]

1935. Beginning to think Bolsheviki will make no demonstration; if so, shall regret as believe sentiment turning against them and time opportune moment for giving them wholesome lesson. Minister for Foreign Affairs will reply Saturday to criticisms expected to-morrow on his address of yesterday and will leave for Paris Sunday morning.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 1, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received November 6, 2 a.m.]

1941. Bolshevik demonstration for November 2 abandoned but Trotsky and associates still advocating deposing of Kerensky ministry and claim demonstration be made if necessary therefor. Milyukov delivered strong address in Council of Republic yesterday mainly directed at the Bolsheviks whom he attacked fearlessly charging deplorable conditions including overwhelming Italian defeat to Bolshevik teachings. Criticized mercilessly Skobelev instructions for Paris conference. I was one Ambassador present and received ovation from the council excepting Bolsheviks when Milyukov complimented America. Rumanian Minister and myself acknowledged [ovation], Bolsheviks abstaining, at the close when the speaker paid tribute to Allies.

Minister for Foreign Affairs went to Stavka yesterday, returns tomorrow; departure for Paris changed from November 3 but not definitely fixed.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 2, 1917.*

1821. Overtures were made last week to the American Federation of Labor to call or to participate in an international conference of workmen and socialists from all countries. The Executive Council of the federation having before it a report made by the president of the federation, Mr. Gompers, made the following official declaration:

That we regard it as untimely and inappropriate, conducive to no good result, but on the contrary harmful, to hold an international conference at this time or in the near future with the representatives of all countries, including enemy countries, and we are constrained therefore to decline at this time either to participate in or to call such a conference. We take occasion to again send fraternal greetings to the people and the Republic of Russia and our earnest wishes for the success and permanency of Russia's democracy; that we all make energetic efforts in our common cause for freedom, justice and democracy in all of the nations of the world.

Please bring to attention of Provisional Government and to Consul General, Moscow.

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 2, 1917, 1.27 p.m.*

The Associated Press has sent an interview with Premier Kerensky concerning Russia's participation in the war. Based on two preliminary bulletins the *Washington Post* to-day published the wholly unwarranted headline, "Russia quits war." Thereafter I issued the following statement which you may use in any manner you may deem advisable:

There has been absolutely nothing in the despatches received by the Department of State from Russia, nor in information derived from any other source whatever, to justify the impression created by the *Washington Post* to-day, principally by the headline, "Russia quits war," that Russia is out of the conflict. A reading of the full interview with Premier Kerensky of which the paper published only an abbreviated and preliminary account, itself shows that the headline is entirely unwarranted.

Our own advices show that the Provisional Government in Petrograd is attacking with great energy the problems confronting it. Reports received from Petrograd by mail and telegraph show that Premier Kerensky and his government, far from yielding to discouragement, are still animated by a strong determination to organize all Russia's resources in a whole-hearted resistance and carry the war through to a victorious completion. At the same time this Government, like those of the Allies, is rendering all possible assistance.

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 2, 1917, 8 p.m.*

1825. Associated Press report received to-day gives interview with Kerensky. General impression after careful reading remains unfavorable. Report credits Kerensky with expressing sense of exhaustion of military capacity Russia and his surprise at absence of British fleet from Baltic when German fleet undertook recent operations there. Garbled version of report received earlier and printed one morning paper indicated Russia withdrawing from war and ready for separate peace.

Please ascertain reliability of report furnishing Department with copy original version as telegraphed by Associated Press also such other facts and comment as may assist Department.

It might be that this Government would find it difficult to justify financial support to another country associated with it in this war and which was nevertheless supine and inactive.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 2, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received November 4, 12.01 a.m.]

1945. Bolsheviki made unsuccessful attempt with two motor cars to start demonstration. Press reports great majority soldiers in Petrograd garrison have passed resolutions to obey Soviet if demonstration ordered. Right young men from the officers' military school just arrived Embassy saying ordered here by Petrograd staff to protect Embassy and guards sent to all foreign missions. Think this not significant but merely precaution.

Minister of War reported resigned but afternoon papers say will remain. Newspapers, Skobelev attacked speech of Minister of Foreign Affairs whose reported resignation denied. He returned this afternoon but so occupied could not see him.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 4, 1917, 6 p.m.*

[Original not received. Copied from confirmation.]

1949. Just conferred with Minister for Foreign Affairs, who has been inaccessible since the 29th. He says that he will start for Paris about the 10th instant, detained by replying to criticisms in the Council of Republic, 5th or 7th instant. Minister of War charged some evening paper yesterday with advocating separate peace, but publishes denial to-day and paper suppressed. Impression prevalent that the Minister of War flirting with Bolsheviki [regarding] deposing Provisional Government; resignation presented, then withdrawn but now granted indefinite leave and not expected to resume charge, assistant acting.

British Ambassador granted six weeks' leave going with Tereshchenko to Paris conference. Some predict he will not return. British Ambassador and Italian Ambassador apologized, by instruction of their Governments, to Kerensky for joint note but French Ambassador refused or failed to do so saying that his Government stood by its contents. Appears Minister of Foreign Affairs will represent Russia at Paris but can not be determined until Council of Republic acts on instruction. All-Russian Council of Peasants modified instructions of their delegate Skobelev.

Minister of Foreign Affairs says advance being planned on Russian-Rumanian front where army reliable, but does not expect great results. No demonstrations here, but many robberies throughout the country by hooligans and deserters. Citizens forming protective organizations in Petrograd and elsewhere.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 6, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received November 7, 11.25 p.m.*]

1954. Minister of War granted nominally indefinite leave, really removed and reported gone to monastery for recuperating. Bolsheviks reported preparing demonstration across the river where many factories located. Immediate cause is suppression of several Bolshevik papers including Gorky's.^{[1](#)} Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks Government can suppress but no one can foretell result now.

Kerensky just spoken in Council of Republic and demanded to know whether council will support the Government.

FRANCIS

^{[1](#)} Maxim Gorky's *New Life*.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 6, 1917, 9 p.m.
[Received November 8, 6.40 p.m.]

1957. Answering your telegram 1825, November 3 [2], just received. I saw Kerensky Associated Press interview the day sent but after same filed. Have also seen explanatory interview sent to-day and am repeating both *en clair* my telegram No. 1958 [November 10]. Kerensky received New York *World* and *Times* editorials on the interview and pleased thereat. English editorials displeased him as he thought it too critical of Russia. His secretary approved both interviews by signature on the copies filed in the telegraph office. Minister of Foreign Affairs did not see the first interview but read the second with me to-day and thought it satisfactorily explanatory. It is true Russia tired economically but the main handicap is army demoralization which is incurable except by time and propaganda. Criminal excesses of deserting occurring daily and may cause reactionary sentiment but regardless thereof we can not decline to extend or fail in any way to encourage Russia to continue war as her withdrawing therefrom would prolong the struggle five years or more and entail upon us incalculable sacrifice and loss.

Have shown Minister for Foreign Affairs your statement concerning interviews conveyed in unnumbered cable of November 2. We think inadvisable to use same here until the interviews published here which is unlikely as comments from England and America thereon might encourage peace sentiment if advocates thereof should feel that Allies expect Russia to do no more fighting instead of abandoning Russia at this juncture. What would you think of our sending two or more army divisions via Vladivostok or Sweden to her aid if I could get the consent of Russian Government therefor or even induce Government to make such a request? Moral effect of American troops on Russian front be more beneficial than the material assistance so rendered as millions of sensible Russians only need encouragement to organize. Reported 36,000 Russian officers at interior town have informed Government are ready to organize into brigades and go to front or perform any service Government may desire but Government has not consented thereto.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 10, 1917.*
[*Received November 18, 3.20 p.m.*]

1958. Following verbatim copies of Kerensky interviews given Associated Press representative Rennick:

Kerensky received Associated [Press correspondent in] beautiful panel library former private library office [of] Tsar, Winter Palace. Correspondent called attention widely contradictory reports Russia's conditions printed America and asked Premier frank statement facts.

"It [has] been said by travelers returning from England and elsewhere that opinion many people not officially but generally is that Russians practically out of war. Is Russia out of the war?"

Kerensky laughed with the answer. "[That] is a ridiculous question. Russia is taking enormous part in war. One has only to remember history. Russia began the war. While she already fighting England was only preparing and America was only observing. Russia at beginning bore whole brunt fighting thereby saving England, France. People who say she [is] out of war have short memories. We fought since beginning, we now worn out and have right [to] claim that Allies now take heaviest part burden their shoulders. At present Russian public opinion greatly agitated by question where is great British fleet now that German fleet is out in Baltic. Russia," Premier repeated, "is worn out. She been fighting one and half years longer than England."

"Could American army be of use if sent Russia?"

"It would be impossible send one," Kerensky replied. "It [is] question [of] transport; difficulties are too great."

"If America cannot send troops what [would] be most useful way [for] her [to] help Russia?"

"Have her send boots, leather, iron, and," Premier added emphatically, "money."

Kerensky drew attention [to] fact Russia fought her battles alone. "Russia

has fought alone, is fighting alone, France has had England to help her from start and now America has come in."

Kerensky was asked regarding morale [of] people, armies. "Masses are worn out economically," said Kerensky. "Disorganized state life in general has had psychological effect on people. They doubt the possibility of attainment."

"What is lesson to democracies of world of Russian revolution?"

"This," he replied, "is for them to find out. They must not lose faith in Russian revolution because it not a political revolution but an economic one and a revolution of facts must be made. Russian revolution only seven months old, no one has right to feel disillusioned about it. It takes years [to] develop fully. In France which [is] only as large as three Russian departments or states it took five years [for] their revolution [to] develop fully."

Associated [correspondent] asked what Kerensky expected from Constituent Assembly.

"Constituent Assembly begins new chapter [in] history revolution; its voice [will] be decisive; it [is] certainly most important factor future Russia."

"What future do you picture for Russia after war?"

"No one can draw any real picture [of] future," Kerensky said. "Naturally man who really loves country hopes for all good things but that [is] only his viewpoint which may or not be accepted by others."

Kerensky pale, nervous, and sat end carved table facing Associated [correspondent] emphasizing points statement tapping table [with] fingers. Wore brown undecorated uniform buttoned closely. He plainly fatigued result many trips [to] front, constant audiences diplomats, peasants' group, who latter [were] gathered outer room waiting see [him].

When Kerensky shown editorials on interview from England and America Associated Press sent following, filing same yesterday but not sent until to-day:

David Sauskis, secretary Kerensky, made following statement Associated to-day regarding "misinterpretation by London press" of interview recently accorded by the Minister-President to Associated [Press]:

I have seen Kerensky reference interview. Showed him quotation English press, he very much astonished at manner his plain statements received [in] London. Whoever read whole interview can draw but one conclusion from it, that Russia was doing, is doing, will do her utmost in carrying on her share [of] the common cause against enemy; that having devoted all her might from very first days

[of] war when England only begun her vast preparations and America was still neutral, Russia, who [was] always much poorer economically than her mighty allies, feels now natural pinch [of] war more than England, America, and therefore is justified in contention that her allies shoulder now heavier burden and should assist her unstintingly with war material and finances in matter of her requirements. Minister-President [in] this interview pointed out that not every one of Allied countries appreciates fairly great part Russia was and is still playing in war and that some are inclined to attack her bitterly because [of] great difficulties with which she [is] confronted now because natural evolution of her history. She will continue do her duty.

Sauskis said interpretation [by] American press [of] interview pleasing. He [has] recently recovered [from] serious illness.

FRANCIS

Chapter V. The November Revolution—The Bolshevik “Coup d’État,” November 7, 1917—The Struggle for Control

[198] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 7, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 10, 4.20 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/632

[199] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 7, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 10, 9.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/634

[200] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 8, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received November 9, 11.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/630

[201] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 8, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received November 10, 6.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/633

[202] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 8, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 10, 9.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/635

[203] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 9, 1917. [Received 11.65 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/631

[204] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 9, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 17, 9 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/668

[205] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 10, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received November 12, 1.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/642

[206] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 10, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received November 12, 2.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/646

[207] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 11, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 12, 1.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/645

[208] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 12, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 13, 3.16 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/651

[209] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

The Hague, November 12, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received 8.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/650

[210] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 12, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received November 16, 4.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/661

[211] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 13, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received November 17, 5.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/676

[212] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 14, 1917. [Received 8.25 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/658

[213] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 15, 1917. [Received November 19, 4.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/678

[214] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

Washington, November 16, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/661

[215] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 16, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 18, 8.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/677

[216] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 17, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received November 20, 2.45 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/689

[217] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 17, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received November 18, 2.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/673

[218] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 19, 1917. [Received 6.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/688

[219] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 19, 1917. [Received November 20, 12.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/682

[220] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 19, 1917. [Received November 20, 6.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/695

[221] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 20, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received November 22, 9.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/703

[222] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 21, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received November 22, 7.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/702

[223] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 22, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 24, 2.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/714

[224] The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/3477

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 7, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 10, 4.20 a.m.]

1961. Whitehouse,¹ *en route* to the Embassy this morning, was accidentally met by aide-de-camp of Kerensky and several [minutes afterwards by] latter who told him that he was hurriedly leaving to meet regular troops on the way to Petrograd to support Government which would otherwise be deposed. He acknowledged that Bolsheviki control city and that Government powerless without reliable troops as there are few here of that nature. He said that he expected that the remainder of Ministry would be arrested to-day and told Whitehouse to convey request to me not to recognize Soviet government if such is established in Petrograd as he expected whole affair to be liquidated within five days but this in my judgment depends on number of soldiers who will obey (him?).

FRANCIS

¹ Sheldon Whitehouse, Secretary of the Embassy.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 7, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received November 10, 9.15 a.m.]

1962. Bolsheviki appear to have control of everything here. Cannot learn whereabouts of any Minister. Two reported arrested and taken to Smolny Institute which is headquarters of Bolsheviki. Trotsky made incendiary speech Sunday and was followed in Russian by a man, Muscareis Nereid, who claims same strain [sic]. Trotsky introduced Lenin to Bolshevik audience to-day and Lenin made peace talk, violently attacking *bourgeoisie* and advocating division of property. No government here at present. Little firing on the street but no armed contests, some streets guarded. Majority of soldiers claim to be neutral but nearly all here are with Bolsheviki who say will form new government and notify Allies Russia cannot fight more and announce peace terms to Germany and if not accepted will then fight desperately for Russia. Many newspapers, perhaps all, suppressed.

10 p.m. Reported all Ministers arrested except Kerensky who has gone to Luga about 80 miles toward north front.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, November 8, 1917, 4 p.m.
[Received November 9, 11.50 p.m.]

959. Because of the possibility of telegraphic communication between our Embassy in Russia and the Department being interrupted due to latest developments in Petrograd, I am sending the following which appear in the press this morning as dispatches from the Russian official telegram bureau. According to these telegrams Bolsheviks have made successful *coup d'état*; have taken the State Bank, telegraphs, telegram bureau and have arrested certain members of Kerensky's government. It appears that an extraordinary meeting of Soviet was held yesterday afternoon, President Trotsky declaring Provisional Government no longer exists. The Council of the Republic declared dissolved. Lenin was greeted with long applause and spoke of the three problems facing Russian democracy: (1) immediate cessation of hostilities; (2) turning over land to the peasants; (3) settling the country's economic crisis. Resolution on vote of confidence for Kerensky was defeated 123 to 102; declaration by Maximalist [*sic*] Party was read disapproving of the *coup d'état* and withdrawing from Soviet. Kerensky finally proclaimed to the temporary Parliament¹ that the Government would fight even unto death to prevent the Bolshevik traitors who want to let [*sic*] the troops who will take Wilhelm and his friend into Russia from getting the supreme power they are aiming at. He read telegrams from the front demanding energetic measures against the excesses in St. Petersburg.

MORRIS

¹ Presumably at the session of Nov. 6.

File No. 861.00/633

[Document 201]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *November 8, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received November 10, 6.10 a.m.]

53. Revolutionary party headed by Council of Workmen-Soldiers' Deputies supported by garrison have taken over government of Moscow including administration post, telegraph. They have closed offices of all conservative newspapers. All relatively quiet. Consulate General will keep the Department fully informed and will take all necessary steps to protect American citizens and their interests.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 8, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 10, 9.30 a.m.]

1964. Telegraph office says our cables forwarded but doubt it, consequently repeating this from Moscow where it is sent by hand. Whereabouts of all Ministers except Kerensky unknown but most credible report is that all are imprisoned in St. Peter Fortress. Considerable firing last night until 2 o'clock. Main object of attack was Winter Palace where Ministry thought to be in session. After valiant defense by woman regiment and battalion of cadets Winter Palace surrendered having been bombarded by war vessel *Aurora* from river and attacked from the land. Casualties unknown. Quiet on streets to-day but Petrograd Council Workmen-Soldiers have sent bulletins throughout Russia that Soviet in control and Government deposed. Foreign Office, replying to inquiry, telephoned does not know where Minister of Foreign Affairs is and that no one representing new power has communicated with that department. ... [A person] connected with Department of Agriculture reports same closed as impossible to transact business and says all Ministers except Kerensky are imprisoned. Various reports concerning coming of troops from the northern front but impossible to ascertain truth thereof as wires under control of Petrograd council. British Ambassador just telephoned request that I come to British Embassy for conference 6 p.m. Suppose Allied diplomats invited.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 9, 1917.*
[Received 11.65 p.m.]

963. Information has reached me from Russia to the effect that a congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Councils for all Russia which opened Wednesday evening in Petrograd sent out yesterday morning three proclamations:

- (1) All power belongs to Soviets; the Government's representatives have been removed from their posts; chairmen of various Soviets are in direct communication with revolutionary Government.
- (2) Death penalty restored by Kerensky at the front is annulled and free play is given to political propaganda at the front; all revolutionary soldiers and officers arrested for so-called political crimes are to be set free.
- (3) Former Ministers Konovalov, Kishkin, Tereshchenko, Malyantovich, Nikitin and others have been arrested; Kerensky has fled; all military organizations are exhorted to take all measures to arrest him and bring him back to Petrograd; all complicity with Kerensky will be punished as high treason.

After some fighting the Bolsheviki took possession of Winter Palace where all Ministers except Kerensky were located.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 9, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 17, 9 a.m.]

1968. Possibly ominous quiet prevailed here last night and to-day. Definitely ascertained that all Ministers except Kerensky in Peter and Paul Fortress. Petrograd Workmen-Soldiers with minority of national Soviet named Ministry 4 a.m. to-day but am not officially informed. Understand Lenin is [Premier], Trotsky Minister for Foreign Affairs.

Telegram from Consul General dated November 8, 8 p.m., states Moscow under Bolsheviki sustained by garrison.

Petrograd City Duma refuses recognition of Military Revolutionary Committee which has been directing all matters from Smolny Institute, headquarters of Petrograd Soviet.

Kornilov reported escaped. Kerensky reported *en route* Petrograd with one and one half army corps from northern front, but another report says railroad employees refusing to bring soldiers into Petrograd unless so ordered by Soviet committee.

Meeting called by dean yesterday attended by entire Diplomatic Corps. Dean said French Ambassador requested meeting. Latter said object was to confer concerning safety of our respective colonies. No [only] definite action taken was that [each] head of mission should act in such matters as his judgment dictated. No mention made of any new government or recognition thereof when and if established.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 10, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[Received November 12, 1.35 a.m.]

1970. Troops of the Provisional Government reported approaching city and one engagement reported at Gachina about thirty miles from Petrograd. In my estimate Bolshevik regiment defeated. These rumors unconfirmed.

Trotsky visited a senator yesterday after Bolshevik messenger had been refused secret treaties which he demanded, Assistant Minister Neratov and Petraev having told messenger that treaties could not be taken from department but only be exhibited to new Minister for Foreign Affairs when appointed by authorized power. Trotsky appeared later and after assembling Foreign Office force, announced himself Minister for Foreign Affairs whereupon entire force declined to serve and left department which is now closed, not even responding to telephone calls. Only department responding to telephone is Ways of Communication but Minister of Ways of Communication imprisoned.

State Bank entered by Bolsheviki, said to be sailors, who took possession in the name of Soviet government but no appropriation of money reported.

Later, 5 p.m. Just been visited by member of Committee of Safety of which Avksentiev chairman and which has representatives from City Duma, from All-Russian Council of Peasants, and from army delegates to Soviet national congress who bolted that organization when Bolsheviki came into control. Committeeman's name Vilenkin, whose brother former attaché, Russian Embassy, Washington, says Bolsheviki being deserted by soldiers and new government virtually ended; that Savinkov and Kerensky with troops only 20 versts from Petrograd and within twenty-four hours and advancing; says instructed to inform me officially.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 973).

File No. 861.00/646

[Document 206]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 10, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received November 12, 2.25 a.m.*]

1972. All ministers released except Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Trade and Commerce. Of course we should make no loans to Russia at present.

Kerensky said to be within five miles of Petrograd but nothing definite is known, not even if armed resistance will be [offered].

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 974).

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 11, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 12, 1.35 a.m.]

972. I have just had talk over long-distance telephone with my representative I sent to Haparanda who had a conference with Italian Ambassador to Russia who arrived at Swedish frontier this morning and gave the following information.

The mayor of Petrograd has appointed a Committee of Safety which is operating against the Bolsheviks and this committee is receiving the support of the American and British Embassies. The Duma of the city of Petrograd is sitting continuously; the labor elements are deserting the Bolshevik Party. Bolsheviks have one battleship in Petrograd supporting them. Kerensky is supposed to be about forty miles from Petrograd where he has issued proclamations to the effect that he is still the Prime Minister of Russia. Kerensky expects march with troops against the Bolsheviks in Petrograd. Helsingfors, Finland, is in the hands of Bolsheviks. There is no railway communication between Petrograd and Moscow. Bolsheviks have not secured control in Tornea. Conditions there are normal and there have been no disturbances.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 12, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 13, 3.16 a.m.]

977. I have been able to get into telephone communication with Torneå and I am informed that according to report current there Kerensky is in control of Russian telegraphs; that telegrams from southern Russia report country is controlled by Cossacks working under Kerensky; that the Bolshevik troops badly beaten at Tsarskoe Selo and retired to Petrograd where they are quartered in certain section of the city; that the Allied missions in Petrograd are now in connection with Kerensky who has announced Government centers at Moscow, Novocherkassk; that Generals Kornilov and Kaledin have called upon every one to oppose Bolsheviks. According to passengers arriving at Torneå to-day from Petrograd, newspapers are reappearing in Petrograd all announcing defeat of Bolsheviks; that there has been considerable fighting on Nevski Prospekt.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/650

[Document 209]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *November 12, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received 8.30 p.m.*]

1619. Russian Chargé d’Affaires says that all Russian diplomatic missions in western Europe, with one exception not heard from, have communicated with each other and agreed not to recognize Lenin government nor to carry out any instructions that may be received from it.

GARRETT

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]


PETROGRAD, November 12, 1917, 10 p.m.
[Received November 16, 4.40 a.m.]

1974. Last cable from Department yesterday No. 1829, November 3 [6].² Have sent daily cables giving conditions, some through Stockholm. Bolshevik government attempting to administer but have not taken charge of departments and continue issue orders from the Smolny Institute, Bolshevik headquarters. Have received no written or oral notice that new government administering affairs.

Kerensky reported with 60,000 troops ten miles distant. Was expected yesterday. One report is that he is attempting to negotiate with Petrograd garrison of 60,000 troops minimum great majority of whom are neutral. Another report is that he is under arrest by the troops with him and they are waiting for the coming of Alexeev, Kornilov or some man in whom they have more confidence. Still another report is that his troops are Bolshevik in sentiment and unwilling to fight their comrades. Only armed resistance to Bolsheviks here since the fall of Winter Palace 2 a.m., November 8, is *Junkers* or cadets from schools for officers. Many *Junkers* have been brutally murdered. One report is that only sixty-five of twelve [hundred] survive but think that exaggerated. Battalion of women aided *Junkers* to defend Winter Palace but surrendered with few casualties; hostilities resulting in their treatment after surrendering but none murdered. Telephone office captured by thirty-five *Junkers* yesterday but surrendered after occupation of eight hours. Bolshevik armed force consists of sailors, some soldiers and of armed workmen.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 991).

 ² Vol. III, chap. IV.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 13, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received November 17, 5.15 p.m.]

1978. Quiet here probably result of announcement of railway union that if civil war not ended immediately railroads would cease to operate throughout Russia.

Reports that two battles fought ten miles distant with Bolsheviks successful in the first and Kerensky in the second but both unconfirmed. Bolsheviks control Petrograd having issued an order that pillaging and searching of apartments cease. Telegraph employees struck last night refusing to work for Bolshevik government. Have received nothing official from Lenin-Trotsky government.

Effort being made to compromise on Ministry exclusively socialistic, including Bolshevik, International, Menshevik and Social Revolutionary factions. Present government opposed by Social Revolutionists, many Mensheviks and some Internationals. Chernov reported with Kerensky forces and is mentioned as compromise president. All four factions mentioned advocate peace. Bolshevik government was named night of 8th by Soviet which passed at the same session a law dividing all lands in Russia including those belonging to Crown, Royal Family, Church and large landowners, specifying no compensation therefor but excluding Cossack lands.

Much fighting in Moscow streets. Reported that 2,000 killed, Mensheviks in control. Fighting also in Kiev where Bolsheviks defeated by Cossacks who in control. Three Cossack regiments in Petrograd but taking no part in contest. Cossacks reported with Kerensky 10,000 to 20,000 in number but no definite information. Exact number of soldiers in Petrograd unknown. Estimates vary from 60,000 to 200,000; large majority profess neutrality but thought imbued with Bolshevik sentiment.

[FRANCIS]

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1000).

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 14, 1917.*
[*Received 8.25 p.m.*]

983. Have just been in telephonic communication with our representative Torneå who says he is informed Petrograd still in control of Bolsheviki, that fighting of very disorderly character has been renewed in Petrograd, that Bolsheviks are without discipline having no officers to direct troops, that it is reported telephone and telegraph offices have been wrecked. He states that newspapers report Kerensky advancing on Petrograd with 100,000 troops, Bolshevik newspapers say he has only 5,000. Bolsheviks are digging trenches around Petrograd. Passengers report that Allied missions still working together but have no dealings with Bolsheviki and that endeavor to form coalition government has been practically abandoned as parties could not agree among themselves. Another Cossack general named Krasnov said to be advancing to Petrograd.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 15, 1917.*
[*Received November 19, 4.20 p.m.*]

1983. Last cable from Department unnumbered, dated November 3. Situation here mixed, Bolshevik forces composed of soldiers, sailors and armed workmen command city under direction of a Military Revolutionary Committee. Socialistic factions trying to agree on a coalition socialistic Ministry. No Americans injured. Forces under Kerensky reported near city. Several engagements in which Kerensky forces reported defeated. Fighting on Moscow streets. Killed estimated high as 5,000. National Hotel, Great Theater, telephone and post office injured by Bolshevik artillery. No advice of Americans injured Moscow but no direct information from Summers since 11th. Comparative quiet prevails here.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain.

File No. 861.00/661

[Document 214]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden
(Morris)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 16, 1917, 3 p.m.*

408. Your 991, November 15, 9 p.m.¹ Try advise Francis Department has nothing from him since his 1964, November 8. Apparently wireless stations also blocked. Please continue to advise Department which is anxious for information conditions specially welfare Embassy and Consulate staffs and other Americans in Russia.

POLK

¹ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 16, 1917, 6 p.m.
[Received November 18, 8.15 a.m.]

1985. Endeavoring to reach you through every available channel. American Minister, Stockholm, reports forwarding cables sent him. Find two cables delivered from you since November 3; namely, 1829, November 6, 4 p.m.,³ and open cable same date giving Secretary's statement concerning Japanese relations⁴ which communicated to Japanese Ambassador and Chinese Minister, both gratefully acknowledging receipt. British, American, French, Italian Ambassadors united in sending alternately daily courier to Torneå or Stockholm. I hear that British courier planned leaving to-day but strike on Finnish railroad prevents.

Embassy guard reported in 1945⁵ left November 12 leaving guns here. They were *Junkers* who were ordered to return to Nikolai School where they arrived safely. *Junkers* to the number of 1,200 have offered only a weak resistance to Bolshevik soldiers and armed workmen called Red Guard who have brutally killed *Junkers* whenever seen in streets and reported to have murdered some who surrendered. Quiet here; have been only casual shots fired in the streets. Reported severe fighting Moscow. Killed estimated at 4,000, including many of the citizens. Last report is fighting ceased, Bolsheviks in control. Ten Polish soldiers in Embassy sent without request by Polish military committee which assumes neutral position which understand Bolsheviks say must end or Polish soldiers be disarmed. No communication received from power administering affairs here. If Poles ordered from Embassy shall organize and arm staff numbering twenty to defend Embassy against pillage. Other Embassies also guarded by Polish soldiers. Do not know what they will do but I have concluded to decline Bolshevik guards if tendered. Have no fear of personal violence or damage to Embassy where I remain continuously. Have decided however to advise unattached American women and men with wives and children to leave Russia temporarily and have secured two sleepers therefor leaving on Siberian November 20.


Efforts to agree on compromises Ministry unsuccessful thus far. Quiet here.

Kerensky appears to be fugitive; after his defeat at Gatchina on 13th was arrested by Cossacks whom he led to defeat. Learned this from his aide who left him 2 a.m., 14th, coming to Petrograd in civilian clothes and calling at Embassy after dark last

evening saying had books, papers, printed matter and effects in Petrograd and that Kerensky had instructed him to inform me of the situation. Departments closed or partially operating without chiefs. Secured sleeper from superintendent of passenger service.

FRANCIS

² Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1008).

 ³ Vol. III, chap. IV.

 ⁴ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. 269.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 219 [Pg. 219 includes portions of [Doc. 193](#) and [Doc. 194](#)].

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *November 17, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received November 20, 2.45 a.m.]

59. On the 9th instant Maximalist Party supported by Moscow garrison and workmen armed by Kerensky to fight Kornilov seized government of Moscow. The mayor of city and all authorities supported by officers, students and military cadets, occupied arsenal and strategic points leading to Kremlin. Heavy fighting took place over entire city lasting seven days and accompanied by heavy loss of life and property.

Moscow in chaos, panic may be looked for if the armed workmen begin to loot. All real newspapers stopped and city practically isolated. Maximalists threaten to stop railways to prevent arrival of troops to support Provisional Government.

Americans all safe, many of them going to barracks of French military mission for defense. Consulate and my private residence slightly damaged by rifle and shell fire, houses in immediate vicinity completely demolished.

I cannot too strongly commend Poole's untiring efforts in behalf of Americans in grave danger.

The situation is grave as more serious fighting is expected soon and the Maximalists will not give up the city without great loss of life. Every effort is being made to protect Americans and I may have to draw for considerable sum to meet the emergency and enable them to leave if necessary. I am keeping Embassy advised.

There is strong feeling amongst the working class against the Allies including America and if the movement is not put down immediately peace may be made with Germany. Even if this be not done Russian troops cannot continue the campaign as they have no food, no discipline and are weary of the war. The difficulties of transport and pressure on the western front will prevent German military advance into heart of Russia this winter but the general disorganization now existing will permit almost unhindered operations by German espionage and propaganda. Our immediate problem is to counteract their work in every way possible. For this purpose as well as to lend moral support to the better elements in Russia, which will regain the upper hand, every effort must be made to

maintain every American agency in Russia.

SUMMERS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 17, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 18, 2.05 a.m.]

1006. I have just had a personal letter from Ambassador Francis dated November 13 and brought by courier in which he states that he will continue advising me of the situation and asks that I inform you of his cables which I have been doing immediately they were received. The Ambassador writes that there is no Government there of which he is officially informed.

The Allied embassies' military attachés have visited informally the Smolny Institute, headquarters of Bolsheviki, and have been assured that all foreigners particularly American citizens are quite safe in the capital. Trotsky, who has been appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, is a Bolshevik and like them all is advocating the general division of property, including money in the banks. As you know I have been sanguine about the outcome in Russia and have done all I possibly could to keep her in the war. From my telegrams you will observe that the new Ministry, whatever its composition, is likely advocate peace but not separate peace. The new government's first act was to draw up peace proposal all countries at war which was dispatched by wireless night of November 8.

Ambassador has not heard of receipt of any replies. A three months' armistice was also proposed.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 19, 1917.*
[Received 6.20 p.m.]

1011. Following telegram dated 18th received to-day from our representative, Torneå:

No news from Petrograd to-day. Local Workmen's and Soldiers' committee received telegram from their headquarters in Helsingfors stating that Kerensky's forces surrounded by Red Guard near Petrograd but Kerensky escaped again. Have captured Cossack General Krasnov and Voitinski, Commissar of Provisional Government; that Petrograd quiet; that Bolshevik troops were sent to Moscow to assist Bolsheviks there; that Cossack General Kaledin still completely controls Don Cossack region thereby holding all of Russia's coal and bread supplies; that Abo and Aland still in hands of Russian troops, Helsingfors committee also ordering frontier to be closed; and that passports visaed by Russian missions abroad not to be recognized here. Another irregular train arrived this morning but carrying few passengers. Norwegian courier states opposing forces in Moscow evenly divided but that new Bolshevik troops sent from Petrograd will succeed to overcome loyalty supporters.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 19, 1917.*

[*Received November 20, 12.05 a.m.*]

1020. Our representative Torneå telegraphs me 3 o'clock this afternoon as follows:

To-day new rumors regarding large-scale preparations by Kerensky to advance against Petrograd. Moscow fighting and serious damage to city confirmed by passengers and newspapers arriving from Petrograd to-day. Petrograd quiet, theaters open and trains running. Bolsheviki unable to present satisfactory list of ministers for new cabinet. Passengers state soldiers quietly parading with banners, "Russia does not want separate peace," demanding Constitutional Assembly of all Russia, "Down with Petrograd domination of minority party's tyranny!" demanding freedom of press, "Nicholas's régime was never as tyrannical as Bolsheviki's régime." Gorky's paper and *Golos Naroda* say, "No peace! With Russian Constituent Assembly, and dismissal of Red Guard." Central Committee of Social Democrats passes resolution, "If coalition cabinet is formed all parties must be proportionately represented, liberty of press, dismissal of Red Guard, immediate cessation of fratricidal war and freedom from imprisonment of former Government supporters." Passengers almost unanimously of opinion that no matter how strong present revolutionary government is it cannot last because it is without support of all parties including extremist socialists.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 19, 1917.*

[*Received November 20, 6.30 p.m.*]

1024. From Petrograd:

1993, November 19, 9 p.m. No disturbances here or Moscow. Bolshevik control in Moscow; also have force here but appear unwilling or unable to exercise it. Food becoming scarcer daily, bread ration lowered to three-quarters pound for two days. Mayor of Petrograd informed municipal council that Soviet asked State Bank for fifteen million rubles which refused thereupon neutral soldier guard replaced by guard of Bolshevik regiment. City Duma, thinking bank seriously threatened, appointed special commission of twenty councilors for its protection and decided to issue appeal to troops and population on the subject.

When All-Russian Soviet adjourned November 8 after appointing Ministry with Lenin President and Trotsky Minister for Foreign Affairs, it elected executive committee of one hundred. About thirty withdrew from committee after an effort to form compromise ministry failed. Remainder of committee at meeting yesterday by vote of fifty-five to five made Lenin virtually dictator by giving him authority to formulate and promulgate rules, regulations and laws for the government of Russia. Some prominent Bolshevik members of committee headed by Kamenev, Rykov and others withdrew from committee and issued address giving reasons therefor. Peasant soldiers of western front at the instance of Chernov adopted resolution against Lenin ministry and declared until Constituent Assembly meets would recognize no new government not empowered by All-Russian Congress of Peasants. Ten or more Bolshevik ministers resigned. Francis.

Our passport control representative at Torneå wires revolutionary-military committee assumes charge there and prohibits exits when unauthorized by Smolny.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 20, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received November 22, 9.10 a.m.]

2001. ... [A former official] accompanied by Chaikovski, well-known Russian, visited me to-day representing National Committee of Defense. Stated Russian conditions critical as Bolshevik government, composed mainly of Lenin and Trotsky, had deceived people by promising peace which could not fulfil. Severely condemned Lenin and Trotsky for misleading people who were weary of war and desiring peace will overturn Bolshevik pretended government as it cannot negotiate peace and will be followed by greater anarchy than now prevails. They thought situation might be saved if Allies would call a conference and state aims for which they are fighting thus showing active desire to stop war. I told them our aims had been stated our entering the war and repeated several times since. They so admitted but said absolutely necessary that Allied conference be held and peace aims of all Allies be announced, and if reasonable would be acceptable to Russian people, and if not accepted by Germany such a move would inspire Russia with renewed courage and resuscitate army which now demoralized. They said had called on British Ambassador who had told them confidentially that he approved of suggestion and would so cable his Government. Do not see that we can lose by such conference and recommend that authority be given me to discreetly state our position on the question. ... Chaikovski represents peasants on the committee whose chairman Avksentiev has left Petrograd because unsafe for him to remain there. Please answer.

Lenin attempting to administer. Trotsky visited Foreign Office yesterday, received by Neratov whose flight with treasury untrue. Neratov offered no opposition to Trotsky taking charge but thereupon left the Foreign Office as did other chiefs of bureaus and employees. Trotsky called for cashier who appeared, delivered keys on demand and also departed. Trotsky not interviewed but his secretary quoted as replying to reporters that new Minister for Foreign Affairs would remove Russian representatives in other countries and in due time notify diplomats in Russia of his installation as Minister for Foreign Affairs.

What done at Paris conference? Army food supply is exhausted and divisions reported marching to Petrograd where food is scarce.

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1039).

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 21, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received November 22, 7.30 a.m.]

1038. The private secretary of Kerensky, Dr. David Sauskis, by some means contrived to leave the frontier at Torneå unknown to the Bolsheviks who had a strict guard at this place and he has just arrived at Stockholm. I confidentially learned of his whereabouts and have just had a long conversation with him in which he states that he left Petrograd Friday and saw Kerensky a few days prior to his departure. He states that the reason for Kerensky's defeat by the Bolsheviks was due to the railway union. This union presented an ultimatum both to Kerensky and Bolsheviks demanding that they cease hostilities and stating that if their demand was not complied with all railway transportation would cease at once. Their ultimatum being ignored all trains were stopped. This left Kerensky without ammunition and also delayed reenforcements which were *en route* to aid him. Bolsheviks on the contrary had vast amount of supplies and ammunition in Petrograd and therefore defeated Kerensky forces. Sauskis states that he is convinced that the whole Bolshevik movement has been engineered from Germany. He says many evidences of this have been found and cites where two boxes in the possession of two private soldiers in Helsingfors were opened and were found to contain three million and ten million Finnish marks, respectively. He also points out the fact that Bolsheviks have appointed a Polish lawyer named Koslovski as administrator of Polish affairs who is notorious German agent who was arrested by Kerensky for dealing with the enemy. He states also that a private soldier is now Governor General of Finland. Sauskis states that Bolshevik government cannot possibly exist for more than two to four weeks and that in his opinion the next government will be all socialist. He urges that the United States be not impatient and says that the only hope is for America not to take sides in the present struggle but to await the formation of some more stable government.

MORRIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *November 22, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received November 24, 2.10 p.m.]

85. Situation quiet but anarchy and confusion reign everywhere. On the one hand anti-Maximalist feeling growing on account of cruelties and atrocities committed during recent riots. On the other hand army and proletariat consider Allies responsible for continuation of the war. This is a direct result of German propaganda and the decentralizing and disintegrating forces at work in Russia are so great that the army will be unable to render Allies further assistance.

At Moscow banks are closed and business suspended. New disorders are daily expected. I am taking all possible steps to protect Americans and will if necessary send them away in which case I may have to draw on the Department for funds for the purpose.

As dean of the Consular Corps have demanded and secured exemption of foreigners' homes from search. All the Consulates have furnished their nationals safe-conducts with seal of the War Revolutionary Committee, also a document establishing status of their dwellings. Strict orders have been given by Revolutionary Committee to respect these documents which though irregular are absolutely necessary under present conditions. Am daily in contact with committee and firmly insisting on the strictest respect for the lives and property of foreigners.

Y.M.C.A. have done brave work here and their coolness has enabled us to avoid a panic.

Every one safe and relatively calm.

SUMMERS

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following unsigned telegram to the Russian Embassy at Washington was left by the Ambassador at the Department of State on November 27, 1917:]

PETROGRAD, *November 22, 1917.*

On the 7th of November the action of the "bolsheviki" took place, having for its result the arrest of the members of the Provisional Government. On the 11th General Manikovski took temporarily charge of the Ministry of War, on condition of a complete non-interference into his activities and so as to enable the Ministry of War, standing out of politics, to resume its work necessary for the defense of the country.

The activities of the Ministry of War had recommenced and all measures were taken in order to secure the safety of foreign Embassies and Legations as well as to the promptest restoration of the telegraph communications. The general headquarters of the armies were informed of the situation and a reply was received stating that the conditions there were analogical. General Dukhonin sent a wireless on the 14th of November communicating that on account of the absence of Kerensky and lack of information as to his whereabouts, he is assuming temporarily the high command of the armies and called the troops, awaiting the solution of the crisis, to remain calm on the front fulfilling their duty towards the country so as to prevent the possibility for the enemy to take advantage of the situation and to penetrate further into boundaries of the motherland.

In view of the fact that the Foreign Office has not as yet resumed its activities, the Chief of the General Staff has considered it necessary to enter into direct relations with the Allied Embassies in order to carry on, as far as possible, the current affairs. Following the instructions given by the Chief of the General Staff, the Director of the Military Intelligence called on the British Ambassador, dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and made the following suggestions:

- (1) The Foreign Office having temporarily interrupted its activities, relations concerning urgent current affairs to be established directly with the General Staff.
- (2) With regard to the Allied conference in Paris it was stated that the Russian delegates were unable to leave for Paris on account of the events of 7–12th of November. Nevertheless, under the present conditions it would be highly undesirable for the interest of the common cause to

enable the strengthening of an impression that Russia by the force of the events is practically out of the ranks of the belligerents and is no more considered by her allies as an active member amongst them.

Consequently it seems advisable either to postpone the conference until a time when Russian delegates could participate, or to organize simultaneously in Petrograd another conference of a purely military character pertaining to matters already elaborated and prepared by the Russian General Staff, and so as to communicate to the Paris conference the proceedings of the Petrograd meeting, the latter to be *vice versa* kept informed of the results attained in Paris.

- (3) Rumors, which appeared in the Russian press, about the departure of the Allied representatives have an extremely unfavorable action on public opinion; any impression which might be created to the effect that the Allies are abandoning the Russian people in the present critical situation could rouse a feeling of the nation that Russia is freed from responsibility for the disruption of the Allied action.

Chapter VI. The Armistice with the Central Powers—Appeals for General Peace Negotiations

[225] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 10, 1917, 3 p.m. [Received November 11, 10.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/644

[226] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

London, November 18, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received 11.10 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/13332

[227] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 21, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received November 22, 4.46 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/705

[228] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 22, 1917. [Received November 24, 9.10 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/954

[229] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 22, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received November 24, 6.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/716

[230] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 24, 1917. [Received November 27, 9.15 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/957

[231] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 24, 1917, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/740a

[232] The Minister in Denmark (Egan) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, November 26, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 27, 7.55 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/960

[233] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 27, 1917. [Received November 28, 9.54 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/964

[234] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 27, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received November 30, 12.20 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/969

[235] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 28, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 30, 9.32 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/974

[236] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 28, 1917, 12 noon. [Received November 30, 1 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/737

[237] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 29, 1917. [Received November 30, 11.40 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/967

[238] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 1, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 763.72119/967

[239] The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State

Undated.

File No. 763.72119/1856¹/₂

[240] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 2, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received December 3, 3.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/756¹/₂

[241] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 3, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received December 4, 6.05 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/7956

[242] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 4, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 6, 10.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/765

[243] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 6, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received December 10, 10.10 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1003

[244] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 11, 1917. [Received March 2, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/1212

[245] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 14, 1917, 12 p.m. [Received December 16, 2.27 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/814

[246] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 18, 1917. [Received March 2, 1918.]

File No. 763.72110/1420

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 10, 1917, 3 p.m.*
[Received November 11, 10.35 p.m.]

967. I have been able to obtain information concerning recent events in Russia which I am cabling to you as I believe our Embassy's communications are being interrupted. This information comes from Bolshevik sources which is all that now leaves Russia.

Two proclamations have been issued by Soviet's Revolutionary Military Committee announcing that it holds the reins of government at head of garrison and proletariat of Petrograd; that its course, namely, immediate democratic peace, annulment property owners' right to possess land, workers' control of production and formation of government from ranks of Soviet has been won; that soldiers and workmen have risen as one man and won cause without bloodshed; front is called upon to support Soviet which will immediately propose just peace, give land to peasants and call Constituent Assembly.

The Congress of Soviets of all Russia in session at Petrograd adopted resolution that all belligerents commence negotiations for just democratic peace such as is wanted by majority of working classes of all belligerents and was wanted in Russia after fall of monarchy; such peace should be immediate, without annexations or forcible conquest of foreign nation and without indemnities. Russia is ready to take steps to have such a peace agreed upon by authorized representatives of all nations. Government understands by annexations either annexation by powerful state or [of] weak nation against its will or occupation of transoceanic territories, which takes place when population of any state is held by force, its right to a general referendum is refused against its will expressed in its press, national assemblies, party decisions or by revolt, and troops of occupation are not withdrawn. The government regards it a crime to continue war to partition weak nations among the powerful and proclaims its solemn decision to sign peace conditions as above. All peace negotiations shall be absolutely open and non-secret and all secret treaties of former Government shall be published and declared null and void. Government proposes immediate cessation of hostilities to be agreed upon for a period of three months and that all the nations of the world should participate in peace negotiations.

MORRIS

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

LONDON, *November 18, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[*Received 11.10 p.m.*]

For the President:

The following is short *résumé* of the general political conditions.

Russia: Kerensky and other more responsible officials urge Allies to make an offer of peace, basis no annexations or indemnities. They believe Germany would not accept and this would help to solidify Russia. They do not believe Germany would make separate peace with Russia owing to danger of socialistic infection, but they believe Germany will take Petrograd and near provinces in spring. They claim this would suit German purposes better because demobilization of Russian Army would produce anarchy and total loss stores of supplies. ...

EDWARD HOUSE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 21, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received November 22, 4.46 p.m.*]

2004[?]. Soviet passed resolution ordering Dukhonin, chief of staff and acting generalissimo, to propose three months' armistice to enemy commanders but to submit terms back for approval. Also indicated would inform chiefs of Allied missions of such action. No communication yet received from Lenin government, Ukrainian independent government reported agreed on three months' armistice. Reports multiply concerning German activities. Believe German headquarters established here and Moscow where work becoming more open daily. No news from the outside world. Quiet here, snowing. Efforts to form compromise ministry not entirely abandoned but accomplishing but little.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1040).

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 22, 1917.*
[*Received November 24, 9.10 a.m.*]

2006. Following is literal translation of document received at American Embassy 11 p.m., 21st instant:

THE COMMISSARY OF THE PEOPLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PETROGRAD, *November 7, old style, 1917.*

MR. AMBASSADOR OF THE UNITED STATES: By the present I have the honor to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the National Congress of the Councils of the Deputies of the Workmen and Soldiers established on the 26th of the month of October of this year (old style) a new government of the Russian Republic under the form of the Council of the Commissaries of the People. The president of this Government is Mr. Vladimir Ilich Lenin and the management of the foreign policy was entrusted to me as Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs.

In drawing your attention to the text of the proposition for an armistice and a democratic peace without annexations or contributions founded on the right of people to dispose of themselves, proposals approved by the Congress of the Councils of Workmen and Soldiers, I have the honor to beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good enough to regard the above-mentioned document as a formal proposal for an armistice without delay on all the fronts and for the opening without delay of negotiations for peace—a proposal which the plenipotentiary government of the Russian Republic is addressing simultaneously to all belligerent nations and to their governments.

I beg you, Mr. Ambassador, to be good enough to accept the assurance of the perfect consideration and very profound respect of the government of the councils for the people of the United States who also like all the other peoples exhausted by this incomparable butchery cannot help but ardently desire peace.

The Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs
LEON TROTSKY

[*Managing Secretary of the Council of Commissaries of the People*]

BONCH-BRUEVICH

[Witnessed by] *Secretary*, N. GORBUNOV

As a receipt for the communication mentioned above was requested the dragoman of the Embassy signed a receipt for an envelope as addressed to the American Ambassador. I presume that same as above has been addressed to my colleagues and will immediately confirm. A meeting of representatives of Allied powers called by British Ambassador for 3 p.m. to-day.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 22, 1917, 9 p.m.
[Received November 24, 6.10 p.m.]

2007. At a meeting of Allied chiefs this afternoon agreement was unanimous and emphatic that no notice should be taken of note from Foreign Office in my 2006. Note had been received by British, American, French and Italian Embassies and by Belgian and Serbian Legations only. Japanese and Brazilian Embassies and Rumanian, Portuguese, Chinese, Greek and Siamese Legations had not received the note but were represented at conference.

Conclusion without dissent was that each chief when asked by the [correspondents] should reply truly whether note received and he make whatever additional statement he chose. I have told Associated [Press] and *World* representatives that note received and forwarded Department for its information and shall make same reply to Russian press if asked.

Agreed furthermore that each chief should request his Government not to direct him to make reply to communication, as pretended government established by force and not recognized by Russian people.

Learned at conference British, French and Italian Ambassadors representing governments of London agreement, with the approval of their [governments, instructed] military attachés at headquarters to protest against armistice as violating that agreement. Shall wire Major Kerth² at headquarters to join in protest. Heard since conference that Dukhonin, acting generalissimo, replied refusing to obey order and stating that he commanded army to resist invader whereupon he was removed and Krylenko, commissary of Lenin government, appointed.

8 p.m. Rumanian Minister just received telegrams his military attaché at north front that famine has begun and army desperate; also telegram from his military attaché at west front that Dietrichs who is next in command to Dukhonin says Lenin working for Germany whose plan is to encourage civil strife in Russia so that German troops will be called to restore order and then separate peace negotiated on terms favorable to Germany and disastrous to Russia. This not improbable. Rada of Ukraine has ordered all Ukraine needed soldiers to return

home and Cossacks told by army committee to return to their country. Chernov, Tseretelli and Avksentiev reported at Stavka organizing another government with Chernov as president.

[FRANCIS]

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1053).

² Lieut. Col. Monroe C. Kerth, representative of the U. S. Army with the staff of the Russian Commander in Chief.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 24, 1917.*

[*Received November 27, 9.15 a.m.*]

2024. Translation of Trotsky's speech previously referred to transmitted in full by mail.¹ After outlining his interpretation of effect of Soviet peace decree upon Russia's foreign relations he emphasized power of working classes and helplessness of *bourgeoisie*. Referring to political attitude of other nations towards Soviet government he stated greatest hostility thereto manifested by Great Britain, referred to opposition to war on part of French working classes and the resulting ministerial crisis, the hesitation of Italy prior to war and present despair her working class and then referred to the United States as follows:

The United States intervened in war after three years had elapsed under the influence of sober calculation of American stock exchange. America could not permit victory of one coalition over the other. America interested in weakening both coalitions and strengthening hegemony of American capital. Furthermore America's war industry is interested in war. During war America's exports increased more than twofold and reached figures which not one capitalistic state had attained. All the exports with hardly any exception go to Allied countries. When in January Germany announced unlimited submarine warfare all railway stations and docks in United States were crammed with products of war industry. To remove them was impossible. Transportation was disorganized and New York experienced hunger riots such as we have not seen here. At that time financial capital presented Wilson an ultimatum: the sale of products of industry must be guaranteed which Wilson obeyed hence the preparation for war and later the war itself. America is not aiming at territorial acquisition. America can patiently receive the fact of Soviet government as she is sufficiently satisfied by exhaustion of Allied countries and of Germany, in addition America is interested in investing her capital in Russia.

Trotsky further stated that Germany's internal economic situation forces her to adopt semipatient attitude regarding Soviet government and finally declared that impression produced in Europe by peace decree verifies most optimistic hopes. He then gave in full the text of communication to Allied Ambassadors which I have

already telegraphed and also the following text of order to General Dukhonin:

CITIZEN SUPREME COMMANDER IN CHIEF: The Council of Commissaries of the People by commission of the All-Russian Congress of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies has assumed the government together with the obligations to propose to all belligerent nations and to their governments an immediate armistice on all fronts and immediate opening of negotiations with a view to concluding peace on democratic principles. Now when the government of Soviets has been confirmed in all the most important points of the country the Council of Commissaries of the People considers it necessary to make without delay a formal proposal for armistice to all belligerent countries, both to Allies and to those engaged in hostile operations against us. An announcement to this effect has been sent by Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs to all the plenipotentiary representatives of Allied countries in Petrograd.

You, Citizen Supreme Commander in Chief, the Council of Commissaries of the People, in fulfilment of the decision of All-Russian Congress of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, commissions, immediately upon receiving the present announcement, to address to the military authorities of the hostile armies a proposal to immediately cease military operations with a view to opening peace negotiations. Whilst charging you with the conduct of these preliminary negotiations the Council of the Commissaries of the People orders you first to report without interruption to the council by direct wire regarding the progress of your negotiations with the representatives of the hostile armies; second, to sign the act of armistice only by a preliminary agreement with the Council of Commissaries of the People.

The President of the Council of Commissaries of the People
V. LENIN

The Commissary for Foreign Affairs
L. TROTSKY

The Commissary for Military Affairs
KRYLENKO

As Dukhonin refused to obey instructions, the following was officially promulgated on the 23d instant:

SOLDIERS: The matter of peace is in your hands. You will not suffer counterrevolutionary generals to destroy the great cause of peace. You will surround them with a guard in order to avoid lynching unworthy of the revolutionary army and to prevent these generals from avoiding the court that awaits them. You will preserve the strictest revolutionary and military order.

Let the regiments on the front immediately elect plenipotentiaries to formally initiate negotiations for an armistice with the enemy. The Council of the Commissaries of the People gives you the right to do this.

Inform us of every step of negotiations through all channels. Only the Council of Commissaries of the People has the right to sign the final convention for the armistice.

Soldiers, the matter of peace is in your hands. Let there be vigilance, self-control and energy and the cause of peace will conquer. In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic.

The President of the Council of Commissaries of the People

LENIN

*The Commissary of the People for Military Affairs and Supreme
Commander in Chief*

N. KRYLENKO

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 24, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1864. For your information. In reply to an inquiry as to whether we would join with the Allies in an agreement not to recognize independently any new Russian Government, the Department has informed the French Ambassador that we would be glad to exchange views with the Allies at any time on the subject but that we would not bind ourselves to a course which might look to Russia as a measure of compulsion.

LANSING

The Minister in Denmark (Egan) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *November 26, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received November 27, 7.55 a.m.*]

1627. The German proposal to treat with Russia for a separate peace, announced in to-day's telegrams, provided the latter first withdraw one hundred kilometers from the present front, is clearly an attempt to cause the dissolution of what remains of the Russian Army, to come into easy possession of the war material and foodstuffs within that zone and with their paid agent Lenin in control to dictate terms insuring Teutonic commercial and political ascendancy in Russia for generations to come. Prussia victorious is certain to make heavy demands. German press views on the subject will be cabled to-morrow.

AMERICAN LEGATION

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 27, 1917.
[Received November 28, 9.54 p.m.]

2032. Trotsky issued address to "Committees of Regiments, Divisions, Army Corps and Armies and to Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies" stating former Generalissimo Dukhonin is distributing among army note of chiefs of Allied military missions (except the American) protesting against violation of treaty between "Tsar's Government" and Allies of August 23 [/September 5], 1914. He says protest is against separate armistice of Russia with Germany but "gives no reply to the proposition for an armistice on all fronts made to them by Council of Commissaries of People." In conclusion the Allied representatives threaten that any violation of treaty by Russia would carry most grave consequences.

Addressing by Allied representatives of diplomatic note to General removed for disobedience would mean in its form an inadmissible interference in the internal life of the country aiming at producing civil war. But in substance this diplomatic note if it has not been invented but really exists would signify attempt of Allied representatives through threats to cause Russian Army and Russian people to further prolong the war in execution of treaties made by the Tsar and confirmed by the governments of Milyukov, Kerensky, Tereshchenko.

The Council of Commissaries of People from first day of existence has openly declared that it does not consider the Russian people bound by old treaties made unknown to the nation in the interest of the *bourgeois* classes of Russia and of the Allied countries. An attempt to influence the revolutionary will of the Soviet government through the dead letter of the secret treaties in advance doomed to failure. With regard to the threats contained in the note which cannot swerve us from the path of a struggle for an honorable democratic peace we declare that the republican government in the person of the Council of Commissaries of People is proposing not a separate but a universal armistice and in making this proposal it feels itself to be the exponent of the general interest and efforts of the popular masses not only of Russia but in general of all belligerent

countries.

Soldiers, workmen, peasants, your Soviet government will not permit you to be driven into the carnage as though by stick of foreign *bourgeoisie*. Do not fear menaces. The suffering peoples of Europe are with us. They all want an immediate peace. Our proposition of an armistice for them sounds like the glad tidings of salvation. The nations of Europe will not permit the imperialistic governments to lay their hands on the Russian people guilty of wanting peace and the brotherhood of nations. And let it be known to all that the soldiers, workmen and peasants of Russia have not overthrown the Tsar and the government of Kerensky in order to remain food for cannon for the Allied imperialists.

Soldiers, continue your struggle for an immediate armistice. Elect delegates for the negotiations. Your commander in chief Krylenko is leaving to-day for the front in order to take charge of the struggle for an armistice.

Down with the old secret treaty and diplomatic intrigues! Hurrah for an honorable open struggle for a universal peace!

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1083).

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 27, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[*Received November 30, 12.20 p.m.*]

2034. Your 1864, November 24, 7 [4] p.m., received to-day. Chiefs of Allied military missions and military attachés were called to the General Staff 3 p.m. to-day and given following communication in French and Russian from Trotsky. Reply from military attaches was that communication would be handed to their respective Ambassadors. Following translation made by Military Mission:

1. As evidenced by all our steps, we are striving for general and not separate armistice. To a separate armistice we may be forced by our allies if they will close their eyes before the facts.

2. We are ready at any moment with any representatives of the Allies (translator thinks this means any of the Allies) to conduct negotiations for immediate accomplishment of an armistice.

We did not demand a parliamentary "recognition." We are recognized by the people.

We want business negotiations. We reserve the right to publish protocols for the information of all.

3. That negative attitude with which our peace initiative is being met from the side of several of the Allied Governments, cannot in the slightest change the course of our policy.

The Allies should answer: are they willing to begin negotiations for immediate armistice aiming at the conclusion of peace and democratic principles? Are they agreeable to support our initiative in this direction? Do they demand other measures? What kind?

As long as Allied Governments answer with bare "no recognition" of us and our initiative we will follow our own course appealing to the peoples after the governments. Should the results of the appeal bring separate peace, which we do not want, responsibility will fall completely upon the Allied Governments. Trotsky.

This sent by military attaché to Embassy 7 p.m.; suppose British Ambassador will convene Allied representatives on the subject as it was understood at meeting of

November 21¹ that no separate action looking to recognition would be taken.

Constituent Assembly elections close here to-night. Reported Bolsheviks will not have majority from Petrograd but I doubt it. As Moscow elections postponed week and impossible for many delegates to arrive, all action probably be postponed unless Bolsheviks have majority of those appearing.

FRANCIS

¹ See *ante*, p. 245 [Pg. 245 is part of [Doc. 229](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 28, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received November 30, 9.32 p.m.*]

2037. My 2034, November 27, sent you direct because had received your 1864 in three days. Morning papers contain three signed communications from Krylenko addressed to army and people as "Commissary of the People for Military, Naval Affairs and Supreme Commander in Chief." They contain statement that committee consisting of incentive [lieutenants?], military doctor and soldier of first class have been appointed "to apply to the highest commander of (German Army?) of the place where these parliamentaries will be received with request that supreme command of German Army be asked whether will send fully empowered delegates to open immediate negotiations for establishment of armistice on all fronts of belligerent countries for the purpose of initiating thereafter peace negotiations." These parliamentaries entered German trenches. Of said communications "order No. 3 to the army and navy" states: "Our parliamentaries have returned bringing with them the official reply of the German supreme commander in chief expressing his consent to conduct negotiations for an armistice on all fronts "and that meeting of those empowered by both sides is fixed for December 2. Order further warns all against opposing its provisions, directs immediate cessation of firing and fraternizing. Prohibits military operations except in answer to such on part of enemy.

Papers also contain addresses of Dukhonin to Russian people from the Stavka,² appealing to towns, Zemstvos and peasantry to rally together, "in name of salvation of our country, be strong in spirit and give the suffering land of Russia a government of all the people on [omission] of all citizens, and knowing neither violence nor blood nor bayonets. Lose no time. The army is awaiting your word."

Krylenko's order No. 2 dated 26th brands Dukhonin's appeals as hypocritical lies; removes commander and commissary of the northern front; also commander of Fifth Army, also commander of Twenty-seventh Corps and declares Dukhonin "to be an enemy of the people, by reason of criminal activities leading to a fresh outbreak of civil war. All persons supporting Dukhonin are to be arrested independently of their public position, their situation in the various parties and their past."

Trotsky note in my 2034 is presuming and insulting to Allied Governments. It threatens appeals to peoples of countries whose Governments will not recognize him or refuse to propose armistice and peace. Kerth, representing military attaché at Stavka, did not sign protest made under written treaties between Allies because not authorized to do so and for further reason that we are not parties to such treaties. Understand that my colleagues here feel that their military attachés exceeded orders in stating that violations of said treaties would be “followed by grave consequences” when should have confined themselves to protest only.

I directed Judson¹ to authorize Kerth to protest against armistice which at that time was thought and meant to be separate armistice. Now however Bolshevik government claims it never intended to open negotiations for separate armistice.

In my opinion Russia in opening negotiations for another armistice without our knowledge and approval is violating its pledged faith to us as all advances made by us to Russia have been for the clearly expressed purpose of prosecuting the war and my recommendations thereof have been based upon the definite and reiterated promise of Russia to continue the war with all the means at her command.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1090).

² The Stavka, or army headquarters, was at Mogilev.

¹ Brig. Gen. W. V. Judson, Military Attaché and chief of the American Military Mission to Russia.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 28, 1917, 12 noon.*
[Received November 30, 1 p.m.]

2039. *Pravda*, official publication of Soviet, publishes manifests to-day signed by Lenin and Trotsky. It announces that German commander in chief has consented to peace negotiations meaning armistice; that Krylenko has postponed five days opening of armistice negotiations "in order to propose once more to the Allied Governments to define their attitude to the matter of peace negotiations. Military operations on Russian front have been stopped by mutual consent."

It appeals to soldiers, workmen and peasants of the belligerent countries by name including ours. It states: "On December 1 (meaning 2) take up peace negotiations. If the Allied nations do not send their representatives we shall conduct negotiations with the Germans alone. We want a universal peace. But if the *bourgeoisie* of the countries forces us to conclude a separate peace the responsibility will fall entirely on it." Elections terminate to-day. Returns incomprehensible but great interest; liveliest during the last few days, and unconfirmed reports indicate Bolsheviks will be disappointed with returns. Constituent Assembly will be most representative of all authorities since Emperor abdicated. If elections fairly held and votes honestly counted it will represent will of Russian people. Reported that day of assembling postponed to November 30 but can find no authority therefor.

If separate armistice concluded and operative it should be conditioned on opposing armies remaining [*in*] *statu quo*, and in default of contrary instructions shall request meeting of Allied chiefs whom shall advise to send military attaché informally or without recognizing Soviet government to so recommend to negotiators of armistice.

Have received no instructions concerning recognition. Reported that President Wilson has made emphatic public statement concerning Russian situation. Is it true?

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 29, 1917.*
[Received November 30, 11.40 p.m.]

2040. Following is translation of document received this afternoon:

COMMISSARY OF THE PEOPLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
PETROGRAD, *November 29, 1917.*

For the information of the representatives of the countries allied with Russia: In reply to the formal proposition of the Council of the Commissaries of the People regarding the opening of negotiations for an immediate armistice on all fronts for the purpose of concluding a democratic peace without annexations and contributions with the right of all nations to self-determination the German supreme command has made known its consent. All the documents relating thereto and the statements of facts have been published by me in the "bulletin of the Central Executive Committee."

Military operations on the Russian front have been brought to a standstill. The preliminary negotiations will begin on November 19/December 2. The Council of the Commissaries of the People, as formerly, so also now, considers necessary the simultaneous conducting of the negotiations by all the Allies with a view to attaining a speedy armistice on all fronts and to secure a universal democratic peace.

The Allied Governments and their diplomatic representatives in Russia will be good enough to reply whether they wish to take part in the negotiations, which are to open on December 2, at 5 p.m.

Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs
L. TROTSKY

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1093).

File No. 763.72119/967

[Document 238]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 1, 1917, 3 p.m.*

1875. Your 2034, November 27; 2039, November 28; and 2040, November 29. You are to make no reply to communications mentioned in these telegrams and are informed that this Government awaits further developments. The President has made no statement.

LANSING

The Russian Ambassador (Bakhmeteff) to the Secretary of State¹

Undated.

In regard to the present conditions, I am guided by the following considerations:

Notwithstanding the fact that the government of Lenin, which has seized power through violence, can in no way be considered as representative of the Russian people, his proposal of an armistice to the Allies should not be left without answer, because the declining of the Allies to express themselves on the question of peace and war would only strengthen the Bolsheviki in their efforts to create in Russia hostile feeling towards the Allies. An identical result would be reached by a formal protest of the Allies against the actions of Lenin and in general by threats, which could only deteriorate the conditions and help the Bolsheviki to carry out extreme decisions, which, although not legally binding for the Russian people, in their essence would be of irreparable character to the cause of Russia and the Allies. It seems on the contrary necessary to approach the position of Russia in its acute reality, and analyzing the true causes of the success of the Bolsheviki, to strain all endeavors to formulate such theses concerning the question of war and peace which would contribute to the enforcement in the popular feeling in Russia of the necessity of all possible efforts for the continuation of war with the Allies and which thereby would undermine in substance and not only formally the success of the Bolshevism. In this respect, it seems at present especially propitious for the Allies to formulate in their answer their conception of the basis of a just and democratic peace as the aims of the war. It should be clearly formulated why the unrelinquished endeavors to such a peace and the great efforts made thereto could receive incurable damage if a truce was made, thereby removing the attainment of the desired aims. The main point is that, by their answer, the Allies must deprive the Bolsheviki of any possibility to throw upon the Allies the responsibility of impeding the conclusion at the present moment of such a democratic peace. On the contrary, in their answer the Allies should clearly lay the whole weight of such responsibility on the German people, from whom the world's democracy is obliged to await the first active steps directed towards the liquidation of war and which are to testify the real desire of the German people to enter into the circle of democratic nations. As a wise basis of such a declaration appears the formula emphasized by President Wilson in his reply to the Pope's peace proposal. At the same time so as to avoid interpretation of this answer as a formal recognition of the Bolsheviki government, the reply of the Allies could be realized in the form of declarations of Prime Ministers or as a proclamation to the Russian people. The answer is to be

made in the most definite expressions as only resolute politics can paralyze the work of the Bolsheviki and allow to gain the time indispensable for the rallying of constructive democratic elements in Russia.

[File copy not signed]

¹ Note in the margin of MS.: “Handed to F[rank] L[yon] P[olk] by Russian Ambassador (his views to Paris).” This paper was probably handed to Mr. Polk, Counselor for the Department of State, early in December 1917.

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *December 2, 1917, 2, p.m.*
[Received December 3, 3.10 a.m.]

For the President and the Secretary of State:

There have been long and frequent discussions as to Russia but the result has not been satisfactory to me. I wanted a clear declaration along the lines of my cable to you of Friday.¹ England was passively willing, France indifferently against it, Italy actively so. They all were willing to embody the [Russian] Ambassador's suggested [texts?] if certain additions were made to which I could not agree. It was decided finally that each power should send its own answer to its Ambassador at Petrograd, the substance of each answer to be that the Allies were willing to reconsider their war aims in conjunction with Russia and as soon as she had a stable government with whom they could act. The Russian Ambassador at Paris believes it of great importance that you send a message to Russia through Francis or otherwise letting them know of the disinterested motives of the United States and of its desire to bring a disorderly world into a fraternity of nations for the good of all and for the aggrandizement of none.

EDWARD HOUSE

 ¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. 1, telegram dated Nov. 30.

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *December 3, 1917, 2 p.m.*

[*Received December 4, 6.05 p.m.*]

For the President:

Mr. Balfour and I [had] a conference last night. This morning he has prepared this despatch to send to the British Ambassador at Petrograd provided that his Government will agree:

I gather from your reports that the present provisional government at Petrograd has, without consulting the Allies, requested the enemy to grant an armistice on the Russian front. It is well aware that this is contrary to Russia's treaty with her allies but they argue, it seems, that inasmuch as the treaty was concluded while the autocracy was still in power it can have no binding force on the democracy which has succeeded it. I doubt whether this doctrine, inconsistent as it clearly is with any kind of stability in international agreements, will commend itself to a Russian government which can claim with justice to represent the Russian people. But, in formally repudiating it, His Majesty's Government desire to say that it is not by an appeal to treaties however binding that they desire to induce an unwilling ally any longer to contribute its share to the common effort. They base their claims on deeper principles accepted to the full by the provisional government itself. According to your report the peace which the latter desires is a democratic peace; a peace which accords with the wishes of the smaller and weaker nations; which repudiates the idea of squeezing plunder out of conquered enemies under the name of war indemnities; or adding by force of arms reluctant populations to great empires. This, speaking broadly, is also the kind of peace which His Majesty's Government desire to see secured for the world; and they have always expressed their willingness to discuss the details of the Allied war aims in the light of these general principles. But evidently this policy cannot be effectively carried out until Russia has established a stable government acceptable to the Russian people, a consummation which has not been reached. In the meanwhile you are at liberty to point out, should you think it expedient, that the very worst way of obtaining the sort of peace which the provisional government and His Majesty's Government alike desire is the method which the provisional

government appears to have adopted. The provisional government puts its trust in an immediate armistice which it hopes will be followed by a satisfactory agreement: the Allies desire that a satisfactory general agreement may be reached (in general harmony with their declared aims) to be followed of course by an armistice. By which method are our objects most likely to be gained? When arms have failed rhetoric is not likely to succeed. So far as His Majesty's Government are aware of, no responsible German statesman has ever said a word indicating agreement either with the ideals of the provisional government or with the Allied declaration of policy. Their attitude is not likely to become more accommodating nor will Russian aims be nearer of accomplishment if the Russian Army is permitted to become negligible as a fighting force. The only peace which could be secured by substituting argument for action is one which would be neither democratic nor durable nor Russian. It would be German and imperialistic.

EDWARD HOUSE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 4, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 6, 10.55 a.m.]

2066. Your 1875, December 1, 3 p.m., received to-day. Have made no replies to communications designated.

No advice received from Paris but French Embassy informs me through naval attaché of the receipt of wireless message stating that joint instructions would be sent to all Allied missions here and added, "In accord with Japan," which I understand.

Petrograd papers to-day contain following:

From New York and Washington the correspondents of the United States telegraph that the American Government intends to hold a policy of patience with regard to the present situation in Russia striving to prove its faith in the final triumph of good sense of the democracy. According to some rumors even in the case Russia concludes an armistice the United States are prepared to recognize that which the whole Russian people recognize. In view of this it is possible that if it should be decided in the military conference in Paris to send so-called threatening *communiqués* to Russia the American delegates will not sign them.

The position of the Washington government is founded on the assumption that a large part of Russia does not sympathize with the aims of the Bolsheviks and more than that their success is by no means assured. Concerning the sending of ships and munitions and other merchandise to Russia, the United States will be governed to a considerable degree by the indications of the Russian Ambassador Bakhmeteff who has already stated that he does not recognize the government of the Bolsheviks.

Trotsky issued an order three days ago removing all diplomats averse Soviet government.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 6, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received December 10, 10.10 a.m.*]

2072. Following just received:

COMMISSARY OF THE PEOPLE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
December 6, 1911.

For the information of the Ambassador of the United States of America:

The negotiations that have opened between the delegates of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria on the one hand and the delegates of Russia on the other have been interrupted on the initiative of our delegation for one week in order to make it possible during this period to inform the nations and the Governments of the Allied countries of the fact itself, of the negotiations and of their trend.

On the part of Russia it is proposed: (1) to announce that the armistice proposed has for its object a peace on democratic principles as they have been formulated in the manifesto of the All-Russian Congress of the Councils of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies; (2) the armistice is to be made conditional on the obligation that troops be not thrown from one front to another; and (3) to evacuate the islands of Moon Sound.

Regarding the question of the aims of war the delegates of the opposite side decline to make a definite answer, pointing out that they had been commissioned exclusively to regard the military side of the armistice. In the same way regarding also the question of a universal armistice the delegates of the opposition side pointed out the absence of authority on their part for raising the question of an armistice with countries whose delegates are not participating in the negotiations.

On their part the delegates of the opposite side proposed the conditions of an armistice on the front from the Baltic to the Black Sea, and it was proposed that the period of this armistice be of twenty-eight days. At the same time the delegates of the opposite side undertook to transmit to their government the proposition of the Russian delegation for immediate addressing to all the belligerent countries, that is to say, to all the Allied

countries besides Russia, a proposition to participate in the negotiations.

In view of the unwillingness of our delegation to sign a formal armistice at the present stage of the negotiations it was again decided to stop military operations for a week and the negotiations regarding an armistice were stopped for the same period.

In this way between the first decree of the government of the Soviets regarding peace (November 8) and the time of the forthcoming resumption of peace negotiations (December 12) there lies an interval of over one month. This period appears, even considering the present disturbed means of international communication, entirely sufficient to enable the Governments of the Allied countries to define their attitude to the peace negotiations, that is to say, their readiness or their refusal to take part in the negotiations regarding the armistice and peace and, in case they refuse, to openly, before the face of the whole of humanity, declare clearly, precisely and definitely in the name of what aims must the nations of Europe shed their blood during the fourth year of war.

Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs

L. TROTSKY

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 200

Moscow, *December 11, 1917.*
[*Received March 2, 1918.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department that the secretary of the Bolshevik plenipotentiaries, Karakhan, has telegraphed as follows to the Petrograd Bolshevik organization:

There is being circulated among the German soldiers an appeal, signed by Lenin and Trotsky, in which it is stated, among other things, that in case German soldiers are compelled to go to the assistance of their base, the Russian soldiers will not advance. These sheets are being distributed among the German soldiers by the million. On this account members of the German delegation of plenipotentiaries made the following declaration to Karakhan:

The leaflet circulated among the German soldiers in the name of the Russian Government is an interference in the internal affairs of Germany. From the beginning of the Russian revolution Germany has repeatedly and officially declared that it will in no case interfere in the internal affairs of Russia, and that it categorically demands reciprocity for itself.

It is disloyal of the Russian Government to try to instigate open rebellion against the government with whose representatives it has concluded an armistice, or to incite sabotage, which would be useful only to the foreign enemies of Germany in the west.

Such double-dealing suggests that the apparent desire of the Russian Government to proceed from armistice to peace with Germany is not sincere.

The leaflet menaces the successful course of the negotiations and thus encourages the enemies of the armistice and of peace, who desire to break off the negotiations and continue military operations between Germany and Russia.

The Russians should be aware that wide circles in Germany doubt the legal qualifications of the Russians to carry on negotiations for armistice and peace, as the Russian Government has so far not obtained general recognition. Such disloyal conduct on the part of

the Russian Government only increases the numbers of those sharing this view, and this might thus threaten the negotiations now in course. This sheet shows that its authors view the internal situation in Germany in a false light. But as this false light is one of the essential factors of their political calculation, it may turn out that this entire calculation will miscarry. And if this is so, it suggests doubt of the permanence of the Russian Government and thereby creates a doubt whether it will be able to bring the proposed negotiations with Germany to a conclusion.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 14, 1917, 12 p.m.*
[Received December 16, 2.27 a.m.]

2099. Night of 7th Bolshevik soldiers and Red Guard broke in Winter Palace wine cellar and have since committed like depredations on clubs and residences. On 10th they invaded house joining Embassy. Last night they forcibly entered corner store of this [street] and firing was continued at intervals during the night and day for twenty hours. Conditions likely to become worse before improving. Thought last night they might attempt to enter Embassy, from dark room of which I observed their movements until about 3 a.m. and saw many of them stop and drink directly in front of entrance.

Constituent Assembly did not meet to-day. Trotsky in signed article printed in official bulletin to-day in connection with peace negotiations states armistice negotiations resumed and if armistice be signed the Russian delegation has full authority to take up negotiations for peace.

The armistice at present preserves a separate character inasmuch as on our part it is being concluded by the armies of Russia and Rumania.

Responsibility for the separate character of the armistice falls entirely on those governments which up to the present moment refused to announce their terms for an armistice and peace and which are continuing to hide from foreign peoples the aims for sake of which the war must continue.

Evidence accumulating that Monarchists are aiding Bolsheviks. Grand Duke Paul, younger brother of Alexander III, is nominal prisoner in Smolny, but is treated as honored guest having good quarters, best food, automobile for outing and is called "Your Imperial Highness."

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 224

Moscow, *December 18, 1917.*
[Received March 2, 1918.]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department that the terms of armistice¹ finally agreed upon between Maximalist, German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish plenipotentiaries are published here as follows:

With a view to the attainment of a durable peace, honorable to both sides, the following armistice is concluded:¹

1. The armistice begins at 14 o'clock, December 17, 1917, and extends to 14 o'clock, January 14, 1918. The contracting parties have the right, beginning with the twenty-first day of the armistice, to denounce it, giving seven days' notice of resumption of military actions. If not denounced, the armistice is automatically prolonged until one of the parties denounces it with seven days' notice.
2. The armistice embraces all the land and aerial forces of the states named on the land front between the Baltic and the Black Seas. On the Russo-Turkish front in Asia the armistice will come into force at the same time. The contracting parties obligate themselves during the armistice not to increase the number, the composition and make-up of their military units and not to carry out regroupings in preparation of an offensive. The contracting parties obligate themselves until January 14, 1918, not to carry out any operative dislocations of troops on the front between the Baltic and the Black Seas excepting those already begun at the moment of signature of the present agreement. The contracting parties obligate themselves during the armistice not to concentrate forces in the ports of the Black Sea and of the Baltic, east of the 15th degree of longitude east of Greenwich.
3. The front entanglements of both positions are accepted as the demarcation lines on the European front. These lines may be crossed only in the conditions laid down in paragraph 4. Where there is no unbroken line of positions a straight line connecting the respective forward points occupied is accepted as the demarcation line.
4. The space between the two demarcation lines is considered as neutral, as are likewise rivers dividing the positions of the two sides. Navigation of these rivers is forbidden excepting in the interest of commercial

transport. In cases where the positions are separated by a considerable space, the Commanders in Chief of the two sides will come to a mutual understanding both as to demarcation lines and as to the conditions of intercourse between the two sides, guiding themselves unconditionally by the conditions of paragraph 6.

5. With a view to the development and strengthening of friendly relations, the following rules for regular intercourse between the sides are agreed upon: the right of free intercourse is enjoyed by parliamentarians, members of local armistice commissions and their substitutes, who must carry suitable papers. For example, on two or three points of the sector of each division there will be arranged intercourse, such points being determined in agreement with the staff or committee of the division. Intercourse is permitted by day.
6. The interment of common soldiers is permitted in the neutral zone, after agreement between the staffs. Questions in regard to the return to their homes of soldiers dismissed finally from service and having their residence beyond the demarcation lines will be decided in the peace negotiations. This refers also to Polish troops. Persons crossing the enemy's demarcation line without observing the above rules will be detained, whereby the term of their release will be fixed either in the peace negotiations or upon the denunciation of the armistice.

With respect to military operations on the naval theaters of war the following is agreed to:

1. The armistice embraces the entire Black Sea and the Baltic Sea east of the 15th [degree of] longitude east of Greenwich, and embraces all the naval and aerial forces of the contracting parties in these waters. With respect to the extension of the armistice to the White Sea and Arctic Ocean along the Russian coast there may be arranged an agreement between the naval and general staffs of the contracting parties. Attacks upon naval and commercial vessels of the contracting parties in said zones must be avoided now as far as possible.
2. Attacks by sea or air on ports and shores of both contracting parties in all theaters of naval war are forbidden. Likewise vessels of the contracting parties are forbidden to enter port or approach shores occupied by the other party. Flights above ports or shores of both contracting parties in all theaters of naval war are forbidden. Flights across demarcation lines are forbidden.
3. The demarcation line in the Black Sea is the line from Olinka Lighthouse, mouth of the St. George branch of the Danube, to Cape Geros; in the Baltic it is from Regul, on the western shore of Worms Island, to Bokshar Island.
4. The establishment of detailed rules of navigation for commercial vessels

in these regions is entrusted to the commission for armistice in the Baltic and Black Seas. The contracting parties obligate themselves during the armistice in the Baltic and Black Seas not to make preparations for active naval operations directed against one another. To avoid accidents and misunderstandings on the fronts firing practice on the part of infantry is not allowed within five versts of the demarcation line.

Aerial forces and captive balloons must be restricted to areas ten versts behind the demarcation line.

After a series of minor administrative paragraphs, it is further provided:

Immediately after the signature of the present treaty of armistice will begin peace negotiations and the contracting parties express their willingness to withdraw their forces from Persia. To work out the details of such withdrawal of troops and also to assure the above-mentioned principles (?), the Russian and Turkish higher commands will enter at once into negotiations with the Persian Government.

Supplementary to and in further development of the treaty of armistice the contracting parties agree to take steps for the speedy regulation of the question of the exchange of civil prisoners and invalids directly across the front.

The contracting parties will take measures for the reestablishment of cultural and economic relations between the countries concluding the armistice. To this end measures will be taken, among other things, to facilitate, within the bounds permitted by the armistice, postal and commercial relations, the forwarding of books, newspapers and the like.

In connection with the last clause it is noted in the Moscow newspapers that German textiles, notions and other articles have appeared in small quantities in the retail trade near the front, and are being exchanged for fats and foodstuffs. German commercial and industrial enterprises are said to be soliciting orders through permanent, or possibly recently arrived special agents. German governesses are desired in the want columns of the Maximalist press.

Trotsky (Bronstein) made a report to the Petrograd Council of W[orkmen's] and S[oldiers'] Deputies in which he pronounced the prohibition of the movement of troops from the Russian to other fronts during the armistice a triumph of Maximalist diplomacy. Kamenev (Blumenberg [Rosenfeld]) made this an unconditional prerequisite of negotiations, and the Germans were forced to agree. The opposition press observes coldly that this is pure buncombe; that the Germans have already transferred their best troops to Italy and France; that the language adopted permits anything the Germans may care to do now; and that this feature of the armistice automatically falls on January 14, 1918, whether the armistice is prolonged beyond that date or not.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

¹ Signed at Brest Litovsk, Dec. 15. For the armistice of Dec. 5, see *post*, p. 307 [*Pg. 307 is part of [Doc. 305](#)*].

¹ The Consul General apparently followed an unofficial Russian text which differs in certain details from the German text published in the *Deutscher Reichsanzeiger* Dec. 18, 1917.

Chapter VII. The Establishment of the Soviet Power

Contents

Attitude of the American and other governments toward the Bolshevik régime—Interviews of the American military attaché and Red Cross representative with Trotsky—Decrees abolishing private ownership of real estate—The beginnings of civil war—Elections to the Constituent Assembly—The Kalpashnikov incident

[\[247\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, November 24, 1917. [Received November 26, 12.13 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/718

[\[248\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, November 24, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received November 27, 3.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/722

[\[249\] The Military Attaché in Russia \(Judson\) to the War Department](#)

[Petrograd,] 25th November, 1917.

File No. 861.00/11427

[\[250\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, November 25, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received November 27, 3 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/721

[\[251\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, November 26, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received November 28, 7.13 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/727

[\[252\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, November 26, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received November 29, 5.28 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/736

[253] The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War Department

[Petrograd,] 14/27th November, 1917.

File No. 861.00/11427

[254] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, November 27, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received November 30, 6.20 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/740

[255] The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

Paris, November 28, 1917, 10 a.m. [Received November 29, 8.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/739½

[256] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 29, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 4, 5.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/748

[257] The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War College Staff

Petrograd, November 30, 1917, 2 p.m. [Copy received from War Department,
December 6.]

File No. 861.00/1685

[258] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 30, 1917, 4 p.m.

File No. 763.72/7922a

[259] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 30, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/721

[260] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, November 30, 1917, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/703

[261] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, November 30, 1917, 11 p.m. [From, confirmation copy, original not received.]

File No. 861.00/743½

[262] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 1, 1917. [Received December 5, 10.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/758

[263] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington, December 1, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1008a

[264] The Minister in Denmark (Egan) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, December 1, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received December 8, 12.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/745

[265] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 1, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received December 2, 2.28 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/746

[266] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 1, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 4, 2.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/750

[267] The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War Department

[Petrograd,] December 1, 1917.

File No. 861.00/11427

[268] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 2, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received December 5, 4.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/761

[269] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 2, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received December 5, 11.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/757

[270] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 2, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received December 5, 12 noon.]

File No. 861.00/754

[271] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 2, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received December 5, 4, p.m.]

File No. 861.00/756

[272] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 2, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 6, 1.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/763

[273] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 3, 1917. [Received December 4, 5.12 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/747

[274] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 3, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 5, 8.51 p.m.]

File No. 708.72119/987

[275] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 3, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 5, 11.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/764

[276] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 3, 1917, 12 p.m. [Received December 5, 7.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/762

[277] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

The Hague, December 4, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received 11.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/752

[278] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 4, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received December 5, 5 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/755

[279] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, December 5, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received 7.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/760

[280] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 5, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received December 11, 4.19 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1006

[281] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 6, 1917, 11 a.m. [Received December 7, 2.20 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/773

[282] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 6, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received December 7, 6.15 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/775

[283] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 6, 1917, 2 p.m.
File No. 861.00/796a

[284] The Secretary of State to the General Secretary, International Committee, of the Young Men's Christian Associations (John R. Mott)

Washington, December 7, 1917.
File No. 763.72119/987

[285] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

Washington, December 7, 1917—3 p.m.
File No. 861.00/780a

[286] The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, December 7, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received December 8, 2.55 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/774

[287] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 7, 1917, 7 p.m. [Received December 11, 7.31 p.m..]

File No. 861.00/792

[288] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 8, 1917. [Received December 11, a.m.]

File No. 811.142/2757

[289] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 8, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 763.72119/987

[290] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 9, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 11, 8 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/786

[291] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 10, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received December 14, 4.14 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/808

[292] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 11, 1917, 12 noon. [Received December 15, 5.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/812

[293] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, December 11, 1917, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/804d

[294] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 11, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received December 13, 1.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/795

[295] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 11, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 13, 2.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/803

[296] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 12, 1917. [Received January 30, 1918.]

File No. 861.52/10

[297] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, December 12, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received 8.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/797

[298] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 12, 1917, 4 p.m. [Received 8.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/793

[299] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 12, 1917, 6 p.m. [Received December 15, 5.56 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/830

[300] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 12, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received December 15, 2.38 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/823

[301] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 12, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 16, 2.20 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/815

[302] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 13, 1917. [Received December 14, 4.10 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/799

[303] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 14, 1917. [Received December 16, 1.20 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/824

[304] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 15, 1917. [Received December 19, 5.35 a.m.]
File No. 861.01/9

[305] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, December 15, 1917. [Received January 30, 1918.]
File No. 861.00/1028

[306] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, December 15, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received 7.35 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/816

[307] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 15, 1917, 6 p.m.
File No. 861.00/808

[308] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)

Washington, December 15, 1917, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/714

[309] The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in European Countries, Japan, China, and Siam

Washington, December 15, 1917, 8 p.m.

File No. 861.01/9a

[310] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 17, 1917, 9 p.m. [Received December 22, 1.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/852

[311] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 17, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 20, 11.18 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1029

[312] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 18, 1917, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/815

[313] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 20, 1917, 1 p.m.

File No. 861.00/823

[314] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, December 21, 1917, 8 p.m. [Received December 22, 8 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/850

[315] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 21, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received December 23, 8.20 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/859

[316] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 22, 1917, 4 p.m.
File No. 763.72119/1029

[317] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 22, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received December 24, 8.32 p.m.]
File No. 361.61/4306

[318] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, December 23, 1917, 5 p.m. [Received December 24, 10.50 a.m.]
File No. 861.01/11

[319] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 23, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received December 25, 5 a.m.]
File No. 811.108/383

[320] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 23, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 26, 2.10 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/862

[321] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 24, 1917, 6 p.m.
File No. 861.00/902a

[322] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 24, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 26, 1.45 p.m.]
File No. 861.00/864

[323] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 26, 1917. [Received December 28, 11.50 a.m.]
File No. 361.01/4312

[324] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 27, 1917, 7 p.m.
File No. 861.00/808

[325] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 28, 1917, 10 p.m. [Received December 30, 2.57 p.m.]
File No. 361.61/4315

[326] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, December 29, 1917, 2 p.m.
File No. 861.00/864

[327] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, December 29, 1917, 2 p.m. [Received December 30, 6.18 a.m.]
File No. 861.00/3478

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 24, 1917.
[Received November 26, 12.13 a.m.]

No disturbance here to-day but tension very great. North front army reported starving and leaving trenches. German work more active, less secretive daily. Understand in direct connection by wireless with Berlin for two days and messages exchanged; also that German Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed message to Soviet government to which reply made by wireless.

Reported that new socialist government formed at Stavka with Tseretelli president, and will be supported by sufficient armed force to depose Bolshevik government, but unconfirmed-Newspapers contain official proclamation or order signed by Lenin and Krylenko directing soldiers to negotiate armistice themselves and to place their generals under arrest professedly for protection against lynching.

Have managed to continue in touch with Department of Ways of Communication without recognizing Smolny,² having obtained special car for eighteen Americans on Trans-Siberian Railway express of the 20th instant and procured their tickets without asking Smolny approval. Sending Horn³ to Moscow to-night to relieve freight congestion there where reported over ten thousand cars containing provisions. Have arranged with Ways of Communication Department here for Horn's recognition Moscow.

Trotsky in speech to committee reporting dispatch of notes to Allied representatives said that America entered war because German submarine warfare prevented shipping of supplies to Allied countries when her wharves were crowded with accumulation thereof, and that America's aim in war is commercial supremacy.

Fear this armistice negotiation fraught with deplorable consequences. Soldiers without food and clothing will be more than willing to leave trenches, and when they do pillaging will result.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1004).

² Smolny Institute was used by the Bolsheviks as their headquarters.

³ Henry J. Horn, member of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 24, 1917, 11 p.m.
[Received November 27, 3.25 a.m.]

2025. Attempt to form government at Stavka failed being unable to agree on Tseretelli or Chernov. Latter acceptable to army but not to other socialist factions. Doubtful whether either could command sufficient following to overthrow Lenin.

Quiet here. In some cases regiment reserves right to determine after which [whether] it will obey order when received and even if majority decide affirmatively minority do not comply unless wish. Barracks of Litovski regiment only a block and half from the Embassy. Polish guard left Embassy Wednesday on advice but I sent military attaché to Litovski barracks to inform commander did not desire guard, that regiment having been ordered to supplant Polish guard. Requested military attaché, however, to say that if necessity for use of guard should arise would advise commander by messenger. Military attaché reported guard would be furnished on request. Judson² has independently advised that I permit two soldiers of Litovski regiment to stand guard at the Embassy entrance as he has done at Military Mission. I think inadvisable to do so, consequently have had two Embassy employees on guard after 1 p.m., until which time police officer sat in my apartment. My instruction to guard is not to fire on any one attempting forcible entrance but to advise me as I live in Embassy. I should go to entrance in such event and if necessary would dispatch messenger to Litovski barracks for guard. Such arrangements preferable to Bolshevik guard in whom have no confidence and do not know whom it would admit. Three nights passed undisturbed. Understand no bread obtainable Petrograd today and if this continues may have riots. Food shipped by you arrived and distributed. Have you received my personal checks therefor mailed September 21? Last of food entered Embassy to-day. Shortly afterwards Red Guard demanded to know what was in packages which entered Embassy gateway and documents permitting same. I directed report that this was American Embassy and packages contained food and kerosene shipped from America, whereupon guards apologized and left. Lawlessness seems inevitable and even Embassy may have trouble. If so shall exercise discretion.

Naval attaché reports hearing that British and French Embassies requested

battalion each from their respective Governments for protection. Both Embassies have Bolshevik guards. Italian and Japanese Embassies have no guards nor any Legation except possibly Portuguese, Rumanian and Belgian.

Krylenko due at Stavka this evening, having left here yesterday in armored train. Will probably arrest Dukhonin.

What do you think of treating Russia as China was treated? Have considered recommending that the President issue address to Russian people pledging our earnest efforts to furnish shoes and clothing and directing attention to progress we are making in improving transportation by which food scarcity would be relieved as there is abundance thereof in Russia if properly distributed.

Please thank Crane for appreciated London message of the 16th received 22d after his sailing and say I hold him to his promise to visit Mrs. Francis whom hope Department keeping informed of my safety.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1070).

² Brig. Gen. W. V. Judson, Military Attaché and chief of the American Military Mission to Russia.

The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War Department

[PETROGRAD,] 25th November, 1917.

[Copy of a letter sent to the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Petrograd.]

EXCELLENCY: There has been brought to my attention the following press communication from the United States:

The American Government has announced that no shipments of military supplies and provisions to Russia will be effected until the situation of this country will be established. The government before permitting the export of American products wants to know into whose hands they will get in Russia. The exports to Russia will be resumed only after the formation of a steady government which can be recognized by the United States, but if the Bolsheviks will remain in power and will put through their program of making peace with Germany, the present embargo on exports to Russia will remain in force. The credits to the Provisional Russian Government reach to the present day \$325,000,000, of which \$191,000,000 have already been appropriated; the larger part of this money has already been spent for the purchase of supplies, which are ready for loading. The ships allotted by America for the carrying of this freight are ready for sailing but do not receive permission to leave the ports and they will be refused coal.

It occurs to me that it is but fair to convey to your excellency the circumstances that neither I nor the American Ambassador has as yet received from the United States of America instructions or information similar to that contained in the press report above quoted. Nevertheless it seems but fair to express to your excellency the opinion that the press report correctly states the attitude of the Government of the United States. We are in daily expectation of receiving information similar to that conveyed by the above-mentioned press report.

Before sending you this communication I have submitted it to the American Ambassador who concurs in the expressions contained in it.

I avail myself [etc.]

W. V. JUDSON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
American Military Attaché
Chief of American Military Mission to Russia

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 25, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received November 27, 3 a.m.*]

2027. No developments. Elections for Constituent Assembly beginning Petrograd to-day, continuing three days. Assembly called for November 29 but Moscow elections reported postponed one week and Assembly if meets probably adjourn ten days and trouble expected here because judges of election appointed by Kerensky claiming jurisdictions opposite those Lenin selects.

Assembly is authority to which all Russia has been looking since revolution began and is empowered to determine form of government without referring same back to people for confirmation. Assembly likely to be Bolshevik in sentiment but if so develops, will still have a semblance of representing the people and as every such organization is sole judge of election and qualification of its members can only be overturned by revolution. If courts now exist here, of which no evidence apparent, their decrees if observed will be dictated by force.

Have thought of proposing to my colleagues here that we request conference with committee appointed by Assembly on state of the nation or perhaps request that committee be appointed to confer on that subject with chiefs of Allied missions.

FRANCIS

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1077).

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 26, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received November 28, 7.13 p.m.*]

2029. Trotsky has addressed a note to British Ambassador calling attention to internment of Chicherin and Petrov, Russian socialists interned in England “for socialistic propaganda,” and requesting their release, adding:

In order to strengthen this request I dare call attention, Mr. Ambassador, to the fact that within Russian Republic there are many Britishers who do not hide counter-revolutionary manner of thought and enter into relations with *bourgeois* clash with Russia. Revolutionary opinion in this country does not agree that Russian revolutionary fighters be in concentration camps in England while counterrevolutionary Britishers are not subjected to any limitations in Russian Republic.

Looks like reprisal threat.

[FRANCIS]

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden (No. 1082).

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *November 26, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received November 29, 5.28 a.m.]

89. Bolsheviki continue in undisputed control of government of Moscow and surrounding provinces. City quiet but disorders expected though population disarmed and resistance difficult. Bolsheviki inciting proletariat (against?) law-abiding citizens by which placards posted conspicuously. Accusing Allies of continuing war against will of people. Thousands of deserters returning to their homes. Famine at front and anarchists and German propaganda plunging entire country in chaos and endangering life and property of all.

I am endeavoring to arrange departure all American women and children at earliest possible moment. The entire consular staff, the Y.M.C.A., and the men connected with American enterprises will remain at their posts. To leave Russia now would only give Germans a freer hand to incite and organize Russian masses against us. American Red Cross members left as soon as possible after fighting began, notwithstanding my protests.

Strongly advise Department join, especially with neutral powers, in protest against present régime.

Bolsheviks' decree prohibiting any one from withdrawing more than one hundred fifty rubles weekly from bank paralyzing business and creating panic. Consular Corps protesting energetically against this and similar measures affecting the rights of foreigners. No wireless publicity dispatches have been received as yet by Bullard¹ but understand Bolsheviks are intercepting some important messages. I am continuing publicity work as energetically as before.

The disintegrating forces at work in Russia preclude any further active participation in the war for a long time. Even if the army so willed it, hunger and lack of clothes will prevent further operations. My opinion is that added and successful operations on the other fronts may induce the loyal forces to continue the war. Strong assurances should be sent for publication that America will aid Russia if she continues the war.

Bring this telegram to the attention of Polk and other high officers of the State Department.

¹ Arthur Bullard, director of the Russian division, United States Committee on Public Information.

***The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War
Department***

[PETROGRAD,] 14/27th November, 1917.

[Copy of a letter sent to the Chief of the Russian General Staff, Petrograd.]

EXCELLENCY: Referring to my letter of 12/25th November, 1917, relating to a quotation from American press reports, I desire to say that nothing therein should be construed as indicating that my government has or may be expected to express preference for the success in Russia of any one political party or element over another. Americans have the greatest sympathy for the whole Russian people in the complex situation in which they find themselves and do not wish to interfere except helpfully in the solution of any Russian problem. Their sympathy extends to all sections of the Russian people. Their representatives here are now informed that no important fraction of the Russian people desires an immediate separate peace or armistice. And it is certainly within the rights of Russia, in the position in which she now finds herself, to bring up the question of a general peace.

There is no reason why the attitude of her Allies toward Russia or toward any important elements in Russia should be upon anything but a most friendly foundation.

I desire to avail myself [etc.]

W. V. JUDSON
Brigadier General, U. S. Army
American Military Attaché
Chief of American Military Mission to Russia

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, November 27, 1917, 8 p.m.
[Received November 30, 6.20 a.m.]

91. I am transmitting following telegram from Bullard to Creel¹ and strongly indorse same, and request that it be brought to the attention of Secretary of State. I further recommend immediate action thereon as time is of the greatest importance.

Sisson just heard from. Am going to Petrograd to-morrow to meet him. Only one wireless dispatch yet received, dated Paris, November 20 [unintelligible passage]. Expect improvement in local telegraph communications soon.

I consider it unwise to recognize the *de facto* government of the Bolsheviki but regard it of the utmost importance from each point of view of the unfamiliar work [sic] that the reasons for refusal should be clearly and publicly stated. Trotsky is claiming that the attitude of the Entente powers is based on capitalistic fear of social revolution. Much of the disorganization of the army is due to this sort of argument. It is the most serious form of antagonism our publicity work has to fight. Refusal to recognize Bolsheviki should be motivated, not on repugnance to their fantastic social experiments, but on sound democratic grounds.

They began their insurrection on the eve of the general elections for the Constitutional Assembly, which were scheduled for the 25th, 26th and 27th, because they knew there is no chance of winning. In sharp contrast to the revolution of March this is a minority insurrection. The [Bolsheviki] are only one small faction of the socialist movement and moreover their influence is limited to a few well-defined localities. There are large sections consequently where their very name is unknown. And having overthrown the Provisional Government by armed revolt, lacking a majority support, they can only hold the power by sheer terror. Their first act of power was to imprison the former ministers, all of whom are sincere democrats. The second was to confiscate all hostile newspapers, not only the few monarchical newspapers but also the Constitutional Democratic and even the moderate socialist newspapers. This assault on the liberty of the press

was especially serious at the time of general elections. They have complete control of the posts and telegraphs and are using this power to falsify public opinion.

The elections in the Moscow district which were announced for yesterday have been postponed. It is doubtful whether the Constitutional Assembly can be held contact [sic]. Threats of a general massacre of the *bourgeoisie* on election day are being floated in the obvious intention of scaring opposing voters away from the polls. All these extreme measures show that the Bolsheviks are afraid to face the democratic verdict of an honest election.

A strong statement from Washington that the United States is entirely neutral in regard to the (protracted) internal question of social reforms but refuses to recognize an undemocratic government of violence and terror would be generally approved by all the responsible democratic elements here and would be a severe blow to the irresponsible adventurers now in power.

The most difficult task which confronts our publicity work is the counteracting of the German propaganda which asserts that the capitalists who control America would rather lose the war than see the workers gain a victory in the social struggle. The wireless dispatch referred to above was good. Now a clear statement by the President condemning the undemocratic policy of the Bolsheviks and perhaps a similar statement by Gompers would have a valuable effect.

Please communicate to Creel at once.

SUMMERS

¹ George Creel, chairman of the Committee on Public Information.

File No. 861.00/739¹/₂

[Document 255]

The Special Representative (House) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *November 28, 1917, 10 a.m.*

[*Received November 29, 8.30 a.m.*]

2820. For the President and Secretary:

There have been cabled over and published here statements made by American papers to the effect that Russia should be treated as an enemy. It is exceedingly important that such criticisms should be suppressed. It will throw Russia into the lap of Germany if the Allies and ourselves express such views at this time.

EDWARD HOUSE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 29, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received December 4, 5.40 a.m.*]

2041. Have transmitted through Stockholm *en clair* verbatim copy of a communication Trotsky concerning armistice.¹ Same sent immediately all Allied missions.

Gave informal reception and Thanksgiving [Day] tea to-day inviting Americans through press notice and informing embassies and legations by telephone. Two hundred attended. All Allied Ambassadors came except British consequently have not seen him since receiving Trotsky note informing Allied diplomatic representatives of armistice conference of December 2 and asking if their governments wished to take part therein.²

An Embassy secretary reports that British [Ambassador has] changed position and is recommending his Government to recognize Soviet administration and admit that Russia compelled to negotiate separate peace to the end that remaining Allies may retain Russian good will. Cannot credit this but if do not receive notice of meeting of Allied chiefs by noon to-morrow shall request same be called.

Election returns incomplete but Cadets elected four in Petrograd, Bolsheviks six, all others two, which is encouraging as expected Bolshevik majority. Assembly meets December 13 and reliable reports to the effect that if there should be Bolshevik majority it will not be large.

FRANCIS

¹ See telegram No. 2040 of Nov. 29, *ante*, p. 253 [*Pg. 253 includes portions of [Doc. 236](#) and [Doc. 237](#)*].

² See *ante*, p. 244 [*Pg. 244 is part of [Doc. 228](#)*].

The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War College Staff

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *November 30, 1917, 2 p.m.*

[*Copy received from War Department, December 6.*]

Text received Kerth's protest filed at Stavka³ November 27 against separate armistice. Contains no word in message [*sic*]. Same date French military representative Stavka informed latter French Government does not recognize Bolshevik government and relies on Russian high command to put aside all criminal negotiations, etc. Based on these two communications Trotsky makes statement that Soviet government can not permit such interferences with internal life country which tend to kindle civil war. Further such steps, he says, will bring heavy consequences for which his government refuses to accept responsibility.

Excellent authority for belief that British Ambassador has requested authority his Government to adopt very conciliatory attitude toward Russia and all political elements thereof including Bolsheviks, even recognizing that Russia may be in fact forced to peace of any character.

Something may yet be saved of favorable Russian influence upon Allies' interests. Wide margin still among possibilities. Long-armistice rather than separate peace might result in continuing enemy troops, retaining nearly two million enemy prisoners and depriving Germany of Russian supplies.

Patience, not unfriendly attitude, now demanded with no further protests or threats.

If Constitutional Assembly Bolshevik it will be time for recognition; if Cadet, Assembly will probably not have opportunity to function.

Above cabled to Pershing.

JUDSON

³ The Stavka, or army headquarters, was at Mogilev.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1871. Department informed November 1 that British military mission in Russia reported to London that the quartermaster general Russian Army expected by January to have available 400,000 selected troops now being formed of volunteers from the same territorial area or Zemstvo. Men to be clothed and fed by Zemstvo organizations. Volunteer provincial committees to be formed also by selection from each provincial Zemstvo.^{[1](#)}

Please report whether this movement continues and whether yourself or General Judson can supplement information above. Also advise Department in this connection whether any suggestion made to send foreign troops other than Japanese to Russia.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} See *ante*, p. 71 [Pg. 71 is part of [Doc. 44](#)].

File No. 861.00/721

[Document 259]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1873. Your 2027, November 25, 8 p.m.^{[1](#)} Referring last sentence Department believes it would be most unwise to interfere in any way or take any sort of initiative such as you suggest.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)].

File No. 861.00/703

[Document 260]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1917, 7 p.m.*

1874. Referring your 2001, November 20, 10 p.m.^{[2](#)} Department believes conference impracticable such as you indicate first paragraph and does not desire you to participate therein.

LANSING

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of [Doc. 220](#) and [Doc. 221](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, November 30, 1917, 11 p.m.

[From, confirmation copy, original not received.]

2043. Have just seen British Ambassador who says has cabled for authority arrange *modus vivendi* with Soviet government as he expects it to be in power some time. Think has suggested that be permitted communicate with Smolny through attaché of the Embassy, not career secretary, but who speaks Russian.

Trotsky issued an order that no British passports be visaed for exit as British Embassy has not replied to Trotsky's demand that Chicherin and Petrov, Russian Bolsheviki interned in England, be released. British Ambassador says he is giving interview in which states has forwarded all commutations [communications] received from Smolny to London and is awaiting instructions. This means all British subjects in Rumania [Russia?] are prohibited leaving, and British Ambassador much exercised thereat.

Morning papers contain address from Provisional Government concerning Constituent Assembly which convenes December 11, 2 p.m. Address signed by six ministers: Prokopovich, Acting Premier and Minister of Food; Malyantovich, Minister of Justice; Nikitin, Minister of the Interior and Post and Telegraph [departments]; Gvozdiev, Minister of Labor; Liverovski, Minister Ways of Communication; Maslov, Minister of Agriculture, all of whom were ministers when last revolution began; also signed by four vice ministers and two chiefs of bureau. Above ministers all free, having been released because they were socialists. Address states that Kerensky and Minister of War and Minister of Marine have resigned and the other ministers are imprisoned. The address criticizes Bolshevik government and appeals to people to support Constituent Assembly.

Election returns incomplete; reports continue that Bolsheviki will not have majority. Meantime Lenin and Trotsky administering affairs from the Smolny without opposition. Reports and general belief are to effect that if Bolsheviki have not majority of Assembly will ignore its authority or doctor returns to retain power.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 1, 1917.*
[Received December 5, 10.10 a.m.]

2049. Trotsky in speech last night quoted as follows:

To-day I had with me here in Smolny Institute two Americans having close ties with the capitalistic element of the American nation who assured me that the attitude of the United States is expressed correctly by the letter of Judson and not Kerth.¹ I am inclined to believe that such is really the case not, assuredly, because I believe in the platonic sympathy for the Russian nation of which the American imperialists wish to persuade me. The point is that after all that has taken place during the last two days the American diplomats have understood that they could not overcome the Russian revolution and therefore they desire to form with us "friendly" relations considering that this will be an excellent means of competition with the Germans and in particular with the British capitalists after the war. Anyway, we are in no wise interested as to how Allied or enemy imperialists will treat us. We shall conduct an independent policy of class no matter how they may treat us and I give these considerations only because I see therein a symptom of the unshakable forces of the Russian revolution and of its [r]evolutionary government.

He then discusses British relations, saying British Consul visited Smolny after prohibition of all British subjects to leave Russia and asked what would be the result if British reply to demand for release of two socialists were delayed. Trotsky adds:

I did not hesitate a moment and replied to him that if the comrades continue to remain in concentration camps through the ill will of the British Government, then revolutionary Russia will find it possible to adjust to their situation that also of the British counter-revolutionists in Russia. Our Allies and enemies abroad must understand at last that the times of Tsars and of Kerensky with Milyukov are over, that every Russian citizen, be he even a political emigrant or a revolutionary soldier in France, now finds himself under the protection of the governmental authority of the

Russian revolution.

This threatens internment of British subjects in Russia if [interned] Russian agitators are not released in England.

Judson says has cabled his two letters and Kerth's to War Department.¹ I directed Judson to instruct Kerth, who is at Stavka, to protest against separate armistice or peace. Judson thinks that Kerth did so before receipt of his instructions but that is immaterial. Trotsky objects in published statement that protest was addressed to Dukhonin after Dukhonin's removal. Kerth blameless therefore as Dukhonin was in command when protest submitted. Neither Judson nor I gave instructions concerning person to whom protest should be made and Kerth entirely justifiable in presenting same to person in command.

Trying to ascertain who are two Americans who presumed to speak for Americans when I have abstained therefrom to this moment. British Ambassador in authorized interview published to-day says:

In an interview accorded to Reuter correspondent Lord Cecil is reported to have said that His Majesty's Government could not recognize the present Russian Government and the Ambassador has further been instructed to abstain from any action that could be taken as implying recognition.

Not clear whether last clause in quotation stating instructions directly received or continuing to quote Lord Cecil.

FRANCIS

¹ See footnote 1, *post*, p. 276 [Pg. 276 includes portions of [Doc. 262](#) and [Doc. 263](#)].

¹ The letter of Lieut. Col. Monroe C. Kerth can not be found in the files of the War Department; for the two letters of Brig. Gen. W. V. Judson, dated Nov. 25 and 27, respectively, see *ante*, pp. 266 [Pg. 266 includes portions of [Doc. 248](#) and [Doc. 249](#)] and 269 [Pg. 269 includes portions of [Doc. 252](#) and [Doc. 253](#)].

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 1, 1917, 3 p.m.*

882. For Colonel House:

Your 2820, November 28, 10 a.m. American papers have printed very little along the lines indicated. All that can be found is a statement in New York *Tribune* which attracted no attention here that officials consider that "the opening of immediate peace negotiations would place Russia almost in the list of unfriendly nations." More emphatic statements along the same lines were telegraphed from London. I made a verbal statement to the press this morning deprecating such sensational stories and urged that they be counteracted. I said we realized Russia was going through a very difficult time and has suffered severely as a result of German intrigue; that every effort is being made to assist the Russian people in working out the salvation of the country and that the American Ambassador and other officials in Russia are working on the same instructions that were given them months ago to help in every legitimate way.

Will you not issue such statement along these lines you deem advisable and add that there is no truth in the report that officials of this Government have voiced sentiments hostile to Russia?

LANSING

File No. 861.00/745

[Document 264]

The Minister in Denmark (Egan) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *December 1, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received December 8, 12.25 a.m.]

1653. It is feared that some of the neutral nations, perhaps under pressure, may recognize the Bolshevik government. This would increase its prestige enormously. Perhaps representation against such recognition might be made by our Government.

AMERICAN LEGATION

¹ Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 1, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received December 2, 2.28 p.m.]

1095. W. F. Sands,² who is well known to the Department, just arrived from Petrograd *en route* to America. He informed me that his view of Russian conditions is as follows:

The strike by all Government officials and employees against the Bolshevik control was still in full force up to the date of his departure from Petrograd, November 26. There is no longer any doubt the Bolshevik leaders are in close communication with the leaders of the growing party of restoration. The connecting link between the two extremist parties is, as might be expected, the old secret police which disappeared during the first days of the revolution and has now resumed its former position of influence in both extreme parties. Sands states this to be a fact within his personal knowledge. He says that it is of course possible that the secret police are laying a trap for reactionaries. The rank and file of the Bolshevik Party are not aware of this combination as it is also beyond question that the party of the restoration intends by stimulating instead of avoiding a famine in all the great cities to reduce the people to a certain extent [to a] condition of misery from which they can only look to a Tsar to rescue them. These leaders are fully aware of [risks] involved by this policy and of the danger to life from violence and disorder which will naturally follow famine in the great cities but they consider this to be a necessary condition to achieve their object. The leaders of the restoration party are also fully aware that Germany desires the restoration of the Tsar. They recognize the principal Bolshevik leaders are working in the interest of Germany but they are willing to take whatever risk may be involved therein in order to accomplish the restoration. The restoration party is growing rapidly in numbers and has been greatly increased by Kerensky's treachery to Kornilov and subsequent downfall. A picked force is being organized to strike heavily when the country has reached the proper condition of disorganization and misery. Sands says he will give you the details of this movement when he reaches Washington. He expresses very strongly the hope that the Embassies and particularly the American Embassy will not be withdrawn from Russia under any conditions as such a course will inevitably throw Russia completely and irrevocably into the hands of Germany. Present conditions in Russia are more favorable to Americans than to any one else. The other Allies are not trusted. Americans are; and in Sands's opinion our

Government should most carefully avoid so allying themselves with any particular party or group of men in Russia as to cause the isolation of the Ambassador when that party fails or falls from power. All the Allied Embassies have committed this error and Allied interests have suffered for it. Sands urges strongly that the United States hold on as firmly as possible to its real interests in Russia and in Russia's gateway, Sweden, and that we urge upon the Allies the necessity for a free hand to America in Russia and Scandinavia.

MORRIS

² Special Assistant in the Embassy at Petrograd, 1916–1917.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 1, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 4, 2.15 p.m.]

2050. Judson saw Trotsky to-day with my approval as at yesterday's meeting of Allied chiefs I advocated unofficial effort to influence armistice terms at conference beginning to-morrow. No objection was offered to each chief's exerting such influence unofficially and not personally. Judson making full report to War Department.¹ Says no friction attended first session and thinks some good accomplished. My desire was as indicated my 2039, November 28, 12 noon,² to throw safeguards around separate armistice, if inevitable, that would protect other fronts and prevent transfer thereto of German troops now confronting Russian Army; also to prevent liberation of Austrian-German prisoners and Russian prisoners. Trotsky told Judson had thought of such provisos.

Allied chiefs still carefully avoiding recognition. Reports continue that Bolsheviki will not have majority in Assembly.

FRANCIS

¹ See *infra*.

² *Ante*, p. 252 [Pg. 252 includes portions of [Doc. 235](#) and [Doc. 236](#)].

The Military Attaché in Russia (Judson) to the War Department

[Telegram—Extract]

[PETROGRAD,] *December 1, 1917.*

I had long interview with Trotsky this morning on military features of Lenin-Trotsky program, especially relating to armistice negotiations beginning tomorrow. I emphasized unofficial character and had Ambassador's consent. I pointed out in many ways parallel features of Russia's and Allies' interests and argued that if any armistice is made, it should be of long duration with enemy troops remaining in position and no exchange of prisoners or products.

Trotsky was very responsive. He implied that his principles and desire for peace leave him wide latitude in armistice negotiations and stated that he would be glad to have me cable to the United States that in the negotiations he would observe and endeavor to protect the interests of Russia's allies; he further stated that the points I raised appealed to him or had already been in his mind and that armistice commission would be given instructions accordingly.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 2, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received December 5, 4.45 p.m.]

2052. Jerome Davis, acting head of Young Men's Christian Association in Russia, just arrived from western front bringing address to President Wilson from "Central Executive Committee for the formation of fighting revolutionary battalions of the staff of the Commander in Chief of the Russian Army." This address inveighs against separate armistice and peace as dishonoring. Russia appeals to President as head of first nation recognizing Russian revolution and requests that the President send the address to Paris conference which is asked to state aims of the Allies in the war. Address furthermore requests that communication be established with Allies and extended therefrom. This commonly called "death battalion" numbers minimum of 20,000. Address sent to Kaledin for signature and if obtained will be sent to me for transmission to the President. Kaledin commander in chief of the Cossacks numbering 200,000.

Davis says northern and western fronts permeated with Bolshevik spirit and desire separate peace while southwestern, Rumanian and Caucasian still recognize Dukhonin and willing to fight but may change spirit and desert Dukhonin any time. Davis left Stavka night of 13th when Dukhonin in doubt whether he could command enough troops to resist Bolsheviks or would move further south. Soviet government has sent troops to capture Dukhonin and headquarters and Trotsky announced evening of 13th that his troops would capture headquarters within forty-eight hours.

Trotsky's speeches still threatening and defiant. In speech of 13th when asked about [demobilization] said soldiers would be permitted to carry arms to their homes. Reported that order issued for the arrest of Milyukov, Shingarev and others. Petrograd mayor arrested yesterday but released and given ovation by city council when he reappeared.

Davis says that if Bolsheviks interfere with Constituent Assembly when convenes that will be signal for civil war to begin throughout Russia. Election returns still incomplete but indicate Bolsheviks will not have a majority.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/757

[Document 269]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 2, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[*Received December 5, 11.10 a.m.*]

2053. Your 1873, November 30, 6 p.m., received to-day. Have done nothing, not even mentioned to colleagues action suggested in last sentence of my No. 2027, November 25, 8 p.m.^{[1](#)}

FRANCIS

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 267 [Pg. 267 includes portions of [Doc. 249](#) and [Doc. 250](#)].

File No. 861.00/754

[Document 270]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 2, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[*Received December 5, 12 noon.*]

2054. Your 1874, November 30, 7 p.m., received to-day. Have taken no steps on plan proposed in my No. 2001, November 20, 10 a. [p.] m.² Have not seen the parties mentioned therein since cable was sent. Instructions will be followed. Please advise action of Paris conference. No proceedings published here.

FRANCIS

² *Ante*, p. 238 [Pg. 238 includes portions of [Doc. 220](#) and [Doc. 221](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 2, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received December 5, 4, p.m.]

2056. Just had visit from Captain Proctor of the British military mission stationed at Archangel, who says sent by Admiral Kemp commanding British flotilla at Archangel to urge British and all Allied Embassies to conciliate Trotsky because all foreigners in Russia except Germans are in imminent personal danger. Kemp advises that all British, American, French and Belgians go immediately to Archangel to which British relief ship is destined and where accommodations on ship and ashore can be procured. Says 45,000 armed Serbian soldiers at Vologda in starving condition and Kemp desires them transported to Archangel for the protection of foreigners; also British, French and Belgian military units numbering about 300 each in Russia; says good wireless station at Archangel and direct cable from there to London; that 100,000 tons of munitions, much accumulation of lumber and export cargoes there which will need protection from demobilized army. Proctor says has lived in Russia fourteen years and thinks every foreign interest in great jeopardy not excepting embassies and legations. He is evidently frightened and says Kemp thinks England should immediately release interned socialists in compliance with Trotsky's demand.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 2, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 6, 1.25 a.m.]

2057. Judson's visit to Trotsky exciting comment, especially among Allied missions who consider it step toward recognition. Judson has insisted for some time that Soviet is *de facto* government and relations therewith should be established. After discussing matter with Allied colleagues as reported in 2050, December 1, 9 p.m., I consented that Judson should send subordinate to discuss armistice provisions only and was not aware that Judson had gone himself until after visit made. He reported to me had stated in the beginning to Trotsky that visit personal, not official, and that had talked about conditions and requirements armistice only, that Trotsky when asked whether desired to discuss Kerth protest or Judson letter of recall Trotsky replied negatively. Following is account of visit published in Soviet official organ to-day evidently from Trotsky:

Yesterday, December 1 [/November 18], General Judson, chief of the American Military Mission, visited Comrade Trotsky in Smolny. General Judson informed Comrade Trotsky that at present he has no opportunity of speaking in the name of the American Government since recognition of Soviet authority is not yet an accomplished fact, but he appeared for the purpose of establishing relations, elucidate certain circumstances and dispel misunderstandings. General Judson inquired whether the new government is seeking to terminate the war jointly with the Allies, which according to the words of the General can hardly participate in the negotiations taking place on December 2. Comrade Trotsky in short words explained to the General the policies of the Soviet government in the matter of a struggle for general peace. The paramount circumstance which the People's Commissaire specially emphasized is the fact that all negotiations will be openly conducted. The Allies will be able to follow the progress of the negotiations and can therefore join the Russians at any later stage of the proceedings.

General Judson asked for permission to cable this information to his Government and in conclusion stated that "the time for protests and threats addressed to the Soviet authority is over, if it ever existed." The

General asked whether the People's Commissaire insists upon explanations on the subjects of various incidents that have taken place (statements of protest of members of the American Military Mission). Comrade Trotsky stated that the formal side of the matter is not interesting and the incident may be considered closed with the General's statement that the time for threats and protests is over.

Judson has just shown me above translation from his office. Told by me that should not have said "time for threats and protests is over"; says statement incorrect but not as much so as feared.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 3, 1917.*

[*Received December 4, 5.12 a.m.*]

1106. Swedish press reports on Russia:

Five delegates left for Brest Litovsk, included only one well-known name Bolshevik leader Kamenev. Two General Staff officers also accompanied delegation, General Staff saying these officers don't share views separate peace action but accompany delegation to protect Allies' military and technical interests. American Military Attaché publicly declares Russia's right under present circumstances to put forward question of general peace. American Military Attaché, according to Soviet bulletin, visited Trotsky unofficially and told him he had come to do away with certain misunderstandings especially on point how far new government intend strive after peace in conjunction with Allies. Trotsky replied peace debates would be public and Allies given opportunity follow whole developments. General Jackson [Judson] said he would bring this to his government's knowledge saying time for protests and threats against Soviet government was passed. Trotsky said that General's above words were sufficient to annul protest of American Attaché to Russian Army headquarters. Executive Committee has turned itself into temporary parliament to function until Constituent Assembly meets. Government henceforward responsible to parliament to which it must give account every eighth day. Peasant Soviets have united with Petrograd Soviet. Personnel of Russian Embassies, Legations and Consulates have been discharged for refusing recognize new régime. Russian Legations Copenhagen, Stockholm have left notes of Trotsky unanswered.

Regarding Finland, it is reported that Bolshevik government has named new Finnish Governor General. In view of recent adoption by Finnish Senate of supreme power in Finland it is probable that he will not be recognized.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 3, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 5, 8.51 p.m.]

2061. Inform Mott:¹

Enormous agitation by newspaper cartoons, pictures done freely and openly by Germans among Russian troops. Most agitation directed against England, France, and Italy because insinuated that they want territorial gains from war. Publications tell Russian soldiers not to fear separate peace for Japan will not attack. Russian soldiers believe Allies wish territorial conquest. Publication of Italian treaty supports belief. Immediate statement by Allies of willingness to make peace without annexations and punitive indemnities would help tremendously if made before Constituent Assembly December 11. If possible for the sake of Russia and democracy real effort toward general peace should be made. Russia wants detailed terms of peace. Have just forwarded to President through Ambassador request of Russian volunteers and death battalions for such statement. Represents directly 20,000 soldiers and probably shared by Cossacks numbering 200,000 and by millions of private Russian citizens. Immediate action should be taken by the Government. Food and clothing Russian soldiers getting most critical. Northern and western armies already disloyal and have practically made peace and the remaining armies strongly favor peace. If Russia makes separate peace Association should stay in Russia. If Germans gain absolute control Russia will be costly for Allies. If Association remains here believe we can be greatest help to Russia, United States and the world. Please authorize this action immediately. In sending men to Russia emphasize permanent work rather than war work. Jerome Davis.²

FRANCIS

¹ John R. Mott, general secretary of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations.

² Acting head in Russia of the American Y.M.C.A.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 3, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received December 5, 11.50 p.m.*]

2062. Your 1871, November 30, 4 p.m.³ Plan outlined was formulated but never executed. Rodzyanko, Alexeev now with Kaledin at Novocherkassk and thought making efforts to organize army but extremely doubtful whether succeed. Kornilov reported escaped and gone south with four hundred Cossacks who were guarding him. Trotsky, however, playing bluff game and making every effort for recognition by Allied missions. Verkhovski, Minister of War, and Maruchevski, Chief of Staff, arrested. If Trotsky disrupts or postpones Constituent Assembly as reported in contemplation may arouse overwhelming opposition and ride to a fall. Surprising strength of Cadets in election is more attributable to opposition to Bolsheviks than strength of Cadets who considered reactionary. Cadets' strength may become so formidable in Assembly that will drive into Bolshevik ranks some Internationals and Social Revolutionists of left who otherwise would oppose Bolsheviks. Judson investigating as directed in 1837 [1871?¹].

FRANCIS

³ *Ante*, p. 273 [Pg. 273 includes portions of [Doc. 257](#) and [Doc. 258](#)].

¹ John R. Mott, general secretary of the International Committee of Young Men's Christian Associations.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 3, 1917, 12 p.m.*
[Received December 5, 7.35 p.m.]

2063. Your circular 28th.² Had personal talk with British Ambassador to-day who thought nothing doing now in matter mentioned in your 1871¹ which was plan of Verkhovski when Minister of War. British Ambassador admitted had received instruction to do nothing toward recognizing Soviet government. His official statement quoted in my 2049³ did not definitely so state and I think failure intentional. He is anxious lest some British subjects be interned here if socialist[s] not released in England. British subjects still refused exit. Proctor's fears mentioned in my 2056 are exaggerated.


British Ambassador says heard French wireless received stating that Paris conference had agreed on instructions to Allied missions in Russia which will be immediately transmitted.

Japanese Ambassador with whom had talk several days ago says no Japanese troops expected in Russia. Main reason therefor appeared to be physical obstacles as he said distance so great and rail transportation so limited that many opportunities for impeding progress by burning bridges front and rear and destroying tracks. He consults with me and appears quite calm. Greatest menace I see is demobilization of the army if armistice negotiated especially since Trotsky threatens to permit soldiers to retain arms.

Kaledin may possibly cut off food supplies from this section if Assembly interfered with. If so grave consequences will ensue.

Reported that Caucasian front numbering 400,000 did not elect a single Bolshevik to the Constituent Assembly. Reported that Bolsheviks captured Dukhonin and staff at Mogilev.

FRANCIS

 ² *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. I.

¹ *Ante*, p. 273 [Pg. 273 includes portions of [Doc. 257](#) and [Doc. 258](#)].

³ *Ante*, p. 275 [*Pg. 275 includes portions of [Doc. 261](#) and [Doc. 262](#)*].

File No. 861.00/752

[Document 277]

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, *December 4, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received 11.20 p.m.*]

1723. Minister of Foreign Affairs in conversation confirms the report that Dutch Minister at Petrograd refused to receive communication from Maximalist government. Loudon has notified him of this Government's approval. ...

GARRETT

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 4, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[*Received December 5, 5 a.m.*]

1113. In view of Russian situation and of conditions of which I am informed by Colonel Thompson, head of Red Cross. William F. Sands and others who have just come from Russia, I should like to call to your attention whether it would be advisable for the Allies to use good offices with the neutral powers as to the desirability of not recognizing Bolshevik government in Russia for the present. From well-informed sources I learn the present Russian Government is very anxious that one of the neutral powers make a start by recognizing their government which would give it an official international standing and create more satisfactory atmosphere for them to continue their relations with the Central powers and which would also establish a precedent for other neutral countries to follow. Should you so desire I can informally and unofficially ascertain Sweden's feeling on this point.

MORRIS

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *December 5, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[*Received 7.43 p.m.*]

410. I have received from all members of Russian Legation and from Russian Consul here note stating that they do not recognize the Bolshevik usurpers at Petrograd as having any legal authority. These notes have been acknowledged without comment. Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that Norwegian Government has merely acknowledged without comment Trotsky's notification and that this Government will not recognize the government of Bolsheviks until the great powers do so.

SCHMEDEMAN

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 5, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received December 11, 4.19 a.m.]

2067. No developments noteworthy from armistice conference to-day. At the meeting of Allied chiefs cables to British and French Ambassadors submitted but no definite instructions therein. Allied missions still not recognizing Soviet government; this agreement unanimous and emphatic.

French Ambassador read a telegram from Vladivostok dated 4th saying 1,500 Bolshevik soldiers arrived there from Petrograd on 3d, object unknown. Japanese Ambassador said that he thought American warship at Vladivostok but if so neither naval attaché nor I aware thereof.¹ British Ambassador stated had heard of threats of Trotsky to place him under arrest.

My judgment is to await meeting and action of Constituent Assembly. Rumor is that Bolsheviks will postpone convening. The reason is that at [all] returns indicate they will not have majority but probably plurality. Cruiser *Aurora* still here and said to be awaiting meeting of Assembly to open fire thereon if dislikes its complexion.

Suggested at conference to-day inevitably tension might become so great as to compel Allied missions to leave Russia.

FRANCIS

¹ The Ambassador was informed, by telegram No. 1895, Dec. 12, that the U. S. S. *Brooklyn* had been at Vladivostok since Nov. 25.

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *December 6, 1917, 11 a.m.*

[*Received December 7, 2.20 a.m.*]


2857. Mr. Maklakov, the Russian Ambassador, told me to-day orally that he had just heard from his government for the first time ill about a week. The telegram was signed by Trotsky and directed him to notify all the Russian consuls in France that an armistice would be declared between Germany and Russia and Russian Government directed him also that unless he was in sympathy with such a program he should consider himself as removed from his position and should turn over the mission with all the archives, records, etc., to one of his secretaries. The message concluded by asking for an immediate telegraphic reply.

The Ambassador said to me [if] the situation at Petrograd were not so grave and his action not liable possibly to prejudice the action of the Allies he would merely reply by asking who Trotsky was. He told me that this man was a Jew by birth and that his real name was Bernstein [Bronstein], Under the circumstances, however, he said that he would make no reply whatever to the telegram. He declared that regardless of future events in Russia he would never permit himself to retain his position under a government controlled by Trotsky. He regarded Lenin as fanatical rather than corrupt.

During our talk he advanced the rather interesting view that if the proceedings attending the discussion of the terms of armistice were to be made public each day, the German Government might thereby be compelled to take such a position as would reveal her true purposes in such a manner as to cause widespread revulsion among the Russian people. He expressed the opinion that under the circumstances such a plan of publicity as announced by Lenin and his associates, thus putting Germany on record, might have an unexpected effect from that which its promoters sought.

The Ambassador commended the President's message¹ very highly and said that he thought its dissemination among the Russian people would be of great value in refuting the German propaganda that had been industriously carried on among his people to the effect that the Allies were bent on carrying out an imperialist policy favoring annexation of territory.

SHARP

¹ Address to Congress, Dec. 4; [*Foreign Relations, 1917*, p. IX](#) .

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, *December 6, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[Received December 7, 6.15 a.m.]

1126. Referring to following reported interview which appeared in the Swedish newspapers and is supposed to have taken place between General Judson, the American military attaché (no doubt the newspapers in error gave the name of Jackson instead of Judson), and Trotsky and which was contained in my telegram No. 1106.¹ This has been causing a great deal of comment in Sweden. In an informal conversation with the Foreign Minister yesterday on other matters he asked me as to the authenticity of this report regarding statement of Judson's. I quote below *Dagens Nyheter* report regarding interview. ...

MORRIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 283 [Pg. 283 includes portions of [Doc. 272](#) and [Doc. 273](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 6, 1917, 2 p.m.*

1883. Referring press reports received here last few days concerning communications of Judson with Trotsky relative armistice, President desires American representatives withhold all direct communication with Bolshevik government. So advise Judson and Kerth. Department assumes these instructions being observed by Embassy. Have you received Department telegrams instructing Embassy take no action Nos. 1873, 1874, and 1875, two of them dated November 30, the third dated December 1?²

LANSING

² Telegrams Nos. 1873 and 1874, *ante*, p. 274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of [Doc. 259](#), [Doc. 260](#), and [Doc. 261](#)]; telegram No. 1875, *ante*, p. 254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of [Doc. 238](#) and [Doc. 239](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the General Secretary,
International Committee, of the Young Men's Christian
Associations (John R. Mott)***

WASHINGTON, *December 7, 1917.*

DEAR MR. MOTT: I enclose herewith paraphrase of a telegram for you from Mr. Jerome Davis, which the Ambassador at Petrograd has transmitted without comment.³

I am somewhat concerned to observe the tone of Mr. Davis's recommendations, which are so obviously at variance with the announced policy of this Government. The handling of diplomatic questions of this sort should, of course, be left entirely in the hands of the Ambassador at Petrograd, and other Americans in Russia should concern themselves strictly to the special work upon which they are engaged. Both the Ambassador and the Department are always glad to have the benefit of the opinions of our people in Russia, but I feel strongly, particularly in the present critical juncture, that any attempt by unauthorized persons to deal with diplomatic questions is fraught with grave danger.

As we are all striving to attain the same end, I am confident that you will agree with me and feel that I owe it to you to let you have this frank expression of my views in the belief that you will wish to counsel your people in Russia to confine themselves to the work which has taken them to that country and to lend their earnest cooperation to the Ambassador in the duties that devolve upon him.

I am [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

³ *Ante*, p. 284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)].

File No. 861.00/780a

[Document 285]

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 7, 1917—3 p.m.*

436. Your 1113, December 4, 4 p.m. Please ascertain informally and discreetly Sweden's feeling towards recognition of Bolshevik government. Department at present awaiting developments but desires to be kept advised attitude of neutrals on this subject.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/774

[Document 286]

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *December 7, 1917, 6 p.m.*

[*Received December 8, 2.55 p.m.*]

Russian Ambassador informs me he has received a peremptory telegram from Petrograd signed by Trotsky directing him either formally to acknowledge the authority of the group governing Russia, or to transfer the affairs of the Embassy to any other member of the staff who is in sympathy and acknowledges the authority of the Maximalists. The Ambassador has reported the matter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs who assures him that he will continue to recognize him as Russian representative.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 7, 1917, 7 p.m.*
[Received December 11, 7.31 p.m..]

2074. Cannot refrain from expressing great gratitude for President's message¹ because has right ring and states my views concerning war much better than could myself. Think impossible for Soviet government to [last] long. Even extreme socialist and peace champions are disgusted with sailor and Red Guard excesses such as Dukhonin murder and other outrages. If convening of Assembly prevented by force or postponement such action will cause revulsion against Bolsheviks and probable uprising. Reported that plan of Kaledin and associates is to cut off all food shipments for this section if Assembly interrupted. I have not absolutely lost hope of Russia's continuing in war but do not expect offensive action. Think I am almost alone in this belief. Furthermore I do not agree with Judson and others who think Germany cannot be defeated if Russia makes separate peace. Kornilov joined Kaledin where Rodzyanko and Alexeev have been week or more. Milyukov's whereabouts unknown. Kerensky's also; but latter states in announcement printed to-day that while no longer President, he is still member of Provisional Government and joins in announcement concerning meeting of Constituent Assembly signed by other Ministers and published as reported in my No. 2043¹; orders for arrest of all signers thereof issued by Lenin but none apprehended yet as whereabouts unknown.

Have seen no American paper since this revolution began. Brown, special correspondent *Chicago News* and connected with McClure Syndicate, claims to have gotten the only telegrams out of Russia for four days after revolution began. Says is Bolshevik in sentiment but when Kornilov was captured he practically sympathized with that cause and left Petrograd for Stockholm. Brown said to me that if United States did not consent to peace offer the dollar would be worth no more than ten rubles is now. Donnel eh Fleurot [Dosch-Fleurot], New York *World* correspondent, is also in touch with Trotsky and Lenin. I think both correspondents would like to see (the?) Soviet government recognized.

FRANCIS

¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, p. ix.

¹ *Ante*, p. 274 [Pg. 274 includes portions of [Doc. 259](#), [Doc. 260](#), and [Doc. 261](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 8, 1917.*
[Received December 11, a.m.]

2028 [2080?]. *Pravda*, Bolshevik organ, to-day contains letter from Vladimir Bakrylov, former secretary of Breshkovskaya, headed, "Relations of American Red Cross with Russian political men." It relates that Breshkovskaya and Sauskis, Kerensky's secretary, were "cooking up something with a group of Americans from the Red Cross"; that Americans had promised two million dollars; that Sauskis brought "Robins and two other Americans," who handed Breshkovskaya two packages of fifty thousand rubles paid by Americans; that Sauskis reported that over two million rubles had already been deposited and the rest would be deposited next day; states this money was used or to be used for publishing newspapers, operating cinemas, organizing lecturers, etc. It appears that several newspapers were founded which have been since suppressed; one called *Narodnaya Pravda* had its first issue suppressed because "was of such *pogrom* character with caricatures of Chernov, Lenin, and others that Sauskis and Breshkovskaya protested and asked to do it over again." It stated further: "Having glanced into this abyss of filth, I told Breshkovskaya that I could not longer work for her and left." Letter ends, "My conscience will not allow me to be silent longer."

This is first knowledge of application of money concerning which have cabled Department.

Thompson and his publicist, Brown, left 4th for London. Breshkovskaya's whereabouts unknown.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 8, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1891. Your 2061, December 8, 9 p.m.,^{[1](#)} has been transmitted, although manifestly improper in character, as it enunciates views utterly at variance with announced policy of this Government. Department prefers to have recommendations on political situation come from you. When necessary to transmit messages bearing on political conditions Department desires in each instance for its better understanding and guidance an expression of your personal views.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 284 [Pg. 284 includes portions of [Doc. 274](#) and [Doc. 275](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 9, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received December 11, 8 p.m.*]

2081. Present revolution began November 7 when Kerensky commandeered automobile of Embassy secretary and escaped, sending me message to effect that troops in Petrograd not siding with Bolsheviki were neutral and that he would return with troops from the front and liquidate entire situation within five days. Same date the remaining ministers at a meeting at Winter Palace were surrounded and after resistance of six hours surrendered November 8, 2 a.m., when they were taken to Peter and Paul Fortress where five, including Minister of Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance, are still confined. Same evening new Ministry was named at Smolny Institute by Petrograd Council of Workmen and Soldiers and a portion of national Soviet of the same organization. That Ministry Council of Commissaries of the People. Lenin was named President, Trotsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs. Names of others immaterial as nearly all declined to serve, including Verkhovski, Minister of the Interior [*sic*], and Verderevski, Minister of Marine. Same meeting promulgated peace decree sending same by wireless to all belligerent nations.

No charges have been presented against Ministers of the Provisional Government who were captured and imprisoned and no one knows why they were imprisoned except that the Bolsheviki desired control. Immediate cause Bolshevik outbreak was a discussion in the Council of Republic concerning instruction of Russian delegate to be represented conference called for November 16. Council of Republic had taken no definite action on the subject but Tereshchenko had made several speeches, the last of which dwelt upon fidelity to Allies and advocated importance of sending an undivided delegation to that conference. Skobelev had been appointed delegate Soviet and given instructions to advocate peace proposals. The last meeting of the council was November 5 when it adjourned to November 7 and never met after November 5. I conferred with Minister of Foreign Affairs November 6 and made full report thereof to the Department same date. See my No. 1957.¹ Have not seen Tereshchenko since nor had any communication with him. My cables from No. 1957, November 6, to 2006, November 22,² informed Department of developments. As advised by my 2006 received notice from the Foreign Office that government had been assumed by Council of Commissaries of

the People and Trotsky as Commissary of Foreign Affairs was in charge of the Foreign Office. Exact text of that communication forwarded to Department in my 2006. Department's 1864, November 24, 4 p.m., received November 26,³ was first indication received by me that Department knew of revolution in progress.

Department's 1875, December 1,⁴ gave definite instructions to make no reply on three subjects reported by the Embassy. I advised Department of meetings opposing Allied chiefs; also of my personal conferences with the British Ambassador and Japanese Ambassador. Last conference of chiefs held December 5 as reported in my 2067.¹

This Soviet government has survived beyond expectations. It was established by force, which was secured by promise of immediate peace made by Lenin and Trotsky to a demoralized army and to a people discouraged because that army was demoralized. Seeing that it could not maintain itself without active effort to procure the prohibitory peace the Soviet government appointed commissioners to negotiate separate armistice but claimed later that it meant a general armistice if Allies would agree to it, armistice and separate peace would be consummated if Allies decline to participate in negotiations for general armistice and general peace, manifestoes threatening to appeal to the people of belligerent countries if the governments thereof continue to refuse recognition or declined to participate.

This is brief summary of situation. Reference to my cables will show how carefully I have avoided every appearance that could be construed as recognition or in any way strengthening government of Lenin and Trotsky, having persistently refused appeals of military attaché to permit Bolshevik government to place in Embassy guard of soldiers obeying Soviet commands and to permit him to procure from Smolny permit for my personal automobile. As recognition of Provisional Government six days after its organization was made at psychological moment and when followed by recognition of other Governments, as it was, had effect of strengthening and establishing that Government so any apparent recognition of this government would have had like result. In such policy I will [did] not [rely on] own judgment but was in thorough accord with all Allied missions here with whom you directed close relations should be established.

American Red Cross mission manifested surprising nervousness from beginning of revolution, Thompson and some other members sleeping at apartment of Military Mission which had and has Bolshevik guard and [with] which Thompson had much closer relations than with Embassy. That nervousness perhaps attributable to the disbursements which my 2080² informed Department were strictly enforced [recently revealed] by former secretary Breshkovskaya, objects of which were unknown to me until publication of letter.

Judson's personal call on Trotsky was without my knowledge or approval as explained in my 2058³ and I was compelled so to state to my colleagues at meeting of December 5 when they remarked that it was understood we should act in union and in any case Judson's visit to Trotsky was a violation of such

understanding. Sisson arrived November 25 when I had short talk with him. His next call was five days later, November 30, when he insisted with Judson that I permit latter to procure automobile permit for myself and when I declined and said was doing nothing he replied, "That is what I complain against, and it is driving us to perdition"; whereupon I promptly and emphatically reminded him I was the Ambassador and the responsibility mine and I did not hesitate to exercise it.

I have not promulgated as instructed your circular of November 9 concerning Liberty Loan nor your 1819¹ concerning Paris conference because, first, there was no channel therefor except Bolshevik publications which would not have fully printed such announcements; secondly, because thought such publications would exasperate Soviet government and possibly alarm American colony many of whom were already in nervous condition.

Constituent Assembly, whose action I have been awaiting before making definite recommendation, will meet December 11 if plan followed. Various reports current, however, concerning postponement of its convening and threats of excluding Cadets from seats to which they have been elected but doubtful whether will appear as would probably be arrested.

You can see how difficult is the situation. Impossible to ascertain whether government under German influence but it is known that some attaches at Smolny are Germans and also that other Germans are in Petrograd and Moscow and at the front and making little effort to conceal their identity. I think Lenin and Trotsky reckless adventurers and playing bluff game. Rumors current to effect that divisions in Soviet ranks now appearing.

(More to-morrow.)

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 220 [Pg. 220 includes portions of [Doc. 194](#), [Doc. 195](#), and [Doc. 196](#)].

² *Ante*, p. 244 [Pg. 244 is part of [Doc. 228](#)].


³ *Ante*, p. 248 [Pg. 248 includes portions of [Doc. 231](#), [Doc. 232](#), and [Doc. 233](#)].

⁴ *Ante*, p. 254 [Pg. 254 includes portions of [Doc. 238](#) and [Doc. 239](#)].

¹ *Ante* p. 287 [Pg. 287 includes portions of [Doc. 279](#), [Doc. 280](#), and [Doc. 281](#)].

² See telegram No. 2028, *ante*, p. 291 [Pg. 291 includes portions of [Doc. 287](#) and [Doc. 288](#)].

³ The Ambassador possibly refers to telegram No. 2057, *ante*, p. 282 [Pg. 282 includes portions of [Doc. 271](#) and [Doc. 272](#)]. Telegram No. 2058 is not on this subject.

 ¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1917, Supplement 2, vol. 1.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 10, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received December 14, 4.14 a.m.]

2083. Your 1883, December 6, 2 p.m.,² just received and sincerely welcomed. My policy and course thoroughly explained in my 2081 and much pleased to learn you approve.

Numerous rumors have been current for weeks that Monarchists working with Bolsheviks and same supported by various occurrences and circumstances. This, moreover, not unreasonable as such government more vulnerable than one founded on real democratic basis.

Just heard from source worthy of credence that Smolny government absolutely under control of German General Staff. Reported Germans have announced will occupy Petrograd December 23. While see no object in their so doing other than moral effect think they could do so if desire and it is possible they may so conclude. In such event Embassy would leave but fear could not go to Sweden as frontier closely guarded by Soviet government and it is possible could not secure transportation from Petrograd. Shall, of course, exercise best judgment. Have you any instructions? My plan is and has been from beginning to remain here regardless of governmental changes and internal dissensions, relying for protection on respect of Russian people for sovereignty which I represent. Such has been my reasoning when declining to authorize Bolshevik guard in Embassy. Trotsky gives widest possible circulation to any favors requested by even subordinates of Allied missions, hoping thereby to convince Russian people that his government is recognized by Allies as that would be most effective argument for its recognition in Russia.

Reported that Kornilov after escaping arrived at Kharkov with 7,000 armed followers, demolished armored train sent to interfere with him and when demanding fresh locomotives of the station master and told same would not be furnished Kornilov replied, giving ten minutes for furnishing locomotives or station master would be shot. Locomotives were provided and Kornilov proceeded south, Rodzyanko and Alexeev are with Kaledin at Novocherkassk where troops are assembling but not known in what numbers nor what their plan is.


Horn¹ sees me daily and is diplomatic, also efficient railroad operator. Has had

office in the Department Ways of Communication since his appointment, having been established there by personal visit of myself; also has interpreter and is keeping in touch with subordinates operating department. Stevens, as I have advised, is at Vladivostok awaiting Emerson's arrival. He has instructions to keep in touch with transportation managers and I am sparing no effort to collaborate likewise but abstaining from any act that can be construed as recognition of Soviet government. Department's 1884, December 5, 3 p.m.,² received yesterday and endeavoring to give same widest publicity as think be beneficial in many ways.

FRANCIS

² *Ante*, p. 289 [*Pg. 289 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#), [Doc. 283](#), and [Doc. 284](#)*].

¹ Henry J. Horn, member of the Advisory Commission of Railway Experts to Russia.

² Vol. III, chap. iii.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *December 11, 1917, 12 noon.*
[*Received December 15, 5.25 a.m.*]

116. The system of workmen's control to be instituted in all factories in Russia practically deprives directors or owners of any management of their property. The eventual nationalizing of such plants will cause incalculable losses both to Russian and foreign interests and will curtail if not stop all production. It can be easily seen that Germany will profit by this paralyzation. I am handling each concrete case where American interests are involved energetically as possible with a view to protecting their interests but fear that the general decree of nationalization and control will eventually be carried out. I may likewise add that the Soviets, Moscow, manifest a desire not to create international difficulties for which reason I am unofficially impressing upon them the danger of the proposed measures.

SUMMERS

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 11, 1917, 3 p.m.*

6009. Department has received no information regarding the policy which the British Government proposes to adopt in the present Russian situation. Please inquire informally and cable immediate report. Keep Department advised.

LANSING

¹ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 2944).

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 11, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[Received December 13, 1.30 a.m.]

1159. Your 436² and 438.³ I have ascertained that Swedish Government does not intend doing anything premature regarding recognition of Bolshevik government in Russia. I have also ascertained that Swedish Foreign Minister states that they would not in any event recognize the Russian government before a regular government was established by the Constituent Assembly.

In a personal conversation with the Russian Minister here I learned that he had received telegram from the Russian Chargé d’Affaires at The Hague stating that the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs has sent instructions to the Dutch Chargé d’Affaires at Petrograd not to reply to Trotsky’s note and to have no relations with him.

The Russian Chargé d’Affaires at Christiania has informed the Russian Minister here that the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs had informed him that the Norwegian Government would not take the initiative in recognizing the Bolshevik government.

On December 2 the Russian Minister here called on the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs at his private residence and informed him that he had received two communications from Trotsky ordering him to submit to latter’s authority or deliver the archives to another, threatening violence in case of refusal to which communications the Russian Minister made no reply and he asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs what attitude the Swedish Government intend taking with reference to recognition of Bolshevik government. The Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that his Government would be in no haste to recognize the Bolshevik government and would follow the lead of the other powers.

MORRIS

² Ante, p. 290 [Pg. 290 includes portions of [Doc. 284](#), [Doc. 285](#), [Doc. 286](#), and [Doc. 287](#)].

³ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 11, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[*Received December 13, 2.35 a.m.*]

2088. Constituent Assembly not convened Lenin having announced it would not be permitted until four hundred members in assembly room provided which is Tauride Palace formerly occupied by National Duma. Probably only about one hundred members in Petrograd, many elected members prevented from coming by fear of arrest.

Armistice negotiations will be resumed to-morrow. Bolsheviks in my judgment will make separate armistice and separate peace on German terms if necessary in order for them to retain power which is dearer to them than welfare of Russia and her allies.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 203

Moscow, *December 12, 1917.*
[*Received January 30, 1918.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department that by decree published in the gazette of the Council of Workingmen's and Soldiers' Delegates, private property in land is declared abolished. All landed properties are handed over with their buildings, implements and livestock to the land committees. The homes of landowners are to be used for hospitals, primary schools, theaters and hospices, under which term seem to be understood public inns. Pillage and incendiarism are discountenanced. The injunction to spare the property of estate owners from destruction or theft is the most hopeful feature of this decree. The majority of the proprietors have already been driven away and the management and benefit of their properties have passed into the hands of the neighboring peasants. Those living on their estates are for the most part compelled to submit requests to use food supplies to the local land committee.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *December 12, 1917, 4 p.m.*
[Received 8.45 p.m.]

7934. Your 6009, December 11, 3 p.m. Mr. Balfour informs me that his Government will not recognize the Lenin so-called government, certainly not until it can show some sort of authority from the people. There are, moreover, at present other difficulties in the way of recognition; the Ukraine, the Cossacks, and other peoples in different parts of the Russian Empire, may possibly show opposition to Lenin and his program dealing with Germany. If these should remain anti-German they would deserve help if it could be given to them. Balfour has instructed his Ambassador in Petrograd to have no dealings with any of the present factions until events warrant a change of his present views. The whole attitude of the British Government toward Russia is now under Cabinet discussion and Balfour promises further information as fast as conclusions are reached.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/793

[Document 298]

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 12, 1917, 4 p.m.*

[*Received 8.45 p.m.*]

1166. Russian Minister, Copenhagen, informs me that Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs told him that Danish Government would take no action with reference to recognition of Bolshevik government for the present and would await developments.

MORRIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *December 12, 1917, 6 p.m.*
[Received December 15, 5.56 p.m.]

118. In view of advisability of furnishing Department immediate information regarding critical situation in Russia Consulate General will telegraph in future such events as have bearings on conduct war and American interests.

Russkoe Slovo, most important newspaper in Russia, closed on account of publishing statement that Krylenko captured General Staff in conformity with plans emanating German General Staff.

Election returns give (Social?) Revolutionists enormous majority over Bolsheviks. Recriminations between these two parties very bitter. Former opposed to separate peace and to the illegal and violent measures of Bolsheviks charging them with doing everything possible to bring anarchy and ruin [on] the country.

Heavy fighting reported throughout south of Russia between Cossacks and loyal troops on the one hand and Bolsheviks on the other hand. The results are not known.

Recent Bolshevik projects and decrees abolish all courts; confiscate to the state all property real and personal both in cities and country; repudiate all loans foreign and domestic; abolish all grades in regiment.

Decrees relating to nationalizing amount to control of factories creating great alarm among foreigners. At a recent meeting of the President of Soviets with American and Swedish Consul General representing Allied and neutral countries Swedish Consul stated categorically as representing interests that such measures would not be tolerated. We jointly pointed out in an unofficial manner to Soviets the gravity of such extreme measures at this time and are endeavoring to do all we can in a friendly way to influence leaders Bolsheviks to stop campaign of terrorism waged against educated classes and are encouraged by result.

Strongly advise labor organizations in the United States to counsel Russian Soviets to modify their program which must lead to chaos

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 12, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[Received December 15, 2.38 p.m.]

2091. Trotsky in speech Sunday night reported in Bolshevik paper as saying:

The chief of the American Red Cross came to Smolny and said straight that in Russia there never had been any such strong government as ours and that America of course will give us all kinds of supplies except munitions which we do not require any more.

The visit of the American immediately showed the People's Commissaries the extreme advantages for us in international situation.

Suppose Robins is meant, as he is acting since Thompson's departure. This was in morning paper of 11th. Have awaited expecting Robins to do so [come] and explain, but not appeared. Are Red Cross members wearing uniform included in your 1883, December 6, 2 p.m.,¹ which says, "The President desires American representatives withhold all direct communications with the Bolshevik government"?

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#), [Doc. 283](#), and [Doc. 284](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 12, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 16, 2.20 a.m.]

2092. Morning bulletin, official Bolshevik organ, prints address signed, "The Council of the Commissaries of the People," addressed to "all the workers and the exploited." Address says Cadet Party is counter-revolutionary and is aiding Kaledin, Kornilov, Dutov² and Cossacks to incite civil war; says council has determined to open Constituent Assembly when four hundred of eight hundred eligible members are assembled; that "the political leaders of the counterrevolutionary civil war will be arrested. The *bourgeois* rebellion will be quelled at any cost."

Central Committee of Cadets arrested including Shingarev, former Minister of Finance, Kokoshkin, Countess Panin, Gessen, editor of *Rech*, and others. Milyukov also reported arrested but think he is not here.

City Duma declared yesterday a holiday in honor of Constituent Assembly, calling on people to assemble in churches and elsewhere. Such assemblages were prevented by Red Guard but people paraded streets in considerable numbers some passing Embassy and cheering our flag. Those passing here appeared orderly, well dressed and above average intelligence. Feeling growing exceedingly nervous.

Am inclined to think advisable for chiefs of Allied missions to join in statement to Russian people asking establishment of government which will command their support and merit recognition by Russia's allies while disclaiming any intention or desire to interfere in any way in their internal affairs. Have you any instructions?

FRANCIS

² Ataman of the Orenburg Cossacks.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 13, 1917.*

[*Received December 14, 4.10 a.m.*]

1171. Swedish press reports via Agence Havas. Although Maximalists in power large cities account support garrisons, whole districts throughout country against them and started organizations against Soviet government of independent character. Thus Finland, Ukrainia, Siberia, Don district, Caucasus and central Volga district have become organized centers threatening Maximalism. Bolsheviki showing anxiety by appeal to people because of alarming increase Cossack movement. In Caucasus, Don district and Ural, Cossacks active. Rumors this effect in Petrograd confirmed by Maximalist government. Movement began Don district under Kaledin, Kornilov and other important men. Already threatening Ekaterinoslav, Kharkov and Moscow as hindering transportation provisions northward. In Ukrainia seem to help transportation Cossacks and hinder Maximalist troops. In Caucasus, Karaulov defeating Maximalist troops; in [Ural region?] Cossacks arresting Soviet and Revolutionary Military Committee and trying get possession Chelyabinsk junction, Siberian central railways for transportation food from Siberia to central Russia. Situation most serious and Maximalist government says in its appeal revolution in danger. Troops sent seem unsuccessful as Trotsky has asked Krylenko send from front enough troops suppress movement.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 14, 1917.*
[Received December 16, 1.20 a.m.]

2100. To-day's bulletin, official organ of Soviet, says Trotsky in speech at Grenadier Regiment said:

Judson came to us and said that it isn't true that England is preparing to deprive us of supplies and Colonel Robins said that he had never seen a firmer government. He thinks that his Government will be the first to recognize us and will propose the services of American engineers to regulate the railways and automobiles for the transportation of food supplies. The matter assuredly does not lie in a general love for us but in the fact that America and England on the one hand and America and Japan on the other hand are interested in having us remain a market for their goods.

We have been threatened that Japan, as a punishment for the negotiations, would annex Siberia. But if Japan could take Siberia from us she would do this independently of the war and of the armistice. However, she does not do this because America does not allow it.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 15, 1917.*
[*Received December 19, 5.35 a.m.*]

2107. Following translation of official communication received last night from National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

For the information of the Allied and neutral embassies and legations: Certain embassies have refused to visa the passports of the diplomatic couriers of the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. The institutions concerned have given as the motive that the council of the National Commissaries is not yet "recognized" as the government. The question of recognition is one of form, and the government of the Soviets treats with entire indifference this detail of the diplomatic ritual. Nonrecognition does not free, however, from the necessity to reckon with the Soviet government as with a fact. Statements to the effect that "unrecognized government" cannot have diplomatic couriers are unfounded if only because the Soviet government considers necessary diplomatic relations not only with the governments but also with the revolutionary socialist parties which are striving for the overthrow of the existing governments. Finally, it is impossible not to point out that the above-mentioned embassies are conducting the policy of "nonrecognition" in an extremely one-sided manner as they themselves are constantly applying to the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with requests for giving them such and such authorizations and certificates for securing free passage for their diplomatic couriers, etc.

Considering the further maintenance of such an order of things entirely inadmissible, the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has given instructions that henceforth no permits are to be issued, in general no facilitating to be done for the representatives of those embassies which view it as their task to create for the Soviet government petty chancery difficulties.

By order of the National Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

Secretary (Signature illegible)

Embassy has received application visa courier passport for entry to United States. Please instruct concerning treatment of such applications especially when courier carries pouch to “revolutionary socialistic parties which are striving for the overthrow of the existing governments.” Embassy official courier Franklin *en route* Petrograd from Jassy will be started for London in a few days and probably be refused exit unless Embassy agrees to visa Soviet courier passport for entrance to the United States.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

No. 212

Moscow, *December 15, 1917.*
[*Received January 30, 1918.*]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department in regard to political developments in Russia during the first half of December. This period has been marked by negotiations for an armistice; the issuance of decrees confiscating private property in land and buildings, repudiating the public debts contracted or held abroad and introducing the election of military officers; by the beginning of civil war in south Russia; and by the adoption by the Maximalist organization of measures designed to defer or prevent the assemblage of the Constitutional Convention.

The elections to the Constitutional Convention have not been finished. The Electoral Commission has been under arrest and is now hindered in its work. Up to December 13, according to returns published in the *Utro Rossii* of this city, 219 members have been returned. Of these 117 are Socialist Revolutionaries, 25 are other moderate socialists, 12 are Constitutional Democrats, 60 are Maximalists and 5 are scattering opponents of Maximalism. The Socialist Revolutionaries expect to elect not less than 350 of the entire membership of upwards of 800. They have declared through their press their firm resolve to act with the Constitutional Democrats in opposition to the Maximalists.

The elections are held under a decree giving every man or woman an equal voice. The balloting is conducted in the simplest manner. Summonses are distributed through the house committees in the cities and through the village authorities. After showing his summons the voter deposits a sheet on which is printed a number indicating which list of candidates he prefers. No changes are permitted. Where there is more than one member to be chosen the proportional system prevails.

When it began to appear that the Maximalists would be a decided minority in the Constitutional Convention, the Maximalist organization threw off the mask of friendship for the convention. It will be recalled that one of their devices when overthrowing the Provisional Government was to assure their followers that they were the only friends of the convention and that their success would assure its assembling. One of their first blows at the convention was the promulgation on December 5 of a decree introducing a form of recall for members. This decree declared:

The Council of Workingmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Delegates in each election district has the right to order new elections for all municipal, Zemstvo and other representative institutions, not excluding the Constitutional Convention. Upon the demand of more than half the electors the council must order new elections.

In announcing this decree "Lenin" (Ulyanov) explained that important party changes had been going on during the election campaign.

It soon became evident, however, that more radical steps would have to be taken to prevent the Constitutional Convention from fulfilling its functions. On December 11, when two or three score of deputies proceeded to the Tauride Palace in Petrograd they found Red Guards and garrison soldiers in command there, and they learned that three deputies, belonging to the Constitutionalist Democratic Party, had been arrested that morning in the home of Countess S. V. Panin, former Assistant Minister of Education, who was also placed in detention. The deputies assembled in the hall formerly occupied by the National Duma, found less than a quorum present, elected a provisional president, and adjourned till the following day. The members arrested were A. I. Shingarev, Prince P. D. Dolgorukov and Professor F. F. Kokoshkin, of the University of Moscow. In accepting election as provisional president, V. M. Chernov, former Minister of Agriculture and the present leader of the Socialist Revolutionaries, made an address that seemed to indicate a change of heart since he left the Kerensky cabinet, or else that he was misjudged at that time. Chernov had recently returned from Mogilev, where it had been reported that he was in conference with the army committees in regard to the formation of a government to replace the Maximalist organization. In his address he declared that the people expected the Constitutional Convention to assume all its rights. Only the Constitutional Convention could speak words that would not be mere fireworks. The convention should declare now that, with the opening of the convention, there was no other authority in Russia than itself.

On Wednesday, December 12, the deputies found the Tauride Palace occupied by 8,000 soldiers with machine guns. Orders had been issued to permit entry only upon passes issued by the military commandant of the palace, and to forbid any further meetings of the deputies until not less than 400 should be present. The sailors at the doors of the session hall wavered and the deputies succeeded in holding a brief meeting in which the arrival of two dozen or so more additional deputies was announced, and adjournment was taken until Thursday. The building was then cleared.

Among the deputies present there was not a single Constitutional Democrat, and not a single Maximalist. The Maximalist deputies were detained at the Smolny Institute in order to break a quorum, if necessary. Orders had been issued to admit no Constitutional Democrat and to arrest all their leaders. During Tuesday and Wednesday F. I. Rodichev, Mayor Shreider of Petrograd and former Minister of Trade Kutler were arrested. The arrest of the latter was accompanied by the

discharge of firearms, though no resistance was offered. Mr. Kutler was wounded slightly. The proscription list is supposed to contain the names of P. N. Milyukov, M. M. Vinaver and V. M. Chernov. Milyukov and Vinaver are in hiding. About 200 other arrests were made in Petrograd. Some were conducted to the Smolny Institute, some to the Peter-Paul Fortress and some to the prison known as the "Kresty." The prisoners are said to have been harshly treated, being threatened with the butts of rifles and being subjected to other insults. The Maximalist organization has ordered the trial of the Constitutionalist Democratic leaders before a revolutionary tribunal on a charge of complicity in the plans of Grand Ataman Kaledin of the Don Cossacks and of Generals Kornilov and Denikin, who are trying to join Kaledin.

The decree in regard to private property in land has been reported to the Department.¹

The decree in regard to private property in land and buildings in cities and towns was published on Thursday, December 13, in the Moscow organ of the Maximalists. It reads as follows:

Until otherwise ordered, it is decreed as follows:

1. Beginning with December 12 tenants of parcels of land and of buildings of every kind are forbidden to pay the agreed rental to the owners of such buildings. Tenants of rooms and beds are not affected by this order.
2. The administration of real estate is transferred to the house committees. Where they do not exist they must be formed at once.
3. House committees are authorized to receive not more than half of the rental to cover expenses of management. House committees are obliged to report their expenditures and to turn in the remainder of the money paid to them to the institutions to be designated in a later decree.
4. The remainder of the rental must be paid by the tenants into such offices as shall be designated in a later decree.
5. Tenants that pay rent to house-owners and house-owners receiving it are subject to ejectment after three days from the premises they occupy and to imprisonment up to three months.

The decrees in regard to the repudiation of the public debts, as far as held abroad,¹ and in regard to the election of military officers,² have been reported to the Department.

The terms of armistice signed at Brest Litovsk [on December 5] between plenipotentiaries from Russia and by representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey were as follows:³

1. To suspend all military operations, beginning from December 6 until noon of December 30 [December 17/4].

2. Both parties have the right to resume military operations after that date by giving a three days' notice.
 - (a) The suspension of military operations embraces all land and aerial forces of the above-mentioned countries between the Baltic and the Black Seas and on the Russo-Turkish front in Asia.
 - (b) It also embraces the German land forces on the Moon Sound Islands.
 - (c) Hydro-aeroplane squadrons have the right to fly only over the sea.
 - (d) The shelling of land positions by naval forces is forbidden.
3. Advanced lines of defense will serve as demarcation lines on the European fronts. The space between these lines is neutral. On the Asiatic front demarcation lines will be established by agreement between the Commanders in Chief.
4. Both parties agree to issue strict orders against passing the demarcation lines.
5. During the whole period of the suspension of military operations only such dislocations of troops in units surpassing divisions may take place as were directed not later than December 4.
6. All separate truces heretofore made by individual units are void.

A report in regard to a protest made by the German authorities against the distribution of revolutionary leaflets among the German armies before and during the truce negotiations has been made to the Department.

On December 1 the Russian General Staff at Mogilev was holding out against the Maximalist organization, and it was supported by a General Army Committee, representing troops of the several sectors of the front. Owing to the refusal of Grand Ataman Kaledin to recognize the Maximalist regime, Red Guards and troops were moved from Petrograd and other places in the direction of Novochoerkassk. It was reported that troops not considered trustworthy agents for the dispersal or coercion of the Constitutional Convention were selected for service against the Cossacks and against the General Staff, and that sailors and Lettish battalions were drawn into Petrograd to replace them.

On the morning of December 2 sailors and Red Guards arrived at Mogilev and occupied the staff headquarters without meeting with opposition. Shortly afterwards sailors murdered Commander in Chief Dukhonin, according to prearranged plan, it appears. The Maximalist Commander in Chief Krylenko protested against this act of barbarism. General Kornilov and General Denikin and other officers fled, the one from Bykhov, near Mogilev, in company with his faithful Tekkintsy guards, the others with six battalions of shock troops. They foresaw the surrender of the staff headquarters and got away the night of December 1. The shock battalions moved in six trains of 50 coaches each in the direction of Belgorod, with the object of effecting a junction with Kaledin at Novochoerkassk. Maximalist troops occupied Belgorod. General Kornilov marched by land in the same general direction. Fighting began near Belgorod on December 7. The first echelon of the shock troops was forced to fall back, and it was reported

that 80 men were taken by the Maximalists. The battle lasted the greater part of the day. Artillery was employed on both sides. The losses of the shock troops were very slight. The number of killed and wounded on the side of the Maximalists has not been reported, but it was not large. The shock troops were reported to be in a difficult situation with respect to locomotives, part of those at their disposal having broken down, and with respect to food supplies, which they were obliged to requisition from the peasants, and this stirred ill-will against them. It was reported on Thursday, December 13, that the shock troops had succeeded in slipping away from the Maximalists and were again in motion. General Kornilov does not seem to have effected a junction with General Denikin's forces, and his whereabouts was not known at last accounts.

Events in the lower Don Basin have been leading up to a breach ever since the defeat of the Government forces at Moscow. Many of the officers and *Junker's* of Moscow slipped away in civilian clothes and took refuge in the Don Territory. Hundreds of officers from the front and large numbers of Cossacks also went to the Don Territory, and Grand Ataman, or Hetman, Kaledin took measures to prevent their return to the front, anticipating the speedy cessation of military operations against Germany and Austria-Hungary and fearing that the Cossacks at the front would be involved in broils with Maximalist forces. He was also naturally desirous of strengthening his forces in order to repel expected invasion from the north.

On December 4, having received word that the Maximalists were moving considerable bodies of troops against the Don Cossacks, and that "Lenin" (Ulyanov) had proclaimed open war against the latter, Ageev, head of the civil administration of the Cossack territory, issued an appeal for all the Don Cossacks to take arms in defense of their land and liberty. On December 8 the Council of the General Cossack League, embracing representatives of all the twelve Cossack armies, adopted the following resolution:

The Council of the League of Cossack Armies ...¹ adhering to the resolution of the Don government and of the Don group of the Cossack Congress at the front, declares:

1. The Cossacks seek and demand nothing for themselves beyond the bounds of their territories, but at the same time, being guided by the democratic principle of the autonomy of the peoples of Russia, will not tolerate in their territories any other authority than that of the people, organized through voluntary agreement on the part of the several nationalities, without outside pressure of any kind.
2. The sending of punitive expeditions against Cossack territories, particularly that of the Don, ...¹ will interfere with the movement of trains of provisions, coal and naphtha to the cities of Russia.
3. The Cossacks protest against the movement of outside troops into

Cossack territories without the consent of the military or territorial governments of these territories.

4. The Cossacks have made infinite sacrifices in the defense of the country, and they will not bear any responsibility for the consequences of any peace that may be concluded without the consent of the whole people, expressed through the Constitutional Convention.

The Maximalists in the lower basin of the Don demanded the submission of Hetman Kaledin and the entire Don government. The other elements of the Rostov Council of Workingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies withdrew as a protest against the bloodshed, which was foreseen. After some negotiations between Kaledin's representatives and the Maximalists, in the presence of the assistant mayor of Rostov, on December 7 a party of Cossacks and *Junkers* attempted to arrest the Maximalist rump of the council. Several persons were killed and a few others were wounded. The attempt did not succeed. Fighting was begun about the same time at the neighboring town, or suburb, of Nakhichevan, populated chiefly by Armenians. Infantry, artillery and machine guns were employed. Three trawlers of the Black Sea Fleet came up the Don River and bombarded Nakhichevan and Rostov, without much effect, it appears. There was at first no decided success of either party, but it appears that the Cossack general Pototski was captured at the Rostov railway station, the Maximalists disarming at the same time a party of *Junkers* from Kiev. In the beginning the Cossacks had only about 2,000 armed men in Rostov, it is reported, whereas the Maximalist regiments numbered about 15,000, in addition to Red Guards and Black Sea sailors. At the time that the Cossack government disarmed the 272d and 273d Regiments at Novocherkassk and that the Kuban government disarmed two brigades of artillery at Ekaterinodar, Hetman Kaledin seems to have planned the disarmament of the Maximalist garrisons at Rostov and Taganrog also, but he prudently delayed action that might provoke hostilities, on account of the somewhat complicated situation in these cities.

In the course of the next two days the fighting seems to have gained intensity, and it is reported that the Maximalists suffered great losses at Nakhichevan. The *Junkers* and older Cossacks, arriving from Novocherkassk, proved to be well-disciplined and steadfast troops. The Cossacks in and around Rostov and Taganrog had been to a certain extent gained over by the Bolsheviks, or at least were made to waver in their loyalty to the Cossack government. The new forces drove the Red Guards from the Rostov railway station.

The last information from the scene of hostilities is contradictory. Usually well-informed circles in Kiev, which is in constant communication with Novocherkassk, is to the effect that the Cossacks have gained the upper hand [sic]. The Maximalists are, however, drawing reinforcements from Moscow, Kharkov and elsewhere. They are trying to get support from Odessa, but the Ukrainians do not seem disposed to permit the passage of troops through territory they control.

The Maximalist organization in Petrograd is spreading reports that their forces have beaten the Cossacks. They declare that Rostov, Nakhichevan and Taganrog are in the hands of their troops, and they assert that there is discontent among the older Cossacks on account of their mobilization. This is, however, discredited. On the contrary, they are represented to be the firmest friends of Hetman Kaledin.

In the meantime the bureau of the Central Cossack League at Petrograd has been visited by the Maximalists and all the officers and attaches were arrested.

A well-informed business man of Rostov has called at this office and furnished some additional information as to the situation in the Cossack territories before his departure from Rostov, immediately preceding hostilities. He said that the population of the Don Territory numbered about 5,000,000, of whom about half were Cossacks. The latter are for the most part well off. The Russian peasants in their territory are also comparatively prosperous and contented. The Russian workingmen of the cities are, however, partly under Maximalist influence, and the miners in the Donets coal basin are always giving trouble. Owing to disagreements between the miners and the coal companies, Kaledin some time ago introduced martial law in the territory, applying it chiefly in the coal basin. This caused estrangement with the city administration of Rostov, largely autonomous, and with the Ukrainists at Kiev. In general, however, relations between the territorial and the city governments were fairly good, and it is now planned to introduce modifications of the territorial government that will satisfy the city and the non-Cossack population of the territory. The large Jewish population of Rostov was in certain ways a source of weakness to Kaledin, as the Cossacks felt indisposed to exert themselves to defend the safety of men that are reputed to be war profiteers above all else. The Cossack government disposed recently of only 16 of the 56 Cossack regiments, the remainder being at the front. The Maximalists have or recently had 15,000 men in Rostov and 10,000 men in Taganrog, in regular army formations. The strength derived by the Maximalists from Red Guard reinforcements could not be easily estimated, but the best of the Maximalist troops were sailors from the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets. The Cossacks have greatly improved their military qualities under Kaledin's popular administration. They now have artillery, infantry and even aeroplanes, as well as *automobiles-blindés*. They had good guns but perhaps lacked ammunition, though they control the supplies that had been stored in the territory. The relations between the Cossacks and the Constitutional Democrats are close. The Rostov informant stated that Milyukov, Alexander Guchkov, Rodzyanko and Generals Alexeev and Euzski are at Novochoerkassk, the first two incognito. The Maximalists state that Generals Lubomirski and Denikin are also there. The relations between the Don, the Kuban and the Terek Cossacks are particularly close, and there is a good understanding for mutual support with the Orenburg, Ural and Siberian Cossacks. The Cossacks of the Don would like to improve their communications with these farther removed allies by constructing a railway from Rostov to Orenburg, which has railway communication with Siberia. The Rostov informant stated that the

question had been broached to an American military attaché and other Americans who were recently at Novocherkassk.

The relations of the Cossacks and the Ukrainists do not seem to be as good as they were some time ago, according to this informant. The Ukrainists have been dissatisfied over the proclamation of martial law in the coal basin, on which they are dependent for fuel, disagreeing with Kaledin as to the necessity and wisdom of the maintenance of martial law. On this point Kaledin has so far been unyielding, refusing to permit outside interference. The presence of dangerous Maximalist agitators among the miners probably justifies his attitude amply.

The Ukrainists, according to this Rostov information, are bent on independence and are more disposed to lean upon Austria-Hungary than any Russian party. This makes them unreliable allies of the Cossacks, yet they cannot afford to join in any attack on the Cossacks, lest their turn should come next. Whether they will actively assist the Cossacks in their proposed march to the north in the late winter or spring remains to be seen.

Rostov, like the remainder of Russia, is feeling a scarcity of currency, the peasants hoarding all the paper money that bears the Emperor's portrait, and was thus issued prior to the revolution. There is said to be only five millions of rubles in the Rostov banks, and there are plans to issue notes under the joint guaranty of the territorial and city governments, of the Treasury and of the branch of the State Bank. These institutions have not recognized the Maximalist organization.

Events have also been ripening at Kiev recently. All the Maximalist military formations there were disarmed on December 12. The aviation park offered resistance and there was some bloodshed. The pontoon battalion, the reserve mountain battery and the heavy artillery, parked across the Dnieper, offered no resistance. The Ukrainists captured quantities of guns and ammunition. The Ukrainists also arrested eight Maximalist leaders, who were trying to organize an attack on the Ukrainian government. From last accounts the Ukrainists seem to have liquidated the Maximalist organization in their capital.

There has been fighting of a severe character between Kuban Cossacks and mountaineers of their neighborhood, who seem to have been instigated by the Maximalists to make a diversion and hinder the Kuban Cossacks from going to the assistance of the Don Cossacks. It is even hinted that German influence has been made felt against the Kuban Cossacks, and it is said that similar intrigues were begun in the Orenburg Cossack Territory, but that the energetic measures of the Orenburg administration made an end of the game. But in a time of general lawlessness it does not require much outside suggestion to send the Caucasus mountaineers again on plundering raids of the Cossack settlements.

The Odessa Maximalists are striving to sow trouble between the Russians and the Rumanians, spreading reports that the Rumanians are planning a separate peace with Germany. What they really aim at is a revolution in Rumania. Of this there are no indications in the Russian press.

In the Moscow Maximalist Council Commissar Friche reported what steps had been taken in concert with the foreign consuls to protect the interests of foreign residents. The council seems to have felt that too much had been done, declaring that any distinction in favor of foreigners was inadmissible, and particularly, that foreign landowners must lose their land, buildings, livestock and equipment along with other landowners.

At Harbin, according to reports dated December 12, as a result of an insult to the American Consul by soldiers at the railway station, the foreign consuls were disposed to take matters into their own hands, and the Russian residents were looking forward with satisfaction to this change. It is to be borne in mind, of course, that the Russian news is now highly colored by party view and interest.

The conservative and opposition socialist press of Moscow has published the names of quite a number of former agents of the secret police under the autocracy that have taken service under the Maximalists, and it is even said that overtures have been made to former Minister of Justice Shcheglovitov, the intellectual leader of the Imperial Council in the period preceding the fall of the autocracy. Shcheglovitov is a jurist of solid attainments and would be able to afford valuable technical assistance. The Maximalists served the autocracy as secret agents, managing to get on better with the old regime, through their common hatred of the more moderate parties, than any other opposition group. It is believed that many Black Hundred leaders are also working with the Maximalists, sabotage against the middle-class parties suiting them exactly.

In the period under review great disorders have taken place, including the plunder of the Winter Palace wine cellars by a regiment of the garrison, apparently with the connivance of the Maximalist leaders, and by the rougher element of the population. There was an orgy of drunkenness for several days. Other wine depots in Petrograd have also been plundered one by one, and the Tsarskoe Selo Palace has been pretty thoroughly looted, according to newspaper accounts.

In the long list of armed attacks on business houses and residences, usually undertaken by persons presenting counterfeit orders to conduct a house search, the most productive in loot recently was made on the home of Countess Ribopierre on December 12. Thirty men ransacked the place and carried off valuables estimated at 300,000 rubles. The general public is convinced that the Red Guards are concerned in many of these exploits.

The Maximalists have destroyed the municipal administration of most Russian cities, having nowhere found formal recognition. They have succeeded in disrupting some of the Zemstvos, or county and state administrations; have dissolved the Military Industrial Committee, and have brought the work of the Zemstvo League for military preparations to a practical standstill. The latter organizations have of course realized for some time that the continuance of military operations on the Russian front was more than problematical, and they were directing their energies toward preparations for the orderly demobilization

of industry and the ancillary enterprises of the Zemstvo and Municipal Leagues.

Among the developments expected in the early future is a campaign against the universities and secondary educational institutions. Madame Kolontai, who was once under arrest on account of her financial role but is now Minister of Education, is expected with trepidation by the Moscow gymnasium principals and teachers. No evidence has been offered to disprove the charges made against Madame Kolontai of serving as the medium through which German Government funds were poured into Russia for the disorganization of the Russian Army and country. But naturally this does not discredit her with "Lenin" and "Trotsky." Her present ambition seems to be to socialize educational institutions, by which she seems to mean making personal addresses on socialism and the like to the pupils, including those in grammar grades. The Maximalists have not announced their plans with respect to cultural studies, but are supposed to have no sympathy with them. It is feared that they intend, if possible, to close the universities and secondary schools or to make them purely practical and technical institutions.

The old established liberal newspaper, the *Russkiya Vedomosti* of this city, rises to its traditions in a criticism yesterday of the Maximalist decree in regard to urban real estate, pointing out its glaring inconsistencies with itself, with other decrees of the Moscow Maximalists and with every elementary notion of justice. It is pointed out that the decree provides for payment of half the house rent to the house committee and half into some public treasury, yet does not decide which half shall enjoy the stay of six months recently granted rent payers by the same authorities for half of rent payments; that a tax of 20 per cent has just been announced on Moscow real estate, yet there is no provision for relieving the house owner of this burden; that the majority of urban houses are mortgaged, yet there is no provision for payment of interests. This criticism may seem superfluous, as the faults of the Maximalist decrees are self-evident. But it is just such patient explanation that counts in the long run. What is needed now in Russia is the Finnish spirit not to yield an inch, not to recognize illegality, and to hold out indefinitely, as the Finns held out for nearly two decades. The effects of repeated blows at all public and private credit will soon be felt with accumulative force.

It would be a mistake, however, to judge the Maximalist organization by its crude legislation. It is in a hurry and it does not have to reckon yet with intelligent criticism. The Maximalist leaders are not stupid. "Trotsky" (Bronstein), who seems to exceed "Lenin" in qualities of leadership, has displayed an intellect as acute as his will is daring. His policy is becoming clearer daily. It is to gain adherents among as wide classes as possible by means of bribery, and thus make enemies of the Constitutional Assembly, which would surely undo much of his work. The peasants have been invited to help themselves to the landlords' lands and livestock and implements and stores, and they have done so. The workingmen have been promised the control of factories, and many of them have been seized. The middle-class tenants are offered the control of the houses they live in, deferred rent payments and the suggestion that rent will be largely abolished, and

many of the rent payers will be tempted.

Having been convinced that the Maximalists will be in a minority in the Constitutional Convention, Bronstein has boldly announced that the Maximalists will override that institution.

The more remote plans of the Maximalist leaders seem to be outlining themselves more clearly. Of course they realize that the chances are against the realization of their dreams of a socialist democracy, but they are working for it. If they fail they will at least have done their utmost to destroy the present capitalistic structure of society and thus to facilitate, as they believe, the future advances of socialism. And, if they should succeed now in their ultimate aims, they believe that their sabotage would not be disadvantageous to the social structure they design. Take the repudiation of foreign debt, for example. In spite of the “cheerful idiot” remark of the *Social Democrat* that this measure will improve Russian credit, the Maximalist leaders of course know that the contrary is true. But they calculate that the Russian workingmen and peasants, with their crude tastes, do not require many foreign importations and can produce the foodstuffs and textiles, machinery, tools, nails and the like that they require, or the bulk of them. What is not to be had at home they can get from Germany, exporting in exchange timber, flax and foodstuffs. Their main concern now is to give the soldiers the peace they have promised, making the best terms they can, and to put down opposition at home. According to present prospects both of these tasks will tax every resource at their disposal. A critical moment seems to be approaching.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

¹ *Ante*, p. 299 [Pg. 299 includes portions of [Doc. 296](#) and [Doc. 297](#)].

¹ See despatch dated Dec. 13, 1917, [vol. III](#), chap. i.

² Not printed.

³ For the terms of armistice of Dec. 15, see *ante*, p. 261 [Pg. 261 is part of [Doc. 246](#)].

¹ Omission indicated in the original.

¹ Omission indicated in the original.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *December 15, 1917, 5 p.m.*
[*Received 7.35 p.m.*]

7980. I had an informal talk on December 4 with Lord Robert Cecil, on the subject treated in telegram 1653, December 1, 3 p.m.,^{[1](#)} from the Copenhagen Legation, which was transmitted to the Department through me.

Mr. Balfour now informs me that should you see fit to take any steps to prevent the recognition of the Bolshevik government by neutral powers the British Government is ready to lend its support.

PAGE

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 277 [Pg. 277 includes portions of [Doc. 263](#), [Doc. 264](#), and [Doc. 265](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1906. Your 2083, December 10, just received.² British Government has given Ambassador, Petrograd, liberty to withdraw Embassy and leave protection of British subjects in hands of Consuls if at any time he concludes that crisis should be anticipated by taking such a course, but suggestion made that it may be well for him to consult his Allied colleagues before taking such a step.

Department approves your present course and relies on your judgment to determine best future action in regard to remaining Petrograd.

LANSING

² *Ante*, p. 295 [Pg. 295 includes portions of [Doc. 290](#) and [Doc. 291](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow
(Summers)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1689. Your 59, November 17,³ and subsequent telegrams on situation. Department appreciates your sound and able handling of difficult conditions, also courageous cooperation of your staff, including Poole. No Government either belligerent or neutral has recognized Bolshevik government at Petrograd.

Department desires to keep in close touch with developments [in] Moscow and Moscow district.

LANSING

³ *Ante*, p. 234 [Pg. 234 includes portions of [Doc. 215](#) and [Doc. 216](#)].

File No. 861.01/9a

[Document 309]

The Secretary of State to the Diplomatic Representatives in European Countries, Japan, China, and Siam

[Circular telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 15, 1917, 8 p.m.*

Pending further instructions you should have no official relations with Russian diplomatic officers who recognize or who are appointed by Bolshevik government.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 17, 1917, 9 p.m.*
[Received December 22, 1.35 p.m.]

2117. Trotsky visited French Ambassador yesterday and was received but can not learn whether by previous appointment. Interview as reported in Soviet organ was concerning presence of French officers with Ukrainian Army which Trotsky construed as “openly supporting countenanced [counter-] revolutionary machinations of Kaledin” and disorganizing [Russia]. Ambassador replied all French officers on mission in Russia have received instructions not to intervene in internal political struggles and that presence of officers mentioned was long since accredited to generals commanding the southwest and Rumanian front, and “is explained by the invitation frequently expressed by various Russian governments to supervise the formation of the national Ukrainian Army” and in case of armed conflict between Rada and Soviet would take no part therein.

Account states question of exchange of diplomatic couriers between Russia and France was discussed but if conclusion reached it is not given.

Account further states that in discussing peace conditions negotiations now being conducted Trotsky said that the Russian revolutionary forces would not conclude a peace on basis of subjection “but a peace without annexations and contributions granting to all the oppressed nations the right of free self-determination. The refusal of these democratic principles would carry with it the breaking off of negotiations.” Claimed Chernov reported to have condemned severely action Soviet government toward Constituent Assembly in speech made yesterday. Commissary of Soviet directed by Constituent Assembly in signed statement denied charge that is endeavoring to prevent Assembly meeting and affirmed he will convene same when half or four hundred members arrive and register. This explanation of interference with Assembly appears apologetic and indicates that Soviet government beginning to realize conditions. No cable yesterday because for first time began to feel despair and disgust that Russia had permitted Bolsheviks to remain in control for six weeks.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 17, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[Received December 20, 11.18 p.m.]

2113. Armistice made for twenty-eight days subject to termination on seven days' notice but otherwise automatically extended. Understand Trotsky thinks has achieved a success, but such another success were worse than a defeat. It means, in my judgment, that Russia is out of the war. He spoke Saturday threatening guillotine and Lenin asserted that Soviet government superior to Constituent Assembly and justified treatment of Cadets. Two Poles called claiming could raise Polish army of 800,000 to fight Germany and that 400,000 Poles in Austrian Army would turn against Central Empire. Shall investigate and report but so many rumors prove unfounded I attach little importance thereto. Reported arrangements being made for German commissioners to come to Petrograd to negotiate peace and for German soldiers to come for their protection. Depredations ceased in Embassy neighborhood but continue in other sections and people so nervous that they would welcome monarchy or Germans if order could be restored thereby.

Diplomatic Corps met this afternoon to consider note couriers, see my 2107,¹ adjourned till 20th after providing for committee of two Allied and one neutral employee who will be instructed to visit Smolny unofficially and state that proposed plan is impossible and to suggest another. British, French and Danish employees were selected as those countries say require couriers. I can do without courier service for a month provided cables not prohibited but fears thereof were expressed by my colleagues. I opposed proposition to accept Trotsky plan on condition that couriers should not do propaganda work and asked in what capital Soviet government has a diplomatic mission. Dutch Minister replied, "In Sweden," but Swedish Minister not present. Appears British and French Embassies have been requested to visé Soviet courier's passports but declined on the ground that government not recognized. No application made to vise courier passport to America.

FRANCIS

¹ Ante, p. 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)].

File No. 861.00/815

[Document 312]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 18, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1910. Your 2092, December 12, 9 p.m., last paragraph.^{[1](#)} Department prefers no action at present.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of [Doc. 299](#), [Doc. 300](#), and [Doc. 301](#)].

File No. 861.00/823

[Document 313]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 20, 1917, 1 p.m.*

1917. Your 2091, December 12, 8 p.m., last sentence.^{[1](#)} Red Cross members in uniform certainly included in instructions Department's 1883, December 6.^{[2](#)} Red Cross is so advising Robins.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 301 [Pg. 301 includes portions of [Doc. 299](#), [Doc. 300](#), and [Doc. 301](#)].

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 289 [Pg. 289 includes portions of [Doc. 282](#), [Doc. 283](#), and [Doc. 284](#)].

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *December 21, 1917, 8 p.m.*
[*Received December 22, 8 a.m.*]

8035. My 7980, December 15, 5 p.m. I have been keeping my eye on this matter and yesterday spoke casually to Lord Robert Cecil about it. He says the British Government has yet no intention to recognize the Bolsheviks but awaits developments not knowing what it may seem wise to do later. He promised to keep me informed before taking action if his Government should reach a different decision.

An informal negotiation is going on through private channels between London and Petrograd looking to the release of interned Russians here in exchange for free exit from Russia of British subjects. But this negotiation is not regarded by the British Government as a recognition of the Bolsheviks.

PAGE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 21, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received December 23, 8.20 p.m.]

2128. Kaledin resigned attributing same to false reports concerning his objects. Conflicting reports concerning results of conflicts between Cossacks and Bolsheviks but the majority indicate Bolsheviks' defeat. Reports are current of engagements between Ukraine troops and Cossacks concerning land differences, Rada confiscating lands owned by Cossacks.

Reported yesterday that peace conference terminated because of irreconcilable differences. This is unconfirmed but persistent rumors to the effect that enemy delegations refuse to grant Russian demands such as self-determination of nations. I fear separate peace will be concluded on geographic [German] terms as this government is under German influence and knows that if hostilities resumed will be overthrown.

Soviet bulletin of the 20th instant contains article demanding release of Berkman and Goldman saying, "We have right to make demand on American Ambassador who should remember if American people can remain silent when their comrades are being made game of, the Russian public will certainly not keep silent if the Russian emigrant is being trifled with." Article also mentioned Mooney, Baker and Kramer and says: "Everywhere our comrades are sitting in the prisons of the democratic republic of the United States." Another anarchistic Berkman-Goldman meeting called for the 22d.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 22, 1917, 4 p.m.*

1924. Referring your 2107 and 2113^{[1](#)} American Minister at Stockholm reports that British Ambassador at Petrograd has been instructed to say to Bolshevik government that Great Britain would permit couriers from Bolshevik government to enter Great Britain at stated intervals. Department desires you take no action concerning couriers with Bolshevik government.

Department is suggesting to Allied chiefs of mission here its views that chiefs of mission of belligerent countries at Petrograd quite informally and without appearance of coalition should confer regularly as to any proposed courses of action and where they disagree then to advise their respective governments of majority and minority views.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, pp. 303 [Pg. 303 includes portions of [Doc. 303](#) and [Doc. 304](#)] and 318 [Pg. 318 includes portions of [Doc. 310](#) and [Doc. 311](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 22, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[Received December 24, 8.32 p.m.]

2132. Kalpashnikov, colonel of the Russian Army, was arrested yesterday by a party composed of Bolshevik soldiers, Red Guards and sailors and taken to fortress where he is now confined. Kalpashnikov brought to Russia from America one hundred or more automobiles for the Russian Red Cross which that organization transferred to American-Rumanian Red Cross with Kalpashnikov as manager on Anderson's request.¹ Anderson's telegrams to Kalpashnikov were sent through the Embassy and delivered to American Red Cross, Petrograd, for Kalpashnikov. Telegram of December 5 received on 7th and delivered to Red Cross December 14 for Kalpashnikov. directed shipment of all available automobiles with the greatest possible expedition to Rostov and informed Kalpashnikov that American Ambassador would provide necessary funds to Es. 1,000 [100,000?] and get reimbursement by draft on Red Cross Society, Washington. I had never authorized such statement nor did Kalpashnikov ever apply for any money. Order for shipment was countermanded six days later, original order and countermand were desired to be forwarded to Kalpashnikov, consequently no efforts ever made to ship to Rostov. Trotsky procured correspondence from Kalpashnikov's apartment and after refusing to listen to Robins's explanation thereof, because Robins could not state was sent by me, made speech last night criticizing French and British Ambassadors and attacked me charging I had been plotting to aid Kaledin. This absolutely false and wholly without foundation. Trotsky said:

The Ambassador will now have to break his golden silence. An Ambassador who does such is no more an Ambassador but an adventurer and the heavy hand of the revolution will deal with him.

Much interest and excitement concerning Trotsky attack. I am making statement to press which shall forward *en clair* denying all connection or knowledge of Kaledin movement stating your instructions are definite and emphatic not to interfere in internal affairs stating I had observed same scrupulously and enforced same to extent of my authority and explaining in detail Anderson's correspondence with Kalpashnikov. Trotsky utterances exceedingly offensive and my reply thereto unusually mild but such course appears wiser at moment, his

object evidently being to maintain Soviet government in power.

FRANCIS

¹ Lieut. Col. Henry W. Anderson, in charge of the American Red Cross Commission to Rumania, at this time in Jassy.

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *December 23, 1917, 5 p.m.*

[*Received December 24, 10.50 a.m.*]

2939. Department's 2944, December 11.¹ The Foreign Office informs me to-day concerning the policy of the French Government towards Russia that the matter had been thoroughly gone into with Colonel House before his departure for America. Very little had occurred since then to modify its attitude. The French Government will ignore the Russian Government as now constituted and the only official acts now being performed by the French Government in Russia are through its consuls, who continue to act in minor questions such as issuing of passports, etc. I was told that it was the aim of the French Government to avoid open hostility with those in authority in Petrograd though undoubtedly Lenin and those surrounding him must know by this time of the support being given by the Allied powers to the opposing forces of Kaledin. Mr. de Margerie said that the best information coming to the Foreign Office in regard to Lenin was that he was not influenced by corrupt motives though he was an extremist in his views in every way. He expressed the opinion that the professed purposes of the Leninists favoring local autonomy would weaken their efforts in their campaign against the Ukrainian provinces.

SHARP

¹ See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 297 [Pg. 297 includes portions of [Doc. 292](#), [Doc. 293](#), and [Doc. 294](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 23, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[*Received December 25, 5 a.m.*]

2133. Anarchistic meeting held to-day demanded release of Berkman, Kramer and Goldman, passing resolutions to that effect and declaring would use whatever means required to accomplish end desired; when amendment proposed that if demand not granted, "American Ambassador should answer with his skin," chairman ruled against amendment saying, "We have the strength to accomplish our object and will take all means necessary therefor believing more in acts than in words."

My representative understands that resolution would be presented to or through Workmen-Soldiers' Deputies and thinks attendance about six hundred. Ambassador willing to make any sacrifice necessary in order to unite and inspire American people for the projects [objects?] of war.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 23, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[Received December 26, 2.10 a.m.]

2134. Trotsky speech expurgated printed in bulletin to-day mentions no Ambassadors but confined to peace and takes position that if German terms not acceptable to Soviet government will be referred to constituent body and if approved by it Bolshevik government will say:

Find yourselves another party which will sign the communications but we Bolsheviki, and I hope the left Social Revolutionists, will summon all to a sacred war [against] the militarists of all countries.

Also says:

If voice of laboring class of Germany does not awake and show that powerful influence which must play the decisive part peace will be impossible.

Ends with statement:

But if we, owing to the economic disruptions, cannot fight, if we shall be forced to abandon the struggle for our ideals, then shall say to our brothers abroad that the proletariat struggle is not ended, that it is only put off as it happened in 1905 when we being defeated by the Tsar did not end the fight against Tsarism but only postponed it.

This appears to me an adroit attempt to prepare Russia for acceptance of Germany's terms after which Bolsheviks will appeal to socialists of England, France, Italy, and America to refuse to fight longer and thus be playing into Germany's hands. They have already appointed delegations to visit England and France for such purpose and no doubt will for America.

FRANCIS

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 24, 1917, 6 p.m.*

1931. Circulate following questionnaire to consular representatives in special red code or by hand for earliest report to Embassy by same channels. Vladivostok has been instructed to report also direct to Department. Cable Department soonest possible digest of reports received, sending full reports later by courier service.

Department directs that you apply to your district following questions and report to me soonest possible in special red code or by hand:

- (a) What is structure of local government, its authority, executive power, capacity to maintain order?
- (b) Has it proclaimed or manifested inclination for separate or autonomous organization?
- (c) Describe attitude of population of cities as compared with country population.
- (d) What is influence of Bolsheviks?
- (e) What are leading factors, both political and individual, in local situation?
- (f) What are conditions of railway transportation and supply including food?
- (g) Has full quota of representatives to Constituent Assembly been elected and sent to Petrograd? What are political affiliations of such representatives?

To the Consuls at Moscow, Odessa, Tiflis, the following queries should be added:

- (h) Number of troops your district and general condition both political and material.
- (i) How does population stand in relation to army units in your district?
- (j) How are troops in your district as a whole disposed toward movements of Ukraine, Kaledin and Caucasus to continue war? Are they supporting them or opposing them?
- (k) What is program and platform of army units?

Department suggests that effort be made with utmost discretion to obtain views of representative Russians.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 24, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[Received December 26, 1.45 p.m.]

2138. Cabled you week ago of disgust and despair concerning situation. You will recall that from beginning of this revolution I advised waiting for convening action of Constituent Assembly, which was authority acknowledged by Grand Duke Michael, in whose favor Emperor abdicated for himself and son, and the authority looked forward to by the provisional or *ad interim* Government. That Government was recognized by all Russians and every Allied and neutral as temporary, authorized administrator of Russian affairs until meeting of Constituent Assembly fixed for December 11. On November 8 Provisional Government was overthrown by Bolsheviki through force which Bolsheviki secured by promise of immediate peace and division among soldiers of land and property. Before meeting of Assembly, Bolsheviki declared Cadets counter-revolutionary, removed Assembly commissioners appointed by Bolsheviki, and in other ways prevented convening of Assembly. This is revolution but fact remains that Bolsheviki have maintained themselves in power in Petrograd and Nankeen (Moscow?) and are *de facto* government in those cities and although there are opposition movements in Ukraine and elsewhere, Bolshevik power is undoubtedly greatest in Russia. I have expected that sober second thought of Russians would establish government which would command recognition and cooperation of Allies and such would eventuate if Russia were not menaced by an adroit and powerful German enemy. Soviet government has run after about seven weeks during which period Germany has made great progress toward again establishing her influence here. German commercial agents are taking orders for German manufactures and preparing to establish direct commercial communication. German emissaries are flattering Soviet government and at the same time encouraging monarchists, *bourgeois* and especially landowners with the hope of saving their property and preserving Russia from anarchy and division, thus paving the way for German peace. Last Trotsky speech, see my 2134, was intended, I think, to prepare Russia for such peace as all apparently agree that Russia will fight no more. Must confess that I am unable to take issue with such conclusion. Am willing therefore to swallow pride, sacrifice dignity, and with discretion do all that is necessary to prevent Russia's becoming ally of Germany. It is possible that having accomplished

establishing relations with Soviet government Allied representatives could influence terms of peace and thus preserve Russian neutrality, thereby preventing Germany's acquiring munitions of war stored in Russia; also preventing immense Russian resources' becoming available by Germany for conflict with Allies.

I have not spoken to colleagues on these lines but am willing to do so if you approve. Such course, mildly speaking, would be exceedingly distasteful but may be advisable. You are better circumstanced than I to keep [judge] effect thereof in the United States. I still believe that we, with assistance of Allies, can defeat Germany even with Russia as her ally, but the cost thereof in blood and treasure would be enormous.

Trotsky's ambition is to effect world-wide social revolution. President Wilson's progressive policy has been so farseeing and so wise that such revolution would gain little foothold in America, but I cannot speak for other countries.

If Russia makes peace do you not think would be wise for us to recognize independence of Finland? Would highly appreciate your views on course outlined herein.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 26, 1917.*

[*Received December 28, 11.50 a.m.*]

2144. Continuing my 2132¹ concerning automobiles ordered to Rostov by Anderson which Trotsky misconstrued as plan to assist Kaledin. Papers published Christmas morning my reply to such charges. My statement follows:

My attention has to-day been called to an article appearing in to-day's issue of the bulletin of the Soviets in which it is alleged that the most prominent representatives of the United States are shown to be implicated in the Kaledin plot: that they have taken all measures to assist in [omission]; that under the guise of a Red Cross train destined for the southwest front American officers in Jassy, Messrs. Anderson and Perkins and their associates, and the Russian officers Kalpashnikov and Verblyunski have made an attempt to send several dozen automobiles "and other things" to be placed at the disposal of Kaledin, that Colonel Kalpashnikov and his accomplices have been arrested; that papers of exceptional importance have been seized, among them a telegram from the chief of the American Red Cross Mission in Jassy commissioning Colonel Kalpashnikov to receive from me Rs. 100,000 to send the train to Rostov and a certificate signed by me to the effect that the train is going from "Petrograd to Jassy"; that the plot of the American imperialists with the Kaledinists has been exposed; and that it is now time for me and for the Government which I represent to speak. I have also been informed that in a speech at the Alexander Theater on the night of December 8/21 Mr. Trotsky has charged [me] with "counter-revolutionary" activities.

Instructions of my Government are very definite and positive prohibiting any interference by any American representative in Russia in the internal affairs of this country. I have observed these instructions scrupulously and, so far as my authority extends, have directed their strict observance by all connected with the American Embassy or under its control. The charge or insinuation that I was aiding Kaledin or any other of the numerous and varied factions in Russia is absolutely without foundation and my statement to this effect should be sufficient to convince all of its truth and

correctness.

The American Red Cross is an organization in my country supported by voluntary subscription and officially recognized by the Government of the United States, the purpose of the existence of which is the alleviation of human suffering. During the present war in which the United States is now engaged the American Red Cross maintains certain missions operating in the countries of its allies, among them a mission to Russia and one to Rumania, under the chairmanship of Lieut. Col. Raymond Robins and Lieut. Col. Henry W. Anderson, respectively.

The American Embassy at Petrograd has never failed to afford all assistance and cooperation possible with the American Red Cross in Washington and with its missions in Russia and Rumania especially, one of its chief duties and privileges being the transmission to their respective destinations of cables between the respective missions and the American Red Cross in Washington.

The bulletin of the Soviets published the text of a telegram from Colonel Anderson to Colonel Kalpashnikov relative to the shipment of certain motor cars to Rostov-on-Don, directing Colonel Kalpashnikov to apply to me for the advance of Rs. 100,000 for the account of the Red Cross. The bulletin does not publish the text of the two following telegrams from Colonel Anderson which, together with the text of the telegram published, were delivered to Colonel Kalpashnikov on December 1/14:

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PETROGRAD.

575. Following signed Anderson for Kalpashnikov:

JASSY, *December 11 [1917]*.

Perkins and Verblyunski left for Petrograd 10th. In view changed conditions here disregard my 569, December 5. Have motors ready for shipment on arrival Perkins who carries instructions. Spend necessary funds up to Rs. 50,000. Move them promptly. See Robins about other supplies mentioned my 559, November 28, and act on Perkins's advice as to further purchase.

VOPICKA
American Minister

AMERICAN EMBASSY,
PETROGRAD.

Following from Anderson:

JASSY, *December 5 [1917]*.

568. Please see my No. 569, to-day, which is for Colonel

Kalpashnikov. Please supply him, for the purposes stated therein, necessary funds up to Rs. 100,000 and draw on American National Red Cross, Henry P. Davison, chairman, with this telegram attached to cover.

It is most urgent that this matter be done at once, so please assist Kalpashnikov in the matter in every way possible.

AMERICAN MINISTER

In this connection I desire to state that I have never paid Colonel Kalpashnikov a kopek for this purpose or for any other, nor has he ever applied to me for any funds whatever.

Copies of these telegrams and of all others relating to Red Cross work are on file with the American Red Cross Mission to Russia, the chairman of which, Lieutenant Colonel Robins, is empowered to speak on all matters relating to his mission.

On October 24/November 6 Lieutenant Colonel Anderson requested the Russian Red Cross to transfer to the American Red Cross Mission to Rumania, in order to relieve the Rumanian situation, the motor cars, ambulances, equipment and supplies originally obtained through the efforts of the Siberian Regiments American Ambulance Society in the United States, represented by Colonel Kalpashnikov, intended for use upon the various Russian fronts, which was granted. Since that time the respective missions have been engaged in an endeavor to fulfil the terms of the agreement. The charge that these motor cars are intended for the use of General Kaledin, which in itself is preposterous and impugns the good faith of the official representatives of a government known to be actuated by the most friendly motives toward the Russian people, is additionally disproved by the following letters to me from Colonel Anderson, which show his desire that the safety of the cars be assured:

December 8, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I hand you herewith copy of my recent telegram regarding the motor cars which Colonel Kalpashnikov is to bring to this commission.

The American Red Cross recently placed at my disposal an additional appropriation of \$1,000,000 and I am anxious that the motor cars and supplies of this commission shall not fall into the hands of the enemy in the event of further invasion of this territory.

Major Perkins will explain more fully the plans of the commission and is fully authorized to act for me. Sincerely yours,

HENRY W. ANDERSON

*Lieutenant Colonel and Chairman,
American Red Cross Mission to Rumania*

[Enclosure]

Decembers, 1917.

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I thank you for your letter of November 13 enclosing copies of the notice in regard to the motor cars of Colonel Kalpashnikov. I desire to express my appreciation of your courtesies and the assistance rendered to Colonel Kalpashnikov in the matter.

Major Perkins of this commission, who will call on you, will explain our present purpose in regard to these motor cars, and I will be grateful for any assistance you may be able to give in carrying that purpose into effect.

I have determined that these cars and other property of this commission shall not fall into the hands of the enemy if it can be avoided.

Sincerely yours,

HENRY W. ANDERSON
*Lieutenant Colonel and Chairman,
American Red Cross Mission to Rumania*

The document given by me to Colonel Kalpashnikov bespeaking assistance in the transportation of these automobiles from Petrograd to Jassy follows customary precedent in such instances, in fact, since the issuance thereof I have also given on December 1/14 a similar certificate bespeaking protection and safe-conduct for "ambulances, medicines and clothing" sent from Petrograd to Jassy by the American Red Cross Mission to Russia.

It is inconceivable that further documentary evidence or statements are needed to disprove the incendiary allegations intended to arouse animosity towards the American Government, this Embassy of the American people, or to attribute to the American Government or its representatives an act so wholly contrary to its traditional policy.

I trust it will be very difficult for any one to convince the Russian people that America does not feel friendly to Russia and that her people do not cherish an earnest and sincere sympathy for the people of this country in the difficulties that confront them. Many substantial evidences of such sentiment have been given [since] the revolution of March last. Only yesterday a delegation called at this Embassy and presented a floral offering as an expression of the effort I am making to have 1,075,000 pairs of boots and shoes shipped from America for the members of the railway union and their wives and children.

¹ *Ante*, p. 321 [*Pg. 321 includes portions of [Doc. 316](#) and [Doc. 317](#)*].

File No. 861.00/808

[Document 324]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 27, 1917, 7 p.m.*

1938. Referring Department's 1906, December 15, 6 p.m.,^{[1](#)} and your 2133^{[2](#)}
Department thoroughly realizes chaotic conditions may arise, appreciates your
purpose to remain and hopes you may judge it practicable to do so.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of [Doc. 306](#), [Doc. 307](#), and [Doc. 308](#)].

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 322 [Pg. 322 includes portions of [Doc. 317](#), [Doc. 318](#), and [Doc. 319](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 28, 1917, 10 p.m.*
[*Received December 30, 2.57 p.m.*]

2154. Statement in my 2144 was published 25th textually in Soviet official publication and followed by number of impertinent questions indicating doubt as to truth my statement. If had official relations with the government officers would demand apology or explanation. Have not replied but sent Robins to Trotsky who repulsed first two efforts of Robins to explain. Yesterday received clear statement from Anderson which Robins to-day showed Trotsky and reports that Trotsky discredited.

Anderson wires through American Legation, Jassy, that ordered automobiles to Rostov December 5 because "conditions became acute" and his plan was to save Red Cross units from Germans by southern route motoring from Rostov to British Army in Mesopotamia. Conditions improved few days later when order canceled and Kalpashnikov ordered to bring automobiles to Jassy where much needed, adding "further than this we have nothing whatever to do with any political or military conditions Russian either directly or indirectly." Suggest show Davison.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/864

[Document 326]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 29, 1917, 2 p.m.*

1946. Your 2138, December 24, 11 p.m. Department desires you to continue the course you have pursued in the past and which it has approved. Department relies on your good judgment to persevere in difficult situation.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *December 29, 1917, 2 p.m.*
[Received December 30, 6.18 a.m.]

8090. The Foreign Office has given me the following memorandum:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to the United States Ambassador and has the honour to transmit herewith for his excellency's confidential information a copy of a memorandum regarding policy of the Allies in Russia which was agreed to at the conference held at Paris on the 22d instant.

Foreign Office, December 28, 1917.

Circulated to the King and War Cabinet

MEMORANDUM PREPARED FOR LORD MILNER AND LORD R. CECIL ON
SUGGESTED POLICY IN RUSSIA AND ACCEPTED BY M. CLEMENCEAU AND M.
PICHON ON DECEMBER 22, 1917

At Petrograd we should at once get into relations with the Bolsheviki through unofficial agents, each country as seems best to it.

We propose to send Sir George Buchanan on leave for reasons of health but we shall keep a Chargé d'Affaires there. We do not suggest that our allies should follow our example. Sir George Buchanan's long residence in Petrograd has indelibly associated him in the minds of the Bolsheviki with the policy of the Cadets and he stands to them for much the same as, say, M. Milyukov.

We should represent to the Bolsheviki that we have no desire to take part in any way in the internal politics of Russia and that any idea that we favour a counter-revolution is a profound mistake. Such a policy might be attractive to the autocratic governments and Austria but not to the western democracies or America. But we feel it necessary to keep in touch as far as we can with the Ukraine, the Cossacks, Finland, Siberia, the Caucasus, etc., because these various semiautonomous provinces represent a very large proportion of the strength of Russia. In particular we feel bound to befriend the

Ukraine since upon the Ukraine depends the feeding of the Rumanians to whom we are bound by every obligation of honour. As for the war, we should carefully refrain from any word or act counter to [*sic*] condoning the treachery of the Russians in opening peace negotiations with our enemies but we should continually repeat our readiness to accept the principles of self-determination and this includes that of no annexation or indemnities. We should present [*impress*] on the Bolsheviki the importance of not being satisfied with empty phrases from the Germans and point out that unless they get specific undertakings from them as to such questions as Poland, Bohemia, the Rumanian parts of Transylvania, not to speak of Alsace-Lorraine and the Trentino, they will get nothing. Meanwhile their powers of resistance are melting away and they will soon be, if they are not now, at the mercy of the German Kaiser who will then snap his fingers at all their fine phrases and impose on them any terms he pleases. They should be told that it is now probably too late to do anything to save the personnel of the army but the material of the artillery can still be preserved and at the very least it should not be transferred to our enemies to be used against the western democracies. Most important of all, the Bolsheviki should prevent if they can the wheat districts of Russia, such as the Ukraine, falling into the control of or being made available for the Central powers. This makes another reason why we are anxious to support and strengthen the Ukraine and why we urge on the Bolsheviki that far from trying to coerce the Ukrainians they should enter into close cooperation with them in southern Russia. Our principal object must be, if we can, to save Rumania. Next we must aim at preventing Russian supplies from reaching Germany. Finally we are bound to protect, if possible, the remnant of the Armenians not only in order to safeguard the flank of our Mesopotamian forces in Persia and the Caucasus, but also because an Armenian union, if possible with a Georgian autonomous or independent state, is the only barrier against the development of a Turanian movement that will extend from Constantinople to China and will provide Germany with a seaport of even greater danger to the peace of the world than the control of the Baghdad Railway.

If we could induce the southern Russian armies to resume the fight, that would be very desirable, but it is probably impossible to secure these objects. The first thing is money to reorganize the Ukraine, to pay the Cossacks and Caucasian forces. ... The sums required are not, as things go, very enormous but the exchange presents great difficulties. If the French could undertake the finance of the Ukraine, we might find the money for the others. It is understood that the United States will assist.

Besides finance, it is important to have agents and officers to advise and support the provincial governments and their armies. It is essential that this should be done as quickly [quietly] as possible so as to avoid the imputation as far as we can that we are preparing to make war on the Bolsheviki.

We would suggest that the Ukraine should be again in this matter (dealt with?) by the French while we would take the other southeast provinces. A general officer from each country would be appointed to take charge of our respective activities but they would, of course, keep in the closest touch with one another through carefully selected liaison officers in order to ensure the utmost unity of action.

It is for consideration whether we should facilitate the return to southern Russia of the numerous Russian officers at present in France and England.

PARIS, *22 December 1917.*

PAGE

Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly—Assumption of definite control by the All-Russian Soviet Congress—Proclamation of the Soviet republic—The “Sisson documents”

[\[328\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, January 6, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received January 7, 6.52 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/914

[\[329\] The Ambassador in Italy \(Page\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Rome, January 8, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received January 9, 3.06 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/923

[\[330\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen, January 9, 1918—3 p.m. [Received January 11, 12.52 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/936

[\[331\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, January 9, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received January 11, 5.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/937

[\[332\] The British Ambassador \(Spring Rice\) to the Secretary of State](#)

File No. 861.00/1390

[\[333\] The British Ambassador \(Spring Rice\) to the Secretary of State](#)

File No. 861.00/1380

[\[334\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen, January 14, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received January 16, 2.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/957

[335] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Moscow, January 14, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1213

[336] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 16, 1918, 12 p.m. [Received January 20, 10.17 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/975

[337] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, January 18, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 763.72/8513

[338] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 18, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received January 21, 8.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/979

[339] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 18, 1918. [Received January 22, 3.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/980

[340] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 19, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received January 24, 6.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/996

[341] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 19, 1918. [Received January 24, 8.45 a.m.]

File No. 701.7161/4

[342] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 20, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received January 24, 5.47 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/995

[343] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 20, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received January 23, 6.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/991

[344] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 20, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received January 25, 9.37 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1002

[345] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 22, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received January 25, 2.27 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1000

[346] The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, January 22, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received 10.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/985

[347] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 23, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received February 2, 8.42 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1043

[348] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, undated. [Received January 24, 1918, 9.27 a.m.]

File No. 701.7161/5

[349] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 25, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received January 29, 1.88 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1016

[350] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 26, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received January 30, 11.27 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1029

[351] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 27, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received January, 30, 10.31 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1209

[352] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 28, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received January 29, 7.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1013

[353] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, January 29, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received January 30, 10.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1030

[354] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)

Washington, January 29, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/985

[355] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 30, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received February 4, 1.21 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1047

[356] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, January 31, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received February 1, 12.42 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1039

[357] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 31, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received February 5, 4.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1053

[358] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 1, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 124.61/27a

[359] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 1, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1044A

[360] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 1, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received February 3, 4.15 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1228

[361] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 2, 1918. [Received February 7, 4.20 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1062

[362] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, February 3, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received February 4, 3 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1049

[363] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 4, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1056a

[364] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 4, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received February 9, 3.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1075

[365] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 5, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received February 7, 11.07 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1064

[366] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 7, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received February 9, 4.40 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1250

[367] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, February 7, 1918, 10 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1054

[368] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 8, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received February 11, 1.32 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1083

[369] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, February 9, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received 6.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1076

[370] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, February 9, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received February 10, 2.23 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1079

[371] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 9, 12 p.m., to February 13, 1918, 1 a.m. [Received February 13,
8.22 a.m., to February 16, 7.55 a.m.]

File No. 862.20261/53

[372] The British Embassy to the Department of State

File No. 861.00/1087

[373] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington, February 11, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1049

[374] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 13, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1075

[375] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 13, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 801.00/1086

[376] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 13, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received February 16, 1.43 a.m.]

File No. 862.20261/55

[377] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 14, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1064

[378] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, February 18, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 862.20261/53

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 6, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received January 7, 6.52 p.m.*]

2205. Constituent Assembly called for January 8 [18]. Third All-Russian Democratic Congress¹ called to meet Petrograd three days later and no secret that it will supervise work of Constituent Assembly to prevent enactment of reactionary laws and enforce passage of progressive measures such as land distribution. All-Russian Peasant Congress called for 25th.

Trotsky's plan to have separate peace, if negotiated, approved by Constituent Assembly or if German propositions unacceptable to transfer to Constituent Assembly responsibility for its rejection or acceptance.

FRANCIS

¹ The III All-Russian Congress of Soviets opened Jan. 23, 1918.

File No. 861.00/923

[Document 329]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ROME, *January 8, 1918, 8 p.m.*

[*Received January 9, 3.06 p.m.*]

1343. Learn that Belgian Government has been considering directing its representatives to get in touch with Maximalists and has made inquiry of Sonnino how Italian Government would consider it. Sonnino declared himself absolutely opposed to such movement and stated that he has forbidden Italian representatives even to visa passports issued by Maximalists.

NELSON PAGE

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *January 9, 1918—3 p.m.*
[*Received January 11, 12.52 a.m.*]

1803. The following is a statement by Major General Prince Cantacuzene relative to present conditions in Russia from where he has just arrived. He saw service at the front from the outbreak of the war, in East Prussia where he was shot through the body and was unable to return to duty for nine months, until the advent of the Bolsheviks when he resigned his command at Kiev and escaping arrest by a very narrow margin accompanied by his wife gained the Crimea. After a time they went to Petrograd where they remained until January 2. Prince Cantacuzene was permitted to leave largely owing to the state of his health due to his wounds. He was made Brigadier General by the old régime and Major General by the Provisional Government to which he adhered to prosecute the war against the Central powers.

[1.] Political: Many consider Bolshevik government strongest since revolution. Informant's opinion is that facts have proved that constructively it has no strength nor ambitions whatever. All its actions have been purely destructive and it has acted with consent of and been upheld by only lower elements of country; has encouraged all kinds disorder and satisfied all baser ambitions of populace not even succeeding in restraining looting, assassinations, highway robbery, etc.

Generally expected that Bolsheviks will shortly be submerged by still more anarchistic wave; but certain groups of the substantial classes (amongst [them] even small groups of the qualified workmen) have been so disgusted by prevailing disorder and misery that they are trying organize movement for law so far without any sign of much hope success.

Believed by nearly all thinking people there will be no separate peace. If there should Bolsheviks cannot enforce any measures except with German strength.

No prospect of stronger party's being shortly in power for some time to come even as foreseen by most optimistic unless one established and held in place by outside power with their troops as in case of German occupation.

No leaders in opposition to present group who would seem to promise new party movement with any chance of success.

There is much talk of "counter-revolution" and it has been excuse for many arrests. Certain number of people working for reestablishment of monarchy, but not with the ex-Emperor at its head. Various candidates are mentioned, but in informant's opinion without chance of present success. There is also much talk of fact that there figures in German program of occupation the recall of the Tsarevich Alexis, his establishment on throne with German regent. Informant does not know basis for [attribution of] this plan to Germans. In his opinion Russia will eventually return to idea of a monarchy as only way of holding together various races composing nation.

Bolshevik government supposed to be entirely in German pay. German money was found in several cases in hands of its agents and all the "directive" of movement conceded to come from Germany.

Informant had been told at first hand of several facts which would tend to show Bolshevik *coup d'état* was engineered by German intrigue and he has had proofs thereof in, every military administration in Kiev in connection with Ukrainian movement.

2. Economic: Food conditions in Petrograd so bad as to mean starvation for poorer classes in very short time. The very large reserves of old regime were squandered in first weeks of revolution as a measure to create popularity. Afterwards lack of confidence in "Provisional" Government prevented collection of supplies in summer and now lack of transportation and refusal of southern provinces to give up their supplies cut off Petrograd. All sorts of riots based on economic conditions together with epidemics are breaking out in big cities and are expected to become more acute. Conditions in south are slightly easier. Butter in Petrograd has mounted from forty kopeks to eight to twelve rubles a pound when obtainable; flour commands any price, three hundred rubles a barrel; milk and eggs nonexistent; tea in Kiev not found; coffee had by card system one-eighth pound monthly per head in Petrograd.

Food conditions daily growing more acute owing mainly distrust authorities and lack fuel for transportation.

In southern Russia grain of big proprietors has been sold for army for three years as rapidly as harvested. Peasants: have sold no grain for a year and not all their grain for year previous to that. Are supposed to have large stores hidden. In villages on the Poltava estates they admit this quite frankly.

Informant has never heard that peasants were holding grain reserves for invading enemy. They claim it is for themselves or for trading with the townsfolk to obtain manufactured goods.

At present starvation reigns in remnants of army. Heavy losses by the disorderly retreats where reserves of provisions fell into enemy's hands, bad arrangements for transportation and looting by deserters being main reasons. Same conditions as to warm clothing for army which has been largely sold by deserters.

Informant thinks that after conclusion of separate peace Germans could obtain from Russia grain, forage, beet sugar, ammunition and artillery, clothes and Red Cross supplies. Unable to state in what quantities, but not great.

Germans would have practically no rail facilities for shipping stuffs to Germany because of lack of fuel refused by the Don Cossacks to all railroads beyond the frontiers of their province.

Germans could not obtain substantial food shipments from Russia before spring as most grain reserves are hidden by the peasants and would have to be requisitioned forcibly; perhaps in south some might be bought at very high prices.

Money very scarce. Said by bankers twelve billion should be hidden among peasant classes. Banks are now in hands of Bolsheviki and newly printed money of the Provisional Government has no value in eyes of population.

Since Bolsheviki came into power personnel of the Emission Bureau are on a strike together with Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and refuse to recognize or work with new government. Old regime bills are being bought up by German agents at premium of 5 or 10 per cent, sent to Germany supposedly for use in Poland and Russia.

The head of one of the foreign banks in Petrograd considered that Bolsheviki's decrees carried no weight for the future. Everyone continued to invest in old régime war loans. French Government this autumn considered safe to take upon itself payment of interest on old regime war loan bonds held by French subscribers (thinks also on liberty loan bonds question). Financial men informant talked with lately all considered Russia's immense undeveloped resources as offering sufficient guarantee of easy payment of all debts to foreign governments though economic order must be established first and each Bolshevik measure retards that time. Financial and industrial men seem to consider the present administration a temporary although very acute disadvantage and both Russian and foreign bankers in Petrograd were expecting for days the "occupation" of the banks by Bolsheviki with apparent exception of the big American bank. The extreme anxiety for haste with which the Bolsheviki try to push the execution of each measure they take would seem to indicate that they themselves feel they are in power temporarily. Their manner of enforcing is with threats or sudden appearance of groups of Red Guards. Never do they show any organization of government or administrative machinery and in no case has any plan of theirs been made for beyond the 4th of January (old style) [1st?] which is a curious coincidence, as that marks the [date] of conclusion of armistice.

Clothing very expensive, about ten times old prices, boots and shoes practically nonexistent and all boot shops closed. Food and clothing for poorer classes not obtainable without great difficulty. Luxuries at enormous prices found more easily.

3. Military: Army for fighting purposes nonexistent; officers not permitted to

resign; are still with their groups but have had all epaulets removed and been degraded to rank with soldiers. All pensions suppressed even to wounded or maimed and those with St. George's [Cross]. Condition of officers and their families near starvation, no hope of help forthcoming from any quarter. No one at front or back [can] imagine for moment that army could make a stand against an invading force.

[GRANT-SMITH]

¹ Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 9, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received January 11, 5.30 a.m.]

2212. Visited French Ambassador yesterday. Had no more intelligence concerning American purchasing grain; I asked Jenkins to report thereon.

Said France desired to recognize Ukrainia but his Government had cabled Ministers [in] England and Italy suggesting or requesting concerted action.

Robins, who visits Smolny often, says Trotsky *en route* Brest addressed four armies who received him cordially and pledged themselves to fight rather than submit to disgraceful peace. Ukrainian delegation admitted to peace conference which very significant and indicates Soviet abandoning policy of all-Russian subjection. Soviet government recognized Finnish independence but retaining passport officials at border.

Beginning to think separate peace improbable perhaps impossible and inclined to recommend simultaneous recognition of Finland, Ukraine, Siberia, perhaps Don Cossacks Province and Soviet as *de facto* government of Petrograd, Moscow and vicinity. Understand another government organizing at Archangel and comprising territory equal to England, France and Germany combined. More later.

FRANCIS

The British Ambassador (Spring Rice) to the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy at Petrograd have forwarded the following summary of the Bolsheviki movement:

Trotsky and Lenin have now complete control of the movement, and their policy, which they have fully explained, amounts simply to a world-wide social revolution, with the suppression of religion, nationality and property. Trotsky's support of the cause of small nationalities is directly contrary to his doctrines, and is given solely for tactical purposes, and the question of peace or war is regarded by him and his followers solely from the angle of its effect on the objects of the revolutionary movement.

These facts are not disputed and, if understood, they explain completely the policy of the Bolsheviki. It is needless to enquire whether they are or have been taking money from the Germans.

Trotsky's position is now very difficult. He can accept the German terms, but this would destroy his influence in western Europe, on which he counts for promoting the revolution in Russia. He can refuse their terms, but this would destroy his position with the masses in Russia, whose support he requires and who desire peace. It seems probable that he may do his best to induce the Germans to offer to accept his terms, subject to the provision that the Allies should also accept them very shortly. He would at the same time assure the Germans that the Allies cannot do this, and he might thus extract himself from his present position.

The policy of Trotsky and Lenin will in any event be to prevent 2 success on either side in the war, and to do their utmost to bring discredit on existing governments in all countries. They will try to help in getting rid of British rule in Egypt and India: their present marked hostility to British institutions may be due to the fact that they think them more solid than those to be found in some other places. Great Britain is now receiving continuous abuse in the papers under Bolsheviki control, and it might be desirable that the above facts, which can scarcely be disputed, should be brought to the attention of the press, in order to prevent the public's being misled.

WASHINGTON, *January 9, 1918.*

The British Ambassador (Spring Rice) to the Secretary of State

MEMORANDUM

The United States Government have already been informed of the policy which the British Government propose to adopt in their relations with the Bolsheviki government.

The British Government feel it essential that in some way or other relations should be kept up between the Allies and the Bolsheviki authorities at Petrograd, and the former Acting British Consul General at Moscow, Mr. Lockhart, is being sent to Petrograd with instructions to keep unofficially in touch with them. The British Government will also, by means of unofficial channels, keep in touch with the newly appointed agent of the Bolsheviki government in London, M. Litvinov.

As already explained, the British Government consider it necessary to maintain relations in some way, and they feel that this can best be done by the means now adopted, as the present system does not entail the recognition of the Trotsky-Lenin government either by the British Government or the Governments of the Allies.

WASHINGTON, *January 9, 1918.*

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *January 14, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[Received January 16, 2.55 a.m.]

1823. I venture to submit the following views with which I concur:

It is the opinion here in certain quarters, the naval attaché who spent some time in Russia and the informant mentioned in my telegram 1803, of January 9, 3 p.m., being particularly impressed, that the first practical step towards combating German intrigue in Russia should be through the establishment by one of the Allies of relations with the Bolshevik *de facto* government, the others holding aloof and confiding their interests to the one chosen. Teutonic influence could thus be better counteracted, the participation in certain conferences might be realized, communication with particular parts of Russia established, courier service facilitated, etc. Should the Bolshevik government prove more long-lived than anticipated, the Allies' delegate would have a voice in affairs; as soon as they fell, the others could take up the work.

At present the Allies have apparently no definite connection with the *de facto* government, are cut off from the Ukraine, Finland and other separatist movements while some Austro-Germans have entered into direct relations with each group and consequently are enabled to pursue their plans unhindered.

Should such a course be deemed advisable is not the United States from tradition, recent entry on the scene, Latin American experience with *de facto* governments and especially in the light of the President's recent message, the best suited among Germany's opponents to undertake the task?

GRANT-SMITH

¹ Sent via the Embassy in Great Britain.

***The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the
Ambassador in Russia (Francis)***¹

Moscow, *January 14, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the letter of the Embassy of the 28th ultimo, communicating instructions of the Department of State to report to the Embassy in regard to certain political conditions in this consular jurisdiction.

Prefacing its answers to the questions of the Department, this office finds it necessary to stress one or two considerations. In Russia feelings outweigh facts, and the present fluidity of feeling makes institutional stability problematical. The social unrest fostered by the Maximalists, and the instincts and appetites to which they appealed, are not confined to one section. These forces are felt in every part of the country with greater or less intensity, dependent on the level of prosperity and contentment and on exposure to the general currents of the world's thought. The level of prosperity is higher in the Ukraine, among the Cossacks and in Siberia than in central and northern Russia, and the intellectual level is lower. Having more and better lands, these regions will resist any plan to throw all lands into one melting pot. The land question is at the root of the demand for autonomy, though not the sole basis. On the other hand the Maximalists are able to appeal with greater or less success to the social unrest existing in the Ukraine, among the Cossacks and in the Siberian cities. Partial community of ideas largely explains why so few of the civil battles announced by the newspapers amount to more than, "I came, I looked, I went away." At the time when the press had heavy artillery playing at Bakhmach, a junction on the road to Kiev, and a bloody hand-to-hand conflict in progress, an American business man passed through Bakhmach by train. He said the Ukrainians and the Maximalists gathered and each side removed a rail from the track, not fifty miles, as announced by the newspapers. Within twenty minutes they had decided there was to be no fight, laid the rails again and dispersed. The incident is typical. In general it may be said that tea is brewed hotter than it is drunk in Russia. It is the land of false reports, false alarms, false starts. Every calculation has to be discounted. It is only the unexpected that happens. The undersigned believes that much can be done by the Allies to stay the decadence of Russia, to hasten its recuperation, and to counteract German and Austrian influence, but exaggerated expectations should not be entertained. If it be expected that the Ukraine will maintain on the southwest and Rumanian front an army able to hold the Central powers in check, that expectation will be undeceived [*sic*]. What may be hoped for is the relative success of checking the withdrawal of hostile forces to other fronts and of making

an organized offensive against the southwest as difficult and as expensive as possible, to say nothing of the limitation of trading with Germany, whether legal or illicit. If it be expected that the Ukraine and the Cossacks will be able to reduce the center and the north of Russia by military force, this expectation will be undeceived [*sic*], as far as the early future is concerned. The Cossacks are too weak for such an effort, and the Ukrainians are carrying water on both shoulders. The Kiev government is threatened with a Maximalist Ukraine movement that has been started at Kharkov. This has made the Kiev Ukrainians more complaisant in the matter of food supplies. The Ukrainians are now promising not only to permit, but to stimulate and to compel shipment of grain northward, against currency, the demand for gold having been forgotten.

But even moderate success of the efforts of the Entente Allies to check anarchy, help lay foundations for an orderly future and hinder the enslavement of Russia by Germany would justify great exertions. In making the world safe for democracy, they may righteously and judiciously also try to make democracy in Russia safe for the world; and generous solicitude for helpless small peoples by no means precludes due consideration of the menace of anarchy in a helpless large one. The recuperation and integrity of Russia may well become objects second only to the winning of the war itself.

There is too little discretion in Russia to permit the solicitation of the opinions of Russians upon the questions submitted by the Department. Already it is a daily commonplace of Maximalist newspaper discussion that American capitalists are supporting General Kaledin with money and supplies. Such opinions of worth as may be gathered incidentally will be communicated to the Embassy and the Department.

An attempt will be made to answer the questions of the Department with respect to central Russia, the Ukraine, the Southeastern (Cossack) federation, Siberia to Irkutsk, White Russia and Central Asia.

CENTRAL RUSSIA

Central Russia will here be taken to include the Moscow consular district in European Russia, with the addition of Kostroma, but without Chernigov.

Q. (a) What is structure of local government, its authority, executive power, capacity to maintain order?

In Moscow there is a Council of Workingmen's and Soldiers' Deputies, elected by the garrison and by industrial workers in direct elections, by groups of fifty, roughly speaking. Being too unwieldy for daily action, the council has delegated many of its functions to its Executive Committee. The latter elects such commissars or higher administrative and executive officers, of varying importance, as are considered necessary. The Executive Committee controls the garrison through the commander of the Moscow military circuit, embracing the western half of the territory of central Russia. There is an appointive executive

board for the management of the banks. There are commissars for practically every form of executive and administrative function, from police to tramway management. The distinctions between local and central government have been effaced, as also between Zemstvo and central government. Local commissars have been placed in charge of the Zemstvo Federation, whose activity has been reduced almost to nothing.

The rights and duties of councils have been defined in an "instruction" published in the Maximalist newspaper, the *Pravda* of Petrograd, and republished in the *Russkiya Vedomosti* of this city on the 6th instant. It is therein declared that local councils are fully competent to deal independently with all local questions, but that they should constantly be guided by the decrees and resolutions of the central council and of the more important municipal, provincial and district councils. Their jurisdiction is declared to embrace all administrative, financial, economic and cultural questions. They have the moral obligation to enforce the decrees and decisions of the central government and other higher authority, and the right to take independent action, to make requisitions and proclaim confiscations, to close opposition newspapers, make arrests, dissolve public and social organizations; and they receive funds from the Public Treasury.

This "instruction" indicates but does not circumscribe the activities of the local councils. It makes no mention of the administration of justice, which has been entrusted to revolutionary tribunals, or which, in the absence of such tribunals in most Russian cities, does not exist at all. It says nothing of accounting for public funds, which, though primitive, is not altogether neglected.

In addition there is in Moscow a system of ward assemblies, with a central council, to which certain very minor administrative tasks have been entrusted. They are the superiors of the house committees. It is possible that in time the ward assemblies and their central council may develop into regular municipal government, in place of the organization broken up by the Maximalists, but the ward assemblies are now thoroughly Maximalist. In time of stress the garrison committees and the separate council of soldiers' deputies share power with the organization above described. Ordinarily the soldiers interest themselves mainly in their internal affairs.

The Moscow council enjoys more credit than the Petrograd local council, being second in influence and power to the All-Russian Council. It is often more radical than the central council, and it appears to be better supported by the local workingmen, owing doubtless to the greater firmness of the industrial organization of this district.

Maintenance of order is discouraged by the Petrograd Maximalist leaders, who issue praise to the local councils displaying most zeal in requisitioning, confiscating, harassing the recalcitrant. In practice the relations of the population to the Maximalist authorities are better than might have been expected. The Maximalist commissars and other functionaries are overworked and are disposed

to look for the easiest way out of any difficulty. Those who approach them courteously usually meet with more amiable and fairer treatment than they expected. The Russian character is fundamentally good-natured. Profoundly resentful of the refusal of the middle classes to recognize their regime, the Maximalist functionaries are easily flattered by approaches from their social superiors.

Police functions are entrusted in Moscow to militiamen and Red Guards, selected from the factories and works, and paid both regular factory wages and a bonus of 25 to 60 rubles per day. There is much jealousy of the Red Guards among the garrison soldiers. Militiamen stand fixed posts by day and traffic is regulated and daring broad-daylight crimes are now rare. The streets are poorly lighted, militiamen, roundsmen and Red Guard special detachments are rarely seen at night. That there is not more crime than is noted must be attributed to the deeper traits of Russian character, the results of former discipline, and the house committees. There is no police detective work. Persons caught in round-ups of lodging-house districts are practically never identified with their crimes.

Q. (b) Has it manifested or proclaimed tendency to separate or autonomous organization?

The territory of central Russia, as above circumscribed, has been defined largely by the process of eliminating districts with autonomy programs. But it includes the Mohammedan population of Kazan, Ufa, Orenburg and, to a less extent, other Volga communities, which have had meetings at Kazan and Ufa to claim some form of local self-government for the Mohammedans of Russia, numbering about 25,000,000. As will be seen later, the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks are in good relations with the Southeastern (Cossack) federation, and are expected to join it when assured of a practicable direct contact with this federation. Lastly, it may be remarked that Mogilev, like Vitebsk, Vilna, and Minsk, and parts of Smolensk, have a considerable White Russian population, and there is a movement for White Russian autonomy or local self-government, with its center at Minsk. At Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk, and in the provinces of the same name, as in Volhynia, the military element is considerably more prominent in the Maximalist organizations than in regions farther from the front. Volhynia has a large Ukrainian population, but up to the present has not been prominent in the Ukraine movement. Having here briefly indicated the distinguishing features of governments formerly attached to the consular districts of Warsaw and Riga, it will not be necessary to revert to them under a separate heading.

There is a movement to hold a Great Russian Congress at Moscow in February to counteract excessive demands for autonomy and to plan for the proper representation of Great Russia in the future federal republic.

Q. (c) Describe attitude of population of cities as compared with country population.

The organization at Moscow is copied with approximate fidelity wherever the

Maximalists are in control. Their influence is strongest in the industrial cities, towns and villages clustered around Moscow in the western half of the region of central Russia. It is weaker in the trading centers to the east, with their closer relations to the agricultural population. The peasants are in the main faithful to the Social Revolutionaries, their mentors for two decades. The peasant land committees have listened to S. R. advice, or to none, being guided mainly by their appetites. Just now the Maximalists are trying to seize the land committees, with problematical success. The peasants are in opposition, owing to the anarchy in trade, the scarcity and high prices of commodities.

There is a council in every considerable city and town, and, nominally at least, there are district as well as provincial councils. So far cantonal councils are either nonexistent, being replaced by the land committees, or of little importance. The peasants are little restrained by any authority. Their constables are removable, often punished physically, by mobs in disagreement with their action on any matter.

Q. (d) What is influence of Bolsheviks?

In practice opposition socialist parties have been reduced to secession from the councils, or to protest. In practice they sometimes exert a moderating influence.

Q. (e) What are leading factors both political and individual in local situation?

The industrial workers and the soldiers of the garrison are the sources of the power of the Maximalists. The intellectual and propertied classes have been reduced to passive resistance or apathy. Muralov, the commander of the military circuit, seems to be more of a personality than any other local Maximalist leader. He has made sincere efforts to restore some semblance of order among the troops.

Q. (f) What are conditions of railway transportation and supply, including food?

Moscow, its industrial region and the country as a whole are always on the verge of a railway breakdown, fuel and food famine. In practice the General Railway Union continues to move trains, irregularly, slowly, fewer in number, and subject to increased hazards of theft and violence. Locomotives move their loads with difficulty. Food supply commissioners meet with constant difficulties in procuring grain from the peasants, who have it in abundance in south Russia, and in the southern half of central Russia. During the four days of the Russian Christmas holidays only two cars of grain or flour were registered as arriving. The daily bread allowance has been reduced to three and one-half ounces per person, and it is doubtful whether a further reduction will not be made. Individual cases of starvation have occurred in upper Volga cities. But in practice food difficulties have not yet become insurmountable. Speculators, fearing confiscation, have thrown concealed stocks on the market, many house committees and other voluntary food organizations have stocked potatoes, cabbages and other articles. There is a food organization at every factory, for every railway, in connection with every considerable group of workers. These procure food through the public food

commissioners or by private purchase, which the Maximalist organization can not suppress. Railway passenger traffic is largely given up to speculators or agents of speculators, with all the foodstuffs they can drag into the cars. The International Harvester Company's food organization for its Lubertsi workers, near Moscow, may be taken as typical. Its office employees throughout Russia secure and ship goods. The workers themselves control the distribution, taking care, by the way, that none of it is passed on to office employees, who as *bourgeois* can look out for themselves or starve. But the fact in issue is that these hundreds of workers are fed, lighted, warmed, clad, gum-shod and provided with other creature comforts. The danger of starvation, in view of the universal corruption of Maximalist, as of some former functionaries and of railway agents, may thus be discounted heavily. Moreover, the Ukrainian government has just promised to exert pressure to force a stream of grain from its abundant supplies into central and northern Russia.

Q. (g) Has full quota of representatives to Constituent Assembly been elected and sent to Petrograd? What are political affiliations of such representatives?

The elections have been completed except in a few remote districts, and in military units that have lately been dislocated. Only a fraction of the deputies elect have gone to Petrograd, on account of the expense of living there while waiting for the opening of the assembly. The *Utro Rossii* of Moscow, which has given most attention to the elections, states that 614 deputies have been elected in all Russia. Of these 279 are said to be Social Revolutionaries, 165 Maximalists, 32 radical Social Revolutionaries allied with Maximalists; Ukraine Socialists, 79; Constitutional Democrats, 16; Mohammedans, 19; the remainder scattering. The proportions of the several party representations vary slightly in central Russia and in the country at large, the Social Revolutionaries and Maximalists being somewhat more numerous in central Russia, other socialist groups predominating or at least competing successfully with the S. R. and Maximalists in the territories with autonomous programs. The Mohammedans are conservative liberals.

Q. (h) Number of troops in district and general condition both material and political.

The strength of the garrisons in central Russia can not be guessed even approximately. They have probably always outnumbered the troops at the several fronts, have perhaps been two or three times as numerous, in the average. The military commanders have only vague information as to the present strength of commands, as many soldiers report at barracks only at will, occupying themselves with petty trade. As many as 5,000 could be seen daily in front of each of the rubber-shoe depots, crowding out all civilians. Recent measures for distributing commodities through house committees and other consumers' organizations have clone away with almost all these queues. Soldiers have since been less conspicuous in the streets, and it is supposed that many have gone to their homes. The garrison soldiery is dirty, unkempt, slouchy, unsoldierly in every respect. They are well enough fed and clothed, but need washing and brushing. They do not salute

officers, but are not often insolent, except the small minority that engage in highway robbery. They have minimum military value. They do not want to fight either foreign or domestic enemies. The Moscow garrison was held in check for a week by not more than 1,500 striplings and a few officers, according to most trustworthy estimates. They are Maximalist in their political sympathies, but understand nothing except that they are promised freedom from fighting, food and idleness.

Q. (i) How does population stand in relation to army units in your district?

The middle and upper classes are hostile and contemptuous. The unorganized work people are divided, some being partisans of the Maximalists, many being critical.

Q. (j) How are troops in your district as a whole disposed toward movement of Ukraine, Kaledin and Caucasus to continue the war? Are they supporting them or opposing them?

The Maximalist troops and all but a very small number of all the troops in the Moscow district are opposed to the continuance of the war and therefore they do not sympathize with a movement anywhere else to continue the war. They are also told that the Ukrainians, Cossacks and all other non-Maximalists are counterrevolutionaries and tools of the *bourgeoisie*. They are easily convinced, but do not want to fight and can not be depended upon in civil war. They have no platform and no program.

All the available evidence indicates that conditions throughout central Russia, excepting the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks, are quite similar.

UKRAINE

For purposes of this inquiry the Ukraine will be taken to embrace that part of the Odessa consular district west of the Don Territory, with the addition of Chernigov and Volhynia, subject to exceptions that will be noted.

(a) Throughout this region councils were organized on the general model after the spring revolution. The Ukrainians set up a rival organization at Kiev and gradually extended their influence. Their small numbers, not more than a hundred intellectuals in the beginning, it is stated, dictated a cautious policy until they should win adherents in the army and among the peasants. They now have a Rada or parliamentary assembly, a ministry or general secretariat, a voluntary army, control of the staff of the southwest and Rumanian fronts, now combined in one front. In Kiev crime is rife but the streets are well lighted and people flock to theaters, *cafés chantants* and other amusements. The councils exist in many towns of the Ukraine and there is a struggle for supremacy between them and the Ukrainians.

(b) The avowed policy of the Ukraine is to take the lead in creating a federal republic in Russia. There is, however, a pro-Austrian party, with partisans, it is

- supposed, in the ministry. There is also an open and skilful Austrian propaganda. A motive for secession from Russia would be the hope of attaching to their republic the Ukrainians of Galicia, Bukovina and Transylvania.
- (c) The intellectual and propertied classes are bitterly hostile to Ukrainism. The industrial workers of the cities lean toward Maximalism. The ignorant peasantry are the mainstay of the movement. They understand little and care mainly for the preservation and increase of their landholdings. They are dividing estates, as peasants elsewhere in Russia are doing.
 - (d) The Maximalists have adherents in all the cities of the Ukraine. Having secured possession of Kharkov, they have extended their influence towards Kiev from every direction.
 - (e) The leading factors of the situation are the traditional cult of the Little Russian language and literature and national customs; the historical distrust of the Little Russians for Poles and Russians; the attempts of the autocracy to suppress the Little Russian nationality; the land question; the Austrian propaganda.
 - (f) The railways are operated by the General Railway Union, as elsewhere in Russia. They are in better condition than in central Russia. Provisions are abundant and prices are lower than in central Russia.
 - (g) Ukrainian socialists and the two principal Russian socialist parties, Maximalists and S[ocialist-] R[evolutionaries], divide the bulk of the Ukraine representation. Most of the deputies that went to Petrograd returned home shortly afterwards.
 - (h) There are said to be about 35,000 regularly organized Ukrainian volunteers in Kiev. Russian, that is non-Ukrainian troops, are disarmed in passage, and Ukrainian troops are hindered as far as possible from reaching the Ukraine from other fronts, and of course are disarmed. Nevertheless the concentration of Ukrainian soldiers from other fronts is going on steadily and there is likewise a steady withdrawal of other elements from the Ukraine front, so-called.
 - (i) Polish aristocratic contempt for Little Russian boors still largely colors the attitude of Kiev society to the Ukraine movement, but society in the narrower sense can now only grumble.
 - (j) The soldiers of Ukraine origin probably have more discipline and better fighting qualities than the average of the Russian armies taken as a whole. The Ukrainian volunteers cheerfully salute officers, conduct themselves in an orderly fashion and are ardent patriots, but have still to prove their military value.

The Maximalist Ukraine movement, launched at Kharkov, is gaining ground in the provinces of Kharkov and Ekaterinoslav. The Maximalists are also crowding the Ukrainians in the eastern half of Chernigov. Little is heard of the Ukrainians in Volhynia, but they have a stout party in Mogilev. Both sides are disposed to negotiate and to try to outwit one another. The Ukrainians can not be relied upon now to take a firm stand with the Cossacks against Maximalism.

Bessarabia, with strong Ukrainian and Rumanian elements, has an obscure

autonomous movement.

The Black Sea coast districts are not definitely aligned with any party. The fleet is divided. The propertied elements would gladly welcome any master. Odessa vaguely dreams of an autonomous territory embracing parts of Kherson and the Tauride.

The interesting and judicious reports of Consul Jenkins at Kiev are herewith appended, along with extracts from letters from other Americans at Kiev.¹

SOUTHEASTERN (COSSACK) FEDERATION

The Southeastern federation embraces the Don, Kuban, Terek and Astrakhan Cossack territories and armies, and some of the mountain and steppe tribes north of the Caucasus. The present territory of the federation extends from the eastern border of Ekaterinoslav Province to the Caspian Sea, and from the Caucasus slopes to the latitude of Voronezh and Saratov; for the future it is planned to embrace the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks and various steppe tribes extending indefinitely toward southwest Siberia. There is a good understanding among all the twelve Cossack armies, who are equally interested to preserve their lands from encroachment by outsiders. Relations with the Orenburg and Ural Cossacks are bound to be of little value unless control is secured of the southern branch of the Siberian Railway running through Ufa, Samara and Orenburg-Samara, which city is separated from the Don Territory by a wide belt of hostile country. There is a plan afoot for a railway from Rostov to Orenburg, but that seems to be a project for the future. As a present proposition the success of the Southeastern federation seems to be dependent on foreign support and foreign control of the Siberian Railway and of connections with the Don country, which would require immense forces.

Matter pertinent to the Department's questions will be extracted from the reports of Consul D. C. Poole, who has been detached from this office for duty at Rostoy.

- (a) "As yet the constitution of the Southeastern federation is very informal. From each province entering in the union there are two members elected, which together form the government. There is as yet no central organ before which that government should be responsible. The members are responsible only to the provinces that elected them. The decisions of that government have as yet only moral, but not a binding authority, upon the separate units of the federation. It is still in the formative stage. ...¹ It has been decided to form a separate military district embracing the entire federation, with a single commander for all forces, Cossack and territorial.
- (b) "Not separation from Russia, but reconstruction of Russia on federal lines is the aim of the federation, the S[outh] E[astern] F[ederation] serving as temporary nucleus. ["]
- (c) and (d) Bolshevism has adherents in Rostov and Taganrog. There is social unrest.

- (e) There are big men in the Cossack movement and in the patriotic Russian movement centered at Novocherkassk. General Alexeev is to be commander in chief of the military district, and to direct operations beyond the Don Territory. General Kaledin is to retain command of the Cossack troops and to direct operations as long as they are defensive. President Kharlamov is described as a man of parts. Constitutional Democratic sympathy and advice are represented by such men as Milyukov, Guchkov, Rodzyanko, the latter being now somewhat in the background.
- (f) Railways are operated with more regularity than they are north of Kharkov and Voronezh. There is ample food.
- (g) Newspaper dispatches state that the elections for deputies have just been completed in the Don Territory. The Cossacks captured 12 of 19 places, the Constitutional Democrats 2, the S[ocialist-] R[evolutionaries] 4, the Rostov garrison electing the nineteenth.
- (h) New army of forty-eight battalions, besides twenty-one batteries of artillery and other branches now organizing by General Alexeev, who hopes to complete his task by May 1. Details are found in Consul Poole's telegrams Nos. 8 and 9.
- (j) Cossacks returning from the front need rest, a mental change, having been subjected to some extent to Maximalist agitation.

Mr. Poole's telegrams, herewith appended, should be read *in extenso*.¹

SIBERIA

Contests between Maximalists and Siberian federationists have occurred in all the larger cities along the Siberian Railway. A battle raged an entire week at Irkutsk, twelve principal streets being devastated. The Maximalists seem to have had rather the better of the fighting there. The more westerly and southwesterly portions of Siberia are securely federationist. A Siberian republic, designed to bridge over the present period of anarchy and to further the formation of a general Russian federation, is in formation at Omsk. The Siberian Railway is operated with more success than the railways of northern and central Russia. Food is abundant. The people are prosperous and self-reliant. In other respects the information at hand does not warrant fine distinctions between Siberia and European Russia.

CENTRAL ASIA

The lappings of political waters on such further shores as Turkestan, Bukhara, Khiva, and among the Bashkirs and Kirghiz, etc., all of which have been dreaming of some form of local self-government, which they call autonomy without knowing what the word means, scarcely affect the present inquiry.

I have the honor to be [etc.]

For the Consul General:
[File copy not signed]

¹ Enclosure in despatch of the Consul General to the Secretary of State, Jan. 18 (received Mar. 2).

¹ Not printed.

¹ Omission indicated in the original.

¹ The telegrams referred to are not printed; their substance is contained in Consul Poole's report, forwarded by the Ambassador in Russia as enclosure to his despatch of Jan. 24/Feb. 6, 1918, [vol. II](#)². chap. iii.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 16, 1918, 12 p.m.*
[*Received January 20, 10.17 p.m.*]

2241. From published accounts here of speeches at Brest by Hoffmann, Kühlmann, and Trotsky it appears that negotiations for separate peace have nearly reached breaking point; in such event I shall recommend assistance be extended to whatever power may be in control of forces opposing Central Empires, as importance of keeping Russia in the war in my judgment growing daily.

Preparation being made by Soviet for demonstration on convening Constituent Assembly 18th; four machine guns installed in the National Duma where convention meets.

Social Revolutionary meeting held yesterday to which sent unofficial representative. Speakers generally favored peace, suggesting proposition by Assembly to Allies for general peace on terms outlined in President's last speech, some advocating liberty of independent action if Allies fail to participate. Some speakers said Assembly would severely criticize attempt of Soviet to negotiate separate peace. Lenin thinks attempt to kill him instigated by Germans who he claims are furnishing money to Social Revolutionists in hope they will be more pliable than Soviet when in power.

Your 1988¹ received to-day, deciphered and having attention.

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed.

File No. 763.72/8513

[Document 337]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 18, 1918, 4 p.m.*

1998. Referring Department's 1924, December 22, 4 p.m.,^{[2](#)} British Embassy states that British Government concurs generally in the course suggested but assumes, however, that it is not intended that the diplomatic representatives of the various governments at Petrograd should in no circumstances take independent action. The Department concurs.

POLK

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 320 [Pg. 320 includes portions of [Doc. 315](#) and [Doc. 316](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 18, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received January 21, 8.55 a.m.]

2252. Called meeting Embassy to-day of Allied chiefs of missions France, England, Italy, Japan, Rumania, Belgium, Portugal, Serbia, China, Greece, Siam, and Brazil attending. After stating thought meetings should be held oftener for conferences and perhaps concerted action, told them meeting of the Constituent Assembly appointed for to-day was crisis in Russian affairs and seriously affected Allied interests. Stated the occasion merited thought and solicitude by us and that if they did not think it advisable to attend opening in a body asked what they thought of my going. Explained that Constituent Assembly looked upon as supreme authority in Russia and if untrammelled would represent free will of the Russian people, which my Government desirous to have expressed. After prolonged discussion decided advisable no one should attend to-day but to meet again to-morrow after giving subject mature deliberation and learning first-day proceedings. Meantime Japanese Ambassador and English Chargé d'Affaires reported had not arrived on time because compelled to make detour to avoid street fights which in progress during our deliberations. All expressed appreciation of being assembled and importance of the subject submitted.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 18, 1918.*

[*Received January 22, 3.15 p.m.*]

2253. Noon was hour fixed for Assembly meeting but delayed until 4 p.m. Red Guards mainly, but accompanied by few soldiers, attempted to disband parades and demonstrations favoring Assembly, first ordering parades to disband but firing on people at times and being fired on in return, casualties unknown, but not thought great, one Assembly member killed near Embassy.

Members attending something over 400, of which two thirds Social Revolutionary, one third Bolsheviks and extreme left of Social Revolutionary. Think no Cadets attended. Social Revolutionists named oldest member temporary chairman but was prevented from officiating by president, Petrograd Soviet, promptly assuming chair and reading declaration of Commissaries instructing convention concerning proceedings. Begins with assertion that all power is with Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Deputies. Reading finished, a member stated: "All power in Constituent Assembly." Soviet chairman made no response other than asking what next, whereupon Maximalists began singing *Internationale* hymn. Roll was called next including Milyukov, Rodzyanko, Kerensky, Shingarev, Tseretelli, Lenin, Skobelev, only last three of those named being present. Chernov nominated President of [by] Social Revolutionists; Spiridonova, a woman, by Maximalists. Chernov elected, receiving 244 to 153, six abstaining. His [this] proceeding just finished.

Beginning rather encouraging. Government using no force in convention other than preventing members from entering hall by guard stationed at door; Chernov and Shreider, former mayor, Petrograd, demanding reason of sailor guard, received reply that was so ordered. Rumors current yesterday that two regiments would protect Assembly, but heard of no armed bodies of troops on streets; think soldiers generally remained in barracks; some soldiers in parades favoring Assembly.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 19, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received January 24, 6.10 a.m.]

2255. Constituent Assembly installed. Chernov in a speech severely criticized Soviet government for not concluding peace. Tseretelli spoke counseling harmony. Bolsheviks withdrew, Social Revolutionaries continuing session until 5 a.m., when adjourned to 6 p.m., but Duma now closed and government reported as announcing that Constituent Assembly really party convention which cannot expect governmental protection nor use of Duma hall. Allied chiefs met Embassy to-day, but did nothing; adjourned to to-morrow afternoon to await developments and read Chernov's speech. Robins confident that Chernov in touch with Mirbach,¹ as is using considerable money, and no other available source known. Chernov been extremely radical, not trusted by colleagues when in Provisional Government; Constituent Convention voted down resolution approving stand of Russian peace commissioners at Brest. Trotsky expected today or to-morrow, consequently peace negotiations virtually terminated and nothing but resumption of war confronts Soviet government unless it be indefinite prolongation of armistice which French Ambassador says Germany violating by sending troops to western front. Tell Secretary of the Treasury Central Soviet Committee referred to Constituent Assembly resolutions of Commissaries repudiating all foreign loans and canceling domestic holdings exceeding Rs. 10,000, but that measure possesses more life than Assembly itself which appears moribund. Perhaps Assembly farcical, not unadulterated calamity if its peace program adopted; can tell better after reading Chernov's speech and peace resolution which understand mentions Allies and passed hurriedly about [before] adjournment which was forced by Red Guards and sailors.

FRANCIS

¹ Wilhelm, Count von Mirbach, German commissioner in Russia; see *post*, p. 409
[Pg. 409 is part of [Doc. 413](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 19, 1918.*
[Received January 24, 8.45 a.m.]

2256. To-day's issue of anarchist organ contains following:

Citizen Ambassador, we have received your official statement-protest against the arrest of the Rumanian Minister Diamandi and looting of the cellars of the Italian Ambassador Torretta.¹

We have the honor reply you as follows: Messrs. Torretta and Diamandi, same as all the other diplomatic representatives in Russia of the Allied and non-Allied powers, are the authorized representatives in Russia of their capitalistic and imperialistic governments and spokesmen of the *bourgeois* interests of their countries.

As such all diplomatic representatives of all countries from the beginning of the revolution acting under the orders of their governments actively interfered in the Russian affairs and tried to hinder the progress of the Russian revolution interfering in the liberation of the laboring class. They actively and materially supported all the counter-revolutionary ideas and actions of Kornilov, Kaledin, Dukhonin, the Ukrainian Rada and all the other foes of the liberation of the laboring Russian people.

The governments that sent you to Russia in their own countries are everywhere the foes of the laboring classes, are strangling each revolutionary step of their nations, shooting, hanging, and putting in prisons the leading fighters for the liberation of mankind.

Therefore we in fighting with the counter-revolutionists of our own country have nothing to say against the arrest by the Bolsheviks of the Rumanian diplomatic representative.

In particular as far as you are concerned, Mr. American Ambassador, kindly take notice of the following statement.

The leading fighter in the cause of liberating mankind, our comrade Thomas Mooney, has been sentenced to death by your Government. The Government of the United States has also put into prison our comrades

Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman and others.

At numerous meetings regarding this the Russian workmen, peasants, soldiers and sailors have expressed their energetic protest regarding atrocities perpetuated by your Government towards honest revolutionists and demanded their immediate liberation. In numerous resolutions regarding this the Russian soldiers, workmen and sailors pointed out that to violence they will reply by violence, to death by death.

Owing to the fact that neither you, Mr. Ambassador, nor your Government have given due attention to these resolutions we are authorized to officially announce to you that if in the shortest time possible our comrades Thomas Mooney, Alexander Berkman, Emma Goldman and others will not be liberated then we shall consider you personally responsible for their lives and liberty. You defend one of the members of the Diplomatic Corps as its *doyen* which means that you have diplomatic mutual responsibility. Know then that with us revolutionists there is also our own international mutual aid.

FRANCIS

¹ See *Post*, pp. 477 [Pg. 477 includes portions of [Doc. 446](#), [Doc. 447](#), and [Doc. 448](#)] and 479 [Pg. 479 is part of [Doc. 449](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 20, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received January 24, 5.47 a.m.]

2259. Continuing my 2255. Assembly which adjourned at 6 p.m. yesterday excluded from Duma not attempting entrance when advised by committee would be refused. Central Committee of Commissaries issued a decree dissolving Constituent Assembly because counterrevolutionary *bourgeois* influenced and not acknowledging result of October revolution¹ which demonstrated that all power rests with Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Soviet.

Shall advise Allied chiefs, meeting this afternoon, to take no action concerning Assembly, certainly not until further developments. Social Revolutionists had decided majority in Assembly voting solidly on every proposition but Soviet were organized more; Cossacks had giant power and used it.

Trotsky not returned. Reported that the chief German commissioners left Petrograd for Brest but unconfirmed. Impossible to say what effect on Soviet government or Assembly. Political conditions astounding, outrages in my 2258² had been confirmed [omission].

FRANCIS

¹ November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

² Not printed; reported the murder by Red Guards in a hospital at Petrograd of A. I. Shingarev and F. F. Kokoshkin, cabinet members of the Provisional Government and delegates to the Constituent Assembly.

File No. 861.00/991

[Document 343]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 20, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[Received January 23, 6.40 p.m.]

2260. American woman, Russian born, telephoned this afternoon had important information to impart, but afraid to visit Embassy. Sent to see her, were told Embassy be attacked by anarchists and burned to-night, whereupon sent for guard, and ten soldiers here now. Report probably not true but thought precaution wise.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 20, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[*Received January 25, 9.37 a.m.*]

2261. Allied chiefs met Embassy, all present. Rumanian Minister advised that Allied chiefs leave Petrograd for Stockholm or Christiania and await further developments because Soviet government unable to protect, and had by force dissolved Constituent Assembly. I opposed on the ground that leaving now would promote German interest and insure separate peace. Proposition received only vote of Rumanian Minister, Japanese Ambassador saying however he desired submit to his Government, but expressed personal agreement with me. Any instructions?

Trotsky returned. Germans asked ten days' adjournment of negotiations, which was granted.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1000

[Document 345]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *January 22, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received January 25, 2.27 a.m.]

165. On the 15th instant all newspapers except extreme Bolshevik were suppressed. On the 18th the Bolsheviks suppressed a demonstration of peaceful citizens in favor of Constitutional Assembly. Casualties about fifty though exact information unobtainable. Sporadic firing over city until to-day when Bolshevik demonstration celebrating dissolution of Constitutional Assembly has ended in general fighting all over city with many casualties. Artillery and machine guns being placed at strategic points and city in state terror, serious trouble being expected to-night. Americans all safe and everything has been done to protect them.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Japan (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *January 22, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received 10.20 p.m.]

Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me on the 17th to inquire of my Government, first, whether it had yet considered what action should be taken by the candidates [United States] in the event the present *de facto* Russian government should send envoys to replace those now serving. Reports indicate that Japan will face this problem in the near future. Secondly, whether my Government has considered what policy it would adopt towards Russia if a treaty of peace were concluded between the *de facto* Russian government and the Central powers.

Minister for Foreign Affairs in this interview volunteered most earnest expression of devotion to the Allied powers' cause, personal loyalty to the Anglo-Japanese allegiance [alliance] and the desire of his Government for the closest cooperation in [between] Japan and the United States in attaining the purpose of the war as set forth in the President's recent message; finally he expressed his gratification at the personal message which the President at a recent interview [gave] Ambassador Sato. The entire interview was a matter for curious contrast to Baron Goto's previous conversations with me. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me Sato would not return to America and I am reliably informed that Baron Goto is making a very vigorous campaign for the appointment of Dr. Nitobe as his successor. The Foreign Office is reported opposed to this selection.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 23, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received February 2, 8.42 a.m.]

2274. Belgian Minister called last midnight. Urged me to give interview or signed statement to Russian people presenting reasons why separate peace not advisable, claiming Trotsky would refer to All-Russian Soviet meeting to-day his position in peace negotiations and Belgian Minister thought sentiment of congress so divided that required such expression from myself to prevent separate peace.

Robins, Sisson just left Embassy. Assert congress will overwhelmingly approve Trotsky action. Consequently did not mention Belgian Minister's request. Robins, Sisson, especially former, in close relations with Smolny. Robins visits me daily, gives desired information concerning Bolshevik policies, therefore cannot refuse his requests to send cipher cables to Davison, Thompson, but trust you do not construe my sending as approval of recommendations therein. No. 2272¹ delivered Embassy to-day; No. 2273¹ delivered week ago and held for favorable opportunity to discuss with Robins especially clause stating "Ambassador has recommended simultaneous recognition Bolshevik, Ukrainian, Finnish present authorities as *de facto* government," as he misunderstood me if so thought. In my 2208,¹ establishment of working relations suggested with said governments, also with several other professed governments in Russia. Robins, Sisson claim Soviet government stronger daily, but am not fully prepared to concur as awaiting effect of dissolving Assembly which Robins says provokes no important protest. Too soon to hear from provinces about this or murderous assault in hospital.²

Vice Consul Poole arrived to-day, had interesting two-hour conference. Says sent you four cables, January 4, 10, 18.³ Have you received? My French, British colleagues, if advised of their Governments' action as Poole reports, have denied such knowledge in replying to my direct questions. Poole discredits effects; brought letters from British, French representatives to their Embassies stating Poole viewed situation as they did but I shall not deliver letters until see British Chargé d'Affaires and French Ambassador.

Conference with only unimprisoned, unabsconded bank president to-day revealed he contemplating departure saying worst not yet experienced but Soviet government will be supplanted by anarchistic domination. You can see therefore

difficulties confronting Russia and your Ambassador.

No anarchistic intelligence to-day. Marine couriers guarding tonight. MacVickar and Christy arrived to-day.

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed; they were messages delivered by Robins to the Embassy to the sent forward.

¹ Not printed; they were messages delivered by Robins to the Embassy to the sent forward.

¹ Dated Jan. 8, [vol. II](#), chap. vi.

² See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 354 [*Pg. 354 includes portions of [Doc. 341](#), [Doc. 342](#), and [Doc. 343](#)*].

³ Not printed. See despatch No. 1036 of Jan. 24/Feb. 6, 1918, from the Ambassador in Russia, [vol. II](#), chap. iii.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *undated*.

[Received January 24, 1918, 9.27 a.m.]

1365. I understand Petrograd *Pravda* has published following article in reply to a newspaper article condemning violence against the Rumanian Legation and which I forward for Department's information:

Are Diamandi, Francis, and Noulens⁴ envoys in the opinion of peasant government and Russian people? Should Soviet government regard as envoy those not recognizing Soviet authority? To whom are they accredited? They state they are not staying as envoys but to get information. They are agents aiming strangulation Russian revolution and if liberties are taken with our soldiers we shall arrest them no matter what they say about their inviolability.

MORRIS

⁴ The diplomatic representatives in Russia of Rumania, the United States, and France.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 25, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received January 29, 1.88 p.m.]

2287. Food conditions grave; bread quarter of pound daily allotment. Hotel France raided last night by Red Guards; all food taken.

Factory workers, especially women, organizing, passing resolutions against Soviet, which is the natural result of food scarcity, but the problem is what will succeed present power if overthrown. Bolshevism growing in the Ukraine. If Germans negotiate separate Ukraine peace and control resources of that section they will be indifferent to Soviet peace; could take Petrograd, but properly consider it liability not an asset.

Took Poole to British and French Ambassadors to-day to make a report on southern conditions. Think both those Governments have aided financially Alexeev movement, but not through Embassies here.

Trotsky's unexpected departure very significant, indicating separate peace I fear.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 26, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received January 30, 11.27 a.m.]

2292. Robins, who informed me yesterday morning of Trotsky's hasty departure for Brest, told me 11 last night that Trotsky had sent for him night before to tell him thereof and to ask whether knew what our Government would do about his recognition and on receiving negative reply inquired whether Ambassador knew. Robins replied thought not but would ask. I told him I had no instructions concerning recognition and was satisfied Government would not act other than in concert with Allies. Robins telephoned to-day that Trotsky had returned, consequently I doubt whether he started; possibly this was scheme to force our hand. Trotsky billed for speech in Congress to-night on peace negotiation.

Apparently repudiation national debt not absolutely decreed. Was recommended by Council of Commissaries to central committee which referred it to Constituent Assembly by which was rejected; was submitted in declaration of Soviet principles to All-Russian Congress which enthusiastically adopted entire declaration. Assistant Commissary Foreign Affairs now says repudiation is a law "but its enforcement in hands of Council of Commissaries"; this evidently means that commissaries authorized to withhold enforcement of law if creditors recognize Soviet government and extend further assistance.

Loss of our advances to Russia immaterial compared with defeat of Germany but very questionable whether can afford to recognize government which wilfully repudiates predecessors' obligations. Furthermore credit extended by us small when compared with that of our Allies.

Bolshevik organs contain accounts of great social unrest and strikes in Austria and threatenings of same character in England. Report received that Austrian Emperor abdicated but not confirmed and not published. Have you received such information? Soviet leaders, as have often cabled, striving for world-wide social revolution and would sacrifice any government or any country therefor.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 27, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[*Received January, 30, 10.31 a.m.*]

2293. Trotsky, speaking last night to Soviet over two hours, exhibited maps showing German demands and virtually stated no separate peace possible, but said armed resistance impossible and negotiations would continue. Organizing of Red Guard into volunteer army abandoned.

Stated war existed between Rumania and Russia and Rumanian Minister would be given passports immediately. Also criticized French severely, charging French artillery had fired on Russian troops; asserted French and English had aided Cossacks and Ukraine; did not neglect America, calling our Government imperialistic and capitalistic, but made no specific charges of unfriendly acts. Said separate peace would prevent social revolution in Germany, which is endeavoring to incite by propaganda.

Saw Rumanian Minister 6 o'clock when had received no communication from Soviet, but was packing preparatory leaving. Said not heard from Government for fifteen days and knew nothing of occurrences there; that Bessarabia had declared independence and Rumania irresponsible for occurrences in Moldavian republic, which name assumed by Bessarabia. French Ambassador says received no instructions on the subject in your 2014.¹ ...

Germans would be pleased by departure Allied missions, but I think I should remain even if others go.

FRANCIS

¹ *Post*, p. 481 [Pg. 481 includes portions of [Doc. 450](#), [Doc. 451](#), and [Doc. 452](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 28, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received January 29, 7.25 a.m.]

2294. All-Russian Soviet Congress [addressed by] Lenin last night at length; assumed control of Russia supplanting Constituent Assembly and admitting 71 bolting radical members thereof to membership; adopted enthusiastically declaration of Bolshevik principles rejected by Constituent Assembly. Think it repudiates all foreign loans; has 786 registered delegates.

Lenin reported favoring separate peace and yielding on territory question but did not mention subject in his speech, Trotsky opposing; latter left suddenly for Brest supposedly on German concessions as he said on returning here considered negotiations virtually terminated.

Congress unlikely to act on peace before hearing from Trotsky. If armistice terminated Germans could capture Revel within week also Petrograd if desired.

[FRANCIS]

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *January 29, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received January 30, 10.15 a.m.]

1406. General Judson, chief of the American Military Mission in Russia, has spent two days in Stockholm with me and informs me that the situation in Russia is gradually growing more serious and that, in his opinion, in time the legations and embassies will have to leave Russia, but it is also his view that they should all remain there just as long as is possible so as to prevent the Central powers having open field in Russia. He has made to me and has also drawn up for the use of the War College, the following statement which he asks you to please transmit immediately:

Leaving Russia it seems duty to attempt forecast future based on most careful consideration of [situation] and tendencies.

Bolshevik government will last several, probably six months, until collapse of transportation and economic life of country. Unless we have friendly intercourse with Bolsheviks, not involving recognition, we may lose many chances to serve our own interests and thwart enemy, and our representatives may soon have to quit Russia. Bolsheviks only Russian element likely to be at all hostile to Central powers, as leaders will not compromise. Very many Russians would welcome Germans to preserve private interests and end socialistic régime, due to drastic nature of latter. Recuperative power of Russia through possible efforts well-to-do educated classes experienced in affairs is departing. These classes on the verge of enduring great distress and becoming submerged. Break up of Bolsheviks likely to be accompanied local reigns of terror, especially Petrograd.

Following above, an increased disintegration may be expected, smaller local communities often mutually hostile forming for local protection. German and Austrian assistance will be actively sought by many elements.

Great shock to civilization in Russia is probable and accompanying incidents may be catastrophic.

Restoration of Russia will be enormous world problem which reformation cannot be fully entered upon till Bolsheviks have run their course. Most important thing now is to pursue pacifist policy doing everything to show

friendliness and sympathy for all Russian elements in order to lay foundations for future helpfulness and not let Russians feel they must turn to Germany.

If after reference peace question by Trotsky to Soviet military operations should be received [revived], they will be on small scale and in nature friendly but shall [should] be assisted as holding of enemy troops on east front will be worth more than cost.

MORRIS

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Japan (Morris)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 29, 1918, 7 p.m.*

Answering your January 22, 7 p.m., you may advise the Japanese Government:

- (1) That this Government has not been approached in regard to sending Bolshevik envoys to replace Russian representatives now in this country and will probably not be in a position to receive envoys from Russia until it establishes relations with a government at Petrograd.
- (2) That the attitude of this Government and the people of the United States towards Russia is expressed in the President's address to Congress and indicates a settled purpose to assist the Russian people which is not contingent upon the acts of authorities in Russia not recognized officially by the United States.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 30, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received February 4, 1.21 p.m.]

2303. No new developments. Trotsky at Brest where negotiations resumed to-day. Reported that he playing for time in the hope of starting social revolution in Central empires. Germany can dictate separate peace if she desires as Soviet admits inability to offer resistance. Meantime food conditions growing rapidly worse. Red Guard sailors, some soldiers, forcibly appropriating food whenever desired. Am maintaining a guard six Americans who sleep and eat in the Embassy; be prepared for continual increase of draft on European war expense appropriation.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *January 31, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received February 1, 12.42 a.m.]

1423. Have just had conference with Italian Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg who arrived in Stockholm to-day. He reports that conditions in Russia are appalling and are getting constantly and rapidly worse. Long lines form before all shops which have food for sale. People are already suffering severely from lack of food. Italian Embassy Petrograd has been ransacked and looted by Bolsheviki, two of their servants receiving severe bayonet wounds. Threats of violence have been made against the American Ambassador but had not been carried out when he left. Only 150 rubles a week may be drawn from the banks by one person. People with large houses have been informed that they must be prepared to dispose of all but three rooms, this being maximum number allowed to a family. Italian Chargé d'Affaires informed me that, before he left, the Government had discontinued practice of supplying food to the various embassies and legations. I learn by telephone from Haparanda this morning that there is still no railway or telegraph communication between Tornea and St. Petersburg.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 31, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received February 5, 4.45 p.m.]

2310. Endeavoring through Robins to get Lenin revoke Reed appointment with fair prospect of success.¹

Lenin incensed that Zalkind, assistant commissary Foreign Affairs, sent me note enclosing anarchist resolution and without tendering protection or remonstrance or any comment whatever. Foreign Office sent a messenger to the Embassy, 7 last evening, to inform Ambassador that anarchist demonstration planned for last evening, Christmas eve [*sic*], Trotsky had prevented; notwithstanding had six men on guard. No demonstration and Robins thinks none planned. Lenin appointed Chicherin to succeed Zalkind.

Smolny reports on great strikes in Germany and demands by strikers for Russian peace on Soviet terms; also appeals for general peace along lines of President Wilson's message but [?] please cable immediately if true.

FRANCIS

¹ John Reed, U. S. newspaper man, whose appointment as Consul at New York had been announced by the Soviet régime.

File No. 124.61/27a

[Document 358]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1918, 7 p.m.*

2038. Department's latest from you dated January 28. We are much concerned welfare yourself and staff. Since receiving Stockholm's reports, dated January 28, that you were isolated, have been trying to communicate by all possible channels.

...

Referring Department's 1906,^{[2](#)} we rely fully on your judgment as to staying Petrograd. ...

LANSING

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 316 [Pg. 316 includes portions of [Doc. 306](#), [Doc. 307](#), and [Doc. 308](#)].

File No. 861.00/1044A

[Document 359]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 1, 1918, 7 p.m.*

2039. Department appreciates gravity of the political situation and the possible danger of a crisis. Do you recommend any moderation of Department's attitude towards the Bolsheviki authorities? If so, explicitly state your views. Department is not disposed to put you and the members of the Embassy staff in personal danger if it can be avoided without compromising the position of the Government.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 1, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received February 3, 4.15 a.m.]

2316. Separate peace seems to be now very doubtful, notwithstanding Trotsky's speech on eve of departure for Brest, as he is strengthened by German strikes, Soviet successes in Ukraine and reported social uprising in Rumania where King said to be deposed.

Soviet domination spreading. Jenkins wires 31st fighting continues at Kiev and [garbled groups] resigned because attitude of radical government in Rada. Telegrams received through French Embassy which apparently has direct communication. French Ambassador thinks Soviet will succeed. Ukraine and peace commissioners follow lead of Trotsky. If I conclude negotiations be terminated without separate peace shall be disposed to establish working relations with Soviet.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 2, 1918.*

[*Received February 7, 4.20 a.m.*]

2325. All-Russian Workmen-Soldiers-Peasants' Soviet [Congress] adjourned 3 yesterday morning. Its roll showed 977 workmen-soldiers delegates, 610 peasant delegates, and 129 fraternal delegates without votes. Its leaders claimed Russian representation from Vladivostok to Murmansk and from Odessa to Dvinsk. It made declaration proclaiming Russia, "Republic of the Councils of Workers-Soldiers-Peasants' Deputies," in which entire power is vested. It pronounced its fundamental task to be abolishment of exploitation of one person by another, the entire annulment of classes and establishment of socialistic organization of society. It proclaimed the socialization of land and made all land the property of the whole people without redemption; all woods, mines, waters and entire movables and immovables, estates and rural economic concerns to be national property. It transferred factories, works, mines, railways, and other means of production and transportation to the Council of Workmen and Peasants of the Republic and confirmed action of Commissaires in placing same under control of workers. Concerning national debts, it says:

The first blow dealt to international banking financial capital the Third Congress of Councils sees in the Councils' decree about the annulling of loans concluded by the Government of the Tsar, the landowners and *bourgeoisie*, being confident that the Councils' power will steadily pursue this course until the final victory of the international workers' revolution against the yoke of capitalism.

It approves the transfer of all banks to the state. It announces for general working conscription. In order to guarantee the consummation and preservation of such principles, it decrees "to arm the laboring masses, to organize a socialistic red army of workers and peasants and to entirely disarm the propertied class." It approves of the publication of the secret treaties and advocates "widest fraternization with the workers and peasants of the armies waging war at present against each other and attaining at all costs and by all revolutionary methods of a democratic peace of the laboring masses without annexations and contributions on the basis of the free self-determination of peoples." It "insists on the complete

breaking off of the barbarous policy of the *bourgeois* civilization which founded the welfare of the exploiters in a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of the populace in Asia, in the colonies generally and in the small countries.” It commends recognition of Finnish independence, advocates withdrawal of armies from Persia and champions the right of free self-determination to Armenia. It asserts “in the moment of a decisive fight with exploiters,” meaning *bourgeoisie*, they should have no place in any organs of authority and “power must belong entirely and exclusively to the working masses and their plenipotent representatives, the Councils of Workmen, Soldiers and Peasants.” It advocates a complete and sound union between laboring classes of all nations in Russia in federation founded on above principles and ends by “leaving it to the workers and peasants of every nation to independently determine themselves at their own plenipotent Councils’ congress whether they wish and on what terms take part in the federative government and in the remaining federative Councils’ institutions.” It creates Central Executive Committee consisting of 160 Bolsheviks, 125 left Social Revolutionists, 3 Maximalists,¹ 3 anarchists, 7 Social Revolutionary Maximalists, 7 right Social Revolutionists, 4 White Russians, in whom supreme power is vested.

FRANCIS

¹ The Petrograd *Pravda* in its issue of Feb. 2. 1918, gives a similar composition of the committee except in place of 3 Maximalists it reports 2 Internationalists, and in place of 4 White Russians, 2 Mensheviks.

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 3, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[Received February 4, 3 a.m.]

3138. My 3092, January 24,² and 3100, January 26.³ On account of the importance of the intelligence conveyed in these two telegrams, coming to the Foreign Office from Jassy by wireless, I have thought that an account of a conversation which I have had with my Russian colleague, Mr. Maklakov, apropos thereto might be interesting to the Department. On asking him what he thought as to the problems in Russia, of the Germans' being able to establish order in Ukraine if called upon to do so, he said that it would not be difficult.

In this connection it may be recalled by the Department that Mr. Maklakov had foreseen somewhat the present situation as long ago as November, when I quoted him in my No. 2801 of November 26, 4 p.m.,⁴ where he pointed out the danger which, following a period of anarchy and hunger, would leave an opening for the insidious work of Germany to be given more or less [*sic*], after it had hand in Russian affairs on the plea of restoring order.


The Ambassador is now strongly of the opinion that neither Germany nor Austria is able to employ the necessary force to maintain order there, that either a Maximalist or Ukraine power that would come to terms with Germany to-day would under present chaotic conditions be likely to be overthrown to-morrow. He said that contrary to the opinion of some, Germany would profit very much more by having order quickly restored in Russia than the continuation of revolutionary disorders with which she could not satisfactorily cope and on account of which she could not rely upon getting a supply of grain, minerals and oil.


As to the [intervention] threatened by armed forces of the Allied powers and particularly Japan, he believed such a course would have a disastrous effect not only on his own country but upon the cause of the Allies. He said that he had a personal acquaintance with Mr. Potanin, president of the newly constituted government of Siberia at its capital of Omsk, that he knew by personal knowledge that Siberia was to-day decidedly anti-Maximalist. He believed further that the participation of Japan in any movement to restore order or to interfere in Russian affairs would arouse a unitedly hostile sentiment against the Allied powers as such an act would be looked upon with grave suspicion.

During the conversation Mr. Maklakov told me of a protest which he had made to

Mr. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, against the action of the French Government in recognizing the independence of Finland which he said was against the truest interest of Russia. Admitting that the old Russian regime had not treated Finland with liberality or even justice, yet Finland should be given (a minimum?) autonomy which would not be incompatible with a general Russian sovereignty; that the creation of Finland into a separate and completely independent power would shut Russia off from her northern seaports and very greatly hamper her freedom of traffic via Archangel. He believes that after the war all of Russia would again unite and that the institution of separate and independent provinces now being attempted would pass away before the general desire and pride in the Russian solidarity of territory and power. Despite the anomalous position of Mr. Maklakov here as one who has been refused recognition of the Maximalist government and without form of recognition [from] the French Government he is nevertheless looked upon as being very able and well informed as to the conditions in his country. He impresses me as a big man, levelheaded and full of unselfish patriotic devotion.

SHARP

 ² Vol. II, chap. i.

 ³ Vol. II, chap. iv.

⁴ Not printed.

File No. 861.00/1056a

[Document 363]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 4, 1918, 5 p.m.*

2043. If you are able to remain Petrograd Department requests you obtain weekly statements from naval, military and commercial attaches, also information from such other sources as you find available, which you can compound into a single brief cable report to Department with background of your own views. Department believes this will enable you to supplement your valuable daily telegrams by weekly resume of situation which will be additionally helpful, the reports to be sent every Friday.

POLK

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 4, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[*Received February 9, 3.50 a.m.*]

2333. Your 2038, February 1, 7 p.m., just received. Your telegrams coming through regularly, consequently cannot account for delay in mine. Not aware Petrograd communication with Europe severed until messages from Vladivostok, Archangel, London.

Perhaps Soviet using this additional lever for recognition. Has given notice through official organ that missions of governments where Russia has deposits cannot procure funds until such governments recognize right of Soviet government to draw Russian funds deposited in those countries.

Trotsky still absent; Zalkind started for Switzerland. Lenin tells Robins anarchist threats are German-inspired. No hostile demonstration occurred. Guard of six Americans maintained in the Embassy, four couriers of whom are restless but shall hold until arrival twelve marines, for whose entrance requesting Smolny¹ consent. Cannot provide absolute protection against bomb thrown by anarchist; one exploded in hand of anarchist writer in building where was published threatening editorial. Remember your 1906 and not asking further instructions on this subject. Expression of confidence very gratifying.

FRANCIS

¹ Smolny Institute was used by the Bolsheviks as their headquarters.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 5, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[*Received February 7, 11.07 a.m.*]

2336. Germans purchasing bank and other stocks notwithstanding confiscation decrees. National City refused currency deposit of twenty million rubles, because feared increased responsibility and could not lend. Furthermore, bank thought, very properly, that such sum could only come from German sources. Heard also confidentially that largest holder in well-known bank here had bid for his holdings at highest market ever known, notwithstanding Soviet decree confiscating bank shares. These and similar transactions indicate Germany anticipating separate peace and united commercial relations and deposing of Soviet domination. This and other reliable information increase my fear of separate peace which Germany can dictate if so inclined. Think Germany be much pleased if Soviet government recognized by Allies and would then in a moment demand separate peace, signing of which with Russia would mean much more with Allied recognition of Soviet government than without. For this and other reasons I cannot recommend recognition. Am, however, endeavoring to establish gradually working relations with view of influencing Soviet government in the manner described.

Danish and Siamese Legations invaded by official armed delegations searching for food but instead of calling Diplomatic Corps for protest as requested by some colleagues I sent Robins to Smolny and [to] suggest that local commissaries under whose direction searching conducted be instructed against violation of extraterritorial rights. Lenin promised Robins to comply.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72119/1250

[Document 366]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 7, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[*Received February 9, 4.40 a.m.*]

2346. Nothing from Brest. Unconfirmed report that separate peace concluded but conditions so outrageous that incredible.

Council by decree signed by "Lenin and five other Commissaries issued to-day changes Russian calendar to accord with ours, taking effect Russia February 1 which decree designates February 14 in Russia.

Patriarch, according to the laws Russian church, has excommunicated all Bolsheviki because of confiscation of church property and violence to clergy.

FRANCIS

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 7, 1918, 10 p.m.*

6491. Embassy Petrograd reports that Kamenev has been appointed Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Large of the Bolshevik government and Zalkind appointed in the same capacity to Switzerland and that passports of both have been visaed by British representatives. Please ascertain if report regarding visa is true.

LANSING

¹ The same, *mutatis mutandis*, on the same date, to the Ambassador in France (No. 3154).

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 8, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[*Received February 11, 1.32 p.m.*]

2349. Your 2039, 1st. Delayed answering because I have been considering the safety of staff and the colony. Conclude anarchistic violence if exercised be directed solely against Embassy or me, consequently ask no change in Department's policy, certainly not before Brest negotiations are ended.

Have absolutely reliable evidence that Lenin, Trotsky accepted German money from June to October professedly for peace propaganda and army demoralization but I have not shown to Robins as might impair his effectiveness by weakening his implicit confidence in their sincerity. I had Robins ask Ministry of Foreign Affairs to apologize to Danish Minister for visits to Legation which was done, thus again avoiding meeting and protest of the Diplomatic Corps. Danish Minister grateful. Do not consider such acts as violation of your instructions. Still think that Soviet recognition would be mistake for if separate peace concluded it would be much less binding upon Russian people and much less satisfactory to Germany without our previous recognition.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1076

[Document 369]

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *February 9, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received 6.35 p.m.*]

8588. Your 6491, February 7, 1 p.m. British authorities have visaed passports for Kamenev and Zalkind and some other Bolshevik representatives whose names I expect to be able to telegraph later.

PAGE

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *February 9, 1918, 11 p.m.*

[*Received February 10, 2.23 a.m.*]

3177. Your No. 3118 [3154], February 7. I have just been informed by the Foreign Office that the report to which you refer is entirely correct. It was explained that the British Government having received a representative of the Bolshevik government there was nothing else to do for the French Government but to adopt a similar course. It has therefore visaed the passport of Kamenev proceeding to Paris via England in the capacity of Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Large. I have been informed that it is also (true that?) Zalkind has been appointed in the same capacity to Switzerland. I am told that the latter is the brother-in-law of Trotsky and has been his assistant secretary.

The Foreign Office informs me that until recently a representative of the Bolshevik government by the name of Holzmann was here in Paris about ten days in a diplomatic capacity for his government, but that every minute he was closely watched by the police and his person even searched. I was told that in all probability the new representative will also be kept under surveillance.

SHARP

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 9, 12 p.m., to February 13, 1918, 1 a.m.*¹
[*Received February 13, 8.22 a.m., to February 16, 7.55 a.m.*]

2354. Following prepared by Sisson and myself from documents we have seen whose authenticity I do not doubt and the originals of which we are endeavoring to procure.

The following documentary evidence, tending to prove Lenin and Trotsky and other Bolsheviki leaders in German pay and that disruption of Russia is but one move in plan of Germany to sow disorganization in Entente countries, reached me from widely different sources. I am expecting further evidence from the same sources but send incomplete data now available hoping that Washington may at once add its resources to the search for correlated evidence to prove or disprove accusation. All documents, except letter signed Yoffe [Joffe], are said to be from the files of "Kontrerasvedka," Government secret service organized under Kerensky. If so, unavoidable question arises why K. did not use evidence against Bolsheviki last July. German agents within his Government may have prevented. The letter signed by Y. is from Brest Litovsk *dossier* at the Smolny Institute directly from a person known to have access thereto. Photograph of letter has been shown to me. Neither originals nor photographs of other documents are in our possession but are in Petrograd and have been seen by an American although without opportunity for painstaking scrutiny. Scheidemann communication document No. 11 is a letter, others on telegraph forms. Purported originals may be in our possession shortly but they themselves would not be necessarily proof of authenticity, such proof is more likely to be found in corroborative evidence in the possession of Department of Justice or Allied secret services. The British known to be working on part of the material. Many clues lead to Stockholm and Copenhagen, impossible to follow them from here. I suggest intensive effort to complete case but advise against immediate publication unless necessary to counteract Bolshevik propaganda in the Entente countries. Its publication would be regarded here as calumnies of foreign capitalists and would have little effect beyond inciting to reprisals.

The contents of translated documents follow:

Circular 18 February 1914, Ministry, to all groups of German banks and, by agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government, the Österreichische-Kreditanstalt:

The management of all German banks which are transacting business abroad and by agreement with the Austro-Hungarian Government the Österreichische-Kreditanstalt Bank are hereby advised that the Imperial Government has deemed it to be of extreme necessity to ask the management of all institutions of credit to establish with all possible dispatch agencies in Luleå, Haparanda and Vardö on the frontier of Finland, and in Bergen and Amsterdam. The establishment of the agencies for a more effective observation of the financial interests of [German] shareholders of Russian, French and English concerns may become a necessity under certain circumstances, which would alter the situation of the industrial and financial market.

Moreover, the managements of banking institutions are urged emphatically to make provisions for very close and absolutely secret relations being established with Finnish and American banks. In this direction the Ministry begs to recommend the Swedish Nya Banken in Stockholm; the banking office of Fürstenburg; the commercial company Waldemar Hansen, in Copenhagen, as concerns which are maintaining relations with Russia.

(Signature) N3737
(Apparently division for "foreign country operations")

Note: This is outline of basic financial structure begun February 1914, five months before war was launched and still in operation; notice reappearance in subsequent Lenin messages, towns Lulea and Vardö, likewise reference to American banks. Olof Aschberg, one of the heads of the Nya Banken, came to Petrograd month ago and boasted that N. B. was the Bolsheviki bank. He was overheard by one of our own group. He secured from Smolny permit export several hundred thousand gallons oil. Opening at Hotel Europe headquarters, where both Mirbach and Kaiserling of the German Commission have been entertained, he negotiated with the State Bank February 1 last, contract for buying cash rubles and establishing foreign credit for Russian Government and is opening others with the John MacGregor Grant Co., exporting concern, which it finances in Sweden and which is financed in America by the Guarantee Trust Co. We have no information reflecting on last mentioned company. Fürstenberg is now at Smolny under the name of Ganetski, is one of inner group and is likely soon to be placed in charge State Bank. Aschberg now in Stockholm but returning. The material in this and other comments is independent of the documents and accurate on fact statements.

DOCUMENT NO. 2

Circular June 9 [November 2?], 1914. [From the] General Staff to all

military attachés in the countries adjacent to Russia, France, Italy, and Norway.

In all branches of German banks [in] Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, and the United States special war credits have been opened for the subsidiary war requirements. The General Staff is authorizing you to avail yourself in unlimited amounts of these credits for the destruction of the enemy's factories, plants and the most important military and civil structures. Simultaneously with the investigation [instigation] of strikes it is necessary to make provisions for the damaging of motors, of mechanisms, with the destruction of vessels, setting incendiary fires to stocks of raw materials and finished products, deprivation of large towns of their electric energy, stocks of fuel and provisions. Special agents detailed, which shall be at your disposal, will deliver to you explosive and incendiary devices and a list of such persons in the country under your observation who will assume the duty of agents of destruction.

General Army Counsel
DOCTOR FISHER

Note: Observe that this is dated six weeks before the rest of the world knew it was to be warred upon and even then making exact plans for a campaign of incited strikes and incendiary fires in the industrial plants and the yet uncreated munition plants in the United States.

DOCUMENT NO. 3

Circular November 2, 1914, from the Imperial Bank to the representatives of the Nya Banken and the agents of the Diskonto Gesellschaft and of the Deutsche Bank.

At the present time there have been concluded conversations between the authorized agents of the Imperial Bank and the Russian revolutionaries, Messrs. Zenzinov and Lunaeharski. Both the mentioned persons addressed themselves to several financial men who, for their part, addressed themselves to our representatives. We are ready to support the agitation and propaganda projected by them in Russia on the absolute condition that the agitation and propaganda (carried on?) by the above-mentioned Messrs. Z. and L. will touch the active armies at the front. In case the agents of the Imperial Bank should address themselves to your banks we beg you to open them the necessary credit which will be covered completely as soon as you make demand on Berlin.

RISSE

Addition as part of document:

Z. and L. got in touch with Imperial Bank of Germany through the bankers

(D?) Rubenstein, Max Warburg and Parvus.

Note: L. is the present People's Commissioner of Education. Z. is not a Bolshevik, but a right Social Revolutionist and in the discard, whereabouts unknown. Parvus and Warburg both figure in the Lenin and Trotsky documents. P. is at Copenhagen. W. chiefly works from Stockholm.

DOCUMENT NO. 4

Circular February 23, 1915. Press division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to all Ambassadors, Ministers, and Consular Officers in neutral countries:

You are hereby advised that in the country to which you [are] now accredited special offices are established for the organization of propaganda in the countries of the coalition of powers which is in a state of belligerency with Germany. The propaganda will be connected with the stirring up of social unrest and strikes; of revolutionary outbreaks resulting from it; of separatism among the component parts of the state; practically civil war; and will also comprise agitation for disarmament and the discontinuation of the war butchery. You are requested to cooperate and to favor in every way the managers of said offices. These persons will present to you proper certificate.

BARTHELM

Note: Here is the exact German formula for the incitement to war "from the rear": strikes, efforts towards revolution, the use of humanitarian appeals to weaken arm of its forces.

DOCUMENT NO. 5

From president of Kirdorff's Rhenish Westphalian Industrial Syndicate to the central office of Nya Banken in Stockholm. To Svenson Baltzer, representative of Diskonto Gesellschaft in Stockholm, and to Mr. Kirch, representative of Deutsche Bank in Switzerland.

The Rhenish Westphalian Industrial Coal Syndicate charges you with the management of the account of which you have been apprised for the support of Russian emigrants desirous of conducting propaganda amongst Russian prisoners of war and the Russian Army.

KIRDORFF

Note that this document already figures in the [omission] several governments having been intercepted in the correspondence of Prince von Bülow. It has new and direct pertinency to the Lenin-Trotsky data which follow herewith.

DOCUMENT NO. 6

COPENHAGEN, *June 18, 1917.*

MR. RUFFNER,
HELSINGFORS.

DEAR SIR: Please be advised that from the Diskonto Gesellschaft account, 315,000 marks have been transferred to Mr. Lenin's account in Kronstadt as per order of syndicate. Kindly acknowledge receipt Nilandeway [Nylandsvej], 98, Copenhagen, W. Hansen & Co.

SVENSEN

Note: Kronstadt, the navy base, was the nerve center from which L.'s activities radiated during the summer, both before and after he fled from Petrograd. He was not always there but it was Bolshevik domain. Sailors were, and still are, his first dependence. Hansen & Co. are named in document 1.

DOCUMENT NO. 7

STOCKHOLM, *September 8, 1917.*

MR. FARSEN,
KRONSTADT (via Helsingfors).

Carried out your commission: passports and the indicated sum of 207,000 marks as per order of your Mr. Lenin have been handed to persons mentioned in your letter. The selection met with approval of his excellency the ambassador. Confirm the arrival of said persons and separate receipt of your counter receipts.

SVENSEN

Note: Ambassador is probably Von Lucius, a complimentary reference.

DOCUMENT NO. 8

KONTRERAZVEDKA, GENEVA, *June 16, 1917.*

MR. FÜRSTENBERG,
STOCKHOLM.

Please note that at the request of Mr. (Jullias?) francs 32,000 have been paid for the publication of Maximalist socialist pamphlets. Advise by telegram addressed to Decker of the receipt of the consignment of pamphlets, number of bill of lading and date of arrival.

KRIEK, DEUTSCHE BANK

Note: Fürstenberg is named in document 1 and is Ganetski in St. Petersburg.

DOCUMENT NO. 9

MR. RAPHAEL SCHOLNICKAN,
HAPARANDA.

Dear Comrade: The office of the banking house M. Warburg has opened, in accordance with telegram from the Rhenish Westphalian Syndicate, an account for the undertaking of Comrade Trotsky. The attorney [?] purchased arms and has organized their transportation and delivery track Lulea and Vardö to the office of Essen & Son in the name Luleå receivers and a person authorized to receive the money demanded by Comrade Trotsky.

J. FÜRSTENBERG

Note: This is the first reference to Trotsky. It connects him with banker Warburg and with Fürstenberg. Luleå is a Swedish town near Haparanda.

DOCUMENT NO. 10

LULEÅ, *October 2, 1917.*

MR. ANTONOV,
HAPARANDA.

Comrade Trotsky's request has been carried out. From the account of the syndicate and the Ministry (probably Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin, press division) 400,000 kroner have been taken and remitted to Comrade Sonia who will call on you with this letter and will hand you the said sum of money.

J. FÜRSTENBERG

Note: Antonov is the chief military leader of the Bolsheviki. He was in command of forces that took St. Petersburg. He is now in field against Kaledin and Alexeev. At the date of this letter Trotsky was already at the head of Petrograd Soviet and the Bolshevik revolution was only a month away.

DOCUMENT NO. 11

BERLIN, *August 25, 1917.*

MR. OLBERG.

Your desire for [omission] together with the intention of the party. By agreement with the persons known to you 150,000 kroner are transferred to be at your disposal at Fürstenberg's office through Nya Banken. Kindly advise *Vorwärts* about everything that is being written by the newspaper about present events.

SCHEIDEMANN

Note: This letter from Scheidemann, the German socialist leader, links him with

Fürstenberg-Ganetski, with the Nya Banken and with subsidizing the Russian revolution. Trotsky published a newspaper during the summer. Another newspaper spoke for Lenin. *Vorwärts* would seem to refer to the socialist organ at Berlin. Scheidemann's rôles both as German peace propagandist and as strike queller in Germany are illumined by this letter.

DOCUMENT NO. 12

BERLIN, *July 14, 1917.*

MR. MIR,
STOCKHOLM.

We are transferring to your name through Mr. I. Ruchver, examining magistrate, 180.000 marks for the expense your journey to Finland; the balance will be at your disposal for agitation against England and France. The letters of (Malyanik?) and Steklov which were sent were received and will be signed [considered].

PARVUS

Note: Mir is the Russian word for peace. Lenin was in hiding in July. Report placed him, among other places, in Stockholm. Notice that the agitation is to be against England and France; it took the form from the opening days of the Bolshevik revolution of attacks on them as imperialist nations. Parvus is Copenhagen banker already referred to.

DOCUMENT NO. 13

No. 771. Confidential.

BREST LITOVSK, *December 31, Russian [style], 1917, No. 385 M. K.*

To the Council of National Commissaries:

Comrade L. D. Trotsky has charged me to bring to the knowledge of the Council of National Commissaries the motives for his telegraphic proposal to arrest the Rumanian diplomatic representatives in Petrograd.

General Hoffmann, referring to the conference which had taken place in Brest Litovsk between the members of the German and Austro-Hungarian delegations on December 29, presented to the Russian delegation in the name of the German and Austrian chief command (a deciphered radiotelegram was exhibited in this connection), a confidential demand concerning the immediate incitement of the Rumanian Army to recognize the necessity of an armistice and adopting the terms of a democratic peace pointed out by the Russian delegates. The implacability of the staff and the whole commanding force of the Rumanian Army, with regard to which the chief command of the German Army has received the most exact agency information, spoils the excellent impression produced in Germany and on

all the fronts by the Russian peace propositions which has made it possible to again stimulate the popular feeling against England, France and America and can bring about an undesirable and delusive [dangerous] aggravation of the peace question up to the German Army going over to the attack on our front and an open annexation of the territories occupied in Russia. The General expressed his opinion that against peace might be the Cossacks, some Ukraine regiments, and the Caucasian army, in which case they will also doubtless be joined by the Rumanian armies which, according to the information in possession of the German staff, enters into the calculations of Kaledin and Alexeev. It is greatly in the interests of the German and Austrian delegations that complete harmony should prevail on the entire Russian front as regards the conclusion of an armistice and adopting the terms of a separate peace between Russia and Germany seeing that in this event the German and Austrian chief command will propose to Rumania their terms of peace and will be in a position to take up their operative actions on the west front on a very large scale at the same time. General Hoffmann, in the course of a conversation with Comrade Trotsky, twice hinted at the necessity of immediately beginning these war operations, and at new negotiations with Switzerland carried on with great success. When Trotsky declared that at the disposal of the council's power there are no means of influencing the Rumanian staff, General Hoffmann pointed out the necessity of sending trustworthy agents to the Rumanian Army and the possibility of arresting the Rumanian mission in Petrograd and repressive measures against the Rumanian King and the Rumanian commanding forces. After this interview Comrade Trotsky by telegraph proposed to arrest the Rumanian mission in Petrograd with all its members. This report is being sent by special courier, Comrade I. G. Brosov, who has personally to transmit to Commissary Pokrovski some information of a secret character regarding the sending to the Rumanian Army of those persons whose names Brosov will give. All these persons will be paid out of the cash of the German Naphtha Industrial Bank which has bought near Boreslavl the business of the joint stock company of Fanto & Co. The chief direction of those agents has been entrusted, according to General Hoffmann's indication, to a certain Wolf Venigel who is keeping a watch over the military agents of the countries allied with us. As regards the English and American diplomatic representatives, General Hoffmann has expressed the agreement of the German staff to the measures taken by Comrade Trotsky and Comrade Lazimirov with regard to watchfulness over their activity.

A. YOFFE

Note: The date is January 12 [13], new style, the eve of the Russian New Year. The Rumanian Minister was arrested that night in Petrograd and only released the next day on the united demand of all Embassies and Legations in Petrograd. Since then he has been sent out of Russia. The letter shows that Trotsky took

Hoffmann's personal demand as an order and most important of all, however, it strips the mask from the Lenin and Trotsky public protestations that they have sought to prevent the peace negotiations with Germany from turning to the military advantage of Germany against the United States, England and France. Their aim here disclosed is, instead, to aid Germany in stimulating feeling against England, France and the United States in enabling Germany to prepare for an offensive on the western front. Success of German negotiations with Switzerland is emphasized. A German bank is named as paymaster for Bolshevik agitators among the Rumanian soldiers. Is "Wolf Venigel, the field director, the Wolf von Igel of American notoriety? Similarity in name is striking. Finally General Hoffmann and the German staff are satisfied with Trotsky's watch over the American and English diplomats.

There are fifteen national Commissaires. Yoffe who signs the letter is a member of the Russian peace commission. Since this letter was written Zalkind has gone to Switzerland on a special mission.

FRANCIS

¹ In five sections.

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 167

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy have received instructions to inform the Department of State that instructions have been sent to the British Minister at Jassy to explain to the Rumanian Government the attitude which the British Government have adopted in dealing with the Bolsheviki government at Petrograd.

The British Minister was informed in these instructions that while it was not at present possible to grant complete recognition to the Bolsheviki government it would be most undesirable to risk a complete rupture with them. So long as it was quite clear that the relations between the British Government and the Bolsheviki authorities were perfectly informal and unofficial there seemed to be no grounds why Mr. Lockhart should not carry on negotiations as the recognized representative of the British Embassy at Petrograd, and he was therefore being appointed in this capacity. The British Government would in this way be entering into relations with the *de facto* Bolsheviki government at Petrograd in exactly the same way as they had done with the *de facto* governments in the Ukraine, Finland, and elsewhere.

The British Minister was further instructed to explain to the Rumanian authorities that in taking this step the British Government had been largely influenced by their hope and belief that they would through a regular intermediary be able to exercise more influence with the Bolsheviki authorities and thus to help Rumania by improving the relations between Rumania and Russia and by protecting Rumanian interests generally. Rumania would also clearly benefit by any steps which might result in preventing or postponing the conclusion of a separate peace between Germany and the Bolsheviki government.

WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1918.*

File No. 861.00/1049

[Document 373]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 11, 1918, 4 p.m.*

3165. Please repeat your 3138, February 3, 10 p.m.,^{[1](#)} to London with Department's instructions to bring views reported therein to attention of British Foreign Office.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 366 [Pg. 366 includes portions of [Doc. 361](#) and [Doc. 362](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 13, 1918, 3 p.m.*

2059. Your 2333, February 4, 8 p.m.²

Referring Department's 2032, January 30, 7 p.m.,³ we infer you desire guard but your telegram arrived too late for marines to make the only connection to Kola nor have you advised entry of marines arranged for. In view of this and other considerations Department will not send additional marines but will replace those you have retained with others who can take their turn for service in Embassy, gradually releasing those there now and thus keeping courier service in uninterrupted circulation.

Referring Department's 2021, January 26, 6 p.m.¹ What answers have you from London, Jassy, Scandinavian missions as to inconvenience caused?

LANSING

² *Ante*, p. 368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of [Doc. 363](#), [Doc. 364](#), and [Doc. 365](#)].

³ Not printed.

¹ Concerning courier service; not printed.

File No. 801.00/1086

[Document 375]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 13, 1918, 7 p.m.*

2061. Department has reports that under officials of Bolshevik government freely granting licenses for carrying business and for export also when graft offered. Also that anarchistic tendencies in factories led by a former American Shatov are further impeding complications created by Bolshevik decrees of public ownership. Please investigate the foregoing and report. Consul and commercial attaché should have data to assist your inquiries.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 13, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received February 16, 1.43 a.m.]

2365. My 2354² mainly framed by Sisson on documents procured by myself and sent at his instigation to prove relation which I thought existed from the beginning of the last revolution until my conviction shaken by Robins who said after thorough investigation was convinced that Lenin and Trotsky received no German money. Am now satisfied they did accept it but recent developments demonstrate they did their work too well and were making inroads in Germany and Austria. They felt justified in accepting money from Germany as they promote the chances for their world-wide social revolution for which they are constantly working, being willing to sacrifice any country therefor. Kolontai and three other prominent Bolsheviks leaving for Stockholm bent on international revolutionary propaganda; watch them. Provisional Government probably unaware that money used; such information possibly withheld by Halpern, its trusted official, whom British now suspect although he was then their legal adviser.

Separate Ukrainian peace negotiated with *bourgeois* Rada which Soviet army successfully fighting; Sweden and Germany aiding *bourgeois* element in Finland which Russian Red Guard fighting; reported arrests by Bolsheviks of Baltic province German-sympathizing landowners because Germans threatening Revel and Petrograd, all indicate that Bolsheviks sincerely opposing Germany and consequently aiding Allies but unintentionally. Difficult to believe that declaration that state of war ceased is part of frame-up with Germany. Army demobilization part of program to prove Bolsheviks not continuing imperialistic war while organizations of Red Guard volunteer legion to defend revolution not inconsistent.

Meantime Alexeev, Kornilov organizing army in south avowedly to preserve order in Russia when Soviet government overthrown as now generally predicted inevitable. A's representatives here declare he not fighting Bolsheviks but pleased by their success in Ukraine.

Situation is difficult problem. Immediate solution impossible.

Trotsky and other peace commissioners returned to Petrograd and Trotsky will address Central Soviet Committee evening of 14th.

² *Ante*, p. 371 [*Pg. 371 includes portions of [Doc. 370](#) and [Doc. 371](#)*].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 14, 1918, 5 p.m.*

2065. Your 2336, 2349² and other recent telegrams. Department approves your course and desires you gradually to keep in somewhat closer and informal touch with Bolshevik authorities using such channels as will avoid any official recognition. This Government is by no means prepared to recognize Bolshevik government officially. Department's previous instructions are modified to this extent.

LANSING

¹ Repeated to the diplomatic representatives in Great Britain (No. 6569, Feb. 14), France (No. 3184, Feb. 14), Japan (Feb. 15), China (Feb. 15), and Rumania (Feb. 19), for communication to the governments to which they were accredited.

² *Ante*, pp. 368 [Pg. 368 includes portions of [Doc. 363](#), [Doc. 364](#), and [Doc. 365](#)] and 370 [Pg. 370 includes portions of [Doc. 367](#), [Doc. 368](#), and [Doc. 369](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 18, 1918, 4 p.m.*

2074. Your 2354³ and subsequent telegrams same subject.

I have read these documents with great interest and trust that you will make every endeavor to obtain further evidence not only of German intrigue with Bolsheviki but also with members of former governments particularly Stunner.

Unless you see some objection, please explain the “widely different sources” mentioned by you, also telegraph name of American who had seen photograph of Y[offe] letter. What part of the material are the British working on? Department agrees with you that the case must be completed before publication can be even considered. Department is not inclined to think publication at this time desirable.

Omit no effort to obtain original or at least photograph of Document No. 1 and Document No. 2. The latter of great importance. The Department desires the original if possible also of Document No. 4.

It would seem to be preferable to obtain photograph rather than original of Y. letter as loss of original might be discovered and lead to undesired inquiry. Would it be possible to obtain copies of all the Brest *dossier*? Please endeavor to secure complete information regarding “new negotiations with Switzerland carried on with great success.” It would appear that person mentioned is Von Igel formerly in this country.

In order to complete our information in this case it is necessary to satisfy yourself if possible as to whether there are documents or not on file to show that while Bolsheviki were willing to accept German money on the terms mentioned in Document No. 3 they did not at the same time intend to carry on the same form of propaganda amongst German and Austrian troops on the eastern front. Also report what evidence you can find to prove or disprove that such propaganda is being carried on now.

LANSING

³ *Ante*, p. 371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of [Doc. 370](#) and [Doc. 371](#)].

Resumption of hostilities by the Germans—Removal of the American Embassy to Vologda—President Wilson's message to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, March 11, 1918

[\[379\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, February 18, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received February 21, 7.11 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/8939

[\[380\] The Assistant Secretary of State \(Phillips\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Washington, February 19, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1125

[\[381\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, February 20, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received February 24, 12.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1142

[\[382\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, February 21, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received February 26, 8.58 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1164

[\[383\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, February 22, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received February 24, 4.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1145

[\[384\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, February 22, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received February 28, 12.28 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1171

[385] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, February 23, 1918, noon. [Received February 24, 11.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1144

[386] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 24, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received March 1, 5.52 p.m.]

File No. 861.77/311

[387] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

Washington, February 25, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 124.61/29b

[388] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 26, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received March 4, 1.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1195

[389] The Consul General at Stockholm (Halstead) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, February 27, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received March 1, 9.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1179

[390] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 1, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received March 5, 12.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1230

[391] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 4, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received March 5, 11.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1231

[392] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/2487

[393] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 5, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received March 8, 10.19 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1251

[394] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/2472

[395] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 7, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received March 9, 4.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1258

[396] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 10 [9?], 1918, 2 a.m. [Received March 10, 4.20 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1262

[397] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, undated. [Received March 9, 1918, 5.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1263

[398] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)

Washington, March 11, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1284a

[399] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 12, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received March 13, 2.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1282

[400] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, March 12, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1270a

[401] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 12, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received March 15, 5.33 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1302¹/₂

[402] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)

Washington, March 12, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1263

[403] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 15, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received March 17, 2.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1309

[404] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 15, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received March 18, 2.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1312

[405] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, March 15, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1294

[406] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, March 17, 1918. [Received March 19, 7.06 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1317

[407] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 18, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received March 20, 12.06 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1322

[408] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, March 19, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1302

[409] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 20, 1918, 12 noon. [Received March 23, 9.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1351

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 18, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[*Received February 21, 7.11 p.m.*]

2387. If Germans decide to come Petrograd they can; hear however Soviet preparing resistance. Allied missions would leave, if possible, before Germans arrive. Swedish exit impossible; Murman route open now, but probably unavailable later, as Germans or White Guard can interrupt. From Revel Germans can take Helsingfors, and then surround and capture Petrograd where resistance too ineffectual against Germans' warfare. Government perhaps go Moscow where think I shall go if possible.

Trotsky thought that protest against resumption of hostilities without seven days' notice was sufficient, and while awaiting reply heard of fall of Dvinsk.

Robins has just telephoned that Hoffmann's reply was that thought armistice ended where peace negotiations terminated, and Russia had been given ten days' notice instead of three.

FRANCIS

The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to the Secretary of State¹

[Memorandum]

WASHINGTON, *February 19, 1918.*

De Laboulaye² informs me that the French Government has instructed the French Ambassador in Petrograd to inform Chicherin (associated with Trotsky) indirectly that if the Bolsheviki resist the German menace and defend Russia against the German aggression, France is ready to give the Bolsheviki help in money and material. The French Government now inquire whether the United States will give similar instructions to the American Ambassador in Petrograd.

WM. PHILLIPS

¹ Notes in the margin of MS.: "This is out of the question. R[obert] L[ansing]. Submitted to Pres[iden]t who says the same thing. R[obert] L[ansing] 2/19/18"

² Second Secretary of the French Embassy.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 20, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[Received February 24, 12.35 p.m.]

2395. Soviet government demoralized, nearly stampeded. Germans reported 70 versts from Dvinsk toward Petrograd. Regardless whether Soviet proposals accepted think I should leave with staff but, not fully decided. Germans could control city within forty-eight hours. If depart, planning go eastward but all arrangements indefinite. More later. If leave I shall confide interests to Norwegian Minister, my most sympathetic neutral colleague, who represents no other power.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 21, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received February 26, 8.58 p.m.]

2400. Pursuant to my 2395, February 20, 3 p.m., Germans still advancing. Five Allied Ambassadors have agreed to prepare for departure on short notice, Allied Ministries likely to concur. British going via Murmansk, Japanese and myself via Vladivostok, French and Italian undecided. Trying to secure a special train for Japanese, Chinese and American. Planning to stop *en route* Vologda and another place if safe; awaiting developments Harbin or Vladivostok where I shall advise Department of conditions and get instructions. Unwilling to absolutely abandon Russia to Germans.

Soviet government demoralized, indorsed at meeting evening 19th, with practical unanimity, radio sent by Lenin and Trotsky to Berlin but Central Executive Committee last evening disapproved of radio and are now considering formation of new government exclusive of Lenin and Trotsky and if formed will attempt to oppose German advance but such resistance be farcical. Do not know when Germans will take Petrograd but such is their intention and any hour may see uprising here in German interest, sufficient German and Austrian prisoners available to form larger army than the Red Guard; Petrograd garrison numbering 50,000 or more refused to oppose German advance.

Lenin, Trotsky may possibly not have been Germany's agents continuously but if had been could not have played more successfully into Germany's hands. Last revolution has materially set back cause of democracy in Europe and if Allies cannot prevent will result in making Russia virtually German province of monarchical form. I earnestly urge that we assume control Vladivostok and British and French take control Murmansk and Archangel in order to prevent supplies thereat falling into German hands.

History shows Russians incapable of great movements or great achievements as whatever creditable has been accomplished can be traced to foreign inspiration and leadership. Now is the time for Allies to act. Am greatly interested in immediate developments and shall keep Department thoroughly advised if possible.

Probably advisable to hold transport *Thomas* until my arrival Harbin but have no

intention of returning myself unless so ordered which trust not be the case.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *February 22, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received February 24, 4.15 p.m.]

197. The culmination of the anarchy which resulted from the attempt to install in Russia a democratic régime which the people neither desired nor understood has finally resulted in German domination. Liberty has been misconstrued by the ignorant masses as the unrestricted right to dispossess law-abiding persons and revenge themselves for real or supposed wrongs committed by a former regime. The result has been fatal not only to the cause of democracy and the preservation of law and order in all countries, Allied, neutral or enemy, but especially in Russia where the anarchy and chaos created and the destruction of the resources, plans will bring about a situation the nature of which will overshadow the present international conflict and demand the intervention of all the powers now at war. The damage done cannot be remedied except by intervention. In any event the repressive measures to be taken must be very severe as is inevitably the case where criminal acts are to be punished and law restored. The disorders in Russia must once for all be understood as criminal and not political. The great mass of news furnished the press in the United States comes from well-intentioned but absolutely irresponsible correspondents who endeavor to picture Russia as they would like to see it and who know absolutely nothing of the psychology of the people.

The Consulate General is advised to-day that the Embassy is endeavoring to find special train to leave Petrograd. Trustworthy reports confirm the advance of the German armies on Petrograd and Moscow. Information has been received that German troops are already entraining for Moscow. The city is further menaced by large numbers of German and Austro-Hungarian prisoners who have occupied strategic points.

There is unfortunately general apathy and disinclination on the part of all parties to join the Bolsheviki in any opposition to German domination. As already outlined in previous cables they would prefer see Russia dominated by Germans than controlled by the *de facto* anarchist government. It was with a realization of this fatal development that I asked Poole to go to Rostov and report fully to the Department on the only organized and healthy movement in Russia to reestablish

order and combat German domination. Unfortunately the movement has been disorganized but the ideals remain the same and those men [who] have been frustrated, who have endeavored to save Russia and who through Poole have sent their appeals to America will yet be the ones on whom we must rely to reestablish order and combat Germany. All Americans are safe and I am endeavoring to send them Samara to await train to Siberia. Here I wish to point out again the importance of protecting the Siberian Railway. It is practically the only outlet at present from Russia.

I shall remain here as long as possible with Poole, Thomson, and Randolph and everything will be done to protect American interests.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 22, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received February 28, 12.28 a.m.]

2402. Continuing my telegram No. 2400 Germans advancing but deliberately. Lenin and Trotsky resignations withdrawn; both Council and Executive Committee decided to resist Germans and have issued mobilization order; soldiers however crowding station appropriating trains and leaving for homes.

Five Allied Ambassadors agreed to support resistance if offered and French and British through their engineer officers are assisting Red Guard destroying railroad to prevent German advance. Such action in response to inquiry by Trotsky of French officer visiting Smolny. Possible resistance ineffectual but may delay enemy arriving consequently departure of Allied chiefs postponed. Ambassadors agreed to meet Trotsky for conference if so requested either here or French Embassy but not Foreign Office.

Promises special train available twelve hours' notice.

Food conditions alarming, riots probable, anarchistic demonstration reported contemplated within next few days.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1144

[Document 385]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *February 23, 1918, noon.*
[*Received February 24, 11.55 a.m.*]

201. German advance Moscow, Petrograd continues and communication with staff may be cut at any moment. Most Americans leaving to-day for Samara. Consulate General will go to the same place in case of necessity.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 24, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[Received March 1, 5.52 p.m.]

2410. In my judgment terms of peace make Russia a German province with good prospect of becoming ally. I renew my recommendation for immediate possession of Vladivostok, Murmansk, Archangel. Allied mission chiefs remaining here for present. Japanese, Chinese and American missions sending special train with some of their nationals and portions of their staffs to Vologda to-day to await orders. Wright, Armour, Ruggles, Johnston¹ remaining with me; also marine couriers as anarchistic outbreaks possible. Phelps in Stockholm. Crosley and wife left yesterday for Stockholm, remainder of force with train. Impossible to ascertain yet how far Soviet action will be approved in Russia. It may lead to civil war, Social Revolutionists declaring Constituent Assembly be reconvened. I shall await further developments. Could only use my judgment in default of instructions.

British and French have started via Murmansk, many colonists and most of military missions. Allied Ambassadors meeting at Embassy daily.

I have [instructed] Stevens, Emerson force and railroad equipment be held in Japanese waters or Vladivostok awaiting developments.

FRANCIS

¹ Earl M. Johnston, private secretary to the Ambassador.

File No. 124.61/29b

[Document 387]

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *February 25, 1918, 4 p.m.*

562. Please deliver following message to Ambassador Francis:

To-day's press reports you have left Petrograd. Confirming previous instructions Department relies on your judgment as to leaving your post and taking measures requisite to safeguard staff and archives from falling into enemy hands. Seals, codes, cipher messages or translations should be taken with you or if this impossible should be burned and seals destroyed. Please repeat to Consuls Petrograd and Archangel.

Consuls Moscow and Helsingfors have been sent like instructions direct.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 26, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received March 4, 1.25 a.m.]

1416 [2416?]. Germans continue approaching. Soviet planning defensive. Leaving to-night Siberian Railway with staff, Consul, Red Cross, Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, Brazilian missions. Planning to await developments Vologda possibly return here, probably working eastward. Have advised consuls Harbin, Vladivostok and missions Peking, Tokyo requesting preparations to send force if requested as it is reported that 20,000 armed German prisoners are at Irkutsk. Japanese Ambassador unperturbed, says that he has 30,000 troops in Manchuria, Chinese 10,000 Harbin.

Trotsky again resigned, Germans disinclined to sign peace treaty with Soviet without ratification as would be compelled to sustain such government. Reported demanded ratification by Constituent Assembly or survivors of four national Dumas. Our problem is establishing such relations with the new government as would prevent its being pro-German.

British, French, Italian, Belgian, Portuguese missions going to Helsingfors or Murmansk to-morrow.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1179

[Document 389]

***The Consul General at Stockholm (Halstead) to the
Secretary of State***

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *February 27, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[*Received March 1, 9.40 p.m.*]

The following from Petrograd:

February 25, 4 p.m.

Sent train east last night with 53 Americans, 40 Japanese, 32 Chinese, mostly staffs of Embassies. Now endeavoring to arrange train to follow with Ambassadors, but their plans uncertain. Will endeavor to keep you advised. Situation serious. Myself and two vice consuls will be compelled to remain for some days. Repeat Washington, D. C. Tredwell.

HALSTEAD

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 1, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received March 5, 12.15 a.m.]

Just received your unnumbered telegram February 25, 4 p.m., forwarded by Norwegian Legation. Arrived yesterday with Japanese, Chinese, Siamese, Brazilian chiefs at Vologda leaving Petrograd February 27, 2 a.m., not 23d as your cable indicates. My cables from 22d to 26th gave conditions and plans.

Vologda 350 miles from Petrograd is decidedly best location now having direct temporary connection with Petrograd, Moscow, Archangel, Vladivostok and indirectly with Murman. Soviet here helpful by Lenin's instructions; living in special train near station and having service wire to Petrograd.

Almost entire staff, also Robins, Sisson and majority of colleagues, urged leaving several days before departure. Robins and staff, except Thacher and Wardwell, in Red Cross car with me having left Stevens, agent of National City, to look after supplies distribution.

Awaiting developments Vologda. Reports concerning German advance contradictory. Japanese colleague solicitous lest Germans cut line to Harbin and he may go east to-morrow possibly accompanied by Chinese Minister. Siamese and Brazilian chiefs remaining with me and request you so advise their Governments. Think decidedly unwise for me quit Russia as have cabled several times; reported remainder of Allied chiefs gone Helsingfors.

Persecuted Russian officers, *bourgeoisie*, whose property confiscated, naturally welcome Germans whose advance resisted only by Bolsheviki who are not unanimous on the subject, Lenin advocating non-resistance, Trotsky ominously quiet. If Soviet overthrown which highly probable Allies should cultivate new government to prevent its alliance with Germany.

Your instructions concerning staff and archives executed before I left and you advised. First special which left the 24th with twenty-three of Embassy's staff and thirty my colleagues, including six Y.M.C.A., three Y.W.C.A., also Japanese, Chinese nationals and staff members have continued eastward but American staff ordered remain on train at Perm for orders.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 4, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received March 5, 11.43 p.m.]

Awaiting here action of Moscow Soviet conference on separate peace, which am exerting influence discreetly to have rejected. Have ordered Huntington to Irkutsk to keep me advised. Communicated direct with organization Siberian republican party which [omission] on [omissions] but independent of [omission] slack government. Contemplating sending Wright home to report fully concerning Russian situation, but undecided yet.

What United States forces at or near Vladivostok? Japanese Ambassador told Siamese Minister, replying to inquiry, that Japanese troops would not be sent into Siberia unless given a real benefit [omission] of their own movements and guaranteed possession for [omission] after the war ends meaning probably five years, probably forever.

Martin [telegraphs?] from Murmansk February [omissions] to military attaché [omission] British admiral [omission] told him had wired England for 6,000 troops to protect situation and asked our American military attaché to support request through our military [attaché] London. Martin went from Archangel by sleigh stopping at twenty-one villages where he found anti-Bolshevik sentiment strong and great opposition to German peace terms, and expressed opinion that independent government likely to be proclaimed.

These some of the reasons why I contemplate sending Wright home to explain and why think I should remain in Russia.

Hope my action approved.

FRANCIS

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was forwarded by the Chargé to the Department of State on August 13, 1918:]

The British Foreign Office to British Representative in Petrograd

March 4, 1918.

The British Government will gladly assist the Bolshevik government as far as in their power in resistance to the Germans. Assistance of this sort was promised by Mr. Lindley on Monday and instructions have now been sent to the British admiral at Murmansk to assist the local Bolshevik authorities as far as he can in opposing the advance of the German forces: the naval forces at his disposal are being increased for this purpose.

In this way the British Government are demonstrating in a practical manner their wish to help the Bolshevik government against their external enemies, but in the meantime Russia under Bolshevik control has done nothing to help herself, but has merely issued proclamations which have not had the effect of causing the Germans to withdraw nor the Russians to fight.

The most vigorous action which has been taken by Bolshevik Russia has been against Rumania, who might, with proper help, have been a most valuable protection against the aggressive plans of Germany. The enormous military supplies provided by France, United States, and Great Britain, are being abandoned by Russia without an effort and will probably be used on the western front against the countries which supplied them.

It is possible that you are justified in your hope that Russia may still have the power and will to reconstruct the forces which she has purposely destroyed and I sincerely hope that you are right in your view that the present situation is one of merely temporary paralysis. But meanwhile what course are the Allies to pursue? Japan is not prepared to await the outcome of the present situation even if we were ready to do so. In her opinion it is absolutely essential from the point of view of her own safety to prevent the Germans' extending their power to the Pacific, and this view seems to us justified. Moreover, we desire in our own interests to prevent the Germans from seizing the stores at Vladivostok in the same way as they are seizing those in western Russia and also to prevent Germany's obtaining control of the Siberian supply of foodstuffs in the same way as those of the Ukraine.

We note that in your opinion the whole of Russia will be thrown into the

hands of Germany if Japan undertakes an expedition to Vladivostok. While your view may be correct you should remember the following points:

1. The invasion undertaken by Germany is intended to crush socialism in Russia, while intervention by Japan will have no connection at all with Russian internal politics.
2. The German armies are intended to dismember Russia and are successfully doing so while the intervention of Japan would, by a declaration of the Allies, be a guarantee as a temporary measure, after which Russian territory would remain as before.

The invasion by Germany is intended to result in the economic exploitation of Russia and in her political weakening, while action by Japan is required to help resistance by Russia to these developments, As regards Trotsky's statement that England and the United States will be blamed for Japanese intervention, we would point out that Japan will decline to look on at the Germanizing of Siberia whatever action may be taken by Great Britain and America.

It seems practically certain that Japan will be compelled to take action in her own interests and it is obviously preferable from the standpoint of Russia that such action should be taken by Japan not as an isolated power but as the mandatory of the Allies If credence is given in Russia to the absurd story that intervention by Japan is in accordance with a secret arrangement between Germany and the Allied powers, the Bolsheviks have only themselves to blame in view of their own promotion of the German propaganda campaign against the United States and England.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 5, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received March 8, 10.19 a.m.]

Wright leaving to-night eastward and after spending one day with portion of staff now awaiting orders at [Vereshchagino] will proceed to Harbin and there await instructions from you or myself. Main object sending him is keep close touch with eastern conditions, observe corps movements, inform Stevens concerning railroad situation. Shall miss him greatly. Bailey will return to me from V. if health permits if not will accompany Wright.

Trotsky sent French officer here to ask me what moral and material assistance Allies could render if peace not ratified at Moscow conference March 12. I am sending military attaché and Riggs to Petrograd to-night to confer with Soviet government which realizes its helplessness if peace not ratified as Lenin, Trotsky both think will be the case and I concur. I have invited Japanese Chargé d'Affaires to send Japanese military attaché with mine to Petrograd which he now considering.

American Consul Helsingfors wires British Embassy at Tammerfors and experiencing difficulty in getting through lines between White and Red Guards and French Embassy planning to pursue same route but difficulties hourly increasing. Developments appear to demonstrate wisdom of my coming here and remaining here for present.

I have instructed military attaché to assure Soviet government that I will recommend moral and material cooperation provided organized resistance is sincerely established which will give promise of retarding German advance and engaging attention of troops who would otherwise be sent western front.

This change of front by Soviet affects my recommendation concerning Archangel, Murmansk, Vladivostok whose capture now would be unwise; nevertheless Allies should be prepared to take those ports if developments justify.

FRANCIS

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

[A copy of the following paraphrase of a telegram was forwarded by the Chargé to the Secretary of State on August 13, 1918:]

*The British Foreign Office to the British Special Representative in Russia
(Lockhart)*

March 6, 1918.

In reply to the appeal which you make the following points are brought to our notice.

It appears that Trotsky and the Congress at Moscow can adopt one of the following three lines of action:

1. They may decide to proclaim a holy war against Germany. If so, is it possible for us, after our previous experience, to expect that the result will be anything except a fresh surrender and a fresh dismemberment of Russia? An army cannot be made by fine words, though they can easily destroy it. The Bolsheviks have with complete success endeavoured to shatter the fighting spirit of Russia, and they can hardly revive it in the same way.
2. They may decide on the acceptance of domination by Germany with all its results. If so, it is impossible for them to blame the Allied powers for taking such action of their own as may be necessary in self-defence, provided always that the independence and integrity of Russia are not threatened by such action. Against this danger every precaution will be taken.
3. The Congress and the Government may appeal to all such organized forces as are still available for help in resisting the enemy. These forces consist Justly of the Rumanian Army, which still exists, and secondly of the slight help which might be given by the ships of the Allies at Vladivostok and points in the White Sea, and thirdly of the Japanese.

In your view the employment of the Japanese would be a disaster. Throughout the war, however, the Russian authorities have been most willing to profit by Japanese intervention and by the help of Japanese gunners, and if the Japanese agree to intervene they would come, not like the Germans as hostile conquerors, but as allies and friends. You state that Trotsky wishes for a working agreement with Great Britain, though he is not prepared to enter into friendly relations. His attitude is understood, but we suggest that it would be reasonable for him also to try a working

agreement with Japan. This policy is strongly recommended for his consideration in the interest of Russia no less than in that of those who still regard themselves as her allies.

I do not understand what you say about the unnecessary suppression of Bolshevism. The British Government have clearly and constantly repeated that they have no wish to take any part in Russia's domestic affairs, but that the prosecution of the war is the only point with which they are concerned.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, March 7, 1918, 1 p.m.
[Received March 9, 4.35 a.m.]

236. In confidential conversation with Consulate General ... [a high Soviet official] stated that peace terms will not be observed and that Germans will continue to advance occupying or controlling all Russia to the Volga. The non-fulfilment by Russia of any of the clauses will serve as reason further advance. As Bolsheviki will refuse to demobilize Red Guard, inevitable result will be the continuance of military operations. Germans have advanced already from Narva to Yamburg, only 75 miles from Petrograd, simultaneous peace was signed [sic].

Bolsheviki had hoped that by signing peace time would be gained for organizing new army. This he admits is now recognized by Bolsheviki as serious mistake as Germans will not discontinue operations until the already demoralized army is completely dissolved leaving country defenseless. He further stated that *de facto* government will soon remove to Moscow of those though [sic] have endeavored to persuade Petrograd Soviets to go to some place beyond the Volga. He stated that Lenin's position was still very strong but that Trotsky had recently lost much of his influence.

The general impression gained from conference was that a large section of the Bolshevik Party realized the disastrous situation brought on by the party and the absolute defenselessness of Russia against German domination. ...

I shall keep Department fully advised proceeding of coming congress Soviets. It is not thought they will oppose peace terms.

Embassy at Vologda still. All newspapers except anarchist and Bolshevik friendly.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 10 [9?], 1918, 2 a.m.*
[Received March 10, 4.20 p.m.]

Robins arrived midnight reports that from Petrograd after important conference with Trotsky on 5th he wired me in Military Mission cipher result of conference but military attaché had left for Petrograd, as you were advised, with code, consequently did not learn of conference until Robins arrived hour ago. Since Robins left Petrograd, Moscow and St. Petersburg Soviets have instructed their delegates to All-Russian Conference of March 12 to support ratification. Such action I fear is the result of threatened Japanese invasion of Siberia which I have anticipated by sending Wright eastward. Trotsky told Robins had heard such invasion countenanced by Allies especially America and it would not only force government to advocate ratification of humiliating peace but would so completely estrange all factions in Russia that further resistance to Germany would be absolutely impossible. Trotsky furthermore asserted that neither his government nor Russian people would object to America's supervising all shipments from Vladivostok into Russia and virtually controlling operation of Siberian Railway but Japanese invasion would result in non-resistance and eventually make Russia a German province. In my opinion Japanese advance now exceedingly unwise and this midnight cable sent for purpose of asking that our influence be exerted to prevent same. Please reply immediately. (More to-morrow.)

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *undated*.

[*Received March 9, 1918, 5.15 p.m.*]

238. The morning press indicates almost certain Allied intervention in Siberia in favor of Russia against German domination. Should this be contemplated recommend consulates in Russia be instructed to go to Vladivostok to perform such duties as may be recommended. Intervention will render further stay in Russia perilous. Remainder Americans in Moscow leaving to-morrow for Vladivostok. [I] will remain with Poole as long as we can be of any assistance. Under no circumstances would we leave until after Ambassador's telegram.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Moscow (Summers)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 11, 1918.*

Convey following message from President to the people of Russia through the Soviet Congress:

May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of Germany for the purposes of the people of Russia. Although the Government of the United States is unhappily not now in a position to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves forever from autocratic government and become the masters of their own life. Woodrow Wilson.

Ambassador has been advised of text and also these instructions.

POLK

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 12, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[Received March 13, 2.50 a.m.]

6. Military attaché returned after satisfactory conference with Trotsky and Russian Chief of Staff. No definite program adopted but Trotsky talked as if war unavoidable and said that it should have support of Allies, but was evidently quite sensitive concerning Allied forces entering Russia without approval of *de facto* government, especially Japanese, who were then reported about entering Siberia. Trotsky said that intended to accept and encourage cooperation of Russian officers and was proceeding to organize army of million men "under iron discipline," which exceedingly encouraging for resistance to Germans. Such resistance may be futile and may not possibly become organized, but this is unquestionably sole reliance, as it is the only effort being made. I am not sanguine but not hopeless, and military attaché feels likewise. I am encouraging by interviews and speeches, patriotic resistance to invasion, and sending home every staff member who is unnecessarily or timidly despairing.

Military attaché wiring Martin that he and I approve of his entering conference at Murman and desire him to continue to confer and keep me advised.

Press dispatches from London indicate that Allies, except America, were inclined to permit if not encourage Japanese invasion but we demurred and demanded consent of Russian authorities. Another dispatch from Tokyo states specifically no Japanese occupation or invasion planned or contemplated without Allied approval. Consequently tension somewhat relieved, but reassuring advices from you on this behalf would improve or clarify situation. Conference [Congress] postponed to 14th.

[FRANCIS]

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1918, 3 p.m.*

Japanese Chargé read to the Department on March 7 an inquiry from his Government to the following effect:

Provided it is correctly reported that the Bolshevik government of Russia signed the peace treaty at Brest Litovsk shall the Allied powers regard Russia as a neutral or as an enemy or shall they take the stand that, inasmuch as the treaty was the invalid act of a self-instituted government not recognized by any of the Allies, relations between the Allies and Russia remain unaltered?

Department to-day read to the Japanese Chargé d'Affaires an answer to that inquiry as follows:

In the view of the Government of the United States recent events have in no way altered the relations and obligations of this Government towards Russia. It does not feel justified in regarding Russia either as a neutral or as an enemy, but continues to regard it as an ally. There is, in fact, no Russian government to deal with. The so-called Soviet government upon which Germany has just forced, or tried to force, peace was never recognized by the Government of the United States as even a government *de facto*. None of its acts, therefore, need be officially recognized by this Government; and the Government of the United States feels that it is of the utmost importance, as affecting the whole public opinion of the world and giving proof of the utter good faith of all the governments associated against Germany, that we should continue to treat the Russians as in all respects our friends and allies against the common enemy.

POLK

¹ The same, on the same date, to the diplomatic representatives in France, Italy, Russia, Japan, and China, and to the Consul General at Moscow.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 12, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received March 15, 5.33 p.m.]

7. Just received your unnumbered undated cable giving message of President to people of Russia which Summers is instructed to convey through Soviet Congress, and have repeated same to him, authorizing its conveyance, lest his cable delayed. I think utterance well framed, timely, and hope it will be enthusiastically received.

Bolshevik name changed to Communist Party. Trotsky remaining in charge of Petrograd as Commissaire of People's Revolutionary Commune. Lenin and other commissaires gone to Moscow.

Robins brought me from Trotsky written series of questions asking, in event of war caused by conference's refusing to ratify, or by Germany's breaking treaty and resuming offensive, or by Soviet government's being compelled by Germany's behavior to repudiate peace treaty and resume military operation:

- (1) Is support of United States, Great Britain and France assured Soviet government?
- (2) In what way could support be expressed in shortest period and on what terms, meaning war supplies, transportation facilities, and other supplies?
- (3) In particular and especially in what way would the assistance of the United States be expressed?

Also unnumbered question of what measures Allies and especially United States would take to "practically interfere with a Japanese invasion in our Far East and assure uninterrupted connection with Russia via Trans-Siberian Railway." Also what [assistance] "in our opinion" in such a contingency would Great Britain render from Murman and Archangel? Furthermore, "what steps could Great Britain undertake to assure this help and thereby remove the ground for rumors of unfavorable intentions of Great Britain towards Russia in immediate future?"

Document unsigned. Final clause follows:

All above-stated questions are put on basis of self-understood supposition that the internal and foreign policy of Soviet government continues to be directed by principles of international socialism, and preserves its entire

independence regarding all non-Socialist governments.

This document received midnight 8th, when my March 9, 2 a.m., cable immediately framed and forwarded. If Department thinks above questions require reply in addition to President's message, shall transmit same to Trotsky through Robins when received.

FRANCIS

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at
Moscow (Summers)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1918, 6 p.m.*

Your 238. As cable communication takes two or three days Department relies on your judgment to determine when developments require you to leave Moscow, but hopes situation may not require you to move Consulate. In view of disorders at Irkutsk last December which resulted in burning numerous buildings and also the presence of armed prisoners of war reported by Macgowan via Peking, the Department suggests you consider whether Omsk or Irkutsk is the better place in the event you are forced to withdraw from European Russia.

Your work has been admirable. If matter requires, do not hesitate to leave post temporarily, turning over Consulate to consular officer whom you consider best qualified.

POLK

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *March 15, 1918, 10 a.m.*
[*Received March 17, 2.15 p.m.*]

251. President's message read shortly after opening Congress of Soviets last evening, Sverdlov, Chairman Central Executive Committee, presiding. Following is exact translation of portions of official minutes:

CHAIRMAN SVERDLOV: Comrades, I shall have difficulty in reading all the telegrams received here. Have received a vast number. One telegram stands out among them which I shall submit to your attention. It is the telegram from [the President of the United States]. The telegram is as follows (reads telegram. *Applause*). Comrades, allow me in the name of the Congress to express my firm belief that the wide masses of the proletariat and the semiproletariat of western Europe as well as of America and Australia are with us with all their hearts. Allow me to express my firm belief that these masses are watching with the closest attention the struggle which we are carrying on here in Russia and I will permit myself to submit to your attention the resolution which was adopted by the presidium of the Central Executive Committee in answer to President Wilson's address to the Congress. The resolution reads as follows:

The Congress expresses its gratitude to the American people, above all the laboring and exploited classes of the United States, for the sympathy expressed to the Russian people by President Wilson through the Congress of Soviets in the days of severe trials.

The Russian Socialistic Federative Republic of Soviets takes advantage of President Wilson's communication to express to all peoples perishing and suffering from the horrors of imperialistic war its warm sympathy and firm belief that the happy time is not far distant when the laboring masses of all countries will throw off the yoke of capitalism and will establish a socialistic state of society, which alone is capable of securing just and lasting peace as well as the culture and well-being of ail laboring people (*Applause*).

Comrades, allow me to consider this applause a sufficient answer that you all join this resolution.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *March 15, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received March 18, 2.30 a.m.*]

257. In contradiction to reports which might reach Department regarding representative character of Congress of Soviets I am informed by prominent socialist labor [leader] and conservative leaders that the twelve hundred delegates composing the Congress represent an infinitely small proportion of the people of Russia; that the delegates were chosen by Bolshevik leaders [regardless] of the wishes of people; that the vast [masses] of the peasants are violently opposed to the government of the Soviets; that all the Social Revolutionary Party, would be overvalued [which prevailed] in the last elections for the Constituent Assembly, do not recognize the present government and that all the intelligent classes of Russia are against the present régime not [*sic*] force. I am also assured that great dissension exists amongst the Bolsheviks themselves and that it is merely a question of time when they must give up their power. They have stopped the sale all over Russia of the socialist and conservative newspapers allowing opinions their own and anarchist literature to reach the people who are becoming greatly exercised. At works of Chjifen factory only few hundred men out of four thousand consented to join the Red Guard. At International Harvester Works only fifty out of four thousand workmen volunteered to serve. If there is resistance to Germany it must come from a union of parties which will appeal to all classes of Russian people. The present régime of intolerance and lawlessness cannot count upon the vast majority of the people.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

File No. 861.00/1294

[Document 405]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, *March 15, 1918, 7 p.m.*

10. ... Approve your staying at Vologda until further instructions unless circumstances require you to move without consulting Department. Important that all American representatives in Russia should keep in closest touch possible.

LANSING

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 17, 1918.*

[*Received March 19, 7.06 a.m.*]

1720. Swedish press reports concerning Moscow Congress: Lenin made speech showing necessity accepting peace so painful to Russia. Reviewed historical course Russian revolution and reminded audience great victories revolution had won although now suffering defeat through German imperialism. He said: "We must accept this peace as momentary respite, awaiting time when European proletariat will come our assistance."

Reports from Petrograd: Peace treaty ratified midnight March 15.¹ After ratification Steinberg, Commissary Justice, announced Social Revolutionaries of left repudiated all responsibility and reserved right use every means their command prevent execution conditions of treaty.

Reports consequence ratification peace treaty Commissariat of People has provided former president Russian delegation Brest to be Russia's ambassador Berlin. Swedish press comments presumably Sokolnikov and not Trotsky person referred to. That post covered so soon doubtless of great political significance as initiating *modus vivendi* between Germany, Russia.

Reports from Petrograd: Strong detachments Red Army disarmed and arrested guard Regiment Preobrazhenski counter-revolutionary plans being suspected.

Reports British Consul Moscow has requested all British subjects prepare leave Moscow.

Reports Odessa and Nikolaev taken by Germans without fighting. Russian fleet Odessa fled Sevastopol. In both cities Germans immediately repressed Soviets. At Nikolaev they took possession shipyards. German offensive continued towards Kherson.

MORRIS

¹ See footnote 2, *post*, p. 436 [Pg. 436 includes portions of [Doc. 437](#) and [Doc. 438](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 18, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received March 20, 12.06 a.m.*]

17. Have telegraphed Tokyo and Peking requesting keep me advised developments especially movements Japanese, Chinese troops. If division each American and Chinese troops could enter Russia with Japanese, think opposition to latter be minimized thereby.

Tredwell, whom I sent to Petrograd, wires it is believed that city be controlled by German commission supported by army within a week; that next move will be on Moscow, and peace will be brief.

Tredwell telegraphs, Haynes and Sisson with other Americans left Helsingfors 12th for Björneborg, Finnish port.

I gave Moscow and Petrograd press declaration that America does not recognize separate peace, but considers herself still ally of Russian people against common enemy. Told mayor of it, and asked if would be less welcome thereby; he replied promptly would not.

Mayor, commissaire, chairmen Duma and local Soviet, and five other officials dining at local Embassy 19th instant.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1302

[Document 408]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 19, 1918, 3 p.m.*

13. Your 7, March 12, 5 p.m. Department considers President's message to Russian people and address to Congress adequate answer.

LANSING

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *March 20, 1918, 12 noon.*
[Received March 23, 9.55 a.m.]

278. The *Russkoe Slovo* publishes following interview with Trotsky regarding alliance of the United States with the Soviet government:

Such an alliance is impossible. The Russia of the Soviets cannot align itself by determinate engagements with capitalistic America, for this would be a betrayal of its [omission]. It is possible that America is seeking such a *rapprochement* with us, driven in so doing by its antagonism towards Japan, but in any case there can be no question of an alliance by us of any nature with a *bourgeois* nation.

The Department can easily realize the danger of such statements to our present friendly relations with Japan.

SUMMERS

Chapter VIII. The Conclusion with the Central Powers of the Peace of Brest Litovsk, March 3, 1918

[410] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 27, 1917. [Received 10 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1043

[411] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 29, 1917, 11 p.m. [Received December 31, 8 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1053

[412] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, December 31, 1917. [Received January 1, 1918, 3.03 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1059

[413] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, January 1, 1918. [Received March 2.]

File No. 861.00/1211

[414] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 1, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received January 2, 10.30 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1061

[415] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 1, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received January 3, 2.19 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1064

[416] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 2, 1918. [Received January 4, 2.09 p.m.]

File No. 763.72110/1066

[417] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 2, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received January 4, 4.21 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1070

[418] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 3, 1918, midnight. [Received January 6, 5.17 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1072

[419] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 5, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received 11.41 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1074

[420] The British Embassy to the Department of State

File No. 763.72119/1090

[421] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 6, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received January 7, 10.41 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1080

[422] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, January 9, 1918, 2 p.m.

File No. 763.72119/1072

[423] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 12, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received January 14, 11.16 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1123

[424] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 13, 1918. [Received January 15, 2.18 a.m.]
File No. 763.72/8500

[425] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, January 21, 1918. [Received January 22, 12.30 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1147

[426] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 28, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received January 31, 5.06 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1213

[427] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 11, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received February 14, 10.41 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1277

[428] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 18, 1918. [Received February 21, 4 p.m.]
File No. 763.72/8929

[429] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 19, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received February 24, 3.46 a.m.]
File No. 763.72119/1375

[430] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, February 22, 1918. [Received February 23, 12.37 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1364

[431] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

The Hague, February 22, 1918. [Received February 23, 4.45 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1370

[432] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 24, 1918. [Received February 26, 11.03 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1384

[433] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, February 24, 1918. [Received March 1, 3.21 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1401

[434] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, March 4, 1918. [Received March 5, 2.25 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1430

[435] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, March 5, 1918. [Received March 6, 12.06 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1228

[436] The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)

Washington, March 12, 1918.

[437] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 16, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received 1.45 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1471

[438] The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

The Hague, March 19, 1918. [Received 8.50 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1476

[439] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, March 25, 1918. [Received April 8.]

File No. 763.72119/1572

[440] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, March 25, 1918. [Received 9 p.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1505

[441] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 2, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received April 4, 2.55 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1540

[442] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 15, 1918. [Received July 13.]

File No. 763.72119/1805

[443] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 30 and April 2, 1918. [Received March 30, April 3, 7, and 11.]

File No. 763.72119/1533, 1534, 1557, 1565

[444] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of

State

Moscow, April 22, 1918. [Received April 29, 3.05 a.m.]

File No. 763.72119/1626

[445] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, August 23, 1918. [Received September 12.]

File No. 763.72/11443

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 27, 1917.*
[Received 10 p.m.]

1232. Swedish press via Petrograd telegram bureau reports Russian delegation Brest Litovsk proposed negotiations based following six points:

1. Forcible incorporation territories conquered during war prohibited.
2. Restoration people's integrity political independence where deprived of same by war.
3. Various nationalities not having independence before war assured right determine themselves whether they will belong to one or other state or become independent.
4. In territories inhabited by various nationalities rights minorities guaranteed and special rights granted involving cultural independence and making possible administrative autonomy.
5. No belligerent payments. So-called costs of war sums already paid out returned. For payment damages private persons fund provided by proportional contributions from all belligerents.
6. In solution colony problem points 1, 2, 3, 4 shall be observed.

Russian delegation declares impermissible any forcing of weaker by stronger nations; for example, economic boycott, forced trade agreements, separate customs conventions hindering freedom of third-state agreements, or sea blockades, etc.

Petrograd telegram bureau reports state siege declared Moscow. Kornilov's forces six thousand with two hundred machine guns decisively beaten, been followed hundred versts government Kharkov by Black Sea sailors, also Polish Legionaries [sic]. Reports great Cossack forces massed near Tsaritsyn. Railway men taken energetic measures prevent them getting further north.

MORRIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 29, 1917, 11 p.m.*
[*Received December 31, 8 a.m.*]

2166. Been expecting communication from Foreign Office inviting participation in peace negotiations, adjourned to January 4, but none received. Shall promptly forward if received. Soviet government professes to think Allies will participate in negotiations but Allies will probably decline. When doing so President or yourself should address a communication to the Russian people explaining the declination in order to prevent Russia's falling into the arms of Germany as ally and thus induce Russian benevolent neutrality and transfer to Central Empires responsibility for continuance of war.

Germans arriving daily and making no effort to conceal their identity.

Peace demonstrations here to-day to celebrate success of negotiations at Brest. Trams discontinued, vehicles prohibited on streets mornings by parade.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *December 31, 1917.*

[*Received January 1, 1918, 3.03 p.m.*]

2163[?]. Following is textual translation of address mentioned in my 2169:¹

To the peoples and governments of the Allied countries: The peace negotiations which are being conducted in Brest Litovsk between the delegation of the Russian Republic and the delegations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria have been suspended for ten days until December 26 [/January 8] in order to give to the Allied countries a last possibility to take part in the further negotiations and thus secure themselves against all the consequences of a separate peace between Russia and the enemy countries.

At Brest Litovsk two programs have been presented, the one expressing the [view] point of the All-Russian Congresses of Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, the other in the name of the Governments of Germany and her allies.

The program of the Republic of the Soviets is the program of consistent socialistic democracy. This program has for its purpose the establishment of conditions under which, on the one hand, every nationality independently of its freedom and the level of its development would receive an entire liberty of national development, and on the other hand, all the nations might be united in an economic and cultural collaboration.

The program of the countries at war with us is characterized by their statement that: "It does not enter into the intention of the allied powers (namely, Germany, Austria, Turkey and Bulgaria) to violently incorporate the territories seized during the war." This means that the enemy countries are ready to evacuate at the peace treaty the occupied territories of Belgium, the northern Departments of France, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Poland, Lithuania, Courland, in order that the subsequent destiny of the contested provinces may be decided by the population concerned itself. The step which the enemy Governments are making towards the program of the democracy under the pressure of circumstances

and chiefly of their own laboring masses, lies in their renouncing new violent annexations and contributions. But in renouncing new conquests, the enemy Governments proceed from the idea that old conquests, old acts of violence of the strong over the weak are rendered sacred by historical prescription. This means that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine, Transylvania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, etc., on the one hand, Ireland, Egypt, India, Indo-China, etc., on the other, are not subject to revision. Such a program is profoundly inconsistent and represents a project of an unprincipled compromise between the pretensions of imperialism and the opposition of the laboring democracy. But the very fact of the presentation of this program is an enormous step forward.

The Governments of the Allied nations have hitherto not joined the peace negotiations for reasons which they have obstinately declined to exactly formulate.

It is now impossible to repeat that the war is going on for the liberation of Belgium, the northern Departments of France, Serbia, etc., for Germany and her allies announce their readiness to evacuate these provinces in the event of an universal peace. Now after the presentation of peace terms by the adversary it is impossible to get off with general phrases concerning the necessity of carrying on the war to the end. It is necessary to say clearly and precisely what is the peace program of France, Italy, Great Britain, the United States. Do they demand along with us the giving of the right of self-determination to the peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, Poznán, Bohemia, the Southern Slav provinces? If they do, are they willing on their part to give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Indo-China, etc., as the Russian revolution has given this right to the peoples of Finland, Ukraine, when [White] Russia, etc.? For it is clear that to demand self-determination for the peoples that are comprised within the borders of enemy states and to refuse self-determination to the peoples of their own state or of their own colonies would mean the defense of the most naked, the most cynical imperialism. If the Governments of the Allied countries were to manifest the readiness—along with the Russian revolution—to construct peace on the basis of an entire and complete recognition of the principle of self-determination for all peoples and in all states; if they were to begin with the actual giving of this right to the oppressed peoples of their own states: this would create international conditions under which the compromise program internally contradictory of Germany and in particular of Austria-Hungary would manifest all its inconsistency and would be overcome by the pressure of the peoples concerned.

But up to now the Allied Governments have decidedly not manifested in any way their readiness to enter upon a really democratic peace, nor could they owing to their class character. Their attitude towards the principle of

national self-determination is not less suspicious and hostile than that of the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary. On this point the conscious proletariat of the Allied countries has just as little illusion as we. With the governments now existing all that can be considered is to set up in opposition to the imperialistic compromise program which the peace terms of Germany and her allies represent another imperialistic compromise program on the part of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. What is the program of the latter? In the name of what aims could they require the prolongation of the war? To these questions now after the two programs of peace have been presented in Brest Litovsk a clear, precise and categorical answer must be given.

Ten days separate us from the resumption of the peace negotiations. Russia in these negotiations does not bind herself to the consent of the Allied Governments. If the latter continue to *saboter* the cause of universal peace the Russian delegation will appear all the same for the continuation of the negotiations. A separate peace, signed by Russia, would without doubt inflict a heavy blow on the Allied countries, chiefly on France and Italy. But the prevision of the inevitable consequences of a separate peace must determine the policy not only of Russia, but also of France, Italy and the other Allied countries. The Soviet government up to now has struggled in every way for an universal peace. No one can deny the significance of the results attained in this direction. But in the future everything depends upon the Allied nations themselves. To bring their own Governments to immediately present their peace programs and to participate on their basis in the negotiations, this has now become a question of national self-preservation for the Allied nations.

The Russian revolution has opened the door to an immediate universal peace on the basis of an agreement. If the Allied Governments are ready to take advantage of this past possibility general negotiations can open immediately in one of the neutral countries. In these negotiations with the indispensable condition of their complete publicity the Russian delegation will as heretofore defend the program of the international socialistic democracy as against the imperialistic programs of the Governments both of the enemy and of the Allied countries. The success of our program will depend on the extent to which the will of their imperialistic classes will be paralyzed by the will of the revolutionary proletariat in each country.

But if the Allied Governments in blind obstinacy, which characterizes the falling and perishing classes, again refuse to participate in the negotiations, then the working class will be confronted with the iron necessity of tearing the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give peace to the nations.

In these ten days the fate of hundreds of thousands and of millions of

human lives hangs in the balance. If on the French and Italian fronts an armistice be not concluded at once a new offensive just as senseless, as merciless and as resultless as all the preceding ones will engulf fresh innumerable victims on both sides. The automatic logic of this slaughter, let loose by the governing classes, is leading to the complete destruction of the flower of the nations of Europe. But the nations wish to live and they have the right to do so. They have the right, they are bound to throw aside all who impede their living.

Whilst addressing to the Governments a last proposition to take part in the peace negotiations, we at the same time promise entire support to the working class of each country which will rise up against its national imperialists, against the jingoes, against the militarists, under the banner of peace, of the brotherhood of nations and of the socialistic reconstruction of society.

FRANCIS

¹ Trotsky addressed this note on Dec. 29 to the peoples and governments of the Allied countries, as stated in the Ambassador's telegram No. 2169, not printed.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

No. 244

Moscow, *January 1, 1918.*
[Received March 2.]

SIR: I have the honor to report to the Department in regard to political developments in Russia during the last third of December. The outstanding event of this period was the seizure of the banks, which has been reported to the Department. The domestic situation has not progressed toward a solution. The country seems to be waiting for the resumption of the peace negotiations. During the pause at Brest Litovsk there have been developments of symptomatic importance at Petrograd, where there is a constant interchange of views between Maximalist leaders and various official and semiofficial delegations representing the Central powers.

On December 30 Commissar Trotsky (Bronstein) issued by wireless telegraph an appeal to "All Nations and the Governments of Allied Countries," which is given as follows in the gazette of the Moscow Council of W[orkmen's] and S[oldiers'] Deputies of this date:² ...

In anticipation of this appeal, the Council of the People's Commissars on December 28 published the following resolution or decree:

Considering that the council is based on the principle of the international solidarity of the proletariat and fraternity of the laboring masses of all countries; that only on an international scale can the war against war and imperialism be waged to a victorious conclusion; the Council of the People's Commissars deems it necessary to go to the assistance of the radical international workingmen of all countries, quite regardless of whether these countries are at war with Russia, are the allies of Russia, or are neutrals. To this end the Council of the People's Commissars resolves to appropriate for the needs of the revolutionary international movement, and to place at the disposition of the foreign representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the sum of 2,000,000 rubles.

It was inevitable that there should be opposition on the part of diplomatic representatives of interested countries to the departure of foreign representatives of the council armed with such instructions and equipped with funds to be used in interference in their domestic affairs. The council therefore tried to enforce the issue of visas to its representatives by threatening reprisals with respect to

foreigners desiring to leave Russia and by making difficulties for couriers of foreign powers.

In spite of the declarations of the Maximalist leaders that the German and Austrian answers to the declaration of the Russian delegation afforded the basis for beginning peace negotiations, it soon became apparent that the Maximalist leaders were far from united in this view. Meanwhile actual negotiations were transferred to Petrograd, where German commissions began arriving. In order duly to impress them with the firmness of the Maximalist regime and to meet their demand for the convocation of the Constitutional Convention to ratify the proposed peace and to sanction the Maximalist seizure of power, the Maximalists arranged a popular demonstration in Petrograd on Sunday, December 31. The opposition press in Moscow reports that one regiment refrained altogether and others, partly, from participation, and that women and striplings formed a large proportion of the civilian contingents. The first German delegation to arrive reached Petrograd on December 26, under the leadership of Vice Admiral Baron Kaiserling and two other naval officers. They came as representatives of the German General Staff to consider along with representatives of the Russian Naval Staff the cessation of the naval war between the two countries. Vice Admiral Baron Kaiserling had served as naval attaché in the German Embassy at Petrograd. They were announced as the vanguard of a larger commission, embracing thirty-three other persons, including Count Mirbach, former Counselor of Embassy at Petrograd, and the Austrian Prince Hohenlohe, as well as representatives of Bulgaria and Turkey. It was stated in the gazette of the Moscow Council of W[orkmen's] and S[oldiers'] Deputies that this commission would consider with Russian representatives questions growing out of the terms of armistice arranged at Brest Litovsk; and that a joint commission was to discuss the terms of a commercial treaty between Germany and Russia, the renewal of relations between Russia and the Central powers in general, and the exchange of prisoners of war. Up to December 28 fourteen members of the larger delegation had arrived at Petrograd. Baron Kaiserling was quoted in the newspapers as being agreeably surprised by the evidences of good order and comparative abundance of food supplies that he had observed, while deprecating the view that Germany was suffering or that the discipline of the German Army and people had been in any wise shaken.

One of the opposition newspapers to-day states that five other German delegations are awaited in Petrograd to work in favor of peace in Petrograd, Odessa, Berdichev, Minsk and Focsani, Rumania. This statement needs confirmation.

Information coming from Petrograd to-day by telephone and telegraph shows that the German delegation has not restricted itself to the large field of activity outlined in the foregoing, but is in effect continuing the peace negotiations nominally interrupted at Brest Litovsk. At a joint meeting at Smolny Institute of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of W[orkmen's], S[oldiers'] and Peasants']

Deputies and the General Army Congress, one of the Russian peace delegation, Kamenev (Rosenfeld), made a detailed report on the course of the peace negotiations. He said that it was no secret to anybody that if the German imperialists still harbored illusions in regard to the continuance of the war, this could by no means be said of Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Private discussions among themselves had no doubt delayed the progress of the negotiations. The answer of the Austro-German coalition was a decided victory for the October revolution.¹ During two conferences held during the interruption of negotiations at Brest Litovsk the German proposals were elicited in concrete form. These were:

1. Russia and Germany proclaim the cessation of the state of war between themselves. Both powers are resolved to live henceforth in peace and mutual friendship. Germany will be ready, under the condition of previously expressed complete mutuality with respect to its allies, as soon as peace is concluded and the demobilization of the Russian Army shall be effected, to evacuate its present positions and the Russian territories occupied, in so far as that will not contradict point No. 2.
2. Inasmuch as the Russian Government, in accordance with its principles, has already proclaimed for all the peoples, without exception, entering into the make-up of the Russian state, the right to self-determination even to entire separation; it takes note of the decision expressing the will of the people: of the desire of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Estland and Livland for complete national independence and for separation from the Russian state. The Russian Government recognizes that in the present conditions these declarations must be regarded as an expression of the popular will, and is ready to draw the conclusion logically resulting therefrom. Inasmuch as, in those districts to which applies the above-exposed decision, the question of evacuation is not such as to be subject to the terms of point No. 1, the time and the method of the declaration as to separation, on the basis of a plebiscite on a broad scale and with the exclusion of any sort of military pressure in any fashion whatsoever, which declaration is on the Russian side affirmed to be necessary, are left for consideration and determination by a special commission.
3. The treaties, agreements, etc., which were in force between the contracting parties upon the outbreak of the war, will come into effect again, in so far as they are not contradictory to changes that have taken place during the war in the possessions of both sides. Each side is obliged within three months of the signature of the preliminary treaty of peace to communicate the treaties, agreements, etc., or their separate stipulations, which, in accordance with point No. 1, should not come into effect. If it is a matter of the separate stipulations, the other side is given a further term of one month in which to denounce the treaty as a whole. Separate stipulations of treaties ceasing to be effective as soon as possible are to be replaced by new treaties corresponding to changed relations and views.

4. Each of the contracting parties will in no case act with respect to the subjects, ships or wares of the other side, in all questions of a legal or economic character, less favorably than to the subjects, ships or wares of any other state whatsoever not enjoying in the given case rights established by treaty.
5. The contracting parties are agreed that with the conclusion of peace the war shall come to an end also in the economic field. They will not participate directly or indirectly in any measures aiming to prolong hostile actions in the economic field, but, with all the means at their disposal, will, within their respective bounds, hinder such measures, even if they should proceed from the side of individuals or from any other source. On the other hand they will do away with difficulties interfering with the resumption of friendly business and commercial relations, and will facilitate the interchange of commodities between the two sides, particularly those exchanges equalizing surplus and deficit. During the transition period, necessary for the wiping out of the results of the war and the establishment of regular relations anew, in conceding limitations in their relations, such as the prohibition of exportation, the regulation of importation, and the like, which during this period are inevitable, they will take care that this is done with tender regard for one another. On the other hand, in the course of this period, they will as little as possible burden the acquisition of necessary objects with import duties, and therefore will enter as soon as possible into negotiations to the end that the freedom from duties established during the war shall have a temporary wider extension. Furthermore they will at the same time organize the interchange of commodities to the widest extent possible. For this purpose there will be formed mixed commissions, which shall begin work as soon as possible.
6. The contracting parties as soon as possible will begin negotiations for the conclusion, in place of the treaty of commerce and navigation of 1902 [1894] and 1904, of a new treaty corresponding to the new circumstances.
7. Irrespective of the conclusion of a new treaty of commerce and navigation, the contracting parties concede to one another during twenty years after the conclusion of peace the rights of the most-favored nation. However neither side will claim participation in favors, wherever granted, in minor frontier relations, or that Russia may grant to countries on [its?] Asiatic border or to the independent states formed of the Russian state, or which Germany may show to Austria-Hungary, or to other countries now or in the future bound to it by a customs league, or to its colonies.
8. Russia expresses its consent that the Danube commission shall be entrusted permanently with the administration of all the mouths, of the Danube; and that this commission shall embrace only the representatives of the states of the Danube and the Black Sea, at the same time that the control of the Danube above Braila shall be entrusted to riparian states of this part of the river.
9. Military laws limiting the private rights of Germans in Russia-and of Russians in Germany, as subjects of hostile states, are repealed. Private persons whose rights, as a result of such laws, have been infringed, must, as far as possible, be

reestablished in such rights. As-far as possible, they ought to receive proper compensation. Parcels of land, mining enterprises and shares in such that have been sold, shall in any case be paid for, in so far as under the new Russian, legislation the property concerned has (not?) become the property of the state. The amount of compensation in accordance with point 2 (?) will be determined by mixed commissions formed of representatives of both sides and of a neutral president.

10. The contracting parties will not demand compensation for' their war expenses, that is for government expenditures in the conduct of the war, nor for losses resulting from the war, that is to say those losses that have arisen for themselves or their subjects through military action and military measures, including requisitions.
11. Each of the contracting parties replaces the losses caused its subjects during the war as a result of acts of violence contrary to international law on the part of the other side in respect to civilian subjects, particularly its diplomatic and consular representatives, touching their life, their health, or their property, or the diplomatic and consular premises. The amount of the losses will be determined in mixed commissions formed of representatives of both sides and a neutral president. (In this and other places the Russian text is: doubtful, owing doubtless to translation from, the German, and perhaps to intent.)
12. Prisoners of war and invalids of both sides are to be returned at once to their country. (Probably means only invalid prisoners of war.) The exchange of the remaining prisoners of war will take place as soon as possible at fixed times, to be arranged by Russo-German commissions. The question of repayment of funds expended in their maintenance, in case of disagreement in arriving at the amount of these funds, is to be passed for consideration to a commission with a neutral president.
13. Civilian subjects of both sides, interned or sent away from their homes, are at once restored to liberty and as soon as possible to their country, without charge.
14. Russian subjects of German descent, particularly so-called German colonists, may settle in Germany during the course of ten years, with the right to settle their estates and carry away their property.
15. Commercial vessels of one of the contracting parties, standing at the time of the outbreak of war in the harbors of the other side, and also prizes of both sides not yet adjudicated, are to be restored, or if that be impossible, compensation is to be paid.
16. Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties will be renewed as soon as possible.

Kamenev (Rosenfeld) represented the German terms as acceptable, or at least as affording a basis for profitable negotiation. On the other hand Pokrovski and Pavlovich, two other leading members of the Russian delegation, are reported to have declared them utterly unacceptable.

One of the opposition newspapers of the better sort states that the German

representatives declared that, inasmuch as Russia could not offer foodstuffs in exchange for German manufactures, for the present, if Russia would hand over its military stores Germany would immediately pay for them in manufactures.

The Petrograd Social Democratic newspaper *Pravda* declared the German assertion, without detail as to when or how the will of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and “parts” of Livland and Estland had declared their will to be annexed to Germany, that such decisions had been reached and announced and must be accepted by Russia as *faits accomplis*, was an unprecedented farce at the expense of Russia.

In an interview given another Petrograd newspaper, *Nash Vek*, Pavlovich declared peace was far removed. Pavlovich divided the peace negotiations into two periods, before and after the declaration of the Ukraine government that it would recognize no peace unless signed by Ukraine delegates. Before the Ukraine declaration was, made the Germans had displayed a disposition to make concessions; but their tone had changed sharply at this time, Kühlmann had made way for General Hoffmann, representing the annexationists, and asserting strategic reasons for delaying the evacuation of Russian territory until general peace is made. Kaledin or the Ukrainians might, continue, the war, and then the, loss of such positions as Brest might be embarrassing. Pavlovich was quoted as saying no Russian Government would ever accept such terms as the Germans proposed.

The effort of the Russian delegates to bring pressure to bear on the German Government in favor of certain German socialists, and especially to persuade the German Government to issue passports for the departure to Stockholm of certain independent socialists, was coolly rebuffed by Count Mirbach, who declared this was a question of German domestic politics, with which he was not at all concerned.

After debate, the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Council of W[orkmen's], S[oldiers'] and P[easants'] Deputies adopted the following resolution:¹ ...

In an interview in the Petrograd gazette of the Council Trotsky (Bronstein) is quoted as admitting that the peace negotiations would hardly be resumed at Brest Litovsk, and that the unacceptability of the German terms was evident; in accordance with this attitude and the resolution above quoted, the chairman of the Maximalist peace delegation has telegraphed to the delegations of the Quadruple Alliance, proposing the resumption of the negotiations at Stockholm. It was added that the first two paragraphs of the German proposals were regarded as contradictory to the principle of the self-determination of peoples.

It is stated by the *Utro Rossii* that Count Mirbach emphasized in his last talk with Trotsky (Bronstein) that Russia should exercise every effort to induce the Entente powers to take part in the peace negotiations, and to have added that a separate peace was hardly realizable at the present time. It thus appears to be agreed here that, as was pointed out in these despatches when peace was first proposed, it was easier for the Maximalists to offer peace than to obtain it from Germany. The

results of the failure of the peace campaign are said to be already in evidence. The difference of opinion between the Maximalist leaders in regard to the acceptability of the German proposals is said to be shared by the bayonets upon which their power rests and by the workingmen in whose name they rule. It is reported that there is a deep and growing disappointment among the soldiers who know only that they have been promised peace. It is characteristic that when guards, both Red Guards from the factories and soldiers who were placed at Moscow banks, were asked what they expected to gain from the seizure of the banks, they answered invariably that they knew nothing about it and that all that they did know was that they had been promised peace and they supposed that everything that was being done was intended to promote peace and prosperity.

Resentment against Germany, naive but natural, is finding expression in the Maximalist official press. The position of the Maximalists is truly difficult, when they are confronted with the prospect of the resumption of hostilities by Germany, after they have destroyed the army, stopped the production of military supplies, begun the demobilization of munitions works, smashed the organization of the military industrial committee and the Federations of Zemstvos and Municipalities, disorganized industry, commerce and finance, and have opened internecine strife with the south and begun a desperate struggle for control of the railways with the General Railway Union. As to conditions on the front, it is stated by representatives just arrived at Petrograd that during the armistice the soldiers have in many places destroyed their winter shelters, broken down their own wire entanglements and left the line wholly unguarded.

German trade across the military lines has grown steadily during the armistice, but the Germans appear to have convinced themselves that there was no surplus available in the north for the supply of German armies on a large scale, and that there was no great hope of carrying on such trade in the southwest. It has been reported that railway tracks were being connected at Dvinsk, and even that there was passenger traffic on the Riga front. But these reports have to be discounted. There is no doubt, however, that the German delegations in Petrograd have been conducting themselves as if masters of the situation. For example, it is related and it seems to be true, that a part of the Petrograd telegraph office was placed at their disposal, and that they sent away the Russian telegraphers and began direct communications with Brest Litovsk.

In view of the growing importance of the Ukraine front, the note of the Ukraine government, above mentioned, deserves careful examination. It was approved and transmitted on Christmas Day.¹ The note was addressed to all belligerent and neutral powers and was as follows:

In the third proclamation of the Ukraine government on November 20 the Ukraine republic was proclaimed, and this act defined the international position of the republic. Striving to bring about the creation of a federal league of all the republics that have arisen until now on the territory of the

former Russian Empire, the Ukraine republic in the person of the General Secretariat enters into independent international relations until such time as a general Russian federation shall be formed and the international representative functions shall be apportioned between the governments of the Ukraine republic and the federal government of the future federation. In connection therewith, the General Secretariat finds it necessary now to inform the powers and peoples of the world of the attitude of the Ukraine republic towards the peace negotiations beginning at Brest Litovsk between the representatives of the Council of People's Commissars and the representatives of the powers waging war with Russia.

Taking firm ground on the view that the present war is of infinite evil to all powers, particularly to the laboring classes of each state; that all belligerent powers ought to renounce aggressive aims and proceed at once to peace negotiations, the Ukraine Central Assembly, the parliament of the Ukraine republic, has found it necessary to pursue an active policy in the matter of the conclusion of peace. From the first days of the proclamation of the Ukraine republic, setting forth in the third general resolution of the assembly the necessity of immediate peace, the Ukraine Assembly found it necessary to proceed to an armistice. To this end representatives of the General Secretariat were sent to the southwest and the Rumanian fronts, now united in one Ukraine front, under the direction of the government of the Ukraine republic. Further, when the Council of People's Commissars, in agreement with the governments of the powers waging war against Russia, entered upon an armistice on all fronts of Russia, the General Secretariat sent its representatives to Brest Litovsk for purposes of information as to what was going on. In this connection the General Secretariat deems it necessary to point out that the representatives of the Council of People's Commissars, although informed that representatives of the government of the Ukraine were to arrive at Brest Litovsk to take part in the negotiations, signed the general armistice without any agreement with the government of the Ukraine republic. Now, when the Council of People's Commissars, in accordance with the last point of the general armistice, has begun peace negotiations at Brest Litovsk with representatives of the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, the General Secretariat, in the name of the Ukraine republic, declares:

1. The entire democracy of the Ukraine power [nation] is striving for the cessation of the war throughout the world, for a peace between all the belligerent powers, for universal peace.
2. The peace concluded by all the powers ought to be a democratic peace, must safeguard every nation unto the smallest, must guarantee to every power complete self-determination, restrained in its will by nothing and nobody.
3. For the establishment of the possibility of the actual expression of the

will of the peoples suitable guaranties are necessary.

4. Equally no annexations are admissible.
5. Likewise and equally, in the interest of the laboring classes of all countries, contributions, no matter in what form, are inadmissible.
6. Small nations and powers, ruined by the war, should be given material assistance in accordance with rules which must be elaborated in the peace congresses.
7. The Ukraine republic, having now upon its land the Ukraine front, and making its entry independently into the arena of international affairs in the person of its General Secretariat, which is bound to conserve the interests of the Ukraine people, ought to take part on a parity with other powers in all peace negotiations, conferences and congresses.
8. The authority of the Council of People's Commissars does not extend to the Ukraine republic, and therefore a peace that may be concluded as a result of negotiations with the powers at war with Russia, can become obligatory for the Ukraine only when the terms of peace shall be accepted and signed by the government of the Ukraine republic.
9. Peace in the name of the whole of Russia can be concluded only by a federal government, which must be recognized ("which requires the recognition of," seems to be the intent) by all the republics and politically organized territories of Russia; and, if such a government should not be formed in the early future, then the only authority capable of concluding peace is the representative body of all these republics and territories.

Firmly supporting the demand for a universal, democratic peace, the General Secretariat, striving at the same time to hasten this general peace to the utmost of its power, and recognizing the great importance of efforts to speed its realization, finds it necessary to have its representatives in Brest Litovsk, hoping, at the same time, that the final peace will be crowned with an international congress, to which the government of the Ukraine republic summons all belligerent powers to take part.

In accordance with the plan worked out by the General Secretariat, the Ukraine Assembly at the same time authorized it to elaborate conditions of general peace and to convoke a congress representing all parts of Russia to take action upon the matter. Socialist Revolutionaries of the Ukraine offered an amendment to the effect that the Ukraine government should take in hand the creation of a federal republic, which should then be intrusted with the peace negotiations. The evidences of vanity to be found in the utterances of the Ukraine government should not, in the opinion of the undersigned, lead to inattention to it as a powerful factor in the reconstruction of Russia. On the surface at least, there are now no evidences of a tendency to look toward Austria-Hungary, for the sake, among other things, of reunion with the Ukrainians of Galicia and Transylvania. What would be the effect of a German offensive in the southwest on the political

outlook of the Ukraine might depend on its success and extent, and in any case the question belongs rather to the sphere of problematic politics. As far as can now be ascertained, the Ukraine leaders are firmly attached to the idea of a Russian federal republic.

Domestic events in Russia will be made the subject of a second report dealing with the same period.

I have [etc.]

MADDIN SUMMERS

¹ In a covering despatch of Jan. 5 attention is called to this despatch, “which contains an interesting report prepared by Mr. D. B. Macgowan,” Consul at Moscow.

² The appeal was dated Dec. 29 and was published in the Petrograd *Izvestia* Dec. 30. See the Ambassador’s telegram No. 2163 of Dec. 31, ANTE, p. 405 [*Pg. 405 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)*].

¹ November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

¹ *post*, p. 419 [*Pg. 419 includes portions of [Doc. 415](#) and [Doc. 416](#)*].

¹ Presented in the Rada Dec. 8/21.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 1, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received January 2, 10.30 p.m.]

2172. Robins entered Embassy yesterday afternoon most excited, saying had just left Trotsky and Krylenko enraged because [they] claimed to have discovered "conspiracy" of Germans and had decided to sever all negotiations. Robins wished authority to tell Trotsky I would recommend prompt effective assistance in such event, which I readily granted. Immediately called on British and French Ambassadors whom told of report, withholding identity informant by Robins's request but vouched for its truth; they approved my action. Robins said rupture would occur at conference at 8 o'clock but Judson informed me after midnight that Robins had told him conference opens to-day. Robins, Judson, Sisson, visited me to-day, urged that I prepare cable recommending prompt assistance to which I agreed. Shall send later when hear rupture consummated. Meantime suppose Robins will tell Trotsky of my agreement and latter will use same for securing better terms from Germans. "Conspiracy" "undeveloped. Cannot imagine however any fit application of such term unless it be that Trotsky and Krylenko suspect Germans also dickering with Russian reactionaries or possibly with Ukraine Rada. Shall take any step think necessary to prevent separate peace but am inclined to think that if such unavoidable it should favor Germans to extent possible in order to make it the more unacceptable not only to Allies but to pacifists and proletariat throughout the world. Do you agree?

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 1, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received January 3, 2.19 a.m.]

2173. I construe the Trotsky note:¹

- (1) As a claim that if general peace not concluded it will be fault of Allies for not participating in negotiations when resumed.
- (2) That if Allies do participate two annexation policies will be submitted: one designated "imperialistic" or "capitalistic," which submits by plebiscite to people only of territories captured in present war their self-disposition; the other designated "socialistic democratic," based on limitation not [only to] conquered countries or [but also] peoples in involuntary subjection. Submits self-disposition to Alsace-Lorraine, Ireland, Madagascar, etc.
- (3) Address avoids subjects of restitution or reparation or compensation for insults, wilful and inhuman damage inflicted.
- (4) Address implies or explicitly states that separate peace is foregone conclusion meaning German terms be accepted with socialistic or democratic [modifications] if obtainable.
- (5) That in event of either separate or general peace social revolution throughout the world will be aggressively prosecuted by proletariat of all countries and internationalism will be persistently advocated.

Question of economic boycott after war necessarily deferred till general peace but my understanding is that we oppose such policy.

We should do all possible in the event of separate peace to persuade Russia to adopt policy of benevolent neutrality.

Continuation of war with its horrors and sacrifices should be avoided if possible with honor but in my opinion general peace now would be war victory for Germany. Furthermore it will prove advantageous, followed by a war of conquest within [sic]. Germany meanwhile would gain such a foothold in Russia as to become almost invincible. German methods, German system would so utilize Russia's vast resources and so organize Russia's man-power as to become the strongest force in commerce and war the world has ever known. Already Germans are beginning organization here. Germany is now enervated by three and a half

years of war and if permitted to recuperate will never be so weak again.

FRANCIS

¹ Dated Doc. 29; see the Ambassador's telegram No. 2163 of Dec. 31, *ante*, p. 405 [Pg. 405 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 2, 1918.*
[Received January 4, 2.09 p.m.]

2178. Following resolution adopted last night by joint session of Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, the Petrograd Soviet and the assembly [conference] on the demobilization:

Having heard the report of the peace delegation and entirely approving its action, the joint assembly of the Central Executive Committee of the Councils of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, of the Petrograd Soviet and of the demobilization conference representing the whole army, decides:

The first program statement made by the representatives of the Quadruple Alliance in Brest recognized, in principle the conclusion of peace without annexations and contributions. This recognition created a basis for further negotiations regarding a universal democratic peace.

However, already in this statement the representatives of the German Government refused to recognize the right of self-determination in favor of the oppressed nationalities and the colonies which had been seized before the beginning of the war in 1914.

Already this restriction which was immediately noted by the Russian delegation showed that the ruling classes of Germany under the pressure of the popular movement were forced to make concessions to the idea of a democratic peace. They are at the same time trying to distort this idea in the direction of the old annexationist policy. The repeated statement of the Austro-German delegation setting forth the practical conditions of peace in the east still further distort the idea of a just democratic peace.

The meaning of this statement is that the Austro-German Governments refuse to give immediately a plain undertaking to withdraw their troops from the occupied provinces of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and parts of Livonia and Esthonia.

In point of fact the free expression of the will of the population of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and all the other occupied provinces is impossible

whilst foreign armies remain in them and until the return of the evacuated portion of the original population. The German delegation's reference to the fact that the will of the peoples in these provinces has been already expressed is manifestly unfounded. Under a state of siege, under the yoke of military censorship, the peoples of the occupied provinces have not yet been able to express their will. The documents to which the German Government might refer can, in the most favorable case, only verify as to the expression of the will of separate privileged groups, but not of the masses of the people of these territories.

We declare:

The Russian revolution remains true to its international policy. We stand for the effective self-determination of Poland, Lithuania, Courland. We never recognize as just the imposing of an alien will on any peoples.

The joint assembly insists that further peace negotiations be conducted in a neutral state and commissions the Council of the Commissaries of the People to take all measures for carrying this into execution.

We address ourselves to the peoples of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey. Under your pressure your governments have been forced in words to appropriate your (this should read our) motto: "without annexations and contributions," but actually they are endeavoring to realize the old policy of annexations. Remember: the conclusion of a speedy and actually democratic peace is now in your hands. To you look the peoples of the whole of Europe, tortured and bled by an unexampled war. You will not allow the German and Austrian imperialists to carry on war against revolutionary Russia for the sake of the enslavement of Poland, Lithuania, Courland and Armenia.

The workmen's revolution calls upon the working classes of all countries to rebel.

The workmen's revolution of October¹ has done its duty towards the peoples of the whole world. The workmen's and peasants' government has published the secret treaties. The workmen's and peasants' government is ready to immediately evacuate all the territories occupied by the Russian armies during this war. It gives all the peoples that inhabit Russia without exception the right of complete self-determination up to separation without any military pressure on [its] part. But it requires the same of the other side also.

We appeal as to our kin to the French, the Italian, the Serbian workmen and say to them: The governments of your countries have not even advanced one step towards peace which the governments of Central Europe have been obliged to do. The governments of your countries have up to now not even announced their aims of war. Your governments are prolonging

the war by all statements true and untrue. Your governments are not advancing a single step towards the peace program of the Russian revolution. Your governments do not want to renounce the treaties which they made unbeknown to the people with the former Tsar Nicholas II. Achieve the immediate adhesion of your countries to the peace negotiations on the basis of the declarations made at Brest by the Russian delegation.

FRANCIS

¹ November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 2, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[Received January 4, 4.21 p.m.]

2180. Peace negotiations resumed 8th and Trotsky wiring Germany suggesting continuance in neutral country. Peace commissioners reported last night to joint meeting which acted as advised in my 2178. Resolution adopted after several hours' discussion, Trotsky as usual dominating entire affair. Hitch apparently on section appertaining Courland, Lithuania, etc., Russian sections, which Germany claims have already expressed a desire to become German provinces. Soviet takes issue contending that peoples of said countries should be permitted to express by plebiscite their preference for Russia, Germany or independence unintimidated by presence of German or Russian soldiers, as otherwise *bourgeoisie* would control. Germany will yield this point but with reluctance, I think. Remainder of sixteen sections restore commercial intercourse between Russia and Germany absolutely without restriction. Consequently Germany will make satisfying peace if at all possible.

Question now is if separate peace cannot be prevented, whether we should assist Soviet to get most favorable terms or by masterly inactivity permit Germany to dictate her own terms. My 2172 was inclined to favor the latter policy but question has two sides. If we could aid Soviet we gain its good will and thereby have equal trade opportunity in Russia with Germany; it would be better than having ill will. Furthermore, if Germany is permitted to dictate humiliating terms to Soviet government latter might be so weakened thereby that monarchists would overthrow congress and if they should dominate would they not make Russia an ally of Germany against us? Please give your opinion.

Surely our interest is to prevent separate peace and circumstances may arise which will require such prompt action on my part to accomplish such end that cannot wait replies. Of course would not presume to commit Department but might consider it advisable to commit myself to recommend assistance to *de facto* government on condition that negotiations absolutely terminate and such assistance be rendered for sincere vigorous prosecution of war. If Department thought otherwise, I would so inform Soviet government but unofficially. Am using Robins in these matters. Do you understand and approve?

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 3, 1918, midnight.*
[Received January 6, 5.17 a.m.]

2187. For the President:

I cabled Secretary Lansing in my 2166, December 29, 10 [11] p.m.,¹ requesting that you or he address some communication to the Russian people explaining why it is impossible or inexpedient for the Allied countries to join in the peace negotiations begun between Russia and the Central Empires and adjourned for ten days to enable Russia's allies to participate. It was my conviction at that time that the Allies would not respond and that separate peace between Russia and the Central Empires was a foregone conclusion. Such an eventuality now seems less probable, in fact exceedingly doubtful, because Germany notwithstanding her agreement to negotiate separate peace with no annexations, no indemnities, is with characteristic evasion endeavoring to forestall the untrammelled self-displeasure [self-determination of] the people of Courland, Lithuania and other sections of Russia now occupied by German invaders, by claiming that inhabitants of those sections have already expressed their desire to become German provinces. Such claim was set forth in the first of the sixteen articles of peace proposed by the Central Empires. The peace commissioners of the Soviet government readily saw the German chicanery in this article, discussed it at length and made a counter-proposal which the Austro-German peace commissioners said they would be compelled to refer to their respective governments before replying thereto. Adjournment was then had for ten days. Commissioners of Soviet government returned to Petrograd accompanied by representatives of fifteen broken and depleted armies, and made report to a joint meeting of the Central Committee, of the People's Commissaries [sic] with the Petrograd Soviet and with the Committee on Army Demobilization.

The Russian Army wearied with three years of horrible struggle and looking forward with relief and joy to a cessation of hostilities, almost within their grasp, were so open to doubt in feeling by this German move that their representatives in the Petrograd meeting, of [with] practical unanimity, courageously asserted their willingness and determination to continue the struggle rather than yield to the unjust demands which the Central Empires sought to impose. The resolutions passed by the joint meeting above described were transmitted in my cable 2178 to

the Department.

Having received no reply to suggestion in my 2166,¹ I now respectfully request that you reiterate in some public manner the noble expressions of your address to the United States Senate of January 22 last. Assumed message was delivered and promulgated before America entered the war, but it portrayed in impressive terms the kind of a peace that would be enduring, the kind of a peace all just-minded and right-feeling peoples could join in a league to enforce. That was the same kind of a peace that Russia championed after the revolution of March last and the same kind of a peace that the Soviet government of Russia and the worn soldiers of this afflicted country feel is now jeopardized by German trickery.

I am not suggesting the formal recognition of any government in Russia that is not founded upon the will of the free people of this great country. My cables to the Department bear testimony to my opinion of any power established by force among a people who had made wise provision for the organization of a government deriving its just powers from the consent of the governed. It is our duty, however, to use any legitimate means to combat the merciless methods of an unscrupulous enemy whose success would be a catastrophe to civilization and a manifest injury to mankind.

The psychology of war justifies and demands the repetition of the noble humanitarian thoughts expressed in your great message to the Senate. Failure to reiterate those sentiments at this juncture may possibly cause Russia to take a step which will not only sacrifice the gains of the revolution, but would be a stain upon her honor which the efforts of generations could not eradicate. The tired people of this country will not fight for territory, they need *status quo ante*; nor for commercial advantage, for their enormous resources will insure commercial prosperity for years to come. Nor will they fight for treaties made by governments they had overturned, but they possibly will struggle for a democratic peace, for the fruits of the revolution, if appealed to by a country whose unselfish motives they recognize as they do ours.

There are numerous parties in Russia and many plans as to the future welfare of these peoples, and also several would-be governments, but all are advocating provisional government [*sic*] and doing so for the reason, as they claim, that Russia by occupation [exhaustion can] fight no more. In my judgment the only hope for Russia remaining in the war is from the failure of the separate peace now being negotiated by the Soviet government with the Central Empires.

Consequently we should spare no effort to bring about such a consummation. Such a communication as you, and you only can make, whether it prove successful or not, will make a deep impression on the heart of Russia and will demonstrate again what is universally admitted, and that is that your utterances concerning the object of this war and the enduring peace that should follow it, together with the armament limitation which will be realized if such peace is secured, mark a new era or an end of warfare and throw a new light on the relations of governments

and peoples finally. If Germany will slight a democratic peace it spells German defeat and the world is safe for democracy.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 405 [*Pg. 405 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)*].

¹ *Ante*, p. 405 [*Pg. 405 includes portions of [Doc. 411](#) and [Doc. 412](#)*].

File No. 763.72119/1074

[Document 419]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 5, 1918, 10 a.m.*
[*Received 11.41 p.m.*]

2202. German peace commissioners refused to go Stockholm, consequently Trotsky himself going Brest to-night hoping to induce adjournment to some neutral ground.

FRANCIS

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 26

MEMORANDUM

The British Embassy have received a telegraphic report from the British Ambassador at Petrograd, respecting the situation existing on January 1, 1918. After reporting the failure of the peace negotiations with Germany owing to the latter's insistence on the continued occupation of the Balkan [Baltic] provinces the Ambassador says:

The existence of the Bolsheviki government is so dependent on their undertakings to secure a democratic peace that they can with difficulty recede from their position, but if they are unable to secure peace they can hardly retain power for long. If they fall they will almost certainly be succeeded by the Social Revolutionary Party whose first step will probably be to ask the Allies to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of a general peace. If the reply to this proposal is unfavourable the negotiations with Germany will be renewed and, as the party cannot command the services of any statesman of known strength, the final result will probably be the acceptance of the German peace terms.

WASHINGTON, *January 6, 1918.*

[*Received January 7.*]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 6, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received January 7, 10.41 p.m.*]

2204. Trotsky gone to Brest to meet German peace commission but told one man at noon yesterday and another at 5 p.m. that Lloyd George had expressed hope that Russia be compelled to make disgraceful peace and Trotsky said on both occasions that policy of Allies was to have German demands satiated in the east so her requirements be minimized in the west.

Trotsky also said Germans experiencing great difficulty in transferring troops from the Russian to west front, because German soldiers tired of fighting and would jump from the trains and desert; cited Kovno district where 25,000 deserters congregated and when soldiers ordered to fire on them had refused to fire and deserters were now surrounded and being starved into submission.

Trotsky and Lenin are now acting as if sincerely desirous of social democratic peace and not as German agents, but think German money still accepted by some Smolny¹ subordinates and some Germans employed at Smolny. Germans became so conspicuous and presuming here that Smolny has ordered them to be less in evidence. Tomorrow, also Tuesday and Wednesday, Christmas holidays.

FRANCIS

¹ Smolny Institute was used by the Bolsheviks as their headquarters.

File No. 763.72119/1072

[Document 422]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 9, 1918, 2 p.m.*

1973. Referring your 2187, January 3, 12 p.m. President delivered speech to Congress yesterday stating war aims and attitude toward Russia. It was cabled you at once.¹ Have it conveyed unofficially to Trotsky. Report results also of measures taken to circulate it.

LANSING

¹ The President's address to Congress of Jan. 8, 1918, containing the "fourteen points" of peace was cabled abroad for publication by the Committee on Public Information.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 12, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received January 14, 11.16 a.m.]

2225. Your 1973. Robins reports had an interview with Lenin who has wired President's message textually to Trotsky at Brest. Lenin said that he approved of message and thought it potential agency in promoting peace. Lenin also expressed himself as believing that war would be resumed and no separate peace effected. Trotsky consented to and compelled [continue] negotiations at Brest as Germans refused going elsewhere. Publicity bureau says 100,000 copies President's message be posted here to-morrow; also said 800,000 printed for distribution by Y.M.C.A. Also several hundred thousand in German for distribution, if possible, along German front and P.T.A. given better translation for distribution than it first made. Graham Taylor going Moscow to-night to expedite circulation. It cannot be given too much. Think effect great, far reaching.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 13, 1918.*
[*Received January 15, 2.18 a.m.*]

2229. In response to request from newspaper for New Year greeting to Russian people, I gave following which appears in to-day's *Vek*, successor of *Rech*:

The best greeting I can give to the Russian people from America is the message of President Wilson, delivered to Congress, December 26/January 8, and given in full to the Russian press. That message not only stated the aims and objects of America in entering and continuing the war to final victory, but expresses clearly and forcefully the sentiments of America to Russia and the sympathy of the American people, which have enjoyed freedom for more than one hundred forty years, for the Russian people who have enjoyed freedom for only ten months. There is nothing I can add to this eloquent and impressive message of the President of my country, which, while delivered to the Congress of the United States is an appeal to all belligerent governments and the peoples thereof.

The Russian people, however, cannot be too often reminded or too deeply impressed with the fact that their hard-earned freedom is jeopardized by negotiations for a separate peace nor that if Germany should dominate Russia their highly prized liberty or the fruits of the revolution will be sacrificed. President Wilson in a memorable message addressed to the Senate of the United States, January 9/22 last, clearly portrayed the kind of a peace that would be enduring, the kind of a peace all just-minded and right-feeling peoples could join in a league to enforce. That was a peace which recognized the right of all peoples to dispose of themselves. That message was delivered and promulgated three and a half months before America entered the war. It outlined the same kind of a peace that Russia championed after the revolution of February 27/March 12 last—the same kind of a peace that the Soviet government of Russia and the wearied but gallant soldiers of this afflicted country feel is now jeopardized by German trickery.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *January 21, 1918.*

[*Received January 22, 12.30 a.m.*]

1346. Swedish press reports via Berlin that negotiations political and territorial questions resumed to-day. After discussion the land [Åland Islands] question came up. Kühlmann¹ said Germany desired consult Baltic peoples and especially Sweden, who although not represented present negotiations, would probably desire to be. That Entente [status] matter of interest to Germany as one of signers of old treaties and first question to be solved was whether Russia or newly recognized Finland had right to settle this. Trotsky said Finland's independence made no change. Kühlmann said Germany had individual rights in this question emanating from old treaty signed after Crimean war and which would be basis of German demands now. Trotsky reserved answer.

MORRIS

¹ Richard von Kühlmann, German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, had joined the German delegation at Brest Litovsk on Dec. 21, 1917.

File No. 763.72119/1213

[Document 426]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 28, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[*Received January 31, 5.06 a.m.*]

2294. Trotsky left early this morning for Brest to sign separate peace having stated to Congress last night that much as regretted imperialistic terms, might be necessary to concede same in order to prevent enemy from appropriating all Russia but powerless to offer resistance. Congress by large majority approved previous peace negotiations and authorized continuance.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 11, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received February 14, 10.41 a.m.]

2358. The Brest negotiations terminated. Following declaration signed by Trotsky and Russian delegation, also by Bolshevik Ukraine delegation, formally promulgated by Smolny:

In the name of People's Commissaries, which is government of Russian Federated Republic, we hereby bring to knowledge of governments and peoples at war with us, to our allies and to neutral countries, that, refusing to sign an annexationist treaty, Russia vdeclares on her part the state of war with Germany. Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria has ceased, that the Russian troops are simultaneously given orders to demobilize completely on all fronts.

This not greatly surprising, except not expected so soon. It is equivalent to separate peace which I think would have been formally signed if Soviet had been recognized by Allies. Must await developments to give information concerning commercial treaty, which think Germany negotiating with Soviet. Have sent commercial attaché to the Department [of] Industry to cultivate unofficial trade relations. Vigilance required to check German commercial activities. Alexeev, Kaledin, Kornilov will not disband forces.

Germany reported to have given Rumania notice that hostilities will be resumed if peace unsigned four days.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72/8929

[Document 428]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 18, 1918.*
[*Received February 21, 4 p.m.*]

2385. Germany notifies that armistice terminate noon to-day when state of war be resumed, to which reply made that same incredible because seven days' notice required. Later, just heard Germans have taken Revel and Dvinsk.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72119/1375

[Document 429]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 19, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[*Received February 24, 3.46 a.m.*]

2393. Smolny wired Berlin last midnight offering to accept peace terms demanded at last conference. This given out 5 this afternoon. German reply not yet received. Some doubt German acceptance now. No successful resistance can be made German advance and if railroads unbroken they can reach Petrograd in forty-eight hours. More later.

FRANCIS

File No. 763.72119/1364

[Document 430]

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

STOCKHOLM, *February 22, 1918.*

[*Received February 23, 12.37 a.m.*]

1552. Swedish press reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau. Council of People's Commissioners sent telegram to German Government, Berlin:

Council of People's Commissioners hereby express protest against action German troops against Russian Republic which had declared state of war ended, and had begun demobilize Russian armies all fronts. They are therefore constrained to consent to signing peace on conditions put forward by delegations Central powers at Brest and announce reply to terms specified by German Government will be given immediately. Lenin, Trotsky.

...

MORRIS

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

THE HAGUE, *February 22, 1918.*
[Received February 23, 4.45 a.m.]

2061. Kühlmann's Reichstag speech, 20th:

Peace with Ukrainia is first peace in this greatest war. Immediately after collapse rotten structure of Tsarism so heavily burdened with blame for world war, national aspirations were manifested in Ukrainia which aimed at stronger racial ties. When Ukrainian delegates at Brest saw Petrograd cabinet had no sincere peace policy, they established friendly relations with Central powers because they did not want to suffer under sins of Tsarism but sincerely desired peace.

Negotiations with them were not easy on account of impossible territorial demands, as is usually the case during rise of new nation. We left regulation of Russian frontier for some later time and confined ourselves to delimiting western frontier. The settlement has been particularly criticized by Poles. It would be wrong to think we were not aware at Brest of extraordinary significance of this frontier regulation. This frontier is of utmost value for Germany's foreign relations and affects momentous internal political interests as well as foreign political interests in Austria. Austrian Premier spoke at length on subject yesterday. I too must say that if peace with Ukrainia had failed owing to this question overwhelming majority of German people would have strongly disapproved attitude negotiators. Stipulations of treaty which leave details of frontier demarcation to commission show our interest in just arrangement. The frontier as now defined can be changed so that fullest consideration can be paid to ethnographic factors and wishes of population. Poles will also be represented in commission so that everything possible has been done to insure just settlement. Dispute concerning Kholm frontier brings danger that discussion of this treaty may lead to discussion of whole Polish problem and this seems undesirable at present time.

In addition to political considerations conclusion of treaty was prompted by consideration that from reliable information Ukrainia still possesses substantial stock grain and food and is able to dispose of some of it.

Establishment regular commercial traffic with exchange of surplus grain fodder and raw materials in Ukraina for our industrial products is very vital interest for us and still more Austria. There will therefore be consultation with Ukrainian government and adoption of joint measures with view to facilities especially respecting railway communication.

The substance of treaty can best be discussed in committee but I may say that this first peace treaty which will undoubtedly serve as model for later treaties fully insures reestablishment of legal relations. Critics of treaty seem to think it will impair or imperil conclusion peace with Bolshevik government. From intimate knowledge obtained in negotiations I can assure House this is certainly not the case. If there was any way at all to induce Trotsky to sign satisfactory peace instrument it was accomplished fact of signed Ukrainian treaty, and I still consider this treaty an important means for arriving at peace with Russian cabinet satisfactory to both sides.

Negotiations with Great Russia led to Trotsky's declaration which amounted to veiled rupture of relations. What followed is well known. Meanwhile new and important things have happened. In reply to new advance of German armies Petrograd cabinet sent wireless to German Government stating its readiness to sign peace under conditions proposed by delegations of Quadruple Alliance at Brest, and that reply to exact terms of German Government would be given without delay. This wireless communication cannot be for us a binding document in view of our past experiences, but we informed Petrograd government of receipt of wireless message and requested written confirmation which it promised to send immediately. However after our experiences with Trotsky and his cabinet I do not wish people to think we now have peace with Russia in our pocket. I should deplore any such impression principally because I wish to spare the sincere and upright love of peace of German people, which is fully shared by Government, any disappointment. Events will develop rapidly. We are exchanging views with our allies concerning this new fact and should arrive at result very soon. As far as can be seen at present there will be no material change of basis of negotiation.

To sum up situation, I should say prospects of peace with Bolshevik government have improved considerably with conclusion of Ukrainian peace, with military pressure we are now exerting, and with the disappointment of certain hopes on which Petrograd government undoubtedly laid great store. The hope may now be expressed that we are nearing the goal but we should not indulge in joy over great event of real peace with Russia until the signatures have been put to the instrument. The impression which I gained was that public opinion received news of conclusion Ukrainian treaty with relief and joy as first step towards better future and reestablishment of general peace which we all hope for and expect to attain with quiet, clear, firm and determined foreign policy. ...

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 24, 1918.*
[Received February 26, 11.03 p.m.]

2405. Following is translation of German peace proposal to Soviet government which Executive Committee now considering with every prospect of approval.

Lenin in statement published in official evening organ says should be approved and if not he will not be connected longer with government. Shall cable later decision of Soviet government. Have secured first official copy given out.

TO THE COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIES,
PETROGRAD.

Answer of the German Government to the application of the Russian Government of February 19, 1918. Germany is willing to continue peace negotiations and conclude peace under the following conditions:

1. Germany and Russia declare the state of war between them put to an end. Both nations are convinced that in the future they will live on friendly terms and peaceful with each other.
2. Countries situated westward from the line indicated to the Russian representatives at Brest, which formerly belonged to Russia, will no more be under the protectorate of Russia. In the Dvinsk district this line must be moved towards the eastern frontier of Courland. The former appurtenance of the said countries to the Russian Empire will in no way force them to any obligations towards Russia. Russia renounces every kind of interference in the internal affairs of these countries. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to define the future destiny of these countries with the consent of their population. Germany is ready after the general conclusion and full Russian demobilization to clear all countries towards the eastward from the line in question, as long as nothing else follows therefrom.
3. Finland and Estland are immediately cleared from Russian troops and Red Guards and the Red Guards will be substituted by German police up to the time when the reconstruction of the country will guarantee safety and governmental order. All inhabitants arrested on political grounds

must be immediately released.

4. Russia concludes peace immediately with Ukraine people's republic. Ukraine and Finland immediately will be cleared of Russian troops and Red Guards.
5. Russia will do everything according to its ability to secure for Turkey the return of her East Catholic [Anatolian] provinces and the full recognition of the abolition of Turkish capitulations.
6. A full demobilization of the Russian Army up to the newly formed battalions by the present Government must take place immediately. Russian warships in the Black Sea, Baltic Sea and the Arctic Ocean must be immediately brought to Russian ports and be left there to the conclusion of general peace negotiations, or be disarmed. Warships of the Entente which are under Russian control must be treated as Russian ships. Commercial navigation in the Black Sea and Baltic Sea will begin at once according to the agreement of armistice; the cleaning out of mines shall begin at once; the blockade of the Arctic Ocean will remain until the conclusion of general peace.
7. The Russian-German commercial treaty of 1904 will be in force as stated in Paragraph [Article] 7, No. [Chapter] II, A, of the peace concluded with Ukraine, except in Section [Article] 11, Nos. [point] 3, of the commercial treaty, special privileges concerning the Asiatic countries; furthermore the first part of the concluded protocol will be in force. To this is added the guarantee of export free of duty of ores; the immediate beginning of negotiations about the conclusion of a new commercial treaty; guarantee of favored-nation rights up to the end of 1925, even to the completion of the provisorium; and lastly the affirmation of Paragraph [Article] 7, Nos. [Chapters] III, IV(a), and V, of the peace agreement with Ukraine.¹
8. The legal relations (political) will be regulated according to the decision of the first reading of the German-Russian legal convention; as far as the decisions are not yet accepted, especially will take place the reimbursement of the losses by civilians according to the German proposals, and the reimbursement for the expenses of the prisoners of war, according to the Russian proposals. Russia will accept it and according to her force will assist the German commission of prisoners of war for civilians and refugees.
9. Russia obliges herself to stop all kinds of government or government-assisted agitation or propaganda against the governments of the four Allies and their government and military institutions, including the territory occupied by the Central powers.
10. The above-mentioned terms must be accepted within forty-eight hours. The Russian plenipotentiaries must immediately go to Brest Litovsk and there within three days sign the peace agreement which should be ratified within two weeks.

Berlin, February 21, 1918.

Minister of Foreign Affairs
VON KÜHLMANN

Attest:

(Signature illegible)

Lieutenant General and Chief of the Army, Section D

FRANCIS

¹ See telegrams dated Apr. 27 and June 7, 1918, [vol. II](#), chap. iv.

File No. 763.72119/1401

[Document 433]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *February 24, 1918.*
[*Received March 1, 3.21 p.m.*]

2409. Executive Committee approved German peace terms as follows: 116 for, 85 against, 26 abstaining, Bolsheviks voting solidly for acceptance. Bolshevik caucus voted 72 for, 26 against, 12 abstaining. Telegraphic acceptance wired Berlin 6 this morning.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 4, 1918.*

[*Received March 5, 2.25 a.m.*]

1612. Swedish press reports via Berlin peace treaty with Russia signed 5 o'clock Sunday.

Petrograd's telegram bureau wires from Petrograd peace delegation Brest accepted all German peace terms and telegraphed Lenin and Trotsky:

As we anticipated deliberations on peace treaty useless. In view Germany refusing discontinue military operations until signing had taken place we decided sign peace treaty without revision and then leave Brest immediately. The most significant change to peace terms of February 21 is as follows: The districts of Ardakhan, Kars and Batum shall be separated from Russian territory. This done under pretext of right of nations to dispose of themselves. Karakhan, Secretary.

Swedish press comments as follows:

Turkey will recover what was lost to Russia at Congress Berlin 1878. Kars of strategical importance as barricading fort in mountains, but Batum is place of most value to Turkey as pipes run there from great petroleum center Baku on Caspian Sea. The tremendous petroleum trade at Baku will come under Turkish control.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 5, 1918.*

[*Received March 6, 12.06 a.m.*]

1624. Swedish press reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau. Central Executive Committee of Soviet has issued following manifesto to all labor, soldier, peasant and Cossack Soviets:

Of 116 members of Central Executive Committee 85 voted against the war, 26 abstaining. Committee then decided approve peace terms presented by German Government in form of ultimatum. To-day Germany forces us accede to terms still more humiliating. Within two weeks peace treaty must be ratified by both parties.

Replies to Central Executive Committee appeal show however serious divergencies among Soviets regarding fundamental principles of revolution. Some advocate signing at any price to give government chance recovering strength for crucial struggle against imperialists under conditions more favorable to proletariat. Others are against signing urging immediate summoning of masses against German imperialists. They regard approval peace terms as defeat for revolution and blow to international revolution.

Executive Committee convenes an extraordinary meeting Soviets and Cossacks' deputies to solve question at Moscow on March 12.

Reports from Vasa according private communications from front Björneborg to-day captured by White Army. Reported White Guard in eastern Nyland recaptured Lovisa and now engaged in fierce fighting with Reds near Borgå.

Reported another German squadron consisting of twelve cruisers and transports sighted off Gottland yesterday.

MORRIS

***The Acting Secretary of State to the French Ambassador
(Jusserand)***

WASHINGTON, *March 12, 1918.*

MY DEAR MR. AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 8, 1918, in which you inform me that your Government considers it to be the duty of the Allied Governments to enter an immediate and most energetic protest against the recently concluded Russo-German peace and proposes the publishing of a joint declaration which, subject to such modifications as may be found suitable, might be concluded in the terms outlined in a draft which you enclose with your note.

In reply, while hastening to express my appreciation of your courtesy in bringing this suggestion and draft to my attention, I beg to advise you that, owing to the present rapidly changing and uncertain conditions in Russia, the Government of the United States, although according in principle with the views outlined in the suggested protest, would prefer, for the present, to abstain from joining in the publication of the proposed declaration.

I am [etc.]

FRANK L. POLK

File No. 763.72119/1471

[Document 437]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *March 16, 1918, 10 a.m.*
[*Received 1.45 p.m.*]

259. Peace terms ratified last night.²

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

² In the Moscow *Izvestia*, Mar. 16, it is stated that preliminary voting on Mar. 15 showed a heavy majority in favor of ratification; in the issue for Mar. 17 it is reported that voting, by name, in favor of ratification, was completed on Mar. 16.

The Minister in the Netherlands (Garrett) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

THE HAGUE, *March 19, 1918.*
[Received 8.50 p.m.]

2159. Hertling's speech Reichstag:

When I first spoke here December 29 last I was able to inform Reichstag that Russian Government had communicated proposal to the various belligerents to open negotiations for armistice and general peace. We and our allies accepted proposal and soon sent delegates to Brest. The powers allied to Russia until then stayed away. The course of negotiations is familiar to you. You recall the endless speeches intended not so much for delegates assembled there as for general publicity and continually postponed realization of object for which we had to aim. You recall also repeated interruptions and resumption of negotiations. A point was reached where it was necessary to propose two alternatives. March 3 peace was concluded at Brest and on 16th ratified by authorized assembly at Moscow.³ It is not my intention to deal with opinions expressed by enemy powers concerning peace with Russia where hypocrisy has become second nature and love of untruth grown to brutality; where they dare to speak of absolute unselfishness of their policy at very moment when they intend to put hand of oppressor on neutral country. Every effort to express oneself quietly, every serious speech, is bound to be in vain and if telegram from Washington thought fit to express sympathy of United States with Congress assembled at Moscow at this time asserting that Germany's forces had invaded Russia to put an end to struggle for freedom, I can put this also aside with the rest.⁴ We never thought for moment and do not think of opposing just wishes of Russia, liberated from Tsarism. As I said in my speech last year, we wish that sorely tried country speedy return to calm and orderly conditions and deeply regret it if they seem to be in remote future and terrible conditions obtain in many places. Adverting to conclusion of peace itself, you have clearly seen that it contains no terms dishonorable for Russia, no heavy war costs and indemnities, no forcible annexation of Russian territory. If number of frontier countries have been separated from official federation, this is in accordance with will of those

countries recognized by Russia. With regard to those countries, we take position already made perfectly clear that they may place themselves under powerful protection of German Empire and have form of government which suits conditions obtaining there and direction of their civilization, naturally, provided our interests are guaranteed. Courland is farthest advanced in development. As you know, authorized delegation of Courland appeared here a few days ago. It notified us of separation of that country from state with which heretofore associated and expressed wish for close economic, military, and political attachment to Germany. In reply, which Emperor ordered me as representative of Empire in international law to give, I recognized Courland's autonomy and took note with thanks and pleasure of desired close attachment of German Empire which accords with old civilization and relations extending back for centuries. However, I reserved final decision regarding political constellation until conditions there shall have become further consolidated and constitutionally authorized organs shall have defined their attitude. As regards Lithuania, a resolution was passed last year aiming at close attachment to German Empire in economic and military respect. I expect in few days a delegation from the National Council which is again to notify us of that resolution and then the recognition of Lithuania as an independent state will take place. We await with composure the further development of political affairs. With regard to Livonia and Esthonia, matters are somewhat different. These two countries are situated east of boundary agreed upon in peace treaty but are occupied by German police force pursuant to Article 6 of treaty with Russia until such time as security is guaranteed by institutions of the country itself and order is restored. Then the time will come for the political reorganization of these countries also. We hope and wish that they also will come to close and friendly relation with German Empire but of such a nature as not to exclude peaceable and friendly relations with Russia. A few words about Poland. Although it is not expressly mentioned in peace treaty, as you know it was the proclamation of two Emperors, November 5, 1916, which proclaimed to whole world autonomy of that country; it follows that further development of new state can only take place on ground of joint negotiations between Germany and Danube monarchy on one side and Poland on other. Recently proposals were made by Polish political circles for development of our future attitude and submitted to Government and members of Reichstag. We shall gladly examine them to see whether or to what extent they are compatible with the objects followed by both Governments and to what extent they can contribute towards permanent and good friendly relations with the newly formed state, our interests being guaranteed. If you approve of treaty submitted to you, and I do not doubt that you will, we hope in few days peace with Rumania will also be concluded and then peace is ready on whole eastern front. But that is not world peace. Not the slightest inclination is manifested in the countries of

the Entente to cease warfare. Their will is to continue the terrible struggle until our destruction. We shall not lose courage. For this reason we are prepared for everything. Prepared to make further sacrifice in our absolute confidence in the splendid command of our army and in our heroic soldiers, but the responsibility falls on the attitude of our enemy.

GARRETT

³ See footnote 2.

⁴ See message from President Wilson to the people of Russia, *ante*, p. 395 [*Pg. 395 includes portions of [Doc. 396](#), [Doc. 397](#), and [Doc. 398](#)*].

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

No. 8633

LONDON, *March 25, 1918.*
[*Received April 8.*]

SIR: With reference to my telegram, No. 9157 of March 21,¹ regarding the statement concerning Russia and the German peace made public by the Supreme War Council held in London last week, I have the honor to transmit herewith the text of the statement referred to.

I have [etc.]

WALTER HINES PAGE

[Enclosure]

PRESS BUREAU, *March 18, 1918, 10.10 p.m.*

The following statement has been issued by the Foreign Office:

The Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of the Entente, assembled in London, feel it to be their bounden duty to take note of the political crimes, which, under the name of a German peace, have been committed against the Russian people.

Russia was unarmed. Forgetting that for four years Germany had been fighting against the independence of the nations and the rights of mankind, the Russian government, in a mood of singular credulity, expected to obtain by persuasion that "democratic peace" which it had failed to obtain by war.

The results were immediate. The armistice had not expired before the German command, though pledged not to alter the disposition of its troops, transferred them *en masse* to the western front: and so weak did Russia find herself that she dared raise no protest against this flagrant violation of Germany's plighted word.

What followed was of like character. When the "German peace" was translated into action, it was found to involve the invasion of Russian territory, the destruction or capture of all Russia's means of defence, and the organization of Russian lands for Germany's profit—a proceeding which did not differ from "annexation" because the word itself was carefully

avoided.

Meanwhile those very Russians who had made military operations impossible found diplomacy impotent. Their representatives were compelled to proclaim that, while they refused to read the treaty presented to them, they had no choice but to sign it: so they signed it, not knowing whether, in its true significance, it meant peace or war, nor measuring the degree to which Russian national life was reduced by it to a shadow.

For us of the Entente Governments the judgment which the free peoples of the world will pass on these transactions could never be in doubt. Why waste time over German pledges, when we see that at no period in her history of conquest—not when she overran Silesia, not when she partitioned Poland—has she exhibited herself so cynically as the destroyer of national independence, the implacable enemy of the rights of man and the dignity of civilized nations.

Poland, whose heroic spirit has survived the cruelest of national tragedies, is threatened with a fourth partition: and to aggravate her wrongs the devices by which the last trace of her independence is to be crushed are based on fraudulent promises of freedom.

What is true of Russia and Poland is not less true of Rumania, overwhelmed like them in the flood of a merciless passion for domination.

Peace is loudly advertised, but under the thin disguise of verbal professions lurk the brutal realities of war and the untempered rule of lawless force.

Peace treaties such as these we do not, and cannot, acknowledge. Our own ends are very different; we are fighting, and mean to continue fighting, in order to finish once for all with this policy of plunder, and to establish in its place the peaceful reign of organized justice.

As the incidents of this long war unroll themselves before our eyes, more and more clearly do we perceive that the battles for freedom are everywhere interdependent; that no separate enumeration of them is needed; that in every case the single but all sufficient appeal is to justice and right.

Are justice and right going to win? In so far as the issue depends on battles yet to come, the nations whose fate is in the balance may surely put their trust in armies which, even under conditions more difficult than the present, shewed themselves more than equal to the great cause entrusted to their valour.

¹ Not printed.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *March 25, 1918.*
[Received 9 p.m.]

1762. Swedish press reports from Berlin:

In consequence of Ambassador Francis's declaration concerning his attitude as circulated by Petrograd's telegram bureau regarding ratification Russo-German peace,¹ the German Government has sent Russian Government the following wireless:

Imperial German Government confident Russian Government will give reply in accordance with peace treaty concluded between Russia—Central powers to this declaration which constitutes public invitation to resume war against Germany.

MORRIS

¹ *Post*, p. 440 [Pg. 440 includes portions of [Doc. 441](#) and [Doc. 442](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 2, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received April 4, 2.55 a.m.]

57. Russian reply to German protest against my declaration stated latter only a repetition of "the President's well-known message to Soviet Congress" but I think the President's message to Russian people through Congress was intended to prevent ratification by expressing good will and encouragement while my declaration was made after peace ratification, intended to inspire dissatisfaction with ratification and as Germany claims was virtual appeal to continue hostilities. Germany's rejoinder to Russian reply merely reiterates first charge. Think incident closed. Have received no expression even indirectly from Soviet government except Robins's telegram that declaration was gratifying to the government which was mystifying as declaration disapproved government action. This indicates peace distasteful to Russian government and ratified on each [as?] breathing spell, as Lenin said, meaning however breathing spell condemning [permitting?] prosecution of world-wide social revolution.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 1107

VOLOGDA, April 15, 1918.
[Received July 13.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose for your information copy of statement to the Russian people made by myself on the ratification of separate peace between Russia and the Central Empires by the All-Russian Soviet Congress at Moscow March 17.¹

It appears that this declaration was objectionable to the German Government which protested through its Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Soviet government and asked that reply be made to my declaration in accordance with the spirit of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty. I also enclose copies of the protest² and the reply of the Soviet government thereto.

As I am cabling you fully and daily concerning relations between the Soviet government and the Central Empires and about general conditions in Russia and as this despatch may not reach you within two months, as there is no prospect of sending pouch by courier, I shall not write further on the subject.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure 1]

Statement made by Ambassador Francis on March 16, 1918

American Ambassador Francis when asked if he would leave Russia since peace with Germany has been ratified by the Moscow conference and what attitude his Government would assume towards Russia made the following statement:

I shall not leave Russia until forced to depart. My Government and the American people are too deeply interested in the welfare of the Russian people to abandon the country and leave its people to the mercies of Germany. America is sincerely interested in Russia and in the freedom of the Russian people. We shall do all possible to promote the true interests of the Russians and to protect and preserve the integrity of this great country. The friendship between Russia and the United States which has existed for a century or more should be augmented rather than impaired by Russia's becoming a Republic and all Americans are sincerely desirous that

Russians should be permitted to continue free and independent and not become subjects of Germany.

I have not yet seen an authentic copy of the peace treaty but am sufficiently acquainted with its provisions to know that if the Russian people submit thereto Russia will not only be robbed of vast areas of her rich territory but will eventually become virtually a German province and her people will lose the liberties for which their ancestors have struggled and sacrificed for generations past. My Government considers America an ally of the Russian people who surely will not reject the proffered assistance which we shall be prompt to render any power in Russia that will offer sincere and organized resistance to the German invasion.

If the Russian people who are brave and patriotic will hold in abeyance for the time being their political differences and be resolute and firm and united they could drive the enemy from their borders and secure before the end of 1918 for themselves and the world an enduring peace.

[Enclosure 2]

Reply of the Soviet Government to the inquiry from the German Government concerning the statement of Ambassador Francis to representatives of the press at Vologda¹

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
BERLIN.

The statement made by the American Ambassador Francis is, in fact, a repetition of the well-known message of President Wilson to the Extraordinary Congress of Soviets. In reply to this message, the Congress of Soviets adopted without objections, and with great applause, a resolution expressing thanks to the American people, giving preference to the laboring and exploited classes of the United States for their expression of good will to the Russian people through the Soviet Congress in the days when the Socialistic Soviet Republic of Russia was living through the most difficult experiences. The Russian Socialistic Soviet Federated Republic took advantage of President Wilson's message to express to all the peoples suffering from the imperialistic war, its warm sympathy and firm conviction that the happy moments when the laboring masses of all *bourgeois* lands would overthrow the yoke of capitalism and establish socialistic order, the only order capable of guaranteeing a lasting and firm peace and promotion of culture and welfare of all nations, is not far off.

The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs considers that the best reply that can be made to the inquiry of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, is reference to this resolution, expressing the opinions of the wide masses of Russian people represented at the Congress by delegations from their Soviets, the most democratic direct method of representation. Through these direct representatives

the roll call of March 16 ratified the Brest treaty, by a majority of 724 against 276 votes (180 refraining). The laboring and exploited masses of Russia themselves decided to conclude peace with Germany. Never before in history did such masses participate in the solution of political problems, especially a problem of war or peace. The laboring masses who have borne the brunt of all sufferings and deprivations of the war and are now experiencing its tragic consequences, fully cognizant of the meaning and importance of their actions, adopted the decision to terminate the war. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs believes that a reminder of these facts will serve as a full and satisfactory reply to the German Government. The People's Commissariat in turn cannot help but point out the advance of German troops in the south of Russia continues in Russian territory, contrary to the terms of the Brest treaty. We repeat our request that the German Government should define definitively what it considers the boundary of the Ukraine.

COMMISSAR OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

¹ See footnote 2, *ante*, p. 436 [*Pg. 436 includes portions of [Doc. 437](#) and [Doc. 438](#)*].

² *Ante*, p. 439 [*Pg. 439 includes portions of [Doc. 439](#), [Doc. 440](#), and [Doc. 441](#)*].

¹ Source stated by the Embassy as Associated Press dispatch, Mar. 29.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegrams]

Moscow, *March 30 and April 2, 1918.*¹
[Received March 30, April 3, 7, and 11.]

301, 303, 304 and 309. The following is a translation of the—

PEACE TREATY OF BREST LITOVSK²

ARTICLE 1

Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other declare that the condition of war between them has ceased. They have decided to live in peace and accord in the future.

ARTICLE 2

The contracting parties will refrain from all agitation or propaganda against the governments or all state and military institutions of the other side. Inasmuch as this obligation affects Russia, it affects also the territories occupied by the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

ARTICLE 3

The territories lying to the west of the line determined by the contracting powers and which formerly belonged to Russia will no longer be under her sovereignty. The line determined upon is marked on the appended map (Appendix I), which is an important part of the present treaty of peace.³ The precise location of this line will be worked out by a German-Russian commission.

In respect to the mentioned territories no obligations towards Russia are to be considered as issuing from their formerly having belonged to that country.

Russia gives up all interference in the internal affairs of the said territories. Germany and Austria-Hungary intend to determine the future fate of the said territories with the consent of their inhabitants.

ARTICLE 4

Germany is ready, as soon as general peace is established and Russian demobilization will have completely taken place, to vacate the territories lying east of the line mentioned in part 1 of Article 3, insomuch as Article 6 does not rule other-wise.

Russia will do all in her power to have the provinces of eastern Anatolia promptly evacuated and returned to Turkey.

The territories of Ardakhan, Kars and Batum will also be cleared without delay of Russian troops. Russia will not interfere in the new organization of internal juridical and international juridical relations of such territories, but will allow the populations of these territories to establish new governments in agreement with neighboring states, especially with Turkey.

ARTICLE 5

Russia will, without delay, proceed to demobilize her army, including those army units newly formed by her present government.

Moreover Russia will either bring her warships into Russian ports and keep them there until general peace is concluded, or will disarm them at once. The warships of the countries continuing in a state of war with the Quadruple Alliance, in so far as such warships are within the sphere of Russian sovereignty, must be treated as Russian warships.

The prohibition zone of the Arctic Ocean remains in force until the conclusion of general peace. In the Baltic Sea and those parts of the Black Sea under Russia's supremacy, the clearing away of mine defense must be begun at once. Merchant navigation in those sea regions is free and is to recommence at once. Mixed commissions are to be formed for the purpose of framing more concise regulations and especially for the purpose of publication of general information as to safe courses of sailing for trading vessels. Such courses must always be free of floating mines.

ARTICLE 6

Russia undertakes to conclude peace at once with the Ukrainian people's republic and to recognize the treaty of peace between the state and the powers of the Quadruple Alliance. The territory of the Ukraine must be, at once, cleared of Russian troops and of the Russian Red Guard. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or the public institutions of the Ukrainian people's republic.

Esthonia and Livonia must be also immediately cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard. The eastern boundary of Esthonia passes in general along the River Narova. The eastern boundary of Livonia, in general, crosses the Lakes Chud [Peipus] and Pskov up to the southwestern corner of the latter, thence it runs across Lake Luban in the direction of Lievenhof on the Western Dvina. Esthonia and Livonia will be occupied by German police force until public safety is secured by proper institutions of the country and until governmental order is reestablished. Russia will at once liberate all the inhabitants of Esthonia and Livonia who have been arrested or deported and will secure a safe return of all deported Esthonians and Livonians.

Finland and the Åland Islands will be also, without delay, cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard and Finnish ports of the Russian fleet and of Russian naval forces. While ice lenders impossible the conveying of warships to Russian ports there must remain on board only a limited crew. Russia ceases all agitation or propaganda against the government or public institutions of Finland.

The fortifications constructed on the Åland Islands must be razed at the first opportunity. As regards the prohibition to erect fortifications of these islands in the future, as well as the question of their future in general in a military respect and in respect to the technical side of navigation, a special agreement must be concluded between Germany, Finland, Russia and Sweden; the parties consent that at Germany's desire other countries bordering the Baltic Sea may be called upon to take part in the above agreement.

ARTICLE 7

Considering the fact that Persia and Afghanistan are free and independent countries, the contracting parties bind themselves to respect the political and economic independence and the territorial inviolability of Persia and Afghanistan.

ARTICLE 8

The prisoners of war of both parties will be allowed to return home. The regulation of questions in connection with the above will be the subject of special treaties mentioned in Article 12.

ARTICLE 9

The contracting parties mutually renounce all indemnifications for their war expenses, that is, for government expenses for conducting the war, as well as all compensation of war losses, that is, such losses as were caused them and their citizens in the zone of war by military operations, including all requisitions made in the enemy's country.

ARTICLE 10

Diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties are resumed at once after ratification of the treaty of peace. The question of allowing consuls of both parties free entrance will be decided by a separate agreement.

ARTICLE 11

The economic relations between the powers of the Quadruple Alliance and Russia are regulated by decisions contained in Appendices II to V. Appendix II determines the relations between Germany and Russia, Appendix III between Austria-Hungary and Russia, Appendix IV between Bulgaria and Russia and Appendix V between Turkey and Russia.

ARTICLE 12

The reestablishment of public and private legal relations, the exchange of war and civil prisoners, the question of amnesty as well as the question regarding

merchant ships which have been seized by one or the other side, will be provided for in separate treaties with Russia, which form an important part of the present peace treaty, and as far as it is possible come into force simultaneously with the latter.

ARTICLE 13

In interpreting this treaty the authentic texts for relations between Germany and Russia shall be the German and Russian texts, between Austria-Hungary and Russia the German, Hungarian and Russian texts, between Bulgaria and Russia the Bulgarian and Russian texts, between Turkey and Russia the Turkish and Russian texts.

ARTICLE 14

The present peace treaty must be ratified. Exchange of ratification documents must take place in Berlin as soon as possible. The Russian Government binds itself to execute the exchange of ratification documents at the desire of one of the powers of the Quadruple Alliance in the course of two weeks. The peace treaty enters into force at the moment of its ratification, unless otherwise stipulated in the respective articles, appendices thereof or supplementary agreements thereto.

In witness thereof the plenipotentiaries have with their own hand signed the present treaty.

Done in quintuplicate, Brest Litovsk, March 3, 1918.

THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT, SUPPLEMENTARY TO THE PEACE TREATY CONCLUDED BETWEEN GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA AND TURKEY ON THE ONE HAND AND RUSSIA ON THE OTHER

On the basis of Article 12 of the peace treaty, concluded between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey on the one hand and Russia on the other, the duly commissioned representatives of the German Empire and the plenipotentiary representatives of the Russian Federal Republic of Soviets have agreed to regulate immediately the reestablishment of public and private juridical relations between Germany and Russia, the exchange of war and civil prisoners, the care of returning fugitives, the amnesty provided for by the conclusion of peace, and also to define the status of merchant vessels fallen into the hands of the enemy, and for this purpose to conclude a supplementary agreement to the peace treaty.

These representatives having duly established that their respective full powers which were used at the signing of the peace treaty also empowered them to deal with the questions above enumerated, entered into agreement in regard to the following:

CHAPTER I.—*Reestablishment of diplomatic and consular relations*

ARTICLE 1

On the reestablishment of consular relations in accordance with the terms of Article 10 of the treaty of peace, each high contracting party agrees to admit consuls of the other party to all parts of its territory, except to such places where, for reason of mixed dialect or other, exceptions were made before the war and in so far as such exceptions will equally apply after the war to any third state without any exception whatsoever.

In the same manner each high contracting party reserves the right, for military reasons, to admit consuls to certain places only after the conclusion of universal peace.

ARTICLE 2

Each high contracting party indemnifies all losses which have been caused during the war within her territory in violation of international law by any action of governing bodies or by the population towards the diplomatic and consular agents of the other, its embassy or consular property, movable or immovable.

CHAPTER II.—*Reestablishment of political treaties*

ARTICLE 3

Treaties, agreements and conventions, which were in force between the contracting parties before the declaration of the war, shall again enter into legal power after the ratification of the peace treaty and the present supplementary agreement with the exception of such cases as may include contradictory decisions and with the exception of cases where these treaties, agreements and conventions were concluded for a definite period, in which cases this period will be prolonged to cover the war.

ARTICLE 4

Each of the contracting parties may advise the other in the course of six months after the signing of the peace treaty what treaties, agreements, or conventions, or their separate decisions are contradictory, in its opinion, to the changes that have taken place during the war. Such agreements or treaties must, as soon as possible, be replaced by new ones, corresponding to the changed views' and relations.

For the composing of new treaties provided for in paragraph 1, a commission, consisting of representatives of both sides, will be convoked in Berlin in the course of six months after the ratification of the peace treaty. In case the commission in the course of three months after its convocation does not arrive at any agreement, each party has the right to renounce such treaties regarding which it notified the other party as per the first part of paragraph 1; if this concerns separate articles of any treaty, the other party has the right to reject the whole treaty.

ARTICLE 5

Treaties, agreements and conventions in which, besides the contracting parties, other powers take part, enter into force for both parties after the ratification of the peace treaty, in so far as they do not contain contradictory decisions. Separate

treaties between both parties, which are connected with collective treaties, are not affected by the provisions of Article 3 regarding prolongation of the validity of treaties and Article 4 regarding rejection of treaties. After the conclusion of general peace, both parties reserve the right to take up a definite position in relation to collective treaties of a political nature in which also take part other belligerent powers.

CHAPTER III.—*Restoration of private juridical relations*

ARTICLE 6

All regulations existing in the territory of one of the contracting parties, by which the subjects of the other party, on account of special war conditions, are subject to any special limitations (war legislation) in respect to their private rights, become null and void after the ratification of the peace treaty.

Just as subjects of each of the contracting parties are regarded, just so are to be regarded juridical persons and companies who have their permanent residence in its territory. Juridical persons and companies who have no permanent residence in its territory, will be placed on equal terms with the country's own subjects, in so far as they are affected in the territory of the other party by regulations governing these subjects.

ARTICLE 7

Regarding private debt relations in so far as same have been influenced by the laws of war time the following is decided:

1. Debt relations are reestablished unless stipulated otherwise in Articles 7 to 11.
2. The substance of 1 does not prevent the question regarding influence of circumstances created by the war on debt relations, particularly the impossibility of fulfilling same owing to transportation difficulties or commercial prohibitions, from being decided in the territory of each contracting party according to the laws common to all inhabitants of the country.

The subjects of the party who are restricted in their rights, owing to the measures taken by the opposing party, must not be placed under less favorable conditions than the country's own subjects who are affected by those measures. In the same manner no one whom the war prevented from fulfilling in due time any kind of obligation should be bound to reimburse losses arising through these circumstances.

3. Pecuniary obligations, the settlement of which was refused during the war on the ground of war legislation, need not be paid before the expiration of six months after the ratification of the peace treaty. On these obligations interest must be paid for the term beginning with the date the payment was due until the termination of the war and for the additional six months at the rate of 5 per cent per annum, disregarding moratoriums; in case interest was stipulated for the original term of payment, such interest must also be paid.

The contracting parties reserve the right to work out more concise regulations regarding legislation in respect to bills of exchange and checks as well as transactions in foreign currency.

4. For the liquidation of debts and other private legal obligations, both contracting parties acknowledge and admit associations recognized by the state for the protection of creditors' interests, in the capacity of authorized solicitors of natural and juridical persons.

ARTICLE 8

Each contracting party, including the states constituting it, immediately after the ratification of the peace treaty renews the payment of its obligations, especially of interest on state liabilities, to the citizens of the other party. Obligations for which payment was due before the ratification of the peace treaty, are to be paid within six months after the ratification.

The regulation contained in part 1 does not apply to claims presented to one party which claims became the property of a subject of the other party only after the signing of the peace treaty.

ARTICLE 9

Regarding the rights of copyright, the rights of industrial patents, concessions and privileges and all similar claims of public legal nature, inasmuch as same have been affected by the laws of war time, the following resolutions are made:

1. The rights indicated in the beginning of the article are reestablished unless otherwise stipulated in Article 11. The holder of the right is released from dues which should have been paid, during the time when he was deprived of the possibility of enjoying same; should these dues have been paid they are subject to reimbursement; in case the state has received a profit exceeding the dues to be paid, owing to the fact that the above-mentioned rights have been enjoyed by third parties, the surplus is to be paid to the holder of the right.

In accordance with the degree in which the state has utilized the appropriated rights, the holder of the right should be correspondingly recompensed.

2. Each contracting party extends to the citizens of the opposing party a term of not less than one year from the ratification of the peace treaty, in order to allow them to take necessary action, provided this does not violate the legally appropriated rights of third persons to establish or maintain the rights of an industrial patent, in case the legal term given for such action has been allowed to lapse owing to the war.

Industrial patents of the citizens of one party can not be declared invalid on the territory of the other party on the strength of their not having been put to use earlier than four years after the ratification.

3. The stipulation of part 1 of paragraph 1 shall not apply to concessions and privileges, nor to analogous claims in the nature of a public right, in so far as the

same have been rescinded or have been declared to have passed into the hands of the state or of the local self-government and remain in their possession on the grounds of legislative acts obligatory for all the inhabitants of the country and applying to all rights of the same kind; in these cases the compensation of the owner of the right is determined by the stipulations of Article 13.

4. The contracting parties reserve the right to work out special legislation in regard to the priority of the right to industrial patents.

ARTICLE 10

The terms of expiration of rights shall not expire in the territory of one of the contracting parties for the citizens of the opposite party earlier than after the lapse of one year after the ratification of the peace treaty, in so far as they did not expire up to the time of the declaration of war. The same applies to the periods for the presentation of interest certificates and dividend certificates, as well as to securities which have become payable through drawing of lots or other causes.

ARTICLE 11

The activity of institutions engaged, on strength of war legislation, in supervising, safeguarding, managing or liquidating properties or collecting payments, shall, without violations of stipulations of Articles 12 and 13, be liquidated in accordance with the following fundamental rules:

1. Properties which are under supervision, safeguard or management must be withdrawn from same immediately at the request of the proprietors; up to the time of being taken over by the latter, their interests must be safeguarded.

Moneys and securities located in the central institution for safekeeping valuables, or with society for deposit operations, or in any other savings institution recognized by the state, shall be placed at the disposal of their respective proprietors within three months after the ratification of the peace treaty; interest must be paid out together with moneys at the rate of 4 per cent per annum from the time of making the deposit; accrued interest and dividends shall be paid out together with the securities.

2. The stipulations of paragraph 1 shall not infringe upon legally acquired rights of third persons. Payments and other obligations of the debtor, paid in to the institutions mentioned at the beginning of the present article, or to their order, shall, on the territory of the contracting parties, have the same status as if the creditor himself had received them.

Private legal measures taken by these institutions, at their occasion, or for them, are valid for both parties.

3. Respecting the activity of institutions mentioned at the commencement of this article, particularly regarding receipts and disbursements, information must be supplied immediately at their request to persons entitled to such.

Claims for compensation for losses caused by the actions of these institutions or

by actions performed at their direction, may be presented only in accordance with stipulations of Article 13.

ARTICLE 12

Parcels of land or rights to a parcel of land, privileges for the working of the subsoil, and also rights to the use or exploitation of parcels of land, of an enterprise or a share in an enterprise, especially shares expropriated or forcibly seized in connection with war legislation, must be restored to the former proprietor within one year after the ratification of the peace treaty on the strength of a claim having been tendered,¹ after deducting profits accrued to him as a result of the said expropriation or seizure, exempt from all rights established in the meantime by third parties.

The stipulations of part 1 do not apply in so far as the properties expropriated have passed into the hands of the state or of the local self-government and remain in their possession on the ground of legislative acts obligatory for all the inhabitants of the country and for all properties of the same kind. In these cases the compensation to the owner is determined in accordance with the stipulations of Art. 13. In the case of such a transfer being rescinded, the demand for restoration provided for in part 1 may be presented in the course of one year after the rescinding.

CHAPTER IV.—*Compensation for civil losses*

ARTICLE 13

A subject of one of the contracting parties, who has sustained a loss in property on the territory of the opposite party, in consequence of war legislation, owing to having been temporarily or permanently deprived of author's rights; industrial patents, concessions, privileges and such like claims to rights, or owing to supervision, safeguarding, management or expropriation of his property, must receive corresponding compensation, in so far as the loss has not been compensated for by the restoration of the former state of affairs. This refers to shareholders who, in the capacity of subjects of hostile countries, were deprived of the right of preemption.

ARTICLE 14

Each contracting party shall recompense the civilians of the opposite party for losses caused to them on the territory, during time of the war, by state institutions, or by the population, by acts of violence to life, health and property, contrary to international law. This stipulation also applies to losses sustained by subjects of one party in their capacity of participants in institutions located on the territory of the opposite party.

ARTICLE 15

To establish losses which must be compensated for according to Articles 13 and 14, a commission shall be convoked at Petrograd, shortly after the ratification of

the peace treaty, formed of representatives of both parties and neutral members in equal numbers; the parties will apply to the President of the Swiss Federal Council to designate the neutral members, including the chairman of the commission.

The commission will establish the fundamental bases by which it will be guided in its decisions. It also will establish the order of conducting the affairs necessary for the fulfillment of its task, and will decide upon the action to be taken for this purpose. Its decisions are reached in subcommissions consisting of one representative of each party and one neutral chairman. The sums determined upon by the subcommissions must be paid within one month after the amount has been established.

ARTICLE 16

Each contracting party will immediately settle for all articles taken by it on its territory from citizens of the opposite party, in so far as this has not been done already.

A special agreement shall be made in regard to determining the compensation for such property values of subjects of one party as are not taken into account among the cases enumerated in paragraph 3 of Article 9, and part 2 of Article 12, and were expropriated, without a sufficient compensation, on the territory of the opposite party.

CHAPTER V.—*Exchange of war prisoners and civil prisoners*

ARTICLE 17

The exchange of prisoners of war provided for in Article 8 of the peace treaty is governed by the following regulations:

1. The prisoners of war of both parties shall be set at liberty to return home, in so far as they do not desire, with the consent of the state which took them prisoners, to remain within its boundaries, or leave for another country.

The exchange of prisoners of war unfit for military service, which has already begun, will be continued with the greatest possible speed.

The exchange of other prisoners of war will take place as speedily as possible at established intervals of time to be exactly determined upon by means of a mutual agreement.

Russia will admit and assist, as far as possible, on its territory German commissions, which will be charged with the care for German prisoners of war.

2. In liberating prisoners of war, there shall be restored to them their private property which was taken away from them by the authorities of the state which took them prisoners, and also that part of their earnings which has not yet been paid or credited them; this obligation does not apply to written documents of military contents.

3. Each of the contracting parties will refund such expenses for the maintenance of

its citizens who have been taken prisoners, incurred by the opposite party, in so far as these expenses have not been compensated for by the work of the prisoners of war in state or private establishments.

The payment will be made in the currency of the state which made the prisoners, in separate instalments for each 50,000 persons, to be paid each time within one week of departure.

4. Immediately upon ratification of the peace treaty a commission shall be convoked at a place yet to be determined upon consisting of four representatives of each of the parties, for the purpose of defining the intervals of time provided for in part 3 of paragraph 1, and also other details of the exchange, especially the method and procedure of repatriation, and in order to supervise the putting into effect of the agreements arrived at.

Furthermore, the commission will establish the expenses in connection with prisoners of war, provided for in paragraph 3, liable to a refund by both parties. If in the course of two months after the commencement of its work the commission does not arrive at an agreement in regard to these expenses, the latter shall be definitely established after calling in a neutral chairman by a majority of votes; the parties will apply to the President of the Swiss Federal Council to nominate the chairman of the commission.

ARTICLE 18

The repatriation of civil prisoners shall be governed by the following regulations:

1. The interned or deported civil prisoners of both parties shall be repatriated free of charge, as soon as possible, in so far as they do not desire, with the consent of that state in which they are located, to remain within its boundaries or to leave for another country.

The agreement concluded at Petrograd in regard to repatriating civil prisoners shall be put into effect with the greatest possible speed.

The commission provided for in paragraph 4 of Article 17 shall settle the questions left open in the Petrograd negotiations, and see to the carrying out of the agreements arrived at.

The German commissions provided for in part 4 of paragraph 1 of Article 17 shall undertake also the care for German civil prisoners.

2. The subjects of one of the parties who, at the commencement of the war, were residing on the territory of the opposite party and had industrial or commercial enterprises there, who are no longer there, may return as soon as the opposite party ceases to be in a state of war. A return may be refused only for reasons of the internal safety of the state.

As evidence a passport will suffice issued by the authorities of the home country in which shall be stated that the owner of the same belongs to the class of persons specified in part 1; a visa on the passport is not necessary.

ARTICLE 19

The nationals of each of the contracting parties shall not be subjected on the territory of the opposite party, for the time that their industrial or commercial enterprise was not in operation or that they were unable to occupy themselves with their trade, owing to the war, to any assessments, deductions, taxes or dues for their industrial or commercial enterprises or other trade activities. Amounts which, in accordance with the foregoing, were not liable to collection, but which had already been levied, must be refunded in the course of six months after the ratification of the peace treaty.

The stipulations of part 1 shall correspondingly apply to commercial and industrial societies (companies) in which the subjects of one of the parties participated as members, shareholders or in some other capacity, and whose establishments on the territory of the opposite party were not in operation in consequence of the war.

ARTICLE 20

Each of the contracting parties obligates itself to honor and to maintain in order the graves located on its territory of military as well as other subjects of the opposite party who died during the time of internment or deportation; the persons empowered by this party shall be entitled to enter into agreement with the local authorities in regard to the maintenance and adornment of the graves. In regard to separate questions connected with the maintenance of graves, further agreements will be concluded.

CHAPTER VI.—*Care of the repatriated*

ARTICLE 21

The subjects of each of the contracting parties who resided on the territory of the opposite party shall, by means of an agreement with the authorities of this party, be given the right to return to their home country in the course of ten years after the ratification of the peace treaty.

Persons who have the right to return to their home country must, at their request, be allowed to leave the country in which they lived up to that time. No hindrance or difficulty shall be put in their way in their written or verbal communications with the diplomatic or consular representatives of their home country.

The German commissions provided for in part 4, paragraph 1, Article 17, will also take upon themselves the care for the German reemigrants.

ARTICLE 22

Those returning home shall receive a fair indemnification for the injuries caused to them during the time of the war owing to their origin, and, in realization of their right to repatriation, they are not to suffer any detriment of a proprietary or legal character. They shall be entitled to liquidate their property and to take away with them the amount realized, as well as other movable articles; furthermore,

they are entitled to repudiate lease contracts, on condition of giving six months' notice, and the lessor, in this case, is not entitled to claim damages caused to him by the premature cancellation of the lease contract.

CHAPTER VII.—*Amnesty*

ARTICLE 23

Each of the contracting parties shall grant to the subjects of the other party immunity from punishment in accordance with the following regulations:

1. Each of the contracting parties grants to the prisoners of war of the opposite party full immunity from punishment for actions committed by them subject to judicial or disciplinary punishment.
2. Each of the contracting parties grants to the civil prisoners of the opposite party who were interned or deported during the war, a complete immunity from punishment for actions committed by them during the time of internment or deportation, subject to judicial or disciplinary punishment.
3. Each of the contracting parties grants to all subjects of the opposite party full immunity from punishment for punishable actions committed by them for the benefit of this party, and for digressions against exceptional laws promulgated in relation to subjects of the hostile country.
4. The immunity from punishment provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 shall not extend to actions committed after the ratification of the peace treaty.

ARTICLE 24

Each of the contracting parties shall grant full immunity from punishment to persons belonging to its own army for work done by them in the capacity of prisoners of war to the opposite party. The same applies to work done by civil prisoners of both parties during the time of their internment or deportation.

ARTICLE 25

Each of the contracting parties shall grant to inhabitants of its territory occupied by the opposite party complete immunity from punishment for their political or military conduct during the time of occupation.

Irrespective of the cases specified in part 1, each of the parties shall grant to the inhabitants of territories which, in accordance with Articles 3 and 5 of the treaty of peace, are no longer in the sovereign possession of Russia or which must be evacuated by Russian troops, full immunity from punishment for their political or military conduct prior to the ratification of the peace treaty.

ARTICLE 26

In so far as by the stipulations of Articles 23 and 25 immunity from punishment is granted, no new lawsuits are commenced, and those already commenced shall be stopped, and the punishments already pronounced shall not be put into effect.

Prisoners of war who were under preliminary arrest or in prison for military or state treason, premeditated murder, robbery, extortionate robbery, premeditated arson or crime against morality, may be retained under arrest up to the time of their repatriation, which shall coincide as far as possible with the first exchange of those fit for military service. Furthermore, Germany reserves, up to the conclusion of general peace, the right to take such measures against persons to whom she grants immunity from punishment as are necessary for the interests of her military safety.

Persons to whom immunity from punishment has been granted, and their families, shall also not be subjected to other limitation of rights; if this has taken place, they shall be restored to their former position.

ARTICLE 27

The contracting parties reserve the right to conclude further agreements, on the grounds of which each of the parties will grant immunity from punishment and other limitations of rights for actions committed to its detriment.

CHAPTER VIII.—*Status of merchant vessels and cargoes which have fallen into the hands of the enemy*

ARTICLE 28

To merchant vessels of the contracting parties and to their cargoes shall apply, irrespective of contrary decisions of prize courts, the sixth Hague convention of the 18th of October 1907,¹ relating to the treatment of merchant vessels of the enemy country at the commencement of the operations of war, on the basis of the following regulations:

The permit for leaving the harbor in the sense of part 1 of Article 2 of the said convention can be considered as granted only when this has been recognized by the other enemy maritime powers as well. Merchant vessels which, in accordance with part 2 of Article 2 have been utilized, shall either be returned with a remuneration for the time of their having been utilized, or, in the event of their having perished, their value is to be refunded in money. In regard to merchant vessels which were not utilized, the country under whose flag they sailed shall refund the reconditioning expenses, but not the fee for their lying in harbor and other expenses in connection therewith. Merchant vessels which, due to their construction, may be converted into warships are included with the other merchant vessels, irrespective of Article 5 of the said convention.

The stipulations of this article also apply to those merchant vessels which were utilized or seized prior to the commencement of the war.

ARTICLE 29

Merchant vessels of the contracting parties, seized as prizes, must be definitely considered as such, if, prior to the signing of the peace treaty, they have been recognized as prizes by the legal judgments of the prize courts, and if they do not

come under the stipulations of Articles 28 and 30. In all other cases they must be returned; if they have perished, their value shall be refunded in money.

The stipulations of part 1 apply to cargoes of subjects of the contracting parties seized as prizes. However, the property of subjects of one party, which, being on board of a vessel under enemy flag, was seized by the opposite party, shall in all cases be restored to the owner, and if this be impossible, its value shall be refunded in money.

ARTICLE 30

Merchant vessels of one of the contracting parties which were seized, confiscated or sunk by the military forces of the opposite party in neutral territorial waters, shall be, as well as their cargoes, irrespective of decisions of prize courts to the contrary, restored, and if they no longer exist, their value shall be refunded in money; for the period of time up to the restoration of the refund of the value of the vessel, compensation shall be made.

ARTICLE 31

Merchant vessels which must be returned in accordance with Articles 28 to 30, are placed at the disposal of the country under whose flag they sailed, immediately after ratification of the peace treaty, in the state in which they are at the time and in the harbor in which they are lying. If such vessel is at sea on the day of the ratification, then, after the termination of her voyage and the discharge of the cargo which she had on board on this day, and in no case later than within one month's time, she must be returned; for the interval of time freights are paid at the highest daily rate.

If, during the time of the utilization of a vessel liable to be returned in accordance with Article 28, her condition has deteriorated to a greater extent than from ordinary wear, this must be correspondingly compensated for. The same applies to a vessel liable to be returned in accordance with Article 30, even if she was not utilized. For damage or losses caused after the cessation of military operations by the party which is obliged to return the vessel, a compensation is to be made in all cases.

As compensation for a vessel no longer in existence, the selling price for same on the day of the ratification of the peace treaty must be paid. As compensation for utilization, freight shall be paid at the normal delivery rate.

ARTICLE 32

Immediately upon the ratification of the peace treaty, a commission shall be convoked at a place to be determined upon in the future, to put into effect the stipulations contained in Articles 28 to 31, which commission will consist of two representatives of each of the contracting parties and a neutral chairman. The parties will apply to the President of the Swiss Federal Council for nomination of the chairman of the commission. The commission shall chiefly solve questions as

to whether in the individual cases there are grounds for returning or refunding the value of a vessel or for the payment of a compensation and determine the amount to be paid in the currency of the country under whose flag the vessel sailed. These amounts, in the course of one month after they have been determined upon, are to be placed at the disposal of the country under whose flag the vessel sailed, for transmission to the owner of the vessel.

CHAPTER IX.—*Organization of the Spitsbergen Archipelago*

ARTICLE 33

The contracting parties will endeavor to attain that in the international organization of the Spitsbergen Archipelago, provided for in the Spitsbergen conference of 1914, both parties shall be placed on an equal footing.

For this purpose the Governments of both parties will ask the Royal Norwegian Government to convoke as soon as possible after the conclusion of general peace a continuation of the Spitsbergen conference.

CHAPTER X.—*Concluding regulations*

ARTICLE 34

The present additional agreement, forming an essential part of the treaty of peace, must be ratified and the exchange of the ratification acts must take place simultaneously with the exchange of the ratification acts of the peace treaty.

ARTICLE 35

The additional agreement takes effect, in so far as nothing to the contrary is stated in it, simultaneously with the peace treaty.

For the purpose of supplementing the present agreement, especially as regards the concluding of further agreements provided for in it, the representatives of the contracting parties must meet in Berlin within four months of the ratification, when also the application of the stipulations of the present additional agreement in territories which are under German protectorate will be settled.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present additional agreement with their own hand.

Done in duplicate, Brest Litovsk, March 3, 1918.

VARIATIONS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN-RUSSIAN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT FROM THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN

1. *In Article 2:*¹ The contracting parties obligate themselves to refund to each other all sums which one party paid out to the other in the territories occupied by it, in the shape of maintenance, pensions, and subsidies to subjects of the opposite party (to pensioners, to widows, to orphans and to relatives of soldiers).
2. *In lieu of Article 8:* The stipulations of this agreement do not apply to the circulation of securities and to obligations emanating from the ownership of

such, and the settlement of the questions connected with this is subject to a special agreement.

In regard to the regulations of mutual state obligations resulting from public debts, from settlements of railroads, mail and telegraph managements and so forth the contracting parties will conclude separate agreements.

3. *Incorporate in Article 17:* The expenses in connection with transportation of prisoners of war to frontier transfer station will be borne by the country which returns the prisoners of war.
4. *In lieu of paragraph 3 of Article 17:* The expenses in connection with prisoners of war, which, in accordance with the regulations of international law, are subject to refund, shall be mutually established in accordance with the numbers of the prisoners of war.
5. *Omit part 2 of paragraph 1 of Article 17.*
6. *Omit Article 25.*
7. *Omit in Article 26 from the words furthermore Germany reserves to the end, and Article 27.*
8. *Omit Article 33.*

VARIATIONS OF THE BULGARIAN–RUSSIAN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT FROM THE GERMAN–RUSSIAN

The Bulgarian–Russian additional agreement is considerably shorter than the German–Russian. Instead of whole chapters, divided into series of detailed articles, only general definitions are given. The following clauses are the most essential:

1. *From Article 3:*¹ Inasmuch as all treaties, conventions and agreements between Bulgaria and Russia, which were in force prior to the war, had to be considered invalid from the declaration of the war, the Governments of both parties obligate themselves to conclude consular and other agreements for regulating juridical and commercial relations.
2. *Article 4:* Postal and telegraphic intercourse between Bulgaria and Russia shall be resumed immediately upon ratification of the present treaty in accordance with the stipulations of the postal telegraphic convention and the agreements and regulations of the international postal and telegraphic union.
3. *From Article 5:* All temporary laws, decrees and orders issued during the time of war against subjects of the opposite party shall be rescinded.
4. *From Article 6:* Subjects of both parties, as regards relations of indebtedness, shall be granted the same advantages as each of the contracting parties grants to its own subjects.

VARIATIONS OF THE TURKISH-RUSSIAN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT FROM THE GERMAN–RUSSIAN

The agreement bears the same character as the Bulgarian–Russian. The following clauses are the most essential:

[This section of the telegram is omitted, as the agreement is printed in full below, page 471 [Pg. 471 includes portions of [Doc. 443](#) and [Doc. 444](#)].]

APPENDICES II TO V

To the treaty of peace between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, on one hand, and Russia, on the other hand—Economic agreements between (1) Germany and Russia, Appendix II—(2) Austria-Hungary and Russia, Appendix III—(3) Bulgaria and Russia, Appendix IV—(4) Turkey and Russia, Appendix V

GERMANY AND RUSSIA

APPENDIX II

In regard to economic relations between Germany and Russia the following agreement is established:

1. The German-Russian commercial treaty of 1894/1904 does not again take effect.

The contracting parties obligate themselves to commence negotiations regarding conclusion of a new commercial treaty as soon as possible after the conclusion of a general peace between Germany on the one part, and the European countries at present at war with her and the United States of America and Japan on the other part.

2. As the basis of the commercial corelationship up to the term mentioned, and in any case up to the 31st of December, 1919, shall be considered the regulations contained in the present appendix, which regulations form an integral part of the present peace treaty. Both contracting parties, are, however, entitled to repudiate these regulations beginning from the 30th of June, 1919, on condition of giving six months' notice. In case, of this right of repudiation being utilized before the 31st of December, 1922, then, for a term of three years, reckoning from the date of the cessation of the activity of the stipulations contained in the present appendix, the principle of the most-favored nation shall be established on the territory of the opposite party, for the subjects, for commercial, industrial and financial companies, including insurance companies, for the products of agriculture and industries and for vessels of both contracting parties. These regulations extend particularly to:

- (a) Acquisition and ownership of movable and immovable property, disposition of same, occupation in commerce, industry and other professions, as well as to dues levied in these instances;
- (b) Import and export and transit of goods, customs dues and customs formalities, internal dues on consumption and the like, and the prohibition of transportations;
- (c) Procedure of the state administration, or administration under the control of the state, of monopolies of one of the contracting parties in relation to buyers or

sellers of the opposite party in establishing prices, or in other business intercourse;

(d) Transportation and transportation tariffs on railways and other ways of communication;

(e) Admission and status of ships, their crews and cargoes, as well as ship's dues;

(f) Transportation of passengers by forwarding agencies, including transportation of emigrants by land and sea and the activity of emigration agents.

3. During the entire time of the application of the principle of the most-favored nation, neither of the parties shall establish, to the detriment of the opposite party, on one of the frontiers of its territory, higher import or export duties than on any other frontier.

Furthermore, in the course of this period, Russia will neither prohibit the export of rough and unworked lumber, nor levy export duty on the same, in so far as it is not especially mentioned in No. 6 of the directory of export duties, nor prohibit export or levy export duty on all kinds of ores.

4. Russia will not claim the advantages which Germany will grant to Austria-Hungary or any other country connected with her by customs union, either immediately adjoining Germany or another country connected with her or with Austria-Hungary by customs union.

Colonies, outlying possessions and territories under protectorate in this respect are placed on the same basis as the mother country.

Germany will not claim the advantages which Russia will grant to another country connected with her by customs union, either immediately adjoining Russia or another country connected with her by customs union, or to colonies, outlying possessions or territories under the protectorate of a country connected with her by customs union.

5. In so far as in neutral countries there are located goods exported from Germany or Russia and subject to prohibition of import into the territory of the other contracting party either directly or through the intermedium of another country, such limitations as to the disposition of same shall be canceled as regards the contracting parties. Both contracting parties, therefore, obligate themselves to advise immediately the governments of neutral countries of the above-stated cancellations of the limitations mentioned.

6. Privileges granted by one of the contracting parties during the time of the war to other countries in the form of concessions or other state measures, must be revoked or extended to the opposite party by granting equal rights.

7. In so far as in the tariff supplement A, or elsewhere, there are no stipulations to the contrary, the general Russian customs tariff of the 13th/26th January 1903 shall be applied for the whole period of the activity of the present provisorium and of the favored-nation principle granted for both by clause 2.

8. The agreements which existed between Germany and Russia on the 31st of July 1914 in regard to Russian sugar remain in force during the time of the present provisorium and during the action of the mutual, most-favored-nation principle established by clause 2.

9. The contracting parties are agreed that, with the conclusion of peace, the war terminates also in the sense of economic and financial relationship. They obligate themselves not to participate either directly or indirectly in measures having the aim of continuing hostilities in economic or financial spheres and to hinder such measures in the boundaries of their state territories by all means in their power.

In the course of the intermediate period required for the removal of the consequences of war and for the organization of new relations, the contracting parties obligate themselves not to create, as far as possible, any difficulties in the way of the acquisition of necessary goods in the form of introduction of high import duties, and express their willingness to enter immediately into negotiations for the purpose of maintaining and enlarging, as far as possible, the customs facilities established during the time of war.

SUPPLEMENT 1 TO APPENDIX II

ARTICLE 1

The subjects of one of the contracting parties, who have settled on the territory of the opposite party or reside temporarily on the same, shall enjoy, in their commercial and business activities, the same rights as the native inhabitants, and shall not be subjected to higher or, in general, to special taxes. In the territory of the opposite party they, in all respects, shall enjoy the same rights, privileges, franchises, advantages and exemptions as the subjects of the most-favored nation.

Both parties are, however, agreed that special laws, decrees and orders, relating to trade, commerce, industry and police, which govern or will govern in either of the contracting countries, and which apply to all foreigners, will not be affected by these considerations.

ARTICLE 2

The subjects of both contracting parties shall have the right, on the territory of the opposite party, on a basis of equality with the native inhabitants, to acquire, to possess and to manage movable and immovable property of every kind, as well as to dispose of the same in the way of sale, exchange, gift, matrimony, legacy or any other method, as well as to receive inheritances through will or on the basis of the law, without being subjected in any one of the cases mentioned, in one way or another, to higher dues, taxes or collections than native inhabitants.

Each of the contracting parties reserves the right to make exemptions from these stipulations for those parts of their respective territories which are declared to be boundary districts or fortress regions.

However, in none of the cases above mentioned shall the subjects of one of the

parties, on the territory of the opposite party, be placed in a less favorable condition than the subjects of any third country.

The subjects of both contracting parties, under observance of the laws, may take out, unhindered, the proceeds of the sale of their property, and, in general, their belongings, without being obliged, in their capacities as foreigners, to pay special or higher dues than native inhabitants in the same circumstances.

On condition of observing the local laws, they shall have free admission to law courts, where they may appear as claimants or defendants, and shall enjoy in this respect all rights and advantages of native inhabitants, and also, like the latter, they will have the right to employ in every lawsuit the attorneys, business managers and other representatives admitted under the local laws.

ARTICLE 3

The subjects of each of the contracting parties, on the territory of the opposite party, cannot be subjected to juridical, administrative or municipal duties, with the exception of guardianships. They also are exempt from any personal service in the army, fleet, reserve of the territorial army and of the navy, the national militia, as also from all duties, compulsory loans, military requisitions and work of any kind, imposed, in the case of war, or owing to exceptional circumstances; with the exception of duties connected, owing to some standard of rights, with the ownership of a parcel of land, and also the military quartering duty and other special duties for the active army, to which the native inhabitants are liable, and the subjects of the most-favored nation in their capacity of proprietors and lessees of real estate may also be liable.

ARTICLE 4

Joint stock companies, and other commercial, industrial or financial companies, including insurance companies, which in accordance with existing laws have been formed lawfully and have their abode in one of the two countries, must be recognized by the opposite country as existing lawfully and shall, in particular, enjoy in the same the right to conduct lawsuits in the courts in the capacity of claimants or defendants. Both parties, however, agree that the foregoing stipulation does not affect the question as to the admission of such companies, formed in one of the countries, to commercial or industrial activity in the other country, or non-admission of the same. This question depends, as heretofore, on the regulations already existing or to be introduced in the country in question.

In any case, the companies mentioned shall enjoy in the other country the same rights as have been granted or will be granted to analogous companies of any other country.

ARTICLE 5

The contracting parties obligate themselves not to impede the mutual relations of both countries by any prohibitions of import, export or transit, and to permit free

transportation.

Exceptions are only admitted for such articles as are or will be considered a state monopoly on the territory of one of the contracting parties, as also for certain articles respecting which exceptional prohibitional rules may be issued for reasons of hygiene, veterinary supervision or public safety, or for substantial political or economic reasons, especially in connection with the after-war intermediate period. During the after-war intermediate period, for the purpose of overcoming the consequences of the war, regulations may be issued limiting the intercourse, as well as prohibition of import, export and transit; they must be put into effect in such a manner as to be felt as lightly as possible, and as soon as circumstances permit they must be rescinded.

ARTICLE 6

The products of Russian agriculture and industry imported into Germany, and the products of German agriculture and industry imported into Russia, must be on the same footing as the products of the most-favored nation, regardless of whether intended for consumption or for storage, for reexport or for transit. In no case, and for no reasons, must they be subjected to higher or special duties, assessments, taxes or collections, or to additional levies or prohibitions against import, if the same does not apply to analogous products of any other country. In particular, every advantage and facility, every exemption from and reduction of import duties of the general and conventional tariffs, which one of the contracting parties, permanently or temporarily, without a corresponding benefit or against compensation, will grant to a third country, shall be granted to the products of agriculture and industry of the opposite country without any conditions, restrictions or compensations.

ARTICLE 7

The products of German agriculture and industry mentioned in the annexed tariff A, on being imported into Russia, and the products of Russian agriculture and industry, specified in the annexed tariff B, on being imported into Germany, shall not be subjected to any special or higher import duty than that stipulated in the said annexes.¹

Should one of the contracting parties assess any of the articles of the home markets, of production or manufacture, specified in Annexes A or B, for the benefit of the state exchequer by means of new internal taxes or excise, the analogous article when being imported can be taxed with an equal or corresponding duty on condition that this duty will be equal for the products of all countries.

ARTICLE 8

Internal duties, which are levied or will be levied on the territory of one of the contracting parties for the benefit of the state, of communities and of societies for the delivery, production, transportation, sale or consumption of any article, may

be levied on analogous articles of the opposite party, but under no pretext at a higher rate or in a more oppressive fashion than on the products of the home country. In so far as internal duties are levied on raw materials and half-finished products, the products made from these raw materials and half-finished products may be correspondingly covered by means of an import duty, even in case similar home products are not taxed directly.

Each of the contracting parties is entitled, for the purpose of obtaining national income, to establish a monopoly on suitable articles, or subject the same to regulations analogous to a monopoly. In this case the foregoing regulations are made correspondingly applicable.

ARTICLE 9

In exporting goods from either of the countries into the other, no special or higher export duties shall be levied than when exporting into the most-favored country. Furthermore, any advantage granted on exports of one of the contracting parties to a third country is automatically and without restriction extended to the opposite party.

ARTICLE 10

Goods of any kind, passing through the territory of either of the parties, shall be exempt from any transit dues, irrespective of whether they are transmitted directly or whether they are unloaded during the time of transportation, warehoused and then reloaded.

ARTICLE 11

The stipulations of the present agreement do not affect:

1. Advantages which are granted or will be granted in the future to other adjacent countries for facilitating local intercourse, within a boundary zone of fifteen kilometers in width.
2. Advantages which either of the contracting parties grants or will grant in the future to another country on the basis of a customs union, either already in existence or to be established in the future.
3. Advantages which are granted now, or will be granted in the future, to arriving and departing inhabitants of the province of Archangel. However, German imports into that territory shall enjoy, to an equal extent, all customs advantages granted to any European or North American country.

ARTICLE 12

Merchants, manufacturers, and other persons engaged in industrial enterprises who prove by means of presentation of a legal certificate issued to them by the authorities of their home country that they have the right to engage in commercial dealings in the country where they reside permanently, may, either personally or through commercial travelers in their employ, purchase goods on the territory of

the other contracting party, or solicit orders, bringing with them samples of goods. The said merchants, manufacturers or other persons, engaged in industrial dealings, as well as commercial travelers, shall enjoy, in both countries mutually, the same rights as regards passports and dues on commercial dealings as do the subjects of the most-favored country.

Persons provided with a certificate entitling them to engage in industrial dealings (commercial travelers) may carry with them samples of any kind, but no goods. Articles, liable to duty, which are brought in by the above-mentioned persons, are exempted, by both parties, from duty both when importing and when exporting, but on the following conditions: If these articles are not sold, they must be taken out again within a year's time; furthermore, there must be no doubt as to the identity of the articles brought in and taken out again. It is immaterial through which customhouse the goods are taken out.

The taking out of samples of merchandise must be guaranteed, when imported, by making a deposit to the extent of the duty due, or by some other guarantees.

The contracting parties will inform each other as to what authorities are entitled to issue certificates for the privilege of engaging in industrial enterprises, of the form which these certificates will take, and the rules which the travelers must observe during the time of their industrial activities.

The subjects of either of the contracting parties, going into the territory of the other to visit fairs and bazaars, to trade or to sell their products, are mutually placed, by both parties, in the same position as the native inhabitants and shall not be subjected to higher duties.

ARTICLE 13

In regard to mutual safeguarding of author's rights as regards literary, artistic or photographic products, the stipulations of the agreement concluded between the German Empire and Russia under date of February 28, 1913, will apply in the relations between Germany and Russia. In regard to mutual safeguarding of trademarks, the stipulations of the declaration of the 23d/11th of July, 1873, shall govern in the future.

ARTICLE 14

German vessels and their cargoes in Russia, as well as Russian vessels and their cargoes in Germany, are placed on the same footing as local ships and cargoes, regardless of whence they sailed or their destination, and also regardless of the origin or the destination of their cargoes.

Every privilege and every advantage granted by one of the contracting parties to a third country, shall be extended automatically and without restriction to the opposite party.

However, exception is made from the foregoing stipulations:

- (a) In regard to those special privileges which in either country now exist or will be granted in the future to the home fisheries and their produce;
- (b) In regard to the privileges which now exist or will be granted in the future to the national merchant fleet.

The stipulations of the present agreement do not apply to coastwise shipping, which as heretofore, shall be regulated in both countries by the existing or future laws. However, in any case, German and Russian vessels shall be permitted to sail from a port of one of the contracting parties to one or more ports of the same country for complete or partial discharge of the cargo brought from abroad, or for lading or filling up a cargo destined for abroad.

ARTICLE 15

The nationality of vessels is recognized by both parties in accordance with the laws and prohibitions of each country, on the basis of documents and letters patent issued by the proper authorities and found on the vessel.

Ship's certificates, issued by either of the contracting parties, are recognized by the other party in accordance with special agreements concluded, or yet to be concluded, between the contracting parties.

ARTICLE 16

German vessels, arriving at a Russian port, and on the other hand, Russian vessels arriving at a German port, merely for the purpose of filling up their cargo there, or for partially discharging the same, may retain and bring out again a definite part of the cargo destined for another port of the same country or for another country on condition of observing the laws and prescriptions of the country in question; in this case they are not obliged to pay any dues for this part of their cargo with the exception of the fees of examination, which shall be levied at the rate established for local vessels.

ARTICLE 17

From tonnage dues and clearance fees are wholly exempt, in the ports of either country:

1. Vessels arriving and leaving from any place in ballast;
2. Vessels coming from a harbor of one of the two countries into one or more harbors of the same country, which can prove that they have paid the said fees in one of the harbors of the same country;
3. Vessels which voluntarily or of necessity arrive with cargo at a port and leave it without having effected any trade.

This privilege does not extend to lighthouse dues, pilot dues, towage dues, quarantine dues, and other dues on ships, established for the requirements of traffic, which are paid equally by the local vessels and those of the most-favored nation.

If a vessel has come to the port through necessity, the discharge and reloading of goods necessitated by repairs to the ship shall not be considered as a trade dealing, nor shall be considered as such the transferring of cargo into another vessel on account of the unseaworthiness of the former, nor purchases necessary for the sustenance of the crew, nor the sale of deteriorated goods with the consent of the customs authorities.

ARTICLE 18

In case a vessel of one of the contracting parties strands near the coast of the opposite country or is wrecked, the vessel, as well as the cargo, shall enjoy the same advantages and privileges which the legislature of the country extends to its own vessels in the same condition. Every assistance and protection shall be rendered to the captain and crew personally, as well as to the vessel and to her cargo.

The contracting parties are further agreed that salvaged goods shall not be subjected to customs duties unless the same will be turned over for local consumption.

ARTICLE 19

The use of high roads and other roads, canals, locks, ferries, bridges and openings of same, harbors and quays, channel marks and lights, pilots, lifting cranes and scales, warehouses, coast guard and ship's property storing facilities, and so forth, in so far as these constructions or institutions are destined for general communication and for general commerce, irrespective of whether they are managed by the state or by private persons with the consent of the state, shall be granted to the subjects of the opposite contracting party on the same conditions and against payment of equal dues as to the subjects of the home country.

With the exception of deviations permissible in regard to lighthouses and pilots, these dues shall only be levied if the above-mentioned constructions and institutions have actually been utilized.

ARTICLE 20

Both contracting parties reserve the right to establish railway tariffs at their own discretion.

However, neither in respect to freight rates nor in respect to the time and method of forwarding shall any difference be made between the subjects of either contracting party. Especially on consignments of goods coming from Russia and destined for a German station, or passing through Germany in transit, no higher rates shall be levied on German railways than on similar German or foreign products going in the same direction and on the same section of the road. The same shall apply on Russian railways for consignments of goods from Germany destined for a Russian station or passing through Russia in transit.

Exceptions from the foregoing stipulations are admissible only in so far as

consignments at reduced rates for public or charitable purposes are concerned.

FINAL PROTOCOL

PART I

TO THE TEXT OF THE TREATY

TO ARTICLE 1

Household effects which have already been in use and movable property of subjects of either contracting party who intend to settle on the territory of the opposite party, shall be exempt in the latter from any import duties.

German official consulates and the employees of diplomatic and of said consular institutions dispatched to Russia, shall have the right to receive newspapers and works of science, art and literature, entirely exempt from the Russian censorship.

The privileges and advantages accorded, as per Article 2 of the treaty between Germany and Russia of the 8th of December/26th of November, 1874, to consular employees, are also extended to special officials attached to German consulates in Russia and also to the agents of the Russian financial department and their secretaries (or attachés) in Germany.

TO ARTICLES 1 AND 12

In the question of passports the subjects of both countries are placed on the footing of the most-favored nation.

The passport visa in Russia holds good for six months. This decision includes the visa of the passports of German commercial travelers of the Hebrew faith.

The fee for issuing foreign passports to Germans living in Russia is not to exceed fifty kopeks.

Russia will in the future also allow a term of twenty-eight days for the use of certificates available within the limits of a frontier line of thirty kilometers allowing the possessor the right of repeatedly crossing the frontier at any place as at present. This term will be reckoned by both parties from the day on which the certificate is first used for crossing the frontier, but these certificates expire if not used for the first time at the latest within fifteen days of the date of issue. This term of twenty-eight days is in no way influenced by the beginning of a new year during the time for which the certificate is available. Certificates in the two languages, German and Russian, are to be given by either country only to its own subjects and to such subjects of the other state who reside in the country in which the certificate is issued.

The day on which the frontier is crossed will in future be marked on the certificate by both Russian and German authorities, according to both the Russian and German calendar. Certificates will be given in future, as at present, both to Christians and Hebrews.

Both contracting parties will allow their subjects to pass temporarily to the territory of the other party for agricultural and trading purposes and will raise no obstacles particularly as regards passport regulations. The representatives of organizations under state inspection which were established on the territory of one party, for the purpose of acting as agents enlisting such workmen, and regarding which the government of this party will notify the government of the other party, shall be admitted within the territory of the latter and may unhindered exercise their functions as agents.

Russian workmen entering Germany for agricultural or other kindred occupations, must be provided as hereto, free of charge, with legal documents valid from February 1 to December 20, new style. These papers must be written in the Russian and German languages.

TO ARTICLE 3

Inasmuch as the subjects of a third state, on the strength of existing treaties and agreements, are exempt in Russia from guardianship, German subjects in Russia must enjoy the same privilege in respect to minors of non-German extraction.

TO ARTICLE 5

Veterinary measures introduced by the German Government with regard to Russian import cannot be applied more strictly than with regard to states which, in respect to contagious diseases of animals and in respect to veterinary institutions, are in the same condition as Russia.

This regulation does not concern agreements in respect to veterinary measures between Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The number of live pigs which according to existing regulations may be imported into Upper Silesia is increased to 2,500 per week.

Meat, which by the German law of meat supervision of June 3, 1900, is considered as prepared, is allowed to be imported into Germany in accordance with regulations of the law referred to.

The permissions stipulated in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the present regulation, may be temporarily suspended or annulled, if this is necessitated by veterinary or police considerations.

TO ARTICLES 5, 6, 7, 9, AND 10

As in Russia at the present time certain goods are subject to higher customs duty when imported across the inland frontier than when imported by the Baltic Sea, the parties have agreed that from the day of the coming into force of the present treaty, the duties on imports across the inland frontier are lowered to the duty rates on imports by the Baltic Sea and that no reduced customs tariff be introduced favoring imports by sea.

The German Government on its part binds itself not to introduce on any frontier

of the German Empire different or more favorable customs duties than on its eastern frontier.

TO ARTICLE 6

The German Federal Council will not avail itself at any time during the life of the present treaty of its right to revoke the permissions given for establishing mixed elevators for grain in transit at Königsberg, Danzig, Altona, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen.

TO ARTICLES 6, 7, AND 11

The agricultural and industrial productions of a third country, which have been transported through the territory of one of the contracting parties, when imported into the other country are not subjected to special or higher customs duties than if directly imported from the place of their origin.

TO ARTICLES 6 TO 9

The Russian Government agrees to accept German gold coin in payment of customs duties, at the exchange of 1,000 marks gold for 462 rubles (1 ruble=1/15 imperial). The Russian customhouses will accept in payment German imperial bank notes at the same rate of exchange.

TO ARTICLES 6 AND 7

In respect to the import of goods, which are subject, according to their origin, to different customs duties, the contracting parties reserve the right to demand certificates of origin as evidence of domestic production or manufacture. Both parties will take care that the above certificates shall restrict trade as little as possible.

TO ARTICLE 12

In order to exercise in Russia the rights provided for by paragraph 1 of Article 12, the persons there mentioned should be provided with special trade certificates, government fees for which should not exceed 150 rubles for a whole year and 75 rubles for the second half of the year. Persons provided with the said trade certificates, desiring to exercise the right stipulated in paragraph 1 of Article 12, by means of commercial travelers in their employ, the latter should be provided with special personal trade certificates, fees for which must not exceed 50 rubles for a whole year and 25 rubles for the second half of a year.

Trade certificates, provided for by part 1 of the present regulation, may be issued in the names of persons going to Russia, and in this case these persons do not need to provide themselves with personal certificates. When issuing trade certificates and collecting fees for same, no distinction is made between those professing the Christian and the Hebrew religions.

Inasmuch as the import of firearms into Russia is not prohibited, German merchants may bring with them samples of such weapons, but only under the

express condition of submission, to all general and local regulations actually in force, or which may subsequently be introduced regarding firearms.

TO ARTICLE 14

The contracting parties reserve to themselves the right of concluding a special agreement regarding navigation and rafting on inland waterways which directly or indirectly connect both countries. Until the conclusion of this agreement German vessels, their crews and German raftsmen on Russian inland waters and Russian vessels, their crews and Russian raftsmen on German inland waters may be engaged on an equal footing with the native inhabitants, in towing and trading navigation, including the transportation of passengers as well as rafting.

German vessels bound for Russia on inland waterways connecting both countries and intending to return to Germany, are admitted into Russia without payment of import customs duty or deposit in guarantee of same.

The term within which such vessels are obliged to return to Germany is two years from the day of their arrival in Russia. Should a vessel be sold in Russia or remain there more than two years, the corresponding import duty must be paid. Should the vessel be delayed, owing to circumstances beyond the captain's control, such as low water level, damage demanding considerable repairs, and other similar reasons, the above-mentioned term must be extended. Import duties are not levied should the vessel be lost through fire or wreck.

No fees are levied at issue of certificates stipulating the return of vessels and payment of import duties.

The certificate of the ship's gauge will be deposited with the Russian customs authorities for the term of the vessel's stay in Russia.

TO ARTICLE 20

The contracting parties will support each other, as far as possible, in the question of railroad tariffs, in particular by means of establishing direct freight tariffs. The above direct freight tariffs should be established to facilitate the export from Russia, as well as the import to Russia, in accordance with the demands of trade, particularly regarding the German ports, Danzig (Neufahrwasser), Ronigsberg (Pillau) and Memel.

In respect to produce, relating in the Russian railroad tariff to grain, also in regard to flax, hemp and timber, freight tariffs from Russian stations of departure to the above-named ports must be drawn up and distributed amongst German and Russian railways participating in the transportation, in accordance with the actual regulations regarding Russian railways leading to the ports of Libau and Riga, or such regulations as may be subsequently introduced.

The same applies also in the case of reforwarding. Additional rates collected, besides the freight tariff rates, must be drawn up in the same manner and the total, in agreement with Russian regulations, must be divided between the

railroads concerned; in this connection an agreement has been arrived at to the effect that only one frontier tax be collected, charged equally to the Russian and German lines leading to the frontier.

Special regulations for the arrangement of matters concerning competition between Königsberg and Danzig which are valid at the present time, remain in force.

Tariff privileges granted by German and Russian railways in respect to goods imported by sea, must, at the demand of the interested government, be granted by railways leading from the frontier, in respect to similar products, from the frontier to the receiving station. In this case the extent of privileges, calculated per kilometer or per verst, in the instance of communication across the inland frontier, should be the same as in the instance of communication through seaports.

No distinction, especially in respect to tariff rates, should be made in regard to the nationality of vessels of the contracting parties, in case the imported goods are further transported by rail or by inland waterways.

The Russian government will see to it that railway freight tariffs, for transportation from Russia to Germany of phosphorites and other phosphates, as well as ores, should not be increased to a greater extent than corresponding to the general average increase of the Russian railway tariff in proportion to the distance, in the same way as it was used as a basis of these tariffs prior to August 1, 1914 (July 19).

At the desire of the German Government, these tariffs will be applied to new stations of departure and destination.

The contracting parties agree that, in regard to railway affairs, mutual relations of intercourse will be the same as before the war between Germany and Russia, and that all deterioration which could arise by the subdivision of the Russian railway system into independent railway systems will be as far as possible avoided. To this end both parties are prepared to concur in a convention, obligatory to the railways of Germany, Russia and of the countries and self-governing districts which have detached themselves from the Russian state, that would especially regulate the stipulations contained in Article 20 of the present treaty and in this concluding protocol, and that would reestablish the continuity of railway tariffs existing before the war, for communication with the ports of the Baltic Sea, the Black and the Azov Seas.

Remark: The tariffs mentioned in Appendices A and B are identical with the tariffs of the Russo-German trade treaty of 1904, and are therefore not cited here.

PART II

TO CUSTOMHOUSE REGULATIONS

1. The right to forward goods under customs control to other customs institutions

is extended by both parties to all customhouses of the first class, which have no railroad communications with the customs institutions having warehouses under their control. However, the condition must be observed that such parcels are subject to corresponding laws and regulations.

2. Both parties agree that the customhouses of both countries must be open all the days of the year, excepting Sundays and legal holidays.

3. The time tables of office hours must be hung in the customhouses of both countries.

Office hours for examination of passports and legitimation cards must be fixed for each district and for each frontier crossing place by a special agreement between the respective departments of both countries. Both parties must fix the same hours, must consider local needs, and in the customhouses of the third class, in supplementary customhouses and in frontier crossing places, an interval must be fixed for the dinner of the employees.

4. Regarding the merchandise liable to customs duty imported by persons with a legal right to cross the frontier, a verbal declaration may be given in both countries and at all customhouses within the limit of their authorization, provided that the merchandise is not imported for the purpose of trade and that the sum due as custom duty does not exceed fifteen rubles for imports to Russia and thirty-five marks for imports to Germany. According to this regulation, transfer offices have the right to collect duties and pass foodstuffs (with the exception of vodka and other spirits) and all household articles.

5. In addition to special regulations regarding river craft, all vehicles, together with the necessary appurtenances which during their importation serve for the carrying of passengers and freight, and which are only for this purpose temporarily brought into Russia by persons known to the Russian or German customs authorities, are admitted by Russian authorities duty free and without depositing security, if the carrier obligates himself to return within a specified time. The written obligation to this effect must be made out free of charge.

6. No special declaration of goods imported into Russia by land is necessary, if such are accompanied by a way bill. In such instances it is sufficient to present the way bill, at the time of entry, to the customs officer. The number of horses and vehicles in a transport as well as the total of way bills and packages are entered on one way bill which is signed by the chief of transport.

7. Flowers and plants, fresh fruit and fresh fish, as well as all perishable goods, must be cleared by both parties, except in case of *force majeure*, inside of twenty-four hours from the time of the arrival of goods at the customs warehouse.

8. The charges for affixing marks certifying to the authenticity of the goods are not to exceed 5 per cent of the customs duty.

The charges for affixing marks certifying to the authenticity with regard to

buttons, ribbons, lace, embroideries and furs, are not to exceed one kopek for each seal. The total charge for affixing seals in each individual case is not to exceed 5 per cent of the sum of the import duty. But if the interested person wishes that the merchandise should be sealed in a manner exceeding the usual manner for certification of authenticity, the said person is bound to pay an additional charge thereby incurred.

The stamping of German gold and silver articles is not liable to higher or special charges than the stamping of similar articles of home production.

9. Money charged for storing of imported goods in the warehouse must be collected by the Russian customs authorities only for the exact time of storage in the customs warehouses, beginning from the fourth day after the commencement of the customs examination.

However, the term during which no storage charges are made must be limited by the period provided in each customhouse for the notification of goods imported, that is five to fourteen days, with the addition of the term of three days provided for in the first paragraph.

10. During the term of the validity of this treaty, the Russian Government obligates itself not to alter in any way the stipulations of Articles 15 and 16 of the Berne convention of October 14, 1890, which determine the right of the sender to dispose of the goods.

11. The regulation stipulated in Article 292 of the Russian statute of May 15, 1901, concerning the importation of goods, according to which the difference between the weight declared and the actual weight of the goods, if not exceeding 5 per cent of the total weight of the goods, is exempt, is modified and the limit of the permissible difference is increased to 10 per cent of the total weight.

12. The right of complaint against the decisions of Russian customhouse authorities regarding fines for incorrect or fraudulent declaration, or regarding the tariff classifications of merchandise, belongs to the sender of the goods, as well as to the party handing in the declaration. Such complaints may be drawn up by the sender of the goods in the German language.

13. The term for presenting complaint in cases mentioned in paragraph 12, both for the sender and the party handing in the declaration, is fixed at two months from the date of communication of the decision of the customhouse to the party handing in the declaration.

As regards the tariff classification of goods, the sender has the right to lodge complaint during the above-mentioned term only in the event of the goods in question still being in the customs warehouses.

14. German consuls in Russia and Russian consuls in Germany have the right to communicate directly, the former with the Russian customs department and the latter with the representatives of German customhouse authorities (provincial

customs director, etc.), in regard to customs complaints pending before such authorities.

15. If the conductors, engine drivers and other railway employees of either of the two contracting parties are detected conveying contraband goods on trains into the territory of the other party, they will lose, at the demand of the respective customhouse authorities, the right to accompany trains to the frontier.

16. All regulations regarding quarantine and veterinary police measures; to wit, orders to close or open the frontiers for any kind of merchandise, or of alterations in the respective local regulations and so forth, must be immediately, on publication, communicated to each other by each of the contracting parties.

All local measures undertaken at the initiative of the district representative (Landrat in Germany, Zemski Nachalnik, Ispravnik in Russia) must be directly communicated to the representatives of the districts of the other country. Such communication must contain the motives of the measures unless these are self-evident.

Measures undertaken in Germany by the Oberpräsident or Regierungspräsident and those undertaken in Russia by the Governor General or Governor, must mutually be communicated to officials of corresponding rank. Communications informing the reasons for such measures must be conveyed through diplomatic channels.

Measures taken by the central authorities of both countries shall, together with the reasons therefor, be communicated through diplomatic channels.

Both parties agree that information regarding veterinary measures must be mutually communicated if possible before they are made public, and in any case not later than simultaneously with their publication.

Both Governments will exchange lists indicating the authorities of the parties who are to exchange communications according to the above.

17. Quarantine regulation against epidemic diseases must be applied by both parties to all travelers crossing the frontier, regardless of their nationality, in accordance with the danger of infection.

18. Neither party will impede the return of travelers who are sent back owing to absence of passport or non-payment of the customs duties; in circumstances mentioned above both parties must readmit even foreign subjects, especially in cases when they have not proceeded inland. The respective authorities of both parties shall agree regarding measures which will have to be undertaken.

Jewish emigrants of Russian origin bearing Russian emigration certificates and other parties sent back to Russia by German authorities, must be admitted by the Russian frontier authorities, provided these persons have not resided in Germany more than one month, counting from the day of crossing the German-Russian frontier.

19. The frontier authorities of both contracting parties must be instructed to convey all vagabonds and other persons possessing no passports and desiring to return to the territory of the opposite party whose subjects they are, exclusively to such customs offices as are in charge of the transfer of travelers.

VARIATIONS OF THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT FROM THE GERMAN–RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENT

APPENDIX III

1. *In Article 1: The Austro-Hungarian–Russian treaty concerning trade and shipping of February 15/2, 1906, is not renewed.*

The rest is identical with the German–Russian treaty.

2. *In Article 2 the paragraph beginning with the words these regulations extend to the end is omitted. The following is inserted in its stead:*

The principle of the most-favored nation, stipulated in the foregoing regulations, retains force in the event of changes in customs relations in one or both of the contracting countries, as well as in any of the separate states constituting part of the same.

3. *In Article 3: The first part is omitted.*

In the second part after the words all kinds of ores there is added: bones, rags, refuse of all kinds, and rubber waste.

4. *In Article 8 there is added:*

The regulations contained in the notes exchanged February 15/2, 1906, regarding fowls and raw animal products, must be applied in the same way during the time of this provisorium.

SUPPLEMENT 1 TO APPENDIX III

This supplement only differs from Supplement 1 to Appendix II in unimportant details.

With regard to Austria-Hungary, the former customhouse tariff is renewed between Austria-Hungary and Russia.

THE BULGARIAN–RUSSIAN AND TURKISH–RUSSIAN ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS

APPENDICES IV AND V

The appendices are identical and consist of five articles, referring exclusively to the principle of the most-favored-nation clause, which may not be abrogated before December 31, 1919.

SUMMERS

¹ In four sections.

² This translation follows an unofficial Russian text which differs in certain details from the Russian text published in the *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* June 11, 1918. A few brief omitted passages have been supplied and occasional verbal corrections made on the basis of comparison with the German text (as published in the *Reichs-Gesetzblatt* and translation thereof, which were printed for the Department of State in the booklet, *Texts of the Russian "Peace"* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918), prepared by the Inquiry, a body of scholars assembled by Colonel House to assist the Department in the study of problems of the coming peace settlement.

³ Appendix I consisted of a map, no authoritative copy or description of which was transmitted to the Department at this time.

¹ Consul Poole's despatch of June 28, 1918, from Moscow supplied the remainder of this article.

 ¹ *Foreign Relations*, 1907, p. 1247.

¹ The article numbers are those of the Bulgarian-Russian additional agreement, *ante*, p. 415 [*Pg. 415 is part of [Doc. 413](#)*].

¹ The article numbers are those of the Bulgarian-Russian additional agreement.

¹ Tariffs A and B were not included in this translation. See *post*, p. 468 [*Pg. 468 is part of [Doc. 443](#)*].

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *April 22, 1918.*

[*Received April 29, 3.05 a.m.*]

399. Treaty supplementing the treaty of peace concluded on the 3d of March, 1918, at Brest Litovsk between the Russian Republic on the one part and Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire on the other part.

THE TURKISH–RUSSIAN ADDITIONAL AGREEMENT

Provision having been made by certain articles of the joint treaty of peace signed on this day at Brest Litovsk by the Russian Republic on the one part and the Ottoman Empire, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria on the other part for the conclusion of special arrangements between the contracting states concerned, the plenipotentiaries of the Russian Republic, viz.:

Mr. G. I. Sokolnikov, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers, “Workmen and Farmers;
Mr. G. I. Petrovski, Commissioner of the People for Home Affairs;
Mr. G. V. Chicherin, Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. L. M. Karakhan, member of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Soldiers, Workmen and Farmers;

And the plenipotentiaries of the Ottoman Empire, viz.:

His Highness Ibrahim Hakky Pasha, former Grand Vizier, Senator, Ambassador of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan at Berlin;
His Excellency Zeki Pasha, General of Cavalry, and Aide-de-Camp to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan;

Have agreed to regulate by a supplementary treaty all matters relating thereto and drawn up to that effect the following provisions:

ARTICLE 1

The following provisions have been made to regulate the details of execution and the delivery of occupied territory dealt with in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the joint treaty of peace.

1. To that end the Russian Republic undertakes to withdraw to the other side of the boundary line as it was before the war all its forces now in the said provinces as well as all its officers both civil and military in a period of from six to eight weeks from the signature of the present treaty.
2. The commanders in chief of the Russian and Turkish armies operating on the Asiatic front shall determine in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 the modus of evacuation and withdrawal of the Russian troops beyond the frontier, as also the means apt to insure its safety.
3. At the time of the evacuation of the occupied territory Russia will insure safety therein until it is again occupied by Ottoman troops. It shall take appropriate measures to prevent acts of vengeance, plunder, crimes or other trespasses from being committed; to conserve intact and preserve from destruction the structures and buildings in the said territory inclusive of military establishments as well as all furniture and equipment. The army commanders of the contracting parties will settle those important points on the spot.

It is understood that the portable and other railroads laid in the said territory as also the rolling stock and bridges shall be allowed to stand as they are so as to make the revictualing of the population easier. The same will apply to military establishments.

4. The Russian Republic will use one division to guard the frontier along a distance of about five hundred kilometers or more, will demobilize all the remainder of the army and carry it to the interior of the country.
5. The Russian Republic undertakes to demobilize and dissolve the Armenian bands whether of Russian or Turkish nationality now in the Russian and Ottoman occupied provinces and entirely to disband them.
6. The two contracting parties will conclude an agreement for the settlement of the revictualing of the inhabitants of the said provinces until normal conditions are restored.
7. The Russian Republic shall not concentrate troops along the border or in Caucasia exceeding one division, not even for drills, until general peace is established.

If it should become necessary to resort to such a concentration for reasons of public safety in the interior, a previous notice must be given to the powers of the Quadruple Alliance.

On the other hand, Turkey is compelled by the necessity of carrying on the war against its other adversaries to keep its army on a war footing.

ARTICLE 2

Within three months after the ratification of the present treaty two Turkish-Russian joint commissioners shall be appointed by the contracting parties; one of these will be charged with the duty of reestablishing the dividing line between Turkey and Russia from the point where the three boundaries, Turkish, Russian and Persian, meet to the point where the line strikes the boundary of the three

sanjaks of Kars, Ardakhan and Batum. Along that stretch the boundary line as it was before the war will be followed; the monuments that may have been destroyed in the course of war operations shall be rebuilt and repaired in accordance with the maps and protocols of the boundary commission of 1880.

The second commission will mark the boundary between Russia and the three sanjaks to be evacuated in accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 4 of the joint treaty of peace. The frontier shall be restored there as it existed before the Turkish-Russian war of 1877 and 1878.

ARTICLE 3

The inhabitants and communes in the territory of either contracting party, holding property and usufruct rights on real property lying on the other side of the border, will enjoy, operate or lease, manage or convey such property by themselves or by proxy.

The said inhabitants or representatives of the said communes will be allowed freely to cross the boundary line upon presentation of passes issued to them by the proper authorities of their domicile and authenticated by those of the other party.

Facilities in crossing the line free of duty will be granted to local agricultural products, farming implements, foodstuffs, fertilizers, seed, building material and cattle for farm work, carried by the said inhabitants or representatives of communes.

The contracting parties reserve for a future special arrangement the settlement of the details of the provisions set forth in the foregoing two paragraphs.

ARTICLE 4

The contracting parties undertake to grant, on and after the ratification of the present treaty, exequaturs to the consuls general, consuls and vice consuls of career of either party in all ports, cities or other places in the territory of the other, except those where objection may be seen to recognizing such officers, provided the same exception applies to all foreign powers.

With regard to the privileges, powers and duties of the said officers during the transitory period referred to in Article 6, the same rules shall, on condition of reciprocity, apply to them as apply to like officers of the most-favored nation.

ARTICLE 5

Each contracting party undertakes to pay an indemnity for all the damages and losses caused during the war within the territories by its agents or people to the consular buildings and furniture as well as to the consular officers and employees of the other party.

ARTICLE 6

All the treaties, conventions, undertakings or other instruments and agreements previously existing between the contracting parties having been made null and

void, *pro facto*, by the very occurrence of the war, the Imperial Ottoman Government and the Government of the Russian Republic undertake to conclude a consular convention and such other instruments as they may deem necessary for the adjustment of their juridical relations. These instruments shall be perfected within the time set by Appendix 5 to the joint treaty of peace for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation. The transitory period in which to apply the provisions in the last paragraph of Article 4, as also the right of denouncement granted to the parties, will be the same as those stated in the said appendix.

ARTICLE 7

The post and telegraph relations between the Ottoman Empire and Russia will be reestablished immediately upon the ratification of the present treaty in accordance with the postal and telegraphic conventions, arrangements and regulations of the international union.

ARTICLE 8

In pursuance of the principle laid down in Article 7 of the joint treaty of peace the two contracting parties declare that they consider to be null and void all previous international instruments intended to create spheres of influence and exclusive interests in Persia. The two Governments will withdraw their troops from the Persian territory. To that end they shall communicate with the Government of that country about the details of the evacuation and the measures apt also to insure for the political independence and territorial integrity of that country the respect of the several states.

ARTICLE 9

All laws, regulations and ordinances enforced in the territory of one of the contracting parties against the citizens or subjects of the other party by reason of the state of war existing in their country and intended to change these personal rights in any way (war laws) become inoperative after the ratification of the joint treaty of peace.

The juristic persons and corporations recognized by the local laws of one of the parties as belonging to the nationality of the other party shall be considered in this respect as citizens or subjects of the said other party.

ARTICLE 10

All debts due to private or juristic persons or corporations, citizens or subjects of one of the parties within the territory of the other party are restored to their *ante bellum* status.

The contracting parties agree to apply to the debts due to their respective citizens or subjects the provisions found in Sections 2 and 3 of Article 2 (Chapter 3) of the German supplementary treaty signed at Brest Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

The citizens or subjects of either party shall in addition enjoy the greater facilities which each of the parties may see fit to adopt in behalf of its own nationals who

may have been unable, on account of the war events, to secure in good time the safeguard of their rights.

ARTICLE 11

Russian subjects of the Moslem faith will be allowed to emigrate to Turkey after disposing of their property and to carry their patrimony with them.

ARTICLE 12

Persons whose rights have been invaded under the war laws mentioned in Article 8, will as far as possible be reinstated in the said rights. After ratification of the present treaty both sides shall simultaneously return the property seized under the said laws. In addition, each party undertakes simultaneously to pay indemnity for the damage caused to the subjects of the other party in their lives or health as a result of the measures taken against them and in their property as a result of liquidation, seizure, requisition or forcible disposition of their real and personal estates. The mode of appraising the losses sustained by reason of the circumstances above enumerated and all matters connected therewith as also the procedure to be followed in the premises shall be settled by the contracting parties under the same conditions as those determined by Articles 2, 3 and 4 (Chapter 4) of the supplementary German-Russian treaty of March 3, 1918.

ARTICLE 13

Prisoners of war who are invalid or unfit for military service shall be immediately sent home. The other prisoners of war and all other persons arrested as a measure of military or public order shall be exchanged as soon as possible after the signature of the present treaty; the exchange will be effected through special commissioners appointed by both parties.

The transportation of prisoners of war to a port of departure or to the frontier will be at the expense of the captor state. Civilian prisoners will be immediately released. The contracting party which arrested or interned them shall bear the cost of transportation from the place where they are held or interned to the residence from which they were taken.

ARTICLE 14

Each contracting party will apply to the prisoners of war and interned civilians in its territory, and also to the citizens or subjects of the other party, the amnesty clauses inserted in Article 1 (Chapter 7) of the supplementary German-Russian treaty signed at Brest Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

ARTICLE 15

The present supplementary treaty shall go into effect, in so far as it is not otherwise provided, at the same time as the joint treaty of peace signed at Brest Litovsk on March 3, 1918.

It will be ratified and the ratifications will be exchanged at Berlin at the same time

as those of the above-mentioned joint treaty.

In faith whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed the present supplementary treaty and affixed their seals thereto.

Done in duplicate, at Brest Litovsk, March 3, 1918.

SUMMERS

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

No. 1321

STOCKHOLM, *August 23, 1918.*
[Received September 12.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith to the Department, for its information, translated extracts from the *Stockholms Aftontidningen* of July 28 on Russia's losses in the Brest peace. ...

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

[Enclosure—Translation]

Russia's Losses in the Brest Peace as Published in the "Stockholm Aftontidningen" of July 28, 1918

The Russian paper, *Petrogradski Golos*, gives a statistical summary of the losses in area, state income and industrial factories which Russia has suffered through the Brest Litovsk peace.

The loss of area is 930,000 square kilometers with a population of more than 56 millions, or 32 per cent of the whole present Russian population. At the same time rather one-eighth of the whole Russian railroad system is lost. Of 97 million dessiatines wheatland, Russia keeps only 69; and of 700,000 dessiatines rye only 100,000. The iron-mining area is decreased by 78.8 per cent. The loss of coal reaches 1,688 million poods yearly, that is, 89 per cent of the total production.

The countries which in the Brest peace were taken from Russia contain about half of the Russian factory and industrial plants; that is, 1,073 metal-working and machine plants (46.5 per cent), 615 paper mills (42.8 per cent), 233 chemical plants (44.4 per cent), 43 corn-brandy distillation plants (53.1 per cent), 1,642 alcohol distilleries (56.2 per cent), 113 tobacco factories (57 per cent), 574 breweries (57 per cent), 918 weaving and spinning mills (86 per cent), 286 raw-sugar factories (86 per cent).

There were 1,800 savings banks in the surrendered territories and the state income therefrom reached 842,238,000 rubles, that is, about 40 per cent of the total income of the whole government of the Tsar.

Chapter IX. The Action of the Diplomatic Corps for Release of the Rumanian Minister from Arrest

[446] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 13 [14], 1918, 1 a.m. [Received January 15, 4.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/949

[447] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 14, 1918. [Received January 16, 2.34 a.m.]

File No. 701.7161

[448] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 14, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received January 16, 10.50 p.m.]

File No. 701.7161/1

[449] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 15, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received January 18, 8 a.m.]

File No. 701.7161/2

[450] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 16, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received January 21, 5.40 a.m.]

File No. 703.7181/3

[451] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, January 18, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 701.7161/1

[452] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, January 23, 1918, 8 p.m.

File No. 763.72/8568

[453] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, January 31, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received February 3, 4.11 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/8732

File No. 861.00/949

[Document 446]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 13 [14], 1918, 1 a.m.*
[*Received January 15, 4.05 a.m.*]

2230. Rumanian Minister and entire Legation arrested 8 this [last] evening. Cause unknown, but supposed to be account occurrences in Rumania. Have called meeting entire Diplomatic Corps noon to-morrow [to-day] at American Embassy to consider this unique proceeding which deplorable from every viewpoint.

FRANCIS

File No. 701.7161

[Document 447]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 14, 1918.*
[Received January 16, 2.34 a.m.]

2231. Diplomatic Corps with unanimity and emphasis decided to demand immediate release of Diamandi without discussing causes of arrest, and to make such demand of Lenin. Diplomatic Corps on my suggestion going in body to visit Lenin with whom I am endeavoring to make engagement. Meeting attended by every chief of mission, including Spain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 14, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received January 16, 10.50 p.m.]

2233. Nineteen heads of missions visited Lenin by appointment, 4 p.m., at Smolny and presented following in French through myself as dean:

The undersigned chiefs of diplomatic missions of all the nations represented in Russia, viz.: United States, Japan, France, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, Siam, China, Serbia, Portugal, Argentine Republic, Greece, Belgium, Brazil, Persia, Spain, Netherlands, Italy and Great Britain, profoundly indignant at the arrest of M. Diamandi, Minister of Rumania, and affirming the unanimity of their sentiments on the subject of the violation of diplomatic immunities respected for centuries by all governments, demand the immediate liberty of M. Diamandi and of the members of his Legation.

Then follow in order above-named signatures of all the chiefs.

Arriving Smolny were promptly admitted and pleasantly received by Lenin to whom I introduced colleagues, each by title, and when all seated I presented above demand. On Lenin beginning to explain assassination [arrest] caused by Rumania's killing and starving Russian soldiers I stated we would not discuss causes or justification but only the principle involved. French Ambassador then entered into conversation, also Belgian Minister and Serbian; Belgian stating feelingly, Serbian emotionally, that notwithstanding outrages in their countries diplomatic immunity never violated. I finally told Lenin, who had said arrest was made to avoid war between Rumania, Russia, that retention of Minister would be more likely to promote than prevent war and would weaken his government in Russia and throughout the world. He said that if I thought so he would refer matter to Council of People's Commissioners and when French Ambassador said we must have prompt reply Lenin said would telephone American Ambassador this evening. Am now awaiting advice which think will be favorable. Many chiefs including British and French and Japanese said would ask their Governments to authorize request of passport if Minister not released. Am not prepared to say what I would do, depends on what I think effect would be on separate peace. Have

you any instructions?

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 15, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received January 18, 8 a.m.]

2238. Continuing my 2233. About 11 heard unofficially Rumanian Minister would be released; hour later heard officially would be released but half an hour later heard previous report mistake; 3 o'clock heard again officially would be released; 10 o'clock to-day telephoned to fortress, learned was still there; at 1 o'clock informed Rumanian Minister been told would be released on signing agreement to release Austrian officers and all Bolshevik soldiers arrested in Rumania but had refused. Continuously telephoning Smolny and fortress, 5 o'clock learned had been unconditionally released and that Ambassador had brought him to French Embassy where have just interviewed him.

Said heard noon 18th [13th] Trotsky wired from Brest ordering his arrest and had offers of protection in other missions but decided to remain in his Legation; that ten soldiers entered around about 8 and took him under arrest; upon asking for papers officer said same would arrive soon; that another officer exhibited paper stating arrest occasioned by arrest of Austrian officers and Russian soldier in Rumania but not definite; had invited guests to dinner and asked permission to dine but was refused and taken to entrance under guard where met thirty more armed soldiers; taken to Peter Paul Fortress arriving about 9; shown into large room where waited until 2 a.m., when shown to small room where only one bed with mattress, no cover; had asked privilege of taking valet but was denied; accompanied by young Rumanian officer who also arrested and consigned to same room but compelled to sleep on mattress on floor without cover.

Rumanian Minister visited 10 a.m. to-day by prison [commander asking] signature paper obligating Rumanian Minister to secure or recommend release of Austrian officers and Bolsheviks who are under arrest in Rumania. Minister refused saying not diplomat when imprisoned but only 59, his cell number. Rumanian Minister said all telegraphic communication with Rumania severed and not advised of occurrences. About 4 p.m. was released and taken by French Ambassador to French Embassy. Naturally very indignant saying been disgraced and must quit Petrograd. I am telephoning missions of unconditional release and calling meeting Diplomatic Corps tomorrow afternoon.

Italian Embassy invaded 3 a. [p.] m. yesterday afternoon. Hundred or more bottles wine consumed or taken by soldiers, two of whom entered living apartments. Italian Ambassador entered complaint to insult. At yesterday's meeting British suggested meeting and action be confined to arrest of Rumanian Minister by government which was confirmed. During discussion with Lenin, French Ambassador mentioned invasion Italian Embassy whereupon Lenin said his first knowledge thereof and asked why government not advised. Italian Ambassador addressed formal communication to me and subject matter will be considered to-morrow. Missions considered extraterritorial and inviolate.

Lenin was shot at while in automobile *en route* Smolny last evening, had narrow escape. Platten, Swiss socialist, on Lenin's left was wounded in hand, eight shots fired. No arrests made yesterday.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 16, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received January 21, 5.40 a.m.]

2240. Diplomatic Corps met here this afternoon. Decided to give press *procès-verbal* of their call on Lenin. *Pravda*, Bolshevik organ, prints that Zalkind, Assistant Commissary Foreign Affairs, stated had telephonic message through authentic source stating:

American Ambassador assures that immediately after release of Rumanian Minister he would protest to him against Rumanian attack on Russian troops and through American representatives in Rumania would make necessary statement to the Rumanian Government. American Ambassador regards Diamandi's arrest as formal expression of protest of Russian Government against activity of Rumanian commander in chief.

Rumanian Minister construes this as justification on my part of his arrest, consequently am writing him following:

My Dear Colleague: I am surprised and pained to learn from you that you for a moment think that I would or could justify your arrest and confinement in Peter and Paul Fortress, as I have had only one opinion on the subject and have made no expression concerning it other than to deplore such an unprecedented infraction of diplomatic etiquette. I have concurred in sentiment of our colleagues, Allied and neutral chiefs of missions, and as the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps accompanied by all of the members thereof, presented to the President of the Commissaries of the People the demand for your immediate and unconditional release and stated when doing so that we could not enter into any discussion concerning the causes of your arrest.

The *procès-verbal* approved at a meeting of the Diplomatic Corps this afternoon gives an account of what [occurred] at Smolny Institute when Mr. Lenin received the Diplomatic Corps at 4 p.m., January 1/14.

I have had no communication direct or indirect nor have I sent any message to anyone connected with the Soviet government on the subject of

your arrest or your release. The dragoman of the Embassy, by my direction, telephoned to Smolny Institute about midnight of the 14th to ask whether the decision concerning your release had been determined, but he had neither instructions nor authority to make any other inquiry and least of all concerning conditions of your release and he informs me that he did not do so nor even think of doing so.

While sympathizing with you in your trying experience and sincerely regretting its occurrence I felicitate you upon your prompt and unconditional release in which I willingly took an active part and congratulate our colleagues as well as yourself upon the speedy termination of this deplorable incident.

Probably such report effected release, but as stated above I authorized no others to take any message whatever to any of the Soviet government. Rumanian Minister says if not released unconditionally would consider arrest continuing and return to prison.

Soviet government attempting to save its face and making my position extremely difficult, but am making every effort to (prevent?) a separate peace.

FRANCIS

File No. 701.7161/1

[Document 451]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 18, 1918, 4 p.m.*

1999. Your 2233, January 14, 11 p.m., just received. Press reports show your efforts successful. Department approves your course thoroughly.

POLK

File No. 763.72/8568

[Document 452]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 23, 1918, 8 p.m.*

2014. Department advised Bolshevik authorities have issued ultimatum to Rumanian Government in regard to retaliatory measures against Rumanian subjects in Russia because of alleged action of Rumanian Government and troops against Bolshevik troops on Rumanian front. French Ambassador informs me that his Government contemplates instructing French Ambassador at Petrograd to protest to Bolshevik authorities. Please confer with your French colleague and advise Department at once what steps, if any, you think practicable to take in the premises.

POLK

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *January 31, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received February 3, 4.11 a.m.*]

2309. Your 2014. French Ambassador informs us that he received no instructions from his Government to protest against retaliatory measures against Rumanian subjects in Russia. As he of course participated in joint protest of Diplomatic Corps against arrest of Rumanian Minister and as the latter has now been expelled from Russia¹ further action or protest appears to be useless.

FRANCIS

¹ For the further developments in relations between Russia and Rumania, see [vol. II](#), chap. v.

Chapter X. The Soviet Republic

Contents

Informal relations with Soviet authorities—Questions of recognition and intervention—Attitude toward diplomatic officers of the Provisional Government—The German advance into Russia

[\[454\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, March 20, 1918. [Received March 21, 1.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1341

[\[455\] The Chargé in China \(Spencer\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Peking, March 20, 1918, noon. [Received 4.18 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1339

[\[456\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, March 20, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received March 22, 9.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1353

[\[457\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, March 20, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received March 22, 9.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1348

[\[458\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, March 22, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received March 24, 9.48 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1357

[\[459\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, March 23, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1341

[460] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, March 23, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1322

[461] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 26, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received March 28, 3.06 a.m.]

File No. 862.20261/74

[462] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, March 29, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received March 30, 7.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1401

[463] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, March 31, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received April 7, 12.53 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1447

[464] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 1, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received April 2, 3.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1416

[465] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, April 2, 1918. [Received 10.11 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1415

[466] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 2, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 360d.1121 R 25/18

[467] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, April 3, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1373

[468] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 4, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received April 7, 1.51 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1449

[469] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, April 4, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received April 4, 4.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1426

[470] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 5, 1918, 1 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1416

[471] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 5, 1918, 8 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1416

[472] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, April 6, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1426

[473] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 7, 1918, 9 a.m. [Received 6.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1456

[474] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, April 8, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received April 8, 2.33 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1450

[475] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 15, 1918, noon. [Received April 17, 2 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1613

[476] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 15, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received April 20, 9.18 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1630

[477] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 15, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received April 19, 10.15 p.m.]

File No. 811.142/3200

[478] The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/1629^{1/2}

[479] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 17, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received April 20, 8.28 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1621

[480] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, April 18, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received 2.36 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1612

[481] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 20, 1918, noon. [Received April 24, 1.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1658

[482] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, April 28, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 811.142/3200

[483] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 24, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received April 30, 7.08 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1704

[484] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, April 26, 1918. [Received April 28, 2.31 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1667

[485] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 26, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received April 27, 10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1669

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 20, 1918.*

[*Received March 21, 1.05 p.m.*]

22. Your telegram March 15, 7 p.m.,¹ garbled almost unintelligible. Caldwell² wires 18th Japanese occupation there unlikely just now.

Moser wires 16th that Moran³ who was not aware correspondence, reports from ... [Soviet officer,] military camp, Irkutsk, whom Moran must know well, that prisoners being armed, organized under German officers by order from Petrograd, which significant if true. I wired Huntington and Consul, Irkutsk, for report. Robins, Moscow, says Trotsky requests American military officer accompany Russian to Siberia to ascertain truth of the report; Robins sending Webster with Hicks, British officer.

Trotsky requests five American officers as inspectors of army being organized for defense also requests railroad operating men and equipment. Riggs conferring with Trotsky on these subjects at Moscow to-day where are some British, French officers. Highly important we know for what such army be used.

Reported German commission soon control Petrograd to insure compliance with peace treaty but Robins, with whom communicated over direct wire, says report baseless. Red Guard disarmed Russian regiment Petrograd yesterday formerly crack organization.

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed in full, see *ante* p. 401 [Pg. 401 includes portions of [Doc. 405](#) and [Doc. 406](#)]; summarizes information received on conditions in other parts of Russia.

² John K. Caldwell, Consul at Vladivostok.

³ Hugh Moran, representative of the Y. M. C. A. in Siberia.

The Chargé in China (Spencer) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PEKING, *March 20, 1918, noon.*
[Received 4.18 p.m.]

Following from Ambassador Francis just received:

Been functioning Vologda since leaving Petrograd February 26 remaining until otherwise advised.

Making public declaration we do not recognize separate peace but still consider Russian people our ally against Germany.

Chinese Minister and Japanese Ambassador left Vologda 4th of March for Harbin but left Irkutsk 13th for Chita and Vladivostok fearing shorter route impracticable.

Please keep me advised especially concerning movements Japanese army and Chinese troops.

I am only Allied Ambassador in Russia; Siamese Minister with me; also Brazilian, Japanese and Chinese Chargés d'Affaires. No other Allied diplomatic representative in Russia. I purpose going eastward if compelled to move but staying in regard to this [?].

And following from Harbin just received:

Bailey arrived 18th, Wright should arrive 21st. Will await instructions here. Special train with thirty-three Americans, all well, arrived with Bailey.

SPENCER

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *March 20, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[Received March 22, 9.55 a.m.]

280. German advance in south continues rapidly and immense supplies falling into their hands. There is practically no opposition. Nikolaevsk [omission] and many other important places captured. Germans evidently contemplate taking possession Don Basin and obtaining iron and coal supplies. As the result of ratification peace treaty, Bolshevik Party discredited. Military Mission and Robins, Red Cross, doing all possible bring about formation new army. I urn assured, however, and firmly believe that few Russians will fight under present regime. Only a national army to defend the country will unite vast majority.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1348

[Document 457]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *March 20, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[*Received March 22, 9.55 a.m.*]

279. The Patriarch of Russia has refused to sanction the peace treaty and condemns same in strongest terms. American attitude will greatly influence peasants especially. Inform Mr. Crane.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, March 22, 1918, 7 p.m.
[Received March 24, 9.48 a.m.]

27. This situation more complicated daily. Tredwell returning from Petrograd reported had seen Baron Fredericks¹ functioning in passport control; may have been there, but Robins by direct wire to-day says this specifically denied by Chicherin and Trotsky and that French mission has accepted government offer and is making assignment of officers for inspection in new army. Riggs, Moscow, strongly recommends we do likewise, but Ruggles here undecided, as he is not thoroughly satisfied that new army is intended for German resistance.

Moser wires 20th through Summers advising that Americans all leave Russia immediately and that Allied interest justifies [intervention]. Macgowan confirms Moran report concerning German officers saying that their uniforms only partially concealed by Russian overcoats. Robins earnestly supporting Commissaire government while Summers says it is not representative and doomed to failure and that the effort to create army will be futile.

Robins, over direct wire, to-day submits following specific inquiry by request of Soviet:

I asked you to inquire of the American Government if a commission for economic and business purposes sent by economic commission of Soviet government will be received by the United States. It is guaranteed by government that this commission will have no political purpose and will not engage in any propaganda work of any description *en route* or in America. Please get a report [reply] to this inquiry at the earliest possible date.

Despatch from Petrograd received to-day says Joffe has been announced People's Commissaire for Foreign Office [Affairs], the same person whose letter was quoted in my 2354.¹ Present government in nominal control from Murman to the Pacific with no apparent organized or formidable opposition. Robins assures me government desires American friendship and aid in resistance to Germany but all its acts and expressions irreconcilable therewith. Friction with British representatives Archangel inconsistent with specific instructions given Soviet

representatives Murman to cooperate with British authorities and French there, but this order given when Trotsky thought Germany rejected Lenin's acceptance peace terms because Russian commissioners at Brest ordered prompt special train before Russia informed of Germany's acceptance. Prominent government officials in speeches call our Government imperialistic and even Lenin and Trotsky do not conceal that new army being organized to aid world-wide social revolution and overturn all existing governments. President of Petrograd Soviet² in speech on [omission] ours most *bourgeois* of all republics and said President's telegram purely a move in political game of diplomacy made to prevent Germany from pilfering everything and leaving nothing for us and because we annoyed by Japanese aggressive policy and predicting that Trotsky will publish secret correspondence showing our dishonorable play in game of international imperialism. Boasted that reply to President's telegram was slap in face to President of bosses' Republic, "because no matter how difficult the position we will always say the truth to the working class."

Purpose remaining Vologda. Unsolicitous about personal self or staff and when reach conclusion concerning sincerity of German resistance, shall make recommendation.

FRANCIS

¹ Formerly Minister of the Imperial Court and Household, Aide-de-Camp to the Tsar, member of the Council of Empire, etc., etc.

¹ *Ante*, p. 371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of [Doc. 370](#) and [Doc. 371](#)].

² Zinoviev had been made president of the Petrograd Soviet on Dec. 13, 1917.

File No. 861.00/1341

[Document 459]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1918, 6 p.m.*

19. Your 22, March 20. Referring request for American officers Department has report suggesting that Soviet leaders who have asked for military assistance must be suspected of acting on orders from German staff with a view to diverting Entente efforts from western front. What are your views?

LANSING

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *March 23, 1918, 7 p.m.*

21. Your 15 [13], March 16,¹ and 17, March 18.² Department believes your action has had good effect, but does not desire to modify in any way previous instructions as to recognition of Soviet government. As conditions change so rapidly Department has issued you only general instructions and relies on your discretion and judgment to determine your movements and matters not affecting policy of this Government. Unhappily, the United States is unable to extend direct aid to the people of Russia at this time but desires you to reflect attitude of America as already conveyed to you in previous telegrams.

LANSING

¹ Not printed; discusses, as does No. 17, the Ambassador's press declaration opposing a separate peace.

² Ante, p. 402 [Pg. 402 includes portions of [Doc. 406](#), [Doc. 407](#), and [Doc. 408](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 26, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received March 28, 3.06 a.m.*]

38. Answering your 19. My No. 2354³ presented documents in such consecutive way as to convince me that Soviet leaders had accepted German money to demoralize Russian Army. ... Robins says absurd that Soviet working with Germans, but Sisson and Bullard convinced, are positive. Probably Sisson and Robins both influenced by pride of opinion and mutual animosity.

I follow developments closely communicating with Summers and Robins daily, who also differ greatly. Riggs, now Moscow, reports Allies responding to appeal to assist army organization generously, having assigned thirty-eight therefor and Italians ordered ten from Italy. Have authorized military attaché to do likewise because it is unadvisable to refuse, but mainly for reason that Trotsky, Minister of War, announces that army will be under strict discipline and is engaging Russian officers who must reenlist and [since] sole occupation gone. While such army nominally for defense, real object is resistance to all existing governments and promotion of socialism throughout the whole world. It is only hope for saving European Russia from Germany. My (real) and strictly confidential reason is that army so organized can by proper methods be taken from Bolshevik control and used against Germans, and even its creators if prove that German allies. I anticipate not revealing last reason to Robins or Riggs.

Whereabouts of Rumanian Military Mission unknown; think contains only two officers who with Riggs may assist in organizing.

Consider it advisable you understand my objects and why can not now form decided opinion concerning objects of Soviet leaders whose acts heretofore could not have been more promotive of German interests whether so intended or not.

FRANCIS

³ Ante, p. 371 [Pg. 371 includes portions of [Doc. 370](#) and [Doc. 371](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *March 29, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received March 30, 7.50 p.m.]

French and Italian Embassies, Serbian Legation arrived, purpose remaining indefinitely. Three chiefs criticizing severely British Embassy for going through Finnish battle lines without waiting other missions, when was understanding that all go together; probably misunderstanding. Missions seeking domiciles after month on special train. Robins again wires Minister of Foreign Affairs asks formally for appointment by us of one representative in each of six commissions to settle Rumanian-Russian affairs, said commissions sitting in Petrograd, Moscow, Odessa, Kiev, Jassy, and Galatz; suppose same request made British and French. If Department desires to comply, suggest members American-Rumanian Military Mission, but can not see consistency therein if diplomatic relations with Rumania severed, as Russian Government not recognized.

Moscow press prints to-day: "American Consul informed Supreme Economic Council that American Government agrees to resume commercial and industrial relations with Russia, regardless of repudiation of debts." Suppose Department authorized such statement, if made. Summers and Robins disagree and are mutually critical.

Answering your 25, concerning railway men,¹ certainly Government would be [ready to] guarantee same not be used in German interest, whether German agent or not, tout willing myself to assume responsibility, consequently request they be sent Vologda where could not arrive before April 15. Duties not specified, as Government ignorant concerning defects and remedies. Transportation situation deplorable, while Russia and the Allies consider railroads our special care. Men likely to be needed to save supplies from German capture if German advance resumed and Moscow captured, which not improbable. Furthermore, I consider exceedingly advisable to increase capacity of Siberian Railway for emergencies. Expenses and compensation could doubtless be arranged if thought desirable.

FRANCIS

¹ Dated Mar. 26, [vol. III](#), chap. iv.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, March 31, 1918, 10 a.m.
[Received April 7, 12.53 p.m.]

303. Jenkins reports from Chita fighting Manchurian frontier Bolsheviks and Semenov, who has ten thousand men, endeavoring reestablish order. It is thought he can accomplish this without Allied assistance. From Jenkins's reports, Germans evidently endeavoring to embroil America and Japan. Reports that anarchists are gaining strength and that Bolsheviks are levying heavy contributions on business houses. Estimates eight thousand Austrian prisoners, Chita, who are joining Red Guard to fight Japanese and capitalism in general.

Macgowan reports large number prisoners armed and with machine guns going east; destination and purpose not clearly explained. It is noteworthy that these prisoners come from as far west as Omsk. They seem to have pursued the same policy towards their officers as Bolsheviks arresting or imprisoning them. This will inevitably result increased anarchy.

Nielsen² from Samara reports many cars cotton loaded *en route* Moscow and being shipped by German firms. Little cotton will be planted this year as growers fear confiscation. International Harvester men report armed prisoners guarding supplies, munitions along railways.

No reports Ray at Rostov.

Illegal and forcible contributions forcing all foreign and native industries to close business. Railways demoralized everywhere. In Moscow serious dissension amongst Bolsheviks. Having destroyed all the nation's resources they naturally have no income and are resorting to illegal contributions, confiscation and other methods to raise funds. This policy naturally borders on the program of the anarchists who are rapidly gaining strength and who are openly asserting their power. In many respects they are more conservative than Bolsheviks, due no doubt to monarchist elements working with them. The *Russkiya Vedomosti*, one of the most influential conservative papers, closed for publishing an article by Savinkov attacking Lenin's complicity Germans. Numerous internal struggles have been frustrated. Manufacturers and other organizations called to-day to protest against treaty of peace and policy of Bolsheviks. There is no doubt that the present

régime can no longer count upon support of workmen, peasants or *bourgeoisie* whose sympathies are still with the Allies though it is doubtful whether they can render any further military resistance unless Allied aid is sent as nucleus around which they will rally. The country will not support the Bolsheviks further in the organization of a new army and German control will be welcomed if the present anarchy continues.

In an interview to-day ... [a high Soviet official] states that' Russia has made no treaties regarding boundaries Ukraine, that Russia does not consider itself in state of war [with] Ukraine, and that Soviets will immediately withdraw all troops from this section to avoid giving Germany excuse carrying on further military operations and occupying further territory. He further states that Germany will be obliged to occupy further territory Russia as soon as conditions western front admit in order to control grain supplies and prepare for world shortage foodstuffs. He expects Moscow to be occupied in May. Regarding new army, he considers resistance to Germans impossible and will give them excuse advance. He thinks government will be compelled move beyond Volga and there reconstitute their forces.

Careful estimate [of] results of peace treaty show that Russia has lost 34 per cent inhabitants, 32 per cent agricultural land, 85 per cent beet-sugar land, 54 per cent industrial undertakings, 89 per cent coal mines, and practically all cotton and oil supplies. At Nikopol alone there are 55 million tons iron ore already mined which is threatened. While the advance in southern Russia has been suspended owing to operations western front, German control this section already effective.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

² Orsen N. Nielsen, Vice Consul at Moscow, on special detail at Samara.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 1, 1918, 2 p.m.
[Received April 2, 3.43 p.m.]

52. Think shall approve Wright's taking leave offered him in December after reports fully. I have established direct communication with Peking, Tokyo as instructed.

French, Italian, Serbian chiefs lunched Embassy yesterday. Arranged daily meeting with French, Italian Ambassadors at the Embassy inviting other chiefs when advisable; both oppose supporting Soviet except on stipulated satisfactory conditions. We have instructed our military attaches at Moscow to come here for report as appears Russian officers recalled as instructors while subordinate officers new army still elected by soldiers. Such army unreliable for German resistance with success. New Minister of War constantly hedging both ways, but another incident like German protest against my declaration will force Soviet to take stand which I am endeavoring to bring about. French, Italian Ambassadors think first step should be demand on Soviet that it cease to attack Allies and rescind loan repudiation decree but I think such demands should be postponed for present. If convincing evidence of German control manifested, would advise immediately appealing to Russian people and sending British, French, American, Japanese, and Chinese [troops] into Russia. Serbian troops who contemplated going to America are leaving by Archangel and eastern routes for Saloniki. I requested Robins to tell Minister of War such troops should be held here if resistance intended but Minister of War replied that French and Serbians insisted on troops leaving which French Ambassador, Serbian Minister yesterday denied and said would have remained with Russian troops if latter induced to teach [fight]. Serbian Minister says Soviet facilitating troops' prompt departure; claims troops aggregate 250,000 and says furthermore enlisting office opened Moscow and many Czech prisoners of war enlisting to fight Central Empires. Robins wires to-day advising my coming Moscow for more thorough cooperation with Soviet government but I have no such intention.

Keeping eye on Siberia to save from German clutches. Purpose going Irkutsk if unsafe here or if Soviet yields to German demand concerning my declaration and request my departure; if unsafe there, shall proceed Vladivostok or Harbin unless you order otherwise.

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, April 2, 1918.
[Received 10.11 p.m.]

1806. Swedish press reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau:

Capture Odessa confirmed. After short bombardment city fell into hands sailors.

Reports Cossack troops supporting Soviet arrested General Alexeev in Don region.

Reports yesterday first direct train to Revel arrived from Berlin, journey taking eighteen hours.

Reports official Petrograd papers confirm Russo-Rumanian agreement concluded, Rumania undertaking evacuate Bessarabia within two months, prisoners exchanged and surplus Bessarabia's grain supply to be exported Rumania.

Reports via Petrograd's telegram bureau: exchange ratifications [Russo-German] peace treaty concluded March 30 at 8 p.m.; the Russian government representative, Petrov, returns Russia tomorrow.

Reports from Petrograd: in reply Soviet request that frontiers Ukraine be defined precisely, the German Government stated independent republic Ukraine comprises provinces Volhynia, Podolia, Kherson, Taurida, exclusive of Crimea, Kiev, Poltava, Chernigov, Ekaterinoslav, and Kharkov. Reports Soviet sent Austrian Government ultimatum demanding Soviet Commissaries arrested Odessa be released immediately. Reports another conflict reported between Soviet and German Government account latter's demand reinforcements, ammunition be sent Red Guard, Finland.

Reports left wing Bolshevik Party under leadership Bukharin, Radek and others in newly started newspaper *Comm[un]ist* attacked Lenin account his approval Brest peace. Lenin charged with betraying revolution and carrying on opportunistic policy, forsaking most sacred principles revolutionary socialism. Bolshevik leaders of left now urge Russia's organization for "the Holy War." Reports apparently only minor portion Bolshevik Party support them. Reports as remarkable fact that Brest peace has called forth protest from not only whole Russian democracy and Social Revolutionary Party, but also from some of foremost leaders Bolshevik Party.

MORRIS

File No. 360d.1121 R 25/18

[Document 466]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 2, 1918, 6 p.m.*

41. Your unnumbered March 29, 9 p.m. Ask Summers source of statement
Moscow press. Not authorized by Department.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1373

[Document 467]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 3, 1918, 6 p.m.*

7128. There is reason to believe that British cable censor has recently suppressed messages in code passing between the Russian Ambassador here and the Russian Ambassador in Paris.

Please ascertain and report for our confidential information attitude of British Government towards these Russian officials. The Department has confidence in Russian Ambassador here and grants him unrestricted cable privileges.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 4, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received April 7, 1.51 p.m.]

69. After two conferences, two hours each, of Allied Ambassadors with military attachés, we agreed to permit officers to continue technically assisting in formulating plan for new army while adroitly making suggestions in order to organize real army. This concluded after much discussion. My colleagues advocated first demanding guarantees such as like treatment for our respective nationals to that granted Germans in peace treaty and consent to Japanese intervention, but finally consented defer demanding such guarantees and to cable their Governments advising against Japanese intervention for the present. Majority military attaches think can soon induce Soviet to request Japanese and other Allied intervention. I also think same possible, but the Allies should be prepared to act promptly in any event. News permeates Russia's enormous area and immense population slowly, as does conviction Russian mentality, but when peace terms known and comprehended in all their severity, Russian pride, if any surviving, should inspire violent antipathy to Germany. I am forwarding protests against Brest peace from Moscow Soviet, also Russian nobility. Patience and vigilance required and I am endeavoring to exercise both.

I think ambassadorial colleagues returned reluctantly and following instructions consequently impatiently inclined to press Soviet. [Lockhart] is the only English representative in Russia except a few military officers; he was formerly consul Moscow but returned to England and was sent here after Buchanan's departure as reputed personal representative Lloyd George. [Lockhart] was informed by Balfour himself that latter cabled you asking consent to Japanese invasion and he made rejoinder that such be tragic mistake now and asked Balfour if such policy would be changed if he could secure promise that war be declared against Germany within six weeks.

This peace can not prevail long. While Germany occupied on western front, Soviet government should be encouraged to prepare for resumption hostilities and when begun, Allies, including Japan, will be asked to assist and should be ready. Moral effect of even four hundred American marines coming with Japan be great from every viewpoint.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *April 4, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[*Received April 4, 4.45 p.m.*]

9351. Your 7128, April 3, 6 p.m. The British Government takes the attitude that the old Russian Embassy no longer possesses any governmental representative capacity, and while it is on excellent terms with the members of the Embassy individually, the privilege of telegraphing in cipher has been withheld.

Foreign Office occasionally send telegrams for Nabokov, old Russian Chargé d'Affaires, in their own cipher at his request.

PAGE

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 5, 1918, 1 p.m.*

48. Your 52, April 1, 2 p.m. As already explained in my 21, March 23, 7 p.m.,^{[1](#)} Department relies on your discretion and judgment to remain in Russia so long as you can reflect friendly purpose and sympathy of this Government for Russian people without imperiling self and staff.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 487 [Pg. 487 includes portions of [Doc. 460](#) and [Doc. 461](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 5, 1918, 8 p.m.*

49. Your 52, April 1, 2 p.m. Department regards any protests relative to repudiation of loans as grave error. ... Protest would not influence Soviet and would only aid German propaganda. In same connection do not give Soviet promise military support as requested in queries submitted through you and through military attaché. This Government is conducting war against Central powers to safeguard free countries, small and great, from domination of German militarism. Its purpose to assist Russia already made clear. Department concurs in your general estimates of Bolsheviki, and approves your decision to feel your way to certainty before making positive recommendations.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/1426

[Document 472]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 6, 1918, 4 p.m.*

7159. Your 9351 does not answer inquiry in Department's 7128. Department desires to know why British Government is suppressing telegrams in code between Russian Embassy here and the Russian Embassy in Paris.

LANSING

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 7, 1918, 9 a.m.
[Received 6.35 p.m.]


315. The *de facto* government is growing sensibly weaker on account of internal dissension, dissatisfaction and opposition on part of workingmen and peasants and the swollen strength of the anarchists who possess arms, artillery and machine guns and threaten openly to overthrow the Soviet government. Outside Moscow the local Soviets are practically autonomous and ignore the central authorities who confess they cannot control them. Soviets are levying arbitrary contributions and imprisoning those who refuse or can not conform thereto. State of anarchy is especially flagrant in Siberia where many American and other firms are seriously suffering notwithstanding energetic protests consulates. Probably all factories closed or closing, there being no raw material and no money to pay employees. The situation is even more serious where nationalization has taken place. The Government realizes its predicament and is endeavoring to employ technical assistance put factories [on feet?]. Lunacharski publicly stated that cooperation *bourgeoisie* indispensable and this is generally considered full failure present political experiment. The Bolshevik press continues violent attacks on Allies. The *Russkoe Slovo*, largest paper Russia, permanently closed for advocating Japanese intervention. Delegations all classes continue sending deputations demanding Allied aid to try curb anarchism and prevent Russia's becoming German colony. As a result of demoralization many banks, letters of credit, and real estate being bought by German agents who are determined central Russian control. Trustworthy reports state that Germans have made contracts for control over Russian oil sucklers [fields], grain and certain railways. The seizure of the mining districts of south completely paralyzes Moscow factories which depend thereon for fuel and raw material. Germans continue advance in south occupying Poltava, Sumy and threatening Kharkov. No resistance due demoralization troops. Every advance met with large stores supplies. In addition to nine governments comprising Ukraine and mentioned my 313,¹ Central powers will take over such a section of Great Russia as will insure control agriculture and manufacturing products. Grüner, well-known German transportation expert, now at Kiev supervising reconstruction railway system in Ukraine.

No communication Tiflis. Erzerum reported captured by Armenians and Batum

surrounded by Turks. Central powers evidently contemplate complete possession [omission] line. Alexeev and Kornilov armies being reenforced and heavy fighting around Ekaterinoslav. Majority conservative leaders now in that section hoping Allied intervention will come through revolution [omission]. Germans purchasing stocks of cotton in Central Asia [omission]. Macgowan, Thomson and others in Irkutsk report that prisoners are recruiting armed for campaign against Semenov. Bolshevik government seems have little authority over their acts.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

¹ Vol. II, chap. iv.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *April 8, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received April 8, 2.33 p.m.*]

9388. Your 7159, April 6, 3 [4] p.m. Foreign Office has promised to look into the matter the telegrams in question between Washington and Paris, and to let me know if they are stopped by British authorities.

According to the conversation on which I based my 9351, the reason for any suppression would be that since the old Russian representatives no longer represent a government, their telegrams might be treated as private messages which are not permitted to pass in code over British wires.

PAGE

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, April 15, 1918, noon.
[Received April 17, 2 a.m.]

438. By decree March 21, Moscow Commissariat Military Affairs has incorporated anarchist forces into socialistic army on equal footing. Since then *de facto* authorities have requisitioned and have given to official anarchist group approximately 30 large private residences for publication newspapers and organs propaganda. As result of protection present government anarchism has openly spread over Russia. As result of growing power and insults offered Colonel Robins of the American Red Cross, who is on very intimate terms with Lenin and Trotsky, orders were given on the 13th to arrest all anarchists. This was done after considerable resistance and partial destruction by artillery of the houses occupied by anarchists. It is understood also that Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, who is expected in Moscow daily, warned the local authorities that anarchism must cease before he arrived.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 15, 1918, 7 p.m.
[Received April 20, 9.18 p.m.]

100. Robins's automobile taken by anarchists 11th when he complained to Soviet government and says without feeling told them to demonstrate claimed power to protect life and property. He reports that morning of 12th 26 anarchists' rendezvous Moscow surrounded by Red Guard demanding disarmament in five minutes; majority surrendered, those resisting were attacked and 522 arrested, 40 killed and wounded. Robins says this thorough demonstration of Bolsheviks' power, another argument for recognition.

Riggs and other Allied military attaches Moscow being estopped from aiding army organization by your cable No. 49, April 5, 8 p.m. Wires Ruggles, 13th:

Formal declaration, which apparently expected by Ambassador, that this is an army to fight Germans will never be made for obvious reasons, therefore our aid can only come after declaration of war when it will come too late.

Furthermore states:

Through Ambassador first I have seen to-day British Foreign Office telegram saying in substance:

British Government signifies its hearty willingness to treat with Bolsheviks on basis of terms as given in telegram relating conversation Trotsky with military missions. It further states that economic questions such as repayment of loans are not to be raised at this time. Only aim to defeat Germany.

A second telegram making this stronger and telling Lockhart to go the limit; furthermore, Trotsky knows this. He is very pleased as he asked for British naval mission and has offered Canadian Colonel Boyle important transport post.

Riggs further says, "Watch French Ambassador who is expecting to aid and will very soon get orders to change his play," and predicts British will beat us to it and

will have French supporting, we coming third. This contrasts greatly with views of Summers and Serbian Minister cabled my 98, April 14, 7 p.m.¹ Desiring, however, to leave no excuse for Soviet government's favoring Germany, am cabling you to-day requesting Emerson and several engineers be sent Vologda immediately.

Moscow papers say "Rus-Tel Agency" suppressed as counter-revolutionary—that agency promulgates statement that I had received cable from you to the effect that Japanese landing agreed to by Allies; apparently my statement based on your 47, April 5, 6 p.m.,² as cabled in my 86, April 10, 4 p.m.;² nullified effect of false publication and allayed excitement about landing.

Moscow Soviet press says Soviet government seeking through neutral government recognition by Allies and claims that Allied missions at Vologda and neutral missions remaining at Petrograd are preparing to move Moscow headed by American Ambassador. I know of no basis therefor, do you? Mirbach, German Ambassador to Soviet government, expected soon, reported leaving Berlin 14th special train of ten cars.

FRANCIS

¹ Apparently not received; see No. 119, Apr. 24, *post*, p. 504 [*Pg. 504 includes portions of Doc. 483 and Doc. 484*].

☞² Vol. II, chap. i.

☞² Vol. II, chap. i.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *April 15, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[*Received April 19, 10.15 p.m.*]

101. On Robins's request, cabling in cipher following to American Embassy, Paris, for Davison, Red Cross:

3. Moscow, April 15. Thacher's 7, April 10, received. Recent events emphasize recommendations for economic constructive program cooperation between Soviet government and America. Complete wiping out anarchist organized force, Moscow, final vindication Soviet internal control. Simply repeat cumulative conclusions for five months. Unless such cooperation between governmental meetings [authorities?], work ended May 1. Wardwell finishing milk distribution Petrograd. Webster returning from Siberian war-prisoner investigation, admirably done. Substance reports [sent to] Secretary of State, Washington, D. C, complete refutation prisoners-of-war scare. Hardy, Andrews here. All very well.

Received and forwarded to-day telegram from Thompson to Robins which R. evidently received previously direct, as it contained misleading excerpt cabled you in my 87, April 10, 10 p.m.¹ Is Robins cabling Department direct or otherwise than through Embassy?

FRANCIS

¹ Vol. III, chap. iii.

The British Ambassador (Reading) to the Secretary of State

No. 407

MEMORANDUM

The British representative at Moscow recently telegraphed to the British Government that while the tension of the situation increased with every day's delay the position was not yet hopeless, and that if a detailed scheme for military assistance to Russia could be put forward at once, an agreement might still be reached.

In reply to this telegram Mr. Balfour has informed Mr. Lockhart that there must be an agreement on general principles before a detailed scheme can be put forth. The sort of arrangement which His Majesty's Government would like to see adopted was stated in outline as follows:

Every effort should be made by the Bolshevik authorities to raise a genuine national army, and in the meantime they should take steps to organize guerilla warfare in those districts of Russia occupied by German forces; they should also make every effort to get rid of German influence in the districts which are out of the reach of the German Army.

Strong measures should be taken to prevent supplies reaching Germany and Austria. This applies equally to foodstuffs from the south of Russia, vessels from the Baltic Fleet, or war material from Vladivostok, Petrograd or Archangel.

Everything should be done to stiffen resistance to German and Turkish invasion in Transcaucasia, and to keep the control of the Black Sea in Russian hands.

The Bolshevik authorities should ask for naval and military assistance from the Allies at Murmansk if the railroad is threatened from Finland, and in any event such assistance should be asked for through Vladivostok, where it is possible to give it in the greatest strength and with the most effect.

From the political point of view, the main conditions which occur to His Majesty's Government in connection with Allied assistance to Russia are that the Allies should undertake to evacuate at the end of the war all Russian territory occupied by them, and also that they should undertake, while in Russia, to take no part whatever in any of the economic or political disputes now existing in Russia. The liberation of the country from the enemy and the restoration of Russian independence would be the only object of intervention.

It would no doubt be necessary to make minor arrangements in detail for the help to be given to the Bolshevik armed forces, but this aspect of the question can

hardly be discussed until the main lines of the scheme have been agreed upon.

The question of sending Allied forces through Vladivostok is now the chief point of difficulty, but the objections to this are rather sentimental than real. Russia needs military assistance and she can not herself provide the necessary military force. She is afraid that the force used would eventually be employed in such a manner as to endanger her independence and integrity. A guarantee by the Allied powers would secure her against this risk, and the security of the guarantee would not be diminished by the fact that Japan must, from the nature of the case, supply the main part of the Allied force to be employed.

While it is possible that Japan may be reluctant to accept the scheme suggested, there is little use in endeavouring to bring it into force unless Trotsky agrees to do his share towards its adoption. Should he refuse to take action, it is possible that Japan may find herself obliged in self-defence to intervene in Siberia, and such intervention would have few of the advantages and all of the drawbacks of the scheme suggested by the British Government.

Instructions in the sense of the preceding paragraphs are now in the hands of the British representative at Moscow, and the British Ambassador is instructed to express the earnest hope of the British Government that similar instructions may be sent by the United States authorities to Colonel Robins.

WASHINGTON, *April 16, 1918.*

[*Received April 19.*]

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 17, 1918, 1 p.m.
[Received April 20, 8.28 a.m.]

367. Renewed German advance in the region of Smolensk; to the south Belgorod has been taken; rapid advances are being made on Kursk and Voronezh. Taking of these chief railway lines reaching Moscow would be very annoying and [would aggravate] the food shortness and preclude manufacture munitions on any important scale.

Replying to protest by local authorities of Kursk against the continued invasion Russian territory Ukraine government stated it is bound in this matter by its treaty with Germany. Concerning Ukraine-Russian treaty of peace Soviet signers say they invited Ukraine delegates to communicate to [with] them at Smolensk. [Soviet] committee headquarters Moscow states German transcripts [conscripts] occupy greater part invaded region. Remainder occupied by Polish troops. Germans have control over all railway lines and stations. Staff headquarters at Minsk. Bavarian troops seem most numerous and are continuing to increase. Their center at Mogilev where Leopold of Bavaria is reported to have [arrived] April 6. Other troops center at Orsha [omission]. All Germans under [command] and practically all artillery removed to western front. Troops left are Landsturm troops and not recruits. Report continues:

Each town has its captain-general who has always at his disposal one company of soldiers with several more in reserve scattered in small detachments in surrounding villages guarding mills, bridges, warehouses and factories. As to the feeling among the soldiers not one [omission] complain of being very tired and anxious for rest and peace but are at the same time very chauvinistic and full of the glory of being victorious.

Polish force is reported 20,000 strong at beginning of the German advance, now are said to be greatly increased by enlistment of Poles in occupied region [omission] among the Polish troops [omission]. Relations with these German troops strained and mutually distrustful. Open conflicts have occurred. Relations of the Poles with Ukraine troops also inordinate. Leader states Poles regard themselves as a part of troops of the government of Russia allied with Germans

against the Bolsheviks but not subject to German orders.

Consulate General arranging to send observers into occupied territory. Foregoing report made by unskilled persons viewing the situation from one point only.

No word from Haine.¹ Soviet authorities reported leaving for St. Petersburg. Thomson² informed by serious person one thousand prisoners Novo Nikolaevsk fully armed having machine guns and two batteries field artillery with German prisoners in command. Continued heavy illegal contributions on Singer and other firms throughout Siberia and arrest of mining managers on refusal to pay. Have taken vigorous action with [central] authorities who promise instruct local Soviets to discontinue levies on Singer Company. Renewed activity by Singer men [previously] reported. Presume Harbin reporting on this.

Bolshevik press continues to interpret events at Vladivostok as indicative of serious disagreement between Japan and the Allies, especially the United States. Spread of this view favored by confusing statements respecting American attitude. [The report] of absence of accord between Japan and the United States detrimental to Allies' interests and prestige in Russia. [Omission] public [statement affirming] unity of action and purpose badly needed. French officials commenting unfavorably on America's friendly attitude towards S[oviet]. All opposition parties state policy present regime directed solely by German Staff.

SUMMERS

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

¹ Possibly refers to Thornwell Haynes, Consul at Helsingfors.

² Alfred R. Thomson, Consul at Omsk.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *April 18, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[*Received 2.36 p.m.*]

9569. Your 7159, April 6, 4 p.m.³ The British authorities are stopping telegrams that pass over British controlled lines between old Russian diplomatic officers for the reasons given in my 9351 and 9388.¹ In consequence of my inquiries, under your instructions, the Foreign Office have directed Lord Reading to take the matter up with you. If the French Government permits the transmission of such telegrams, I suggest that Bakhmeteff's messages to Maklakov might go over the French cable to Brest.

PAGE

³ *Ante*, p. 495 [Pg. 495 includes portions of [Doc. 471](#), [Doc. 472](#), and [Doc. 473](#)].

¹ *Ante*, pp. 494 [Pg. 494 includes portions of [Doc. 468](#), [Doc. 469](#), [Doc. 470](#), and [Doc. 471](#)] and 496 [Pg. 496 includes portions of [Doc. 473](#) and [Doc. 474](#)].

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State²


[Telegram]

Moscow, April 20, 1918, noon.
[Received April 24, 1.10 a.m.]

388. Macgowan [reports] agent Singer Company, probably Russian, imprisoned Krasnoyarsk refusal pay illegal contributions. Singer agent, Tomsk, states armed men forced him pay former clerks Rs. 34,000 arbitrarily claimed. Further reports Red Guards, principally composed Hungarian prisoners who are carrying out arrests, seizures and requisitions [omission?] local council Tomsk levied contribution Rs. 5,000,000 business men. Refusing payment they were arrested [by] armed Hungarians and imprisoned. Macgowan informed Webster and Hicks interference local affairs but was told matter amounted nothing.³ I have taken up energetically with central authorities matter forced contributions and arrests managers American firms. Have been assured that orders have been given stop all future armed [exactions] this nature.

SUMMERS

² Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok.

³ For the connection of Captain Webster and Major Hicks with the investigation of the arming of war prisoners, see *ante*, p. 483 [Pg. 483 is part of [Doc. 454](#)], and [vol. II](#) , chap. i.

File No. 811.142/3200

[Document 482]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 28, 1918, 5 p.m.*

78. Your 101, April 15, 8 p.m. Department understands that Robins is cabling to Colonel Thompson and also Red Cross direct without Embassy's knowledge on matters of political policy. Department requests him to send such messages in future through your Embassy or Summers.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 24, 1918, 10 p.m.
[Received April 30, 7.08 p.m.]

119. Had call from Serbian Minister, who gave dramatic account of interview with Trotsky. He says told Trotsky, as cabled in my 98, April 14, 7 p.m.,¹ that White Guards Finland would advance on Petrograd and in Ukraine on Moscow and while both assisted by Germans, latter would not cross frontier and that Trotsky would be powerless to oppose to which Trotsky gave silent assent. Later when Serbian Minister mentioned Japanese invasion Trotsky hissed and said such would unite Russians.

Germans and Bolsheviks endeavoring to foment dissension between Japan and the United States. Soviet government willing to treat with any power on earth or elsewhere to perpetuate their domination in Russia.

Lying Petrograd journal, which ten days since printed I was returning because of disagreement with the Department concerning Bolshevik policy, yesterday printed another article, professedly emanating from one close to Embassy in Vologda, that America had prevailed upon other Allies to consider Allied relations with Soviet government and that secret conference thereon be held soon in London. Both lies ignored.

Beloostrov captured by Finnish White Guard 22d.

Mirbach arrived Moscow yesterday and reports that anarchist raid of 12th was made on his order [omission]. Germany protested against landing 6,000 British, French troops for protection of Murman railway as reported in Norwegian press. Am anxiously awaiting information if any change in Far East policy.

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed; see footnote 1, *ante*, p. 498 [Pg. 498 is part of [Doc. 476](#)].

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 26, 1918.

[Received April 28, 2.31 p.m.]

421. Following is translation essential portions Lenin's address April 24 before Moscow Soviet:

We have two enemies, the enemy at home and the enemy abroad. The enemy abroad to the east and to the west awaits the moment when he may attack the Russian socialist revolution. We must not close our eyes to a painful fact; we have no army. We can not resist the power of international imperialism.

We have unfurled the flag of war against capitalists in all countries.

Our civil war is almost ended, the assassination of Kornilov is the last act of this struggle. Now a more painful period begins. The enemy at home and abroad assails us with his last reserves. Our aim at present moment is to retrench until the proletariat of the west comes to our aid. If that does not happen we shall perish.

Another enemy a hundred times stronger is the small proprietor. To overturn the *bourgeoisie* was easy, but this small proprietor is terrible fact. [Each] one is a new Kornilov in germ.

The condition of the country worn out by the world war is very grave. We may be crushed at any moment. Nothing but the dictatorship of the proletariat can save us.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 26, 1918, 2 p.m.
[Received April 27, 10 a.m.]

126. Did not intend notice attempted statement reprinted in *Zarya Rossii*, conservative Moscow journal, from *Evening Star*, unreliable Bolshevik yellow Petrograd journal, to the effect that American Embassy indirectly reported that secret conference held or about to be, London, at American instigation to promote improved relations Allied and Soviet government. Soviet *News*, however, official organ Russian Central Executive Committee, in long editorial 24th treats canard so seriously that feel constrained to state that I know nothing about such conference or suggestion thereof. Should be pleased to know if Department been urging such conference or whether anyone has.

FRANCIS

**Arrival of German and Turkish Ambassadors in Russia—Soviet
request for recall of the French Ambassador**

**[\[486\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of
State](#)**

Moscow, April 27, 1918. [Received May 1, 6 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1697

**[\[487\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of
State](#)**

Moscow, April 27, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received May 16, 8.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1810

[\[488\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, April 29, 1918. [Received May 12, 6.82 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1781

**[\[489\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of
State](#)**

Moscow, April 29, 1918. [Received May 16, 4.42 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1797

**[\[490\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of
State](#)**

Moscow, April 29, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received May 13, 10.49 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1751

[\[491\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, April 30, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1669

[492] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, April 30, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received May 18, 7 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1818

[493] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 1, 1918. [Received May 15, 7.23 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1792

[494] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 1, 1918. [Received May 15, 7.58 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1793

[495] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 1, 1918, noon. [Received May 18, 11.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1813

[496] The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 1, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received May 18, 1.21 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1820

[497] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 1, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received May 18, 2.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1816

[498] The Military Attaché in Russia (Ruggles) to the War Department

Vologda, May 1, 1918, 11 p.m. [Copy received from War Department May 23.]

File No. 861.00/1970

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 27, 1918.
[Received May 1, 6 p.m.]

431. According official Soviet gazette German and Turkish Ambassadors called April 27 [26] accompanied by Chicherin on Chairman Sverdlov of All-Russian Central Executive Committee of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. Mirbach's letter credence dated Berlin April 2 substantially as follows when translated from German to Russian and Russian into English:

After ratification peace treaty with Russian Federal Soviet Republic, Royal German Government decided send Russian Federal Soviet Republic a temporary diplomatic representative, the royal Ambassador, Count von Mirbach.

Count von Mirbach will execute task imposed on him of upholding peace and friendly relations between the two states and will bend all his efforts obtain confidence Government Russian Federal Republic.

Being convinced that he will be able meet fully tasks imposed on him, these credentials given and I allow myself beg they be graciously accepted and that he be shown entire confidence in everything he presents to you in name my Royal Sovereign or Royal Government. Hertling.

To the Government of the Russian Federal Soviet Republic.

Sverdlov replied:

In the name Russian Socialistic Federal Soviet Republic have honor welcoming in your person, Mr. Ambassador, representative of a power with which a peace treaty has been concluded at Brest, as result of which peace, so needed by the people, was established between the two states. Everything which hinders this peace must be overcome. To this end our Commissariat Foreign Affairs has sent a note, of which you also informed, Mr. Ambassador, to German Government sole purpose of which is to remove all dangers threatening peace.

I permit myself express hope that you, Mr. Ambassador, will take measures

on your part solve question satisfactory and insure peace between German Government and Government Soviet Republic.

Turkish representative then presented letter dated Sublime Porte, April 4:

In compliance peace treaty Imperial Ottoman Government has right send a permanent mission to Russia immediately on ratification treaty. In expectation appointment permanent diplomatic representative Imperial Ottoman Government has authorized Halil Kem Ali Bey, the Ambassador Extraordinary, Minister Plenipotentiary at Athens, of His Highness the Sultan, to carry out diplomatic functions.

Not known precisely to what note Sverdlov refers in his address to Mirbach, but probably one relating to continued military advances and seizure of ships and forts.

SUMMERS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 27, 1918, 7 p.m.
[Received May 16, 8.05 p.m.]

434. Owing to the stringent press censorship it is difficult to determine accurately the influence by public opinion of developments in the Far East, the French Ambassador's statement and the rather exaggerated belligerency of the Soviet authorities with respect to each. The *Russkoe Slovo* having been closed last month for intimating approval of direct Allied military assistance, the only outspoken opinions now are those supporting the Bolshevik view. Still one of the substantial liberal papers is bold enough to write: "We are not afraid of the Allies in the East. Foreign troops can fight against Germans [on our] territory as well as the English and Americans are now fighting on French"; and a Social Revolutionary organ says: "For all who are free from the hypnotism of German power and the influence of German gold, it is clear that the international position of Russia was in the anti-German coalition and that to take the responsibility to enter into military alliance with America, England, and France, while they are fighting against the German menace, is a question of life or [omission]." [Omission] may be attributed, in part certainly, to the corrective influence of the French Ambassador's statement upon the impression of confusion in Allied councils, which the Russian public has recently gained from contradictory press statements respecting events in Vladivostok. There is increasing evidence of direct German investment in some of the local papers, combined with the influence of the Bolshevik censor, and the opening next week at Moscow of a German press bureau makes it more imperative than ever that the Allies not only pursue a clear-cut, vigorous and well-coordinated [policy] in Russia, but make it perfectly clear to the Russian people what this policy is.

This morning neither the official nor unofficial press prints any further important news respecting developments in Siberia. Jenkins telegraphs from Chita fourteen dead Red Guards brought from Manchurian front. Evidently considerable fighting, and Semenov is gaining ground. Macgowan telegraphs order of Siberian Commissary, Foreign Affairs, forbidding acceptance code messages from foreign consuls. This will very seriously embarrass work there. Am endeavoring have order canceled.

Continued exchange of notes with Berlin respecting violations of Brest treaty,

arising from continued German military advance. [Omission] reports Finnish White Guards have taken Fort Ino on mainland opposite Kronstadt, barely twenty-five miles from Petrograd and in conceded Russian territory. Finnish government detaining five Russian Red Cross ships at Helsingfors.

In south [omission] and official press bureau admits German advance to within short distance of Lugansk city. Apparently well-grounded rumor that Germany will support Ukraine in demand that Tsaritsyn be included in Ukraine border, thus giving control Volga trade. See my 402.¹ In Caucasus, Turks having taken Batum and Ardakhan, are advancing on Kutais on way to Tiflis. Probably aim at complete control railway to Baku on route to Turkestan.

SUMMERS

¹ Dated Apr. 22, [vol. II](#), chap. iii.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 29, 1918.
[Received May 12, 6.82 a.m.]

132. On account of numerous false statements purporting to emanate from American representatives or inspired by American Embassy, mainly I think German-inspired, I am making following statement:

I have paid no attention to the false rumors that have been circulating concerning the Embassy and myself for the past three weeks but have been curious to know their source and their object. I mean the reports concerning my differing with the Government at Washington and planning to return to America or quit Vologda. I have concluded that such rumors, false and utterly without foundations as they are, were not inspired by a friendly sentiment toward America or Russia, or for the promotions of friendly relations between these countries.

I only notice them now because the name of Colonel Robins has been mentioned in connection therewith. Colonel Robins and I are friends and understand each other thoroughly; we have the same object in view, which is to make the world safe for democracy, and we agree that such desirable end cannot be accomplished without the defeat of Germany.

It is necessary to state that the only authoritative expressions concerning American policy in Russia are given out by myself. This is the fifth public utterance since I arrived at Vologda on February 28. The first was concerning the separate peace of Brest Litovsk which my government did not recognize then nor since. The Russian [American?] people still consider themselves allies of the Russian people. The second was elicited by the landing of Japanese and British marines at Vladivostok. The third was on the same subject, and made after I had become acquainted with the facts attending such landing. The fourth was calling attention of the Russian people to wonderful progress America is making to defeat Germany. All other statements said to emanate from or be inspired by the American Embassy are wholly without foundation.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]¹

Moscow, April 29, 1918.
[Received May 16, 4.42 p.m.]

439. ... Following is translation of radiogram addressed to French Government, Paris, April 27, by Commissar Foreign Affairs:

On April 23 the following statement by your Ambassador Noulens was reported in the Moscow press. ...² Having asked Noulensas to the correctness of this statement we have received an official confirmation of it through Labonne, the Consul at Moscow. In the serious days through which Russia is now living Noulens's statements can hardly lead to friendly relations between the Russian and French people. A representative of the French Government who helps to prejudice relations between France and Russia cannot be tolerated within the Russian Republic. The government of the Russian Federated Socialistic Soviet Republic expresses its certainty that Noulens will be immediately recalled by the Government of the French Republic. Chicherin.

...

SUMMERS

¹ Printed in full, [vol. II](#), chap. i.

² The following is a translation of the statement made by the French Ambassador, which appeared in the Moscow *Izvestia* Apr. 28, 1918, together with the above-mentioned radiogram:

The landing of the Japanese in Vladivostok was the result of long-continued troubles and disturbances in that city. Sooner or later an incident was bound to arise, as the result of which armed intervention would be necessary for the purpose of providing for the safety of foreigners. For many months, the information which we received from Vladivostok indicated a condition of anarchy continually threatening the lives and property of subjects of the Allied states. When international relations

attract foreign merchants to any territory and, especially, to coastal cities, to the profit of the whole country, the authorities governing it must understand that they are thereby placed under the obligation of maintaining public order and protecting their guests from street disturbances. In the contrary case, the persons concerned apply to their governments for that protection which the local authorities, too weak or incompetent, are not in position to guarantee. Then the military forces of that country, the subjects of which are exposed to violence, must assume the restoration of order. And this is just, because a country can not be really independent, without a strong, organized government authority. The Japanese question, so far as it is Japanese, can be localized in Vladivostok, on condition that there be given to the Tokyo Government the satisfaction which it has the right to demand.

However, the Allies cannot assume an indifferent attitude toward the advance of the Austro-Germans in the north, as well as in the south, towards an advance extending far beyond the limits which it was possible to foresee after the Brest treaty. The Germanic states are, in fact, endeavoring to conquer all Russia economically. Furthermore, they are endeavoring, by means of their prisoners, to organize colonization centers in Siberia. The Allies may be obliged to intervene in order to meet this threat directed both against the Russian people and against them. But if, at any time, the Allies are obliged to resort to military operations, they will act exclusively in the capacity of allies, who are not intervening in the internal affairs of Russia, who are without any ulterior motives with regard to any kind of conquest, and desire only to protect the general interest in full accord with Russian public opinion, and they will forcibly oppose German seizure of eastern Europe. I have no data of any kind with respect to the intention of the governments as to this question, but, in any event, I can say that if there should be armed intervention, and it should be necessary that it take place in Siberia, it will have an international and distinctly friendly character.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, April 29, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received May 13, 10.49 a.m.]

440. Deliver the following message to Colonel House [from] Bullard:

April 30. I am convinced that Lenin in accord with German Ambassador is conducting diplomatic offensive against us with the intention of weakening our alliance with Japan. The newspaper he controls did utmost to cause split between America and Japan over Vladivostok incident. Now trying to isolate France from ourselves by individual attack on one Ambassador. If one Ambassador is recalled, Lenin will be encouraged attack Belgian, Serbian or American representatives. Allies should present united front. If one Ambassador is forced out all should go. [Lenin] faces dilemma. Our Russian friends, believing him a traitor, will not support him. He must abdicate or deliver the goods to the Germans. If he forces rupture of diplomatic relations, ourselves should occupy Archangel partly to protect immense quantities munitions, partly as rallying point for Russian friends. Joint Allied statement expressing friendship for Russian people, hostility to adventurers now in power who have delivered to Germans [omission]. The only alternative, some such energetic action, is full recognition of the Bolsheviks as legitimate government. Present undefined situation every day more difficult and undignified. But recognition of Bolsheviks means recognition of Brest Litovsk treaty which seems to me impossible. Such recognition would be blow to all healthy democratic elements in Russia, which seems to me betrayal our own ideals. Such recognition would be giving confidence to German tools, which seems to me foolish. This message should be immediately brought to attention Secretary of State.

SUMMERS

File No. 861.00/1669

[Document 491]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *April 30, 1918, 7 p.m.*

99. Your 126, April 26, 2 p.m. Department knows nothing whatever of conference to promote improved relations between Allies and Soviet government.

LANSING

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, April 30, 1918, 8 p.m.
[Received May 18, 7 p.m.]

134. I saw no occasion for Noulens's interview and feared would be criticized. Do not see how France can observe demand of unrecognized Soviet government for Noulens's recall. Interview, whether Soviet demand observed or not, only hastens crisis of whether Soviet government breaks with Allies or with Germany. Am at a loss to know on what ground French, Italian, Belgian, Serbian missions could have returned to Russia after failure to get through Finland if American Embassy had not remained.

I am resolved not to quit Russia and will not [accept] order from Soviet to leave unless you so instruct. Plan to proceed eastward if possible, otherwise go Archangel where could ignore Soviet government if protected by American cruiser. Pleased to hear *Olympia en route* Murman. Urgently request you send cruiser Archangel immediately to provide for emergencies. Consul wires ice there broken and cruiser of twenty-foot draft sufficient. Furthermore think unwise to relinquish to British absolute control that port which is outlet for immense territory rich in resources. If impossible to send cruiser to Archangel, please order *Olympia* go Archangel on my request. Please answer.¹

FRANCIS

¹ Answered by telegram No. 180 of June 13, [vol. II](#), chap. ii.

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 1, 1918.

[Received May 15, 7.23 p.m.]

453. Speaking before Central Executive Committee April 29, respecting present aims of Soviet government, Lenin said in substance among other things:

Present political currents in Russia fall into three groups: (1) that of the *bourgeoisie* and its allies presenting single “democratic” front from Milyukov to Martov; (2) the Bolshevik Party; and (3) left Social Revolutionaries representing small *bourgeoisie*.

Present peace very fragile, may be broken at any moment. But world-wide revolution is ripening, more slowly it is true than we wished and expected. Our purpose is to hold on until the imperialists destroy each other still more. For this end there is but one policy to take: to draw back to wait. Plainly this is not a popular motto, but the Soviet power is sustained only because in the west the fight continues, and in the Orient imperialistic competition vivifies more and more.

State capitalism is not the enemy of socialism, but of the small proprietor. This last is the great and principal enemy. Had we in Russia German state capitalism, transition to socialism would be extremely easy, but the small *bourgeoisie* does not wish to submit to state capitalism and it is the only force capable of upsetting us.

We must organize. Famine and unemployment [threaten] us. The chief motto for May 1 should be: “We have conquered capital; we shall conquer our own disorganization.”

SUMMERS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 1, 1918.

[Received May 15, 7.58 p.m.]

451. Following is translation full official text radiogram from People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs April 26 to German Ministry Foreign Affairs of which substance given in my No. 439:¹

Relations which should exist between the Russian Soviet Republic and the German Empire were established by Brest peace. Russian Government has taken every measure possible strictly to fulfil the treaty from their side, and in this way to secure for our people the chief aim of this treaty, a state of peace. But in reality no such state of peace exists. In south of Russian Republic there is further advance northwards of German troops and detachments of Ukrainians. They are advancing upon Kursk and Voronezh territory undoubtedly Great Russian. They have crossed into the Crimean Peninsula. That frontier line which was one-sidedly established by the Ukrainian Rada itself and officially made known to us by the German Government has been infringed by German and Ukrainian troops. Simultaneously in the north of Finland Russian military property is being seized by White Guard detachments operating in agreement with German landing detachments and under direct instruction from German General Staff. In order to fulfil the Brest treaty which is the legal basis for the relations between Germany and Russia the Soviet government has officially declared its readiness to open immediate negotiations with the Ukrainian Central Rada. No answer, however, has come from this government which is now directed by Germany. German Government having likewise proposed question of peace treaty has in no way given any answer to our offer to open peace negotiations. Instead of this the advance of German-Ukrainian troops against Russia continues as has already been pointed out. Owing to such circumstances the Soviet government considers itself compelled to mobilize all necessary forces in order to secure the freedom and independence of the Russian Republic which is now menaced beyond the limits established by the Brest treaty. It is evident that such a state of things cannot continue for long. The Soviet government considers it indispensable to throw more light on this matter and in the name of

securing peace affirms its complete readiness to fulfil in future the conditions of the Brest treaty. To-day when the German Ambassador was presenting his credentials to the Russian Government the Soviet government expressed its assurance that he will undertake by all possible measures to make government declare definitely whether it considers the conditions of the Brest treaty as remaining in force. If so what measures it means to take to stop the above-mentioned military operations openly threatening the peace treaty between Russia and Germany. If the German Government considers it impossible to maintain these conditions ratified by both the treating governments, it is absolutely necessary to establish with precision what are the exact new demands in the name of which the German Government directs Ukrainian, Finnish and German troops against the Russian Soviet government. A precise and clear answer to these questions is absolutely necessary and the Russian Government expressed its hope that the answer will be such as to create a possible basis for peace so fervently desired by the working classes of Russia, whose most cherished aspiration is peace among all nations. Chicherin.

SUMMERS

¹ Dated Apr. 29, [vol. II](#), chap. i.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 1, 1918, noon.*
[Received May 18, 11.10 a.m.]

136. French Consul, Moscow, wires French Ambassador that has learned unofficially but authoritatively that Soviet government will wait only three days for reply to radio demanding Noulens's recall and if no reply received will submit matter to Council of Commissaires.

Following communication sent by Central Committee of Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party to national council of French Socialist Party also to parliamentary socialistic group:

At a time when the Bolshevik government, which exists only thanks to our conquerors the Germans, assumes under the pressure of the German Ambassador a provocative attitude toward the Allied powers and in particular toward France by making ultimatums of an offensive nature, which clash seriously with the docile servitude with which they carry out the orders of imperialistic Germany, the Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party sends to the French section of the Internationalists socialistic greetings and its protest against the spirit of the foreign policy of the actual dictators now in Russia.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party declares at the same time that the new party born "Communist" and the Bolshevik Party should for every reason be excluded from the Internationalist Party, in that they have trodden upon the most fundamental principles of democracy, resurrecting the worst forms of despotism and of violence, betraying the cause of international socialism by the infamous separate peace with the crowned despots of Central Europe, transforming Russia, humiliated, disarmed and crushed into a commissary department devoted to provisioning the German offensive against the west.

The Socialist Revolutionary Party free to thankfully acknowledge national sections of the international labor order will order their attitude toward the Bolshevik usurpers in accordance with this declaration made by our party which already written has the right to investigators [protest] in the name of

all the Russian working class having had an absolute majority at the Constituent Assembly, the power of which will rise again in spite of the bloody measures of repression exercised by the usurpers of power.

We beg the French comrades to make known this declaration to the Socialist Parties of the other Allied countries. Central Committee Russian Socialist Revolutionary Party.

FRANCIS

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 1, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[Received May 18, 1.21 p.m.]

452. German agents taking advantage depreciation exchange, low prices, and guarantees peace treaty purchase controlling interests, factories, banks, and other business enterprises also land and government securities. In communication from Commissary Foreign Affairs to Greek Consul regarding claim for damages for nationalization large factory Greek subject it was stated: "No such compensation as the Central powers above secured for themselves on the basis of the Brest treaty" would be admitted. On same basis compensation financial and other losses will be granted only to subjects Central powers. German firms closed beginning war being reopened. Representative German mission stated to press:

Berlin had been advised impossible consider commercial relations Russia until order established. Germany indirectly sent Ukraine 150,000,000 marks, arms and machines. Counts on Russian goods and will assist any movement which will stop anarchy and will do all possible establish order in country. Russian merchants desire trade with Germany but fear they will be shot.

This bears out reports observers Consulate General that no shipments being made Germany at present from unoccupied sections and that no goods are coming from Germany. In Ukraine Central powers experiencing greatest difficulty forcing peasants sell grain, and serious uprisings reported many places. Complete demoralization railways will greatly hinder movements freight even if commercial relations be reopened. Observers from occupied sections report Germans confiscating goods every nature leaving population in most distressing condition. Reports shrinkages food supplies recently held Moscow show hunger and disease consequent thereto generally prevalent over Russia. In Moscow bread ration one-eighth pound daily. Land planted this year 50 per cent less than last owing political unrest and lack seed.

Approximately 350,000 workmen unemployed and early closing cotton mills will add another 100,000. Notwithstanding unprecedented issue paper money and forced contributions there is a continued currency famine and State Bank rarely

opens. Occupation Ukraine by Germans reducing Russia to famine.

SUMMERS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 1, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received May 18, 2.30 p.m.]

139. Continuing my 134.¹ Developments indicate crisis approaching. Lenin in speech 28th to Central Executive Committee stated Soviet government on the eve of important move. My opinion is that Mirbach is controlling influence with Soviet government and persistently impressing it that he is only Ambassador who recognizes it. Whether Soviet government will inform Allied missions that considers them private citizens with no privilege of sending enciphered telegrams or whether will present them with passports for departure is a question. In latter event Soviet government likely to designate route of departure and fear same will not be through Siberia, probably Archangel or Murman.

French, Italian colleagues continue daily urging Allied intervention and say same would be welcomed by majority Russians; they think such intervention only awaits American consent. I have been hoping Soviet government would request intervention by saying that French Consul, Moscow, visited Chicherin when Japanese invasion threatened, and asked what would be Soviet policy in such event; Chicherin in written reply March 26, stated such invasion would be resisted by force, if necessary, just as force would be used to resist German invasion of Russian territory. French Ambassador argues that German invasion admitted from Ukraine and protested by Soviet government, but not resisted, consequently his position justifiable as stated in interview.

Chernov, President Constituent Assembly, apparently in Moscow and accounts for his liberty by saying has friends in Bolshevik camps who advise him when arrest arranged so that has been able to escape. He says absolutely knows that Soviet government negotiating for sale to Germany of Russian commercial fleet to pay Russian indebtedness to Germany; furthermore, affirms that able-bodied Russian prisoners remaining in Germany. As provided in your copies cable number [omission] such intervention, but now that Mirbach arrived such request seems hopeless. Petrograd fails to observe protests of British, French, concerning evacuation Archangel supplies and sends Allied missions ultimatums such as recall of Vladivostok consuls, position of Allies concerning Vladivostok marine landings, and relations of Allied governments to Soviet government. Meantime Soviet government promptly complies with German demands.

French Ambassador explains [prisoners] are retained by Germany for labor and that Soviet government receives consideration therefor.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 511 [*Pg. 511 includes portions of [Doc. 491](#) and [Doc. 492](#)*].

The Military Attaché in Russia (Ruggles) to the War Department

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 1, 1918, 11 p.m.*

[*Copy received from War Department May 23.*]

22. In my opinion a crisis in relations of Allies with Russia rapidly approaching, due to German pressure. Germans tell Chicherin, Commissary Foreign Affairs, that German advance continued because they are convinced of secret agreement between Allies and Bolsheviks. They say if agreement broken they will cease advance and threatened moves and make new [treaty] with Bolsheviks on more favorable terms. Also offer instructors for new Red Army.

Bolshevik strategy employed attempting to force us to declare for or against them. German influence growing. Mirbach says Germany stands ready to help Russia actively and immediately in her unfortunate condition. German party in Russia gaining recruits of all classes. German Ambassador with imposing staff in touch with all elements. We are losing our favorable position in estimation Russian people by our complete failure. Had our railroad men been promptly sent here stores of enormous value to Germany could have been evacuated from Moscow and Petrograd" districts. Besides, our standing and influence would have been greatly improved. As it is there is very little that we can point out as having actually accomplished. I believe diplomatic representation in Moscow by Allies important, perhaps by officials there. This [would] offset German diplomacy which cannot be done from here nor from statements by Allied diplomatists for publication. Also that we should negotiate with Bolsheviks *modus vivendi* by consent to immediate Allied intervention through Siberia and northern ports; maintain military contact; establish commercial contact; have clear understanding of what Allied interests in Russia employed and what our policy is to be.

Unless something is done in the near future I believe that the Bolsheviks through German pressure will compel Allied diplomatic corps to leave Russia. Have sent Bukowski¹ to Petrograd to assist British, French officers in evacuation of material. Pershing informed.

RUGGLES

¹ Lieut. P. I. Bukowski, Assistant Military Attaché

Question of intervention: Recommendation of the American Ambassador, May 2, 1918—Statements of American policy—Interference with the dispatch of code telegrams of Allied and American representatives—Russo-German controversies—Reports of conditions; speeches of Lenin—Activities of anti-Bolshevik parties—The recall of Raymond Robins, Red Cross representative

[\[499\] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\)](#)

Washington, May 2, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1630

[\[500\] The Consul General at Moscow \(Summers\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, May 2, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received May 7, 9.18 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1757

[\[501\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, May 2, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received May 8, 7.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1955

[\[502\] The Military Attaché in Russia \(Ruggles\) to the War Department](#)

Vologda, May 3, 1918. [Copy received from War Department May 23.]

File No. 861.00/1970

[\[503\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, May 4, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received May 9, 2.26 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1759

[\[504\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, May 5, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received May 7, 7 p.m.]

File No. 861.731/81

[505] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow (Poole)

Washington, May 7, 1918.

File No. 811.142/3335e

[506] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, May 8, 1918.

File No. 861.00/1729

[507] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, May 9, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 811.142/3335f

[508] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 11, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received May 20, 10.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1826

[509] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 12, 1918, noon. [Received May 19, 7.07 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1823

[510] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, May 12, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received May 13, 3 a.m.]

File No. 763.72/9967

[511] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 15, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received May 22, 10.43 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1835

[512] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, May 16, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1970

[513] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 16, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received May 23, 9.58 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1848

[514] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 17, 1918. [Received May 31, 8.27 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1917

[515] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 17, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received May 23, 6 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1847

[516] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 18, 1918. [Received June 1, 3.09 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1024

[517] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 18, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received May 20, 9.47 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1831

[518] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 18, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received May 31, 4.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1906

[519] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 20, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received May 26, 10.42 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1887

[520] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 21, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received May 27, 2.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1877

[521] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 23, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received May 27, 9.25 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1873

[522] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 24, 1918. [Received May 28, 10.48 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1882

[523] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 24, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received May 27, 5.59 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1885

[524] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 24, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received May 28, 6.48 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1892

[525] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 24, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received May 29, 12.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1895

[526] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 25, 1918. [Received May 29, 12.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1904¹/₂

[527] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 27, 1918, 6 a.m. [Received May 29, 11.12 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1899

[528] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 28, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received May 29, 9.51 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1903

[529] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 28, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received June 6, 2.32 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1954

[530] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 28, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received June 1, 2.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1929

[531] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received June 9, 10.21 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1987

[532] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, May 29, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received June 3, 3.44 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1936

[533] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, May 31, 1918. [Received June 11, 6.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1905

[534] The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State

London, May 31, 1918. [Received June 20.]

File No. 861.00/2078

[535] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne, June 1, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received June 3, 3.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1933

[536] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 1, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1899

[537] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 11 [2], 1918, 7 p.m. [Received June 14, 12.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2017

[538] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 8, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received June 4, 10.22 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1945

[539] The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)

Washington, June 4, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1933

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 2, 1918, 3 p.m.*

103. Your 100, April 15, 7 p.m.^{[2](#)} In regard to aid by military attaché and referring to Department's 49, April 5, 8 p.m.,^{[3](#)} this Government is not prepared to enter into formal engagement with Soviet government which it does not recognize, nor is it now in position to give effective military support. There is however no objection to military attaché's lending such assistance as you deem in accord with spirit of the Department's instructions to you.

LANSING

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 497 [Pg. 497 includes portions of [Doc. 474](#), [Doc. 475](#), and [Doc. 476](#)].

^{[3](#)} *Ante*, p. 494 [Pg. 494 includes portions of [Doc. 468](#), [Doc. 469](#), [Doc. 470](#), and [Doc. 471](#)].

The Consul General at Moscow (Summers) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 2, 1918, 3 p.m.
[Received May 7, 9.18 a.m.]

460. With reference to Department's No. 1531¹ to Embassy. Consulate General is maintaining observers along line of German advance. ...

First two reports received relate to condition at and near Vitebsk, Vyazma, and Bryansk. At Vitebsk food shortage. Jews predominant in local Soviet government, anti-Jewish feeling growing among population which tends to regard oncoming Germans as deliverers. No goods arriving from Germany. Small speculators are getting some goods especially investments [provisions] in small [lots] and warehouses are empty. Trains run about twenty miles beyond Vitebsk whence break as far as Polotsk which is held by Germans. According to persons coming from occupied territory food is cheaper there due strict food control by Germans who register all domestic animals, etc. Germans are persisting seizing working population and sending them for enforced labor to unknown destinations believed not to be in Germany. At Vyazma food conditions worse than at Vitebsk. In country only barley, oats, and flax planting so far owing seed shortage. Total planted indicates 50 per cent of last year at best. In occupied territory Germans reported to be furnishing some seed on proviso two-thirds crop for German Government.

At Bryansk practically no commercial freight movement though some potatoes and flour seen moving toward Smolensk. German, Ukraine troops closing in actively on Bryansk which is Red Army staff headquarters but Red Army lacking in discipline and morale, flees before enemy without fighting and plunders local population which is prepared welcome Germans as deliverers hoping that they will later be rid of them through terms of general peace. Government and railroad property being evacuated to Bryansk from Smolensk and Vitebsk but Bryansk will soon fall as its evacuation impossible owing shortage of engines.

Observers sent from Petrograd by Imbrie¹ report Finnish White Guard having few Germans and Swedes among them only twelve miles from city. Roadstead at Kronstadt crowded. Vessels practically unofficered, crew complements nearly full but mostly new recruits, not enough trained sailors to man guns and engines. No resistance to Germans expected.

¹ Probably telegram No. 1931, Dec. 24, 1917, *ante*, p. 324 [*Pg. 324 includes portions of [Doc. 321](#) and [Doc. 322](#)*].

¹ Robert W. Imbrie, Vice Consul at Petrograd.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 2, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received May 8, 7.35 p.m.]

140. In my judgment time for Allied intervention has arrived. Have been hoping for request therefor by Soviet and have been discreetly working to that end:

- (1) By remaining in Russia with your approval when all colleagues departed.
- (2) By cultivating close unofficial relations with Bolsheviks and encouraging Robins to remain Moscow for such purpose notwithstanding Summers's expressed humiliation thereat.
- (3) By earnestly advising against separate Japanese intervention.
- (4) By advocating and putting into effect Allied military advice in formation new army expecting, as cabled you confidentially, would be able to influence if not control its use—I even persuaded French and Italian colleagues to consent to cooperation of their military missions. This aid however is still in abeyance because you cabled prohibiting its extension until advised of object of new army and since ostensibly object never varied from Trotsky's assurance that was for defending and promoting world-wide social revolution against existing governments including ours.
- (5) By requesting six railroad units be sent Vologda for conference with me and experienced railroad official of Soviet government. Stevens first wired was sending six units and I advised Soviet government accordingly but again you cabled asking definite use of railroad men and after Stevens wired was opposed to sending them I was compelled to explain their failure to come to Trotsky through Rothwell [Ruggles?] and Riggs. I then asked that Emerson with three engineers be sent, see my 99, April 15,² to which you replied in Department's 80, April 24,³ Emerson ordered to come or send Goldsmith and advise me of departure. No advices from Emerson received consequently have not advised Trotsky of your order lest might again have to explain. Do not understand me as [complaining] or criticizing Department action in military or railroad matters.
- (6) Have actively encouraged international commercial shipments between merchants with proper safeguards. During nine days from April 19 to 28 had serious illness, possibly from ptomaine poisoning, by which greatly weakened but never ceased work nor lost spirit although confined to bed, fully recovered

now.

- (7) Unofficially informed Soviet government of Department action concerning Chinese embargo while ignoring offensive prohibition of Consul, Irkutsk, sending cipher messages and inconsiderate demand for recall American Consul, Vladivostok, on statement of the facts, not incriminating if true. I also ignored emphatic demand of Soviet government to define our attitude on landing Japanese, British marines Vladivostok while giving two carefully worded interviews on the subject.

This is partial *résumé* of my policy since quitting Petrograd.

I am unadvised concerning your position on Allied intervention while knowing your opposition to exclusive Japanese intervention which I earnestly approve. My last information was from American Ambassador, Tokyo, to effect that Japan would not intervene against our wishes but since then Motono has resigned and if Japanese policy or our eastern policy altered I am unadvised. Possibly Japan may refuse to intervene without compensation but unless territorial compensation demanded in my opinion her demands if reasonable should be met.

This recommendation, the gravity of which I fully realize, is precipitated because of following conditions:

- (1) Mirbach is dominating Soviet government and is practically dictator in Moscow to whom all differences even between Russians are referred;
- (2) April 27 [26], see Summers's cable 439 of April 29,¹ note was sent by Soviet government to Berlin appealing and protesting concerning violation of Brest treaty by Germany to which Mirbach replied April 30 that German advance would cease if Allies evacuated Murman and Archangel—such information imparted to French military mission Moscow through Lockhart. I think such evacuation would be exceedingly unwise.

Riggs arrived from Moscow and thinks local Soviet will not oppose Germany without Allied encouragement and seems confident that Soviet government will approve Allied intervention if sees same inevitable and if military missions given information of proposed intervention previous to its actual occurrence, that missions can probably influence Soviet government to that end. Whether Soviet government would under such circumstances inform Germany of proposed intervention and cooperate with Germany to resist such intervention is a risk we must take. Riggs advocates Embassy's removing from Vologda to Moscow or certainly diplomatic representative at Moscow in which I can not concur as believe it would result either in recognizing Soviet government or emphasizing non-recognition: if former should be result we would be interfering in internal affairs by strengthening Soviet government; if latter should be result would only increase existing tension. Russia is passing through dream or orgy from which awakening is possible any day but the longer we wait therefor henceforth the stronger foothold Germany will secure. Robins and probably Lockhart also have favored

recognition of Soviet government but you and all Allies have always opposed recognition and I have consistently refused to recommend it, nor do I feel that I have erred therein.

I have deferred this recommendation of the Allied intervention not only in the hope that the Soviet government would request it but with expectation that she would approve requests for purchasing supplies to prevent same falling into enemy hands and also with hope that Russian people would by general expression request Allied intervention in default of Soviet government's doing so. Various organizations throughout Russia have informed colleagues and myself that Russian people would earnestly desire Allied intervention but whether such feeling could assume physical form I doubt, as Bolsheviki treat with severity every such movement terming it counter-revolutionary.

Lenin is dominating Bolshevik spirit and in every speech justifies Brest treaty by calling it breathing spell in world-wide social revolution which he affirms is sure to succeed as proletariat in warring imperialistic countries will soon assert itself as in Russia. In speech of the 28th he apparently justified slaughter at western front as weakening imperialistic governments engaged in struggle for territorial supremacy and thereby brought nearer the dictatorship of proletariat throughout the world. Lenin's last written and spoken expressions are devoted to what he calls the danger from the small *bourgeoisie* which he thinks greatest menace to proletariat as rich *bourgeoisie* are somewhat doubtful. He is able, farseeing and anticipates revulsion against Bolshevik principles from desire of peasants to own and cultivate small tracts of land.

Finally I greatly doubt whether Allies can longer afford to overlook principles which Lenin is aggressively championing.

Shall patiently await instructions or information.

FRANCIS

² Vol. III, chap. iv.

³ Not printed.

¹ Vol. II, chap. i; see also No. 451, May 1, from the Consul General at Moscow, *ante*, p. 512 [Pg. 512 includes portions of [Doc. 493](#) and [Doc. 494](#)].

File No. 861.00/1970

[Document 502]

The Military Attaché in Russia (Ruggles) to the War Department

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 3, 1918.*

[Copy received from War Department May 23.]

23. The Russian Government has forbidden the sending of coded telegrams without the approval of the Commissary Foreign Affairs each case.

This applies to all the Allies.

RUGGLES

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 4, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received May 9, 2.26 a.m.]

146. When informed evening May 2 that French Ambassador's cipher telegrams to Paris refused thought discrimination against him because French Government not replied to demand for his recall, but when my cipher messages to the Department and Summers were refused about midnight was astounded. Cabled you *en clair* concerning [omission] to join therein. Had prepared exhaustive cable special green concerning best course and Allied intervention, having concluded temporizing with Soviet government should cease, but reception was refused. May send same from Archangel but fear be garbled by inexperienced wireless operators.

This prohibition cipher messages may be beginning of policies which will result in withdrawing all diplomatic immunities. In such event am inclined to ask safe-conduct to nearest ally, China, or possibly start eastward without making such request. If informed by Soviet government that Archangel or Murman only exit, shall choose Archangel but the ministers should not leave Russian soil if possible to remain. Allied missions express willingness to accompany me wherever I may go. My preferences follow: Harbin, Vladivostok, Archangel, Murman.

It is possible this treatment of Allied representatives may arouse widespread opposition to Soviet government and result in Bolshevik overthrow; if such appears probable Allied chiefs may appeal to Russian people from wherever they may be but such appeal would be framed against our common enemy, and would not favor or oppose any Russian faction.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 5, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received May 7, 7 p.m.]

149. Filed to-day my telegram No. 140, May 2, 6 p.m., refused May 2. Following delivered to-day to all missions:

According to explanation of the Commissaire of the Post and Telegraph, circular 3201 refers only to the consuls in Siberia and all persons not subject to detention. Lapin.

Also received the following from Chicherin:

Stopping cipher telegrams Vologda was result misunderstanding. We are very sorry to have created inconvenience. Chicherin.

It is my opinion that there was no misunderstanding but Soviet government concluded to retract prohibition order. French Consul Petrograd wired was handling there and applying to neutrals. This changes situation materially as Allied chiefs had agreed to ask safe-conduct to nearest Allied country if prohibition operative. I am authorized by Allied chiefs to provide [protest] against interdict of cipher message to Siberian consuls which shall so instruct consuls in Moscow where I go to-night, leaving Armour here.

Had to-day thorough conference with Japanese Chargé d'Affaires who advocates Allied intervention and when asked in what form said by establishing sane Russian government in Siberia which would be rallying center for German resistance and would attract all anti-Bolshevik Russians. Have not told any colleagues of contents of my 140, May 2, 6 p.m. Shall cable further on the subject from Moscow where Johnston accompanies me.

FRANCIS

The Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow (Poole)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 7, 1918.*

22. For Robins:

15158–10095.¹ Under all circumstances consider desirable that you come home for consultation. We are very reluctant, however, to withdraw entire Red Cross Commission, anticipating that there will be many opportunities to help distribution food and other Red Cross relief measures next two months. Must leave decision in your hands, for you alone can judge possibilities of personal welfare members commission, also likelihood continuing service, but all here feel that Red Cross will find much valuable relief work to do and hope you before leaving will find possible arrange for sufficient personnel to remain and if you desire we will endeavor send other Red Cross representatives to help in maintaining Red Cross efforts. Position in Russia founded on fine basis already established. Cable promptly. Davison.

LANSING

¹ These are Red Cross serial numbers. On the file copy of the telegram is also noted: "Sent at request of American National Red Cross."

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 8, 1918.*

108. The Department has received your 127 and 128,¹ also telegrams from Vologda, Vladivostok and Moscow reporting refusal to receive messages for code. In reply, you are informed that American representatives have not assisted in any movements affecting the internal situation of Russia, as alleged in the statements sent you. The friendly purpose of the United States towards Russia was made clear in the President's address to Congress January 8 and in his message to the Russian people through the Soviet. It will not be modified by charges of the character reported nor by any withdrawal of the diplomatic courtesies and privileges recognized universally among nations.

This Government has received appeals for support from several groups who claim a purpose to establish a new government in Siberia; it has answered none of these appeals. As you were informed by the Department's telegram of May 1 [2]² when Colonel Semenov was reported requesting assistance of Russian railway service corps, a body of American engineers organized to assist the railway administration of Russia, instructions were issued that the work of these engineers should not be diverted to support any movement partaking of civil war nor to facilitate the military operations of Semenov, and if this could be avoided only by their withdrawal then they were to be withdrawn. At the same time you were notified that Colonel Emerson and some of his assistants were proceeding to Vologda to confer with you as to how these engineers could be used in helping the Russian people in European Russia and assisting in strengthening their resistance to the aggressions of the Central powers. Colonel Emerson and three assistants left Harbin for Vologda May 3.

The purpose of the United States is clear and disguised by no measures of secret diplomacy. The United States is at war with the Central powers for the purpose of overthrowing German militarism, thus making it possible for the peoples of the world to live in peace free from the menace of autocratic domination.

The Government of the United States thoroughly understands the desire for repose of the Russian people exhausted after heroic sacrifices of war, and shares their hopes for a lasting peace based on the principles of liberty and justice. The United States now sees Russia overrun by German and Austrian troops. Where

Russians in peaceable centers will not conform at once to the decrees of German commanders, Soviet reports show they are brutally set aside or shot, and the military machine of Germany rolls on over the prostrate body of the Russian people. In spite of the fact that the people of many regions of Russia already suffer hunger and the prospect of a general famine in northern Russia, the Central powers insist on the letter of their bond and are removing from the Ukraine food supplies which the rest of Russia requires and must have, if it is to live. The Department does not understand how such conditions can continue without arousing the Russian people to the dangers which threaten the liberties won by their revolution. Nevertheless, the Department desires you to reflect the friendly purpose of United States towards Russia, a purpose which will remain unaltered so long as Russia does not willingly accept the autocratic domination of the Central powers.

LANSING

¹ Dated Apr. 26 and Apr. 27, [vol. II](#), chap. i.

² [Vol. III](#), chap. iv.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 9, 1918, 5 p.m.*

115. For Robins:

Reconsidered our 10095.² Now considered desirable that you remain in Russia for three weeks longer awaiting further advices. Davison.

LANSING

¹ Also to the Consul at Moscow, No. 29, May 9.

² Department's No. 22, May 7, to the Consul at Moscow, *ante*, p. 523 [*Pg. 523 includes portions of [Doc. 504](#) and [Doc. 505](#)*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 11, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received May 20, 10.30 a.m.]

160. Had conference with Lockhart 9th. He is only diplomatic representative his country has here if may be so called; showed me in strict confidence copy of cable from Balfour to Reading in Washington concerning Allied intervention which was sent from London to Washington April 25, and to Lockhart April 28 for his information. Main object of cable was to persuade President to consent to Allied intervention. Meantime Italian Embassy Vologda received cable stating Reading has informed Italian Ambassador Washington that President unalterably opposed to Allied intervention unless desired by Russian people. Lockhart strongly favors Allied intervention with or without Soviet government approval but says approval desirable, to which I agree, but if securable only by promise to sustain even secretly Bolshevik domination I think cost would be too dear as Lockhart says he is officially informed that Germany has made imperative demand of Soviet government to require Allies to evacuate Murman. Robins of whom I made the same inquiry says no such ultimatum issued. I think report is correct.

Monarchical sentiment growing, also opposition to Bolshevik domination increasing throughout. Confidentially, had a consultation with Sadoul, French captain in close relations with Soviet government, commissioned in French Army after a defeat as radical socialist candidate for Chamber of Deputies. French Ambassador, socialist also, but Bolsheviks dislike socialists who disagree with them more than they dislike non-socialists while moderate socialists bitterly denounce Bolsheviks for delaying by their policies the triumph of socialism for half a century or more. Sadoul says Bolshevism is dead, and only way to prevent restoration of monarchy is assisting in coalition of socialistic democratic and anti-monarchical governments [elements?] for formation of extremely liberal republic. When asked if Lenin, hitherto Bolshevik dictator, would compromise his radical policies the affirmative reply was so prompt that suggestion rose in my mind whether Sadoul was not Soviet agent to sound me on the subject. I replied the suggestion was new and very interesting. Sadoul said Lenin contemplates denationalizing banks, and revoking decree repudiating loans. In my opinion Soviet government realizes its unsatisfied [sic] condition and is playing for time. Chicherin telegrams to me direct, one expressing regret if prohibition cipher

messages had inconvenienced me, another expressing condolence concerning Summers's death together with request to participate in funeral ceremonial which I granted, all indicate desire to establish friendly relations with us.¹ Such desire augmented by information imparted by me through consulate that Emerson and seven engineers coming to assist in transportation betterment. I am not discouraging such advances because wish *de facto* government to side with Allies when steady [*sic*] Allied intervention unavoidable, or when compelled to decide between Germany and Allies. I think that Soviet government when replying to German ultimatum concerning Murman will make evasive statement to gain time.

Had four extremely full days in Moscow but consider profitable. Retaining Consulate General under Consul will justify my returning soon and often as I contemplate. Hope the Department will not send as Consul General one unacquainted with prevailing conditions; I think Harris best qualified for place but his services and judgment required for present on Siberian situation which growing extremely interesting; Poole is quick, capable and untiring. Furthermore, chief Far Eastern division Soviet Foreign Office, and representative of Soviet government at funeral, whom I granted audience 10th after much insistence, asked why I did not engage house Moscow and move from Vologda, and when I replied Allied missions had joined me in Vologda and we thought safer from German interference, he remarked German Ambassador in Moscow, and my rejoinder was: he is treated much more considerately than Allied representatives.

Meantime, I trust sincerely we have been making all possible preparations for Allied intervention as I have recommended for months past, and that active negotiations have begun among Allies therefor, as urged in my No. 140 of May 2, 6 p.m.¹

FRANCIS

¹ Maddin Summers, Consul General at Moscow, died in that city May 4, 1918.

¹ *Ante*, p. 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 500](#) and [Doc. 501](#)].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 12, 1918, noon.*
[Received May 19, 7.07 p.m.]

512. Russian delegation leaves for Kiev to-day to enter into peace negotiations with the new Ukraine government.

German-Russian established commissions provided for by Brest Litovsk treaty, now beginning work at Moscow. Commissariat Foreign Affairs understands from Mirbach that Germany will insist at the outset on immediate denationalizing of banks.

Four Moscow newspapers closed yesterday for printing statements regarding the new German demands, five hundred four [sic], on the ground improperly exciting populace, and Foreign Commissariat subordinate informs me that at least the demand opposing German or Finnish occupation Fort Ino twenty-five miles from Petrograd has been made.

Press prints numerous reports concerning German-Finnish preparations for an advance into Murman Peninsula. In Soviet circles, it is stated privately that England has delivered note which is described as an ultimatum respecting the protection of supplies at Archangel and Murman.

Famine in Petrograd. Frequent reports of hunger from other parts of Russia. Cholera reported from Astrakhan, Penza, Saratov, [omission] Samara [omission] railway and telegraph communications with Orenburg cut, probably due anti-Bolshevik activity ruining [omission]. Harris *en route* Irkutsk.

POOLE

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

PARIS, *May 12, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[*Received May 13, 3 a.m.*]

3871. ... To-day General Niessel, head of the French military mission to Russia, called to see me and for nearly an hour gave a most interesting account of the conditions existing in Russia, which country he left the middle of March, after having spent about seven months there. He had an opportunity to know and to study Trotsky and he describes him as a man of ability and cunning, but so lacking in political sense and able judgment as to render impossible anything like a constructive work, such as all Russia now needs most. While what may be termed as the more conservative element of the Russian people is opposed to his domination, yet it lacks power to bring about his fall. Chaos reigns everywhere with nothing like a national unity of spirit around which to rally a great movement for constructive reform in government. In many places the working-men are regularly paid though they refuse to perform any work. The small farmers will not sell their produce and the lands of the former large proprietors are not being cultivated because there is no money to meet the expenses. Such conditions but increase the prospects of famine. The general said that the greatest menace both to Russia and to the Allies at the present time was the possibility of the people in desperation finally turning to Germany to bring order out of chaos, and with it safety from anarchy. He said that already many who opposed the authority of the Bolsheviks would welcome German intervention as preferable to existence under the despotic power of the former. This led to his stating that Japanese intervention was necessary if [Russia] was finally to be saved from German control. Many in the Chamber of Deputies who had heretofore opposed such intervention would now look with favor upon it.

I find indeed many here prominent in French politics who believe that the only course open, in order to prevent German extension of authority in the East, is immediate Japanese intervention on as effective a scale as possible. Men of such opinion are not only high in the French Government but in military and civil circles. While General Niessel did not think that Germany would be able to enroll much of a military support in Russia with which to fight the Allies, yet I am sure this is contrary to the general belief.

SHARP

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 15, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received May 22, 10.43 a.m.]

520. In address on subject of foreign politics, delivered last night before Central Executive Committee, Lenin reiterated policy already stated, see No. 421,^{[1](#)} namely that Soviet government must retrench and tack while the imperialistic powers devour each other. He continues effort to embroil United States and Japan saying:

An inevitable conflict will arise between Japan and America for supremacy of Pacific and its coasts. The conflicting interests of two imperialistic countries now screened by an alliance against Germany check the movement of Japanese imperialism against Russia.

In concluding read telegram from Soviet representative at Berlin of which following substance:

In conversation regarding demand for evacuation Fort Ino and general attitude Germany toward Russia, German General Staff states that there will be no further advance and Germany's role in Ukraine and Finland is at an end. Germany is ready to help with peace negotiations at Kiev and Helsingfors. It is officially stated by the German Government that Germany stands on the Brest Litovsk treaty, desires to live in peace with us, has no aggressive plans and will make no advance on us. In response to my demand Germany has promised to regard us on the same footing as other neutrals.

POOLE

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 504 [Pg. 504 includes portions of [Doc. 483](#) and [Doc. 484](#)].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *May 16, 1918, 3 p.m.*

128. For information of Department please furnish your comment promptly in regard to telegram No. 22, May 1, 11 p.m.,² from military attaché to War Department. As this telegram primarily political Department assumes that under instructions of Secretary of War the military attaché has already brought it to your attention.

LANSING

² *Ante*, p. 516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of [Doc. 497](#) and [Doc. 498](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 16, 1918, 9 p.m.
[Received May 23, 9.58 a.m.]

173. Robins passed [through] Vologda yesterday in Red Cross, car attached to Siberian Express *en route* Vladivostok thence America, saying departure in compliance with your 22 of the 7th,¹ signed Davison, Lansing, which was received Moscow 10th through Consulate General and was seen by me before delivery. Robins construed this cable as definite recall and when asked by me if Davison returned [ordered return,] replied "no," but said message was from State Department. Robins had intended remaining in the hope that Thompson would influence Department to recognize Soviet government. He planned to leave Moscow 2d instant but telegraphed me that departure delayed by cables from Paris and Washington. I saw in Moscow a telegram from Thatcher² stating received Robins's cable and had told Davison and others of Robins's good work and thought effective. Also saw cable from Davison saying had received Robins's cables and had seen Thatcher and understood situation but could do nothing before reaching Washington and advising Robins to remain until further instructions. Consequently recall surprised Robins. When asked to what he attributed same replied: Summers's suggestion. He stated yesterday he had received cable from Thatcher dated 10th instant stating that he had been Washington and thought had made impression. I do not know whether Robins can reach Vladivostok, as Harbin route closed and Amur route reported cut by Semenov, but Robins said latter report untrue, as Soviet government unadvised thereof. Robins was accompanied by Hardy, Gum-berg and Brown, representative of Chicago *News*.

Associated Press representative here and Groves³ after talking to Robins at the station understand that he had definite proposition to the United States from the Soviet government and was hastening to America in expectation of receiving favorable reply and definitely stated expected to return promptly if Soviet government survived, but Robins, with whom I talked fully, made no mention of such mission nor of returning.

Have instructed consuls along Trans-Siberian Railway to assist Robins if possible and advise me of his progress; also to transmit through Embassy or Consulate

General all messages “on matters of political policy” whether cipher or *en clair* (see your 78, April 21 [23], 5 p.m.¹) as Robins said has procured order of Soviet government directing acceptance of cipher messages signed by himself through consuls.

Some three months ago Robins, after repeated efforts to convert me to the support of Soviet government, upon asking if I had recommended recognition, when I replied, “No,” he said would inform government and tell them I would not. I replied assenting first proposition but requested him not to advise government as to my future course which would depend upon resistance offered to Germany. Robins as I have cabled Department [has] been earnestly advocating recognition and has persuaded several well-meaning Americans that such policy wise, notably Associated Press representatives, Red Cross members and Jerome Davis; the latter I am informed cabled Mott recommending support of recognition. Thacher when at Murman awaiting vessel for London, participated in meetings and advocated evacuation of Murman by Allies, notwithstanding Merrill² advised him that my policy contrary thereto.

I do not understand Robins’s failure to inform me of his plans as he has continuously since [Thompson’s departure] expressed friendliness and admiration of my course. I regret forgetting to tell him yesterday contents of your 78, April 21 [23], 5 p.m.,¹ and that would instruct consuls accordingly.

Of course have no fear of Department’s recognizing Soviet government if it should [last] until Robins’s arrival Washington, which I doubt. Bolshevik press states Robins going to America and will return soon, while opposition press claims his recall final.

May I suggest advising Red Cross and Christian Association to instruct their representatives to confine their activities strictly to the line of their work? Permit me most [earnestly] to say that if the Department would refuse Russian passports issued to socialist fanatics and sensational newsmongers, it would diminish difficulties and lessen embarrassments of this Embassy. Striking examples of unsatisfactory class are. ...

FRANCIS

¹ To the Consul at Moscow, *ante*, p. 523 [Pg. 523 includes portions of [Doc. 504](#) and [Doc. 505](#)].

² Maj. Thomas D. Thacher, former member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

³ J. Philip Groves, clerk in Embassy.

¹ *Ante*, p. 503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of [Doc. 480](#), [Doc. 481](#), and [Doc. 482](#)].

² Probably error for Lieut. Hugh S. Martin, Assistant Military Attaché.

¹ *Ante*, p. 503 [Pg. 503 includes portions of [Doc. 480](#), [Doc. 481](#), and [Doc. 482](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 17, 1918.

[Received May 31, 8.27 p.m.]

177. Lenin made another elaborate speech to Central Soviet May 13 which published Soviet official organ 15th. He again felicitates proletariat on imperialistic governments' exhausting themselves in sanguinary contest, saying violation of *ante bellum* treaties demonstrated that capitalism dominates the warring countries, and that what diplomats designate "national dignity" is really "imperialistic robbery." He stated, "interests of world socialism are paramount to national interests." That Murman held by British, French because those countries had furnished means for construction railroad and improvement harbor, and that Russia compelled to submit thereto because had not power to force evacuation. He asserted that prediction Soviet overthrow now extent [imminent] would prove fruitless as other prophecies had for months past. That present controlling German party desired observance Brest treaty while military party there advocating additional conquest. Read message from Joffe, Russian Ambassador, Berlin, stating Germany now recognizes justice of Russian demands concerning Finland and Ukrainia, and consents to agreement between former Soviet government in Finland and Russian Soviet government which left Fort Ino under Russian control for protection of both Soviet republics, but present *bourgeois* Finnish Republic not yet agreed thereto. Fort Ino is in Finnish Gulf and admittedly on Finnish territory, but commands Kronstadt and Petrograd. Object of Lenin's speech was evidently to encourage and strengthen Soviet patience and confidence. He reiterated that dictatorship of proletariat in all countries only question of time and endurance. Lenin after speaking left meeting. Martov, opposition leader, then spoke and demanded to know exact relations between Germany and Soviet government and whether Germany had requested permission to send German troops over Russian territory to Murmansk and if so what would be reply of Soviet government; demanded to know what Soviet government doing about encroachments of Germany in Crimea and Don Province. Questions were ignored but Central [Executive?] Committee endorsed Lenin by *viva voce* party vote.

Soviet *News* supposedly inspired by Trotsky in editorial 15th quoted approvingly *Vossische Zeitung* which advocates harmony between Germany and Japan

claiming no conflict of interests and mutual benefit derived therefrom, as Germany has no interest Pacific and should concede Siberia to Japan; another instance of efforts to create discord between Allies.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 17, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[Received May 23, 6 p.m.]

175. Mirbach on the 14th made the following disingenuous statement to Commissariat for Foreign Affairs:

The Imperial German Government is basing itself on the legally made Brest Litovsk peace; it has no intentions to exceed its provisions. As regards the special cases when the peace treaty was supposedly infringed, the Imperial Government has the honor to reply as follows:

1. The reason for crossing the Ukrainian frontier towards the north by German troops fighting against the insurgent bands in the Ukraine, this was explained by the wireless message of April 13 to the Russian Government. Confirming this wireless message, the Imperial Government states that the third general proclamation of the Rada is the authoritative one for defining the Ukrainian frontier. This proclamation states that parts of the neighboring governments, inasmuch as they are populated by Ukrainians, must belong to the Ukraine if so desired by the population. The Imperial Government again states that the movement of the German troops does not mean an advance solution of the question of the Ukrainian frontiers; it will be settled by the Ukrainian-Russian peace treaty.
2. Regarding the actions of the German troops in the Crimea, the Imperial Government again points out that its troops in the Ukraine were repeatedly attacked from Crimea, therefore it was necessary to put down the armed bands and the ships which, contrary to the orders of the Russian Government and the provisions of the Brest treaty, continued at their own risk the war against the German troops. The Imperial Government repeats that it does not intend to influence the Crimea in favor of any definite arrangement of its state relations.
3. Regarding Finland, the Imperial Government has several times stated that it is only concerned with the clearing of the country of the rebel bands and the arrangement of order and tranquillity. It has repeatedly pointed out that the problem of the German troops has been made more

difficult by the continuous support by Russia of these bands contrary to the peace treaty. The capture of the entire staff of the Forty-second Russian Army, the sending of Russian troops and warships to Fort Ino, have shown that Russia, not Germany, is to blame for the continuation of the military activities. Whether the seizure of Russian property plays any part in these questions will be determined from the point of view of international law and the Russian Government will receive replies to all of its complaints regarding concrete cases.

4. As soon as we ascertained that the wireless messages of the Russian Government do not reach the Ukrainian government directly, they were transmitted by us to their destination. Thence [due] to this roundabout way the short term given by the Russian Government for the commencement of the negotiations could not be adhered to. Now the Russian Government has probably received the statement by the Ukraine that it is willing to commence peace negotiations. The Imperial Government expresses the hope that the negotiations will commence shortly and will come to successful end. Finally the Imperial Government announces that it is its firm intention to strictly adhere to the terms of the ratified peace made at Brest so as to create normal friendly relations with Russia. In case the Russian Government considers that there are questions which are not absolutely clear as settled in the peace treaty that they have to be discussed then the Imperial Government will willingly enter into an exchange of opinion with the Russian Government. In such case it requests that these questions be specified after which both governments can appoint special representatives for the discussion and conclusion of additional treaties.

Observe Murman situation unmentioned; impossible ascertain what is present status of communications that subject; think Soviet government playing for time and Mirbach hesitates to force issue.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 18, 1918.*

[*Received June 1, 3.09 p.m.*]

536. Official Soviet journal to-day prints communications from Austrian Minister Foreign Affairs to effect that Austrian Government now considers it possible to commence exchange of ratifications of Brest Litovsk treaty, asks Russian delegate be sent Berlin for this purpose. Also prints note from Chicherin to German Ambassador protesting against sinking by German submarine in northern waters of several Russian fishing boats, specifically of the sinking on May 16 of the *Fedor Chilov* en route Vardö to Alexandrovsk and the shelling of its boats with survivors. Asks German Government take necessary steps to punish submarine commander and to compensate victims and families. Also substance of note from Chicherin to Swiss Embassy asking explanation of omission of provision for staff of Berzin, Russian diplomatic representative to Berne. Swiss Ambassador at Berlin had informed Russian Ambassador there that Berzin could proceed Berne with family. Berzin refused go until provision made for his staff.

POOLE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 18, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received May 20, 9.47 a.m.]

181. Referring to my 171, May 16, 7 p.m.,¹ which demonstrates that pro-Ally patriotic Russians forced into German camp to save their country from Bolsheviks, having despaired of Allied intervention, Moscow Consulate General wires that growing tendency evident there in the same direction, and that Central Cadet Committee to check same passed following resolution May 12:

Believing still that Russia must remain faithful to her allies, this committee considers it absolutely inadmissible to take any step whatsoever to apply to Germans for formation of a new government, and finds it impossible to lend them any support.

Apparently Soviet government cooperating with Germany toward formation of federal Russia. Mountain tribes in Caucasus have declared independence and intention to organize separate government. Thomson, American Consul Omsk, wires Central Siberian Soviet organized, with the consent of Central Executive Committee national Soviet. A Commissariat Foreign Affairs for establishing international relations affecting Siberia, and purpose arranging with American, Chinese, and Japanese consuls for commercial and political relations; that like organization contemplated for western Siberia, central Asiatic Russia, eastern Siberia, and the Far East, with capitals respectively at Omsk, Tashkent, Irkutsk and Khabarovsk.

This is a new departure, as Central Executive Committee has almost obliterated strong Moscow Soviet, and planned to concentrate all authority in itself, but doubtful of success, is now trying another combination. It is reported here that as the Allied missions have friendly relations with local Soviet, central Soviet government contemplates establishing diplomatic relations through that channel with those missions. This report is unconfirmed.

FRANCIS

¹ Not printed.

File No. 861.00/1906

[Document 518]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 18, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[*Received May 31, 4.05 a.m.*]

182. Poole wires that Kerensky had been in Petrograd. Is now in Moscow, incognito of course, and has conferred with ... our Committee on Public Information, Moscow, with a view to going to England and America to ask Allied intervention against Germany. If he applies for entrance I recommend be granted. Please answer.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 20, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received May 26, 10.42 p.m.]

185. Mirbach not pressing ultimatum concerning Murman¹ which appears to have been oral not written and probably uttered tentatively; he with German unscrupulousness and regardless of consistency constantly changes tactics. While relations with Soviet government were apparently strained last week he made first official call on Lenin, remaining hour, issued statement that Finnish and Ukraine encroachments were ended and made other advances to Soviet government. At the same time I learn from reliable sources that Mirbach is courting Cadets and anti-Bolsheviks and proposing course similar to that followed in Ukraine when anti-Bolshevik government was established by German force although composed of patriotic Russians who preferred Allied assistance to German but despairing of former embraced latter.

Poole here returning Moscow to-night has called on Chicherin and stated pursuant to my instructions was my only authorized channel of communication with Soviet government. Huntington, also Moscow, arrived while I was there and pursuant to my instructions is establishing relations with Russian-American Chamber of Deputies [Commerce] watching Germans and making informal acquaintance with Soviet officials. Poole, Huntington will alternate in week-end visits to Vologda when I am not in Moscow. I am endeavoring without encouraging hope of recognition to establish such relations with Soviet government as will prepare way for their request Allied intervention without my formally requesting same, as feel latter course would morally commit me to non-intervention, if not implied support, to neither of which am willing to be committed. Furthermore such action on my part would antagonize conservative elements and force them into German alliance. My policy would be materially assisted by raising of Chinese embargo against tea exportation into Russia, also by coming through of shoes *en route* Dairen and arrived there, also by increased allotment for the purchase of supplies, and I hope will be materially aided by coming Emerson and his assistants. Meantime I trust that the Department will arrange tonnage for shipping American products to Archangel for discreet use in purchasing Russian supplies unavailable otherwise; shall safeguard such supplies to prevent acquisition by enemy and I am arranging for distribution thereof

directly to consumers through Zemstvos, and cooperating societies. I am with the assistance of military attaché organizing extensive purchasing commission as I feel confident that the Department in some of the twenty-four cables still missing has complied with my urgent recommendation for increased allotment of funds. Department can readily understand difficulties confronting me in counteracting conscienceless inconsistent efforts of smooth Mirbach.

Latest information from Embassy's men Murman, dated 14th, states Finns attacking railway but repulsed by assistance of the British landed in greater number. Halsey,¹ substitute for Martin, who is now in Moscow but is returning Murman soon, reports local Soviet cooperating with French contingents there but Central Soviet endeavoring with the assistance of German agitators at Murman to prevent such cooperation. Arrival of *Olympia* Murman anxiously awaited. The capture of Murman by Germans would jeopardize Archangel connection with England and America if not wholly sever it, consequently urgently important to send assistance to Murman immediately.

FRANCIS

¹ See telegrams dated May 8 and May 9, [vol. II](#), chap ii.

¹ The Rev. Jesse Halsey, Y.M.C.A. secretary.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 21, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received May 27, 2.35 p.m.]

186. Your 130, May 18, 4 p.m.,² received 20th. Instructions noted. Not planning remove at present but awaiting developments especially concerning Murman ultimatum. Also expecting some indication of our policy concerning Allied intervention, see my No. 140, May 2, 6 p.m.¹ Have heard incidentally that President agreed intervention advisable but preferred awaiting expression from the Russian people requesting same and furthermore was a little undecided what form intervention should take. While information from all sources demonstrates dissatisfaction with Soviet and indicates that Allied intervention would be welcomed by Russian people and probably unopposed by Soviet government any formal declaration to that effect is unlikely or impossible. Such expression from the *bourgeoisie* or any dissatisfied element would be promptly and severely dealt with by the Soviet government as counter-revolutionary movement; if the Soviet government should signify consent to Allied intervention Germans would immediately take Moscow. Consequently situation is complicated but delay is dangerous as likely to force conservative intelligent classes into German alliance; majority of such while instinctively pro-Ally are becoming exceedingly restless under Bolshevik domination characterized as it is by outrageous treatment.

In my judgment the natural and most justifiable form Allied intervention can assume at the present moment is resistance to evacuation Murman consequently I have repeatedly urged cooperation there with the British and French and again so recommend.

FRANCIS

² A telegram stating: "The Department relies on your judgment as to your movements. Endeavor keep Department promptly posted."

¹ *Ante*, p. 519 [Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 500](#) and [Doc. 501](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 23, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received May 27, 9.25 a.m.]

194. Daily I see evidences that Soviet government submits to German demands without protest and am almost convinced that Lenin and possibly Trotsky are pliable tools if not responsive German agents. German action in Ukraine and Finland did not provoke protest, capture of Sevastopol and demolition of Ino both of which Chicherin stated would be defended to last ditch have been ignored or palliated by Soviet government. Lenin's last speech was very comprehensive but was greatly camouflage and intended to satisfy everybody, but his main object was to prove that Germany is endeavoring to observe the Brest treaty and adroitly endeavored to estrange America and Japan. He tamely submits to German tyranny while soothing his followers with statement that the proletariat revolution is surely coming but its champions must be patient and submit to vicissitudes. He commissions Robins to you with what he considers tempting propositions of preferential commercial advantages prejudicial to our Allies, especially to France. Robins while saying nothing to me on the subject told a friend at station that he was going to America, "with the goods," and evidently hoped be successful if Soviet government would survive until he could reach Washington.

German officers established in house Vologda and have representatives at station continuously; going secretly Archangel and investigating stored munitions and conditions generally. Soviet government making no effort to evacuate supplies from Moscow where immense quantities assembled. ...

Secret concentration of troops and supplies in Finland near Russian border and reported cutting Murman line together with activity German submarines near Murman all signify Germans planning dispossess Allies of Murman which I think according to secret understanding with Soviet government and should be resisted by Allies.

Soviet government claims that what remains of Russia is a neutral country. Ukraine boundary still undetermined but estimated population of surrendered territory is 36,000,000 and it is most productive Russian section. Finland still covetously endeavoring to secure more Russian territory.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 24, 1918.*

[*Received May 28, 10.48 a.m.*]

551. During last few days Commissariat Foreign Affairs has sent several telegrams to Soviet representative Berlin respecting continued German aggressions and abuses: attack and seizure of Russian vessel in Black Sea, wholesale arrests in Ukraine, systematic arrests according to previously prepared lists in Lithuania with charge that amnesty as provided by Brest treaty not granted.

Russian-German commission now at work in Moscow on resumption economic relations experiencing almost insurmountable difficulties, especially in connection with claims for damages by individual Germans. In view of increasing difficulties of situation Commissariat Foreign Affairs has handed Mirbach note dated May 22, suggesting Moscow as meeting place of special commission to settle uncertainties arising under Brest treaty, especially the following matters: (1) position of Caucasus; (2) position of Crimea; (3) establishment of boundary line provided for in Article 3 of Brest treaty and discussion of temporary German occupancy; (4) political position of Esthonia and Livonia; (5) clarification of obscure regulations regarding prisoners of war; (6) discussion of fundamental principles of mutual economic relations between Russia, Germany.

POOLE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 24, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received May 27, 5.59 p.m.]

199. It is reported that Soviet government having received no reply to demand for French Ambassador's recall, has again sent a radio repeating demand.

French Ambassador reports that reliable Frenchman, Moscow, had an interview with Patriarch, head of Greek Church, who related talk with Mirbach who visited Patriarch. Patriarch told M. that while the church abstained from interference in political affairs, it naturally sympathized with party of law and order which it seems to me was a mild statement when the course of Soviet government had been aggressively hostile to church. M. replied that he had proposed to conservative *intelligentsia* to support their government if it would overthrow Bolsheviks and would even revise Brest treaty. This accords with my information from other sources and accounts for resolution adopted, see my 181, May 18, 9 p.m.¹ While this highly creditable to right-minded Russians, Allies should not put their patriotism and endurance to a test too severe.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 535 [Pg. 535 includes portions of [Doc. 516](#) and [Doc. 517](#)].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 24, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received May 28, 648 a.m.]

549. Social Revolutionary Party which had large majority in the Constitutional Assembly held secret congress Moscow May 7 to 14. Adopted resolutions regarding Russian foreign policy of which following substance:

In view of daily increasing absorption of Russian vital resources by Germany two courses one [open] to Allies, armed intervention with consent present government, or, "considering Russia a country without a government or as having abdicated its sovereignty in favor of Germany, to have recourse to occupation of certain Russian territory in order to prevent German imperialism utilizing it for its military purposes." Second course which "is not only acceptable but even desirable for Russia, which cannot think of coming out unaided from its present critical military situation," has been proposed by the Allies to Bolshevik government several times and been stubbornly refused.

Considering that the Bolshevik policy has drawn upon Russia danger of complete loss of independence and division into spheres of influence for benefit of powerful neighbors, the Eighth Congress is of the opinion that this danger cannot be avoided except by ending immediately the Bolshevik dictatorship and revesting power in a government based on universal suffrage, a government which in the war with Germany can accept the military aid of the Allies, under such conditions and in such forms as will violate neither the territorial integrity nor sovereignty of Russia. For this government of the organized democracy based on the Constitutional Assembly, the appearance of Allied troops on Russian territory will be acceptable for purposes purely strategic, but not political, with the consent of Russia, and will not forsake guarantee of non-interference of the Allied forces in the settlement of internal political questions and the conservation of Russian territorial integrity.

POOLE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, May 24, 1918, 8 p.m.
[Received May 29, 12.15 a.m.]

552. Was informed by Chicherin yesterday that on 21st German Ambassador read him note from Kuhlmann in which Germany promises respect sovereign rights of the present Russian Government, provided Russian Government itself protects these rights, especially with respect to Murman. Commissary understands this to mean that Germans will sustain Bolsheviki in what remains of Russia, if they will force British and French troops out of Murman Peninsula. At the same time German Ambassador informed Chicherin Soviet protest against sinking Russian boats by German submarines along Murman coast, see my No. 536, 18th,¹ that under terms of Brest treaty Arctic Ocean remains in forbidden zone, and these operations may therefore be expected to continue.

Soviet authorities have as yet made no formal representations to British or French representatives here respecting withdrawal troops. Their policy plainly is to temporize and avoid definite issue, if possible. Nevertheless Halsey,¹ who is replacing Livingston² temporarily at Murmansk, reports pressure being brought to bear by central authorities Moscow on local Murman soviet to have them request withdrawal troops. Compliance considered unlikely. Finnish White Guard concentrated at four strategic points along Murman railway, and there are unconfirmed reports of dispatch of German troops into that region. But on the other hand, Finnish Red Guard has made tentative proposal to join Allies.

Halsey reports to-day three destroyers have been handed over by the Russians to the British and French to be refitted, and one is being refitted by the Russians themselves.

POOLE

¹ *Ante*, p. 534 [Pg. 534 includes portions of [Doc. 515](#) and [Doc. 516](#)].

¹ The Rev. Jesse Halsey, Y.M.C.A. secretary.

² Probably error for Lieut. Hugh S. Martin, Assistant Military Attaché.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 25, 1918.*

[*Received May 29, 12.50 p.m.*]

202. Have given to press Lansing's statement in Department's 108,³ held until now because awaiting your No. 102⁴ received yesterday. In connection therewith have made following statement:

I cannot refrain from saying few words to the Russian people at this juncture being impelled thereto by great peril that threatens their welfare and inspired by noble sentiments expressed by President in soul-stirring address recently delivered in opening another Red Cross appeal for additional hundred million. It is policy my Government not to interfere in internal affairs Russia and that policy not been violated. America entered war to fight for a principle, not territorial conquest nor commercial advantage, and will never lay down arms until all peoples given right self[-determination], until world guaranteed enduring peace. We are conscious our power, resources. We have hardly begun fight. The American people were never so resolute, enthusiastic, unanimous, "knitted together," as well expressed by President in above-mentioned address. This demonstrated by every loan that is asked being oversubscribed, by every appeal made for work or Y.M.C.A. services or any purely charitable cause, meeting with prompt and abundant response. All these things show spirit of American people.

President in address, in alluding effort Central powers conclude peace at expense Russia, made following sincere, touching allusion to this country, begins: "I intend stand by Russia as well France, etc. It is perhaps for the first time in history an unselfish war." The Allied missions in Russia have been subjected to many inconveniences and perhaps indignities, but are willing endure such in order miss no opportunity assist Russian people and prevent Russia's becoming German province. Speaking for American Embassy, I have never contemplated for moment quitting Russia and repeat as stated memo [some] months ago on ratification Brest treaty, I shall not leave Russia until compelled to do so by force. Notwithstanding attempted repudiation loans made to Russia by my Government, I have

persistently encouraged shipment from America to Russia of clothing, agricultural implements, etc., and at this writing am endeavoring bring Russia about 750,000 pairs shoes at Pacific port, destined for Railway Union and families. I also making strenuous effort have embargo raised exports of tea from China to Russia. Number experienced railroad men now *en route* to Vologda confer with me and Department Ways, Communication with object improving transportation facilities Russia. This railway commission, composed several hundred men, arrived Vladivostok December and been awaiting instructions there that time to this. Some of them advising concerning operation Chinese Eastern from Vladivostok to Manchuria station, some were requested to aid transportation troops, supplies for Semenov but fulfilment [?] refused consent there and advised me accordingly, so careful are we not to interfere in internal politics Russia. It unnecessary me state that American Railway Commission, while serving ends its mission in improving transportation facilities this country, will have instructions carefully abstain doing anything that will tend promote acquisition of Russian supplies or products by Central Empires, as such effect not only be against our own interests but would not benefit Russian people themselves.

All Americans except those in training for battle field are industriously occupied in manufacturing supplies for America's allies and without boasting I can safely assert that America can furnish not only all manufactured products required by Russia but all such required by Allies which they cannot produce themselves.

FRANCIS

³ *Ante*, p. 524 [Pg. 524 includes portions of [Doc. 505](#) and [Doc. 506](#)].

⁴ See telegram of May 2 to the Minister in China, [vol III](#) , chap. iv.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 27, 1918, 6 a.m.*
[Received May 29, 11.12 p.m.]

210. Your 115, May 9, 5 p.m.,¹ received here 26th, forwarded without comment to Vladivostok for Robins, who was at [Kurgan?] on the 24th and advised would arrive at Vladivostok 30th, whence probably proceed to Tokyo. Passed through here 15th. See my 173² and 194.³ Robins's return to Moscow would indicate American support of Soviet government, if not be considered as recognition thereof. If such is Department's policy, he should be ordered back from Vladivostok, otherwise should proceed to America.

Poole has established cordial relations with Soviet government through Chicherin who wires me again to-day the following telegram:

Given instructions Vladivostok all cipher telegrams all consuls for America or for European Russia must be sent unhindered. It seems that there was delay in execution of our orders owing to brand-new political system not being smooth as the old machine. Extremely sorry have hampered American correspondence in our desperate fight against threats from all sides and internal foe, people's enemies; revolution necessarily rough but best feelings toward American people.

Chicherin apparently friendly, while Trotsky losing influence and Lenin rapidly becoming dictator and willing to sacrifice any government for the social revolution.

FRANCIS

¹ Ante, p. 525 [Pg. 525 includes portions of [Doc. 506](#), [Doc. 507](#), and [Doc. 508](#)].

² Ante, p. 530 [Pg. 530 includes portions of [Doc. 512](#) and [Doc. 513](#)].

³ Ante, p. 538 [Pg. 538 includes portions of [Doc. 520](#) and [Doc. 521](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, May 28, 1918, 1 p.m.
[Received May 29, 9.51 p.m.]

213. Your 128, May 16, 3 p.m.,¹ received yesterday. Had not seen military attaché's 22, May 1, 11 p.m.,² but he has shown me same and expressed regret that it was sent, assuring no repetition thereof. Furthermore says has changed opinion concerning need of diplomatic representative Moscow. While he assumes entire responsibility for cable, I think it was prompted by others, as he says; while knowing that he could only receive information concerning political policies through Ambassador, he was unaware that he could not independently suggest or give information. I have cabled Department that Robins advised my removing to Moscow but I had no such intention and gave my reasons; was endeavoring to use both Summers and Robins for establishing *modus vivendi* which I think is better now than it has been heretofore.

FRANCIS

¹ Ante, p. 529 [Pg. 529 includes portions of [Doc. 510](#), [Doc. 511](#), and [Doc. 512](#)].

² Ante, p. 516 [Pg. 516 includes portions of [Doc. 497](#) and [Doc. 498](#)].

File No. 861.00/1954

[Document 529]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 28, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[*Received June 6, 2.32 p.m.*]

215. Caldwell telegraphs Soviet government granted him alone privilege of transmitting code messages and requested secrecy thereof, and he so advised Department. I think acceptance of special privileges inadvisable and recommend Department so instruct Caldwell. Soviet government industriously endeavoring to create discord between Allies especially America and Japan and should not be encouraged. Please answer.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 28, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received June 1, 2.55 p.m.]

535[?]. Referring to my No. 534.¹ Tendency here to accept for the moment Germany's assurance that there will be no further military advance in Russia especially in view of apparent concentration of German troops for pronounced drive on western front. Military activity giving way to political activity. Mirbach seeking contact with Soviet moderate or reactionary political group in Russia with a view to forming government which with Germany's aid will replace Bolshevik and subserve German interests. His overtures seem to be meeting response with at least one group made up of Octobrists, right Cadets and members of the union of industrials. Germans endeavoring hasten evacuation to Germany all German prisoners and civilians of military age but are encountering many difficulties [owing to] disorganization railroads, etc.

POOLE

¹ Not printed; quoted portions of German note handed to the Soviet Foreign Commissar in reply to Soviet protest against violations of the Brest treaty.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *May 29, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[Received June 9, 10.21 p.m.]

576. Mirbach continuing negotiations with group of Cadets, industrials, etc., headed by Krivoshein, Minister of Agriculture and leader of the left in the Tsar's government. So far as can be learned German proposition is to support a command which will make K. civil dictator and bring about reestablishment of order. Russians show tendency to hold out in hope that Allied intervention may still come. Mirbach on his side continues conciliatory tactics well [which have] sustained Bolshevik government. The situation is thus rather delicately balanced and in the absence of positive intervention by the Allies it may continue essentially unchanged for some time. It is equally possible however that Allied intervention failing determining parties of the right will agree with the Germans upon prompt united action.

See my No. 552, May 24, 8 p.m. Halsey telegraphs from Murman May 25:

Notwithstanding orders received direct from Moscow Commissariat Foreign Affairs district Soviet desire Allies to remain. They inform me in writing that their feelings toward United States are most sincere and cordial and that this friendship will only be cemented by presence American warship. *Olympia* arrived 24th and is under orders British admiral.

Bolsheviki probably hope that by Murman cession to Finland they can avoid issue through direct clash between Allies on one side and Finland and Germany on other.

Kerensky left before 25th for Murmansk whence he hopes to sail for England probably June 2.

POOLE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *May 29, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received June 3, 3.44 p.m.]

577. Reliable American sent to observe prisoner exchange at Orsha reports in substance as follows:

Three trains each way daily, four hundred to thousand men on a train. Returning Russian prisoners without exception invalids, most of them consumptive, many die *en route*. All Russian officers and all soldiers capable of bearing arms retained in Germany. German trains on the other hand filled with healthy prisoners, 70 per cent according to estimate of one train doctor would be fit for service within month.

Observer reports great majority returning Russians bitter against Germans owing treatment received at their hands. They are anti-Bolshevik, denounce Brest treaty and desire continuance of war. As they are in pitiful condition Y. M. C. A. endeavoring to organize relief.

Prisoners being exchanged at two points beside Orsha. In interior of Russia German commissions vigorously organizing evacuation former imprisoned civilians of military age as well as military prisoners. Commissions *en route* to Ekaterinburg, Omsk, Tomsk, Irkutsk.

POOLE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *May 31, 1918.*

[*Received June 11, 6.40 a.m.*]

231. Soviet press having charged through editorials and signed communications that Allied Governments have made propositions of support and [in] event recognition, I am giving following statement for Russian press, June 2:

There seems to be a misunderstanding or a want of clear understanding as to the relation of the Allied Governments to the present Soviet government. Speaking for the American Government, I can say that no authoritative proposition of an official or even of a semiofficial nature has been made to the Soviet government. Soon after locating at Vologda or about the time of the ratification of the Brest Litovsk peace treaty by the All-Russian Soviet, at Moscow, I made a statement to the effect that my Government did not recognize this separate peace but that the American people still considered themselves as allies of the Russian people in the struggle against the Central Empires and that my Government was ready and willing to extend moral and material aid to any organization that would oppose the German advance. That statement has been substantially reiterated by myself in subsequent declarations concerning the preparations being made by America as a result of the determination and spirit pervading the American people.

American representatives throughout Russia have endeavored to maintain a pleasant *modus vivendi* with the authorities functioning in the localities where such American representatives were located. A number of propositions have been made to such representatives to aid or encourage organizations formed or contemplated for opposition to existing powers but such propositions have been invariably refused or ignored. In other words the policy of my Government is not to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia but to permit the people of this great country to select their own form of government and to frame their own laws and to choose the administrators thereof.

President Wilson, in every public utterance concerning Russia, has expressed the firm determination of the American Government and the

American people to aid the Russian people and not to permit any injury or injustice to be inflicted or imposed upon Russia, or the Russians.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/2078

[Document 534]

The Consul General at London (Skinner) to the Secretary of State

No. 6230

LONDON, *May 31, 1918.*
[*Received June 20.*]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a pamphlet entitled, *The Bolshevik Revolution: Its Rise and Meaning*,¹ by Maxim Litvinov, the plenipotentiary of the Russian people's government in Great Britain.

This pamphlet has been much commented upon in this country as the best available exposition of the subject, and I think that students of the question in the Department will be very glad to have it. Unfortunately, I have only been able to obtain one copy, and Mr. Litvinov tells me that the edition is out of print, but he hopes to let me have a few more later on.

I have [etc.]

ROBERT P. SKINNER

¹ Not printed.

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

BERNE, *June 1, 1918, 11 a.m.*

[*Received June 3, 3.50 a.m.*]

3535. On May 30 the head of the Swiss Political Department informed the Russian Charge d'Affaires M. Onou that the Swiss Government had decided to sequester the archives of the Russian Legation and asked him to accompany two Swiss police officers to his Legation for this purpose. This Onou indignantly refused to do, pointing out that the Federal Government had up to the present time consulted him about routine matters in Russia and inserted his name on most recent advices Swiss diplomatic list. Being informed however that Swiss Government had determined upon sequestration of archives, he requested guarantees that they should not be turned over to any other alleged Legation. Such guarantees the Swiss authorities refused to give and that evening the Swiss police proceeded to seal up the archives and Legation premises. Onou claims that decision of Swiss Government was made under German pressure and under recent secret agreement between Germany and Bolsheviki according to which Russians agreed to disarm Black Sea Fleet under the condition that Germany would bring about their recognition in neutral countries.

Bolshevik representatives who recently arrived in Berne had called upon Russian Chargé d'Affaires on May 20 demanding that he turn over to them archives and Legation premises which he emphatically refused to do and summoned police. Upon refusal of Bolshevik visit he inquired attitude Swiss Government. He was informed that Government intended to call Legation "vacant" upon next diplomatic list but no intimation was given to him of the action which was taken against Legation on May 30 until evening of day upon which archives were actually sealed.

Up to the present time members of Federal Council have informed Allied Ministers that they did not propose to recognize Bolshevik Legation. While they have not given us this attitude, refusal of guarantees relative to future disposition of archives would appear to indicate the possibility of future recognition of Bolsheviki.

Allied Legations here have telegraphed these facts to their governments asking for instructions. Russian Chargé d'Affaires has expressed wish that archives be put

into hands of Allies for safe-keeping. Confidentially, it is stated that important archives were put in place of safety three months ago. Swiss press comments that Federal Government considering that in view of possible dispute between Russian representatives and Bolshevik delegates it was Government's duty to protect archives which would presumably be retained under Swiss seal until formal Swiss recognition of a new Russian government.

Yesterday afternoon Bolshevik delegation left their official cards at my private residence. I am disposed to return my private unofficial cards but would appreciate instructions in this respect desirably for the case that they should request a personal interview.

Onou was Russian Chargé d'Affaires until the fall of the Kerensky [ministry] and is a man with whom I have always had most pleasant relations.

STOVALL

File No. 861.00/1899

[Document 536]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 1, 1918, 4 p.m.*

152. Your 210, May 27, 6 a.m.^{[1](#)} Red Cross has ordered Robins to-day to continue journey home.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 543 [Pg. 543 includes portions of [Doc. 526](#) and [Doc. 527](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *June 11* [2], 1918, 7 p.m.²
[Received June 14, 12.50 a.m.]

238. Still no advices from Siberian consuls. Czech opposition disturbs Soviet government which is sending available troops to disarm Czechs.

Postponed departure from [for] Petrograd until to-morrow.

Soviet government possibly will collapse suddenly and although opposition thereto is quite general it has no organization which unites all its many factions and this condition explains why Bolsheviks have so long survived. Approaching collapse attributed more to inherent weakness of Soviet government and to general dissatisfaction of people than to strength of any organized opposition thereto. My contemplated Petrograd and Moscow visits are mainly for the purpose of ascertaining what organized opposition exists and plans thereof.

FRANCIS

² The serial number and contents of this telegram indicate that it should bear the earlier date, although it may not have been sent when written.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 8, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received June 4, 10.22 p.m.]

239. Have been considering the situation that will confront us when Bolshevik government collapses which may possibly be soon and broached the subject to my colleagues yesterday with suggestion that our respective governments be prepared to instruct Allied Ambassadors here to support whatever government should be formulated by Constituent Assembly fairly elected. Such instructions might be sent before downfall of Soviet government but held until collapse occurs when they should be immediately promulgated before another government formed as postponing action until thereafter would subject Allies to the same situation that has existed for seven months past. French Ambassador, Italian Ambassador agreed, former suggested that in the aforesaid instructions should be condition that all parties should be represented in new government. I demurred advocating no conditions whatever as I thought such position more tenable and furthermore there are numerous parties in Russia, even five or more socialistic party organizations, in addition to formidable international and anarchistic parties.

Russian people require guidance, are helpless without it; we are decidedly most popular of Allies not only because Russians are satisfied we have no territorial designs but because of President Wilson's eloquent, impressive utterances of sympathy and interest and probably because American Embassy was first to recognize the Republic and is only one that never left Russia nor planned to do so.

Following instructions respectfully outlined:

In event present Soviet government abdicates or is deposed, you are instructed to announce to the Russian people, whom this Government has never ceased to consider its ally against the Central Empires, that the Government of the United States will recognize that government which will be adopted by the people through their representatives chosen at an election duly called and held under safeguards which will insure an honest expression of the popular will.

Such an election could be held within thirty days, I believe, by a provisional government composed of unselfish patriotic Russians; experience of the last

fifteen months has equipped Russia for prompt and emphatic expression of popular will and any government so organized, and promised united support of Allies, would be immediately accepted and valiantly sustained by great majority of Russians.

Has the Department any other suggestions for deliverance from this impending dilemma? Please answer.

FRANCIS

File No. 861.00/1933

[Document 539]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Stovall)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 4, 1918, 4 p.m.*

2030. Your 3535, June 1, 11 a.m. Department prefers that you have no relations whatever with Bolshevik representatives. This Government does not recognize the Bolshevik authorities, either *de facto* or *de jure*.

PHILLIPS

**Temporary return of the American Ambassador to Petrograd—
Nomination of a Soviet Ambassador to the United States—
Development of Russo-German disputes—Attitude of Bolshevik and
anti-Bolshevik elements toward German and Allied intervention**

[\[540\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, June 5, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received June 7, 3.16 a.m.]

File No. 701.6111/221

[\[541\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, June 5, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received June 7, 12.45 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1959

[\[542\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Petrograd, June 6, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received June 14, 6.16 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2020

[\[543\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, June 7, 1918. [Received June 28, 8 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2161

[\[544\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, June 8, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received June 16, 10.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2070

[\[545\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, June 8, 1918. [Received June 17, 12.47 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2039

[546] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, undated. [Received June 9, 1918, 3.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1982

[547] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 9, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received June 24, 2.27 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2096

[548] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, June 10, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received June 11, 5.28 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1999

[549] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Parts, June 10, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received 9.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/1988

[550] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 11, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received June 15, 10.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2050

[551] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 12, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1945

[552] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington, June 13, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1988

[553] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 13, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 701.6111/221

[554] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 18, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2020

[555] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, June 19, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/1906

[556] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 19, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received June 21, 7.55 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2084

[557] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 19, 1918, 1[11?] p.m. [Received June 22, 6.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2088

[558] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, June 20, 1918, 10 p.m. [Received June 23, 3.46 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2104

[559] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 22, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received June 24, 9.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2107

[560] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, June 25, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received July 9, 5.54 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2235

[561] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, June 27, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2143a

[562] The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

June 29, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2329

[563] The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

July 2, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2328

[564] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Vologda, July 4, 1918. [Received August 26.]

File No. 861.00/2577

[565] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, July 6, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2096

File No. 701.6111/221

[Document 540]

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 5, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received June 7, 3.16 a.m.*]

1. Following just received via Vologda, addressed American Ambassador:

Russian government nominates as plenipotentiary representative in Washington Citizen Litvinov now same in Paris [London]. Hopes friendship your Government will not object our purpose closer relations, intimate friendship between our peoples. Commissary Foreign Affairs, Chicherin.

See my telegram of June 5, 6 p.m.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 5, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received June 7, 12.45 p.m.]

2. Arrived Petrograd 6 last evening, immediately took down Norwegian flag replacing with ours which now floating. Petrograd dead, city famine stricken. Daily bread allowance equivalent to 18/10 ounces, quality horrible, dear at any price; potatoes 9/20 of pound per week. Philip bought from peasant in Vologda 3 poods of flour at Es. 250 a pood, equivalent about \$125 a barrel, for our own use, which Petrograd dealer attempted to purchase unsuccessfully at Rs. 600 per pood, or about \$250 a barrel. Reported babies dying hundred per week, people all looking underfed.

Many arrests Moscow, Kishkin among them; railroad engineer here on my request; says hospital manager reported hundred bodies brought his hospital killed and faces mutilated to destroy identity but nothing thereof in newspapers.

Engineer has served six weeks as manager transportation with approval of engineers' society to which appointment was submitted when tendered and accepted through honest desire to serve Russia; he has, however, resigned because says impossible to operate railroads under Soviet government which absolutely dominated by demagogues, says in fact no government but dictatorship of Lenin, and all patriotic people, including uneducated who think, are opposed to Bolsheviks and will supplant present government by one dominated by Germany if Allies do not immediately intervene. Engineer says government refuses to accept his resignation and has granted him two months' leave but he will not return to its service. I am holding him until arrival of Emerson from whom have heard nothing since left Vladivostok. He is probably detained by Soviet troops who are reported controlling Siberian Railway east of Perm.

I suggest delaying reply to request in my No. 1, June 5, 5 p.m., especially if inclined to make favorable reply which I do not anticipate.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *June 6, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received June 14, 6.16 a.m.]

5. I have just received astounding telegram from Vologda saying French Embassy been informed that British admiral joined by American and French naval officers at Murman together with British general [said] to have stated that recognition of Soviet government only solution of present Russian situation. Such step in my judgment would be tragic mistake. ... [a high Soviet official] called yesterday, says Soviet government admits, "We are a corpse but no one has the courage to bury us," which describes situation. Soviet government is disintegrating rapidly but making strenuous effort to secure Allied support, effect of which would be deliverance of Russia into German embrace. Naval officers at Murman unacquainted with internal conditions are [unwarranted] in giving subsequent [above-mentioned] advice.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *June 7, 1918.*

[Received June 28, 8 p.m.]

612. Official Soviet gazette for June 7 prints statement made to Kühlmann by Russian representative, Berlin, May 28 in which the following instances of continued German military activity [are cited:

- (1)] Concentration of forces on the Don front, apparently for advance on Novorossiisk, fighting at Bataisk, German submarines blockading Novorossiisk's harbor.
- (2) Continued advance toward Voronezh government in region of Valuiki.
- (3) Raids by German troops into Russian territory on north-western front.
- (4) Threats of advance in Vitebsk government.
- (5) Near Lake Chud all male inhabitants of a village carried off.
- (6) Operations of German submarines in Arctic Ocean and White Sea causing coastal inhabitants to die of hunger as their only means of livelihood is by fishing and coastal trading. Result is strong feeling against Germans and marked increase of sympathy for English in whom inhabitants see only salvation from hunger. Owing this situation and cruel manner of executing German blockade, Russian Government is unable to withstand claims of English respecting Murman coast or to counteract increasing indignation against Germany.

Same paper prints following:

People's Commissariat Foreign Affairs has received information that according to statement of German Government, Russian commercial navigation will enjoy absolute freedom in event of departure of English and their allies from Murmansk coast and adjoining waters.

Also prints protest by Joffe to Kühlmann May 28 against insistence by Ukrainian peace delegation on demarcation line running near Kursk and Voronezh and will [omission] eastward on the Don front. Kühlmann asked to point out to Ukrainian government impossibility of its demands.

Gazette for June 4 prints decree abolishing diplomatic rank. On principle of equality of large and small states all Russian diplomatic agents abroad will be

called simply “Plenipotentiary Representative of Russian Federative Soviet Republic” and diplomatic agents of foreign countries accredited to Russia will likewise be considered as of one rank.

Chaprashnikov, Bulgarian representative near Soviet government, arrived Moscow June 2.

POOLE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 8, 1918, 11 p.m.

[Received June 16, 10.30 a.m.]

616. Recognizing the critical character of the present food shortage Lenin is desperately urging his supporters to hold out through the next two months for the procuring of a more certain tenure of power as soon as the crops are in. Speaking this week at an extraordinary third session of the Central Executive Committee, called especially to discuss food question, he launched a movement for sending units of workingmen into the villages to seize grain. He says there is plenty of food in the country but it is hoarded by the rich villagers. This is an exaggeration for political purposes. The rich villager hardly exists in reality. A great many peasants have some grain and a few have none at all. The attempt to distinguish rich and poor, identifying the former with the small *bourgeois*, is intended to conceal fact which the food crisis is making daily more apparent, namely that the interests of the workingmen and the peasants are opposed. The so-called government of workingmen and peasants now finds itself under the difficult necessity of appeasing hungry workingmen on the one side and on the other side of alienating what support remains to them among the peasants by an attempted forcible seizure of grain. The situation is aggravated by the conflict with the commissariat [Czecho-Slovaks?] which has isolated central Russia from the grain stores of western Siberia and the Ufa and adjacent governments, and has stopped through navigation on the [Volga?]. In these circumstances the Bolshevik government could hardly be expected to survive, were it not that the disorganization of the country has so far assumed the proportions of a terrible catastrophe that no other party cares to attempt the management of affairs without direct foreign assistance. The question of the immediate future there[fore] is, will Germany act before the Allies do, and in what manner.

There is rumor of a divergence between the views of Mirbach and his Government. While Berlin must offer at least certain evil [civility] they are said to favor the reestablishment of Russia under monarchy. [Germany's] policy, is said [to aim] at the creation of several remissions [separate governments, but] do not oppose [federation] on the model [omission?] of the further promises [omission]. The external evidence suggests that the latter plan is being followed for the present. There are indications that White Russia is about to be made into a separate government. From Simferopol the definite formation of Crimean government is

reported. Recent developments reported in 593¹ and other telegrams, though not clear in detail, maintain a similar policy in the Trans-Caucasus. In the Northern Caucasus the revival of the Southeastern federation with their support gives the Germans the pretext most people desire, to extend their control [not only] over the Kuban, Terek and [omission] districts but also into the southern Urals through cooperation with the Orenburg and Ufa Cossacks who [omission] against the socially [omission] they have assumed deliberately on their lands [omission] are not deeply conscious of national issues and may therefore be ready to accept direct or indirect German aid.

In Moscow the German column [control] becomes stronger and stronger. Specific evidence accumulates daily to show that, the Allies having failed to act, liberal and conservative elements alike are finally prepared to accept German support. Germany has apparently not yet decided to assume control in central Russia, but this decision and its immediate execution may come at any moment.

Failing immediate German action, one of the lesser possibilities of the situation is the overthrow of the Soviets by purely mob action springing from insufferable hunger. Also the Czech conflict, which is momentarily becoming more serious, may develop in ways not now to be foreseen.

POOLE

¹ Dated June 2, [vol. II](#), chap. iii.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, *June 8, 1918.*

[*Received June 17, 12.47 p.m.*]

617. Official Soviet gazette to-day prints note of Mirbach, dated 6th, which, after citing in answer to "continual unfounded complaints of Russian Government regarding supposed infraction of existing regulations by German commanding staff "various alleged aggressive and improper acts by Red Army, continued as follows:

Russian Government is carrying on public propaganda against Germany in radiograms addressed to its diplomatic representative at Berlin. For instance, on May 21, in radiogram No. 254, it stated that German military authorities dissolved town council at Nikolaev, that there were strikes at Ekaterinoslav and strikers had been replaced by Austrians. On May 20 it stated Germans were defeated by peasant uprising in Chernigov government, that Skoropadski issued order to shoot leaders of rising, that fighting took place incident to disbanding of Polish detachment near Kiev and both sides suffered severe losses. Radiogram of May 17 mentions disturbances among German troops, German division supposed to have refused to go to French front and its action to have met with sympathy in other German units. Same radio states that Wesenberg German troops protesting against continuance of war arrested and killed some of their officers. All these communications are pure inventions having propaganda purpose. Our troops have right to be protected against such reproaches and the behavior of the Russian Government is all the more striking as nothing is known of similar conduct toward the Allied powers or with regard to the violation of international law through the presence of Allied troops on Arctic coast.

Chicherin has replied immediately to complaint respecting propaganda saying that radiograms in question contained either complaints to be communicated to German Government by Joffe or news summaries for his information. In latter names of Allies' papers from which news taken not given. To be expected such reviews should be one-sided failing to reflect real comments of local press. Moreover radiogram of German Government has been seen containing unfounded reports of street fighting in Moscow and Petrograd. Provisions of Brest treaty as to

propaganda being reciprocal Soviet government might complain of this but feels its position such that it can look with indifference on radiographic transmission of unfounded reports.

POOLE

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *undated*.

[Received June 9, 1918, 3.43 p.m.]

8. The following explaining my return Petrograd:

Yes, I have returned to Petrograd, and am occupying the American Embassy for a few days. The American flag is displayed in front of the Embassy and will remain there after I return to Vologda. When I left Petrograd February 26, Russia was supposed to be in a state war with Germany. The peace commissioners at Brest Litovsk had wired for a special train and the Germans were continuing to advance upon Petrograd. I went Vologda never intending leave Russia but remain in Vologda as long as it was safe from capture from [by] Germans. When the peace treaty was signed I was Vologda not believing such a humiliating treaty would be ratified by the All-Russian Soviet, Moscow. When that body ratified the peace, I issued statement that my Government did not recognize treaty, but considered itself still ally of Russian people. Later I was joined Vologda by the French and Italian Embassies, and by Legations Belgium and Serbia, both missions having returned Russia from Finland. I was accompanied Vologda by Siamese and Brazilian Legations. There are now Vologda also representatives of Japan and China.

Do you see any change in Petrograd?

Yes, a most lamentable change. Appearance of streets now is depressing; one meets few people and those have careworn look, food is unobtainable except at figures beyond the reach of people of ordinary means, infant mortality is enormous, and there prevails feeling of general depression. This the more remarkable and reprehensible because Russia a land of plenty.

How do you account for such conditions?

Primary cause is separate peace with Central Empires, which was followed by demobilization of army and interruption of railway transportation. Occupation of large sections of Russian territory by enemy troops, separation of Ukrainia and Finland, and general industrial demoralization

soon followed, attended by closing and nationalization of banks, which paralyzed all business. If Russia had continued perform her part in war the horrible struggle would have been ended by this time or certainly before close of campaign of 1918.

What is remedy for present deplorable conditions?

Reerection of Russia and salvation of Russians are in hands of the people themselves. America has sent no troops Russia thus far, but my Government has expressed its interest in the Russian people, and in welfare of the country on every occasion, and many times. American Embassy has never quit Russia nor does it intend do so. Government of United States has Consulate General Moscow and one also at Irkutsk. It has Consulate Petrograd, Vladivostok, Archangel, a representative Murmansk, Consulate at Omsk, Tomsk, Ekaterinburg, Chita, Samara, Tiflis, Helsingfors, and had Consulate Kiev until that city was occupied by Germans, and at all these important points representatives of my Government, while looking after interests of American citizens, are willing extend aid to the extent of their ability against common enemy Germany, whose agents are selfishly attempting to exploit Russia and planning to make this great country German province.

Return meets general commendation, but think unadvisable to abandon Vologda embassy, because Allied missions joined me there. Furthermore Germans may invest Petrograd any day, as they have recently sent two new divisions to Revel also two to Dvinsk and reinforcements to Finland.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, June 9, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received June 24, 2.27 a.m.]

249. *En route* Vologda after four busy profitable days in Petrograd where I have received hearty welcome and return commended by all. City virtually has no municipal government, no police, no visible disturbances and no robberies because valuables all removed or sold.

I am convinced more thoroughly if possible that the Soviet government is only a shell. I conferred secretly with reliable member government who confidentially stated entire armed force of Soviet government in all Russia less than 25,000 including Red Army and Red Guard, pay of which recently reduced from 300 rubies to 150 per month; this estimate confirmed from all available sources. I talked with people representing all classes and did not find one favoring present government and regret to say that every one favored monarchy. Several intelligent patriotic Russians who supported revolution asserted that new Constituent Assembly unadvisable as people tired of elections and will not vote. Furthermore 80 per cent cannot read and all disgusted with Bolshevik government which have considered democratic. Bolshevism not only undoubtedly killed world-wide social revolution for half century but fear has irreparably injured democracy in Russia for a generation or until masses are educated and cause pendulum to swing violently in opposite direction.

Industrial leaders including bankers, professional men, landed proprietors, commercial men, generally, have formed combination regardless of party to appeal again to redeem Russia before industry ruined by Bolshevism. This combination with headquarters Moscow, rapidly extending throughout Russia, favors Allies but will treat with Germany for establishment of strong government if Allies support Soviet government or fail to show responsiveness or to manifest disposition to assist in restoration order and any longer delay by Allies is dangerous.

FRANCIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *June 10, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received June 11, 5.28 p.m.]

2262. I have obtained the following information from ... [an American] whom I have known before and who is a Russian by birth but has lived many years in America. He has just returned from Petrograd by boat, having left there Thursday. He states there exists complete quiet in Petrograd and Moscow, there is no looting or killing and there have been no marked disturbances for the last two months. He states, however, there have been considerable disturbances in the villages by the Bolsheviks sending workingmen's detachments into the villages demanding bread which the villagers up to now have refused to give unless they obtain something tangible in exchange as they are unwilling to accept money.

My informant states that while the transportation is still in a very bad condition, yet he noticed some slight improvement in regard to the movement of passenger traffic. Freight traffic continues to be impossible. The food condition in Petrograd and Moscow and particularly in Petrograd continues to be most grave and serious. The people are living on rations which do not meet the requirements of normal subsistence.

My informant states that he notices an increasing lack of confidence among the Bolsheviks themselves in their power to remain in authority. He states the workingmen are leaving the Bolshevik Party in great numbers and that the desertion of the workingmen so far as the Bolsheviks are concerned is increasing daily. The working-men in the factories in Petrograd have formed an association whereby to cope with the present situation and to demand that the Bolshevik government be replaced by a coalition government of all socialist parties. However these resolutions of the association have resulted in no practical changes as yet although they declare that if they do not succeed, they will call a general strike.

My informant states that Lenin in a recent speech before the Central Executive Committee of National Soviets said:

Our power is not of iron; on the contrary it is one of jelly. We are now facing the most crucial period of the Soviet power. The next three months will constitute that period and therefore I call for strict discipline for attempts to improve our organization and increase productivity in the

factories.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/1988

[Document 549]

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARTS, *June 10, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received 9.35 p.m.*]

4151. My 3569, April 10, 6 p.m., and Department's 3673, April 23, 5 p.m.^{[1](#)} Russian Ambassador here is informed by French postal authorities that his cipher telegram sent June 6 addressed Ambarusse, Washington, has been stopped by American censor. Please investigate and inform me what answer I am to make him.

SHARP

^{[1](#)} Not printed; both referred to interference with Russian Ambassador's cables.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *June 11, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received June 15, 10.10 p.m.]

258. Have procured very confidential statement of principal organization mentioned last paragraph my 249, June 9, 6 p.m. After asserting Russia's reerection possible only on national, religious and broad political foundations which been replaced by class and party interests and internationalism it states following principles:

1. Russian unity, integrity, power and economic independence with fidelity to international obligations.
2. Restoration of fighting forces under military discipline.
3. Autonomy of church and religious confessions with predominant places for Orthodox Church.
4. Restoration and protection private property and inviolability diplomatic rights.
5. Restoration strong central authority with local organs.
6. Establishment of broad democratic local self-government.
7. Development of productive forces by increasing people's weakened labor capacity and guaranteeing individual enterprise.
- [8.] Equitable broad social reforms in conformity with popular arrangement for [restoration] political forces.
9. Solution of land problem on the basis of maximum productiveness. This order to be founded on property principles but opposes unjustified concentration of land in individual hands.
10. Taxes in proportion to property owned.
11. Obligatory and free schools for all children of school age.
12. Advocates raising level culture and education.

Remainder of declaration affirms failure of revolution as demonstrated by experience of fifteen months; asserting Constituent Assembly is failure if not broken up through mutual hostility of socialistic parties, because rebelling [elected] under conditions violating elementary requirements for proper elections, on the basis of intricate electoral system bar [for] offices by population and composed of men incapable of creative constructive work.

It opposes new Constituent Assembly as composition thereof would be unequal to present changes, trying conditions. It asserts that destruction of monarchy and proclamation of self-government were perverted in minds of people to mean freedom from all oaths and responsibilities among Russians who for centuries had inseparably connected monarchy with law and order. While advocating restoration lawful lineal monarchy as only redemption from "anarchy and last stages destruction, degradation and beggary," it provides conditions, however. Since April [ancient] autocratic form of government has red [lacked] force to solve the problems confronting a modern state, monarchy established should be limited by a popular government with legislative powers and control of budget. The Executive should be responsible to the houses of popular representatives and finally as a stage between present anarchistic conditions and form permanent organization, we must temporarily have a firm government receiving its power from the institutions of the people and the striving toward order; a government aiming to bring about the quickest possible reestablishment of order, safety of personal property, reestablishment of law. Courts and administration of any such *ad interim* government must possess sufficient force to insure this election.

This is [program] counter to revolutionary and its advocates would be shot without trial if apprehended.

Of course I made no commitment other than reiterating our policy of non-interference with internal affairs.

French Ambassador, Italian Minister going respectively Moscow and Petrograd to-day inform me that Paris conference June 1, attended by their Premiers and Lloyd George, favored immediate Russian intervention but agree to instruct Ambassadors Washington, Tokyo to present question to America and Japan with a view to immediate action which my colleagues including Japanese Chargé d'Affaires earnestly advocate.

My 140, May 2,¹ so recommended on the ground that Soviet government would demand evacuation Murman but, that not yet occurring, am inclined to opinion that should await some overt act or demand by Soviet government before actively intervening. Probably Czechoslovak incident may justify such action, but can get no information thereof. Possibly interference with American enterprises throughout Russia might increase provocation.

General Poole who came on *Olympia* to Murman went thence to Archangel and expected Vologda 14th when I have called military conferences which be attended by French, Italian, Japanese chiefs of military missions.

Meantime I recommend energetic preparations for intervention.

Later. Just learned from French Ambassador that Czechs been ordered by Soviet government to disband and those not entering Red Army be compelled to work; this order replaces [probably] permits Czechs to go to France if disarmed.

FRANCIS

¹ *Ante*, p. 519 [*Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 500](#) and [Doc. 501](#)*].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 12, 1918, 3 p.m.*

177. Your 239, June 3, 5 p.m.^{[1](#)} In the event present Soviet government abdicates or is deposed you may announce to the Russian people, whom the United States has never ceased to consider its associates against the Central powers, that this Government will recognize a government of Russia which it has reason to regard as representative of the people of Russia and chosen by their collective action. The Department prefers that you should not make any announcements which would seem to dictate just how a new government should be chosen. There is no change in this Government's policy towards Russia either in Europe or in the Far East.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 550 [Pg. 550 includes portions of [Doc. 537](#) and [Doc. 538](#)].

File No. 861.00/1988

[Document 552]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 13, 1918, 4 p.m.*

4530. Your 4151, June 10. 6 p.m. United States cable censor has no record whatsoever of having stopped any cable from Russian Ambassador Paris to Russian Embassy here who has full privileges. Only explanation is that cable of June 6 was sent via England and probably as in former cases been held by British cable censor.

Please investigate and report further.

LANSING

File No. 701.6111/221

[Document 553]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 13, 1918, 5 p.m.*

181. Your 1 and 2, June 5, Petrograd.^{[2](#)} Make no answer for the present or without consulting Department.

LANSING

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, pp. 551 [*Pg. 551 includes portions of [Doc. 538](#), [Doc. 539](#), and [Doc. 540](#)*] and 552 [*Pg. 552 includes portions of [Doc. 541](#) and [Doc. 542](#)*].

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 18, 1918, 4 p.m.*

192. Your 5, June 6, 4 p.m., received June 14.^{[1](#)} Report correct except that American commander took no part, merely reporting action of British and French. Navy Department is aware that this Government is unprepared to recognize central Bolshevik authorities or enter into any official relations with them.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 552 [Pg. 552 includes portions of [Doc. 541](#) and [Doc. 542](#)].

File No. 861.00/1906

[Document 555]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 19, 1918, 4 p.m.*

193. Your 182, May 18, 10 p.m.^{[2](#)} Grant visa Kerensky if he applies for it.

LANSING

^{[2](#)} *Ante*, p. 536 [Pg. 536 includes portions of [Doc. 518](#) and [Doc. 519](#)].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State


[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *June 19, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[Received June 21, 7.55 a.m.]

285. Vosnesenski, talkative chief of the Far Eastern Division of Soviet Foreign Office, who represented Soviet government at Summers's funeral, called yesterday saying would be in Vologda five or six days. If his visit had any object it was to tell me that Chicherin had instructed him to say that notes demanding war vessels leave Russian ports³ were sent to please the Germans or perhaps by German orders and that Chicherin expected no reply or action thereon. Radek had told Lehrs⁴ the same and Poole had so wired me.

Have heard from two sources that a German colonel in uniform had recently met combination group in Moscow and promised that 10,000 Germans with German division organized from prisoners of war would overturn Bolshevik government in one week, if combination group would favor German alliance and compel Allied forces and Allied representatives to leave Russia and that combination group considering proposition and disposed to accept. ...

FRANCIS

³ See telegrams dated June 16 and June 21, [vol. II](#) , chap. ii.

⁴ John A. Lehrs, Vice Consul at Moscow.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *June 19, 1918, 1[11?] p.m.*
[Received June 22, 6.40 a.m.]

286. Since my 285, June 19, 9 p.m. French Ambassador just received message from Consul General, Moscow, filed 11 to-day, stating Trotsky and Chicherin had several conferences yesterday with some unknown person supposedly Mirbach; reports hearing through officials of War Department and Foreign Affairs that Soviet government has accepted proffered German aid against Czechs which heretofore refused, and that two German army corps will immediately occupy Moscow. Trotsky in last speech severely criticized Allies.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *June 20, 1918, 10 p.m.*
[Received June 23, 3.46 p.m.]

289. Vosnesenski mentioned in my telegram No. 285, June 19, 9 p.m., taught Russian to Italian Ambassador ten years ago in Petrograd. Latter reports that Vosnesenski called and admitted Soviet government tottering and that he had been sent by Chicherin to Vologda to ascertain whether some arrangement with the Allied Governments was possible. He said that he expected no reply to nor action concerning, the notes demanding that the war vessels leave; stated additional severer note would be sent Murman but no reply expected and that Soviet government would do nothing; confessed Soviet government compelled to obey demands of Germany as it could offer no resistance and feared German advance. Vosnesenski furthermore said that central Soviet government ordered arrest of Japanese Ambassador when he left Vologda March 4 for Vladivostok, but Siberian Soviet government refused to comply because, as it replied, such action would precipitate Japanese invasion. Vosnesenski said Mirbach had offered German assistance against Czechs but was refused. French Ambassador received nothing more concerning agreement between Soviet government and Mirbach which reported consummated the day after Vosnesenski left Moscow. He proposed to Italian Ambassador as compromise that Czechs profess disarmament and guns be sent in care for delivery to Czechs in Mongolia but Italian Ambassador said Czechs would not trust Soviet government. Italian Ambassador asked Vosnesenski why Czechs not permitted to pass bearing arms and Soviet government stated that it was powerless to stop them; Vosnesenski replied that such order would be given if Czechs should go through Mongolia and not join Semenov as that would mean independent Siberia and Bolshevik overthrow. Vosnesenski will remain here several days.

FRANCIS

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 22, 1918, 9 p.m.

[Received June 24, 9.50 a.m.]

663. The general belief prevalent early this week that the Allies had decided to intervene, caused a wave of pro-Ally sentiment among all except the except [extreme] parties. The week closes, however, with a feeling of disillusion respecting the Allies and a renewed movement for cooperation with Germany. This seems to embrace not only the Octobrists, who have been definitely German in their attitude for some time, but also many Cadets. Rodzyanko is mentioned as one of a number now in conference with the German representatives in Kiev. Mirbach continues in touch with other leaders in Moscow. Negotiations are apparently inconclusive as yet and it is possible that the Germans will decide to occupy Moscow as a purely military measure and set up a government of their own choosing.

The week has also been marked by many rumors of the acceptance by the Soviet officials of direct German aid against the Czechoslovaks. The almost complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the Ukraine and northern fronts suggests a partial agreement, and there is no doubt that German and Austrian prisoners are fighting with the Red Army in greater or less numbers. When questioned last night concerning the report direct dispatch of pure German units against the Czechs, Chicherin said that such an arrangement would be suicidal for the present government, but he admitted that their situation is critical in the extreme and one [not] to be surprised if they resort to desperate measures. Their troops seem quite ineffective against the Czechs who hold the Siberian line eastward from Syzran, except Ufa, and are threatening Smolensk [Simbirsk?], [omission] and Ekaterinburg. In the meantime the Germans are already applying military pressure by a renewed advance in the region of Voronezh summits [indicating] probable intention of occupying the whole of that [government] and there are reports, still unconfirmed are [as to?] coming of fresh activities in the region of Smolensk. The Cossacks of the Don and Ural are constantly widening their fields of operation. Dutov is apparently in possession of Orenburg. Local anti-Bolshevik disturbances are reported from Saratov, Tambov, Kazan, and Nizhni Novgorod.

In hope of lessening the growing stringency of the food situation, the Soviet peace delegates at Kiev have asked the Ukraine for 200,000 tons of grain and flour. The Ukrainians have replied that they cannot undertake such deliveries as peasant

revolts have lately stopped grain export to Germany and Austria. They have promised quantities of coal and iron in return for oil products, wood and mission [manufactured] articles order. The Ukrainians are especially anxious to obtain textiles but the Russians so far insist upon grain in return for these. In Moscow relative quiet. The Bolsheviks are apparently making preparations for a last stand. The general public is apprehensive of German occupation. So-called white flour is selling at the equivalent of \$300 an American barrel.

Cole reports from Archangel that the Soviet representatives there have received orders to be prepared to destroy by explosions within forty-eight hours all material which has not already been evacuated.

POOLE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

Moscow, June 25, 1918, 8 p.m.
[Received July 9, 5.54 p.m.]

668. Following threat by the Ambassador that otherwise Germany would occupy central Russia, Soviet ordered the return of the Black Sea Fleet from Novorossiisk to Sevastopol. Only part of the fleet has obeyed order. Remainder including dreadnought named *Free Russia*, 4 destroyers, 2 large, 2 small torpedo boats blown up by the crews. Two large torpedo boats fled to Tuapse. According to the best obtainable information commander in chief vessels which returned to Sevastopol included dreadnought *Volya*, 4 destroyers and 2 small torpedo boats.

German demand for return of vessels was based on Article 5 of Brest Litovsk treaty and [on] express guarantee that vessels returned will not be used by Germany or her allies during the war and will be returned to Russia after conclusion of general peace, as well as further guarantee that in the event fleets returned German troops will not cross line of demarcation approximately coinciding with disposition of troops at beginning of the peace negotiation with the Ukraine.

Chicherin asks that the special attention of the American Government be invited to the action of the crews in destroying part of the vessels. He says this action represents the true sentiment of the Soviets, the order for the return of the fleet having been given only under duress.

The incident is illuminating, signifying whatever the voluntary disposition of the Soviets may be with respect to Germany and the Allies respectively, they are not free agents and cannot, even if they wish, do anything which Germany may consider detrimental to her interests.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/2143a

[Document 561]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *June 27, 1918.*

8459. This Government believes it is inadvisable for Kerensky to come to America at the present time. Lord Reading is aware of this fact and has so advised the Foreign Office.

LANSING

The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

June 29, 1918.

DEAR MR. MILES: Sookine¹ tells me this morning that it will be necessary to determine within the next two or three days whether we will receive in this country the following prominent Russians now preparing to come: Kerensky, Tereshchenko, Maklakov, Burtsev, and Efremotov. He says that, anyway, the French are planning to bring to the United States Kerensky and Tereshchenko. He said there was no way of stopping Kerensky without a great deal of publicity which would be utilized in Russia as showing that the United States was not in favor of receiving him which would be unfortunate. Sookine thought the best thing to do would be to have Kerensky accompanied by these other men and in this way cover him to a certain extent. He tells me that Minor, a representative of the Social Revolutionist Party, is coming and that the French Government believe it would be desirable to have Izvolski also. Apparently the idea in contemplation is that America should receive representatives of all parties in Russia that they should be amalgamated here.

W. P[ILLIPS]

¹ Secretary attached to the Russian Embassy at Washington.

The Assistant Secretary of State (Phillips) to Mr. Miles of the Division of Near Eastern Affairs

July 2, 1918.

MR. MILES: I told Sookine yesterday that the Secretary thought that it would be wiser for these distinguished Russians not to come over to this country at the present time; that if Kerensky and Tereshchenko came over, it would be impossible to refuse the Bolsheviki. Sookine said that he thought it might be embarrassing to refuse, to which I replied that it could be easily arranged that Kerensky would make no requests. He said that he and the Ambassador would try to settle the matter in this way and he hoped that the question would not be brought up by Kerensky.

W. PHILLIPS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

No. 1117

VOLOGDA, *July 4, 1918.*
[Received August 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that I gave a Fourth of July reception to-day which was attended by the members of the Diplomatic Corps in Vologda and all of the attaches of the Allied missions, and by a few Russians, the number of those present totaling, I presume, nearly or quite one hundred.

The feeling in Vologda is very friendly towards the Embassy as it is realized that we have added much to the reputation of the city. The mayor, Mr. Alexandrov, ... who was elected by direct vote of the people before the October revolution,¹ and the adjoint mayor. Mr. Zubov, a Cadet, were present notwithstanding they were removed from office last week by a representative of the central Soviet government at Moscow named Kedrov who has, after arresting and sending to Moscow the city дума of Archangel, stopped at Vologda on his return trip and placed the local Soviet in the full control of municipal affairs.

The Soviet government at Moscow has had a representative here in the person of one Mr. Vosnesenski, who occupies the position of head of the Far East Division in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Vosnesenski is a shrewd Jew and is not lacking in self-complacency or audacity. He was sent to Vologda to ascertain whether the Allies had concluded in principle to intervene but got no satisfaction from me and I do not think he received any definite information from any of my colleagues.

There are many rumors current concerning the advance of the Allied troops or Allied detachments which we are hourly endeavoring to confirm. Authentic reports are to the effect that the landing of Allied forces will be resisted at Archangel; they are in possession at Murmansk however and the local Soviet there is friendly to the Allies because it has seen finally what has been evident to Allied representatives for some time and that is that the central Soviet government is absolutely under the domination of Germany.

I have the honor to enclose herewith copies in English and in Russian of a statement made by me to the Russian people to-day; this has been published this morning in the local Vologda *Listok* and I have ordered 50,000 copies of the Russian text for distribution purposes. ...

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure]

Statement of the American Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Russian People, July 4, 1918

On this July 4, the natal day of the American Republic, I feel constrained to say a few words of encouragement to the Russian people for whom my country cherishes deep sympathy. One hundred and forty-two years ago to-day the thirteen American Colonies proclaimed their independence; they had a population of about three million souls occupying a narrow strip along the Atlantic seacoast. After a struggle of seven years their independence was acknowledged; then followed a critical period of internal dissension which ended in the adoption of a Constitution and the formation of the Government which exists to-day. Americans throughout the world celebrate this day in commemoration of the achievements of our ancestors, to express our pride in our institutions, to renew our pledges of fealty to the principles on which our Government is based and to inspire our descendants with love of country and with appreciation of the liberty they enjoy.

France assisted us to gain our independence and we have always felt sincerely grateful therefor; I am pleased to note that the French Chamber of Deputies has decided to observe the day in testimony of "indissoluble and fraternal friendship."

The Father of our Country warned us against entangling foreign alliances and we observed that injunction for a hundred and forty years or as long as our self-respect, our sense of duty and our obligation to humanity permitted. We were much farther removed from Europe when our independence was achieved than we are to-day. The application of steam as a motive power had not then been discovered, there were no ocean steamers, no steam railroads; there were no telegraph lines, no telephones, no machine guns, no aeroplanes, no submarines.

Within that period our population has grown by rapid strides until it now numbers considerably over one hundred million and many millions of the increase have come from European lands.

We are now engaged in the greatest war of history—a world war in fact—and so earnestly have we taken part that the spirit of our people is aroused as never before. We have not the slightest doubt as to the outcome. Russia is interested in this war as no other country is interested because she will lose most in the event of the victory of the Central Empires. My country and all of the Allies consider the Russian people still in the struggle. We do not observe the Brest Litovsk peace. Surely no Russian who loves his country and looked with pride upon her greatness is going to tamely submit to her dismemberment and humiliation.

President Wilson has said feelingly and impressively on several occasions that he has no intention of deserting Russia, in fact that he is resolved not to do so. That means that we will never stand idly by and see the Germans exploit the Russian people and appropriate to Germany's selfish ends the immense resources of Russia. We take this stand not because we ourselves seek territorial

aggrandizement; not because we have commercial ambitions in connection with Russia; nor because we wish to dictate to the Russian people or interfere in the internal affairs of Russia. We assume this position because we wish the Russian people to have the right to dispose of themselves and not be compelled to submit to the tyrannical rule of Germany, even though such a disposition might result in a temporary peace. It is moreover my opinion that all of the Allies agree with America on this subject.

Therefore on this day which is celebrated in every city, in every village, and in every hamlet in America, I appeal to the Russian people to take courage, to organize to resist the encroachments of Germany. The Allies are your friends and are willing and able to assist you notwithstanding your superb army has been demobilized. The United States which had an army of about two hundred thousand when we entered the war less than fifteen months ago, has already sent to France nine hundred thousand well-armed, disciplined men and is making rapid progress toward raising an army of five million. The strength of the American Navy and of American shipping has been increased many fold and is continuing to grow at a wonderful rate which exceeds all calculations and expectations. There is not a craft on the broad seas that dares float the German flag or the colors of one of the Central Empires.

On May 29 last my Government authorized its representatives throughout the world to express its sympathy with the nationalistic aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks and Jugoslavs and within three days past I have received instructions to announce that the position of the United States Government is “that all branches of the Slav race should be completely freed from German and Austrian rule.”

What an inspiration this should be to Russians!

I can not close this expression to the Russian people more impressively than by quoting from a stirring address made by an association of workmen to their fellow workmen, in which they say:

The power of German militarism—the ruthless enemy of the worker of all lands—has been strengthened in our name. Alliance with it will make us slaves and kill our last hope for the independence of Russia.

We will never recognize this (Brest Litovsk) peace and this alliance with Germany. We must struggle for the independence of our country. We can not manage it alone. In its interest we must make a military alliance with the Allies. ... We appeal to you to struggle for ... the discontinuance of civil war, for the reestablishment of all liberties, for the armament of the whole nation, for tearing up the Brest treaty and against an alliance with Germany.

¹ November revolution, if the new-style calendar is used.

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, July 6, 1918, 5 p.m.

210. Your 140, 249 and 258.¹ Following for your information: Semenov's movement has been defeated for the time and he has retreated to vicinity of Chinese border. Admiral Kolchak began movement towards Pogranichnaya and Vladivostok but without tangible success and reported to have resigned. General Horvat reported to have removed his residence to Peking to conduct further negotiations regarding operation of Chinese Eastern Railway. Part of Stevens force still working on Chinese Eastern and balance at Nagasaki.

July 4 United States had over 1,000,000 troops in France, expected to have twice that number by the end of the year. Every effort being made to shift to Allies balance of man power on western front.

Red Cross negotiating for relief ship to Archangel. Comprehensive plans being discussed for other economic and social assistance. Trial shipment of 50,000 pairs of shoes to Moscow Supply Committee for delivery at Omsk approved. Shipment will be made to Dairen. Poole being informed that committee is to have representatives at Dairen and also at Omsk. Department desires you to report on success of distribution which will follow arrival shoes at Dairen in September.

These measures will indicate that your recommendations are receiving attention and are being followed where conditions observed here make it practicable to do so.

Department is also in close touch with Masaryk who organized Czech forces which are determined to fight Austro-Germans and not fellow Slavs except when provoked in self-defense.

The danger of a conservative reaction has always been in the background as a possible development and to the advantage of Central powers and likely therefore to receive their support. Department has heard nothing from you or Moscow since June 24. Have you seen Moscow telegram to Department, 628, June 12, reporting judgment regarding attitude of cooperative societies in European Russia and Siberia?² The situation is exceedingly complex and Department confides in your judgment to present clearly the constant shifting of events.

Hereafter Department proposes to send you at least once a week a *résumé* of

information from other parts of Russia and of the chief events in the battle area to assist you in seeing as a whole the vast problem of which Russia forms such an important element.


The last week has seen papers filled with reports from German sources of assassination of Tsar, overthrow of Bolsheviki at Moscow and establishment of counter-revolutionary government at Omsk under leadership of Grand Duke Michael, brother of Tsar.

Japan signifies intention in Far East of acting only in harmony with Allies and specially with this Government and gives repeated evidences of good faith in this purpose.

Please acknowledge receipt.

LANSING

¹ *Ante*, pp. 519 [*Pg. 519 includes portions of [Doc. 500](#) and [Doc. 501](#)*], 562 [*Pg. 562 includes portions of [Doc. 551](#), [Doc. 552](#), and [Doc. 553](#)*], and 559 [*Pg. 559 includes portions of [Doc. 548](#) and [Doc. 549](#)*].

 ² Vol. II, chap. i.

Assassination of the German Ambassador, July 6, 1918; Socialist-Revolutionist revolt—Kerensky's proposed visit to America¹

¹ See also *ante*, pp. 536 [Pg. 536 includes portions of [Doc. 518](#) and [Doc. 519](#)], 563 [Pg. 563 includes portions of [Doc. 554](#), [Doc. 555](#), and [Doc. 556](#)], 567 [Pg. 567 includes portions of [Doc. 560](#), [Doc. 561](#), and [Doc. 562](#)], and 568 [Pg. 568 includes portions of [Doc. 562](#), [Doc. 563](#), and [Doc. 564](#)].

[566] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 6, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received July 9, 4.10 p.m.]

File No. 701.6261/11

[567] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 7, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received July 15, 4.53 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2237

[568] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 9, 1918. [Received July 28, 11.45 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2364

[569] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 12, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received July 26, 4.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2367

[570] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 13, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received July 26, 4.40 p.m.]

File No. 763.72/2367

[571] The Secretary of State to the Consul General at London (Skinner)

Washington, July 16, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2078

[572] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 16, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received August 11, 11.32 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2453

[573] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 17, 1918. [Received July 24, 8.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2366

[574] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, August 9, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received August 10, 11.22 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2447

[575] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, August 10, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received 8 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2449

[576] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, August 13, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2449

[577] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 26, 1918. [Received September 16, 9.42 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2711

[578] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 5, 1918. [Received October 29.]

File No. 861.00/3072

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 6, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received *July 9, 4.10 p.m.*]

702. Urgent for Secretary's attention. Smith of the Associated Press has just learned from an authoritative source that the German Ambassador, Count Mirbach, was assassinated between 2 and 3 this afternoon at his Embassy. Two persons arriving in machine threw bomb through window. Ambassador and Captain König wounded. Ambassador died in few minutes. Two arrests so far. Smith asks that Associated Press be informed.

POOLE

² Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4411); by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 7, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[Received July 15, 4.53 p.m.]

German Ambassador Count Mirbach assassinated about 3 p.m. yesterday by two unknown persons who were admitted to his office on presentation of paper, presumably forged, from a department of the Soviet government. Have not yet been arrested. Assassination comes as logical consequence of violent anti-German outburst by left Social Revolutionaries in All-Russian Soviet Congress. While characterizing act as provocation by "Russian, English, French imperialism," official Bolshevik announcement states that the assassin was member of legislation [left Socialist-Revolutionists]. Moscow telegraph station and apparently other strategic points in [hands] of left Social Revolutionary Party. Social Revolutionists have seized city. Fighting in progress. Impossible at present to estimate importance of outbreak.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 9, 1918.

[Received July 28, 11.45 a.m.]

Count Mirbach, the German Ambassador, was assassinated at his Embassy the afternoon of July 6. The act was committed by two Russians. The murder grew out of and was a logical consequence of strong anti-German feeling of the left Social Revolutionary Party in the All-[Russian] Soviet Congress. The Central Executive Committee of the Social Revolutionary Party has accepted full responsibility for the assassination of Mirbach and admitted that the deed was performed by its agents. The assassins have been declared outlaws but not as yet apprehended. All Social Revolutionists delegates to the Soviet Congress have been placed under arrest during the [day]. Following the assassination military forces of the Social Revolutionists numbering not more than thousand seized the telegraphic station and arrested certain of the Bolshevik leaders. Within a few hours they were driven out by the Bolshevik forces which latter, by noon of the following day, were in complete control of Moscow. It has been officially announced by the Bolsheviks that all is quiet but it is known that rioting has occurred in Yaroslavl.

It is reported by Imbrie from Petrograd that on the 7th the Bolsheviks stormed the headquarters of the Social Revolutionists and after an attack in which field artillery was used succeeded in taking headquarters, the combined casualties numbering hundred.

For two days the Bolsheviks ordered the stoppage of passenger traffic as a defensive measure. Communication now reestablished with Petrograd. Bolsheviks announce English have seized Alexandrovsk. Embassy is being communicated with daily by Consulate General. While quiet has been reestablished in Moscow and the Bolsheviks claim that the prompt suppression of the uprising demonstrates their strength, disaffection among certain troops, the growing resistance of peasantry to the attempted requisition of food, creates critical situation.

Turks have taken Baku. Tsaritsyn is reported in hands of the Cossacks. Soviet troops have abandoned Ufa.

It is reported that Kuhlmann will have to resign before the end of the week.

[POOLE]

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway. The Chargé in Norway, in his telegram of transmittal, No. 924, July 27. adds:

Vice Consul [at Petrograd (Imbrie)] states in letter, dated Petrograd July 12, received here to-day ... that since the above telegram was received by him from Moscow direct communication between the Consulate General and the Embassy had been severed because of the cutting of the wire between Moscow and Vologda and that messages were being transmitted through his office only.

Imbrie further states that at the time of writing Petrograd was surrounded on three sides by Germans and White Guard, their nearest point of approach being Beloostrov. He adds that absolute famine confronts Petrograd and that an epidemic of cholera was raging, there being about five hundred cases a day. About fifteen Americans were left in the city which was quiet. Imbrie states that apparently no means of communication is available from Petrograd ... since the Murman line is also cut.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 12, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received July 26, 4.40 p.m.]

710. It is understood that the negotiations for [at] Kiev between Milyukov² and the German military party (see my No. 707³) are directed towards the establishment of a constitutional monarchy at Moscow or Petrograd to embrace the Ukraine as well as Great Russia. Whatever the precise project finally adopted, success will mean, in addition to the drafts already being made among Russian peasants for labor in Germany, the recruiting of Russian military units under German leadership. A subsequent Allied intervention would involve conflicts with Russian troops on Russian soil; and it is even probable that Russian man power might in time be applied directly on the western front. At the same time so bold a project as that discussed at Kiev will expose Germany to defeat in Russia, if only the Allies can promptly take advantage of the opportunity which the situation will offer them.

While the Cadet leaders in Moscow profess to repudiate Milyukov's action, it must be recognized that, if the Germans appear as the champions of a reunited Russia under a reasonable form of monarchy and vigorously put their project into execution, they will find wide support among the intelligent nationalist elements. During an interview with Smith⁴ last night, General Brusilov said that Alexeev had already acceded to Milyukov's solicitations to join the German party and that he himself as a patriotic Russian, desiring the rehabilitation of the Russian state, would be forced into the same course in the absence immediate Allied intervention in force.

The success of the Germans will depend not so much on their adroitness in utilizing the political opportunism of the educated classes as their ability to satisfy the populace. The suppliants [workmen] having command, who are much less numerous but more aggressive, are moved primarily by the food question. The peasantry are most nearly touched by the distribution of the land. It is possible that the experience of the Germans in the U[kraine] will induce a more vigil [liberal] treatment of the land problem, and the peasants are so disgusted with the disorders of the past year that some tact and moderation may produce temporary calm, even if a fundamental solution is not reached immediately.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Legation in Sweden; garbled versions already received via the Embassy in France, by wireless, July 16 and 21; another came Aug. 12, via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway (File Nos. 861.00/2277, 2316, 2474).

² From March to May 1917 Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs.

³ *Post*, p. 619 [Pg. 619 includes portions of [Doc. 581](#) and [Doc. 582](#)].

¹ Presumably F. Willoughby Smith, Consul at Tiflis, at that time in Moscow.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 13, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received July 26, 4.40 p.m.]

711. The food question is more acute and, in the view of the Consulate General, the success or failure of Germany in Russia, and therefore possibly in the whole war, may depend upon its solution. Without the Siberian grain stores Russia maybe self-supporting after the next harvest. Favorable weather conditions are tending to offset reduced acre plantation. But it is improbable that Germany can appropriate all of Russia's grain to Russia's own use as public opinion in the Central Empires will demand heavy shipments thither. I have conferred on this subject with the representatives of ... [an American corporation] here, and they agree that, as the Russian crop will not suffice for both Germany and Russia, the key to the food situation, which is in turn the key to German success or failure in Russia, is the stored grain of western Siberia. I therefore bring again most earnestly to the Department's attention the pressing need for immediate intervention in Siberia for the purpose supporting the Czecho-Slovaks and the new Siberian government and at the same time withholding Siberian grain from German use. If the new front can be drawn along a line running Harbin [from] Murman Peninsula southeastward [to the] Kama so as to include Vyatka and if possible Vologda, thence southward along the line of the Kama and Volga to Samara, whence operations may later be projected toward the Kuban as far as military considerations may admit, a German enterprise in central Russia of the kind indicated above may be changed from the means of enabling Germany to dominate Europe and the entire Eastern Hemisphere into an attribution [a disadvantage] eventuating in a collapse on the western front. Please refer to my 683¹ regarding the desirableness of having an under-fed German Russia beside a well-fed Allied Russia and to my No. 700² regarding the humanitarian considerations involved.

POOLE

² Sent via the Legation in Sweden; other copies sent via the Embassy in France, by wireless July 24, and via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway August 11 (File Nos. 861.00/2356, 2454).

¹ Dated June 30, [vol. II](#), chap. i.

² Dated July 6, [vol. III](#), chap. iii.

***The Secretary of State to the Consul General at London
(Skinner)***

No. 2676

WASHINGTON, *July 16, 1918.*

SIR: Your despatch No. 6230, dated May 31, 1918,³ enclosing copy of a pamphlet on the Bolshevik revolution written by Maxim Litvinov, Bolshevik representative in Great Britain, has been received.

The pamphlet seems to be an able *ex parte* statement of the Bolshevik viewpoint and is filled with those inaccuracies which would be expected in the circumstances.

In view of the attitude assumed by this Government the Department believes it is advisable that you should have no dealings whatever with Bolshevik representatives in Great Britain.

I am [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:
WILBUR J. CARR

³ *Ante*, p. 547 [Pg. 547 includes portions of [Doc. 533](#) and [Doc. 534](#)].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *July 16, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[*Received August 11, 11.32 a.m.*]

715. In speech before newly elected Central Executive Committee yesterday Lenin said that a request received July 14 from German Government for permission to send one battalion of German soldiers in uniform to guard German Embassy in Moscow was refused in spite of assurances of German Government that occupation in no way intended. He said that Russian masses desire peace but that the Soviet cannot agree to allow any foreign troops to enter Moscow and will resist entry by all military measures.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway (No. 993).

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

Moscow, July 17, 1918.

[Received July 24, 8.35 p.m.]

716. Commissariat for Foreign Affairs officially informed Consulate General last evening that according to a telegram from its representative at Berlin, German request for admission Embassy guard to Moscow, reported in my No. 715, has been withdrawn and Germany will be satisfied with guard furnished by the Soviet government. The Soviet government will notify German Government immediately upon the receipt of any information giving ground to fear further attempts against German representatives.

Article [omission?] explains that three days ago its Berlin representative reported that German Government considered assassination closed incident. It says appears according to further report that Von Riezler (?), German Chargé d'Affaires at Moscow, informed German Foreign Office that guard at the time of assassination was insufficient and possibly maliciously negligent. Fredericks of Foreign Office, in charge *ad interim* pending assumption of office [by] Von Hintze, originated demand for admission of German troops to Moscow, which demand German Government has now decided [not] to sustain.

Subordinate of Commissariat informs Consulate General privately that Soviet government secretly requested recall of Von Riezler on the ground of untruthful report concerning inadequacy of guard.

Soviet government has requisitioned several large buildings adjoining German Embassy and will install troops therein.

To date thirteen well-known members of the left Social Revolutionist Party have been shot but the most prominent including instigators of murder of German Ambassador still at large in hiding. Four of them have just been reelected to the Central Executive Committee of the party.

The Social Revolutionist revolt has miscarried for the time being because the peasantry whom the party represents are an unwieldy mass and the party lacks adequate leadership. However reports from the provinces continue to reveal growing anti-Bolshevik work. The most serious uprising is still in progress at Yaroslavl.

² Sent via the Embassy in France; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, August 9, 1918, 3 p.m.

[Received August 10, 11.22 a.m.]

941. Your 8459, June 27, 2 p.m.¹ In the temporary absence of the Ambassador Mr. Kerensky called on the Counselor of Embassy this morning and expressed a strong desire to go to United States with the object of explaining to the President and chief governmental authorities his ideas as to the present situation in Russia. He asserted with emphasis his feeling that he and the people of Russia had always regarded the United States as occupying a special position with respect to Russia and that he felt that the ideas for which his Provisional Government stood which he claimed were those of the mass of the Russian people were more sympathetically regarded by the United States than by any of the other nations now warring against the Central powers. He made the very broad claim that he represented no party or faction in Russia but that he stood for the whole Russian people and spoke for them. He intimated that the object of his desired visit to the United States was to come into personal contact with persons in authority and that if he can not do so he would prefer not to go there. He claimed that he knew Russia and Russian conditions better than any one else and that he alone could give the information which he felt the United States Government wished to have. He stated that he had not "emigrated" from Russia, that his work was there and that he intended to return there as soon as possible and that for this reason he begged that this request be laid before the Government of the United States by telegraph. He added that he has satisfactorily finished a similar mission in France and that he had been able to accomplish most of what he desired in England.

Mr. Laughlin explained in reply that he did not possess the authority either to grant Mr. Kerensky's request or even to give him an answer but that he would lay the matter before the Secretary of State in Washington and ask for instructions. Mr. Laughlin further explained the real welfare of Russia and a settlement of her difficulties in a manner acceptable to the mass of the Russian people formed the constant preoccupation of the President and that Mr. Kerensky should take as one evidence [of] that the manner in which Mr. Bakhmeteff, the Ambassador appointed under his Provisional Government, was regarded and treated in Washington and that whatever wishes the American Government might express in regard to his suggested visit should be interpreted in the light of the profound

good will felt by the United States for the welfare of the Russian people.

The British Government have not yet been consulted either by the Embassy or by Mr. Kerensky regarding his proposed visit to the United States.

The foregoing is respectfully submitted with a request for instructions.

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¹ *Ante*, p. 567 [*Pg. 567 includes portions of [Doc. 560](#), [Doc. 561](#), and [Doc. 562](#)*].

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *August 10, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[*Received 8 p.m.*]

968. My 941, August 9, 3 p.m. During a conversation the Counselor of Embassy had yesterday with Mr. Balfour on other matters he casually mentioned Kerensky's visit and inquired what British Government officials the latter had seen.

Balfour said that he had declined to see Kerensky but he believed the Prime Minister had seen him privately. Mr. Balfour added that the information he had received led him to believe that any disposition on the part of the officials of the Allied Governments to give ear to Kerensky would not make a good impression in Russia where he was discredited. He further remarked that he hoped the President would not receive Kerensky.

All this, however, was merely conversational and in no sense meant as a communication to you, it is transmitted only as information of some interest.

PAGE

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *August 13, 1918, 3 p.m.*

745. Your 941, August 9, 3 p.m., and 968. August 10, 11 a.m. Department is glad to receive in this country distinguished Russians, but while it appreciates thoroughly Mr. Kerensky's desires to serve Russia, it is thought that his presence in this country at this time would introduce an element into a delicate situation which Mr. Kerensky himself would desire to avoid. The Department is inclined to concur in the views expressed to you informally by Mr. Balfour.

LANSING

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, August 26, 1918.

[Received September 16, 9.42 p.m.]

Disaffection from Bolsheviks continues marked. Among peasants, it is almost complete. But opposition to them within the territory they control is taking even less definite form than heretofore because what really active anti-Bolshevik elements exist seek to pass behind the Allied lines in north or into Czech country. It is difficult to perceive from what quarter any interior revolt against Bolsheviks may come.

From exterior point of view indecisive tone of American declaration, published more or less accurately in Bolshevik press, and leisurely nature of advance from the north tend to bolster Bolsheviks up. At the same time, total lack of success against Czechs and conviction they can not oppose advance from the north, the Letts declining to fight the Allies unless White Guard precede Allied troops, make the Bolsheviks more and more ready to listen to overtures of direct military aid from Germany. It is difficult to determine extent and seriousness of these overtures but German *rapprochement* becomes more clearly defined.

The present general tendency is a practical absorption of Bolshevik territory into German occupied zone. It is probable that by the force of circumstances, whatever character the United States and the other Allies may seek to give their present military activities in Russia, distinct Allied and German zones will soon stand in hostile juxtaposition with the Volga roughly as the dividing line.

It results from this that every effort must be made while there may yet be time to evacuate Allied nationals and functionaries from Bolshevik Russia as from hostile territory. The Czechs must not only be promptly supported from the rear, but a junction effected in the north without further delay. At the same time, the now much exposed Samara flank must be protected and the way prepared for a junction with the British from Baku supported by Dutov, Alexeev and other active elements in the intermediary region as pointed out in previous telegrams. Junction in the north is also indispensable to avert famine in that region this winter.

In Moscow relatively quiet. So-called [Commission against] Counter-Revolution again supporting a veritable reign of terror with many summary and baseless shootings each day. Among the Bolsheviks, saner elements giving way to the

violent and completely irresponsible. In Nizhni Novgorod and other provincial cities similar situation.

Lockhart concurs in foregoing and asks communication to British Foreign Office.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania: a badly garbled version also received, Sept. 9, via the Consulate General at Stockholm (File No. 861.00/2650).

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, *September 5, 1918.*
[Received October 29.]

SIR: I have the honor to furnish herewith, for the information of the Department, a translation of a report on the external relations of the Soviet republic made by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs at a meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. September 2.

It is interesting to recall the circumstances of the departure of the Allied Ambassadors from Vologda in connection with the Commissar's confession in the second paragraph of his report that 300 German soldiers in civil attire were admitted to Moscow to guard the German Embassy. One of the reasons given by the Ambassadors for their refusal to come to Moscow was the reported presence of enemy troops in the city. Acting at Mr. Francis's direction I inquired at the time of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs respecting the truth of these reports and was given the most solemn assurances that they were quite unfounded.

This incident reveals what has always seemed to me the fundamental reason for the failure of all the attempts of the Allies to maintain working relations with the Bolshevik government, namely, complete bad faith on the part of the latter. The impossibility of depending upon the accuracy of any statement of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs and the absence of any assurance that a promise once given would be fulfilled undermined the structure of even our informal relations and foredoomed to failure all attempts at practical cooperation.

I would also invite the Department's attention to the paragraph dealing with Ukrainian relations, which discloses the extent of the German territorial aspirations in south Russia and the Caucasus.

The following passage is so important that I quote it in the body of the despatch:

It must be added that our attitude is entirely different with regard to the American citizens, to whom these measures did not extend, because, although the United States Government was compelled by its Allies to agree to participate in intervention, so far only formally, its decision is not regarded by us as irrevocable. It must also be noted that the policy of Japan is not noted for its solidarity with the other Allied powers, which could be seen from the statements of the Japanese representatives in Russia.

The attempt to separate the United States and Japan from the other Allies and to embroil these two with each other has been a *leitmotiv* of Bolshevik foreign policy

as has been frequently remarked from this office. I trust that I have only been fulfilling the desire of the Department in pursuing the policy laid down by Mr. Summers of counteracting in every way possible the impression of divergence in the councils of the Allies which the Bolsheviki have aimed to give to the Russian public.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

[Enclosure—Translation—Extract]

Report of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) as published in "Izvestia" September 3, 1918

The moment when the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs made its report to the Fifth Congress of the Soviets coincided with the tragic death of Count Mirbach. The fact that this action did not call forth any complications in the relations between Germany and Russia and did not even lead to the breaking off of negotiations of a political and financial nature shows that not only we, but also the Germans, wish most seriously to maintain friendly relations. This tendency of the German policy, combined with the firm decision of the majority of the Russian laborers to maintain peace, assisted us to overcome the numerous difficulties in the relations between the two parties.

After the murder of Mirbach the German Government wished to introduce a battalion of German soldiers into Moscow to guard the German Embassy. When we refused the Germans were content to introduce 300 German soldiers into the building of the Embassy without uniform. They also demanded that several houses in the vicinity should be evacuated and occupied by guard of Russian soldiers, numbering 1,000 men. This proved of the greatest difficulty as it was impossible to find suitable accommodation for the people who were to be evacuated. At the same time the Embassy was always informing us that they had news of attempts which were being prepared against them. There was a mysterious attack on the fence of the garden once during the night. By special wish of the counselor of the Embassy, Dr. Riezler, the new German Ambassador was met at Kuntsevo and brought to Moscow by automobile. Dr. Riezler wished the fact to be known only to the members of the Council of People's Commissars. During his ten days' stay in Moscow Helfferich was almost entirely shut up in his house, until he was called to take part in the conference at Berlin, after which the Embassy left for Pskov via Petrograd and finally settled in Revel. The Embassy stated that it had left so as to avoid any complications which might have arisen if another attack had been made on the Embassy or the Ambassador. The Germans were also continually protesting against the fact that Russia had not sufficiently punished the persons guilty of Mirbach's death. The Germans also imagined that the Moscow government was supporting the strike of the railroad men in the Ukraine. The Germans also protested against the agitation among German

prisoners of war in which official Soviet workers often took part. Lenin's open letter to the American workmen was also supposed to have had a bad influence on the Germans as he speaks of the German imperialism as the "robbers" imperialism. These accusations are generally brought under point 2 of the Brest treaty which prohibits each of the parties to agitate among the people of the other party. In reality we do keep to this point and if any organ of the Soviet authority violates this rule we take measures against it. We have taken strong measures against the assassins of Mirbach. We consider it impossible to officially support the Ukrainian strike which is against the German Government. Yet certainly we could not prohibit private persons to collect for the strikers or for them to spread revolutionary ideas. Some of the German demands surpass anything that the Peasant-Workman Russia can do. Misunderstanding can arise by reason of the different form of the two governments. The wish of both parties to live in peace, notwithstanding all misunderstandings, cannot be more clearly expressed than in the fact that negotiations regarding the agreement continued and terminated on August 27, when three treaties were signed.

Even the numerous incidents on the frontier have not changed the will of both countries. About the time of Mirbach's murder a detachment of German cyclists was captured at Vederin by Red Guards, yet the left Social Revolutionists captured and killed them all. The Social Revolutionary Party has organized several incidents. Disturbances took place in Orsha not long ago and Helfferich was obliged to wait until all was quiet once again. Incidents on the line of demarcation often lead to serious repressions on the part of the Germans. Violations of the line of demarcation were very frequent both from the side of the Germans and also from the side of the Ukrainians. On August 4, the Germans fired at the villages near Rylysk. The violation was especially noticeable after harvest. The Germans often advanced to requisition cattle and grain. Recently there have been cases when Germans have crossed the line of demarcation and occupied villages. A squadron of cavalry of Von der Goltz occupied a village to the west of Evstratovki. The life on the line is in constant danger, as the Germans often advance. In some places they take seven eighths of the harvest.

It must be noticed that since the Brest treaty was signed the Germans have advanced considerably to the east in many points. For settling these conflicts it was decided to establish special commissions consisting of representatives of Russia and Germany. In this way it will be possible to settle all misunderstandings arising on the spot.

Serious friction arose between us and the Germans in the Baltic Sea, where the Germans accused us of laying new mines and where they were prepared to remove them even in the interior waters of the Finnish Gulf to a point of three miles from our shore. The arrival of the German ship *Anna Hugo Stinnes* in Petrograd loaded with coal and its return loaded with our goods establishes the exchange of commodities between the two countries, which is the best guarantee of peaceful relations. The German Government was seriously displeased by our decree of July

15, which made it rather difficult for persons living in territory now occupied by the Germans to change their citizenship. A special agreement will be made with Germany in this matter.

The Turkish Army has lately been advancing on our territory. Notwithstanding the frequent promises of the German Government the Turkish Army has now advanced to Baku, which fact led to the temporary victory of the *lourgeoisie* and compromisers. With the ignorant sailors of the Caspian Sea they treacherously called the English to Baku. However, they [the English] will not be able to defend Baku from the advance of the Turks if our negotiations with Germany will not lead to the retreat of the latter army. We shall send troops to Baku to drive out the English as well as the Turks.

Notwithstanding the friction of the Germans with our Government we were able to attain some agreement, but the Ukrainian-German government continues to propose impossible conditions. Negotiations are continuing as the Ukraine demands great territories to be surrendered. The so-called political frontier, which Germany demands for the Ukraine, passes by Kursk not far from Voronezh and encloses a large part of the Donets Basin, leaving us a territory of 12 per cent of the production of the basin. At the same time negotiations are taking place in Kiev between numerous representatives of People's Commissariats and various supply and purchase committees regarding a goods exchange. The chief difficulties are the outward obstacles which do not permit the Ukraine to give us grain for textiles of which she is in great need. The final obstacle for any sort of political agreement lies in the fact that the Hetman government entered into negotiations with the so-called Don government of Krasnov and refused to establish the eastern frontier of the Ukraine where it borders, with the Don region.

Negotiations with the Finnish government in Berlin have temporarily stopped. Finnish representatives demanded the entire coast from the Norwegian frontier, including Kola and Solovka to Alexandrovsk, then along the railroad to Lake Onega, along the lake to Lake Ladoga and further to the present frontier. Against evident facts the Finnish representatives insist that a state of war exists between Russia and Finland, drawing corresponding conclusions for retaining military booty. As result they demanded that all Russian military ships captured by Finland should be given to her gratis as well as all Russian military property. Finland likewise demanded that all the government property of Russia should be given to Finland gratis, excluding telegraph and telephone wires and land bought for money. The representatives also demanded that all obligations of Finland to Russia should be annulled, not only government debts, to which point we agreed, but that we should pay part of their military expenses, indemnification of losses caused by Russian troops after Finland's independence was recognized. At the same time they refuse to pay losses of the Russian Government. As the Finns consider that there has been a state of war with Russia we attempted to agree on several points temporarily: establishment of a demarcation line, protection of private and property rights of citizens, to recognize in principle the rights of

private persons to receive recompense for their losses. We proposed that these matters should be discussed by a commission formed of Russian and Finnish representatives, as well as the establishment of consulates, renewal of direct telegraph, postal, railroad and water communication and protection of trade. No answer was received for several days to our proposal and it was decided to postpone the work of the conference.

All the numerous above-mentioned causes of friction between Russia and Germany have not altered the tendency in principle to live in peace, and during negotiations regarding new agreements Germany was prepared to make some concessions. Parallel to this our relations with the Allies became worse. The successes of the Czechs, who acted under the protection of the Allies, as their political weapon against the Soviet, gave them the idea that the moment for liquidating the Soviet authority in Russia had arrived and that they would be able to form a pro-English *bourgeois* government, abolish the annulment of the loans and our other revolutionary legislation and form a new eastern front against Germany. The enormous Anglo-French counter-revolutionary intrigue, with its numerous branches and large sums of money, which was revealed to a certain extent by documents obtained, changed into an open attack for which preparation had been made in secret for a long period of time. Simultaneously with the murder of Mirbach, as though by signal, the following facts took place: The treason of Muraviev, bought by England and undoubtedly connected with an Anglo-French conspiracy, the White Guard rising in Yaroslavl and the rising in various points of the line of demarcation. The increase of underground work of the Anglo-French agents forced us to demand the departure of the Ambassadors from Vologda where a new "Yaroslavl" was being prepared. The news of the intended English expedition on the Murman forced us to demand some time before the withdrawal of the Allied military vessels; after the Anglo-French descent we made firm protests against this act of violence; we once more made a decided declaration that we considered the Kerensky convention regarding the compulsory service of Russian citizens in the English army invalid, and once more stated the criminality of Russian citizens' serving in the French army; at the further advance of the Anglo-French, we issued an appeal to the toiling masses of England, France, America, Italy and Japan and we have already information that parts of it have filtered through to England and France. We are now issuing English and French literature which is intended to be distributed for the purpose of agitation among the soldiers of those countries who are advancing into our territory. The acts of violence of England and France and the discovery of their underhand intrigues and extensive counter-revolutionary plots have caused the internment of English and French citizens. At present negotiations are being carried on with regard to the departure of the Allied diplomats in exchange for Comrade Litvinov and other Soviet officials, and the departure of their military men in exchange for the return of our soldiers from France, which should take place under the control of the International Red Cross and three members of the Russian Red Cross, cessation of measures of reprisal on both sides, including the region of Czecho-Slovak

occupation, and the permission for the citizens of both countries to return home, including Russian citizens serving in the British Army. It must be added that our attitude is entirely different with regard to the American citizens, to whom these measures did not extend, because, although the United States Government was compelled by its Allies to agree to participate in intervention, so far only formally, its decision is not regarded by us as irrevocable. It must also be noted that the policy of Japan is not noted for its solidarity with the other Allied powers, which could be seen from the statements of the Japanese representatives in Russia.

On the whole, in spite of the great difference between the political organization of Russia and Germany and the fundamental tendencies of both governments, the peaceful relations between the two peoples, which has always been the object of our workmen and peasants' state, is at present equally desirable to the German ruling circles. The close alliance between Russian and English capital, which rapidly developed in the few years preceding the war, is the reason for the present predominance of English orientation among the Russian *bourgeoisie*. The interests of the struggle against Germany, whom Anglo-French imperialism wants to compel to withdraw part of her forces from the west front by the establishment of a new eastern front, and the interests of the struggle against a class opponent who has been able to find expression in Soviet Russia, both demand intervention in Russia on the part of Anglo-French imperialism and the strangling of the Russian revolution. In turning our front against advancing Anglo-French imperialism, we declare, however, that the toiling masses of Russia are striving towards the maintenance of peace with all people and that we are ready at any moment to establish peaceful relations with the Allied people. Precisely in the interests of peaceful relations with Germany, did we sign those agreements which are to-day submitted to the Central Executive Committee for ratification.

Chapter XI. The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic

[\[579\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, August 20, 1918. [Received September 26.]

File No. 861.00/2817

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

No. 9

MOSCOW, *August 20, 1918.*
[Received September 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith four copies of a translation of the constitution of the Russian Socialistic Federated Republic of Soviets, as it appeared in the official Bolshevik journal, the *Izvestia*, of July 19, 1918.¹

I have [etc.]

DEW. C. POOLE, Jr.

[Enclosure—Translation]

CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC²

SECTION I.—DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE LABORING AND EXPLOITED PEOPLE

Chapter I

1. Russia is proclaimed a Republic of the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies. All the central and local authority is in the hands of these Soviets.
2. The Russian Soviet Republic is constituted on the basis of the free union of free nations, as a federation of national Soviet republics.

Chapter II

3. Setting as its main object the destruction of every kind of exploitation of one man by another, the abolishment of class distinction, the merciless suppression of exploiters, the establishment of a socialistic organization of society and the victory of socialism in all countries, the III All-Russia Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, further decrees:

- (a) In order to realize socialization of land, private holding of land is abolished and the entire agrarian fund is declared national property and is given over to the laboring people without redemption on the basis of equal use.
- (b) All woods, minerals and waters of a general state significance as well as all live and immovable stock, model farms and agricultural institutions are declared national property.
- (c) The Soviet law regarding labor control and a Supreme Council for National Economy is confirmed as the first step towards the entire transfer of works,

mills, mines, railways and other means of production and transport into the possession of the Workmen's and Peasants' Republic of Soviets, for the purpose of insuring the authority of the working people over the exploiters.

- (d) The III Congress of Soviets regards the Soviet law of annulment of loans made by the government of the Tsar, landowners and *bourgeoisie*, as the first blow to international banking and financial capital, and expresses the certainty that the Soviet authority will firmly follow this course until the absolute victory of the international workmen's rebellion against the yoke of capital.
- (e) The transfer of all banks into the possession of the Workmen's and Peasants' Republic is confirmed as one of the conditions towards the liberation of the working masses from the yoke of capital.
- (f) In order to destroy the parasite elements of society and to organize the economy of the country, compulsory labor service is introduced.
- (g) In the interest of insuring authority for the working class and to remove every possibility of the reestablishment of the authority of exploiters, the arming of the laboring class, the formation of a socialistic Red Army of workmen and peasants and the complete disarmament of the propertied classes are decreed.

Chapter III

4. Expressing its firm decision to wrench mankind from the clutches of capitalism and imperialism which, in this most criminal war, have drenched the world in blood, the III Congress of Soviets joins the Soviet authority in the policy it is carrying out with regard to the breaking off of secret agreements, the organization of the widest fraternization with the workmen and peasants of the armies at war, and the achievement of democratic peace through revolutionary measures without annexations and contributions on the basis of the self-determination of nations.

5. For the same purpose the III Congress of Soviets insists on the absolute breaking off of the barbaric policy of *bourgeois* civilization, which builds up the well-being of exploiters in a few chosen nations on the enslavement of hundreds of millions of the working population of Asia, the colonies in general and of small countries.

6. The III Congress of Soviets welcomes the policy of the Council of People's Commissars, which has proclaimed the absolute independence of Finland, has commenced the withdrawal of troops from Persia and given Armenia the right to self-determination.

Chapter IV

7. The III Congress of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies considers that at this moment of decisive struggle of the proletariat against its exploiters, there can be no place for the exploiters in any of the organs of government. Authority must belong entirely and exclusively to the working masses and their plenipotentiary representatives, the Soviets of Workmen's, Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

8. At the same time, striving towards the establishment of a really free and voluntary union, therefore a fuller and more stable one, of the working classes of all the nationalities of Russia, the III Congress of Soviets limits itself to the establishment of the fundamental points of the federation of the Soviet republics of Russia, allowing the workmen and peasants of each nationality to decide themselves at their Soviet Congress if they desire to take part in the federal government and in other federal Soviet institutions and on what conditions.

SECTION II.—GENERAL STATUTES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST
FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC

Chapter V

9. The essential object of the Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, at the present transitory stage, consists in the establishment of the dictatorship of the town and village proletariat and the poorest peasants in the form of a powerful All-Russia Soviet authority for the purpose of crushing the *bourgeoisie*, destroying the exploitation of one man by another and the establishment of socialism which will admit of no class distinction and no monarchical power.

10. The Russian Republic is a free socialistic community of all the working people of Russia. All the authority within the bounds of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic belongs to all the working inhabitants of the country, who are united in the town and village Soviets.

11. The Soviets of provinces where there is a different mode of life and which are composed of different nationalities, may unite into autonomous provincial unions with the provincial congress of Soviets and their executive organs at the head.

These autonomous provincial unions belong to the federation of the Russian Socialist Federated Republic of Soviets.

12. The supreme authority in the Russian Socialist Federated Republic of Soviets belongs to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and during the period between the Congresses to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

13. For the purpose of insuring real freedom of conscience to the laboring people, the church is separated from the state and the schools from the church, and all citizens are permitted the liberty of religious or antireligious propaganda.

14. For the purpose of insuring real freedom of opinion to the laboring people, the R.S.F.S. Republic abolishes the dependence of the press on capital and gives the workpeople and the poorer peasants all the technical and material means for the publication of newspapers, pamphlets, books and all other printed matter, and guarantees their free circulation in the whole country.

15. For the purpose of insuring real freedom of meetings to the laboring people, the R.S.F.S. Republic, recognizing the right of citizens of the Soviet Republic to organize meetings, processions, etc., places at the disposal of the workpeople and

poorer peasants all premises suitable for the arrangement of meetings, with light and heat.

16. To insure real freedom of unions, the R.S.F.S. Republic, having broken down the economic and political authority of the propertied classes and having thereby removed all obstacles which until now prevented the workmen and peasants from enjoying freedom of organization and action in *bourgeois* society, will offer the workmen and poorest peasants every support for their organization and union.

17. For the purpose of making knowledge accessible to the working class, the R.S.F.S. Republic will make it possible for the workmen and poorest peasants to have a free general complete education.

18. The R.S.F.S. Republic considers work the duty of all citizens of the republic and proclaims its motto: "He who does not work, does not eat!"

19. For the purpose of defending the conquests of the great workmen's and peasants' revolution, the R.S.F.S. Republic considers the defense of the socialist fatherland to be the duty of all citizens of the republic and introduces general compulsory military service. The honorable right of defending the revolution is only given to the working class, the non-working elements being charged with different military duties.

20. Basing itself on the solidarity of the working classes of all nations, the R.S.F.S. Republic gives all the political rights of Russian citizens to foreigners residing on the territory of the Russian Republic who belong to the working class or are peasants not employing hired labor, and authorizes the local Soviets to give the right of Russian citizenship to all such foreigners without any formalities.

21. The R.S.F.S. Republic gives the right of sanctuary to all foreigners who are subject to persecution for political or religious crimes.

22. The R.S.F.S. Republic recognizing the equal rights of citizens regardless of their race and nationality declares all privileges and advantages on this basis, as well as all oppression and limitation of the rights of smaller nationalities, contradictory to the fundamental laws of the Republic.

23. Being guided by the interests of the working class as a whole, the R.S.F.S. Republic deprives different persons and groups of rights which they make use of in detriment to the interests of the socialist revolution.

SECTION III.—CONSTRUCTION OF SOVIET AUTHORITY

A. ORGANIZATION OF CENTRAL AUTHORITY

Chapter VI.—Regarding the All-Russia Congress of the Soviets of Workmen's, Peasants', Cossack and Red Army Deputies

24. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is the supreme authority of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

25. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is composed of the representatives of the

town Soviets, one deputy for every 25,000 electors, and representatives of the *guberniya* congresses of Soviets, one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants.

Remark 1: In case the *guberniya* congress of Soviets does not precede the All-Russia Congress, the delegates for the latter are sent directly by the *uezd* congresses.

Remark 2: In case the provincial congress of Soviets immediately precedes the All-Russia Congress, the delegates for the latter may be sent by the provincial congress.

26. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets is convoked by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee not less seldom than twice a year.

27. The Extraordinary All-Russia Congress is convoked by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on its own initiative or it the demand of Soviets of a territory comprising not less than one-third, of the whole population of the Republic.

28. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets elects not more than 200 persons to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

29. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee is entirely responsible to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets.

30. During the period between the Congresses the supreme authority of the Republic belongs to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Chapter VII.—Regarding the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

31. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee is the supreme legislative, executive and controlling organ of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

32. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee directs the work of the workmen's and peasants' government and of all the organs of government of the Soviet authority in the country, unites and coordinates the legislative and administrative work and supervises the carrying out of the Soviet constitution and the decisions of the All-Russia Congresses of Soviets and of the central organs of Soviet authority.

33. The Central Executive Committee examines and approves projects of decrees or other propositions introduced by the Council of People's Commissars or by different departments, and also issues its own decrees and regulations.

34. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee convokes the All-Russia Congress of Soviets to which it gives an account of its activity and presents reports on the general policy and on different questions.

35. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee forms the Council of People's Commissars for the general administration of the affairs of the R.S.F.S. Republic and departments for the administration of different branches of government (the

People's Commissariats).

36. The members of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee work in the People's Commissariats or carry out special commissions of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Chapter VIII.—Regarding the Council of People's Commissars

37. The Council of People's Commissars has the general management of the affairs of the R.S.F.S. Republic.

38. For this purpose the Council of People's Commissars issues decrees, orders, instructions and in general takes all measures necessary to the regular and quick course of state life.

39. The Council of People's Commissars immediately informs the All-Russia Central Executive Committee of all its orders and decisions.

40. The All-Russia Central Executive Committee has the right to abolish or to veto any order or decision of the Council of People's Commissars.

41. All orders and decisions of the Council of People's Commissars having an important general political significance are submitted for examination and approval to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Remark: Measures requiring immediate execution may be carried out directly by the Council of People's Commissars.

42. Members of the Council of People's Commissars are at the head of the different People's Commissariats.

43. There are eighteen People's Commissariats, viz.:

- (a) For Foreign Affairs;
- (b) For Military Affairs;
- (c) For Naval Affairs;
- (d) For Home Affairs;
- (e) For Justice;
- (f) For Labor;
- (g) For Social Insurance;
- (h) For Education;
- (i) For Post and Telegraph;
- (j) For Nationalities;
- (k) For Finance;
- (l) For Ways of Communication;
- (m) For Agriculture;
- (n) For Trade and Industry;
- (o) For National Food Supply;
- (p) For State Control;
- (q) The Supreme Council of National Economy;

(r) For Health.

44. Under the presidency of each People's Commissariat a college is formed, the members of which are approved by the Council of People's Commissars.

45. The People's Commissar has the right to make independent decisions on all questions which are subject to the administration of his Commissariat, bringing this to the knowledge of the college. In case of the college's disagreeing with any of the decisions of the People's Commissar, it may lodge a complaint with the Council of People's Commissars or with the presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee without placing a veto on the decision. The separate members of the college have the same right of lodging complaints.

46. The Council of People's Commissars is entirely responsible to the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

47. The People's Commissars and the colleges in connection with the commissariats are entirely responsible to the Council of People's Commissars and to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

48. The title of People's Commissar belongs exclusively to members of the Council of People's Commissars, which is in charge of the general management of the affairs of the R.S.F.S. Republic, and cannot be adopted by any other central or local representatives of Soviet authority.

Chapter IX.—Regarding matters under the jurisdiction of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

49. All questions of a general state significance are under the jurisdiction of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, viz.:

- (a) The approval, alteration, and addition to the Constitution of the R.S.F.S. Republic;
- (b) General direction of the foreign and home policy of the R.S.F.S. Republic;
- (c) The determination and alteration of the frontier line as well as the alienation of parts of the territory of the R.S.F.S. Republic or of the rights belonging to it;
- (d) Fixing the limits and the competency of the Soviet provincial unions which compose the R.S.F.S. Republic, and settling disputes between them;
- (e) Accepting new members into the R.S.F.S. Republic and recognizing the right of different members to leave the Russian Federation;
- (f) General administrative division of the territory of the R.S.F.S. Republic and the confirmation of the provincial unions;
- (g) The establishment and change of the systems of weights, measures and currency, within the territory of the R.S.F.S. Republic.
- (h) Communications with foreign states, declaration of war, and conclusion of peace;
- (i) Making loans, concluding tariff and trade treaties as well as financial

agreements;

- (j) Establishment of the basis and the general plan of the whole national economy and its different branches on the territory of the R.S.F.S. Republic;
- (k) Confirmation of the budget of the R.S.F.S. Republic;
- (l) Fixing of state rates and taxes;
- (m) Establishment of the basis for the organization of the armed forces of the R.S.F.S. Republic;
- (n) General state legislation, judiciary system and law proceedings, criminal and civil legislation, etc.;
- (o) Appointment and dismissal both of separate members of the Council of People's Commissars as well as of the entire Council of People's Commissars, and also the approval of the Chairman of the Council;
- (p) The issue of general regulations regarding the acquirement and the forfeiting of the right of Russian citizenship and the rights of foreigners on the territory of the republic;
- (q) The right of granting general or partial amnesty.

50. Besides the above-enumerated questions, all such as the All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee consider subject to their decision, are within the jurisdiction.

51. The following are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets:

- (a) The establishment, addition to, and alteration of the basis of the Soviet Constitution;
- (b) Ratification of peace treaties.

52. Decision of questions pointed out in points *c* and *h* of Article 1, are only within the competence of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee in case the convocation of the All-Russia Congress of Soviets is impossible.

B. ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL AUTHORITY

Chapter X.—Regarding the Soviet congresses

53. Soviet congresses are formed as follows:

- (a) Provincial Soviet congresses are formed of representatives of town Soviets and *uezd* congresses, reckoning 1 deputy for every 25,000 inhabitants, and from the towns 1 deputy for every 5,000 electors, but not more than 500 delegates for the whole province, or of representatives of *guberniya* Soviet congresses, who are elected in the same way, in case this congress should immediately precede the provincial congress.
- (b) *Guberniya* Soviet congresses are formed of the representatives of town Soviet and *volost* Soviet congresses reckoning at the rate of 1 deputy for every 10,000 inhabitants, but from the towns at the rate of 1 deputy for every 2,000 electors,

but not more than 300 deputies for the whole *guberniya*, and in case the *uezd* congress of Soviets immediately precedes the *guberniya* congress, the elections take place exactly in the same way by the *uezd* congress and not by the *volost* congress.

(c) *Uezd* Soviet congresses are formed of the representatives of village Soviets, reckoning 1 deputy for every 1,000 inhabitants, but not more than 300 deputies for the whole *uezd*.

(d) *Volost* Soviet congresses are formed of representatives of all village Soviets of the *volost*, reckoning 1 deputy for every 10 members of the Soviet.

Remark 1: At *uezd* congresses representatives of town Soviets take part where the population does not exceed 10,000 people; village Soviets of districts with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants unite in electing deputies for the *uezd* congress.

Remark 2: Village Soviets having fewer than 10 members each send one representative to the *volost* congress.

54. Soviet congresses are convoked by the executive organs of Soviet authority of the district (the executive committees) either at their own initiative or at the demand of Soviets of districts which number not less than one-third of the whole population of the given district; Soviet congresses of the province are convoked at least twice a year, *guberniya* and *uezd* congresses once in three months and *volost* congresses once a month.

55. The congress of Soviets (provincial, *guberniya*, *uezd*, *volost*) elects its executive organ—the Executive Committee, the number of whose members should not exceed: (a) From the province and *guberniya*, 25; (b) from the *uezd*, 20; (c) from the *volost*, 10. The Executive Committee is entirely responsible to the congress of Soviets by which it has been elected.

56. Within the bounds of its jurisdiction, the congress of Soviets is the supreme authority of the district; during the interim of congresses this authority is represented by the Executive Committee.

Chapter XI.—Regarding the Soviets of Deputies

57. Soviets of Deputies are formed in the following places:

(a) In towns: reckoning 1 deputy for every 1,000 inhabitants, but not fewer than 50 nor more than 1,000 members.

(b) In villages (Cossack villages, hamlets, Caucasian villages, towns having a population of less than 10,000 people): reckoning 1 deputy for every 100 inhabitants, but not fewer than 3 and not more than 50 deputies for each village.

The term of office of the deputies is three months.

Remark: In those village districts where it will be considered possible, the questions of administration will be directly decided by a general meeting of the electors of the given village.

58. For current affairs the Soviet of Deputies elects from its members an executive organ (the Executive Committee) numbering not more than 5 persons in villages, and in towns at the rate of 1 for every 50 members, but not fewer than 3 and not more than 15 (Moscow and Petersburg not more than 40). The Executive Committee is entirely responsible to the Soviet it has been chosen by.

59. The Soviet of Deputies is convoked by the Executive Committee either at its own initiative or at the demand of not less than one half of the members of the Soviet, but not rarer than once a week in towns and twice a week in villages.

60. Within the bounds of its jurisdiction, the Soviet is the supreme authority of the district, and in cases provided by paragraph 57 (remark) this authority is represented by the general meeting of electors.

Chapter XII.—Regarding the local jurisdiction of Soviet authority

61. The provincial, *guberniya*, *uezd* and *volost* organs of Soviet authority and also Soviets of Deputies have the following as the object of their activity:

- (a) The execution of all regulations of the corresponding supreme organs of Soviet authority;
- (b) Taking all measures for the improvement of the given territory in a cultural and economic respect;
- (c) Decision of all questions having a purely local significance (for the given territory);
- (d) Uniting all Soviet activity within the bounds of the given territory.

62. The congresses of Soviets and their executive committees have the right of controlling the actions of the local Soviets (i. e., provincial congresses have the right of controlling all the Soviets of the given province, the *guberniya* congresses the actions of the *guberniya* Soviets, with the exception of town Soviets which do not compose part of the *uezd* congresses, etc.); the provincial and *guberniya* congresses and their executive committees, besides this, have the right of abolishing the decisions of the Soviets of their district, notifying the central Soviet authority of this in the most important cases.

63. In order to carry out the duties imposed on the organs of Soviet authority, corresponding divisions with chiefs in charge of each division are formed in connection with the Soviets (town and village) and the executive committees (of provinces, *guberniyas*, *uezds* and *volosts*).

SECTION IV.—ACTIVE AND PASSIVE ELECTIVE FRANCHISE

Chapter XIII

64. The right of electing and being elected into the Soviets is enjoyed by the following citizens of both sexes of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic, irrespective of their religion, nationality, place of domicile, etc., who have attained the age of 18 by the day of the election:

- (a) All persons obtaining their means of livelihood by productive and publicly beneficial labor, as well as those persons engaged in domestic economy which affords the former the possibility of productive labor; for instance, workmen and employees of all categories, engaged in industry, trade, agriculture, etc., peasants and Cossack peasants, who do not engage hired labor for the sake of profit;
 - (b) Soldiers of the Soviet army and navy;
 - (c) Citizens belonging to categories enumerated in points (a) and (b) of Article 64, who have in any way lost their capacity for work.
- Remark 1: Local Soviets may lower the present age limit with the approval of the central authority.
- Remark 2: Out of the number of persons who are not Russian citizens, those also enjoy the active and passive elective right who are indicated in Article 20. (Section II, Chapter V.)

65. The following persons have not the right to elect or to be elected, even if they should belong to one of the above-enumerated categories:

- (a) Persons employing hired labor for the purpose of gaining profits;
- (b) Persons living on unearned income such as interest from capital, revenue from enterprises, income from property, etc.;
- (c) Private traders, trade and commercial agents;
- (d) Monks and ecclesiastical servants of churches and religious cults;
- (e) Employees and agents of the former police, special *gendarme* corps and the secret police as well as members of the former reigning house of Russia;
- (f) Persons rightfully recognized as mad, as well as persons under guardianship;
- (g) Persons sentenced for covetous and defamatory crimes for the term fixed by law or the verdict of the court.

Chapter XIV.—Regarding elections

66. Elections take place according to an established order on days appointed by the local Soviets.

67. Elections take place in the presence of the election commission and a representative of the local Soviet.

68. In cases when the presence of the representative of Soviet authority is technically impossible, he is replaced by the president of the election commission, and in case of his absence by the president of the election meeting.

69. A report on the course and result of elections is drawn up which is signed by members of the election commission and the Soviet representative.

70. The exact order of election procedure, as well as the participation of professional and other labor organizations, is determined by the local Soviets in accordance with instructions from the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.

Chapter XV.—Regarding control and abolishment of elections and the recalling of deputies

- 71. All records in connection with elections are sent in to the appropriate Soviet.
- 72. To verify elections the Soviet appoints a mandate commission.
- 73. The mandate commission informs the Soviet of the result of the verification.
- 74. The Soviet decides the question of the approval of disputed candidates.
- 75. In case of any candidate's not being approved, the Soviet appoints new elections.
- 76. In case the whole election has been incorrectly carried out, the question of annulling the election is decided by the highest organ of Soviet authority.
- 77. The last resort for cassation of Soviet elections is the All-Russia Central Executive Committee.
- 78. Electors who have sent a deputy to the Soviet have the right to recall him at any time and to have a reelection, in accordance with general regulations.

SECTION V.—BUDGET LAW

Chapter XVI

79. The financial policy of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic in its present transitory stage of the dictatorship of the laboring classes, furthers the fundamental aim of expropriating the *bourgeoisie* and preparing conditions for the general equality of citizens of the republic in the sphere of production and distribution of wealth.

For this purpose it places at the disposal of the organs of Soviet authority all the necessary means for satisfying the local and general state demands of the Soviet Republic, not stopping before the violation of the right of private property.

80. The state revenue and expenditure of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic are united in the general state budget.

81. The All-Russia Congress of Soviets or the All-Russia Central Executive Committee determines what taxes and income shall be paid into the general state budget, and what shall be paid into the local Soviets, at the same time fixing the limits of taxation.

82. The Soviets impose rates and taxes exclusively for the requirements of local economy. General state requirements are paid from the funds issued by the state exchequer.

83. No sum can be expended out of the funds of the state budget without its being entered in the government roll of revenue and expenditure or by special regulation of central authority.

84. To satisfy the requirements having a general state significance, the

appropriate People's Commissariats vote the necessary credits from the state exchequer which are placed at the disposal of the local Soviets.

85. All credits allotted out of the state exchequer for the Soviets, as well as credits approved for local needs, must be expended for their direct purpose and cannot be used for satisfying any other requirements without a special regulation of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

86. Local Soviets draw up half yearly and yearly estimates of their revenue and expenditure for local needs. The estimates of village and *volost* Soviets and Soviets of towns, which take part in *uezd* congresses, as well as the estimates of *uezd* organs of Soviet authority, are correspondingly approved by the *guberniya* and provincial congresses or their executive committees; the estimates of town, *guberniya* and provincial organs of Soviet authority are approved by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

87. For expenses not provided for by the estimates, or in cases when the estimates have been drawn up for an insufficient sum, the Soviets ask for additional credit from the appropriate People's Commissariats.

88. In case of the insufficiency of local means for satisfying local requirements, the necessary subsidies and loans out of the funds of the state exchequer for covering the immediate expenses are granted to the local Soviets by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars.

SECTION VI.—THE COAT OF ARMS AND THE FLAG OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATED SOVIET REPUBLIC

Chapter XVII

89. The coat of arms of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic consists of a golden sickle and hammer, the handles crossed and pointing downward, on a red background in rays of sunlight, surrounded by a wreath of wheat ears and bearing the inscription:

- (a) The Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic,
- (b) Proletariat of all countries, unite.

90. The commercial, naval and military flag of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic consists of a red flag with the letters R. S. F. S. R. in the top left-hand corner near the flagstaff, or bearing the inscription, Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic.

President of the V All-Russia Congress of Soviets and the All-Russia Central Executive Committee:

Y. SVERDLOV

Members of the Presidium of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee:

T. E. TEODOROVICH

F. A. ROZIN
A. P. ROSENGOLTZ
A. H. MITROFANOV
K. G. MAXIMOV
Secretary of the All-Russia Central Executive Committee:
V. A. AVANESOV

¹ The constitution was adopted July 10, 1918; a later constitution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was adopted July 6, 1923.

² The translation has been left substantially in the form in which it was received. A few brief omitted passages have been supplied and a few verbal corrections made upon comparison with the Russian text issued July 19, 1918, as No. 151, "Izvestii Vseros. Tsentr. Ispoln. Komiteta" (Izdatelstvo Vseros-siiskago Tsentralkago Ispolnitelnago Komiteta Sovetov R.,S.,K. i K. Deputatov, Moscow), and the translation published by the Department of Foreign Political Literature of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.

Chapter XII. The Russo-German Supplementary Treaties, August 27, 1918

[\[580\] The Ambassador in Great Britain \(Page\) to the Secretary of State](#)

London, September 27, 1918. [Received October 15.

File No. 861.00/2958

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

No. 9969

LONDON, *September 27, 1918.*
[Received October 15.]

SIR: With reference to the instructions set forth in the Department's telegram No. 1403 of September 16, 5 p.m.,¹ I have the honor to transmit, herewith enclosed, four copies of the *Enemy Press Supplement to the Daily Review of the Foreign Press*, of September 19, 1918, issued by the General Staff, War Office.²

I venture to add that on pages 594–600, inclusive, of this publication there is given the wording of the Russo-German supplementary treaties, as translated from the texts which were printed in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* of September 7, 1918.

I have [etc.]

For the Ambassador:
IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure—Translation]

Text of the Russo-German Supplementary Treaties³

SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY TO THE TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN RUSSIA
AND THE CENTRAL POWERS

Guided by the wish to solve certain political questions which have arisen in connection with the peace treaty of March 3/7, 1918, between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey, for the one part, and Russia for the other part, in the spirit of friendly understanding and mutual conciliation, and, in so doing, to promote the restoration of good and confidential relations between the two Empires, for which a way was paved by the conclusion of peace, the German Imperial Government and the government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic have agreed to conclude a supplementary treaty to the peace treaty with this object, and have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

For the Imperial German Government:

The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and Imperial Privy Councillor, Rear Admiral Paul v. Hintze, and the Director in the Foreign Office, Imperial Privy Councillor Dr. Johannes Kriege.

For the government of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic:
Its diplomatic representative accredited to the German Imperial Government, M.
Adolf Joffe.

After handing their credentials to one another, and these being found in correct and proper form, the plenipotentiaries agreed to the following provisions:

PART I.—DEMARCATIONS AND FRONTIER COMMISSIONS

ARTICLE 1

In so far as this has not yet been done, German-Russian commissions will immediately be formed to fix the demarcation lines for all fronts where German and Russian troops face one another. Exact details as to this shall be agreed on by the commanders of the troops on each side. These demarcation lines shall be so drawn that there are neutral zones between the respective fronts, which zones must not be trodden by any members of the respective armies, with the exception of *parlementaires*. In so far as there is not regular traffic between the respective fronts, such traffic will be established by the demarcation commissions.

ARTICLE 2

The German-Russian Commission for fixing the frontier line, provided for in Article 3, paragraph 1, of the peace treaty, shall also fix the east frontiers of Esthonia and Livonia, agreed on in Article 6, paragraph 2, of that treaty, more exactly.

After the fixing of the eastern frontier of Esthonia and Livonia, provided for in paragraph 1, Germany will evacuate the territory occupied by her east of this frontier without delay.

ARTICLE 3

Germany will evacuate the territory occupied by her east of the Beresina, even before the conclusion of general peace, in proportion as Russia makes the cash payments she has to carry out from to-day, according to Article 2 of the German-Russian financial agreement of this date; further provisions as to this, particularly the fixing of the individual sectors to be evacuated, are left to the commission referred to in Article 2, paragraph 1, of this supplementary treaty.

The contracting parties reserve the right to make further agreements with regard to the effecting of the evacuation of the occupied territory west of the Beresina before the conclusion of general peace in accordance with the fulfilment by Russia of the remaining financial obligations undertaken by her.

PART II.—SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE

ARTICLE 4

In so far as is not otherwise prescribed in the peace treaty or in this supplementary treaty, Germany will in no wise interfere in the relations between

the Russian Empire and parts of its territory, and will thus in particular neither cause nor support the formation of independent states in those territories.

PART III.—NORTH RUSSIAN TERRITORY

ARTICLE 5

Russia will at once employ all the means at her disposal to expel the Entente forces from north Russian territory in observance of her neutrality.

Germany guarantees that during these operations there shall be no Finnish attack of any kind on Russian territory, particularly on St. Petersburg.

ARTICLE 6

When the Entente forces shall have evacuated north Russian territory, the local Russian coast shipping within the three-mile limit from the north coast, and the fishing boats within a stretch of thirty miles along this coast, shall be excluded from the barred zone warnings. The German naval command shall have an opportunity, in a way to be further agreed upon, of convincing itself that this concession shall not be taken advantage of to forward contraband goods.

PART IV.—ESTHONIA, LIVONIA, COURLAND, AND LITHUANIA

ARTICLE 7

Russia, taking account of the position at present existing in Esthonia and Livonia, renounces sovereignty over these regions, as well as all interference in their internal affairs. Their future fate shall be decided in agreement with their inhabitants.

No obligations of any kind towards Russia shall accrue to Esthonia and Livonia through their former union with Russia.

ARTICLE 8

To facilitate Russian trade through Esthonia, Livonia, Courland and Lithuania the following is agreed:

Section 1

In Esthonia, Livonia, Courland and Lithuania the through transport of goods to and from Russia on routes liable to the payment of duty shall be absolutely free, and the goods to be transported shall not be subject to any transit duties or general transport dues.

Section 2

On the railways connecting Russia with Revel, Riga and Windau, the freight tariffs for the goods to be forwarded in through trade with Russia are to be kept as low as possible. They may only be raised above the rates in force on August 1, 1914, by taking the average of the amount by which a general rise in the freight tariffs of the lines in question may be necessary, to cover the cost of working and upkeep,

including the payment of interest, and timely redemption of the capital invested. Neither must they be higher than the freight tariffs for goods of the same kind coming from inland or destined to remain there, which are forwarded by the same lines and in the same direction.

Section 3

Shipping on the Dvina between Russia and the open sea, as well as between all places on the Livonian-Courland Dvina, and on the Russian Dvina, is to be free for the transport of goods and passengers, subject to the police instructions commonly prevailing, without discrimination between the ships and the subjects of one or the other party. It is not to be subject to any tax based solely on the fact of the navigation. It is not to be subject to any station, slip, depot, turnover, or harbourage dues.

Exclusive shipping privileges must not be granted either to companies, corporations, or private persons of any kind.

Taxes for the use of works and institutions which are created, or may be created in future, to facilitate traffic, or to improve and maintain the navigation of the river, may only be raised uniformly in accordance with published tariffs and to the extent necessary to cover the cost of restoration and upkeep, inclusive of payment of interest and redemption of the capital invested. The cost of restoring and keeping up works and institutions which are not for the facilitation of traffic and the improvement and maintenance of the navigation of the river, but are intended to further other objects and interests, may only be raised to a proportionate extent by shipping dues.

The provisions of paragraphs 1 to 3 apply also to rafts.

Section 4

At Revel, Riga and Windau, Russia shall have suitably situated free-port zones assigned to her, in which the storing and unpacking of goods coming from or intended for Russia can take place without hindrance, and the work of dispatching goods from or to the Russian customs zone can be done by Russian officials.

Section 5

The individual questions connected with the provisions of Sections 1 to 4, particularly the restrictions to which these provisions may be subjected in war time out of consideration for war necessity or for urgent sanitary reasons, shall be regulated by a special agreement.

ARTICLE 9

The water of Lake Peipus is not to be artificially diverted on either side to such a degree as to lower the water level. No methods of fishing calculated to diminish the stock of fish will be permitted; a further agreement as to this is reserved.

The water power of the Narova is to be made available as soon as possible for the

supply of electricity for the Petersburg government according to a special agreement to be made regarding this.

ARTICLE 10

With regard to Esthonia, Livonia, Courland, and Lithuania, agreements are to be concluded with Russia, as to the following points, among others:

1. With regard to the nationality of the former Russian inhabitants of these territories, as to which they must in any case be allowed the right of option and departure.
2. With regard to the return of the property in Russia belonging to subjects of these territories, particularly that belonging to publicly recognised societies, establishments, and institutions, as well as the property in these territories which belong to Russian subjects.
3. With regard to an arrangement concerning the property of the communal districts cut up by the new frontiers.
4. With regard to an arrangement regarding the archives, regarding the documents of the legal and administrative authorities, regarding the legal and administrative trusts, and also regarding the register of births, marriages, and deaths, etc.
5. With regard to the regulation of the new frontiers.
6. With regard to the effect of the territorial alterations on the state treaties.

PART V.—RUSSIAN BLACK SEA TERRITORY WITH EXCEPTION OF THE CAUCASUS

ARTICLE 11

With reservation of the provisions of Article 12, Germany will evacuate the Russian Black Sea territory occupied by her outside the Caucasus after the ratification of the peace treaty to be concluded between Russia and the Ukraine.

ARTICLE 12

The parts of the occupied territory which do not belong to the districts referred to in the third Ukrainian universal of November 7, 1917, shall be evacuated by the German forces at latest on the conclusion of the general peace, in so far as the peace between Russia and the Ukraine shall not have come into being before then.

The evacuation of the railway line Rostov-Voronezh, as well as of the occupied territory east of it, and a suitable frontier district west of it, including the town of Rostov, will follow as soon as this is demanded on the Russian side. Until the evacuation, Germany will permit the forwarding of corn and other goods for the Russian Government, under the supervision of Russian officials, on those portions of the railway situated in the occupied territory; the same applies for the portions of the railway line Taganrog-Rostov and Taganrog-Kursk lying in occupied territory, for the duration of the occupation.

So long as the Donets Basin is occupied by German troops in accordance with

Article 11 and Article 12, paragraph 1, Russia shall receive monthly from the quantities of coal extracted there a three-times greater number of tons than it lets Germany have of crude oil or crude-oil products from the Baku district, in accordance with Article 14, paragraph 2, and a four-times greater number of tons for the consignments of benzine contained therein. In so far as the coal supply in the Donets Basin is not sufficient for this, or must be used for other purposes, it will be supplemented by German coal.

PART VI.—THE CAUCASUS

ARTICLE 13

Russia agrees to Germany's recognising Georgia as an independent state.

ARTICLE 14

Germany will give no assistance to any third power in any military operations in the Caucasus outside Georgia, or in the districts mentioned in Article 4, paragraph 3, of the peace treaty. She will also take measures to prevent the military forces of any third power in the Caucasus overstepping the following lines: the Kura, from its mouth to Petropavlovskoe; from there onwards, the boundaries of the district Shemakha to Agrioba; thence a straight line to the point where the boundaries of the districts of Baku, Shemakha and Kuba meet; then along the northern boundary of the district of Baku to the sea.

Russia will do her utmost to further the production of crude oil and crude oil products in the Baku district, and will supply to Germany a quarter of the amount produced, or at least a number of tons, to be agreed upon later, per month. In so far as the quantities produced in the Baku district are not sufficient to supply this number of tons, or must be used for other purposes, they will be supplemented by quantities produced elsewhere. The price will be reckoned by the price of the coal Russia is to be allowed to have in accordance with Article 12, paragraph 3, and, moreover, by the amount of goods to be supplied by Russia to Germany, in accordance with Article 3, Section 2, of the German-Russian financial agreement of to-day.

PART VII.—TREATMENT OF THE RUSSIAN WARSHIPS AND RUSSIAN STORES SEIZED BY GERMAN MILITARY FORCES AFTER THE CONCLUSION OF PEACE

ARTICLE 15

Germany recognises Russia's ownership of the Russian warships seized by German forces after the ratification of the peace treaty, subject to Russia's coming to terms with Finland and the Ukraine as to the national property of the former Russian Empire. The warships seized will remain under German care until the conclusion of the general peace.

ARTICLE 16

Germany admits Russia's claim to be compensated for the Russian stores which have been seized outside the Ukraine and Finland, after the conclusion of peace,

by German forces. This compensation will be reckoned when discussing Germany and Russia's financial obligations arising from the supplementary treaty to the peace treaty.

PART VIII.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 17

This supplementary treaty shall be ratified, and the ratification documents shall be exchanged not later than September 6, 1918, in Berlin.

The treaty comes into force on the day the ratifying documents are exchanged.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this supplementary treaty.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin, August 27, 1918.

(L.S.) VON HINTZE

(L.S.) KRIEGE

(L.S.) A. JOFFE

GERMAN-RUSSIAN FINANCIAL AGREEMENT TO SUPPLEMENT THE GERMAN-RUSSIAN SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY BETWEEN GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA AND TURKEY FOR THE ONE PART, AND RUSSIA FOR THE OTHER PART

On the basis of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the German-Russian supplementary treaty to the peace treaty between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Turkey for the one part, and Russia for the other part,

The plenipotentiaries of the German Empire, namely:

The State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Privy Councillor, Rear Admiral Paul v. Hintze, and the Director in the Foreign Office, Imperial Privy Councillor Dr. Johannes Kriege,

As well as the plenipotentiary of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, namely:

The diplomatic representative of the Soviet Republic, accredited to the German Imperial Government, M. Adolf Joffe,

Have agreed to regulate Germany and Russia's financial obligations arising from the German-Russian supplementary treaty, the reciprocal return of the bank deposits and bank balances due, as well as the adjustment of certain differences in the mutual economic system, and for this purpose to conclude a supplementary agreement to the German-Russian supplementary treaty, taking into consideration the Russian decisions with regard to annulling the Russian state loans and state guarantees, and as to the nationalisation of certain financial property in Russia.

After handing their credentials to one another and finding these correct and in due form, the plenipotentiaries agreed to the following provisions:

PART I.—GERMANY AND RUSSIA'S FINANCIAL OBLIGATIONS ARISING FROM THE GERMAN—
RUSSIAN SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY TO THE PEACE TREATY

ARTICLE 1

The following provisions of the German-Russian supplementary treaty to the peace treaty between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey for the one part, and Russia for the other part, shall be null and void: Article 2; Article 8, in so far as it relates to the Russian national debt, including state guarantees; Article 9, Section 1, paragraph 2, in so far as it does not deal with remission of obligations incurred; Article 9, Section 3, clause 2; Article 12, paragraph 2, sentence 2, clause 1; Articles 13 to 15; Article 16, paragraph 1; Article 16, paragraph 2, in so far as it relates to Russian expropriations before July 1, 1918; and Article 17, Section 3, and Section 4, paragraph 2.

ARTICLE 2

Russia shall pay Germany a sum of Mk. 6,000,000,000 as compensation for the loss to Germans caused by Russian measures, having regard to the corresponding Russian counter-claims, and taking into account the value of the stores seized in Russia by German military forces after the conclusion of peace.

ARTICLE 3

Section 1

The payment of the Mk. 6,000,000,000 mentioned in Article 2 shall be effected in the following manner:

A sum of Mk. 1,500,000,000 shall be paid by the transfer of

245,564 km. of fine gold, and

R. 545,440,000 in bank notes, consisting of

R. 363,628,000 in notes of R. 50, R. 100, or R. 500,

and R. 181,812,000 in notes of R. 250 or R. 1,000.

The transfer shall be effected by five instalments; namely:

(1) An amount payable September 10, 1918, of

42, 860 km. of fine gold, and

R. 90. 900.000 in bank notes, consisting of

R. 60, 600, 000 in notes of R. 50, R. 100, or R. 500,

and R. 30. 300, 000 in notes of R. 250 or R. 1,000.

(2) Four amounts payable September 30, October 31, November 30, and

December 31, 1918, each of

50, 676 km. of fine gold, and

R. 113, 635, 000 in bank notes, consisting of

R. 75, 757, 000 in notes of R. 50, R. 100, or R. 500,
and R. 37, 878, 000 in notes of R. 250 or R. 1,000.

The instalments shall be handed over to the representatives of the German Government at Orsha or Pskov. The representatives will, on receipt, furnish a provisional discharge, which, after the examination and checking of the gold and the notes, shall be replaced by a final discharge.

Section 2

A sum of Mk. 1,000,000,000 shall be cancelled by delivery of Russian commodities in accordance with the special agreement to be made in regard thereto. The commodities are to be delivered to the value of Mk. 50,000,000 each time by November 15 and December 31, 1918, to the value of Mk. 150,000,000 each time by March 31, June 30, September 30, and December 31, 1919, and to the value of Mk. 300,000,000 by March 31, 1920. In so far as the deliveries cannot be effected within these periods, the amount lacking on each occasion shall be made up forthwith either in German imperial bank notes at their face value or in fine gold and rouble notes in the proportion of three to two at the rate of exchange then obtaining.

Section 3

An amount of Mk. 2,500,000.000 shall up to December 31, 1918, be met by handing over securities of a loan at 6 per cent from January 1, 1919, with a sinking fund of one-half per cent, which will be taken up in Germany by the Prussian Government to the nominal value of the sum mentioned, and the terms of which shall form an essential part of this agreement.

As security for the loan referred to in paragraph 1 specific national revenues shall be pledged, in particular the rental dues for certain economic concessions to be granted to Germans. The securities are to be settled in detail by a special agreement in such a form that the estimated income from them exceeds the yearly sum required for interest and sinking fund by at least 20 per cent.

Section 4

With regard to the balance of Mk. 1,000,000,000, in so far as its payment is not, in agreement with Germany, taken over by the Ukraine and Finland in their financial agreement with Russia, a special agreement shall be concluded.

ARTICLE 4

Property of Germans situated in Russia which before July 1, 1918, was expropriated to the use of the state or of a commune, or otherwise withdrawn from the owner's power of disposal, shall be handed back to him on request, subject to the return of the compensation received by him out of the sum mentioned in Article 2, and with due regard to possible improvements or damage if the property is not still in the possession of the state, or of the commune, or if an expropriation or other withdrawal of similar property has not been effected or is

annulled in regard to inhabitants of the country or subjects of a third power. The request for a return must be made within a year from the period when it can be claimed.

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of Article 8 of the supplementary treaty to the treaty of peace, remain unaffected in so far as they do not relate to the Russian public debt service; as also those of Article 16, paragraph 2, in so far as relates to Russian expropriations after July 1, 1918; likewise of Article 19, paragraph 1, clause 2; Article 22, clause 1; and Articles 28 to 32. In regard to the payment and assurance of the financial obligations arising out of these provisions, in so far as the settlement has not been already effected in clause 3 of this convention, a further agreement shall be concluded.

ARTICLE 6

The contracting parties will mutually furnish all possible information for the establishment of the civil damages suffered by their nationals within the sphere of the other party, and will respond to requests for the production of proofs relating to such damages.

PART II.—SURRENDER OR BANK DEPOSITS AND CREDITS

ARTICLE 7

Each contracting party shall take care that the assets within its territory, lodged with banking and financial institutions (bank deposits) by subjects of the other party, including the moneys and certificates deposited on their behalf with a central deposit office, a public trustee or other state-empowered collecting office, shall be made over on demand to the authorised persons and that they can dispatch them to the territory of their native country free of state taxes and duties.

Each party shall treat the bank deposits within its territory as deposits of subjects of the other party in the sense of paragraph 1, if they are deposited in the name of such a subject. In other cases it must be particularly proved that the deposits are those of subjects of the other party. Possible differences of opinion in regard hereto shall be decided by a commission consisting of a representative of both Governments and a neutral chairman.

Commissions of the kind specified in paragraph 2 shall be set up in Berlin, Moscow and St. Petersburg immediately after this agreement comes into force. The chairman shall, subject to the consent of the Royal Swedish Government, be appointed by the Swedish consuls in these places.

ARTICLE 8

Each contracting party shall take care that the money claims (bank credits) payable by banking and financial institutions within its territory to subjects of the other party shall immediately after the coming into force of this agreement be paid out on demand to the authorised persons without reference to the period of grace

provided by Article 7, Section 3, paragraph 1, clause 1.

Those entitled may also dispatch the sums obtained to their own country free of state taxes and duties.

The provisions of Article 7, paragraphs 2 and 3, apply in corresponding manner to the credits referred to in paragraph 1.

ARTICLE 9

In order to accelerate to the utmost the delivery provided by Articles 7 and 8, of bank deposits and credits on both sides, each contracting party shall forthwith appoint a State Commissioner, with whom their respective subjects may lodge their claims up to January 31, 1919. The two Commissioners shall give notice of these claims for the first time by September 25, 1918, at latest, for the second time by November 15, 1918, at latest, and for the third time by February 15, 1919, at latest, and shall take care that the bank deposits and credits to be made over shall be given up on October 25, 1918; December 31, 1918; and March 31, 1919; and in so far as the claims under Article 7, paragraph 2, and Article 8, paragraph 2, have to be examined by a mixed commission, they shall be given up immediately after the decision of the commission on the side of Germany in Berlin and on the side of Russia in Moscow.

Each contracting party shall take care that the delivery in so far as rights of banks or third parties to the bank deposits or credits are not in conflict shall be effected against an authenticated release of the person in whose name the deposit or credit stood, or who is recognised as authorised, by a decision of the commission referred to in Article 7, paragraph 2. Should another person claim the deposit or credit on the ground of a hereditary title or a legal succession to the whole assets of a juridical person, the release can be furnished by this other person if he is a subject of the same contracting party as the original claimant, and his title is supported by a declaration from the State Commissioner of such party. In all other cases definite evidence of the title must be given to the banking or financial institution with which the deposit or credit rests.

The rightful claimants, who desire to make good their claims without the intervention of the State Commissioner, may apply direct to the banking and financial institutions, in the case of German subjects, only after October 25, 1918, and in the case of Russian subjects, only after December 31, 1918.

ARTICLE 10

The provisions of Articles 7 and 8 find corresponding application to the bank deposits and credits in Russia of subjects of Courland, Livonia, Esthonia, and Lithuania, in particular to the moneys, certificates, and other valuables sequestrated in these districts during the war, as also to the bank deposits and credits in these districts of Russian subjects, including the Russian State Bank as successor in title of the nationalised Russian private banks.

PART III.—ADJUSTMENT OF CERTAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE ECONOMIC SYSTEM OF BOTH
SIDES

ARTICLE 11

Property of Germans shall in future be expropriated in Russia, or otherwise withdrawn from the owner's power of disposal, only when the expropriation or other withdrawal is carried out in favour of the state or a commune under legislation applying to all inhabitants and subjects of a third country, and to all articles of a similar kind, and the owner is immediately compensated in cash.

The amount of the compensation to be paid, in accordance with paragraph 1. shall be fixed by two experts, of whom one shall be appointed by the Russian Government, and the other by the rightful claimant. Should no agreement be reached between them, they shall call in a third expert as chairman, whom the competent Swedish consul shall be asked to appoint in default of agreement to the contrary.

ARTICLE 12

Property, which in accordance with Article 11 has been expropriated, or otherwise withdrawn from the owner's power of disposal, shall be handed back to him on request on return of the compensation paid to him, and regard being had to possible improvements or damage, if the property is not in the possession of the state or of the commune, or if the expropriation or other withdrawal of similar property is annulled as regards inhabitants of the country or subjects of a third power: the request for retransfer must be made within a year of the time when it can be claimed.

ARTICLE 13

The provisions of Article 11, paragraph 2, and Article 12 find corresponding application, in so far as property of Germans in Russia has been expropriated or otherwise withdrawn from the owner's power of disposal after July 1, 1918, and before the coming into force of this agreement.

The request for retransfer can be made, in the cases mentioned in paragraph 1, even when an expropriation, or other withdrawal of similar property has not been carried out in regard to inhabitants of the country or subjects of a third power. Such a request must be made within a year after the coming into force of this agreement.

ARTICLE 14

German creditors, in respect of their claims arising before July 1, 1918, may, immediately after they have fallen due, require them to be satisfied from their debtor's balances with Russian banks, if their claim is recognised as valid by both the debtor and the bank. The debtor's acknowledgment may be replaced by a judicial decision having the force of law; if the bank contests the validity of the claim, the commissions in Moscow and St. Petersburg referred to in Article 7,

paragraph 3, shall decide in regard thereto.

ARTICLE 15

The German-Russian deceased estates convention of November 12/October 31, 1874, shall remain in force, with the proviso that in regard to all cases of inheritance since the new law of inheritance in Russia the provisions for movable property shall apply to immovable property also, and that a duty on the inheritance may be levied only by the deceased's country, and that so long as the law of inheritance in Russia is annulled, or essentially limited, the convention cannot be annulled.

The contracting parties further reserve the right to supersede certain provisions of the deceased estates convention, which have not been observed in practice by fresh ones more in harmony with existing conditions.

PART IV.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 16

This convention shall be ratified, and the ratifying documents exchanged in Berlin by September 6, 1918.

The convention comes into force at the date of the exchange of the ratifying documents.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this agreement.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin, August 27, 1918.

(L.S.) VON HINTZE

(L.S.) KRIEGE

(L.S.) A. JOFFE

GERMAN-RUSSIAN CIVIL LAW AGREEMENT TO SUPPLEMENT THE
GERMAN-RUSSIAN SUPPLEMENTARY TREATY TO THE PEACE TREATY
BETWEEN GERMANY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, BULGARIA AND TURKEY FOR
THE ONE PART AND RUSSIA FOR THE OTHER PART

In virtue of Article 35, paragraph 2, of the German-Russian supplementary treaty to the peace treaty between Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, for the one part, and Russia for the other part,

The plenipotentiaries of the German Empire, namely:

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Imperial Privy Councillor Paul von Hintze, and the Director in the Foreign Office, Imperial Privy Councillor Dr. Johannes Kriege,

As well as the plenipotentiary of the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, namely:

The diplomatic representative of the Soviet Republic, accredited to the Imperial

German Government, M. Adolf Joffe,

Have agreed to regulate the legal position arising out of bills of exchange, cheques, and exchange business (Art. 7, Sec. 3, par. 2), industrial patents (Art. 9), the terms of limitation (Art. 10), as well as the decision of civil and commercial legal disputes by courts of arbitration, in order to carry out the civil law provisions of the German-Russian supplementary treaty, and for this purpose to conclude a supplementary agreement to the German-Russian supplementary treaty.

The plenipotentiaries have agreed to the following provisions, after having handed one another their credentials, and having found these in proper and due form:

PART I.—LEGAL POSITION ARISING FROM BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND CHEQUES

ARTICLE 1

If the presentation of a bill of exchange for payment, or the protest, or the taking of other action necessary to uphold the exchange rights, has not been possible during the war, in consequence of legal instructions, or of *force majeure*, the action in favour of the subjects of the contracting parties shall be considered as having been taken in good time if subsequently undertaken before the expiration of the eighth month after the ratification of the peace treaty, or, in so far as the hindrance still continued at this date, within two months after the abolition of the hindrance, in any case, at latest, within six months after the ratification of peace between Germany and the last great power to be at war with Germany. If, owing to a legal decision arising out of the war applying to the place of payment, a new period has been instituted for the presentation for payment of a bill of exchange and for the raising of protest, then a presentation and protest made within the new period of grace and before the expiration of the eighth month after the ratification of the peace treaty between Germany and Russia, in favour of subjects of the contracting parties, shall also be considered as having been made in good time, if the holder of the bill was prevented from taking action within the old period of grace.

ARTICLE 2

In the case of bills of exchange, which, in accordance with Article 7, Section 3, paragraph 1, of the supplementary treaty, need not be paid before the expiration of six months after the ratification of the peace treaty, the presentation for payment, as well as the protest in default of payment, shall be considered as having been made in good time, if they are made during the seventh or eighth month after the ratification, or, in so far as taking action was prevented within this period of grace, by *force majeure*, within two months after the abolition of the hindrance, in any case, at least within six months after the ratification of the peace treaty between Germany and the last great power to be at war with Germany.

ARTICLE 3

In particular, interruption of direct postal communication with the place where

the action must be taken, shall be regarded as a hindrance through *force majeure*, in the sense of Articles 1 and 2.

ARTICLE 4

If in the cases of Articles 1 and 2 the bill of exchange is not presented on the expiration of six months after the ratification of the peace treaty, the debtor may free himself from the obligation of the bill of exchange by depositing the amount, together with the accrued interest, with the quarters recognised as officially competent by the laws of the land in which the place of payment is situated, at the risk and cost of the holder of the bill.

ARTICLE 5

The provisions of Articles 1–4 apply to the legal position arising from cheques.

PART II.—LEGAL POSITION ARISING FROM EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS

ARTICLE 6

Obligations arising out of short-dated transactions in exchange, particularly in any sort of money, bills, cheques, and payments which were pending between subjects of the respective states when war broke out, must be fulfilled in accordance with the terms of such agreements, within the time fixed between Germany and Russia for the payment of money demands.

If, in the short-dated transactions, it is a question of a bill of exchange drawn on a state with which Germany is still at war, then the obligation must be fulfilled within six months after the ratification of the peace treaty with this state.

PART III.—INDUSTRIAL PATENTS

ARTICLE 7

For payment of the charges for patents which have fallen due through their restoration, conformably with Article 9, Section 1, paragraph 1, of the supplementary treaty, the subjects of each contracting party shall have a period of six months' grace in the territory of the other party, after the present agreement comes into force, the legally prescribed periods of grace and additions being abolished.

A period of grace will be allowed in the same way for the payment of the further charges which have fallen due before this agreement comes into force.

ARTICLE 8

The period of grace provided in Article 9, Section 2, paragraph 1, of the supplementary treaty, for recovering an action lost through delay caused by the war, will be prolonged till the expiration of a year after the ratification of the peace treaty between Germany and the last of the great powers to be at war with Germany.

ARTICLE 9

When a patent which could not be announced by the law of war is announced in the territory of one of the contracting parties within a year after the ratification of peace between Germany and the last great power to be at war with Germany, by those who had announced it in due form, during the war, in the territory of such other party, claim being made to the priority of the earlier announcement, the announcement shall take precedence of all the announcements handed in in the meantime, and shall not be rendered ineffective by any facts which have intervened in the meantime.

ARTICLE 10

The provisions of Article 9 shall not affect the instructions contained in the present or future laws of each party, according to which protection for objects of the kind notified is denied, or is limited in the public interest, or may be withdrawn, or has no effect as against third parties, who may have made use of the object, in good faith, in the time between the reception of the earlier and that of the later announcement.

ARTICLE 11

The Russian Government declares its readiness shortly to enter into negotiations with the German Government respecting mutual protection of industrial ownership.

PART IV.—PERIOD OF LIMITATION

ARTICLE 12

In amplification of the provisions of Article 10 of the supplementary treaty, it is agreed, with regard to extension of the prescribed limits within which application may be made, that when the claimant is prevented by *force majeure* from taking proceedings before the expiration of the extended period of grace, the period shall be prolonged in favour of subjects of the contracting parties, subject to further reaching instructions of the law of the country, until the expiration of two months after the abolition of the hindrance—in any case, not for longer than six months after the ratification of the peace treaty between Germany and the last of the great powers to be at war with Germany.

The contracting parties agree that the prolongation of the period of grace provided in paragraph 1 and Article 10 of the supplementary treaty shall be in force also for the period during which proceedings may be taken arising from bills of exchange and cheques.

PART V.—COURTS OF ARBITRATION FOR CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL DISPUTES

ARTICLE 13

According to the following provisions, civil and commercial disputes may be withdrawn from the competence of the national courts and be submitted to the Courts of Arbitration for decision.

ARTICLE 14

The Courts of Arbitration shall be competent to decide legal, disputes between subjects of the respective states, in so far as it is a question of

- (1) Claims in respect of money matters, arising out of agreements concluded before August 1, 1914;
- (2) Claims arising out of bills of exchange or cheques drawn before August 1, 1914;
- (3) Claims arising out of copyright or patents established before August 1, 1914.

ARTICLE 15

In the sense of Article 14 Germans or Russians shall mean juridical persons or companies situated in Germany or Russia. Those juridical persons or companies shall be excepted which are under compulsory administration, or in liquidation on account of enemy share in their capital, enemy management, or supervision.

The competence of the Court of Arbitration will neither be established nor excluded by a succession to the claims or debt arising subsequently to March 29, 1918.

ARTICLE 16

The Court of Arbitration can only be appealed to when one of the claims indicated in Article 14 has been tried by means of an action or counter-action, and one party moves that the transaction should come before the Court of Arbitration.

The plaintiff can only move that the transaction should come before the Court of Arbitration by handing in a declaration to the Court of Arbitration. If he lodges the complaint with the regular court he loses the right to appeal to the Court of Arbitration.

The defendant must make the proposal in answering the charge, at latest two months after the complaint has been lodged. If, in an action before the regular court, a counter-charge is lodged, the plaintiff must make the proposal to bring the counter-charge before the Court of Arbitration when answering the counter-charge, at the latest, however, two months after the counter-charge is lodged.

The regular court has to submit proposals to bring the matter before the Court of Arbitration to such court, and await its decision. The Court of Arbitration may permit a proposal notwithstanding the lapse of the two months' grace provided for in paragraph 3, if it was not possible, in consequence of *force majeure*, to observe the period of grace.

The decision of the Court of Arbitration that its competence exists or does not exist is binding for the courts of Germany and Russia.

ARTICLE 17

The Courts of Arbitration appointed to arbitrate will be erected in Berlin and Moscow.

The Court of Arbitration in Berlin is competent, when the defendant has his domicile in Germany, or if his domicile is outside Germany and Russia, and he is a German subject.

The Court of Arbitration in Moscow is competent, when the defendant has his domicile in Russia, or if his domicile is outside Russia and Germany, and he is a Russian subject.

If the competence of both Courts of Arbitration is established in consequence of the defendant having several residences, then the plaintiff has the choice which Court of Arbitration he will appeal to. The same applies when, of several defendants, who are legally associated in respect of the subject of dispute, the one has his domicile in Germany, the other in Russia.

ARTICLE 18

If necessary the Court of Arbitration must officially test its competence, particularly the nationality of the parties, and the correctness of the statements made by the parties, on which its competence is based.

ARTICLE 19

The Courts of Arbitration in Berlin and Moscow shall be formed as follows:

Germany and Russia each to appoint a judge and a deputy for each Court of Arbitration. The Danish Government shall be asked equally to appoint from amongst the number of its subjects, for each Court of Arbitration, a judge and a deputy. The appointment of the judges shall be for three years. Only those can be appointed who are qualified to be members of a higher court of appeal in their own country.

In addition to the judges, two commercial judges shall be appointed for each Court of Arbitration, if this is thought advisable and proposed by the organs appointed to represent the commercial class, Germany and Russia each appointing one.

The right of agreeing to add to the number of judges shall be reserved to the governments of the states concerned.

ARTICLE 20

Each contracting party shall concede diplomatic privileges and exemption to the judges and commercial judges who are not its own subjects.

ARTICLE 21

The judge appointed by the Danish Government shall act as president of each Court of Arbitration.

The president shall appoint the necessary clerks of the court, staff, and subordinate officials, at the suggestion of the government of the country where the Court of Arbitration has its domicile.

ARTICLE 22

The costs of the Courts of Arbitration shall be borne by Germany and Russia in equal shares.

ARTICLE 23

The Court of Arbitration, in making its decisions, shall consist of one Danish, one German, and one Russian judge; the Danish judge shall preside. On the motion of one party, the president shall call in a German and a Russian commercial judge in addition. On the motion of both parties the Court of Arbitration, in making its decision, shall consist of a German and a Russian commercial judge, as well as a Danish judge as president.

ARTICLE 24

The language of the court shall be, for the Court of Arbitration in Berlin, the German, for the Court of Arbitration in Moscow, the Russian language. If all the persons have not full command of the language in which the proceedings and deliberations are carried on, an interpreter shall be called in.

ARTICLE 25

The Court of Arbitration must apply those rules of international civil law which were in force in its domicile before August 1, 1914, by virtue of the law or of legal practice. According to these rules, the question has in particular to be judged, whether a claim pleaded is barred by the statute of limitations, in so far as the provisions of Article 10 of the supplementary treaty, or the amplifications to it agreed on, do not take effect.

ARTICLE 26

In applying the laws, and interpreting judicial matters, the Court of Arbitration must take the views of honourable and fair trade dealing into consideration, and judge with due attention to the whole content of the proceedings and the effect of any special agreement.

ARTICLE 27

The Court of Arbitration shall give judgment on the basis of verbal proceedings. The trial shall be conducted by the president: it shall be public. A record shall be taken down of every hearing, and be signed by the president and the clerk of the court.

ARTICLE 28

The parties are to be summoned to the trial. No summons shall be required when the date of the trial is announced in their presence, or in the presence of their representatives.

ARTICLE 29

The period of grace between the serving of the writ and the first date fixed for the trial (*Einlassungsfrist*) shall be at least six weeks, the period of grace between

serving the summons and a later date (*Ladungsfrist*) shall amount to at least one month. The Court of Arbitration can curtail both the *Einlassungsfrist* and the *Ladungsfrist* if this is moved for special reasons. If the *Einlassungsfrist* and *Ladungsfrist* are not observed, a postponement of the date may be moved.

ARTICLE 30

If the summons has been duly served, or the appointed date duly announced, the case can be tried and judgment given, even in the absence of the parties who failed to appear.

ARTICLE 31

The Court of Arbitration may have direct business dealings with German and Russian courts of justice within their competence, in order to request them to effect deliveries, and collect evidence. It may effect deliveries on its own account: it may also hear witnesses and experts who appear before it, on oath or not on oath, as well as accept *ex parte* affidavits and solemn affirmations in place of an oath.

The Court of Arbitration may allow witnesses and experts who appear before it the reimbursement of their expenses and compensation for loss of time; it may also allow them an advance.

ARTICLE 32

The parties may in the proceedings before the Court of Arbitration be represented by an authorised agent, in particular by the commissioner of the association for protection of creditors recognised by the state. The Court of Arbitration shall be free to decide whether the costs of the representatives of the successful party are to be allowed.

ARTICLE 33

The parties and their representatives are entitled to adopt before the Court of Arbitration all legal resources they may consider necessary to defend their cause.

After the parties or their representatives have brought forward all the evidence in their favour, and discussed the result, the president shall state the conclusion reached.

ARTICLE 34

Every decision of a Court of Arbitration is arrived at by a majority of votes of the members.

ARTICLE 35

The findings are to be signed by the arbitration judges, stating the date of their drawing up, and are to be published and delivered to the parties at a public sitting of the Court of Arbitration. Reasons for the decision must be given.

ARTICLE 36

The judgment duly published and delivered to the parties, finally decides the matter at issue.

ARTICLE 37

All disputes that may arise between the parties owing to the wording of the judgment are subject to the ruling of the Court of Arbitration which has delivered the judgment.

ARTICLE 38

The judgments are enforceable in the territories of the contracting parties in the same way as local judgments.

ARTICLE 39

For the proceedings before the Court of Arbitration fees shall be charged to cover the costs. The court decides which party has to pay the fees and bear the cash expenses, and, on request, fixes their amount. The decision is enforceable in the territories of the contracting parties.

The court may reduce the court fees if the party shows that he is not in a position to pay the costs without prejudice to the necessary support of himself and his family.

ARTICLE 40

Legal disputes which at the time of the ratification of this convention are pending before a German or Russian regular court, but have not yet been decided, may, in so far as the provisions of Articles 14 and 15 apply, on the request of a party be again brought before the Court of Arbitration. The request must be preferred before the Court of Arbitration, and until disposed of puts a stop to all periods running in the proceedings.

The Court of Arbitration decides as to the request. When notified that a request has been lodged before the Court of Arbitration, the ordinary court must await its decision. The conclusion of the Court of Arbitration must be delivered to the parties. After the delivery of a conclusion accepting the request, the enforcement of decisions of the ordinary court may be begun or continued only with the consent of the Court of Arbitration.

The Court of Arbitration may, in its decision, have regard to the result of the former proceedings in so far as it sees fit. With the delivery of the decision of the Court of Arbitration the decisions reached in the matter by the ordinary court lose their force so far as they conflict with the decision of the arbitration court.

The Court of Arbitration shall consider the return of a payment voluntarily made or enforced on the ground of a judgment of a regular court enforceable for the time being. The costs incurred in the proceedings before the regular court rank as a portion of the costs of the arbitration proceedings.

ARTICLE 41

The request for the Court of Arbitration to deal with a matter may be made in accordance with Article 40, even after the judgment of the regular court has become enforceable, if the judgment has been delivered only after July 31, 1914, and the Court of Arbitration on request grants reinstatement to the former position.

The request for reinstatement must be lodged with the Court of Arbitration within six months of the coming into force of this convention. It can be based only on the claim that the party concerned, in consequence of his being a subject of an enemy power, or owing to occurrences in the war, has not had sufficient opportunity to prosecute or defend his rights. The claim must be authenticated.

ARTICLE 42

A Court of Arbitration (Arbitration Commission) agreed upon by the parties is equivalent to the regular court in the sense of Article 40. The pronouncement of an award does not conflict with a request for proceedings before the Courts of Arbitration in Berlin and Moscow, so long as it has not been declared enforceable by decision of the regular court. If such a decision has been given after July 31, 1914, as against this decision and the award, replacement in the former position in accordance with Article 41 shall be carried out.

ARTICLE 43

Each Court of Arbitration shall issue an order of procedure, and communicate it to the other Court of Arbitration.

In the order of procedure special provisions shall be made with regard to:

- (1) Summonses and pleadings;
- (2) Court and counsel's fees;
- (3) Reimbursement of expenses of witnesses and experts, and compensation for their loss of time as well as the advances to be made them in this connection;
- (4) The manner of issuing awards;
- (5) The possible formation of divisions and the allotment of cases, and particularly the order of succession in which the commercial umpires are to be called in.

ARTICLE 44

The German and Russian Governments reserve the right to arrange for supplementing and altering the foregoing principles in case this should appear desirable later on.

ARTICLE 45

The agreement as to the Court of Arbitration may be denounced by Germany or Russia on July 1 of any calendar year, but not before July 1, 1921, the notice to expire on December 31. The competence of the Court of Arbitration to dispose of the disputes pending before it shall not be affected by the notice.

PART VI.—FINAL PROVISIONS

ARTICLE 46

This convention shall be ratified, and the documents of ratification exchanged in Berlin by September 6, 1918.

Articles 1 to 12 of the convention come into force with the exchange of the documents of ratification, Articles 13 to 45 two months after the exchange. The German and Russian Governments reserve the right to agree upon a later period for the coming into force of Articles 13 to 45, if regular intercourse should not be established between Germany and Russia.

In witness whereof the plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed this agreement.

Executed in duplicate in Berlin, August 27, 1918.

(L. S.) VON HINTZE

(L. S.) KRIEGE

(L. S.) A. JOFFE

¹ Not printed.

² Only the treaties comprising the appendix to the *Enemy Press Supplement* are here printed.

³ In these supplementary treaties the translation has been left essentially in the form in which it was received, after comparison with the German text (as published in the *Reichsanzeiger*, Sept. 7, 1918) and translation thereof, which were printed for the Department of State in the booklet, *Texts of the Russian "Peace"* (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1918) prepared by the Inquiry, a body of scholars assembled by Colonel House to assist the Department in the study of problems of the coming peace settlement.

Chapter XIII. The Removal of the American and Allied Embassies from Vologda to Archangel

[\[581\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, July 11, 1918. [Received July 20, 12.50 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2296

[\[582\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, July 11, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received July 28, 5.18 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2363

[\[583\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, July 12, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received July 24, 9.35 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2348

[\[584\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow [July 19?], 1918. [Received July 26, 4.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2351

[\[585\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, July 20, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received July 23, 1.18 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2317

[\[586\] The Ambassador in Russia \(Francis\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Vologda, July 22, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received July 25, 5.33 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2347

[\[587\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, July 24, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received July 30, 12.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2380

[588] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, July 25, 1918. [Received July 27, 2 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2361

[589] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow (Poole)

Washington, July 31, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2317

[590] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Murmansk, July 31, 1918, midnight. [Received August 1, 4.07 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2397

[591] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Kandalaksha, undated. [Received August 2, 1918, 2.06 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2410

[592] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia (Francis)

Washington, August 3, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 123 F84/65a

[593] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Murmansk, August 4, 1918. [Received August 5, 6.37 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2414

[594] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Kandalaksha, August 5, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received August 7, 1.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2427

[595] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Kandalaksha, August 7, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received August 8, 1.32 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2436

[596] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Archangel, August 9, 1918. [Received August 11, 1.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2445

[597] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Archangel, August 15, 1918. [Received September 16.]

File No. 861.00/2734

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *July 11, 1918.*

[*Received July 20, 12.50 a.m.*]

[328.] Just received the following from Chicherin:

Urgent. Taking into consideration present situation and the possibility of danger for the Allied representatives the Soviet government looks upon Moscow as the town where the security of the mentioned representatives can be assured. Considering it to be its duty to safeguard the Ambassadors, the Soviet government sees in their coming to Moscow a question of necessity. We hope that the highly esteemed American Ambassador will appreciate this step in the friendly spirit in which it is undertaken. In order to execute this measure and to remove any difficulties the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs delegates to Vologda as its representative Citizen Radek.

Have sent following reply to above message:

Immediately on receiving your urgent message last midnight I called a meeting of the chiefs of Allied missions as their dean.

I am requested by them to ask you why you think our remaining in Vologda unsafe or inadvisable. We have no fear of the Russian people, whom we have always befriended and whom we consider our Allies, and we have full confidence in the population of Vologda. Our only anxiety is concerning the forces of the Central Empires with whom we are at war and in our judgment they are much more likely to capture Moscow than Vologda. We realize that in a country suffering as Russia is at present there are unreasonable and desperate men, but we are confident that they are not more dangerous at Vologda than elsewhere.

At Moscow, on the other hand, we hear that the Germans have already received permission to introduce their troops to safeguard their representatives, and in any case the town is directly threatened by the Germans.

If you mean by your message that the government of Soviets have taken, without consulting the Allied missions, the decision that the latter should come to Moscow and that you are sending Mr. Kadek to carry such a decision into execution, we desire to inform you that we consider that would be offensive to us, and we would not comply therewith.

Given to press.

[FRANCIS]

¹ Sent via Murmansk and the Embassy in Great Britain.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 11, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received July 28, 5.18 a.m.]

707. News of change of ministry in Germany with military party dominating creates expectation here of more aggressive German policy in Russia. German Consulate in Moscow yesterday made preparations for departure, turning over archives to Swedish Consulate, but office running as usual to-day.

Confirmation received of the presence of Milyukov at Kiev and his definite adherence to the German military party whose intervention in Russia he believes to be the only means of restoring the Russian state. His Cadet friends in Moscow profess to repudiate his action and to remain pro-Ally in their sentiments.

Commissariat of Foreign Affairs yesterday invited Allied Ambassadors to quit Vologda for Moscow on the ground that only at the Capital can they be properly protected. Commissariat says that it has word of impending counter-revolutionary outbreak in Vologda and fears moreover that the Germans in order to embroil the Allies with the Soviet government, will instigate murder of an Allied Ambassador.

Soviet Congress has adjourned. Bolsheviks continue in complete control in Moscow, but situation in the provinces reveals great falling away in their support.

Four to five hundred cases cholera Petrograd daily. Food situation there desperate.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate at Petrograd and the Legation in Norway (No. 922); copy received by wireless July 16 via the Embassy in France unintelligible (File No. 861.00/2284).

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 12, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received July 24, 9.35 p.m.]

708. Ambassador telegraphs that Allied chiefs of mission at Vologda have unanimously decided not to comply with Soviet demand that they come to Moscow (see my No. 707). He adds that British Ambassador has so advised General Poole at Murman and Admiral Kalman [Kemp] at Archangel [at same time] urging every day [immediate] sending Allied troops to Archangel.

Chicherin would not admit last night what motive really lies back of pretext of safety. He insists also that no intimation has yet been received of attitude of new German Minister for Foreign Affairs toward Soviet government. Chicherin is conciliatory in his attitude toward Allies for the moment, has declared he will endeavor to reform Lenin's view. Trotsky, on the other hand, seems to have become violently anti-Ally and is reported to have proposed a declaration of war against us. Personal impression gained from almost daily contact with Chicherin not in accordance with conclusion drawn from impression as [omission] from the provinces, namely that the [Bolshevik] power is already moribund.

He also reported [omission] in Kiev in touch with the Germans.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4556); by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

Moscow [July 19?], 1918.
[Received July 26, 4.30 a.m.]

21. Following summary to date of the situation of the Allied diplomatic missions is sent at the Ambassador's suggestion for communication to the Department and the Allied missions Paris:

Commissariat Foreign Office on July 11 invited the Allied Ambassadors to come to Moscow on the ground that only here could their personal safety be assured, and sent Radek to Vologda as representative of Commissariat to arrange for removal. American Ambassador replied on behalf of corps, of which he is dean, that Allied missions had no fear of Russian people whom they have always befriended. Their only anxiety concerned forces of Central Empires which they had heard were to be admitted to Moscow. If Soviets, without consulting Allied missions, had taken decision that latter should come to Moscow, and had sent Radek to carry such a decision into execution, the Ambassadors considered such would be offensive and would not comply therewith. To this message Commissariat replied orally through Consulate General that rumors of admission of German troops to Moscow unfounded; that message respecting Ambassadors' removal to Moscow was intended as an invitation and not as a demand.

On 13th local authorities Vologda, at Radek's direction, placed military guards around embassies. In telegram to Commissariat Foreign Office, Mr. Francis spoke of this as "virtual arrangement to place us under espionage or to make us prisoners." Chicherin replied that guards "have for sole aim your protection against dangers menacing you."

Reply to Commissariat by Mr. Francis, dated 15th, made following chief points: (1) Wishes of Ambassadors not consulted in placing guards; (2) no mention by Commissariat of exact nature of danger threatening missions; (3) missions are in Vologda with approval or by instructions of their respective governments, and cannot change residence without consulting them; (4) cable communication with governments severed—none of the missions has received message from its government since assassination of German Ambassador; (5) no reply to invitation to come to Moscow is possible until communication be reestablished.

Former Tsar shot 16th. You should receive details through British Embassy and the British Government.

² Sent via the Embassy in France; by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *July 20, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received July 23, 1.18 a.m.]

24. Continuance my No. 20 [21?] of yesterday [concerning Ambassadors'] leaving Vologda for Moscow. On 17th Radek sent letter to Mr. Francis expressing regret that compelled to place restrictions around empires [Embassies] and saying further "[omission] communication with your Government severed but with [by?] England landing troops on the Murman [coast] on Monday, could you address your telegrams to your representatives in Moscow, from whom we will receive them for forwarding by wireless?"

Under date of 15th Ambassador telegraphed Consulate General that Radek's attitude offensive and distinctly opposed to cordial and courteous tone taken by Chicherin and instructed me to inquire of Chicherin if Radek's attitude approved. Ambassador called special attention to following sentence in letter ... [from] Radek, July 14: "I remind [you] in a friendly way that the non-compliance with our request we will regard as an act of exceeding unfriendliness and animosity."

In personal interview on 17th Chicherin [expressed] regret that Radek had failed in what Chicherin said was a friendly mission empowered [intended] to smooth our difficulties through personal contact. At the same time he insisted without bluntness that the continuance of Allied missions at Vologda, where they are exposed to danger involving moral [responsibility] of Soviets, creates an "unbearable situation."

From a sure source it is [learned that] Soviet government will not press question of Ambassadors' remarks [removal] to Moscow, for the moment at least, in such a way as to precipitate what Radek has described to Chicherin as an "undesirable and [omission] by him with the Allies and aid which would run counter to our policy of balance," but that they will operate against the Ambassadors "a moral siege of gentle reprisals such as isolating them from their entourage, limiting their supplies, stopping all persons desiring [to see] them, etc."

Lockhart and Consuls General of France, Italy, and America join in foregoing. Please acknowledge.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4539); by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

VOLOGDA, *July 22, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received July 25, 5.33 a.m.]

336. Diplomatic representatives [omission] to go to Archangel as remaining here subjects them to be treated as hostages and possibly to violence and would embarrass military operations. When Allied forces land at Archangel railroad connected therewith will be immediately cut. Being uninformed concerning disembarkment of Allied forces Archangel and unadvised concerning our policy on principle [of] intervention, also our Japanese relations, and ignorant of situation in Siberia, am awaiting developments here. Local officials here decidedly pro-Ally but danger of premature anti-Bolshevik outbreak which endeavoring to prevent. Cannot feel that personal safety is endangered.

[FRANCIS]

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Moscow (No. 34) and the Embassy in France (No. 4566).

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 24, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received July 30, 12.40 a.m.]

35. Japanese Consul General has just received telegram from Japanese Chargé d'Affaires, Vologda, saying that Allied Ambassadors and their staffs had decided to leave that city for Archangel evening of 23d following recent telegram from special committee foreign affairs renewing demand that they proceed [leave] Vologda, and setting 23d as time limit. No confirmation received as yet from other missions. Allied Consuls, Moscow, have decided to remain at posts so long as circumstances permit. Please inform French Foreign Office and Allied missions.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4607); by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

MOSCOW, *July 25, 1918.*
[Received July 27, 2 p.m.]

38. In authorized interview yesterday Chicherin said departure Ambassadors deeply regretted but will not have any influence policy of Soviet republic. It would seem there was nothing to prevent removal to Moscow, but diplomats decided otherwise, preferring to go to Archangel where "owing to military conditions their stay obviously impossible; Archangel can only be regarded as a stage of leaving Russia." Soviet government protests against "invasion Soviet territory by Anglo-French troops" and against "political support which Allied powers are giving Czecho-Slovaks," but he under these conditions does not desire to break diplomatic relations and hopes Ambassadors' departure will not be so interpreted. He perceives no reason why diplomatic relations should not be kept up with Entente powers through their representatives in Moscow.

POOLE

² Sent via the Embassy in France (No. 4590); by wireless from Moscow to Paris.

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul at Moscow
(Poole)***¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *July 31, 1918.*

104. Your 24, July 20, and 28 [38?], July 25. Owing to the wholly unwarrantable action of the Soviet authorities in interrupting telegraphic communication between this Government and its representatives in Russia, the Department of State has no knowledge of the removal of the American Ambassador from Vologda as apparently indicated in your reports. The Government of the United States will persist in its friendly purpose towards Russia so long as the people of Russia are unwilling to accept the domination of the Central powers regardless of any action which may be taken by the Bolshevik authorities. Please advise Ambassador Francis that the Department relies fully upon his thorough understanding of this Government's attitude to reflect our friendly purpose towards Russia, and is confident that if his judgment has prompted him to remove from Vologda to Archangel it has been because the attitude of the Bolshevik authorities at Moscow left him no other course to pursue. Please acknowledge receipt of this telegram and report measures taken to deliver it to Ambassador Francis.

POLK

¹ Sent via the Embassy in France.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, *July 31, 1918, midnight.*
[Received August 1, 4.07 p.m.]

342. Just arrived Murman with Italian Ambassador, Lindley and French Chargé d’Affaires. Other chiefs awaiting advices, Kandalaksha. Poole² and Kemp³ left for Archangel this morning taking Bierer⁴ and Martin and about 1,000 British, French soldiery including 50 American sailors. Anti-Bolshevik revolution planned there for to-day and if successful as anticipated then Allied forces will land Archangel without opposition August 2.

FRANCIS

² Maj. Gen. Frederick C. Poole, in command of British forces in north Russia.

³ Rear Admiral Thomas W. Kemp, R. N.

⁴ Capt. Bion B. Bierer. commanding the U. S. S. *Olympia*.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

KANDALAKSHA, *undated*.

[*Received August 2, 1918, 2.06 a.m.*]

Poole¹ reports having advised you departure of Diplomatic Corps from Vologda and causes therefor. ...² My intention and desire to remain in Russia. [Have not changed?] my judgment as to our having ambassador here. My stay at Kandalaksha and subsequent location will be influenced by developments. Plan to return to Vologda when safe. [Will] advise the Department by cable.

FRANCIS

¹ DeWitt C. Poole, Consul at Moscow.

² The detailed account of the trip, hopelessly garbled in transmission, is omitted. Another account is given in the Ambassador's telegram No. 350, Aug. 4, *infra*.

File No. 123 F84/65a

[Document 592]

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *August 3, 1918, 7 p.m.*

Department believes important you should remain in Russia and approves your decision to do so.

POLK

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MURMANSK, *August 4, 1918.*
[Received August 5, 6.37 a.m.]

350. Your 104, 31st, to Consul, Moscow, through Paris delivered me here last midnight. Don't know what route it came as communication with Moscow, Vologda, Petrograd all severed. Contents surprising as thought Poole kept Department advised by wireless.

Midnight, July 10, I received telegram from Chicherin advising Diplomatic Corps come Moscow as unsafe remain Vologda and telegram so framed that construed by my colleagues as command; telegram stated Radek commissioned to go Vologda arrange removal Diplomatic Corps to Moscow. As dean, I framed reply to telegram declining invitation because Germans likely occupy Moscow and had no fear remaining Vologda; colleagues approved reply but suggested injecting protest against forced removal, whereupon I added another paragraph to reply stating if Chicherin telegram meant forced removal to Moscow, it was offensive, and we would not comply therewith. This sent before Radek arrived in hope of preventing his coming, but Radek arrived 12th and had two protracted conferences with me in which I informed him Diplomatic Corps refused going Moscow because advised that German troops there to guard Embassy and Consulate with consent of Soviet and furthermore had confidence in Vologda people who had treated us kindly. Radek thereupon demanded in writing statement from Allied diplomats that they absolved Soviet government from all responsibility for their safety. I replied would be time enough to give such statement when we knew what Germany demanded in connection with Mirbach assassination which German press and leaders had charged was inspired and executed under direction Allies. Radek expressed regret at being compelled to make following statement especially to me:

I shall station guards around the chanceries and residences of all the Ambassadors and no one will be permitted to enter except with approval of Soviet government.

This occurred 8 p.m., 12th. Guards not sent same night, as Radek specifically stated they would be, but came following morning with notice from "Extraordinary Revolutionary Staff" that would admit no entrance unless

authorized by staff or Embassy. Guard remained at Embassy until our departure from Vologda 1 a.m., July 25. Meanwhile, I, as dean, exchanged several telegrams with Chicherin and received two letters from Radek. In these messages I protested against guards as placing us under espionage if not making us prisoners. Had given to press before Radek arrived, Chicherin's first telegram to me and my reply thereto which were published in Vologda and in Petrograd papers except Soviet organs but not published in Moscow. Revolutionary Staff sent written order to Vologda papers prohibiting publication of statement or communications from Allied missions before being censored. Corps thereupon had 50,000 pamphlets printed in Russian giving correspondence fully and my comments thereon, which we thought closed the incident. Only few copies this pamphlet obtainable, as Revolutionary Staff prohibited its distribution.

Morning 23d, I received telegram from Chicherin entreating Diplomatic Corps to leave Vologda as unsafe to remain and "to-morrow can be too late." Telegram again invited corps to Moscow and stated government had had difficulties which were now satisfactorily settled; later learned that difficulties mentioned were demands from Germany that they be permitted to send German troops or arm war prisoners to guard German Embassy and Consulate. Radek had assured me that Germany had told Soviet ambassador, Berlin would make no demand on Soviet government in relation Mirbach assassination other than punishment of murderers. On receipt of Chicherin's alarming telegram, we decided to leave Vologda and I so informed Chicherin. Americans and French had retained special trains on track Vologda since arrival there and immediately moved records and baggage to these trains and ordered locomotives therefor, planning go Archangel, having understood that locomotives would be furnished when requested, trains having been continuously occupied by Embassy attaché. Railroad replied had orders furnish no locomotives except on Chicherin's order, and when Chicherin, advised of application, wired me inquiring why wished go Archangel, I replied application made for entire Diplomatic Corps which acting in concert and perfect harmony and desired go Archangel because advised by his alarming telegram to leave Vologda and unwilling go to Moscow. Chicherin replied going Archangel meant leaving Russia and asked whether such our intention. I replied disclaiming any intention of quitting Russia unless forced and then my absence would be temporary but before sending showed message to colleagues and suggested making statement concerning leaving apply to all Allied chiefs instead of myself alone. Colleagues, however, while not objecting to my statement, added the following to my message: "If arriving Archangel, local authorities consider it unsafe for us to remain there, we shall leave with regret and with the hope of returning soon."

Locomotive was furnished and Diplomatic Corps staffs and attachés numbering about 130 arrived Archangel, 11 a.m., 26th; was waited upon by two members local Soviet and one representative Central Soviet who had been on train with us. They informed us that boat awaiting us at wharf about 300 yards distant to convey us to

destination selected by ourselves. Corps refused to leave Archangel until permitted to communicate with respective governments via Alexandrovsk cable and if that not permitted demanded armed Allied escort from Archangel bar to Murmansk or Kandalaksha. Soviet committee replied had only one instruction and that was to send corps on through Archangel when arrived there. We positively refused to move and committee powerless to do otherwise said would communicate our wishes to Central Soviet, Moscow. Popov, chief local Commissariat, communicated with Moscow over direct wire during entire afternoon and evening and returned to train about noon, 27th, stating Soviet government replied communication of Allied chiefs with their governments impossible and armed Allied escort unavailable because no armed Allied vessels admitted in Archangel Harbor and telegraph or radio communication with Murmansk and Kandalaksha severed; when asked if severance was political or physical, replied was both. We thereupon demanded another boat in addition to one provided which was inadequate and stated we desired to go to Kandalaksha and to clear as soon as possible and requested two Russian trawlers as escort.

Popov and Lapin, Central Soviet representative, were nervous and frightened because reported existence of anti-Bolshevik organization in Archangel and Archangel Province where have been several outbreaks against Bolshevik rule. Local Soviet, Archangel, had been inclined to favor Allies until Central Soviet sent special commission to evacuate supplies of which I informed you weeks ago. Central Soviet had also sent Kedrov, strong uncompromising Bolshevik, to Archangel who had arrested local Duma and who, on returning, had stopped at Vologda, removed mayor, and installed local Soviet there. Kedrov was in Archangel when we left Vologda but met us *en route* and sending aide informed my aide that boat awaiting us at Archangel to convey us out of Russia on arrival there, the railroad station being on opposite side of the river. We made no reply to Kedrov, who went to Vologda. Armour,¹ who remained at Vologda, wired us that Kedrov had received telegram signed Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin, ordering him not permit us to leave Archangel; this was confirmed to me by French Consul, Archangel, who said he knew that plan was to hold Allied diplomats at Archangel as hostages to prevent Allied landing.

We pushed demands for boats and informed Popov and Lapin we desired to leave as soon as possible for Kandalaksha. They did not tell us of Central Soviet order to detain us but said additional boat would be at wharf, 5 p.m., 28th, and promised trawlers if available. We got baggage on wharf immediately and second boat arrived about 7 p.m. but were not permitted to take baggage aboard until hour thereafter, the excuse being that customs regulations must be observed. Chiefs all went to wharf identified baggage which was aboard by 10 p.m. Meantime additional boat had provided room for numerous Belgian and Serbian refugees assembled Archangel and who were afraid of violence if left there. We finally obtained consent of committee to take refugees aboard. At shortly after 10 p.m. all persons aboard boat were ordered off, including chiefs, and permitted to

reembark on showing passports. This consumed two hours more. Lapin, Central Soviet representative, had informed me that he would, on request of several of my colleagues, accompany us to Kandalaksha but demanded written guarantee of personal safety while there and also return of boats conveying us thither. Considering such request reasonable, I prepared two guarantees carefully worded and had eight Allied chiefs sign both. About 1 a.m. he requested the written guarantees and upon receiving same left the boat for the city and did not return until 3.30 a.m., when he informed me that the boats would immediately clear and we would have one trawler for escort.

Leaving Archangel 4 a.m., 29th, we arrived without incident at Kandalaksha 11 a.m., July 30, and immediately wired Poole, Murmansk, urging him to send troops at once to Archangel. Number troops at Murmansk had been variously reported to be from 3,000 to 25,000, of which Americans numbered 1,000 to 4,000. Arrived Murmansk 10 p.m., 31st. Poole had left for Archangel at 11 a.m., 31st, with Bierer, Martin, Admiral Kemp and about 1,700 men, of which 50 were American bluejackets, being substantially entire force here. I have advised Department by cables from here of developments since arrival. Hastened to leave Archangel not only because feared being held as hostages but on account reported anti-Bolshevik movement and thought advisable to be away when same occurred.

Returning Kandalaksha this evening leaving Riggs, Murmansk to go Archangel direct by first conveyance available. Ruggles, Johnston returning Kandalaksha with me, also Consul Strother who arrived from London 2d; found couriers Christy and Sands here with thirty-four pouches containing mail from January accompanied by couriers Baisden and Steele with thirteen additional pouches whom I am taking to Kandalaksha sending Christy and Sands to London. Italian Minister also returning with me but Lindley sick on His Majesty's ship *Glory* and cannot return with us.

Nothing direct from Poole or Kemp. Shall determine further movements Kandalaksha but plan to return Vologda if possible.

FRANCIS

¹ Norman Armour, Second Secretary of the Embassy.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

KANDALAKSHA, August 5, 1918, 8 p.m.
[Received August 7, 1.40 a.m.]

Left Murman 11 last evening arrived here at 1 p.m. Your August 3, 7 p.m., delivered as train started and highly gratifying. No communication established with Odessa [?] yet; no direct wire communication between here and Archangel. Allied missions remaining on boats and planning return to Archangel when escort secured.

French Ambassador insists that Allied chiefs enter Archangel together but I see no object therein, as such procedure might imply returning to Russia which we have never left and which I had no intention of leaving. Furthermore, new government might ceremoniously welcome us and that would be embarrassing as no chiefs authorized to recognize or communicate officially with any Russian Government. As, however, Allied chiefs have followed my suggestions all day almost or quite invariably, I shall not strenuously oppose entering Archangel together if they insist.


August 2, Constitutional Assembly members of northern region proclaimed new government comprising provinces Vyatka, Archangel, Vologda, Novgorod, Kazan, Samara. Administration includes nine members, one from each of six named provinces, and three additional; one of latter, Zubov, assistant mayor Vologda, is Cadet and good man. I know him personally. New government probably intended as member Federated Russia.

Awaiting escort here, where address cables for the present. No communication with Armour, Packer,¹ Vologda, or with Petrograd or Moscow whom please advise concerning Embassy if possible.

Stay at Archangel depends on developments. Hope that General Poole will effect connection with Czechs and open Siberian Railway. When may supply ship mentioned in your 222, July 11, 4 p.m.,² be expected, Archangel or Murman?

FRANCIS

¹ Lieut. E. L. Packer, Assistant Military Attaché.

 ² Vol. III, chap. iii.

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

KANDALAKSHA, August 7, 1918, 2 p.m.
[Received August 8, 1.32 p.m.]

354. Poole sending escort from Archangel and requests Diplomatic Corps come there; leaving to-day by the same steamer that conveyed diplomatic missions here and on which been living since arrived July 30. Due at Archangel to-morrow, where stay depends on movements of Allied powers. Nothing from Moscow, Petrograd, or Vologda since 28th, nor from Soviet government. Consequently unadvised as to its feeling toward Allied diplomats, remembering however its notice that going to Archangel meant leaving Russia, also that notwithstanding such notice it gave orders to obstruct our leaving Archangel, doubtless desiring hostages to prevent landing Allied forces.

Written guarantees concerning boats and Lapin not observed because Lapin July 31, while I was at Murman, surreptitiously put man aboard trawler and ordered her clearance for Archangel, notwithstanding had willingly promised British Colonel and Lieutenant Calder boats and trawler would remain here until August 2. Man had come from Murman and was going to Archangel to inform Bolsheviks Poole coming and his forces. British battery fired two warning shots to stop trawler which continued going while returning shots and succeeded in escaping. Constant firing by each side and no casualties but much alarm because boats with representatives directly in line of trawler shots. Lapin confined in cabin by military authorities who promised to transfer him to diplomats on latter's request, which made mainly on account of Allied representatives within Bolshevik jurisdiction at Vologda, Moscow, Petrograd. He is Serbian subject and secretly and criminally endeavored to convert Serbian soldiers to Bolshevik principles or to desert and violate their oaths; about 200 Serbian soldiers here well disciplined, patriotic and would kill him if left here or even before leaving if not prevented. British General Maynard commanding forces on Murman line and Colonel Marsh here intended trying him for espionage before military court martial, and reluctantly permit us secretly take him against the law, which we are doing solely because fear reprisals on our representatives if he is shot or severely treated.

Boat captains have voluntarily lowered red flag of the Soviet government and raised Russian tricolor. These boats are the property of Murman Steamship Co., but were nationalized by Soviet government, and their disposition on arrival at

Archangel undetermined.

Address Embassy Archangel until further advised.

FRANCIS

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

ARCHANGEL, *August 9, 1918.*
[*Received August 11, 1.40 p.m.*]

355. Arrived Archangel 10 a.m. Poole in command here with forces advanced 100 miles south. Zubov representing new government welcomed diplomats informally on wharf and I made noncommittal reply.

Diplomatic Corps approved and signed address prepared by myself to Russian people. ...¹

Remaining on boats until domiciles secured. Archangel overcrowded. Probably remain here some time depending on military movement and Soviet attitude. Poole holding several Bolsheviks as hostages for safety Allied representatives Moscow, Petrograd, Vologda, of whom heard nothing; if Department advised concerning them please cable here.

FRANCIS

¹ Address printed as enclosure to despatch of Aug. 15, *post*, p. 633 [*Pg. 633 is part of Doc. 597*].

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

ARCHANGEL, *August 15, 1918.*
[Received September 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith copies in English and Russian of an address to the Russian people, composed by myself, approved, and signed by the Allied representatives of the Diplomatic Corps now in Russia and published subsequent to our return to Archangel. There is also embodied in this pamphlet an appendix giving the telegraphic correspondence between myself, as dean of the Diplomatic Corps, and Chicherin, Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, beginning with the telegram received from Mr. Chicherin on July 23 earnestly entreating the Diplomatic Corps to leave Vologda, which telegram was subsequently cabled to the Department, and concluding with the telegram numbered 7, received just before our train departed from Vologda about midnight July 24, 1918. English translations of these telegrams are also enclosed.

This address to the Russian people was published in the principal newspaper of the city of Archangel on Sunday, August 11, 1918, copy of which newspaper, marked, is also enclosed;¹ 7,500 copies of this newspaper were sold upon this day. The Allied Diplomatic Corps is also having printed 50,000 copies of the Russian pamphlet of this address for distribution. Arrangement has already been made for the distribution, through the Cooperative Societies, of 10,000 copies of this pamphlet at the present time.

As the address clearly sets forth the intentions of the Allied Governments with regard to Russia and their noninterference in Russia's internal affairs, and states the Allies' position with regard to the Brest Litovsk peace, this pamphlet can with compatibility be used for distribution continuously in all territory controlled or which will be controlled by the widening influence of the Allied forces and the new "supreme government of the northern region."

Although this declaration was issued entirely without consultation with, or with the approval of, the new government, the members of the new government expressed themselves as highly pleased with the declaration and especially with the expressed principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of Russia. The pleasure of the new government was no doubt enhanced by the fact that the British military authorities had conducted themselves entirely in a military manner, and being an expeditionary and occupational force had perhaps not taken sufficient cognizance of the existence of the "supreme government of the northern region."

In this connection, upon the first joint meeting of the Allied Ambassadors of America, France and Italy and British Commissioner Lindley with President Chaikovski and his secretary, President Chaikovski expressed his dissatisfaction with the conduct of General Poole with regard to the "supreme government of the northern region," or rather as to lack of cognizance of such government in his military administration. Realizing the delicacy of the situation, the above-named Allied diplomatic representatives undertook to liquidate any friction which might occur and reiterated to President Chaikovski our principle of noninterference in Russia's internal affairs. This seemed to pacify President Chaikovski to a great extent, and although there has been recurrence of the same difficulty, I have no doubt but that we will be able to eliminate this as a factor in the local situation.

Relative to this discussion, the formation of the new government and the entry of the Allied expeditionary forces, inquiries among the local population seemed to establish the fact that the change in government as well as our entry into Russia at this point is more than welcomed by all. Since the change in régime, although the city is under martial law, conditions have been entirely tranquil, and if there are any Bolshevik elements still existent in the city they are not perceivable.

I have [etc.]

DAVID R. FRANCIS

[Enclosure]

Address Published by the American and Allied Representatives in Russia

TO THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE: We as representatives of all the Allied countries having missions in Russia at the present time desire to inform you of our movements and aims and have adopted this method of doing so because the metropolitan press has been forbidden to print our communications or statements. We last arrived at Archangel August 9 after a stay of one week at Kandalaksha during which time three of our number visited Murmansk.

We left Petrograd about February 26 on account of the threatened approach of the German troops, the Dean of the Corps going to Vologda where he was later joined by others and where we have been functioning for four or five months past as representatives of our respective governments who have never ceased to consider you as their allies against Germany.

On July 10 Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs in the Soviet government, wired us that it was unsafe for us to remain in Vologda and insisted that we remove to Moscow, and that he had sent Radek as his representative to Vologda to "execute" the request or demand. Not considering it unsafe to remain in Vologda in the good will of whose people we had entire confidence and believing Moscow an undesirable residence place for us we refused to change our location. Chicherin's first telegram to us and our reply thereto were given to the press and

published in Vologda and Petrograd papers before the arrival of Radek. Subsequent correspondence, however, by wire and mail with Chicherin and Radek, the Russian papers were prohibited from printing; we attempted however to inform you about these occurrences in pamphlet printed in Russian and containing the order issued, by the Extraordinary Revolutionary Staff at Vologda to the journals of that city prohibiting the publication of communications or interviews with us unless previously censored by said staff—the same Revolutionary Staff later prohibited the distribution of such pamphlets.

We thought our non-removal from Vologda was settled when about midnight of July 23 we received from Chicherin an urgent telegraphic message entreating us to leave Vologda as it was unsafe to remain there and to use the words of the message, “to-morrow can be too late.” On July 24 we went to the station prepared to leave Vologda but the central Soviet government on learning that we contemplated going to Archangel informed us that “Archangel is not a fit place for Ambassadors to live” and that our going there meant our leaving Russia. We replied that if forced to leave Russia we would do so with regret and that our absence would be temporary only. The textual copies of the correspondence between Chicherin and ourselves is printed herewith as an appendix.

We left Vologda about 2 a.m., July 25, and arrived Archangel about 11 a.m., July 26, when we were waited upon by Popov, chief local Commissar, and Lapin, representative of the central Soviet government, accompanied by a member of the local Soviet Executive Committee, and informed that a boat was awaiting us at the wharf near the railroad station to convey us to whatever destination we might elect. We replied that we were unwilling to leave Archangel until we could communicate directly with our Governments from which we had received no intelligence for over one month; that if not permitted to cable via Alexandrovsk we requested an additional boat, as the one provided was inadequate for the Diplomatic Corps and our party numbering about one hundred forty, and also an armed. Allied escort from the Archangel bar to Kandalaksha or Murmansk; after stating that their instructions were unequivocal and positive the Soviet Committee observed our firm attitude and said they would transmit our requests and demands to the Central Soviet and report the result thereof to us. The following day, July 27, they reported that cable communication with our Governments was impossible and that an armed Allied escort was unavailable because there was none in Archangel harbor; that no telegraphic communication was possible between Archangel and Murmansk where armed Allied crafts were said to be stationed; when asked if the prevention of such telegraphic communication was political or physical the reply was “both.” The local Soviet Committee promised to furnish us an additional boat and in response to our request for armed escort to Kandalaksha agreed to furnish one or two trawlers if available. Meantime for various reasons we had decided to quit Archangel and go to Kandalaksha and had determined that if no armed escort was obtainable we would go without it. After many delays and inconveniences which some of us looked upon as discourtesies

and in fact indignities we cleared in two steamers accompanied by one trawler from Archangel at 4 a.m., July 29, and arrived, at Kandalaksha about noon, July 30. We are not directly charging the Soviet government at Moscow with ordering our detention at Archangel because we have no documentary evidence on which to base such a charge: we have learned however from sources which we consider reliable and authentic that orders were given by the Central Soviet power at Moscow to Kedrov and to the Archangel local Soviet to prevent our leaving Archangel. The object no doubt was to hold us as hostages in the event armed Allied intervention should occur or be attempted.

On our arrival at Kandalaksha we were informed that Allied troops had left Murmansk for Archangel and were subsequently informed that on August 1 or 2 a local revolution had taken place in Archangel and a new government proclaimed and that later Allied troops had landed under the command of General Poole. In reply to our inquiries we were informed that it would be safe for us to return to Archangel where the accommodations are much superior to those at Kandalaksha or Murmansk.

The foregoing explains our movements from the time we left Vologda July 23 until our second arrival in Archangel. As stated above it was never our intention or desire to quit Russia and we have not done so.

On our return to Archangel we find the city and the surrounding country under the new government which has already explained to you its organization and its plans for the future. While considering you as allies against a common enemy of the Governments and the peoples whom we represent we have no intention of interfering in your internal affairs. We hold to the belief that all civilized peoples have the right themselves to determine their own form of government. We have never recognized the Brest Litovsk peace and so stated to you when it was signed and again when it was ratified by the Soviet Congress at Moscow March 17 and that position has been repeated time and again by our Governments as well as by ourselves. We will never recommend to our Governments the recognition of any Russian Government which has not a national character, which disregards Russia's solemn bonds of alliance and which observes the Brest Litovsk peace treaty.

We feel confident that the Allied countries we represent could make our own peace terms with Germany at any time we would agree to leave Russia to the tender mercies of the Central Empires. Such a peace however if effected would be temporary as Germany after strengthening herself with the immeasurable resources and immense man power of Russia, prompted by her insatiable ambition to rule the world, would threaten the liberties of the peoples whose trust we hold. Moreover we not only sympathize with Russia in the difficulties she has encountered but we feel deeply grateful to her for her heroic struggle and the sacrifices she made and the timely assistance she gave the Allied cause in the beginning of this world struggle. If you have any doubt in your own minds and

hearts concerning the dominating spirit or the grasping selfishness of Germany you need only read the expressions of her rulers, of her military party, of her political leaders, of her clergy, and even of her socialists, to dispel such doubt. The Germans profess to believe that they are God's chosen agents not only for the subjugation of Russia but for all of the peoples of the entire world. When Germany brought on this world war her people were so imbued with their potentialities for success that they assumed a haughty and overbearing attitude toward all opponents. Within a few months a Minister of Foreign Affairs who dared question the strength of Germany to settle this conquest by force of arms was compelled to resign.

Surely you will not accept a peace which has already dismembered your great country in whose record and achievement every Russian with national spirit cherished a pardonable pride. Indifference or lukewarmness or inaction on your part at this time will result in additional and still greater curtailments of your liberties and still greater encroachments on your territories by the Central Empires and will bring down on your memories the anathemas of your descendants. The defense of your country is, nevertheless, a question between every Russian and his own conscience. The Allies leave it there with every confidence and have no intention of forcing any one to fight against his will.

There can be no doubt about the outcome of this war. It will result in the' absolute defeat of the Central Empires. The German dream of world power will be dissipated and even the Germans themselves will look back with humiliation upon the time when they indulged in such vanity and such folly. This Allied victory will result in a lasting peace. There will be no longer any question as to a civilized people's being dominated by a foreign power. The right of all people to dispose of themselves is the main issue in this struggle and it will be settled and settled right before the Allied armies will lay down their arms. Russia has a great future and the Governments and the people whom we represent will not permit that future to be clouded or impaired by German presumption.

We expect to remain in Russia and to continue to represent the friendly sentiment of our countries toward you. Our Governments will recognize any form of government you may adopt provided it is the choice of the entire people and provided furthermore it will offer resistance to our enemy who is your enemy also and the enemy of all liberty-loving people throughout the world. Russia has within her borders more than sufficient products to feed and clothe her immense population but if attributable to civil strife or ineffective transportation you are deprived of the necessities of life we are willing and ready to divide our products with you; the knowledge that you are suffering from hunger or nakedness would prevent our enjoyment of the material blessings of an All-Wise Providence.

[Appendix 1—Telegram—Translation]

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the American Ambassador (Francis)

Moscow [July 22, 1918.
Received July 23.]

I entreat you most earnestly leave Vologda and come here. Danger approaches, tomorrow can be too late, when battle rages distinction of houses cannot be made if all smashed in your domiciles during struggle of contending forces responsibility will fall upon your making deaf ear to all entreaties. Why bring about catastrophe which we will avert?

CHICHERIN

[Appendix 2—Telegram]

The American Ambassador (Francis) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)

July 24, 1918.

Thank you for your telegram. We fully appreciate the uninterrupted interest you have taken in our personal safety and have decided to follow your advice and are leaving Vologda.

FRANCIS

[Appendix 3—Telegram—Translation]

The Soviet Commissar of Ways of Communication (Zaikin) to the Station Master at Vologda

Undated.¹

In accordance with an order from the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Chicherin, I request information without delay as to who from the American Embassy and for what purpose is demanding a special train to Archangel. Until the receipt of this information and the receipt by you of a permit to dispatch the train, same should not be dispatched.

ZAIKIN

[Appendix 4]

Authorized reply by the American Ambassador (Francis)

[July 23, 1918.]

The American Ambassador as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps received about noon to-day a telegram from Chicherin entreating the Diplomatic Corps to leave

Vologda “as to-morrow can be too late” and it is unsafe for them to remain there. This train is desired by the American Ambassador for the entire Diplomatic Corps to convey them to Archangel.

[Appendix 5—Telegram—Translation]

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the American Ambassador (Francis)

Undated.

[Received July 24, 1918.]

Having heard of your resolve to leave Vologda for Archangel we see ourselves compelled whilst appreciating your clear comprehension of the untenable situation in Vologda to be kindly informed by you about some particulars of your decision. If your intention is to leave Russia we are powerless to hinder you in doing so but we express our sincerest regrets at your departure from our soil together with our hope to see you soon in our midst here in the heart of Soviet Russia. In case you really wish to depart we beg to emphasize that in our view the relations between our two countries are not going to be affected by an event to which we will not ascribe any political symptomic character. If, however, the idea of exchanging Vologda for Archangel was not altogether removed from your mind, it is unfortunately necessary to draw your attention to the fact that in the expectation of a siege Archangel cannot be a residence fit for ambassadors and that such a question cannot possibly be answered in the affirmative. I cannot but repeat that under the present condition when our foes seeing their impotence to play a part in the political life of the great masses, seek to conspire and to create artificial outbursts and to provoke civil war, we can, with complete earnestness, point to Moscow where as experience shows our forces are and cannot but remain in undisturbed control of the city and to its peaceful gay suburbs with their splendid villas as to an appropriate abode which our government deliberately proposes to the Ambassador of friendly America. We must at any cost avoid the danger of your departure's being misinterpreted in the eyes of our great masses and of the American public opinion and of its being understood in a sense altogether dissimilar to that in which you and myself would understand it. That at the present juncture would be a fatal mistake and the best means of averting this danger would be your coming to the official center of Russia where a warm friendly reception awaits you. The special train is at your disposal but we do not lose the hope that your decision will be to come to Moscow.

CHICHERIN

[Appendix 6—Telegram]

The American Ambassador (Francis) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)

[*July 21, 1918.*]

On receipt of your urgent telegram of the 22d addressed to me as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and received about noon of the 23d, I called the Diplomatic Corps in conference. After deliberating we decided to leave Vologda but considered that our previous telegraphic correspondence had fully settled the question of our going to Moscow and that conclusion was negative. As Dean of the Corps I replied to your telegram expressing appreciation for your continued interest in our personal safety and advising that we had concluded to leave Vologda. Consequently the entire Diplomatic Corps repaired to their trains at Vologda station, but on giving directions for the train to move we were informed by the railroad officials that no motive power could be furnished without authority from Moscow. We were under the impression and had been informed from reliable sources that these trains were at our disposal and locomotives would be furnished upon our request. When such request was forwarded to Moscow the reply was received after some delay that locomotives could not be furnished without your consent and you desired to know who had asked for the train for the American Ambassador and for what purpose he wished to go to Archangel. I promptly directed that reply be made that the locomotive was desired to take the entire Diplomatic Corps to Archangel as they had concluded to quit Vologda upon receipt of your urgent telegram entreating them to leave because unsafe to remain in Vologda and stating that postponing departure until to-morrow might be too late.

In reply to this statement you wired me at length. The correspondence up to this time had been between myself as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps and yourself as Commissar of Foreign Affairs.

This telegram while sent by me as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps is meant also for my reply as the American Ambassador.

Permit me to say that while your message is appreciated because expressing friendly feeling for the people I represent and a desire on your part to maintain relations with them and with my Government, your treatment of me as their representative does not accord with such expressions. While refraining from interfering in the internal affairs of Russia, I have considered that the Russian peoples were still our allies and have more than once appealed to them to unite with us in resisting a common enemy; I have furthermore recommended to my Government many times to send food to relieve the sufferings of the Russian people and to ship agricultural implements to meet requirements of Russia. A wireless message sent from Washington July 18 received at Moscow was delivered to me after last midnight. It stated that no message had been received from me of later date than June 24 except one sent through Archangel July 7 advising of the killing of the German Ambassador; it furthermore stated that it had cabled me often and fully. I have received no cable from my Government that was sent after July 3 except two wireless messages inquiring why they did not hear from me; I

have cabled fully every day. Moreover the press of Vologda and doubtless the entire press of Russia has received orders to print nothing from any Allied Ambassador or representative without first submitting same to the Soviet government. Some journals in Vologda and some in Petrograd did print your first telegram inviting or ordering the Diplomatic Corps to come to Moscow and our reply thereto; these were given to the press by myself for the information of the Russian people and because I thought secret diplomacy had been abolished in Russia. Upon learning that the press was forbidden to publish further correspondence concerning our removal to Moscow, the Diplomatic Corps decided to have printed in pamphlet form in Russian the entire correspondence on the subject together with some excerpts from a stenographic report of the interview between your representative Radek and myself. These pamphlets have been ready for delivery for two days past, but we are informed that the Central Soviet Committee or the Extraordinary Revolutionary Staff of Vologda has prohibited delivery of same to us.

Your last telegram addressed to myself, while expressing friendly sentiments toward America and consideration for its Ambassador, makes no mention of my colleagues representing America's allies in Vologda. This is to inform you if you entertain any doubt on the subject that the Allied representatives in Vologda are acting in concert and in perfect harmony.

The Allied missions and staffs have been living for twenty-four hours in the special train on track at Vologda station awaiting a locomotive to transport them to Archangel. Your telegram to me states that if permitted to go to Archangel it would only be for the purpose of their leaving Russia which you "are powerless to hinder." Your telegram states that Archangel is not a fit residence for ambassadors in the event of "a siege." Do you expect a German siege of Archangel? You certainly do not anticipate Allied siege of that city or you would not insist upon the Allied representatives coming to Moscow. If you mean a siege of Archangel by Russians I can only repeat what I have said to you and to the Russian people many times and that is that the Allies have nothing to fear from the Russian people whom they have constantly befriended and with whom they consider themselves still in alliance against a common enemy. Speaking for myself I have no desire or intention of leaving Russia unless forced to do so, and in such event my absence would be temporary. I would not properly represent my Government or the sentiment of the American people if I should leave Russia at this time. The Brest Litovsk peace the Allies have never recognized, and it is becoming so burdensome to the Russian people that in my judgment the time is not far distant when they will turn upon Germany and by their repulsion of the invader from the Russian borders will demonstrate what I have continuously believed and that is that the national spirit of great Russia is not dead but has only been sleeping.

The above are my personal views and feelings, and I think that in cherishing such I am properly representing my Government and my people.

The Allied Diplomatic Corps of Vologda awaits your immediate approval of the locomotive to draw their train to Archangel. If local authorities at Archangel consider the situation does not allow us to remain, we shall leave with deep regret and with the hope of soon returning.

FRANCIS

After receipt of this telegram Chicherin had a conversation by direct wire with the American Embassy. The American Ambassador sent Mr. Lehrs, an attaché of the American Embassy, with instructions to inform Chicherin that the Diplomatic Corps reiterated with emphasis its request for a locomotive in order to go to Archangel.

Mr. Lehrs stated:

Immediately after your conversation Mr. Chicherin called for Mr. Vetoshkin and told him that when a definite reply from the Ambassadors would be received which cannot be otherwise but a decision to go to Archangel he should give orders, to immediately provide for a locomotive and also telegraph to Mr. Popov of the Soviet in Archangel informing him concerning the Allied Ambassadors and instructing him to prepare a steamer. If Mr. Vetoshkin thinks necessary that the People's Commissars of the Soviet themselves should send a telegram to Archangel signed by Lenin, Trotsky and Chicherin they would do so. Mr. Vetoshkin thought that it would be necessary.

After this conversation I telegraphed to Mr. Chicherin the following:

I will immediately submit your telegram to the Ambassador. After your telegram has been discussed by the Diplomatic Corps the dean of the corps, American Ambassador Francis, will at once communicate his reply to you by telegraph. We intend to communicate with you this evening about 9 o'clock.

Mr. Lehrs transmitted the following to Commissar Chicherin the same evening:

I am instructed by the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps to inform you that the diplomats of the Allied missions at Vologda after considering your message decided to request you to furnish at your earliest convenience a locomotive to draw their special train from Vologda to Archangel.

[Appendix 7—Telegram—Translation]

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the American Vice Consul (Lehrs)

[Received July 24, 1918, 11.20 p.m.]

We will give instructions that a locomotive should be put at your disposal at Vologda and that a boat should be prepared for you in Archangel. Once more we emphasize that we do not ascribe a political meaning to this individual leaving of diplomatic representatives, which we profoundly regret and which was caused by a sorrowful conjuncture of circumstances, independent of our will.

CHICHERIN

¹ Not printed.

¹ Received by the Vologda station master July 23, in the afternoon.

Chapter XIV. The Withdrawal of the American and Allied Military Missions, Consuls, and Nationals

[\[598\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, August 12, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received August 13, 11.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2480

[\[599\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, August 13, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received August 14, 3.34 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2488

[\[600\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, August 16, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received August 16, 4.25 a. [p.] m.]

File No. 119.2/479

[\[601\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, August 16, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received 11.23 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2518

[\[602\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, August 20, 1918. [Received September 26.]

File No. 861.00/2818

[\[603\] The Chargé in Sweden \(Whitehouse\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Stockholm, August 29, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received August 30, 3.33 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2599

[\[604\] The Chargé in Denmark \(Grant-Smith\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Copenhagen, August 30, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received 11.09 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2600

[605] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, August 30, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received 7.10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2604

[606] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 3, 1918. [Received September 16, 5.34 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2706

[607] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 3, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received September 4, 10.10 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2619

[608] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 5, 1918. [Received September 23.]

File No. 861.00/2774

[609] The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

File No. 861.00/2880

[610] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse)

Washington, September 7, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2480

[611] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, September 9, 1918. [Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2790

[612] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 13, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received September 14, 9.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2686

[613] The Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (Armour), temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 13, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received September 14, 6.51 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2687

[614] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 14, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received September 15, 3 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2690

[615] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

Washington, September 14, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 123 P 78/48b

[616] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 15, 1918. [Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2788

[617] The Consul General at Christiania (Letcher) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, September 16, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received 10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2712

[618] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, September 24, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2744

[619] The Consul at Moscow (Poole), temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 25, 1918. [Received September 26, 1.48 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2799

[620] The Consul at Moscow (Poole), temporarily at Christiania, to the Secretary of State

Christiania, September 28, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received September 29, 5.33 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2834

[621] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London, October 5, 1918. [Received October 23.]

File No. 861.00/3029

[622] The Chargé in Norway (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, October 7, 1918, noon. [Received 10 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2900

[623] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London, October 12, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received 9.56 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2934

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, August 12, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received August 13, 11.30 a.m.]

2629. Swedish Government has transmitted to me by note dated August 11 (1) a report of the American Consul General at Moscow¹ sent on July 31; (2) text of the reply of Chicherin to representations made to him by the American Consul General at Moscow; (3) and (4) two reports of the same Consul General which must have been sent August 5 and 6 respectively.

At the request of our Consul General, the Swedish Consul General sent these communications to his Government to be transmitted to this Legation. Foreign Office informs me at the same time that their Consul General, Moscow, reports that on August 5 he temporarily took charge of American as well as English and Japanese interests.

Following is enclosure No. 1:²

Lenin having declared repeatedly during a speech before an official gathering of the Soviets, July 29, that a state of war exists between the Russian Republic and the Allied powers, the diplomatic representative of Great Britain and the Consuls General of France, Italy and the United States visited the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to inquire if they should not consider this declaration by the head of the government as a declaration of war involving the rupture of *de facto* relations and the departure of the consuls. Chicherin replied that it need not be so understood, that there is a state of defense rather than a state of war, that the Soviet government desires to continue its relations with the Entente as it did with Germany under analogous circumstances.

While reserving consideration of this explanation, the Consuls demanded that any explanation to be acceptable must be made publicly by the head of the government himself. Moreover they consider it necessary to connect this question with that of the departure of the members of the former military missions which events have made necessary. After having agreed to facilitate the departure of these persons conformably to the rules of international law, the People's Commissars now raised absolutely

inadmissible objections. If satisfaction were not immediately given in the matter, the Allied representatives could not but see therein the confirmation of Lenin's declaration that a state of war already existed. Chicherin will consult the Council of Commissars and reply within three days.

The Japanese Consul General, who has already declined to have even informal relations with the Soviet government, declares that he supports the views set forth above, and has notified the Commissariat that he intends to follow the same line of conduct as his Allied colleagues.

2. Reply of Chicherin received during the night of August 2–3:

Seeing that Citizen Lenin's utterances about the military operations being *de facto* conducted by the Anglo-French against Russia, were made behind closed doors at a meeting at which your agent could be present owing to a special courtesy on our part, public explanations cannot be given about non-public utterances. As to the ex-officers of the Entente military missions, we have begun negotiations with the German authorities in order to get from them a safe passage from Petrograd to Stockholm for these officers, any possibility of a passage through Archangel being out of question at the present moment when British cruisers have already begun the bombardment of the islands covering Archangel. Our negotiations on this subject are not yet terminated.

3. Report of our Consul General, dated August 5:

Referring to reports which you have received through the Swedish Government concerning arrests of British and French citizens at Moscow, it results from a conference this afternoon between Chicherin and Karakhan, on the one side, and the Consuls General of Japan and Sweden and myself on the other side, that (1) the Soviet government gives solemn assurance that Allied persons having diplomatic or official character will not be molested; (2) that Allied military missions will not [now?] be allowed to depart as already promised for some time; (3) that civil persons arrested are hostages for lives of Soviet members in territory occupied by the Allies.

Chicherin said that these persons are only civil prisoners arrested for internment in accordance with the usages of war. He persisted in adding, however, that in view of the breach by Great Britain and France of the elementary principle of international law through an attack on Archangel without previous declaration of war, and the subsequent execution of Soviet members, no responsibility can be assumed for their future safety.

I informed Chicherin that I had no knowledge of events in the north, but could warn him that the peoples of the Allied nations are not of a character to be intimidated, that the beginning of a system of reprisals by the Soviet

government could only result in the individual members of that government being in the end held personally responsible, and in the loss to the Bolshevik cause of whatever respect it may now have in the minds of the civilized world.

The Japanese Consul said that he had not heretofore had direct contact with the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs but was impelled by the gravity of the present situation to come personally to inform the Commissariat that the Japanese people will be deeply concerned by present developments; the Commissars are greatly mistaken if they believe that Japan can pass over such a situation with indifference. Chicherin said that the American Consulate General would be furnished the details respecting the alleged shootings in the north, and I replied that I would communicate these to the American Government.

As you are aware, I am quite without instructions in this situation and have no direct word respecting our attitude toward the operations in the north. The Soviet government insists, not without some justice, that the situation is altogether anomalous and unprecedented. Chicherin says that his government does not desire a state of war, and will take *de facto* measures of war only to the extent that such measures are directed against it.

While thoroughly concurring in an aggressive policy in Russia, I respectfully point to the practical complications attendant upon our present program, and earnestly request immediate and explicit instructions in the present situation.

It is to be remarked that Bolsheviks are becoming daily more desperate and no reliance is to be placed in their assurances.

4. Report of Consul General dated August 6:

De facto authorities forcibly entered Consulates General of Great Britain and France yesterday afternoon and arrested Consuls General and their staffs. Release of Consuls General and part of their staffs obtained about 3 o'clock this morning as result of untiring efforts of Swedish Consul General. Guard remains about both Consulates and will not permit nationals to approach. These acts were committed immediately following solemn assurance by Commissar of Foreign Affairs that all persons having diplomatic or consular character would be respected, see my telegram of yesterday.

In these circumstances of manifest bad faith, there was no assurance that the American Consulate General would not be violated at any moment; it was necessary to destroy codes and records. The absence of these, together with the continued unlawful conduct of the *de facto* authorities, now renders it materially impossible even in the absence of other considerations

to continue the exercise of my functions. I am accordingly asking the Swedish Consul General this afternoon to take over protection of American interests and at the same time request facilities for the immediate departure of the American consular and diplomatic staff. Other Allied consuls doing likewise. All possible measures are being taken for the security of private American citizens, who have not so far been molested.

Departure will probably be by way of Petrograd, Stockholm. German Embassy at the instance of Swedish Consul General has already recommended to Berlin issuance of necessary safe-conducts.

5. Translation of telegram from Vologda to Moscow received August 2, signed Armour, Pingaud, and Bowe:¹

An assistant of Kedrov, Commissioner of the People, came to see us to-day, August 1, at 7 p.m. He was instructed to ask our consent leave Vologda and go to Moscow as he was unable to answer for our safety here. After thanking this representative for his solicitude, we referred him to the express instructions of our Ambassadors to remain for the protection of our nationals at Vologda, and the impossibility of our going to Moscow on any pretext whatever. Nevertheless to reply to the desire expressed by the Soviet power and at the same time take care of the interests with which we are charged, we have declared ourselves disposed to go away from Vologda within 3 given distance. We consequently hope that this suggestion will be taken into consideration in spite of the delay of twenty-four hours which is imposed on us, for it is dictated by our desire to remove from the People's Commissioners the responsibilities which they seem to fear. We urgently request further instructions.

WHITEHOUSE

¹ Consul DeWitt C. Poole, in charge of the Consulate General at Moscow; later detailed to Archangel with rank of Counselor of Embassy.

² Also transmitted via the Embassy in France (No. 4682); by wireless from Moscow to Paris (File No. 861.00/2428).

¹ Second Secretary of the American Embassy, French Vice Consul, and British Vice Consul, respectively.

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *August 13, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[*Received August 14, 3.34 a.m.*]

2643. Italian Minister received last night ... telegram from Italian Consul at Moscow in which he stated that before permitting departure from [of] the military missions, Soviet demanded that the interested governments guarantee that officers and soldiers will not be employed directly or indirectly against the Russian Government; likewise that each officer should give his word not to take part directly or indirectly in any act hostile to the Soviet. Italian Consul states that the other military missions have consented but Italians refuse until instructed by commander in chief. He asks urgent reply and says that as situation is very dangerous he has turned over Italian interests to Swedish Consul General and is trying to leave.

[File copy not signed]

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *August 16, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received August 16, 4.25 a. [p.] m.]

2652. Swedish Foreign Office communicates following telegrams from our Consul General in Moscow:²

One, dated August 6, saying he has received no important communication from the Department since July 1 and that judging from one unimportant radio received at least twenty-four telegrams are missing.

His second telegram dated August 9, states as follows:

Japanese Consul General was able to leave yesterday evening and will submit detailed report to Associated Governments. It is probable that I also could leave alone but I refuse to do so: (1) because it is possible that American influence may help to protect British and French representatives, who are exposed to severe reprisals; (2) because there are certain advantages in remaining here, if possible, in spite of the personal danger. The liberation of a large number of French and English citizens, arrested as hostages, has been obtained, and the condition of the ninety persons still in prison is improving, thanks to the efforts of the Swedish Consul General and the International and American Red Cross. Stevens of the National City Bank is in Moscow and most of his people have joined Y.M.C.A. for service with International Red Cross. The same protection has been obtained for the personnel of the Y.M.C.A.

WHITEHOUSE

² See footnote 1, *ante*, p. 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)].

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *August 16, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received 11.23 p.m.]

2660. Foreign Office has received telegram from Swedish Consul General, Moscow, stating that [German] Government refuses to grant safe-conduct until settlement of negotiations now pending with England concerning treatment of German subjects in China and Soviet now refuses to allow consuls to leave via Kotlas on the ground that there is violent fighting along the Dvina. Swedish Consul General adds that negotiations are progressing for departure of consuls via Siberia and for liberation of those English and French still in prison; that negotiations would be greatly facilitated if England would guarantee not to shoot any Commissaries of the People that may fall into her hands. Notice has further been served on Czecho-Slovaks that if they execute any Commissaries on the Samara front, certain Czechs now imprisoned in Moscow will be executed.

Asker, Swedish Consul General in Moscow, who is now here on leave, is returning immediately to his post as Government feels he has influence in Moscow and is beginning to fear also for lives of Swedish subjects.

British Minister has received telegram from his Government approving his informal request through Swedish Foreign Office for a safe-conduct for our people to come via Finland and directing him to make an official request to Finnish Chargé d'Affaires in the same sense. Do you approve of my having joined with him and if so shall I also now make an official request to the Finnish Chargé d'Affaires, although I fear our people will not be allowed to pass via Petrograd?

WHITEHOUSE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

No. 10

Moscow, August 20, 1918.
[Received September 26.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a memorandum in duplicate concerning the arrest of British and French civilians in Moscow and the detention of the Allied consular corps and military missions. This memorandum has been drawn up at my request by Mr. Armour, Second Secretary of the Embassy, who recently arrived from Vologda, and covers events up until August 13, inclusive. Copies of the documents upon which this memorandum is based are also attached.

I have [etc.]

DEW. C. POOLE, Jr.

[Enclosure 1]

Memorandum of Events in Moscow Following the Departure of the Allied Ambassadors for Archangel

On the evening of July 24 the American Consul was invited to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and informed by Mr. Chicherin of the impending departure of the Allied Ambassadors for Archangel. Mr. Chicherin explained that on July 23 he had telegraphed to the American Ambassador at Vologda, as dean of the Diplomatic Corps, once more urging him to come to Moscow as further residence in Vologda had become impossible on account of the danger threatening them there, stating that "to-morrow may be too late." Mr. Chicherin added that on the same evening the Ambassadors had entered their train demanding the locomotive to take them to Archangel, but that this had been refused by the railroad authorities, who declined to grant a locomotive for any destination other than Moscow except upon the direct order of Chicherin. Mr. Chicherin then read a telegram from Mr. Francis, in which the latter set forth the reasons leading up to the decision to depart, particular emphasis being laid upon the interruption of communication with his Government in Washington. The Ambassador also referred to an order given to the press at Vologda, and presumably to the press of all Russia, prohibiting the publication of statements from the Ambassadors, remarking that he had understood that secret diplomacy had come to an end in Russia. Mr. Chicherin stated in his reply that he had answered and explained the points raised in Mr. Francis's telegram and that, if the Ambassadors still insisted upon leaving for Archangel, they would be provided with the proper facilities. However, that as Archangel was not a fit place for their residence, owing to the

imminence of a British advance, they would not be permitted to remain there, but a vessel would be provided, to take them to sea, where they might be transferred to a British vessel.

Mr. Chicherin then requested Mr. Poole to inform the American Government that insistence upon the removal of the Ambassadors to Moscow resulted from circumstances not within the control of the Soviets; that is, the impending White Guard uprising in Vologda, etc., that the Soviet government deeply regretted the departure of the Ambassadors from Russia and hoped that the American Government would not regard this as affecting the friendly relations between the two nations; and finally that the Russian Government earnestly hoped that the Consulate General would remain at Moscow. Mr. Poole replied that, having had no direct word from the Ambassador on the subject of his departure and being in general without instructions in the matter, he had no authority to speak on the subject officially, but that in his personal view he did not think that the departure of the Ambassadors need affect the situation fundamentally; that in the absence of other instructions from Washington the Consulate General would continue at Moscow as long as circumstances permitted and the privileges and immunities necessary to the discharge of his duties, principally facilities for communication with his government, were afforded the Consul (see memorandum of the American Consul's conversation with Mr. Chicherin of July 24, 1918, Document A, also radiotelegram to Paris for the Department of State, dated July 25, 1918. See also American Consul's telegram to Washington of July 25, Document A, ¹).

In an interview published in the official Soviet gazette, the *Izvestia*, for July 25, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chicherin, said that he could state categorically that the departure of the Allied Ambassadors would not in any way interfere in the relations between the Soviet government and the Allies; that the Soviet government deeply regretted that the Allied Ambassadors had not decided to accept the invitation to come to Moscow and that their departure from Vologda for Archangel could only be regarded by the Soviet government as the first step toward their departure from Russia, since, owing to military conditions, it was obviously impossible for them to remain there; finally that the Soviet government could see no reason, even after the departure of the Allied diplomats, why diplomatic relations should not continue with the Allied powers through their consular representatives in Moscow (Document B²).

The following official statement on the same subject was published in the *Izvestia* for July 26, 1918:

On July 25, the American Consul General, Mr. Poole, whose duty it is to support diplomatic relations in Moscow with the Soviet government, visited the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and stated in the name of the English diplomatic representative, Mr. Lockhart, and the Consuls General of France, Italy and Japan, that they approved of the statement he had made the day before to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, which is in

substance as follows:

According to the personal point of view of the Allied Consuls, there is no need to suppose that the political situation should be affected in its essential points by the departure of the Ambassadors who reside at Vologda.

The above-mentioned representatives of the Allied powers intend to remain in Moscow as long as circumstances make this possible and as long as they enjoy the privileges and immunities due to them particularly the possibility of unhindered communication with their Governments, unless they receive instructions to the contrary.

In spite of these reiterated assurances of friendly feeling by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the Soviet government almost immediately proceeded to enter upon a policy of unmistakable hostility.

On the evening of July 26 the Allied representatives, consisting of the British diplomatic representative and the Consuls General of France, Italy and the United States, were received by Mr. Chicherin and Mr. Karakhan. The American Consul made an oral protest in the name of the Allies against the continued detention without adequate reason of a French noncommissioned officer and a French soldier, as well as of Polish and Czech soldiers who had previously been arrested by the Soviet authorities. It was then pointed out that the chief difficulties recently at issue between the Allies and the Soviet government arose from the continuance in Russia of a considerable Allied military personnel and it was proposed that to obviate further difficulties of the same nature the Foreign Office should provide facilities for the departure abroad of the military attachés and their personnel, including the former military missions, as well as for the departure of certain Poles and Czechs, who were being transported in accordance with their desire, for service in France. The Commissariat for Foreign Affairs immediately agreed in principle to the departure of these persons, suggesting only that in view of the large number of Italian soldiers material difficulties might be encountered. It was agreed that a conference should be held at once by representatives of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Commissariat for War and representatives of the Allied nations, with a view to determining the best means of carrying out the departure of these persons practically (Document C¹).

On July 29, the American Consul addressed a note to the People's Commissar, referring to the conference of the day previous in which he requested that facilities be provided for the departure on the day following of the American military officers, assistants to the military attaché, left in Russia (Document D²).

So far as is known the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs took no steps to organize the conference referred to above, but on July 29, informed the Allied representatives very briefly that in view of the situation at Archangel, the

departure of the military attachés must be indefinitely delayed (Document E³).

At a special joint session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, the Moscow Soviet and the representatives of trade-unions, factory committees and other labor organizations convoked at Moscow on July 29, to discuss the general situation, Lenin, President of the Council of People's Commissars, repeated and emphasized in the course of his speech before this body that a state of war existed between the Soviet republic and the Allies.

On July 30, the British diplomatic representative and the Consuls General of France, Italy and the United States called at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and inquired whether they should consider this declaration by the head of the Soviet government as an actual declaration of war, entailing the rupture of the present *de facto* relations and the departure of the Allied representatives. The Commissar for Foreign Affairs replied somewhat evasively that there existed a state of defense rather than a state of war; that, in the new order of ideas established by his government a declaration of the character in question need not necessarily entail a rupture of relations, and that the Soviet government desires to maintain the same relations with the Entente as it has had with the Central powers under analogous circumstances (having reference to the events following the negotiations at Brest). The Allied representatives, reserving for the future consideration of any explanation which might be made, pointed out to the Commissar that they could not concur in secret diplomacy, whereby a clear statement made without qualification before a large public assembly (800 persons being present), should be materially qualified subsequently by explanations made behind the closed doors of a Foreign Office. They said that a statement such as Lenin had made has a specific meaning accepted by the civilized world since time immemorial and entails certain unavoidable consequences; that if a declaration of this character were not to be given a new meaning and to be followed by other consequences, then it would clearly be the duty of those desiring to bring about such changes to make the necessary explanations.

Furthermore, to be in keeping with the principle of open diplomacy, as wide publicity must be given to the explanations as was given to the original statement.

Passing to the subject of the members of the former military missions, the Allied representatives pointed out that the right of these persons to depart when they wished was clearly established by international law and usage and admitting of no qualification whatsoever, and that the objections raised to their departure were factitious and inadmissible. They said that the Archangel route was not insisted upon and had been mentioned only as being apparently the most convenient; that it was quite out of the question that no practicable route could be found by which so small a number of persons could depart; and that the failure of the Soviet government to facilitate the departure of these persons could only be attributed to an absence of good will, involving bad faith with respect to the agreement heretofore made in principle and concretely confirming Lenin's statement that a

state of war exists.

The Allied representatives referred to their intention, already expressed and accepted by the Soviet government, to remain in Moscow as long as they were granted the usual privileges and immunities, and pointed out that Lenin's statement was a direct contradiction of the expression of satisfaction by the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at the continuance of the Allied representatives here. They said that, if within a reasonable time, that is two or three days, Lenin did not publicly explain his statement in some satisfactory way and if at the same time provision were not made for the departure of the Allied military attachés with their personnel, the Allied representatives would be forced to the conclusion that Lenin's statement was intended to be taken in its generally accepted sense and that the Soviet government, apparently not desiring that the Allied representatives should longer continue here, would provide facilities for their departure. Chicherin said that he would lay the matter before the Council of Commissars and give a reply to the Allied representative in three days.

On July 31 a report of this conference was sent by radio to the French Foreign Office for communication to the Allied missions in Paris (Document F¹).

On July 31 the Japanese Consul, Ueda, called on Mr. Karakhan and informed him that the Japanese representatives were in full agreement with the position assumed by the Allied representatives at the conference on the previous day and that the Japanese intended to follow the same course of action as that outlined by their colleagues. Regarding the speech made by Mr. Lenin, Mr. Karakhan explained that England and France had already commenced military operations on Russian territory, but that the Soviet republic had not yet declared war against them. He added that the Soviet government intended to publish a *communiqué* explaining the exact meaning of Lenin's speech. Mr. Karakhan said that he was of the opinion that certain of the Allied representatives were seeking an excuse to leave Russia but that the Soviet government desired that they should remain, particularly the Japanese. Mr. Ueda replied once more that the Japanese would follow the same course of action as the Allies. Referring to the Allied military missions, Mr. Karakhan said that while they would probably ultimately be permitted to leave Russia, in view of the difficulties of the situation it might be some time before this could actually take place, but that Japan, not having commenced military operations and having but one military attaché, there would probably be no objection to his departure (Document G¹).

On August 2, Mr. Chicherin addressed a personal note to the American Consul, informing him that as Lenin's statement concerning the present state of relations between the Soviet government and the Allies was made behind closed doors, a public explanation of the meaning of the speech could not be made. As regards the members of the Allied missions, he stated that the departure through Archangel would be quite out of the question owing to the fact that British cruisers had already begun the bombardment of the islands surrounding Archangel, but the

Soviet government had opened negotiations with the German authorities with a view to obtaining safe passage for these officers from Petrograd to Stockholm (Document H¹).

It will be noted that Mr. Chicherin makes no mention in his note of the conference arranged for in the interview of July 30 by which a committee, composed of representatives of the Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and for War together with representatives of the Allied nations, was to be called to discuss the best means of carrying out the departure.

On August 2, at the Swedish Consulate General, a meeting was held at which the Consuls General of France and the United States placed before the Consuls General of Sweden and Denmark a full statement of the facts concerning the refusal of the Soviet government to provide facilities for the departure of the Allied military attachés and their staffs. The Allied representatives explained that they considered it their duty to bring this matter to the attention of the neutral representatives, because the course of action taken by the Soviet government was clearly in violation of one of the fundamental principles of international law and therefore touched the interests of the neutrals as much as those of the Allies. The neutral representatives immediately concurred in this point of view and announced their intention of protesting to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Shortly after this interview Mr. Radek, Chief of the Central European Division for Foreign Affairs, called on the Swedish Consul General. The question of the departure of the military missions being broached, he informed the Consul General without equivocation or reserve that it was the intention of the Soviet government to detain all Allied agents at Moscow to be shot off one by one in the measure that the advancing Anglo-French imperialists in the north dealt similarly with Soviet members. At the same time Mr. Widerstrom arranged for a conference with the Commissar for Foreign Affairs for August 3. Prior to this conference the Swedish Consul General was furnished by the Allied representatives with a memorandum in which the following points were raised:

- (1) The insistence on the immediate departure of the Allied military missions by any way practicable (the safe-conduct given by the United States to permit the German officials in China after the entrance of the latter into the war to proceed through the United States was cited as a precedent for Germany's giving safe-conduct to the Allied missions to proceed through Finland);
- (2) To demand an explanation of the statement made by Radek to the Swedish Consul General that it was the intention of the Soviet government to hold Allied Consuls and their agents as hostages; and finally to inform the Commissariat unofficially that the Allied Consuls, finding it increasingly difficult to remain in Moscow owing to the uncertainty of communication with their Governments and the difficulty of obtaining satisfaction in response to representations made on behalf of their nationals, felt that the necessity would soon arise for them to withdraw from their posts and hoped that the Soviet government would at once

take the necessary steps to assure means for their departure when this should become necessary (Document 1¹).

On August 3, the Swedish Consul General reported that he had called at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs by appointment, accompanied by his colleagues of Denmark and Switzerland. They were received by Mr. Karakhan, Mr. Chicherin not being present. While Mr. Karakhan appears to have raised the question of continued presence of Russian soldiers in France, nevertheless the Swedish Consul General obtained the impression that the military missions would be allowed to depart freely as soon as the necessary safe-conducts were assured by Germany. Karakhan repudiated the statements by Radek regarding the Allied Diplomatic Corps and informed Mr. Widerstrom that the diplomatic and consular representatives were at liberty freely to depart whenever they chose.

On Monday, August 5, by order of the *de facto* authorities about 200 British and French subjects were arrested. In the majority of cases the prisoners were confined in the former prefecture but some were put into prison. On the afternoon of the same day the Consuls General of Sweden, Japan and the United States conferred with Messrs. Chicherin and Karakhan on the subject of the arrests of the Allied citizens and officials which had been made during the course of the day. Mr. Chicherin stated that it was not the intention of the Soviet government to arrest persons having a diplomatic or official character and promised that all such persons should be forthwith liberated. He then raised the question as to the personnel of the former military missions, stating that some solution regarding their departure was still being sought. As regards the arrest of private persons, Mr. Chicherin stated that the British and French military forces had occupied Archangel and were killing members of the Soviet without a previous declaration of war; that this was a breach of international law; and that as a state of war now existed *de facto*, British and French citizens were being held as civilian prisoners and would be placed in internment camps; and that if the killing of Soviet members continued in the north, the Soviet government could not be responsible for the lives of interned prisoners. The Consuls pointed out to him that these persons were then in effect hostages. Before their departure Mr. Chicherin once more reiterated that persons of diplomatic or consular character would not be interfered with (Document J,¹ see also telegram sent to Washington through the Swedish Consulate General on same date, Document K;² and also telegram to Washington direct, Document L²).

Within an hour after this conference armed troops sent by the *de facto* authorities forcibly invaded the premises of the Consulates General of Great Britain and France and arrested the Consuls General and their staffs.

In the case of Mr. Wardrop, the British Consul General, troops entered the Consulate General against his protest and produced a warrant signed by Serebryakov, Vice President of the Presidium of the Moscow Soviet. The official premises of the Consulates were then put under seal. The British Consul General,

upon declining to accede to the order of arrest except under physical compulsion, was allowed to remain in his private rooms at the Consulate General. A guard, however, was placed around the building and the nationals were not permitted to approach (Document K, 1¹).

The French Consul General, however, and his staff together with the staff of the British Consulate General, were placed in confinement in the former prefecture on the Tverskoi Boulevard. When the troops entered the French Consulate General, M. Grenard demanded upon what authority they did so, whereupon the leader produced a document signed by a member of the Moscow Soviet. As the French Consul General refused to accept this, stating that he could only acknowledge documents signed by the Commissar for Foreign Affairs, the troops withdrew, but returned shortly with another document issued by the same office, stating that he would have to submit himself to arrest. As a result of the efforts of the Swedish Consul General, the French Consul General, the French Consul M. LaBonne, the French Consul General from Warsaw and his two assistants, the British Consul from Tiflis, the Vice Consul from Kiev and Vice Consul Lowden were released about 2 o'clock the following morning. It appeared from negotiations leading up to this release, in which the Consuls General of Japan and the United States took part, that the arrest had taken place by order of the Moscow Soviet, possibly without the knowledge of the People's Commissars. While the People's Commissars seemed willing to order the release of the consular officers, they had difficulty in securing the concurrence of the Moscow Soviet, with the result that three British Vice Consuls were retained in prison forty-eight hours longer. The clerks of the French Consulate General were not released until August 9. These acts were committed immediately following the solemn assurance of Commissar for Foreign Affairs that all persons having diplomatic or consular character should be respected (Document L²).

The *de facto* authorities made every effort to conceal the affair, reports appearing in the papers merely saying that, on account of the British and French invasion of Russian territory, proper precautionary measures had been taken to intern civilians of these nationalities, care being taken, however, not to proceed against women or children or persons of advanced age. As a matter of fact women and children and men up to seventy years of age were arrested.

On the same day the American Consul General wrote to the Swedish Consul General, asking him to take over the American interests in Moscow should the necessity arise (Document M³).

On the following day Mr. Poole wrote again to the Swedish Consul General pointing out that, in view of the arrest of the Consuls General of Great Britain and France with their staffs and fearing that the same action might be taken against himself, he had found it necessary to destroy his official codes and to take other measures of a practical nature. At the same time he requested that steps be taken to obtain the necessary facilities for the immediate departure of the American

consular staff (Document N³).

On the same day the American Consul received from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs a long letter addressed to Mr. Poole personally, in which Mr. Chicherin expressed at some length the ideas of the Bolshevik form of government, stating that it desires to make war against no nation, but that its territory had been invaded by Anglo-French armed forces, as a result of which it was forced to take the necessary measures to defend itself. Mr. Chicherin closed his letter with the following paragraph ... (Document O¹).

This letter, having been received after the decision of the American Consul to place American interests under the protection of the Swedish Consul General, was acknowledged to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs through Mr. Widerstrom (Document P²).

Owing to the unsettled state of affairs and probable departure of the Consuls General from Moscow, the latter sent word to the Secretaries of the French and American Embassies left at Vologda, as well as to the British Vice Consul there, to proceed at once to Petrograd, and there to place themselves under the protection of the neutral legations representing their respective countries. However, these officers had already been forced to leave Vologda under the compulsion of the local authorities and received this word from Moscow only at Danilov while they were awaiting the arrival of their nationals from Vologda. They immediately applied to the Vologda authorities once more for permission to proceed to Petrograd direct, but were informed that they could not be permitted to return to Vologda but must continue their journey to Petrograd via Moscow, which they forthwith proceeded to do, arriving at Moscow on the afternoon of August 8. During their entire journey, lasting in all five days (four of which were spent at Danilov), they were under a guard of ten soldiers, placed in the train by the Commissar for Military Affairs at Vologda "for their protection." This guard was further augmented on arrival at Yaroslavl by fifteen Magyars.

On the evening of August 7, the Japanese Consul General left Moscow for Petrograd, the idea being that he should there await the German safe-conduct, proceeding to Stockholm immediately upon its issuance in order that no time might be lost in acquainting the Allied Governments with the true state of affairs in Moscow and Russia. It is probable that the American Consul General might also have left at this time but he refused to avail himself of the opportunity, firstly because he felt that he might be of assistance to his French and British colleagues who were at that time exposed to the danger of reprisals, and secondly because, in spite of the possible danger, there appeared to be certain advantages to be gained in remaining for the present. During the course of the day (August 7) the liberation was obtained of a number of French and British citizens who had been arrested as hostages, the condition of the ninety remaining in prison being greatly ameliorated thanks to the efforts of the Swedish Consul General and the International and American Red Cross.

On the evening of August 7, Mr. Chicherin informed the Swedish Consul General of the conditions upon which the Allied military missions would be allowed to leave Russia. These conditions included: (1) free departure from England of the Russian representative, Mr. Litvinov, and of all Russian citizens now in England in an official capacity; (2) return to Russia of all Russian soldiers in France by every available route (evacuation to be conducted with the help of the International Red Cross and three representatives of the Russian Red Cross). The third condition, providing that all members of the Allied missions should give their words of honor not to take part in the future in any operations against the Soviet government, while originally put forward was later not insisted upon.

On the night of August 8 the American Consul received a note from the Commissar for Foreign Affairs advising him of the arrival of the Secretaries from Vologda and stating that every precaution had been taken to protect them *en route* (Document Q¹). Mr. Poole acknowledged this letter through the Swedish Consul General stating:

I have the honor to inform you that the Allied representatives at Vologda, after having been forcibly ejected from their official residences, have arrived at Moscow under guard (Document P¹).

On August 9, the neutral Consuls General addressed a general note to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs acknowledging receipt of the conditions governing the departure of the Allied missions and stating that their substance was being forwarded to the Governments of the Allied powers through the medium of the Swedish Government. It was further explained that the British diplomatic representative had already telegraphed to the English Government regarding the departure of Mr. Litvinov and that he was confident that a satisfactory answer would be received. Furthermore, as regards the departure of Russian troops from France, that the French Military Attaché, General Lavergne, had sent a telegram to Paris asking for confirmation of the agreement already made concerning the repatriation of Russian troops and furthermore requesting that their return be hastened as much as possible (Documents R and S¹).

On August 11 the Consuls General of France and America addressed a note to the Swedish Consul General on behalf of the “representatives of the Allied powers at Moscow,” in which they stated that while the governments of the Allied powers had too lofty a sentiment of justice and humanity to consider the exercise of reprisals against persons not directly responsible for the illegal acts committed against peaceful nationals of the Allied countries residing in Moscow, nevertheless they could not answer for the effect which the knowledge of these events might have upon the Allied troops now on Russian territory. It was suggested that the Swedish Consul General might bring this to the attention of the Soviet authorities, informing them that the Governments of the Allies, desiring to avoid such unfortunate events, hoped that the Soviet authorities would take the necessary

steps to bring about the release of the prisoners in question (Document T¹).

On the 13th of August, no reply having been received from the Soviet authorities regarding the departure of the Allied consulates and missions in spite of the insistent demands made through the medium of the Swedish Consul General, the Allied Consuls once more presented to the neutral representatives a memorandum stating that, in view of the actual circumstances and after eight days of negotiations, they considered it indispensable to decide immediately the question of the departure for the following reasons:

- (1) That they have satisfied the demands presented by the Soviet (a) as far as Mr. Litvinov is concerned by the assurances from Mr. Lockhart; (b) as far as the Russian troops in France are concerned by the telegram sent and received by the French Consul General. Moreover, they consider that the free departure from Russia of the Allied representatives will furnish the best guarantee for the fulfilment of these demands.
- (2) That the departure of all the diplomatic, consular and military representatives of Germany has taken place without opposition on the part of the Soviet government: that this departure aggravates considerably the situation of the Allied representatives in Russia and renders their free departure a matter of immediate necessity. If, in consequence of any obstructions and postponement, the dangers which threaten the Allies should be raised, the Allied peoples would see in these obstructions the most flagrant violation of Russia's neutrality and of international law and at the same time a clear act of injustice and of hostility capable of producing the gravest consequences.
- (3) In consequence, the diplomatic and military representatives with all their personnel demand the necessary permission to leave and request that measures be taken to enable them to leave Moscow to-morrow morning, August 14. In view of the actual circumstances the route via Petrograd no longer seems sufficiently safe, the Allied representatives request therefore to follow the only possible route in Russian territory and to be sent to Kotlas via Vologda and Vyatka (Document U¹).

During the afternoon of the 13th the Swedish Consul General was informed by Mr. Chicherin that he had received a telegram from the representative of the Soviet government at Berlin, Mr. Joffe, stating that the German Government agreed in principle to the departure of the Allied representatives and missions from Russia, but that before actually issuing the necessary safe-conducts it would be necessary to have full and complete lists of the names of all the individuals for whom the safe-conducts were requested. It was furthermore stated that the German Government was negotiating on the subject with the British Government through the medium of the Dutch Legation in Berlin with a view to securing the permission of the British Government for the German subjects now in China to be permitted to remain there and not to be transferred to Australia in accordance with the plan recently formulated by the British authorities; this to be in compensation for the

departure of the Allied missions from Russia.

[Subenclosure 1—Document A]

Memorandum of a conversation between the American Consul (Poole) and the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin), July 24, 1918

About 9 p.m., July 24, I was invited to the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs by Mr. Chicherin. He spoke first of the difficulties with the telegraph, saying that nevertheless the radiograms of the Consulate General were being sent promptly to Paris.

He then referred to the departure of the Ambassadors from Vologda, saying that a day or so ago upon receiving an intimation that the American Ambassador had asked for a train, he again telegraphed him saying that it was impossible that the Diplomatic Corps remain at Vologda, for the reasons already stated and which he now repeated, and begging them to come to Moscow. Their reply was to order a train for Archangel. He said they were now in this train at Vologda awaiting a locomotive. He then read me a long telegram addressed to himself by Mr. Francis, of which the substance, so far as I can recall, is about as follows:

Although we have been in our train for twenty-four hours, we are still without a locomotive, being informed that one can be given only upon order from Moscow. Mr. Francis was under the impression that the question of the removal of the Diplomatic Corps to Moscow was settled by previous telegraphic-correspondence, that is, negatively. He then reviewed various difficulties which the Ambassadors had encountered, placing special emphasis upon the absence of facilities for telegraphic communication. He mentioned a telegram from the Department of State in which the Department stated it had not heard from him since June 24 with the exception of one message sent through Archangel and that it had telegraphed him frequently and fully. Mr. Francis also referred to an order given to the press at Vologda and presumably to the press of all Russia, prohibiting publication of statements from the Ambassadors, remarking that he had understood that secret diplomacy had come to an end in Russia. He then referred to a statement in an earlier telegram from Mr. Chicherin, that Archangel might soon undergo "a siege." He said that he presumed that Mr. Chicherin did not have in mind a siege by the Germans, that none was to be expected by the Allies, and that if a siege of Archangel by Russians was suggested, he could only reiterate the earlier expression of complete confidence of the Ambassadors in the Russian people. Mr. Francis spoke finally of the friendship of the Allies for the Russian people.

I informed Mr. Chicherin that I was still without any direct word from the Ambassador on the subject of his departure, having heard of the matter only indirectly through one of my colleagues; that I therefore had no authority to speak on the subject officially but could only give my personal views. These were that the

insistence by the Soviets on the Ambassador's removal to Moscow had been inopportune and was aggravated by Radek's manner of fulfilling his mission as well as by certain incidents, such as continued arrest of Italian soldiers and of two French officers. He replied that the Italian soldiers would be released to-morrow. As for the French officers, the conduct of the French had in many instances been quite impossible necessitating arrests of this character. I explained that I was not competent to discuss the details of this question but that he must understand that the French were our Allies and that we assumed full responsibility for whatever they did. If the conduct of the French in Russia had not been proper, they should be asked to leave. As long as they remained they must be accorded full privileges and consideration, and that in any eventuality our action would be common, that is to say, if one left, we would all leave and that while we remain we would consider any infringement of diplomatic privilege practiced against the French as being directed against ourselves also.

Returning to the question of the Ambassadors, I informed Mr. Chicherin that in my personal view the Ambassadors would not come to Moscow. He said then that they would have to leave Russia. He said that he had telegraphed to Vologda explanation of the various points raised by Mr. Francis; that if they still insisted on leaving for Archangel, however, they would be provided with the necessary facilities and that at Archangel a ship would take them to sea where they might be transferred to a British vessel. I asked if the departure of the Ambassadors would involve also the departure of the Consuls from Moscow. He replied that he hoped not. He asked me to inform the American Government that circumstances which they could not control had forced the Soviet government to insist upon the removal of the Ambassadors to Moscow. If they chose instead to leave Russia, the Soviet government regretted this exceedingly and at the same time expressed an earnest desire that this should not work any change in the relations heretofore existing between the American Government and that of the Soviet republic.

I informed him that until contrary instructions might be received from the Ambassador or the Department of State, it was my intention to remain in Moscow as long as the Soviet authorities would permit, that is to say, as long as they would allow me a reasonable share of such facilities for communication as might exist, would afford me the consideration and privileges due to my position, and assure my personal security. Mr. Chicherin replied that it was very much the desire of the Soviet government that our relations should continue as heretofore.

Finally, I reiterated to Mr. Chicherin that I was without instructions and moreover had had no opportunity of considering various questions raised by this new situation; that I would consult with my colleagues reporting to them the substance of our conversation; and would call upon him about noon tomorrow to learn what further news he had from Vologda and at the same time to hand him a telegram to the American Embassy at Paris explaining the situation to the American Government.

[Subenclosure 2—Document A, 1—Telegram]

*The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State*¹

Moscow, July 25, 1918.

Last evening Chicherin communicated to me substance of recent telegraphic correspondence between him and the American Ambassador as Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, from which it transpires that Chicherin telegraphed Mr. Francis 23d again urging Diplomatic Corps to come to Moscow because at Vologda “danger threatening them to-morrow”; that Ambassadors entered train same evening in attempt to leave for Archangel but up to time of my conference with Chicherin had been unable to do so because railroad officials declined locomotive for any destination other than Moscow except upon direct order from Chicherin. Chicherin said locomotive would be furnished if Ambassadors insisted but that as Archangel was not a fit place for their residence owing to imminence of British advance they could not remain there but must forthwith leave Russia.

He then requested me to inform American Government that insistence upon removal of the Ambassadors to Moscow results from circumstances not within control of Soviets, that is, impending White Guard uprising at Vologda, etc.; that Soviet government deeply regrets Ambassadors’ leaving Russia and hopes that the American Government will not regard this as affecting friendly relations; and finally that Soviet government earnestly hopes Consulate General will continue at Moscow.

I replied that I had had no direct word whatsoever from the Ambassador regarding departure and was in general quite without instructions; that inasmuch as Soviet government had never been recognized, in my personal view departure of the Ambassadors need not affect situation fundamentally; that in the absence of other instructions from the Department Consulate General would continue at Moscow as long as Soviet government permitted, that is to say, as long as it was afforded means of communication and other usual privileges and courtesies. Finally I said I would transmit to the Department the message above stated but would add that in my personal view the present situation has been created solely by inopportune and unnecessary insistence upon the Ambassadors’ removal to Moscow and that if the Ambassadors now leave Russia the responsibility therefor rests entirely upon the Soviet government.

[File copy not signed]

[Subenclosure 3—Document D]

The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)

Moscow, *July 29, 1918.*

SIR: Having reference to our conference of the 26th instant, I have to request that facilities be provided for the departure to-morrow evening of Captain Prince, assistant to the American military attaché, as it has been found impracticable, under the American regulations, to attach him to the consular staff.

Lieutenant Bukowski, also assistant to the American military attaché, is now at Petrograd, and Lieutenant Packer, another assistant, is at Vologda. It is desirable that these two officers also depart without delay. I have accordingly to request that the necessary papers be provided for them and that Captain Prince be permitted to take these papers with him.

Learning that the French military attaché is leaving to-morrow evening also, in company with his staff, I suggest that the facilities provided for them be made available also for Captain Prince.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

[Subenclosure 4—Document E]

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the American Consul at Moscow (Poole)

Moscow, *July 29, 1918.*

DEAR MR. POOLE: It is unfortunately impossible for me as yet to give you a definite answer about the possibility of departure through Archangel. It is in consequence necessary to delay any action in the sense indicated in your letter of to-day until the situation in Archangel is such as to make the possibility of departure unquestionable.

Yours very truly,

G. CHICHERIN

[Subenclosure 5—Document M]

The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Swedish Consul General (Widerstrom)

Moscow, *August 5, 1918.*

SIR: I have the honor to request that, whenever it may be necessary for me to quit my post at Moscow for the time being, or in case the present *de facto* authorities forcibly interfere with the further exercise of my functions, you kindly take over at

once the protection of American interests in the district of Moscow, until such time as other arrangements may be made.

In order to lessen as much as possible the burden to be imposed upon your Consulate General, I am leaving Mr. Alexander Krilichevski, a Russian citizen, heretofore attorney for the American Consulate General, to act as business agent and office manager during the absence of an American officer. There is enclosed herewith, for your information, a copy of the general instructions which I have given Mr. Krilichevski.

I take this occasion to express to you my deep appreciation of your support and cooperation during these recent troubled times and to assure you in advance of the gratitude of my Government for your activities in behalf of American interests.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

[Subenclosure 6—Document N]

The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Swedish Consul General (Widerstrom)

Moscow, August 6, 1918.

SIR: Referring to my letter of yesterday, I now have the honor to confirm the facts already known to you, that, the present *de facto* authorities having forcibly trespassed upon the premises of the Consulates General of Great Britain and France and arrested the Consuls General and their staffs, I find myself in the material impossibility of continuing the exercise of my functions.

It is hardly necessary for me to recall that this violence took place immediately after the Commissar for Foreign Affairs had given the most solemn assurances in your presence that all persons having a consular character would be respected. Having no certainty in these circumstances that the Consulate General of the United States would not also be violated at any moment, it became necessary for me to destroy my official codes and take other measures of a practical nature which now necessitate, even in the absence of other consideration, that I withdraw with my staff to some point beyond the control of the government of Moscow.

Will you be so kind as to confirm these facts to the *de facto* authorities and to request the necessary facilities for the immediate departure of the American Consular Staff, of which a detailed list is herewith enclosed.

At the same time I have to ask you to inform the Commissar for Foreign Affairs that I have received his note of August 5, and that I shall not fail to transmit it textually to my superiors, as soon as I reach Stockholm or some other point where I shall have adequate facilities, for reporting upon the entire situation.

I have [etc.]

[Subenclosure 7—Document O]

The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the American Consul at Moscow (Poole)

Moscow, August 5, 1918.

DEAR MR. POOLE: At the moment when after the unjustifiable Anglo-French incursion Citizen Lenin declared in a speech that the Anglo-French were in fact making war upon us and you came to us to ask whether we are at war or at peace and whether you must remain with us, I answered that our people is still at peace with the peoples of your countries and that in order to enable you to remain here as the representative of America you would continue to have the same facilities as before for communicating with your Government. These facilities are still in your hands so far as these depend upon us, seeing that the stoppage of telegraphic communication through Murmansk is the work of Britain and not ours. We, on our part, have placed at your disposal our only means of communication with your Government, our wireless stations, and these being at your disposal we ask you to make it known to your Government as well as to the great masses of the people abroad that an unwarranted attack, an act of sheer violence, is being made upon us. We have done nothing to provoke this aggression, our people want nothing else but to remain in peace and friendship with all the toiling masses of all other countries. In the midst of peace the Anglo-French armed forces have made a violent irruption into our borders taking by force our villages and our towns, shooting down the faithful responsible workers of the Soviets, disbanding the workers' organizations and throwing their members into prison or sending them away from their homes, with nothing to justify their acts of robbery. No declaration of war was made against us and without a state of war being declared, battles are being fought against us and our national property is being robbed. Against us no right is recognized, no rule is upheld by those who have sent this force of invaders. Because we, the first in the world, have established a government of the exploited and of the poor, against us pure banditism is considered permissible, and the people who have not declared war upon us are operating by us like barbarians.

But we, the Soviets of the exploited and the poor, are not barbarians like these invaders. To those who are shooting down the members of our Soviets we do not answer by doing the same upon the representatives of these Governments. The official agents with diplomatic capacity of these same Governments are enjoying the immunity that their authorities refuse to the members of our Soviets. In adopting this attitude toward the official representatives of Great Britain and France, we are also taking into consideration your insistent demands seeing in you the representative of a people who, with your words, "will not do anything against

the Soviets.” When we answer the measures of war carried out against us with measures of precaution like putting into concentration camps nationals of the invading powers, we are considering them as civilian prisoners. And these measures of precaution we apply only to members of the propertied classes who are our adversaries, no such measure is applied to our natural allies, the workers of these same countries who are now residing here. The working classes of the whole world are our friends, and even now, to those countries whose armies are perpetrating against us undisguised violence, even to their people we declare, “Peace to the houses of the poor.”

Seeing that you have declared that your people does not wish to overthrow the Soviets, we ask you whether you cannot make it clear to us what Britain really wants from us. Is its aim to overthrow the most popular form of government that the world has seen, the Soviets of the workers and of the poor; is its aim counter-revolution? Seeing its acts we can think that it is so. We can think that it intends to restore the worst tyranny of the world, odious tsarism. Or does it want a specific conquest, a definite town or some strip of land that it can name to us?

Remembering your friendliness I hope that you will help to enlighten us upon this problem which faces us at the present moment.

Yours truly,

G. CHICHERIN

¹ *Post*, p. 655 [Pg. 655 is part of [Doc. 602](#)]; *ante*, p. 623 [Pg. 623 includes portions of [Doc. 586](#), [Doc. 587](#), and [Doc. 588](#)]; and *post*, p. 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 602](#)].

² Not printed; see the Consul’s telegram No. 38, July 25, *ante*, p. 623 [Pg. 623 includes portions of [Doc. 586](#), [Doc. 587](#), and [Doc. 588](#)].

¹ Not printed.

² *Post*, p. 657 [Pg. 657 is part of [Doc. 602](#)].

³ *Post*, p. 658 [Pg. 658 is part of [Doc. 602](#)].

¹ See enclosure No. 1 in telegram No. 2629, Aug. 12, from the Chargé in Sweden, *ante*, p. 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)].

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

² See reports of Aug. 5 and 6 in telegram No. 2629, Aug. 12, from the Chargé in Sweden, *ante*, p. 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)].

² See reports of Aug. 5 and 6 in telegram No. 2629, Aug. 12, from the Chargé in

Sweden, *ante*, p. 641 [*Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)*].

¹ Not printed.

² See report of Aug. 6 in telegram No. 2629, Aug. 12, from the Chargé in *ante*, p. 641 [*Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)*].

³ *Post*, p. 658 [*Pg. 658 is part of [Doc. 602](#)*].

³ *Post*, p. 658 [*Pg. 658 is part of [Doc. 602](#)*].

¹ *Post*, p. 659 [*Pg. 659 is part of [Doc. 602](#)*].

² Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Original, sent via wireless to Paris, not received at Department.

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, August 29, 1918, 6 p.m.
[Received August 30, 3.33 a.m.]

2734. Have received to-day three telegrams from Consul General at Moscow. In the first he inquires whether I have asked for a free passage through Finland for Americans and if not, to do so, and whether I have received any instructions for him from the Department. He further states he has received no telegram from you since No. 76 except No. 116¹ by wireless which he can not decipher as he has destroyed the code.

In his second telegram dated August 17 he states that he presumes I am receiving regular reports through Swedish Foreign Office and am informing the Department; that he is doing everything possible to arrange to leave either to the north or to the east so that the Consulate General may remain on Russian territory. But the Bolshevik government insists [that] departure by Petrograd [and] Stockholm seems the only possibility. He hopes that a decision will be come to as soon as possible for his work is stopped and the numerous personnel of the Consulate General must be transferred to northern Russia or Siberia without delay. Up to the present American private citizens have not been molested and he is trying to arrange for their departure but is having difficulty and requests my help to arrange matters with the Finnish authorities. Montesanto¹ is at Vladikavkaz watching events in the Caucasus, but he is not in communication with him at present.

His third telegram dated August 26 is as follows:

Thanks to the efforts of the Swedish Consul General, train has been obtained this evening for Petrograd for American officials and citizens except myself who am remaining to give moral support to my English and French colleagues detained by the Soviet. In spite of telegram to Swedish Legation, Finnish government has not yet granted and guaranteed free passage to Americans, Belgians, Italians and Japanese. Please do everything possible to obtain immediately desired permissions. Situation becomes more and more difficult. Every day lost may have grave consequences.

Swedish Consul General telegraphs on August 27 that a special train left the previous evening for Petrograd with Italian Military Mission, 71 persons, Belgian Consul and personnel of American Consulate General except Poole and all the personnel of the Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A. as well as of the American bank and private citizens, in all 95 Americans. Some Italian citizens were following that day. All passports have been visaed to leave Russia, and Finnish permission will be awaited at Petrograd. American interests confided to the [Norwegian] Legation in the person of an attaché of this Legation who arrived 26th from Petrograd.

Have immediately telegraphed the Consul at Helsingfors to make urgent request of Finnish authorities to grant safe passage and am informally requesting same of Finnish Chargé d’Affaires here.

WHITEHOUSE

¹ Not printed.

¹ Isaiah Montesanto, U. S. Vice Consul at Trebizond.

File No. 861.00/2600

[Document 604]

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *August 30, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[*Received 11.09 a.m.*]

2711. The Danish Minister at Petrograd has telegraphed to the Minister of Foreign Affairs announcing the appearance of a Bolshevik decree ordering the arrest of all subjects or citizens of the Associated Governments between the ages of 18 and 45. I further learn that the announcements of Bolshevik victories over the Czechoslovaks have been chiefly fabrications and that the early fall of Vyatka and Perm is expected. Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *August 30, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received 7.10 p.m.*]

2744. My 2734, August 29, 6 p.m. In reply to my telegram, Consul, Helsingfors, informs me Swedish Minister made arrangement August 26 with Finnish government to allow Allied consulates, missions and nationals accompanying them to pass through Finland, and Finnish government has notified frontier authorities and provided a special train. Vice Consul Waldo has been sent to the border to facilitate their passage.

Swedish Government telegraphed again yesterday to Legation at Petrograd to inform American party that they could pass, as from Poole's statement it would appear that their former telegram did not get through.

WHITEHOUSE

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, *September 3, 1918.*

[Received September 16, 5.34 a.m.]

1 (new series). Minister of the Netherlands, Oudendijk, arrived Moscow August 31 to negotiate directly with Bolshevik government respecting departure of Allied representatives, and release of nationals held as hostages. He warned Commissar for Foreign Affairs that present lawless course can not be continued with impunity. In replying, Commissar referred to the hesitating policy of the United States in Russia. Being informed by the Minister of this fact, I ventured the following oral and entirely informal observations.

By its present lawlessness the Bolshevik government has adopted the most sure means of ending whatever hesitation may still exist at Washington. After long hesitation, the United States regretfully entered the war against Germany for the sole purpose of maintaining international law. The United States has waited long and patiently before determining upon an active policy in Russia. If the Bolshevik government continues unlawful detention and molestation of Allied nationals and representatives the United States may feel once more the obligation of forcibly supporting public law and morality. Speaking personally and quite without instructions I can not doubt that the American people will, in the end, proceed against a treacherous [tyrannical?] and persistently lawless government in central Russia no less vigorously than they are now proceeding without delay against a government of the same sort in Germany.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania.

File No. 861.00/2619

[Document 607]

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 3, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received September 4, 10.10 a.m.]

2770. Consul, Helsingfors, telegraphed that American, Italian and Belgian Consulates and military missions accompanied by their nationals are leaving Russo-Finnish frontier this morning for Stockholm via Haparanda. American party consists of 40 officials, 40 Y.M.C.A., 25 National City Bank, 2 Red Cross and 15 other Americans. Have arranged for special train to meet them at Haparanda on Thursday. Am notifying Ambassador at Archangel.

WHITEHOUSE

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

No. 1359

STOCKHOLM, *September 5, 1918.*
[Received September 23.]

SIR: With reference to my telegram No. 2779 of September 5, 1918,¹ I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy and translation of the note sent by the neutral Ministers, in charge of Allied interests in Russia, to Chicherin, the Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, on August 26 last.

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Netherlands Minister, in charge of British, Japanese, and Belgian interests; the Danish Minister, in charge of French interests; the Swiss Minister, in charge of Italian interests; and the Norwegian Charge, in charge of American interests, to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs

PETROGRAD, *August 26, 1918.*

The undersigned chiefs of missions of the neutral countries in Russia, in charge of the interests of the nationals of the Allied powers, referring to:

- (1) The declaration signed by the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs Chicherin, dated August 9;
- (2) The declaration of the French Minister at Stockholm, addressed to the French Consul General at Moscow and announcing that the English and French Governments granted the conditions imposed by Commissioner Chicherin for the repatriation of French subjects and, in general, all Allied military and civilian nationals to leave Russia at the same time as the official representatives;
- (3) The telegram of August 18 from Mr. Chicherin to Mr. Oudendijk, the Dutch Minister, relative to the conditions imposed on the British Government;
- (4) The despatch of August 23, addressed to Mr. Chicherin by the Dutch Minister, declaring that the English Government accepted the only condition mentioned in the declaration of August 9 relative to Comrade Litvinov;

Express the surprise that they have felt on learning that the Commissioner of the People for Foreign Affairs had, by a note of August 24 addressed to the Swedish

Consul General at Moscow (and to the Dutch Minister), formulated new demands to which he declared he would subordinate the authorization of the government of the Federated Russian Republic of Soviets for the free departure of the military and consular missions and their personnel.

These new conditions may be summarized as follows:

- (a) The government of the Russian Republic demands to be allowed to communicate with the Comrade Litvinov and to receive from him information regarding his situation.
- (b) It asks for a complete list of the Russian citizens with an official character, including Comrade Baitler.
- (c) It will await the notice of the arrival of Comrade Litvinov and his colleagues at Bergen before authorizing the departure from Russia of the French and English diplomats as well as of the personnel of the consulates, whose entry into neutral territory should coincide with the liberation from English domination of Comrade Litvinov and his colleagues.
- (d) As regards the French mission, Comrade Chicherin asks that his Red Cross delegates be permitted to go to France to elaborate a plan of evacuation of the Russian soldiers in France, a plan the putting into force of which should precede the beginning of the evacuation from Russia of the members of the French mission.
- (e) The Commissioner for Foreign Affairs declares, finally, that as the liberation of the interned French and English must coincide with the cessation of repressive measures against the adherents of the Soviet authorities in the Allied countries and on the territories occupied by the Czecho-Slovaks and the English and Allied troops, it is indispensable to delegate immediately in the occupied regions some representatives of the International and Russian Red Cross to cooperate in the settlement of this question.

The representatives of the neutral countries point out that these new demands will still necessitate long *pourparlers*, made more difficult by the absence of direct telegraphic communications, and that the satisfaction to be given them would be the subject of serious negotiations, to such a degree that a very long time must elapse before the liberation of the military missions, consulates and nationals of the Allied countries. Further, there do not exist official representatives of the International Red Cross other than the members of the International Committee of the Red Cross at Geneva.

These demands, placed on a ground when the questions of sovereignty of the Allied nations are engaged, can not, in the opinion of the undersigned diplomatic representatives, be accepted as they are by the interested powers.

On the other hand, the free circulation of the diplomatic and consular representatives guaranteed by all the laws and rules of international law, consecrated further by the constant practice of civilized peoples, must be

respected by the Soviet government without being subordinated to reserves relative to certain points of application.

In view of these considerations the undersigned diplomatic representatives formulate an energetic protest against the new demands of the government of the Soviets as well as against the delay brought to the solution of the question of repatriation. They make, in the name of the Governments whose interests they represent, the most express reserves. They will hold the authors of this denial of justice personally responsible and will demand, at the proper time and place, reparation for the injury suffered by the persons whose interests have been confided to them.

[File copy not signed]

¹ Not printed.

The British Chargé (Barclay) to the Secretary of State

No. 986

MEMORANDUM

His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires presents his compliments to the Secretary of State and has the honour to inform him, by instruction of his Government, that Mr. Balfour has sent the following telegram to Mr. Chicherin:

We have received news that an outrageous attack has been made on the British Embassy at Petrograd, that its contents have been sacked and destroyed, that Captain Cromie, who tried to defend it, was murdered and his body barbarously mutilated. We demand immediate reparation and the prompt punishment of any one responsible for or concerned in this abominable outrage. Should the Russian Soviet government fail to give complete satisfaction or should any further acts of violence be committed against a British subject His Majesty's Government will hold the members of the Soviet government individually responsible and will make every endeavour to secure that they shall be treated as outlaws by the governments of all civilized nations and that no place of refuge shall be left to them. You have already been informed through M. Litvinov that His Majesty's Government was prepared to do everything possible to secure the immediate return of official representatives of Great Britain and of the Russian Soviet government to their respective countries. A guarantee was given by His Majesty's Government that as soon as British officials were allowed to pass the Russo-Finnish frontier, M. Litvinov and all the members of his staff should have permission to proceed immediately to Russia. We have now learned that a decree was published on August 29, ordering the arrest of all British and French subjects between the ages of 18 and 40, and that British officials have been arrested on trumped-up charges of conspiring against the Soviet government. His Majesty's Government has therefore found it necessary to place M. Litvinov and the members of his staff under preventive arrest until such time as all British representatives are set at liberty and allowed to proceed to the Finnish frontier free from molestation.

His Majesty's Government have at the same time addressed the following telegram to His Majesty's representatives at Stockholm, Christiania, Copenhagen, Berne, and The Hague:

His Majesty's Government trust that they may count upon the Government to which you are accredited to express to the Bolshevik authorities in strong terms their reprobation of this disgraceful outrage and to use their best endeavours to secure the personal safety of other British subjects.

I am consulting the Allied Governments as to the advisability of asking neutral governments to proclaim the perpetrators of such deeds as outlaws from civilization. I request your views as to whether such a request would have any prospect of success.

His Majesty's Government fear that they have really little hold at present over the Bolshevik government but they feel that they must do all they can to show that they are in earnest.

The only further course that occurs to His Majesty's Government is to get the neutral countries to express their reprobation of such acts as the murder of Captain Cromie. The Bolsheviks probably feel that Russia will not much longer be safe for them and if they realize that, there is no neutral country where they can take refuge they might hesitate to commit further crime.

As already mentioned above, His Majesty's Government have-asked their representatives in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland and Switzerland for their views as to the prospect of success for such a request and His Majesty's Government in the meanwhile would be glad to have the opinion of the United States Government on this matter.

WASHINGTON, *September 6, 1918.*

***The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Sweden
(Whitehouse)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 7, 1918, 7 p.m.*

1089. Your 2629, August 12, 6 p.m.¹ Inform Swedish Government that this Government has been advised by the acting American Consul General at Moscow of the untiring efforts of the Swedish Consul General in that city in facilitating the departure from Moscow to Sweden via Finland, of the members of the American Consulate General and other American citizens, and desires to express to the Swedish Government its full appreciation of these services on the part of its representative. Say furthermore that this Government is informed that the acting American Consul General has requested the Swedish Consul General in Moscow temporarily to take over the protection of American interests in that city, that this Government is happy to approve this action of its representative and that the Government of the United States will be particularly grateful to the Swedish Government if it will permit Consul General in Moscow to remain in charge of American interests in that city until a consular officer shall have been established there by the Government of Norway which has already taken over the protection of American interests in Petrograd and which has been requested to assume charge of such interests generally in all the cities and districts of Russia from which the American representatives have been withdrawn or may be obliged to withdraw.

LANSING

¹ *Ante*, p. 641 [Pg. 641 is part of [Doc. 598](#)].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, September 9, 1918.

[Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

5. Order issued 6th for arrest of French Consul General and military attaché and all members British diplomatic mission. They were by chance in American Consulate General now "first division" of Norwegian Legation and are still enjoying asylum there on this the third day. Norwegian Attaché endeavoring arrange safe-conducts for French to Danish Consulate and British to Swedish.

Lockhart imprisoned in Kremlin since 4th, motive in part as offset for arrest Litvinov, in part charges of plotting against Soviet government. Policy of British Government respecting Litvinov seems ill-advised to every one here. Little chance of arranging departure of British and French representatives until Litvinov delivered into neutral hands. Owing to the flagrant bad faith of the Soviets during all this affair it is impossible to say whether British and French representatives will be allowed to go under any circumstances. Free departure promised for British and French private citizens except males aged 18 to 40. Other Allies may go without restriction. Italian Consul General planning to leave to-morrow with four hundred Italians, mostly soldiers. Portion of Bolsheviks desire put Lockhart on public trial. Some foundation of fact for charges respecting Lettish troops but none for those regarding destruction of trains and other demolitions. President of extraordinary commission has admitted privately that case was brought out prematurely without conclusive proofs in order to befog issue growing out of Cromie murder. ...

Massacre of Russian citizens by Bolshevik government continues. Shootings at Moscow number about 150 nightly. More than 1,000 people have been shot in retaliation for attempt on Lenin. I have protested personally to Chicherin, pointing out that Bolshevik cause totters on verge of complete moral bankruptcy. Wardwell has written strong protest in the name of American Red Cross. But Commissariat Foreign Affairs has no control and but small influence over extraordinary commission which is carrying on the carnage. The situation is tragic beyond words, and it is difficult to see from what quarter relief may come.

Few straggling Americans being sent out this week. Andrews of Red Cross continues bedridden with a form of inflammatory rheumatism which makes it dangerous to assist [attempt] to move him. There need be no anxiety while he

remains here. Slight improvement in his condition last few days.

Reliable observer returning from Kiev reports feeling in Ukraine against Germany more acute than ever. He considers new outbreak of Bolsheviks possible within near future in protest against the extreme reaction which the Germans have supported.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania.

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 13, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received September 14, 9.15 a.m.]

2837. Have just received through Foreign Office following telegram dated 11th from Swedish Consul General at Moscow:

Yesterday evening, September 10, Soviet government permitted all Italian subjects who so desired, in all 400 persons, of whom 17 had been detained up to the present, to leave Moscow; 90 English, 50 French and 10 Americans left same time. Other British and French subjects except men between the ages of 18 and 45 will follow soon. On the advice of his Allied colleagues Italian Consul General decided to accompany his compatriots, his colleagues thinking that, in view of the extreme gravity of the actual circumstances, the departure of the official representatives should take place as soon as possible and not be delayed under any pretext.

WHITEHOUSE

***The Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (Armour),
temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State***

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 13, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received September 14, 6.51 a.m.]

2840. When Ambassador left Vologda for Archangel on July 25 he left me in Vologda as connecting link between himself and consulates. On arrival Archangel, finding that Bolsheviks had boat prepared for Ambassadors' departure, he wired me to join him immediately, but Bolshevik authorities Vologda held up permit until after departure of vessel. Ambassador then instructed me to remain Vologda joining him when possible. July 26 local authorities compelled French to move into our Embassy, giving as reason need of rooms caused by arrival of Bolshevik staff evacuated from Archangel. I protested, but to no avail.

Archangel staff¹ numbering about (two?) hundred arrived July 29 and was composed largely of former army officers. Although evacuation was officially due to impending Allied landing, it was generally believed that Kedrov, commissioner commanding northern front, had ascertained on visiting Archangel intention of staff to go over to Allies on their arrival, and therefore ordered retirement to Vologda.

On reports of landing of Allied troops,² local authorities immediately showed open hostility to Allies and all Russians who had come in contact with us. The houses of friendly Russians and also Y.M.C.A. and National City Bank apartments were visited by night by troops, and in one or two cases Americans were arrested, though I was able to secure release without difficulty.

On August 1, Kedrov sent officer to Embassy demanding our immediate removal to Moscow, stating Vologda unsafe. I refused to leave on ground of presence of nationals, French secretary and British consul making same reply, but on the following day I was notified that special train would be ready that night to take us to Moscow. Upon my refusal to go to train, troops entered the Embassy during the night and took us with our baggage to the train which left August 3 under guard of ten soldiers. Before departure, Bolshevik authorities promised me I could await nationals forty versts distant. The train however was not permitted to stop before reaching Danilov, one hundred versts distant, from where I telegraphed to the Vologda authorities that they had broken their word and demanded that the train be held, which was granted. Three days later all American nationals [omission]

consisting of members of the National City Bank and Y.M.C.A. passed through Danilov for Moscow.

I therefore telegraphed Mr. Poole placing myself under the jurisdiction of the Consulate General, and on the following day I was instructed to proceed to Petrograd as the Consul General had decided to leave the country owing to the arrest by the Bolsheviks of the Allied consular staffs and nationals.

This I was not permitted to do and our train proceeded to move on. At Yaroslavl our guard of ten was augmented by fifteen Magyars. Fearing that the latter might attempt to seize our documents I burned the red and green codes which had been entrusted me by the Ambassador before his departure. While officially I was not under arrest my movements during my stay at Danilov were particularly carefully watched and at all other places I was not permitted to leave the station platform.

A great section of Yaroslavl was destroyed during recent rising and the effect of the terrorist policy pursued by the Bolsheviks after its capture was still noticeable in the attitude of the people from Vologda to Moscow.

This uprising was brought about by the false announcement made by the Bolsheviks of our landing at Archangel and the consequent belief that Vologda would be also immediately taken, as shown by the fact that during the siege two young women arrived at Vologda bearing dispatches from the White Guard imploring the immediate sending of Allied troops from Vologda.

I consider that the disastrous result of this premature uprising will have the effect of discouraging any similar attempt until our troops are practically in sight.

On the arrival of the train at Moscow we were held in the train for an hour until Chicherin sent the order for our release.

ARMOUR

¹ The Soviet military staff at Archangel.

² A contingent of U. S. troops landed at Archangel on Sept. 4; see [vol. II](#), chap. ii.

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 14, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received September 15, 3 a.m.]

2845. The Swedish Government Foreign Office has sent me copy of telegram received from Swedish Consul General at Moscow with the comment that the telegram lacks a date, was certainly delayed and very much garbled.

Telegram states that American colony at Moscow consists of about 15 people of whom 10 will leave for Petrograd and probably later all will go. Consul Poole, Wardwell of the Red Cross and Anderson, presumably of the Y.M.C.A., will be held temporarily.¹

English colony comprises 800 people of whom 90 are ready to go and 300 have decided to leave later. The rest intend to remain. The consular staff and diplomatic missions, in all 7 persons including Lockhart, are detained on the pretext of having committed a political offense and 20 are imprisoned as hostages.

There are 1,000 persons in the French colony, 250 of whom wish to leave, 350 are uncertain, the rest desire to remain. The consular staff, 20 military persons, 18 officers including the military attaché, 48 men, are detained likewise for political offenses. Further, 28 civilians are detained as hostages.

There are 750 Italians; 450 are ready to leave including the Consul General, an officer of the Military Mission, and the consular staff. Fourteen persons are detained but will probably be released.

WHITEHOUSE

¹ Cf. telegram No. 9 of Sept. 25 from Consul Poole, *post*, p. 673 [Pg. 673 includes portions of [Doc. 618](#), [Doc. 619](#), and [Doc. 620](#)].

File No. 123 P 78/48b

[Document 615]

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in France (Sharp)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 14, 1918, 7 p.m.*

5623. Please forward following telegram for Poole at Moscow immediately by any route available:

Department has approved your remaining at Moscow but now desires you to proceed immediately Stockholm, Archangel or Omsk whichever you can arrange and report from there. Any Americans remaining should accompany you if possible.

LANSING

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 15, 1918.*
[Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

6. Arrived Petrograd 13th to confer with Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires concerning asylum of French and British in the Consulate General reported my No. 5. He returns to Moscow with me to-day. In view of release Litvinov by England, departure of British and French representatives may possibly be arranged.

Americans continue to enjoy relatively favorable position though less so than formerly. Bolsheviks say they are aware of presence of American troops in north but that they have not yet come actively in contact with Soviet units. There is similar effort to dissociate Japanese from other Allies. Even in the case of America this policy is more or less artificial and, as shown by Simmons's¹ experience at Vologda, will inevitably give way under rotten [omission]. From reports true or untrue of actual conflicts to [and] repressions such as those now being practised against British and French, see my No. 7,² old policy of relative friendliness to America will also be unfavorably influenced from now on by development of alliance with Germany disclosed in the supplementary treaties.

For these reasons am bending every effort to complete evacuation of Americans from central Russia. Still about fifteen who can probably be gotten to go and as many more who will not leave under any circumstances. One American, Beaudrie, in prison charged with speculation in food products would have been shot if Russian [omission].

POOLE

² Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania.

¹ Roger E. Simmons, Trade Commissioner, Department of Commerce.

² *Post*, p. 686 [Pg. 686 includes portions of [Doc. 629](#) and [Doc. 630](#)].

The Consul General at Christiania (Letcher) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *September 16, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[*Received 10 p.m.*]

[1145.] Referring recent telegrams relayed for Poole, have received in [un-]official information from British Legation that Norwegian Foreign Office has communicated telegram from Petrograd dated September 11 reporting from Moscow as of 6th instant that Red Guard were besieging American Consulate General demanding surrender to them three French and five British subjects who had taken refuge there. Also reported that Norwegian Legation had protested to Commissar and representative was being sent to Moscow to render such aid as possible.

Personal letter from Poole dated September 4 concluded with the following:

I am making a desperate effort to bring some staying influence to bear on the Bolsheviks but I fear that sad things may have happened even perhaps before this letter reaches you. Thank God we have got out all the Americans who would go!

LETCHER

File No. 861.00/2744

[Document 618]

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1918, 6 p.m.*

1581. Department understands important confidential mail report regarding conditions in Petrograd cabled British Foreign Office from Christiania September 17 and originated with Netherland Minister to Russia. Department understands Foreign Office might consent to furnishing copy. If so please forward by mail soon as possible.

LANSING

The Consul at Moscow (Poole), temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 25, 1918.*
[*Received September 26, 1.48 p.m.*]

9. Pursuant Department's September 14, I left Moscow 18th after arranging with Norwegian Legation for immediate departure of few remaining Americans including Penningroth of Y.M.C.A. and Webster of Red Cross. Though condition improving Andrews of Red Cross cannot be moved for at least fortnight. Wardwell and Doctor Davidson will remain at Moscow to bring him out. Their position relatively secure.

Following search at Moscow Y.M.C.A. headquarters by counterrevolutionary committee September 16 Paul Anderson arrested and held for examination. Recently learned through courtesy of Belgian citizen that Vice Consuls Burri¹ and Leonard² thought to have gone to Baku have been for some time imprisoned at Tsaritsyn. Vigorous action taken and release of all three may have been accomplished by now. Has Department news of Tredwell? Montesanto presumably at Vladikavkaz. All other officers accounted for.

POOLE

¹ Alfred T. Burri, Vice Consul at Moscow.

² Robert F. Leonard, Vice Consul at Moscow.

***The Consul at Moscow (Poole), temporarily at Christiania,
to the Secretary of State***

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *September 28, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received September 29, 5.33 a.m.]

I have come here with a view to accelerating if possible through the Norwegian Government departure from Russia of the Americans mentioned my No. 9 of the 25th. Will return Stockholm October 1. Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires, Petrograd, also here, having left Petrograd 25th. He reports that special messenger has been sent to Tsaritsyn to bring Vice Consuls Burri and Leonard to Moscow and that Chicherin has given written order for their departure from Russia. Chicherin also promises that Paul Anderson will be released and permitted to depart. I am telegraphing Wardwell of the Red Cross to hasten in every way his and Andrews's leaving.

Norwegian Chargé d'Affaires reports conditions unchanged at Petrograd on the day of the departure, wholesale arrests continuing.

POOLE

File No. 861.00/3029

[Document 621]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

No. 10008

LONDON, *October 5, 1918.*
[Received October 23.]

SIR: With reference to the Department's telegraphic instruction No. 1581 of September 24, 1918, and to my telegrams No. 2452 of October 3, 4 p.m.,¹ and No. 2493 of October 4, 5 p.m.,¹ in regard to a report by the Netherland Minister, relating to conditions in Petrograd, I have the honor to transmit herewith, for the information of the Department, a copy of the note, dated October 1, 1918, together with a copy of the report enclosed therein, which was received from the Foreign Office in response to the representations of the Embassy in this connection, and upon which my telegrams referred to above were based.

I have [etc.]

For the Chargé d'Affaires:
EDWARD BELL

[Enclosure]

The British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Balfour) to the American Ambassador (Page)

No. 162839/W/38

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs presents his compliments to his excellency the United States Ambassador and, with reference to his note No. 1261 of the 25th September,¹ has the honour to transmit, herewith, for his excellency's confidential information, a copy of the report by the Netherlands Minister, relating to conditions in Petrograd, which was received through His Majesty's Minister at Christiania.

Mr. Balfour trusts that his excellency will agree with him in considering that it is undesirable that any of the information contained in the report should be made public until the Allied subjects and citizens now in the power of the Bolsheviks have left the country.

LONDON, *October 1, 1918.*

[Subenclosure]

Report of the Netherlands Minister relating to conditions in Petrograd

On August 30 I left for Moscow largely in connection with negotiations for evacuation of British subjects from Russia. The same day Uritski, commissary at Petrograd for combatting counter-revolution, was assassinated by a Jewish student Kanegiesser, whose father is a wealthy (? engineer) and holds a very good position at Petrograd. This murder was at once attributed by the Bolshevik authorities and Bolshevik press (only existing press in Russia) to French and English.

That same night Consul Woodhouse and Engineer Commander Le Page were arrested at 1 a.m. in the street. Every effort was made the next day (August 31) by my secretary Mr. van Niftrik to obtain their release and that of Consul Woodhouse was promised for the afternoon.

At 5 p.m. on August 31 when Consul Bosanquet and Acting Vice Consul Kimens who had been busy the whole day with Mr. van Niftrik in connection with his attempt to obtain release of the arrested were heading to the Embassy and were near the Embassy building, they were warned not to approach the Embassy, told that it had been occupied by Red Guards and that two persons had been killed. They at once decided to head back to find Mr. van Niftrik and asked him to endeavour to secure entry into the Embassy. While driving slowly away from Embassy their car was stopped by Red Guards in another car, one of whom levelled a revolver at them and told them to hold up their hands. They were searched and had to give their names and rank, but to their great surprise were allowed to proceed. Mr. van Niftrik drove with them to Gorokhovaya 2, headquarters of the Commission for Combatting Counter-Revolution, to which persons arrested are usually taken and where Mr. Woodhouse was confined. He had a long interview with the commandant of Petrograd, Bill Shatov, and strongly protested against the unheard-of breach of international law which had taken place, and demanded to be allowed to drive immediately to Embassy to be present at search there. Permission was refused by Shatov, who said that Embassy was being searched because authorities had documents proving conclusively that British Government was implicated in Uritski's murder. When they had left Furm ... and their car was passing the Winter Palace, staff of British Consulate and of missions and some civilians who were at Embassy when it was invaded were seen walking under guard to No. 2 Gorokhovaya.

A meeting of neutral Diplomatic Corps was held that night upon initiative of Mr. van Niftrik, at which following points were submitted:

- (1) That immediate release of those arrested should be demanded;
- (2) That it should be insisted upon that Mr. van Niftrik should be present at examination of arrested;
- (3) That attention should be drawn to gross breach of international law committed by armed occupation of Embassy which bore on the door a signed and sealed

notice to the effect that it was under the protection of Netherland Legation and by refusal to allow Mr. van Niftrik to be present at the search.

The meeting drew up a protest to be presented to Soviet authorities at Moscow.

On September 1 particulars were learnt as to the violation of Embassy and details will be found in a statement herewith enclosed made by Mrs. Bucknall, wife of Lieutenant Bucknall, now under arrest. Mrs. Bucknall was at the Embassy at the time of its invasion. The Red Guards under the direction of several commissaries had made their way into the Embassy at 5 p.m. and behaved with the greatest brutality. Captain Cromie who had tried to bar their entrance and had been threatened that he would be killed "like a dog" had fired, killing two men. He had then been shot himself and died nearly instantaneously. The whole staff of the consulate and missions and some civilians accidentally present at the Embassy had then been marched under escort to Gorokhovaya No. 2, where they remained until Tuesday, September 3, when (at 4 p.m.) they were conveyed to the Fortress of Peter and Paul.

During next few days repeated efforts were made by Mr. van Niftrik, Mr. van der Pals, also Consul and neutral legations to obtain release of those arrested but without success. Mr. van Niftrik endeavoured successfully to obtain an interview with Zinoviev, president of northern commune, on September the 1st; Mr. Scavenius, Danish Minister, who expressed profound indignation at what had occurred, saw Zinoviev at 9 p.m. on that day, and expressed himself in strongest terms. He was promised that body of Captain Cromie should be delivered up to him and Mr. van Niftrik, and on September 2 they together removed the body to the English Church. The funeral took place in the presence of the whole of the *Corps diplomatique* and the greater part of the British and French communities. The coffin was covered with the Union Jack and was completely wreathed with flowers. After it had been lowered into the grave I pronounced following short address in French and English:

In the name of the British Government and in the name of the family of Captain Cromie I thank you all, especially the representatives of the Allied and neutral countries, for the honour you have shown Captain Cromie.

Friends, we have all known Captain Cromie as a real friend, as a British gentleman, as a British officer in the highest sense of the word.

Happy is the country that produces sons like Captain Cromie.

Let his splendid and beautiful example lead us and inspire us all until the end of our days. Amen.

The doyen of the *Corps diplomatique*, M. Odier, Swiss Minister, gave expression to his deep sympathy and admiration for the late Captain Cromie who had died for his country.

In the evening of September 3 no impression having yet been made on the communal authorities another meeting of the *Corps diplomatique* was held. This meeting was attended by neutral diplomatic representatives and Mr. van der Pals representing the Netherland Legation. Unexpected feature of the meeting was the appearance at the suggestion of Mr. Scavenius of German and Austrian Consuls General. The whole of the body met together at 9 p.m., and proceeded to Zinoviev's residence where they with difficulty succeeded in obtaining an interview with him. M. Odier strongly protested in the name of the neutral legations at action taken by communal authorities against foreign subjects. He emphasised the fact that for acts of violence committed against foreign subjects in Russia the Soviets' officials would be held personally responsible. He demanded that permission should be granted for a neutral representative to be present at the examination of the accused. Zinoviev said that he must consult his colleagues on the matter. Mr. van der Pals afterwards again laid stress on this point. M. Odier was followed by German Consul General who made a forcible protest in the name of humanity against the terrorism now entered upon by Bolsheviks. He referred in strong terms to "sanguinary" speech of the other day by Mr. Zinoviev and said that even though French and English arrested belonged to nations at war with Germany yet it was impossible not to unite with neutral representatives in a strong protest against course now adopted by Bolsheviks. He appears to have spoken with great force through one line of [message or perhaps pages missing].

I returned to Petrograd yesterday as I had received a telegram from my secretary urging my return and could not therefore take responsibility of remaining longer absent from Petrograd where position I gather must be very bad. Up to to-day situation here has in no way improved. Besides British arrests numerous arrests of French citizens have taken place, including that of the commercial attaché to French Embassy, though French consular officers have not so far been touched. Thousands of Russians belonging to officer and wealthy classes not excluding merchants and shopkeepers are being arrested daily, and according to an official communication five hundred of them have already been shot; amongst arrested there are a large number of women. For last four days no further British arrests have been made. I enclose herewith a full list of British officials and civilians now under arrest at Petrograd.

Position of British subjects in prison is most precarious and during last few days constant reports have reached Legation that question whether to shoot or release them has not yet been decided. There seems to be also a strong tendency to regard those arrested as hostages. Those belonging to military and naval missions are probably in most danger and in present rabid temper of Bolsheviks anything is possible but there is some hope that consular staff and civilians may be released before matters become still more serious. With regard to members of missions hope of release seems very small.

Conditions under which Englishmen at Peter and Paul Fortress are kept are most miserable. I was informed yesterday by M. d'Arcy, commercial attaché to French

Embassy just released, that they are crowded together with other prisoners, some twenty in a cell, twenty by ten feet. In each cell there is only one bed, rest must sleep on a stone floor. No food whatever is supplied by prison authorities, and they depend entirely on arrangements which this Legation had made, and food furnished by friends and relatives. Rugs, pillows, medicines, warm clothing and other comforts are being sent from time to time, but great difficulties are experienced in getting these articles delivered. From August 31 to morning of September 2 no food at all was accepted for prisoners. Since then they have received some supplies from outside, but it still remains to be seen whether it will reach them regularly at fortress, though I shall leave no stone unturned to secure its proper distribution. Russian prisoners in fortress appear to be absolutely starving and this will make the question of supply of British subjects even more difficult than it would otherwise be, owing to presence in their cells of famished Russians. I enclose herewith copy of letter just received from British prisoners which speaks for itself.¹

Yesterday evening I endeavoured to see Zinoviev in order to inform him of appalling conditions at the fortress but he absolutely refused to see me. I was equally unable to see Uritski's successor and could only gain access to a subordinate of latter, who behaved with lack of courtesy which may now be expected. I informed him of conditions obtaining in fortress and he eventually promised to speak to commandant of fortress whom he had occasion to see that night. He refused to give me the number of Zinoviev's telephone or name of commandant of fortress.

As regards situation in Moscow I can only say that in my opinion it is most grave. Nineteen Englishmen and thirty Frenchmen have been arrested and are kept under the worst conditions. Mr. Lockhart who was released and subsequently rearrested was only saved from being shot on September 4 by my most strenuous exertions. Before I left Moscow a solemn promise was given to me that he would be released but his position is precarious in the extreme, while all those now under arrest there are in great danger. Mr. Lockhart is accused by Soviet government of organising a plot to overthrow it and Bolshevik official and unofficial papers are full of details of alleged conspiracy while it is asserted that British officials at Petrograd were concerned in plot. Attempt on life of Lenin is of course attributed by Bolsheviks to British and French and if he should die it is quite possible that all now under arrest at Moscow and Petrograd would be shot.

At Moscow I had repeated interviews with Chicherin and Karakhan. I consider Chicherin beneath contempt and can only apply to him term "reptile." I was able to show pretty clearly what opinion I held of him. Whole Soviet government has sunk to the level of a criminal organisation. Bolsheviks realise that their game is up and have entered on a career of criminal madness. I repeatedly told Chicherin with all the energy of which I am capable that he must realise full well that Bolshevik government was not a match for England. England had a longer wind than the Soviets. She would not be intimidated; even if hundreds of British

subjects should be executed by order of the Bolsheviks England would not turn one hair's breadth from her purpose. Moment would come when the Soviet authorities, man by man, would have to pay for all the acts of terrorism which they committed. But in spite of persistence with which I drove those facts home, I could not obtain any definite promises from Chicherin but only a few evasive replies and some lies. Bolsheviks have burnt their boats and are now ready for any wickedness.

As regards original objects of my journey to Moscow, evacuation of British from Russia, I found it necessary to promise that Litvinov should be allowed to leave England at once provided that in exchange for this concession all British subjects in Russia including consular staffs and missions were allowed to leave the country. This was agreed to so far as consulates and civilians were concerned including those now under arrest at Petrograd but an exception was made with regard to members of military and naval missions who would be released only on arrival of Russian Red Cross delegates in France for the purpose of repatriation of Russian soldiers. Result of negotiations was reported by telegraph to His Majesty's Minister at Stockholm through intermediary of Swedish Consul General at Moscow for communication to British Government.

As regards invasion of British Embassy at Petrograd I had occasion to present to Chicherin and Karakhan, in addition to my protest and demands for repatriation, embodied in my note to Chicherin of September 2, joint protest drawn up by neutral diplomatic representatives at Petrograd (see above) which I also signed, demanding release of all those arrested at Embassy and that Embassy should be handed over to me and stating that Soviet government would be held responsible in every respect for consequences of this breach of international law which was quite unique in history. This I reported to my Government, at The Hague, through the intermediary of Chicherin for transmission to British Legation there though I cannot affirm that telegram was sent. Chicherin wished to evade question of release of persons arrested at Embassy and only agreed to demand for Embassy to be handed over to me, but I told him plainly that it must be all or nothing, and that I would not consent to half measures of this kind. I have further demanded that all documents seized at the Embassy shall be delivered to me.

The foregoing report will indicate the extremely critical nature of the present situation. The danger is now so great that I feel it my duty to call the attention of the British and all other Governments to the fact that if an end is not put to Bolshevism in Russia at once the civilisation of the whole world will be threatened. This is not an exaggeration but a sober matter of fact; and the most unusual action of German and Austrian Consuls General before referred to, in joining in protest of neutral legations appears to indicate that the danger is also being realised in German and Austrian quarters. I consider that the immediate suppression of Bolshevism is the greatest issue now before the world, not even excluding the war which is still raging, and unless as above stated Bolshevism is nipped in the bud immediately it is bound to spread in one form or another over Europe and the

whole world as it is organised and worked by Jews who have no nationality, and whose one object is to destroy for their own ends the existing order of things. The only manner in which this danger could be averted would be collective action on the part of all powers.

I am also of opinion that no support whatever should be given to any other socialistic party in Russia, least of all to Social Revolutionaries, whose policy it is at the moment to overthrow the Bolsheviks, but whose aims in reality are the same, viz., to establish proletariat rule through the world. Social Revolutionaries will never fight any foreign power and any profession which they may now make in this sense is merely a tactical move in their struggle with the Bolsheviks.

I would beg that this report may be telegraphed as soon as possible in cypher in full to the British Foreign Office in view of its importance.

Consul Bosanquet and Acting Vice Consul Kimens are staying at this Legation but it is essential that this fact should not be known to any one.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

File No. 861.00/2900

[Document 622]

The Chargé in Norway (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *October 7, 1918, noon.*
[Received 10 p.m.]

1216. *Note verbale* from the Foreign Office dated October 4 states that a telegram from Norwegian Legation, Petrograd, under date of October 3 reports that the British and French citizens who had sought asylum in the American Consulate General, Moscow, had left and that Norwegian extraterritoriality had not been violated.

SCHOENFELD

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 12, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[Received 9.56 a.m.]

2737. Following from Stockholm:

219, October 11, 1 p.m. Webster¹ arrived yesterday with 7 Americans, 31 British, 29 French, including Lockhart, Ward, Robin P. Lavergne and consular and military staffs from Moscow. Forty-five British and 5 French still in fortress Petrograd. Wardwell and Andrews hope to come out shortly by boat. Everything all right at Embassy. Rumor Kalamatiano shot in Moscow. Seventeen more Americans arrive to-day. Whitehouse.

Archangel notified.

LAUGHLIN

¹ Capt. William B. Webster, member of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia.

Chapter XV. The Terror

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[Protest of the United States; attitude of Allied and neutral governments—Protests of neutral governments and of the chief of the American Red Cross Commission: answers of the Soviet government—Efforts for the release of hostages and for restriction of the practice of taking them](#) (Documents 624-684)

Protest of the United States; attitude of Allied and neutral governments—Protests of neutral governments and of the chief of the American Red Cross Commission: answers of the Soviet government—Efforts for the release of hostages and for restriction of the practice of taking them

[\[624\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, September 2, 1918. [Received October 16.]

File No. 861.00/2971

[\[625\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, September 3, 1918. [Received September 16, 5.34 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2707

[\[626\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, September 4, 1918. [Received October 16.]

File No. 861.00/2980

[\[627\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, September 5, 1918. [Received October 5, 8.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2890

[\[628\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, September 9, 1918. [Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2790

[\[629\] The Consul at Moscow \(Poole\) to the Secretary of State](#)

Moscow, undated. [Received October 22, 1918.]

File No. 861.00/3020

[630] The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Petrograd, September 15, 1918. [Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2789

[631] The Secretary of State to all American Diplomatic Missions

Washington, September 20, 1918, 6 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2778a

[632] The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

File No. 861.00/3110a

[633] The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador (Jusserand)

Washington, September 21, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2642

[634] The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

Vladivostok, September 21, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received 7 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2763

[635] The Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (Armour), temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 21, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received September 22, 12.51 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2760

[636] The Chargé in Japan (Spencer) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, September 23, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received September 23, 2.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2770

[637] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Spencer)

Washington, September 21, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2763

[638] The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell)

Washington, September 24, 1918, 7 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2763a

[639] The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

Paris, September 24, 1918, 11 p.m. [Received September 25, 6 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2784

[640] The Chargé in Siam (White) to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, September 25, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received September 26, 11.14 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2800

[641] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland (Stovall)

Washington, September 25, 1918, noon.

File No. 861.00/2815a

[642] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 25, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received 10.28 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2787

[643] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, September 26, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received 11.80 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2802

[644] The Minister in Haiti (Blanchard) to the Secretary of State

Port-au-Prince, September 26, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received 9.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2801

[645] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, September 27, 1918. [Received September 28, 1.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2816

[646] The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

Rome, September 27, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received September 28, 12.32 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2815

[647] The Chargé in Norway (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, September 27, 1918, 7 p.m. [Received September 29, 1.38 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2832

[648] The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

Berne, September 30, 1918. [Received October 23.]

File No. 861.00/3034

[649] The Minister in Nicaragua (Jefferson) to the Secretary of State

Managua, September 30, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received 4.30 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2839

[650] The Minister in Peru (McMillin) to the Secretary of State

Lima, October 1, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received October 2, 7 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2849

[651] The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

London, October 2, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received 11.53 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2848

[652] The Chargé in Mexico (Summerlin) to the Secretary of State

Mexico, October 2, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received 7.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2859

[653] The Chargé in Japan (Spencer) to the Secretary of State

Tokyo, October 2, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received October 2, 11.88 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2851

[654] The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

Teheran, October 2, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received October 3, 3.23 p.m.]

File No 861.00/2879

[655] The Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell) to the Secretary of State

Santo Domingo, October 2, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received October 3, 7.09 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2871

[656] Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State (Long)

October 3, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2812

[657] The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 3, 1918.

File No. 861.00/2928

[658] The Minister in Paraguay (Mooney) to the Secretary of State

Asuncion, October 3, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received October 4, 10.38 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2872

[659] The Chargé in Salvador (Arnold) to the Secretary of State

San Salvador, October 4, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received 11.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2885

[660] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, October 7, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received 10.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2895

[661] The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

The Hague, October 8, 1918. [Received October 31.]

File No. 861.00/3112

[662] The Minister in Guatemala (Leavell) to the Secretary of State

Guatemala, October 8, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received October 9, 1.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2917

[663] The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, October 9, 1918. [Received November 8.]

File No. 861.00/3186

[664] The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State

Habana, October 9, 1918, noon. [Received 5.19 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2921

[665] The Minister in Venezuela (McGoodwin) to the Secretary of State

Caracas, October 9, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received October 10, 8.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2931

[666] The Minister in Ecuador (Hartman) to the Secretary of State

Quito, October 11, 1918, 11 a.m. [Received October 12, 9.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2.933

[667] The Chargé in Greece (Chabot) to the Secretary of State

Athens, October 11, 1918, noon. [Received October 12, 5.05 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/2935

[668] The Honduran Minister (Lopez Gutierrez) to the Secretary of State

Washington, October 15, 1918. [Received October 16.]

File No. 861.00/2990

[669] The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State

Havre, October 15, 1918, 9 a.m. [Received 4.23 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2945

[670] The Special Agent in Serbia (Dodge) to the Secretary of State

Nice, October 17, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received October 18, 10.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2992

[671] The Chargé in Argentina (Robbins) to the Secretary of State

Buenos Aires, October 17, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received 3.17 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2966

[672] The Minister in Panama (Price) to the Secretary of State

Panama, October 18, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received 9.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3000

[673] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London, October 22, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received 12.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3016

[674] The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State

Irkutsk, undated. [Received October 28, 1918, 8.50 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3062

[675] The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

Archangel, November 1, 1918. [Received 5.15 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3110

[676] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London, November 1, 1918. [Received November 13.]

File No. 861.00/3212

[677] The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State

Madrid, November 5, 1918, 10 a.m. [Received 11.05 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3163

[678] The Minister in Portugal (Birch) to the Secretary of State

Lisbon, November 5, 1918, 3 p.m. [Received November 6, 10.30 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3168

[679] The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

Sofia, November 7, 1918. [Received December 18.]

File No. 861.00/3488

[680] The Colombian Minister (Urueta) to the Secretary of State

Washington, November 22, 1918. [Received November 23.]

File No. 861.00/3274

[681] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, November 23, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received 10.37 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3265

[682] The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)

Washington, November 30, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/3265

[683] The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris)

Washington, December 9, 1918, 4 p.m.

File No. 861.00/3198

[684] The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State

Omsk, December 31, 1918. [Received January 2, 1919.]

File No. 861.00/3565

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, *September 2, 1918.*
[Received October 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith for the information of the Department a copy of a letter which I have to-day addressed to the Minister of the Netherlands, who is temporarily at Moscow negotiating with the Bolshevik authorities concerning the departure of the Allied representatives and the release of Allied nationals now held as hostages.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

[Enclosure]

The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Netherland Minister (Oudendijk)

Moscow, *September 2, 1918.*

SIR: As of possible interest to you in connection with your negotiations with the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, I have the honor to inform you that I was approached on August 26 by Mr. B. M. Sverdlov, brother of the chairman of the Central Executive Committee, respecting the case of certain women and children said to have been taken as hostages at Ufa.

Mr. Sverdlov explained that the Bolshevik forces upon retiring from Ufa took with them a large number of hostages, chosen more or less at random from the more wealthy inhabitants, and that it was possible that these hostages had subsequently been treated with severity. Without attempting to defend this action he pointed out that the taking of women and children as hostages, even as a measure of reprisal, was a barbarity which should be stopped at all costs. He proposed that if I should prepare instructions in the premises to the American Vice Consul at Samara he would use his influence to have these instructions forwarded by wireless telegraph.

Pursuant to his proposal I wrote Mr. Sverdlov a letter in which I referred to his request for cooperation in the matter of the release of hostages and asked him to employ any means which might be at his disposal to have the following telegram dispatched:

At request of People's Commissars I draw your attention to the cases of wife

of Commissar of Food Supply Tsuryupa, wife of Commissar Bruikhanov, wife of Commissar Yuriev, wife and son President Railway Committee Mukhin, wife of Muraviev, Madam Iliin, wife of Commissar Kadomtsev, wife of Commissar Kibanov, all of whom are said to have been taken hostages at Ufa. You will investigate at once and if confirmation obtained act vigorously to secure the immediate release of the persons named. The taking of hostages of any kind is barbarous. The extension of such measures to women and children is not to be tolerated and, whatever the circumstances, must be prevented by every means in our power. Liberation should not be made contingent upon reciprocity but offered gratuitously as an example which a civilized opponent cannot but follow. Poole.

At the request of Mr. Lockhart I added to the letter that the British Diplomatic Agent concurred in the foregoing instructions and regretted that there was no British agent at Samara whom he might address in a similar sense. At Mr. Sverdlov's suggestion I submitted the case to M. Grenard and he in turn addressed a letter to Mr. Sverdlov, asking him to forward to the French Vice Consul at Samara telegraphic instructions of the same tenor as those quoted above.

I am personally convinced that the only hope of bringing to an end, or in any way mitigating the course of mutual reprisals upon which the Bolsheviki and a part of their opponents have unfortunately entered, is to induce one or the other side to liberate its hostages gratuitously, thus placing upon the other the full moral onus of a failure to reciprocate forthwith. I am not too sanguine of success even by this method but still consider it possible that the Bolsheviki may finally perceive that only by some striking act of abnegation and repentance can they lessen in any degree the black discredit which they have recently brought upon their cause and upon themselves individually.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, September 3, 1918.

[Received September 16, 5.34 a.m.]

2. Reference my No. 1 of even date,² situation of Allied citizens here is dangerous, but that of Russians has already become tragic in the extreme. Complete suppression of all but Bolshevik papers since July 1 and imperfect communication abroad have no doubt left the outside world with hardly more than a suggestion of the true situation in central Russia.

Since May the so-called Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution has conducted an openly avowed campaign of terror. Thousands of persons have been summarily shot without even the form of trial. Many of them have no doubt been innocent of even the political views which were supposed to supply the motive of their execution. The assassination of Uritski and the attempt on Lenin are the results [causes] of this high tyranny. Socialists, once coworkers with the Bolsheviks, have turned against them the methods by which they formerly attacked the tyranny of the Tsars. "Mass terror" is the Bolshevik reply.

Official press publishes to-day following from Petrograd:

In connection with the murder of Uritski 500 persons have been shot by order of the Petrograd Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution. The names of the persons shot and those of candidates for future shooting, in case of a new attempt on the lives of the Soviet leaders, will be published later.

In Moscow "general searches" are being made under general orders to arrest "the better-to-do and all former officers." The ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity and every night scores are irresponsibly shot. Sentence is passed on the slightest grounds, or the general charge, "might be dangerous to the Bolshevik power." In sum, vengeful and irresponsible gangs are venting the desperation of their declining power in the daily massacre of untold innocents. The situation cries aloud to all who will act for the sake of humanity.

It is possible that some stay might be put on the Bolsheviks, if the Allied Governments could gain the adhesion of the neutrals to joint action by which the representatives of the latter would inform the Bolsheviks that the whole world,

neutral and Allied, is revolted by the present inhuman and purposeless slaughter, and unless this is stopped forthwith, Allies and neutrals alike will not only deny members of the Bolshevik government future asylum but hold them jointly and severally responsible for their present deeds. The other and truly efficacious course is a rapid military advance from the north. Our present halfway action is cruel in the extreme. Our landing has set up the Bolshevik death agony. It is now our moral duty to shield the numberless innocents who are exposed to its hateful reprisals.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania, where received by mail from Moscow through Norwegian Government.

² *Ante*, p. 662 [*Pg. 662 includes portions of [Doc. 604](#), [Doc. 605](#), and [Doc. 606](#)*].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, *September 4, 1918.*
[Received October 16.]

SIR: I have the honor to report that under date of September 4, I sent a personal note to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs through the Minister of the Netherlands, who was in Moscow at the time negotiating on behalf of the neutrals respecting the several questions which had arisen between the Entente powers and the Bolshevik government. A copy is enclosed.

I also enclose copies of the telegrams which accompanied the note to the Commissar.¹ The Department will observe that in No. 2 the last three sentences of the text as sent to the Department were suppressed. The reason is obvious. In the copy of this telegram furnished to the Commissar the next to the last sentence of the third [fourth] paragraph was also altered, reading: "An irresponsible government is venting its desperation in the daily massacre of untold innocents."

This step was taken with the approval of my Allied colleagues and the Minister of the Netherlands. I felt that it was a desperate situation justifying any measure which might conceivably restrain the Bolsheviks in their lawless and inhuman career.

In connection with telegram No. 1, I invite the Department's attention to the enclosed excerpt from the report of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs before the meeting of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee on September 2.²

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

[Enclosure]

The American Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)

Moscow, *September 4, 1918.*

DEAR MR. CHICHERIN: AS I have never failed to deal with you frankly, I am sending you herewith copies of two messages already dispatched to Washington, where they will arrive in a few days.

It is impossible for me to believe that you approve of the mad career into which the Bolshevik government has now plunged. Your cause totters on the verge of

complete moral bankruptcy. There is only one possible means of redemption. Words and discussions and counter accusations will no longer avail. You must stop at once the barbarous oppression of your own people.

The enclosed messages will give you and your colleagues some foretaste, I hope, of what the judgment of the world will be when the truth is known. When your government shows not by words but by unmistakable acts that they have returned to the ways of civilization, I shall be most happy to report thereon fully and sympathetically.

Sincerely,

DEWITT C. POOLE, Jr.

¹ No. 1, *ante*, p. 662 [*Pg. 662 includes portions of [Doc. 604](#), [Doc. 605](#), and [Doc. 606](#)*]; No. 2, *ante*, p. 681 [*Pg. 681 includes portions of [Doc. 624](#) and [Doc. 625](#)*].

² See enclosure to despatch of Sept. 5, *ante*, p. 581 [*Pg. 581 includes portions of [Doc. 577](#) and [Doc. 578](#)*].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

Moscow, September 5, 1918.
[Received October 5, 8.30 p.m.]

4. Reference my No. 3.² Following is [summary of a] translation of a telegram which according official gazette has been sent by Commissar of Home Affairs to all Soviets under date of September 2:

Murder of Volodarski and Uritski, attempt on Lenin and shooting of masses of our comrades in Finland, Ukraine, the Don, and Czecho-Slavia, continual discovery of conspiracies in our rear, open acknowledgment of right Social Revolutionist Party and other counterrevolutionary rascals of their part in these conspiracies together with insignificant extent of serious repressions and shooting of masses of White Guards and *bourgeoisie* on the part of the Soviets, all these things show that notwithstanding frequent pronouncements urging mass terror against the Social Revolutionists, White Guards, and *bourgeoisie* no real terror exists.

Such a situation should decidedly be stopped, should be put to weakness and softness. All right Social Revolutionists known to local Soviets should be arrested immediately. Numerous hostages should be taken from the *bourgeois* and officer classes. At the slightest attempt to resist or the slightest movement among the White Guards, shooting of masses of hostages should be begun without fail. Initiative in this matter rests especially with the local executive committees.

Through the militia and the Extraordinary Commission, all branches of government must take measures to seek out and arrest persons hiding under false names and shoot without fail anybody connected with the work of the White Guards. All above measures should be put immediately into execution. Indecisive action on the part of local Soviets must be immediately reported to People's Commissar of Home Affairs.

Not the slightest hesitation or the slightest indecision in using mass terror. Petrovski, Commissar of Home Affairs.

Official gazette, September 4, also contains following:

As Soviet workers have been arrested in Archangel and repression committed by English against communists, Extraordinary Commission has arrested as hostages wife of Kerensky, his two sons, mother and niece.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania.

² Not printed.

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]¹

Moscow, *September 9, 1918.*

[*Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.*]

5. ... Massacre of Russian citizens by Bolshevik government continues. Shootings at Moscow number about 150 nightly. More than 1,000 people have been shot in retaliation for attempt on Lenin. I have protested personally to Chicherin pointing out that Bolshevik cause totters on verge of complete moral bankruptcy. Wardwell has written strong protest in the name of American Red Cross. But Commissariat Foreign Affairs has no control and but small influence over extraordinary commission which is carrying on the carnage. The situation is tragic beyond words and it is difficult to see from what quarter relief may come. ...

POOLE

¹ See *ante*, p. 667 [Pg. 667 includes portions of [Doc. 610](#) and [Doc. 611](#)].

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, *undated*.

[Received October 22, 1918.]

SIR: I have the honor to furnish herewith, for information of the Department, four copies of the letter addressed to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of September 8, 1918, by the chief of the American Red Cross in Russia, protesting against the extreme measures now being adopted by the Soviet government against Russian citizens.

In this connection reference is made to my unnumbered despatch of September 4, 1918, transmitting copies of a similar communication addressed to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs by me personally.

I have [etc.]

DEWITT C. POOLE

[Enclosure]

The Chief of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia (Wardwell) to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin)

Moscow, *September 8, 1918*.

DEAR SIR: In the name of humanity I feel it my duty as representing the American Red Cross in Russia to protest against the extreme measures now being adopted by the Soviet government against its own subjects. I realize that criminal attempts upon the lives of prominent Commissars may call for severe measures against the guilty. As to the punishment for such political or personal crimes the American Red Cross cannot concern itself nor does it attempt to suggest that such punishment be extenuated, however much it would approve, should a more clement policy be adopted particularly where large numbers of persons are involved. However the recent announcements of the beginning of a class terror indicate an intention upon the part of the government to wreak a bloody vengeance upon a whole section of the people, for no other reason than that they are suspected of holding political views different from those of the authorities in power, although they may have taken no steps against such authorities. That this announcement is no mere threat, is made clear by the official statement that after the death of Commissar Uritski in Petrograd some 500 persons were shot. It is not pretended that these people were in any way involved in the crime and moreover it

is inconceivable that their guilt could have been established in the short time which elapsed between the killing of the Commissar and the shooting of so many persons. This wholesale execution is only a particularly striking instance of other acts of like character.

Such unwarranted slaughter cannot be allowed to pass unnoticed by an association whose object is to relieve human suffering. The action belongs to barbarous days and cannot but bring lasting discredit upon the authorities who are responsible for it or who in any way countenance it. That others with whom the Soviet government is contending may also have committed acts of barbarity can be no answer. The American Red Cross, as you doubtless know, has not hesitated and in the future will not hesitate, equally to condemn such actions on the part of the others.

The American Red Cross under trying conditions has used every effort to relieve some of the suffering which is being endured by the people within the limits of Soviet Russia. While it claims no reward for what was freely given, I believe that its actions are fair proof of its freedom from political interest and thus entitle this note to the careful consideration which its serious subject matter deserves. That the future course of the Soviet government in respect to the people within its power will not be guided by mere word of ours, I readily agree; and I ask only that such course should be determined by the simplest principles of humanity and of justice which must be the basis of any form of government which has at heart the best interests of the people which it represents.

Respectfully yours,

ALLEN WARDWELL

The Consul at Moscow (Poole) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

PETROGRAD, *September 15, 1918.*
[*Received September 26, 5.05 a.m.*]

7. Most violent elements of Bolsheviki in control here. Drawing assurance from immunity granted Petrograd by Germany in Article 5 of supplementary treaty,² they are now carrying out a cold-blooded terror which has thrown a palpable stillness over the whole life of the city. Arrests [made?] *en masse* and unknown numbers are shot daily at Kronstadt alone. Unknown number, reported 1,700, mostly former officers, are held as hostages for lives of commissars, though no commissars killed since Uritski. Recent storm washed many bodies of officers ashore on adjacent mainland where they were eaten by dogs, Bolsheviki refusing burial. Population utterly cowed and no prospect of change.

On pretense that proof has been found in ... of plot leading to Uritski's death, forty-six Englishmen were imprisoned fortnight ago in Peter and Paul on order from Moscow. Twenty odd French also there. Learn from one or two who have been released through money or influence that prison conditions for Allied citizens and Russians alike could not be worse. Fifteen to twenty in one small very damp cell, so crowded that only two or three can lie down at once. No air, no exercise, no bedding, practically no food. Forty-four Czecho-Slovaks captured recently endeavoring to make way north to join Allied armies just now discovered in out-of-the-way prison starving to death. Fifteen removed to hospital dying. Twenty-nine continue in prison in serious condition.

Within past week relief work organized in the name of International Red Cross chiefly on initiative American Red Cross. Pillows, bedding and private parcels reaching prisoners and food three or four times week.

Difficulties of the situation increased by Petrograd "commune" respecting orders from central authorities Moscow only when convenient. Great decentralization even within city, local or ward Soviets frequently acting independently in matters of general import. No deaths or executions among French or British as yet.

POOLE

¹ Sent via the Consulate General at Christiania.

² See *ante*, p. 600 [*Pg. 600 is part of [Doc. 580](#)*].

The Secretary of State to all American Diplomatic Missions

[Circular telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 20, 1918, 6 p.m.*

This Government is in receipt of information from reliable sources revealing that the peaceable Russian citizens of Moscow, Petrograd and other cities are suffering from an openly avowed campaign of mass terrorism and are subject to wholesale executions. Thousands of persons have been shot without even a form of trial; ill-administered prisons are filled beyond capacity and every night scores of Russian citizens are recklessly put to death; and irresponsible bands are venting their brutal passions in the daily massacre of untold innocents.

In view of the earnest desire of the people of the United States to befriend the Russian people and lend them all possible assistance in their struggle to reconstruct their nation upon principles of democracy and self-government and acting therefore solely in the interest of the Russian people themselves, this Government feels that it cannot be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at this existing state of terrorism. Furthermore, it believes that in order successfully to check the further increase of the indiscriminate slaughter of Russian citizens all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism.

You will inquire, therefore, whether the Government to which you are accredited will be disposed to take some immediate action, which is entirely divorced from the atmosphere of belligerency and the conduct of war, to impress upon the perpetrators of these crimes the aversion with which civilization regards their present wanton acts.

LANSING

The Secretary of State to the British Chargé (Barclay)

The Secretary of State presents his compliments to the Chargé d’Affaires *ad interim* of Great Britain and has the honor to enclose herewith the text of a circular telegram sent to all American diplomatic missions in the Allied and neutral countries under date of September 20.¹

The Secretary of State takes this opportunity to acknowledge the receipt of the memorandum from the British Embassy, No. 986, dated September 6, 1918,² and to express the feeling of horror with which the Government of the United States learned of the death of Captain Cromie as a result of the unwarrantable violation of the British Embassy at Petrograd contrary to all regard for the firmly established rights and practices of international law. The Government of the United States has not failed also to appreciate the danger which has attended the unlawful arrest of British representatives and subjects at Moscow. As the Chargé d’Affaires *ad interim* is doubtless aware, the acting American Consul General, Mr. Poole, while he has transferred his official functions to neutral representatives, has nevertheless remained in Moscow, giving moral support to his French and British colleagues detained there by the Bolshevik authorities. Mr. Poole appears to have been unmolested as yet but the Secretary of State desires to improve this opportunity to assure the Chargé d’Affaires *ad interim* that the attitude of Mr. Poole correctly reflects the position that this Government desires to assume wherever practicable.

In the meanwhile the Secretary of State has received official reports which indicate not only the detention of Allied representatives and citizens but the actual execution of thousands of innocent Russians, without any regard to justice whatever, by irresponsible bands venting the desperation of their declining power.

The Government of the United States, in the interest of Russian people themselves, can not remain silent or refrain from expressing its horror at such a state of terrorism. Furthermore it believes that, in order successfully to check the further increase of this indiscriminate slaughter, all civilized nations should register their abhorrence of such barbarism. It believes that the Government of Great Britain will agree that some such expression of feeling is not only requisite but also affords the most effective means now available to mitigate the lawless and terrible conditions prevailing in parts of Russia.

WASHINGTON, *September 21, 1918.*

¹ *Supra.*

² *Ante*, p. 665 [*Pg. 665 includes portions of [Doc. 608](#) and [Doc. 609](#)*].

***The Secretary of State to the French Ambassador
(Jusserand)***

WASHINGTON, *September 21, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to enclose herewith the text of a telegram which has been sent by this Department to all American diplomatic representatives in the neutral and Allied countries. This Government feels that it can not be silent or refrain from expressing its horror at the state of terrorism which exists in Russia and which is resulting in the daily execution, without even a form of trial, of innocent Russians who are the victims of irresponsible bands venting the brutal desperation of their declining power.

In enclosing to your excellency the text of this telegram I wish to refer to the notes which you addressed to me under date of August 29¹ and September 2,¹ in which you advised me of the action taken by the Government of the French Republic in regard to the situation of Allied representatives and citizens in Russia, and believe that your Government and the Government of the United States share the same views as to the character of the illegal and unwarranted course of procedure of the Bolshevik authorities towards foreign representatives in Moscow and Petrograd. Since receiving your notes, however, this Government has received official reports showing that while foreigners had been detained contrary to all international procedure, the lives of innocent Russians were being sacrificed daily under conditions which constituted a reign of terror. In these circumstances it has seemed to the Government of the United States, while appreciating the danger of its own and of foreign representatives and citizens, and regarding as wholly reprehensible their treatment by the existing authorities, incumbent upon it to undertake some expression of the abhorrence it feels for the brutal and lawless execution of thousands of innocent Russians without any recourse to justice.

I believe that your Government and the Government of the United States have the same purpose in view, namely to mitigate conditions of absolute lawlessness and terror which now prevail in parts of Russia.

I am glad to improve this opportunity to convey to you the views of this Government and the action which it has determined to take, and am confident that the Government of the French Republic will agree that some such expression of feeling is not only requisite but also affords the only means now available to mitigate the conditions of lawlessness and terror which prevail in parts of Russia.

Accept [etc.]

ROBERT LANSING

¹ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

The Consul at Vladivostok (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

VLADIVOSTOK, *September 21, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[Received 7 p.m.]

158. British Consul has presented discussion [communication?] referring to murder of their naval attaché in Petrograd and detention of British subjects in Russia and requesting my concurrence in British proposal that all known Bolsheviki leaders in this province be arrested and held at Allies' disposal as hostages for good treatment Allied subjects in Russia. British Consul further states proposal already presented General Otani who referred it to his Government which replied it is willing approve provided Allies agree to it. I have declined to take any stand on question without instructions from Department.

CALDWELL

***The Second Secretary of Embassy in Russia (Armour),
temporarily at Stockholm, to the Secretary of State***

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 21, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[Received September 22, 12.51 p.m.]

2876. All persons coming from Russia report conditions there appalling; a veritable slaughter of ex-officers and representative persons is taking place. Men are shot without trial, the only charge offered being "dangerous to the Soviet." Sole support behind Soviet consists of Lettish and Chinese mercenaries. Latter 3,000 in number, low-class Mongolians of desperate character commanded by Chinese and German sergeants and Lettish and German officers. Chinese only used for firing-squad duty, since even Letts revolt at butchery commanded of them. Officers shot at night in cellars, guns being muffled with silencers.

Italian Consul General who left Moscow September 10 arrived yesterday. Reports that before his departure he had interview with Peters, head of the Extraordinary Commission against Counter-Revolution. During conversation Peters signed 72 death warrants without reading papers he was signing. Before Italian Consul General left room fusillade had commenced in court announcing that slaughter had begun. On another occasion Italian Consul General present while revolutionary tribunal in session. After ordering release of four Italians in whom he was interested, tribunal without examination ordered others on the list to be shot and execution began before Italian Consul General left the building. Consul General begs that above be not communicated to the press as he fears for the effect it may have on safety of those remaining.

Lockhart was taken to Kremlin shortly after raid on British Embassy, Petrograd, has not been seen since, and British Legation here [omission] shot. Latest reports indicate French and British Consuls General, Moscow, under house arrest, but Poole at large and permitted to visit them. Poole is being generally praised for his vigorous and courageous action. Italian Consul General thinks his presence in Moscow is proving a help to the English and French and says that Bolsheviki worried by Poole's activity and would welcome his departure.

All persons from Russia, official and non-official, agree that immediate and vigorous action from the north imperative, if there is to remain alive any of that element of Russians to whom our Government has been looking to take up the work of reconstruction in Russia.

The Chargé in Japan (Spencer) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *September 23, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received September 23, 2.55 p.m.]

I called on the Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs and left with him a memorandum in the sense of the Department's September 21 [20], 6 p.m. He discussed the British proposals of retaliation for Captain Cromie's murder in Petrograd, made some two weeks ago, and said he had stated Japan's willingness to act at that time in conjunction with all the Allies but not with England alone. He seemed certain of Japan's sympathetic feeling towards the suggestion for the civilized nations to express abhorrence at present existing mass terrorism, but was skeptical as to immediate results therefrom, adding that mere expressions had but little influence on perpetrators of murders. He promised a reply within a few days and requested detailed information as to measures proposed I might be able to give at a later date.

SPENCER

File No. 861.00/2763

[Document 637]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Japan (Spencer)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 21, 1918, 7 p.m.*

Your September 23, 4 p.m. Department received representations from both French and British representatives in regard to murder of Captain Cromie and arrest of Allied representatives at Moscow. In reply the Department has informed the British and French Governments that it is confident they will agree that the only means available to check the conditions of terror which exist in Russia have been set forth in Department's circular telegram to you dated September 20.

Please repeat to Vladivostok Department's circular for his information and instruction answering his inquiry to Department, No. 158, dated September 21, 3 p.m.

LANSING

File No. 861.00/2763a

[Document 638]

***The Secretary of State to the Consul at Vladivostok
(Caldwell)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 24, 1918, 7 p.m.*

Your 158, September 21, 3 p.m. You will please not concur in British proposal and will await Department's circular telegram on the general subject being repeated to you from Tokyo.

LANSING

The Ambassador in France (Sharp) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PARIS, *September 24, 1918, 11 p.m.*
[Received September 25, 6 p.m.]

5182. Department's circular, September 21 [20], 6 p.m., to London was repeated as requested to Berne, Rome, Madrid, Havre and Lisbon. In taking this matter up with M. Pichon, Minister for Foreign Affairs, this afternoon he said that the French Government would very gladly cooperate with the Government of the United States in restraining, so far as practicable, the disorders and crimes now being committed in Russia and stated further that it would be pleased to join with the United States Government in any common declaration to that effect. The Minister stated that, as a matter of fact, there has been sent out, under date of September 1, a declaration, by radio, by the French Government that the Bolshevik government would be held responsible for all the crimes committed under its rule. He expressed satisfaction that Washington was now taking the initiative in this expression of horror which must exist among all civilized people over the atrocities [which] now can be seen committed in Russia.

SHARP

File No. 861.00/2800

[Document 640]

The Chargé in Siam (White) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

BANGKOK, *September 25, 1918, 11 a.m.*

[*Received September 26, 11.14 p.m.*]

Replying circular telegram September 20, 6 p.m. Siamese Government, sharing the United States Government's friendliness towards Russia, is in principle disposed to join United States and Allied powers in the name of humanity in a protest against wanton destruction life and liberty in Russia.

WHITE

File No. 861.00/2815a

[Document 641]

***The Secretary of State to the Minister in Switzerland
(Stovall)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *September 25, 1918, noon.*

Please deliver copy Department's circular 20th regarding Russian massacres to Bulgarian Minister for transmission to Murphy,^{[1](#)} instructing latter to present matter to Bulgarian Government.

LANSING

^{[1](#)} Dominic I. Murphy, Consul General at Sofia.

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 25, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received 10.28 p.m.]

2898. I showed yesterday to the Minister of Foreign Affairs the text of your circular telegram of September 20, 6 p.m. He begged me to inform you that he was in entire accord with the sentiments therein expressed and that he had already authorized the Swedish Minister at Petrograd to join his other neutral colleagues in sending to Chicherin a very strong note of protest against the barbarity of the acts of the Soviet. Chicherin sent a very long reply to this note and ended by stating that if the neutral Ministers exceeded the legal limits to which they were entitled for the protection of their own subjects, this would be considered as attempting to support the counter-revolution. The Minister thereupon added that there was nothing more that could be done.

I pointed out to him that I thought that there were two things alone which interested the Soviet leaders; namely, the money they had stolen and a future asylum where they could enjoy their ill-gotten gains. He said he did not think that the question of asylum entered in since the Bolsheviks knew that once they lost their power there was no hope of escape and he attributed this cause for the bloody delirium now reigning at Moscow and Petrograd. However as regards the money I told him what I presumed he already knew, that the Bolshevik courier who had reached Stockholm on Saturday was none other than Gukovski, former Commissioner of Finance, who had brought eighteen sealed trunks with him and that I had fairly reliable information that part of the contents of these trunks was 60,000,000 rubles in imperial notes. He took note of this and I hope will at any rate keep watch over these funds.

A fairly large quantity of platinum was also brought out but I did not mention this as I understand it is for sale and I thought our Government might wish to buy it. I will make a further report on the platinum soon.

WHITEHOUSE

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *September 26, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[*Received 11.80 p.m.*]

2830. Contents your circular telegram September 20, 6 p.m., communicated to Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs 24th. Yesterday he acknowledged full agreement with sentiments expressed but feared that compliance with suggestion might bring about change in Bolshevik attitude toward neutrals, who thus far had been respected, and seriously jeopardize usefulness of Danish Minister at Petrograd who has succeeded in rendering valuable services not only to neutrals but notably to citizens of Allied states. Before making definite reply to your suggestion he would consult their Minister at Petrograd and would join only in case of unanimous action on the part of neutrals.

I supported your proposal with various arguments the justice of which he admitted but plead special circumstances which counseled Denmark's acting with caution.

Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

The Minister in Haiti (Blanchard) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PORT-AU-PRINCE, *September 26, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received 9.43 p.m.]

Haitian Minister for Foreign Affairs in acknowledging the receipt of Legation's note bearing on subject Department's circular September 20, 6 p.m., in the name of the Haitian Government [stated]:

That it can but feel the same profound sentiment of horror and repulsion felt by the Government of the United States in presence of the appalling crimes which have just been revealed, at the same time an ardent sympathy for so many innocent victims and for the great Russian nation so cruelly stricken. The Haitian Government declares itself disposed to an immediate action in order that the perpetrators of these atrocities and of these calamities be impressed with the sentiment of absolute reprobation which they inspire to any civilized people.

BLANCHARD

File No. 861.00/2816

[Document 645]

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *September 27, 1918.*

[Received September 28, 1.30 a.m.]

2913. Swedish press reference recalling decree for mass terrorism Moscow. Paper *Mir* reports question terrorism discussed by Central Committee, Lenin expressing desire return revolution's good methods. Majority supported him.

WHITEHOUSE

File No. 861.00/2815

[Document 646]

The Ambassador in Italy (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ROME, *September 27, 1918, 4 p.m.*

[*Received September 28, 12.32 a.m.*]

2054. Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m., terrorism in Russia, only received September 24 from Paris. It was immediately brought to the attention of Foreign Office which replies to-day: "Italian Government adheres fully to the views of the United States Government."

NELSON PAGE

The Chargé in Norway (Schoenfeld) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *September 27, 1918, 7 p.m.*
[Received September 29, 1.38 p.m.]

1180. In reply to my note of September 23,¹ in pursuance of your circular telegram of September 20, 6 p.m., I have received from the Minister for Foreign Affairs a note dated yesterday in which his excellency states that the Diplomatic Corps at Petrograd, including the Norwegian Chargé d’Affaires, verbally protested to Commissaire Zinoviev against the continuance of the murders there and urged on the Commissaire that no executions must take place without previous trial and judgment. The note states further that on September 5, last, the Diplomatic Corps at Petrograd sent the said Commissaire a written protestation, copy of which Minister for Foreign Affairs encloses. The Minister for Foreign Affairs states further that he has telegraphically advised the Norwegian Legation at Petrograd that he approves the *démarche* made by it jointly with the other Foreign Missions in Petrograd. His excellency states finally that as soon as the Norwegian Legation at Petrograd reports the reply to the note of protest referred to he will inform me thereof as well as of other eventual measures the situation may call for. ...¹

SCHOENFELD

¹ Not printed.

¹ Summary of note of protest here omitted; it is printed in full, *infra*.

The Minister in Switzerland (Stovall) to the Secretary of State

No. 4667

BERNE, *September 30, 1918.*
[Received October 23.]

SIR: Confirming my telegram No. 4926 of September 27, noon,² I have the honor to transmit herewith copy and translation of the *aide-mémoire*, and enclosure thereto, of the Swiss Government dated September 24 concerning the protestation against acts committed by the Soviets in Petrograd.

I have [etc.]

PLEASANT A. STOVALL

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Swiss Political Department to the American Legation

AIDE-MÉMOIRE

Replying to the *aide-mémoire* which the Minister of the United States gave to the President of the Confederation, the Political Department has the honor to inform his excellency that the Swiss Minister in Russia, at that time Dean of the Diplomatic Corps at Petrograd, in the name of the Diplomatic Corps handed a note of September 5 to the Council of the Soviets, embodying the conversations of the chiefs of missions with Commissioner Zinoviev. The American Legation will find enclosed the text of this note, which corresponds in broad lines with the contents of the American memorandum.

September 11 the Swiss Minister adhered to the new step taken by General Brandstrom, then Dean of the Diplomatic Corps, on his return to Petrograd.

The Swiss Minister in Russia has then already signed protestations to which the American memorandum alludes, thus the desires expressed by the memorandum are already realized, so far as the Swiss Government is concerned.

BERNE, *September 24, 1918.*

[Subenclosure—Translation]

The Swiss, Danish, and Netherlands Ministers, the Swedish, Norwegian, Spanish, and Persian Chargés, and the German Consul General, to the Soviet Commissar of the Northern Commune (Zinoviev)

The representatives of the Diplomatic Corps at Petrograd, having been themselves witnesses of the arrest of great numbers of persons of all ages and both sexes, and the summary executions daily carried out by the soldiers of the Red Army, requested an interview with Commissar Zinoviev, who received them on Monday, September 3. They stated that they had no intention of interfering in the political contests at present disrupting Russia; but that, taking a purely humanitarian point of view, they wished to express, in the name of the Governments they represent, their profound indignation at the reign of terror instituted in the cities of Petrograd, Moscow, etc.

Without any other reason than that of gratifying their hate against a whole class of citizens, without orders from a legal power of any sort, crowds of armed men enter day or night into private houses, plunder and steal, arrest and throw into prison hundreds of unfortunate people entirely unconnected with political straggles, whose only crime is to belong to the middle classes, and whose extermination is proclaimed by the leaders of the country in their own papers and in their speeches. It is quite impossible for the poor distressed families to obtain any information as to the place where their relatives have been imprisoned; permission is denied them to communicate with the prisoners and to supply them with the necessary food.

Such acts of violence, incomprehensible on the part of men who profess their wish to promote the happiness of mankind, call forth the indignation of the civilized world, now acquainted with the events in Petrograd.

The Diplomatic Corps considered it its duty to inform Commissar Zinoviev of the feelings of reprobation which animate it. It has protested and it does protest energetically against the arbitrary acts which are being committed every day. The representatives of the powers make all express reservations as to the right of their Governments to demand the satisfactions which may be considered necessary and to render personally responsible before the courts all perpetrators of the criminal acts which have been committed or may be committed in future.

They ask that the terms of the present note be brought to the knowledge of the Soviet government.

[PETEOGRAD, *September 5, 1918*]

² Not printed.

File No. 861.00/2839

[Document 649]

The Minister in Nicaragua (Jefferson) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MANAGUA, *September 30, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[*Received 4.30 p.m.*]

Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m. Nicaraguan Minister for Foreign Affairs in a lengthy note to this Legation condemns the inhuman acts inflicted upon the peaceable Russian citizens and concurs with the views of the United States Government and offers hearty cooperation with it in befriending the Russian people.

JEFFERSON

The Minister in Peru (McMillin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LIMA, *October 1, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[Received October 2, 7 a.m.]

Your telegram of September 20, 6 p.m. In reply to my note Minister for Foreign Affairs has made in part the following reply:

I take pleasure in informing you of the fact that my Government will not find it inconvenient to agree with your excellency's Government not to recognize officially nor to enter into international relations of any kind with any power organized in Russia by the initiations or with the participation of those responsible for the system of terrorism now prevailing; to consider these men as criminals and outlawed by their own deeds; to deny them asylum in our national territory; and to agree in view of the fact that the true character of the crimes of which they are guilty is not political, to concede the extradition of the guilty ones should the duly authorized governments in order to punish them so request.

The community ideals and doctrines existing between the Peruvian Government and Government of the United States and the solidarity cemented between them by the attitude taken by Wilson's government during the European war might be again shown in taking this action in favor of the fundamental rights of men and by our common sympathy and support for the régime of peoples.

I am forwarding a full reply by mail.¹

McMILLIN

¹ Not printed.

The Ambassador in Great Britain (Page) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 2, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[*Received 11.53 a.m.*]

2399. Your circular telegram September 20. British Government state similar communication has been received through Chargé d'Affaires at Washington, and that Mr. Barclay has been instructed to inform United States Government that British Government agree in principle with course proposed and would be prepared to join in such an expression of feeling as soon as Allied subjects and citizens in Russia have been placed out of danger, but that it might be inadvisable to make any declaration of the kind suggested until this is done.

PAGE

File No. 861.00/2859

[Document 652]

The Chargé in Mexico (Summerlin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MEXICO, *October 2, 1918, 11 a.m.*
[Received 7.50 p.m.]

1570. Department's circular September 20, 6 p.m. Foreign Office replies that Mexican Government has instructed its diplomatic agents to report as to the true situation in Russia. As soon as these reports are received and if the case merits, Mexican Government will consider what attitude it should adopt in evidence of its sympathy for the Russian people.

SUMMERLIN

The Chargé in Japan (Spencer) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TOKYO, *October 2, 1918, 1 p.m.*

[*Received October 2, 11.88 a.m.*]

Referring to my cable September 23, 4 p.m.,^{[1](#)} and confirming conversation I had with Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Monday, Embassy received to-day memorandum from Foreign Office stating that Japanese Government painfully shocked at information mass terrorism in Moscow, Petrograd. It shares the profound sense of horror of the American Government and will gladly join in protest as suggested against acts of sheer brutality.

SPENCER

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 692 [Pg. 692 includes portions of [Doc. 636](#) and [Doc. 637](#)].

File No 861.00/2879

[Document 654]

The Minister in Persia (Caldwell) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

TEHERAN, *October 2, 1918, 4 p.m.*

[*Received October 3, 3.23 p.m.*]

17. Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m. Minister for Foreign Affairs states he will send appropriate instructions to Persian Chargé d'Affaires in Moscow.

CALDWELL

The Minister in the Dominican Republic (Russell) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

SANTO DOMINGO, *October 2, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[*Received October 3, 7.09 p.m.*]

Your September 20, 6 p.m. Dominican Government replies as follows:

Speaking for the Dominican people and in their name after consultation with a number of distinguished Dominican citizens to which were invited Archbishop, several ex-Presidents, presiding Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals, Governor of Santo Domingo Province and other prominent men representing as far as circumstances permitted entire country, Military Governor registers the solemn protest of the people of the Dominican Republic against the acts of terrorism and outrage, murders and wanton excesses that have been and are being committed in Russia. The Dominican people have heard of these sinister events with horror and they cannot refrain in common with all civilized peoples from lifting up their voice in solemn protest and from public execration of the perpetration of such savage crimes.

RUSSELL

***Memorandum by the Third Assistant Secretary of State
(Long)***

October 3, 1918.

The Chinese Minister called to-day and told me that he had been advised by his Government that they thoroughly sympathized with the statements made by the United States Government in regard to the conditions in the interior of Russia, and said that his Government would like to join this Government in any representations which we made to the Bolsheviki. I told him that probably this Government would make no representations, but that it would be done by the neutrals and that some of them had already done so.

BRECKINRIDGE LONG

The Swedish Minister (Ekengren) to the Secretary of State

WASHINGTON, *October 3, 1918.*

EXCELLENCY: By order of my Government, I have the honor to transmit the following copies of telegrams sent by Mr. Chicherin to the Swedish Minister at Petrograd. From these telegrams it appears that certain atrocities against men, women, and especially children have been committed by the Czecho-Slovaks in the governments Samara and Ufa, for which governments the Entente have formally taken responsibility since their occupation by the Entente. Mr. Chicherin points out that these atrocities will have as consequence reciprocal measures from the Soviet government.

The telegrams read as follows:

[Translation]

Moscow, *September 20.*

Our friends who managed to escape from Samara bring the following:

Twelve thousand persons have been arrested; all those having some connection with the Soviet power were shot; thirty-seven women have just been arrested; out of that number sixteen wives of Bolsheviks have already been shot and the others have been sentenced to death by hanging. Samara is a district occupied by the Czecho-Slovaks, for which the Entente expressly assumed responsibility; therefore it is the Entente's occupation. We expect you to protest, especially as you are a party to the action for securing release of nationals of the Entente in Russia; we have always declared that political repression in Entente regions forces upon us reprisal measures, and particularly so when confronted by such atrocities.

Moscow, *September 21.*

Children of St. Petersburg proletarians in children's homes in the governments of Samara and Ufa [are] in a dreadful condition. Czecho-Slovaks have massacred teachers and monitors with excessive cruelty; cutting off noses, ears and gouging eyes; and have taken away money and victuals. Six per cent of the children are dead. We protest against such atrocities; and hope that you will intervene for the return of the children.

With renewed assurances [etc.]

W. A. F. EKENGREN

File No. 861.00/2872

[Document 658]

The Minister in Paraguay (Mooney) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ASUNCION, *October 3, 1918, 3 p.m.*

[*Received October 4, 10.38 a.m.*]

Department's September 20, 6 p.m. The Paraguayan Minister for Foreign Affairs has stated verbally to me that his Government earnestly disapproves the terrorism and violence being practised in Russia, and that he will confirm the verbal statement by a note sent to this Legation.^{[1](#)}

MOONEY

^{[1](#)} Note of Oct. 10 not printed.

The Chargé in Salvador (Arnold) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

SAN SALVADOR, *October 4, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[*Received 11.15 p.m.*]

Department circular, September 20, 6 p.m. Note received from the Foreign Office states that the Government of Salvador being inspired in the most firm and enthusiastic manner in the sentiments of the United States Government hereby register their most explicit protest for the sufferings to which the Russian citizens have been so cruelly subjected and to register [their] decision to cooperate quickly in aid of whatever measures the Government of the United States deems proper to take in the matter and in so far as it is possible for Salvador to participate in the same morally and materially. Full text of note follows by pouch.²

ARNOLD

² Not printed.

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, October 7, 1918, 5 p.m.
[Received 10.55 p.m.]

2876. Referring to my 2833 of September 27, 10 a.m.,¹ and 2830, September 26, 2 p.m.,² The Danish Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that his Government is inclined to adopt the view of their Minister at Petrograd who suggests in view of the strong collective protest made by the neutral representatives at the capitol under date of the 5th September³ with which the German Consul General associated himself against the imprisonment *en masse* of persons of all ages and both sexes and the daily summary executions indulged in by the soldiers of the Red Army and the fact that the reign of terror is steadily subsiding, that the Danish Government should take no further action of that character for the moment. He suggests, however, that the Allied Governments and the United States might associate themselves with the *démarche* of the 5th ultimo, the text of which I am sending by pouch together with Chicherin's reply, and the protest of the Diplomatic Corps against the violation of the British Embassy building with its attendant outrages.⁴

Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

¹ Not printed.

² *Ante*, p. 695 [Pg. 695 includes portions of [Doc. 642](#), [Doc. 643](#), and [Doc. 644](#)].

³ *Ante*, p. 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of [Doc. 647](#) and [Doc. 648](#)].

⁴ The protest of Sept. 5 is printed *ante*, p. 697 [Pg. 697 includes portions of [Doc. 647](#) and [Doc. 648](#)] (Chicherin's reply, *post*, p. 705 [Pg. 705 is part of [Doc. 663](#)]). The text of the latter protest is not printed; see *ante*, pp. 675 [Pg. 675 is part of [Doc. 621](#)] and 678 [Pg. 678 is part of [Doc. 621](#)].

The Chargé in the Netherlands (Bliss) to the Secretary of State

No. 2034

THE HAGUE, *October 8, 1918.*
[Received October 31.]

SIR: On September 23 I addressed a note to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in conformity with your telegraphic instructions No. 4534 of September 20 and am in receipt of a reply, the essential paragraphs of which were telegraphed in my No. 4701 of yesterday's date.¹

I now have the honor to transmit copy and translation of Mr. van Karnebeek's note, together with the enclosures thereto. These enclosures are copies of joint communications to the existing government at Petrograd by the diplomatic representatives of the neutral countries in that city who are in charge of the interests of the Associated Governments in Russia.⁵

I have [etc.]

ROBERT WOODS BLISS

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Netherland Minister of Foreign Affairs (Van Karnebeek) to the American Chargé (Bliss)

No. 12

THE HAGUE, *October 5, 1918.*

MR. CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of September 23 last, relative to the chaotic conditions prevailing in the republic of the Soviets.

Indeed the reports reaching us here regarding the régime of terror imposed upon that part of Russia recall the blackest pages in the history of the revolutions and civil wars that ever disturbed the peoples of the world.

If I could indulge in the hope that an expression of conscientious public opinion in other lands, brought anew to the attention of the men now in power at Petrograd and Moscow, would find the desired response, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a foreign country ought perhaps to be waived in favor of sentiments of humanity and solidarity.

In view of the evidence that the unceasing representations made by the Minister of the Queen can have left no doubt in the minds of those now in power with regard

to the judgment her Government has formed of their actions, we see ourselves compelled to abstain from a gesture which could only be platonic.

Both singly and by collective protests in which all his colleagues have joined, the Minister of the Netherlands has raised his voice against these actions, whether in regard to the interests of Netherland subjects and of persons placed under the protection of the Royal Legation, or in regard to the interests of the Russian population victim of these acts of terrorism.

May I be allowed to communicate to you in this connection the text of two collective protests which I have just received from Mr. Oudendijk.

In closing I take the liberty of begging you to express to your Government my sincere appreciation of the sentiments which have inspired the suggestion it has charged you to make to me and to acquaint it with the considerations I have had the honor to submit to you hereinabove.

Be pleased to accept [etc.]

VAN KARNEBEEK

¹ Not printed.

⁵ See footnote 4.

File No. 861.00/2917

[Document 662]

The Minister in Guatemala (Leavell) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

GUATEMALA, *October 8, 1918, 3 p.m.*
[*Received October 9, 1.30 a.m.*]

Your circular telegram of September 20, 6 p.m. Guatemalan Minister for Foreign Affairs has just now informed me that the Guatemalan Minister at Washington, D. C, has been instructed to publish the protest of the Government of Guatemala in the sense of above-mentioned circular telegram.

LEAVELL

File No. 861.00/3186

[Document 663]

The Chargé in Sweden (Whitehouse) to the Secretary of State

No. 1428

STOCKHOLM, *October 9, 1918.*
[Received November 8.]

SIR: With reference to your circular telegram of September 20, regarding the general protest that should be made against the inhumanity of the Bolsheviks, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of the memorandum received from the Swedish Government in answer thereto, together with translation of the answer of Chicherin to the note of the neutral powers, which was sent to me by the Swedish Government with the memorandum.

I have [etc.]

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE

[Enclosure—Memorandum—Translation]

The Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation

His Majesty's Government fully participate in the feelings which have caused the Government of the United States to propose that an action should be taken with a view of putting an end to the outrages in Russia. As would be known, His Majesty's Government have already taken steps in the direction suggested in the American proposition, inasmuch as the Swedish representative in Petrograd has taken part in the action by which the foreign representatives at that place in the name of humanity appealed to the government of Soviets to put a stop to the terrorism.

Whereas in the note that was on that occasion addressed to the government of Soviets all the arguments have already been made use of that could or should be brought forward in that connection, His Majesty's Government much regret that they can not see their way to participate in a further action as suggested by the American Government.

STOCKHOLM, *October 5, 1918.*

[Subenclosure—Translation]

Reply of the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Joint Note of the Diplomatic Corps

The note which was handed us by the representatives of the neutral powers on

September 5 is an act of grave interference in the internal affairs of Russia. The Soviet government could let it remain entirely unanswered, but the Soviet government always with pleasure takes advantage of every opportunity to explain the meaning of its policy to the masses of people in all countries, since the government not only represents the labor class in Russia, but also all exploited humanity. The Commissariat of the People gives the following reply regarding the questions touched in the note:

The neutral powers try to represent a picture of the oppressed *bourgeoisie* in Russia, a picture which is to arouse deep indignation of the *bourgeoisie* of the entire world. We do not intend to deny the assertions made by the representatives of the neutral powers, who, in their note, repeat all the lies which are spread by the Russian *bourgeoisie* about the Red Army. Neither do we wish to deny assertions regarding concrete cases of abuse since the representatives of the neutral powers, in the first place, do not give any concrete cases, and in the second place, abuses on the part of individuals always occur in every war, and we are engaged in a civil war. But the representatives of the neutral powers do not protest against separate abuses of irresponsible persons, but against the régime which is carried out by the workmen's and peasants' government in its fight against the exploiting classes. Before we explain why the workmen's and peasants' government uses the red terror, against which the representatives of the neutral powers protest in the name of humanity, and because of which they threaten us with the condemnation of the whole civilized world, we permit ourselves to ask a few questions. Is it known to the representatives that the international war is now in its fifth year? In this war small groups, consisting of bankers, generals and bureaucrats, have thrown the masses of people of all the world to kill and destroy each other in order that the capitalists might earn milliards for their own account. Do you know that in this war not only millions have died at the front, but that both belligerents have bombarded open cities and killed defenseless women and children? Do you know that one of the belligerent parties in this war condemned tens of millions of people to famine by cutting this country off from the supply of grain, in spite of international laws? That this belligerent party hopes that the starvation of the children will force the other party to surrender to the victor, grace or no grace? Do you know that the other party makes prisoners of hundreds of thousands of defenseless, peaceful "enemy" citizens and sends them to compulsory labor far from their homes, taking from them all right to defense? Is it known to you that in all the belligerent countries the ruling capitalist clique has taken from the masses the freedom of assembly, the freedom of the press, the freedom of strike, that for every attempt to protest against this white terror the *bourgeoisie* condemn the workmen to prison or send them to the front to kill, in that way, every thought of their human rights? All these pictures of the crushing of the laboring class in the interest of capital, all these pictures of the white terror against the proletariat, are very well known to the leaders of the neutral capitalistic countries and their representatives in Russia. Still they seem either to have forgotten the exalted ideals of humanity or else they have forgotten, in this

case, the masses? who have been killed on the battlefields.

The so-called neutral powers did not dare to protest with a single word against the white terror of capital, nor did they wish to, because the *bourgeoisie* in ah neutral countries have helped the capitalists of the belligerent countries to continue the war, earning milliards on deliveries made to both belligerent camps.

We take the liberty of putting still another question. Have you, the representatives of the neutral powers, heard anything about the massacre of the Sinn Peins in Dublin, about the execution, without trial, of hundreds of Irishmen with Skeffington at the head? Have you heard anything about the white terror in Finland, about tens of thousands who have been shot, about tens of thousands of workmen imprisoned, about their wives and children, against which no protests have been or will be made? Have you heard about the mass executions of workmen and peasants in the Ukraine, about the mass execution of workmen by the heroic Czecho-Slovaks, the hired bandits of French-English capital?

The governments of the so-called neutral powers have surely heard about them but it has never occurred to them to protest against these actions of the *bourgeoisie* who suppress the labor movement since they themselves, in their own countries, are forced to suppress every labor movement in order to favor the interests of the *bourgeoisie* thereby. It is sufficient to recall the labor demonstrations in Denmark, Norway, Holland and Switzerland which were put down with the aid of the military. The workmen in Holland, Switzerland and Denmark have not had time to act before the Governments of these countries have had time to mobilize their military forces to suppress the slightest protests on the part of the masses of people. If the representatives of the neutral powers threaten us with the indignation of the civilized world and protest against the red terror in the name of humanity, we beg to point out to them that they have not been sent here to protect humanity, but to protect the interests of capitalistic countries, and we advise them not to threaten us with the indignation of the whole civilized world which is covered from head to foot with the blood of workmen, but to fear the fury of the masses of people of the whole world, who are marching against the "civilization" which has led humanity to this butchery which is without result. In all the capitalistic world there exists the white terror against the laboring class. The working class in Russia has destroyed the power of Tsarism, whose bloody régime has not called forth any protests from the neutral powers. The working class in Russia has destroyed the reign of the *bourgeoisie* in Russia which, under the flag of the revolution and the silence of the neutral powers, executed soldiers who did not wish to spill blood in the interests of the war speculators. They also executed peasants who declared the earth to be their property, the earth which they have plowed for a hundred years and moistened with their sweat. The greater part of the Russian people, as represented by the second Workmen's Congress, have put the power in the hands of the workmen's and peasants' government. A group of capitalists who wanted to regain their factories and banks which had been taken from them in favor of the people, a group of property owners who wish

to rob the peasants of their ground, a group of generals who again wish to force the workmen and peasants to obedience with a whip, all these did not approve of this, the decision of the Russian people. With the help of foreign capital they have mobilized counter-revolutionary bands with whose assistance they cut Russia off from bread so that the hand of starvation may quell the Russian revolution. They have become convinced that it is impossible to overthrow the workmen's government which is supported by the masses of people. They try to instigate counter-revolutionary disturbances amongst these masses in order to hinder the workmen's and peasants' government in its efforts to lead the country out of the anarchy into which the criminal politics of the former government have brought it. They have sold Russia in the south, north and east to foreign imperialistic countries, gathering foreign bayonets from all directions they could get them. Behind the forest of these foreign bayonets they send hired murderers to kill the leaders of the laboring class, in whom not only Russia's proletariat but all humanity see the realization of their hopes.

This counter-revolutionary clique which utilizes foreign and Russian capital to force slavery and war on the Russian people, this clique the Russian workmen will ruthlessly annihilate. We declare before the proletariat of the whole world that no outward protests and representations will deter the hand which is to punish those who raise arms against the workmen and the poorest peasants in Russia, who wish to starve them and who wish to drive them into new wars in the interests of capital. We assure equal rights and liberties to all those who loyally fulfil the duties which belong to the citizens of the socialistic Russian Republic. To them we bring peace, against our enemies a ruthless war!

We are convinced that the masses of people in all countries which are oppressed and terrorized by small groups of exploiters will understand that violence in Russia is used only in the holy interests for the liberation of the masses, and that they will not only understand us, but even follow the same path as we.

We reject most energetically the interference of the neutral capitalistic powers in favor of the Russian *bourgeoisie* and declare that in every attempt on the part of representatives of these powers to exceed the limits for the lawful protection of the interests of their citizens, we will see an attempt to support the Russian counter-revolution.

CHICHERIN

The Minister in Cuba (Gonzales) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

HABANA, *October 9, 1918, noon.*
[Received 5.19 p.m.]

Referring to the Department circular of September 20, 6 p.m., Secretary of State replies Cuban Government and people naturally feel same aversion as the United States towards the wanton acts of cruelty now being perpetrated in Russia and are disposed to take some action to show its sentiments, but as Cuba is at present without diplomatic or consular representation in Russian coupled with the fact that owing to the distance separating the two countries it would be difficult to express these sentiments in any way which would be effective, it would appreciate knowing if the Government of the United States has suggested any particular form of action.

GONZALES

The Minister in Venezuela (McGoodwin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram—Extract]

CARACAS, *October 9, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[*Received October 10, 8.55 p.m.*]

Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m., and my September 28, 7 p.m.^{[1](#)} The Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day handed me a memorandum referring very briefly to conditions in Russia as designated and to the attitude of the Government of the United States concluding as follows:

The Government of Venezuela manifests its sympathy for the countries threatened with great misfortunes, applauds the idea of fraternity which inclines the Government of the United States to offer its generous assistance in alleviating the sufferings of the Russian people and is not indifferent to the grief which is caused by deeds contrary to the sentiments of humanity and the ideas of civilization.

...

McGOODWIN

^{[1](#)} Latter not printed.

File No. 861.00/2.933

[Document 666]

The Minister in Ecuador (Hartman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

QUITO, *October 11, 1918, 11 a.m.*

[*Received October 12, 9.30 a.m.*]

Department's circular telegram of September 20, 6 p.m. Memorandum of the Minister for Foreign Affairs informs that Ecuador will cooperate with United States and other republics of America in protesting against existing outrages in Russia.

HARTMAN

File No. 861.00/2935

[Document 667]

The Chargé in Greece (Chabot) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ATHENS, *October 11, 1918, noon.*

[*Received October 12, 5.05 a.m.*]

579. Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m., in regard to Russian terrorism and desire of the United States to befriend Russian people: Greek Government has replied that it is entirely disposed to associate itself with any action which the American Government and its allies shall take to make known to the authors of these crimes the horror and resentment of the civilized world.

CHABOT

The Honduran Minister (Lopez Gutierrez) to the Secretary of State

[Translation]

WASHINGTON, *October 15, 1918.*
[*Received October 16.*]

MOST EXCELLENT SIR: An inquiry having been made of my Government by the most excellent the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of this country to Honduras as to whether it would be disposed to take an immediate resolution toward the terrorism that has set itself up as a system of government in Russia where no one, be he a native or an alien, be he ever so peaceable, can feel secure of his life or property, I have been instructed by the Minister of Foreign Relations of that Republic to make known to your excellency the horror with which my Government witnesses the establishment in the Russian nation of a systematic persecution that cannot but bring in its trail an aggravation of the anarchy that prevails in that unfortunate country.

No nation that takes pride in professing principles of civilization will fail to pass the most severe condemnation on Russian terrorism. My Government holds that this is surely not the age in which to attempt to set up governments on the foundation of murder and violence. That abominable system can bring but one result, a gashing split of the countries into persecutors and persecuted, with endless anarchy supreme.

Under the circumstances, I deem it the duty of all the countries possessed with any degree of self-respect to protest against all systems of government abhorrent to civilization.

Most noble is the attitude taken by your excellency's Government on this question, and it affords me great pleasure to declare in the name of that which I have the honor to represent its firm adhesion to the lofty sentiments which moved it to make the declaration recorded at the beginning of this note.

I renew [etc.]

J. ANTO. LOPEZ G.

File No. 861.00/2945

[Document 669]

The Minister in Belgium (Whitlock) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

HAVRE, *October 15, 1918, 9 a.m.*
[Received 4.23 p.m.]

143. Replying to Department's circular of September 22 [20], 6 p.m. The Belgian Government shares the sentiment of horror which the acts of terrorism in Russia inspire in the American Government and if the American Government judges it opportune to express to the authors of these excesses the aversion with which the civilized world considers them and decides to publish to that effect a solemn declaration, the Belgian Government would be happy to join in such a statement.

WHITLOCK

The Special Agent in Serbia (Dodge) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

NICE, *October 17, 1918, 10 a.m.*

[*Received October 18, 10.15 p.m.*]

Your circular September 20, 6 p.m., regarding terrorism, in Russia communicated to Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs who telegraphs to-day substantially as follows:

Serbian Government shares the view of the Government of the United States that measures should be taken to end Bolshevist terrorism, and after examining the question of the non-military measures which it could take has come to the conclusion that it has no means at its disposal except to express its aversion to the acts of terrorism in Russia. Serbian Government is also ready to associate itself with the Government of the United States in any action of the same nature.

DODGE

The Chargé in Argentina (Robbins) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

BUENOS AIRES, *October 17, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[*Received 3.17 p.m.*]

Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m. The Foreign Office, in a memorandum dated October 16, addressed to this Embassy, replying to the inquiry in the telegram above mentioned as to whether the Argentine Government would be disposed to take some immediate action condemnatory of the acts being at present committed in Russia, which inquiry was submitted by me to the Foreign Office in person on September 24, states:

The Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship of the Argentine Republic cannot refrain from expressing its deepest aversion at acts of the nature mentioned in the communication under reply and is entirely in accord with the manner of thinking of the Government of the United States of America.

ROBBINS

File No. 861.00/3000

[Document 672]

The Minister in Panama (Price) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

PANAMA, *October 18, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[*Received 9.40 p.m.*]

Department's cabled circular of September 20 promptly complied with. Panaman Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day communicates a resolution adopted by the National Assembly in which, expressing their disapproval of the practices mentioned in Department's telegram, it calls upon all Russians in the name of justice to desist from them. Panaman Minister for Foreign Affairs expresses in his note the horrors felt by his Government over these wrongs and declares that his Government is ready to cooperate with the United States in any measures deemed by latter to be proper to making its influence felt against the continued perpetration of such atrocities.

PRICE

File No. 861.00/3016

[Document 673]

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *October 22, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[*Received 12.50 p.m.*]

2986. My 2399, October 2, 11 a.m.^{[1](#)} Foreign Office has instructed British Chargé d’Affaires to inform you that the majority of Allied subjects having now been released from Russia, British Government will be glad to join United States Government in taking the proposed action.

LAUGHLIN

^{[1](#)} *Ante*, p. 699 [Pg. 699 includes portions of [Doc. 650](#), [Doc. 651](#), and [Doc. 652](#)].

The Consul at Irkutsk (Thomson) to the Secretary of State²

[Telegram]

IRKUTSK, *undated*.

[*Received October 28, 1918, 8.50 p.m.*]

In reference to the question Ufa hostages³ which involves safety Allied subjects in Moscow, please communicate if possible to Major Wardwell, Red Cross, Moscow, that Vice Consul Williams, Chelyabinsk, telegraphed contents of Catchpool representative [report to] International Red Cross and American, British, French and neutral consuls at Moscow relative to his efforts to secure the release of women hostages held at Ufa. The report shows that Catchpool decided on arrival at Ufa, in violation [spite] of hostility there to complete liberation women, to request their release on parole in Ufa while he was to proceed at once to Vyatka, where Bolsheviks have taken their hostages from Ufa, with a letter signed by these women thus conditionally released, addressed to Bolsheviks, Vyatka, in which they ask Bolsheviks to release the men to International Red Cross. The plan approved by governor of Ufa, who has signed the protocol, authorized the release of the women on parole immediately.

Then French Consul Bayard, Ekaterinburg, who manifested hostility toward the plan from the first, secured arrest of Catchpool by Czech espionage organization and laid three charges against him: (1) having a forged ticket of admission to the government conference then in session; (2) having a falsely signed paper, French Consul General, Moscow (on examination Czechs, American and British Consuls from Ekaterinburg found all Catchpool papers quite satisfactory); (3) French Consul charged that in conversation Catchpool has shown sympathy with Bolsheviks for whom doubtless was collecting information, and French Consul urged that he be forbidden to return to Moscow. Catchpool answered the fact that he was chosen by the authorities in Moscow to carry out the mission was a proof of his sincerity.

Czech authorities refused to free him unless he would sign paper that would not try to return to any part of Russia held by Bolsheviks. Catchpool reluctant to sign because he felt responsibility to Moscow consuls to return, but the British and American Consuls from Ekaterinburg advised against the attempt to return under the circumstances, and on their advice he signed.

French Consul, Samara, was with British and American Consuls in the joint protest in the matter to the Russian Government at Samara and, since this directly

concerns the French citizens held in Moscow, attitude of French Consul at Ekaterinburg inexplicable.

[Catchpool requests] communicate with Major Wardwell, Red Cross, Moscow, through the Department, inform failure of efforts his representative for the reason given; communication from here is impossible.¹ No answer from our joint protest against taking hostages to the Samara government, although thrice repeated. Should the protest be repeated to the new government, Omsk? Will endeavor to obtain information relative to the present situation, Ufa.

THOMSON

² Sent via the Consulate at Vladivostok (No. 232, Oct. 28).

³ See despatch from the Consul in Moscow, Sept. 2, *ante*, p. 680 [Pg. 680 is part of [Doc. 624](#)].

¹ Telegram repeated, Nov. 1, to the Chargé in Sweden, with instructions: "Please ask Wardwell what this telegram means. Department has no information whatever regarding hostages taken by Czechs and Bolsheviks."

The Ambassador in Russia (Francis) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

ARCHANGEL, *November 1, 1918.*
[*Received 5.15 p.m.*]

535. On receipt of your cable September 24, 5 p.m.,² I sent copy thereof to provisional government for its information: prompt reply was received approving action and saying sovereign Archangel government expressed entire sympathy with sentiments expressed by you and hoped that our noble aim would be accomplished and—

Government convinced that all nations acknowledging themselves morally responsible to uphold human rights of mankind will unite their efforts in supporting movement which America has initiated.

FRANCIS

² Not printed; see circular telegram, Sept. 20, *ante*, p. 687 [*Pg. 687 includes portions of [Doc. 630](#) and [Doc. 631](#)*].

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

[Extract]

LONDON, *November 1, 1918.*
[Received November 13.]

SIR: With reference to my despatch No. 9990 of October 2, 1918,³ forwarding a memorandum on conditions in Russia, I have the honor to transmit, herewith enclosed, copies of certain documents¹ supplementary thereto, also prepared by Mr. Norman C. Armour, formerly Second Secretary of the American Embassy at Vologda. ...

(c) A communication from M. Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Major Allen Wardwell, relative to alleged atrocities committed by anti-Bolshevik forces.

...

I have [etc.]

IRWIN LAUGHLIN

[Enclosure]

*The Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Chicherin) to the Chief of the American Red Cross Commission to Russia (Wardwell)*²

MOSCOW, *September 11, 1918.*

DEAR SIR: It is only because the body which you represent is not a political organization that I can find it compatible with my position not to repudiate offhand your intervention as a misplaced interference in the affairs of a foreign state, but to enter in the friendly spirit corresponding to the character of your organization into a discussion of the matter involved. You affirm that your organization did not hesitate to condemn acts of barbarity on the part of our adversaries. Where are these utterances of condemnation? When and in what form did the American Red Cross protest when the streets of Samara were filled with corpses of young workers shot in batches by America's allies, or when the prisons of Omsk were filled with tens of thousands of the flower of the working class and the best of them executed without trial, or when just now in Novorossiisk the troops of England's mercenary Alexeev murdered in cold blood

7,000 wounded who were left behind by our retreating army, or when the Cossacks of the same Alexeev murdered without distinction the young men of their own race in whom they see a revolutionary vanguard? I would be very glad to learn what the American Red Cross has done in order to publicly brand these untold atrocities, the everyday work of our enemies, everywhere practised by them upon our friends when they have the power to do it. But are these the only atrocities around us? In a wider field, at the present period when the oligarchs who are the rulers of the world drench the earth with streams of blood, cover it with heaps of corpses and whole armies of maimed and fill the whole world with unspeakable sufferings, why do you turn your indignation against those who, rising against this whole system of violence, oppression and murder that bears as if for the sake of mockery the name of civilization, those I repeat who in their desperate struggle against the ruling system of the present world are compelled by their very position in the furnace of a civil war to strike the class foes with whom the life and struggle is raging? And in a still wider field are not the sacrifices still greater, still more innumerable, which are exacted every day on the battlefield of labor by the ruling system of exploitation which grinds youth and life force and happiness of the multitude for the sake of the profits of the few? How can I characterize the humanity of the American Red Cross which is dumb to the system of everyday murder and turns against those who have dared to rise against it and surrounded by mortal enemies from all sides are compelled to strike? Against these fighters who have thrust themselves into the fire of battle for a whole new system of human society you are not even able to be otherwise than unjust. Our adversaries are not executed as you affirm for holding other political views than ourselves, but for taking part in the most terrible of battles, in which no weapon is left untouched against us, no crime is left aside and no atrocities are considered too great when the power belongs to them. Is it not known to you that by the decree of September 3 the death sentences are applied only for distinct crimes, and besides banditism and ordinary crimes, they are to be applied for participation in the White Guard movement, that is, the movement which helps to surround us everywhere with death snares, which unceasingly attacks us with fire and sword and every possible misfortune and wishes to prepare for us, if only it had the power to do so, complete extermination? You speak of execution of 500 persons in Petrograd as of one particularly striking instance of acts of like character. As for the number it is the only one. Among these 500, 200 were executed on the ground of the decision of the local organization, to whom they were very well known as most active and dangerous counter-revolutionaries, and 300 had been selected already some time ago as belonging to the vanguard of the counterrevolutionary movement. In the passion of the struggle tearing our whole people, do you not see the sufferings, untold during generations, of all the unknown millions, who were dumb during centuries and whose concentrated despair and rage have at last burst into the open, passionately longing for a new life, for the sake of which they have the whole existing fabric to remove? In the great battles of mankind, hatred and fury are even so unavoidable as in every

battle and in every struggle. Do you not see the beauties of the heroism of the working class, trampled under the feet of everybody who were above them until now, and now rising in fury and passionate devotion and enthusiasm to recreate the whole world and the whole life of mankind? Why are you blind to all this in the same way as you are dumb to the system of atrocities against which this working class has risen? It is only natural then if you are unjust against those whom you lightheartedly condemn, if you distort even the facts of the case, if you see wanton vengeance against persons of other views there, where in reality there is the most terrible, the most passionate, the most furious battle of one world against the other, in which our enemies with deadly weapons are lurking behind every street corner, and in which the executions of which you speak, executions of real and deadly enemies, are insignificant in comparison with the horrors which these enemies try to prepare for us, and in comparison with the immeasurable horrors of the whole system with which we are at present at grips in a life and death struggle.

I remain,

Yours truly,

G. CHICHERIN

³ Not printed.

¹ Not printed.

² See *ante*, p. 685 [*Pg. 685 includes portions of [Doc. 628](#) and [Doc. 629](#)*].

The Ambassador in Spain (Willard) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

MADRID, *November 5, 1918, 10 a.m.*
[Received 11.05 p.m.]

2039. Department's circular September 20, 6 p.m. Foreign Office replies as follows:

His Majesty's Government, which could not fail to receive with most lively sympathy the note to which I have the honor to reply, takes pleasure in informing your excellency, with the request that it be transmitted to your Government, that inspired by the same sentiments which served as the base of the attitude of the Washington Government, His Majesty's Government has fully approved the conduct of the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires in Petrograd, who on September 3 last agreed with his colleagues to visit representative of the Commissioners of the People in that city, and to set forth without intention of interfering with internal affairs of the country, his strong protest and reprobation of the acts of violence which were being committed, and begging that the bloodshed cease. Two days later, on September 5, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires signed a collective note reiterating this request, and expressing profound indignation at the régime of looting, imprisonment *en masse* and continuous shootings, assassinations. These declarations, communicated to the Commissioners of the People by the diplomatic representative of Spain, constitute an eloquent proof of the impression made upon His Majesty's Government by the situation through which Russia is passing, and are accordingly a testimony of the feelings that the acts committed there have aroused in the Spanish nation.

WILLARD

The Minister in Portugal (Birch) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LISBON, *November 5, 1918, 3 p.m.*

[*Received November 6, 10.30 a.m.*]

622. Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m. I am in receipt of Portuguese Government's reply to Department's inquiry concerning willingness to register protest against the acts of terrorism lately committed in Russia. The Portuguese Government states that it will lend its support to whatever action is taken by the nations in this connection and gives at the same time its hearty approval to the proposal. The Portuguese Government will also follow the matter with the kindest interest through whatever course the Government of the United States may deem expedient to direct its [action].

BIRCH

The Consul General at Sofia (Murphy) to the Secretary of State

SOFIA, November 7, 1918.
[Received December 18.]

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith copy of *note verbale* No. 2895, of the 26th ultimo, from the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, expressing the feelings of horror with which Bulgaria views the acts of barbarity committed by the so-called Government of Russia, and likewise expressing its entire willingness of associating itself with the Government of the United States in any movement designed to manifest the world's condemnation of the misgovernment of the present ruling powers in Russia.

I have also the honor to transmit herewith my note No. 619, of the 4th October,¹ to the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

I have [etc.]

D. I. MURPHY

[Enclosure—Translation]

The Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Legation

No. 2895

SOFIA, October 26, 1918.

NOTE VERBALE

Annexed to its *note verbale* No. 619 of the 4th October last, the United States Legation kindly transmitted a copy of a telegram received from the Secretary of State at Washington, in which was described the existence in Russia of a veritable reign of terror by the mob, directed against peaceful citizens in Moscow, Petrograd and other cities; where wholesale executions took place and where thousands were shot without judgment; the existence of irresponsible bands satisfying their brutal passions, by massacring countless numbers of innocent people.

The Government of the United States, guided by sentiments of humanity, appeals to all the civilized nations to manifest their horror at the barbarous acts committed by the Russian Government.

At the same time the Legation of the United States would be pleased to know if the Royal Government of Bulgaria is disposed to take part in an immediate action,

irrespective of the conduct of the war, for the purpose of bringing to the attention of the instigators of the crimes, the repugnance which civilization feels in face of their acts of madness.

In reply, the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs has the honor to advise the honorable Legation of the United States, that Bulgaria revolts against such barbarous crimes and to give proof of her deference to and of her solidarity with the Government of the United States, Bulgaria is ready to associate herself willingly with any humanitarian initiative, undertaken for the purpose of expressing disapproval of, and disgust at the above-referred-to massacres.

¹ Not printed.

The Colombian Minister (Urueta) to the Secretary of State

No. 1887

WASHINGTON, *November 22, 1918.*
[*Received November 23.*]

SIR: The Colombian Government has been advised, through the United States Legation in Bogotá, of the deplorable events that have taken place in Russia, where the chief cities, such as Petrograd, Moscow, etc., according to reliable information, have been the scene of wholesale murders, which keep the peaceable population of that country under the scepter of terrorism.

Such crimes, denounced by you to neutral governments, have aroused in the Colombian Government the same feelings of horror as are expressed by you in your circular to the United States embassies and legations, and at the same time of compassion for the victims of so great excesses.

Consistent with those feelings and with its friendly sentiments towards the Russian people, my Government has instructed me to express its reprobation of the wanton acts committed in Russia, as well as its best wishes for a speedy coming of the Russian people to a life of order, liberty, and self-government.

The Colombian Government will be glad to be associated with any public statement made in the sense of the present note by the Government of the United States.

Accept [etc.]

C. A. URUETA

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *November 23, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received 10.37 p.m.]

3178. Department's circular of September 20, 6 p.m. My 2830, September 26, 2 p.m.¹ The Minister for Foreign Affairs read me this afternoon a telegram from the Danish Minister at Petrograd (which had taken five days in transmission) who said he would greatly deprecate the withdrawal of the Danish diplomatic mission and consular officers from Soviet Russia owing to the success which had thus far met their efforts in protecting the interests not only of Denmark but also of the Allies, especially France.

Mr. Scavenius² said that he had anticipated such a reply from the Minister who was naturally enthusiastic over the successes thus far attained especially in succoring the unfortunate. He realized however that the question could not be viewed from that angle alone and said that it would be most embarrassing should the Danish representative be the only one to remain at Petrograd. I pointed out that in dealing with the Bolsheviks it must be viewed as organized society as opposed to terrorism and anarchy. The Minister for Foreign Affairs begged that I should obtain an expression of opinion from you with regard to the advisability of the withdrawal of their Minister and Consul General from Petrograd and Moscow respectively, that it would be taken as confidential and in no way regarded as the exercise of pressure.

I am inclined to think that this request is made in good faith and is actuated by a real desire on the part of some member of the Government and more responsible persons in Denmark to strengthen their position before the country on this question by the ability to point to a concerted expression of judgment of the Associated Governments in favor of the withdrawal. But should the Associated Governments refrain from taking a definite stand on the question, it would be possible for the Danish Government to interpret the lack of such a statement to mean that the presence of their representatives in Russia was permissible and even desirable in order to guard the interests of other governments and they would be enabled incidentally to reap the benefit of the trade connections which would undoubtedly be made through their presence there.

Copy to London.

¹ *Ante*, p. 695 [*Pg. 695 includes portions of [Doc. 642](#), [Doc. 643](#), and [Doc. 644](#)*].

² Erik Scavenius, Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs.

File No. 861.00/3265

[Document 682]

The Secretary of State to the Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 30, 1918, 3 p.m.*

1242. Your 3178, November 23, 5 p.m. Department is not disposed to influence the Danish Government in regard to continuing its representatives in Soviet Russia under existing conditions.

LANSING

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Consul General at
Irkutsk (Harris)***¹

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 9, 1918, 4 p.m.*

I quote for your information copy of a telegram November 9 from Wardwell, who left Moscow recently, and which was telegraphed by the Embassy at London, reading as follows:²

In an effort to limit the taking of hostages particularly of women in the civil war conditions prevailing in Russia, French, English, and American representatives in Moscow joined with neutral and American Red Cross organizations in protesting against arrest of certain women taken at Ufa. In addition to certain despatches to Samara they also sent Catchpool, a British subject but a member of the Friends Society, to Samara to further this protest and procure release of women. This action had important bearing upon efforts to release women then in the prisons of Moscow. Greatly regret apparent failure of this effort and difficulties which Catchpool has encountered. He was fully authorized to act on behalf Moscow consuls and believe his arrest entirely unwarranted. Urge that every effort be made to protect him and to permit him to move about Russia as am satisfied his work has no political significance. Believe it desirable wherever possible to use efforts to prevent taking women as hostages as there is danger that this inhuman practice may increase during the struggle now going on in Russia.

The Department deplores the taking of hostages and is especially opposed in principle to the taking of women and children. The Department desires you to ascertain if hostages are still held and if so endeavor to bring about their immediate liberation, and to express the hope of this Government that the practice of taking hostages will be promptly discontinued. This Department also is of the opinion that the arrest of Catchpool was wholly unwarranted and that every effort should be made to protect him and permit him to move about Russia in connection with the work of securing relief of hostages.

POLK

¹ Sent via the Legation in China to be forwarded to Omsk.

² See *ante*, p. 712 [Pg. 712 includes portions of [Doc. 673](#) and [Doc. 674](#)].

The Consul General at Irkutsk (Harris) to the Secretary of State¹

[Telegram]

OMSK, *December 31, 1918.*
[*Received January 2, 1919.*]

272. Referring corrected copy Department's December 9, 4 p.m. As question referred to was being dealt with [through] government in Samara, I desire to go on record with the following instructions sent to Vice Consul Williams² at that time when matter was referred by him to me.

On September 6 I telegraphed Williams as follows:

Under no circumstances are women and children to be held as hostages. Demand their immediate unconditional release if this has not already been done. Harris.

On September 10 I again telegraphed Williams, Samara:

I understand that English, French and possibly Americans are being held as hostages in Moscow. The object of my sending you my September 6 was to protect the foreigners held as hostages in Moscow. While this is an internal Russian affair apparently and we have no right to interfere, yet if foreigners, and possibly Americans, are to suffer indirectly from the practice of such methods it becomes our duty to take measures to prevent it. Make an unofficial representation in effect that nothing is to be gained by putting restraint upon these women and that Moscow should be informed that they have been set entirely free.

Endeavor to inform Wardwell, Moscow, by radio of my efforts and your efforts in this matter. This may help position of large number Allied subjects in European Russia. Harris.

As a result of our efforts in their behalf these hostages were placed under a sort of house arrest or restraint and they had not been entirely liberated at the time Samara was evacuated. I have never been able to ascertain what actually became of them.¹ An investigation will be made, at once concerning the treatment accorded Catchpool.

¹ Sent via the Legation in China.

² George W. Williams, Vice Consul at Moscow, detailed to Samara.

¹ On Dec. 15 Consul General Harris transmitted a badly garbled telegram from the city government of Ekaterinburg, sent with the permission of the Omsk government, addressed to the International Red Cross delegates at Moscow, proposing the exchange of a number of named hostages, Czecho-Slovak and Russian. None of the names contained in the original message to Samara, quoted in enclosure to Consul Poole's despatch of Sept. 2, appear in the list of Bolshevik hostages to be liberated. This telegram was forwarded Dec. 28 to the Legation in Sweden for transmission, if possible, to Moscow (File No. 861.00/3511).

Chapter XVI. Bolshevik Propaganda

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[Efforts to counteract it and check its distribution through Scandinavian countries](#)
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**Efforts to counteract it and check its distribution through
Scandinavian countries—Withdrawal of Swedish and Danish
diplomatic officers from Russia**

[685] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, January 10, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received January 11, 2.36 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/933

[686] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway (Schmedeman)

Washington, January 14, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 861.00/933

[687] The British Embassy to the Department of State

File No. 861.00/1403

**[688] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)**

Washington, February 5, 1918, 8 p.m.

File No. 811.111/2004

[689] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, February 11, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received February 12, 1.40 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/1088

**[690] The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
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Washington, March 7, 1918, 3 p.m.

File No. 811.111/3153

[691] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, October 13, 1918, 1 p.m. [Received 2.40 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/2936

[692] The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

Washington, November 6, 1918, 5 p.m.

File No. 861.00/2936

[693] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, November 13, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received November 14, 3.27 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3210

[694] The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

London, November 20, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received 4.24 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3249

[695] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, November 26, 1918, 8 p.m. [Received 8.43 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3281

[696] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, November 26, 1918, 9 p.m. [Received November 27, 1.15 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3286

[697] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, November 27, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received November 28, 4.17 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3284

[698] The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

Washington, December 2, 1918, 2 p.m.

File No. 861.00/3284

[699] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 5, 1918, 4 p.m. [Received 11.25 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3352

[700] The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

Stockholm, December 9, 1918, 5 p.m. [Received December 10, 3.17 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3381

[701] The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

Christiania, December 14, 1918, 2 p.m. [Received 4.55 p.m.]

File No. 861.00/3432

[702] The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

Copenhagen, December 23, 1918, 6 p.m. [Received December 24, 9.35 a.m.]

File No. 861.00/3524

File No. 861.00/933

[Document 685]

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *January 10, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[*Received January 11, 2.36 a.m.*]

460. A representative of Bolsheviks now in Christiania recently stated that it was the intention of his party to spread their doctrines in Scandinavia with particular energy and that similar efforts would be made in England and the United States as soon as agents could be set to work. So far as this country is concerned I do not think it impossible that there will be considerable Socialist agitation and resulting unrest in a not distant future. Would again call attention to necessity of strict surveillance of immigration into the United States from Russia.

Ambassador at London advised by telegram.

SCHMEDEMAN

File No. 861.00/933

[Document 686]

***The Secretary of State to the Minister in Norway
(Schmedeman)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *January 14, 1918, 3 p.m.*

205. Your 460. Naval attaché Christiania reported under date January 8 as follows: "Bolshevik government has sent fresh money collected in Russian banks in large amounts to Stockholm for special use of propaganda in England and United States." Please endeavor to ascertain in what banks money deposited and advise Stockholm accordingly.

LANSING

The British Embassy to the Department of State

No. 71

MEMORANDUM

As the United States Government are aware, the Bolsheviki government have appointed a representative in London with whom the British Government are unofficially in communication. The Bolsheviki authorities in Russia have thus the opportunity of sending sealed mail bags to London, and have used these bags for the transmission of the party's literature, which thus escapes censorship. Some of the British papers have already published very violent speeches from Russian sources, and, if no means of checking the importation of this literature through the Bolsheviki representative is adopted, there seems little doubt that an active antiwar and revolutionary propaganda will be started in all parts of the country through the efforts of the Russian agents.

The ordinary way of dealing with the problem would be by notifying the Bolsheviki representative that if he continues practices directly contrary to diplomatic usage he will be requested to leave Great Britain. The British Government consider it certain however that, if such a course were decided upon, the Bolsheviki authorities in Petrograd would retaliate, and probably insist that all persons connected with the British Government, including the Embassy, should leave Russia. The results of such a measure, both to individual British subjects in Russia and to the relations between the two countries, would of course be most harmful.

The situation is thus one of some difficulty, especially as it seems most probable that the course adopted in Great Britain will be extended, as and when opportunity arises, to Italy, France, Japan and the United States. The same problem may consequently be expected to arise in these countries, and the British Government are most anxious to learn as soon as possible what action the United States would propose to adopt towards this propaganda on the part of Bolsheviki representatives, should the case arise in this country. It is no doubt desirable that similar action in dealing with this question should be taken, if necessary, by all the Governments concerned, and enquiries as to their views on the subject are being made also of the French, Italian and Japanese Governments.

WASHINGTON, *January 16, 1918.*

***The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Russia
(Francis)***

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, *February 5, 1918, 8 p.m.*

2045. ... Take visa declarations of alien emigrants of laboring class who entirely convince you by evidence of origin, occupation, and object of emigration that they may safely come to United States, and refer declarations to Department in duplicate with full report in triplicate, where report is necessary, by mail, unless applicant is prepared to defray cost of telegrams. Refuse visa in all other emigrant cases.

Obtain previous approval Department before visaing passports of other aliens, including merchants, commercial travelers, and persons *en route* to other countries through United States, submitting declarations to Department in same manner as in case of alien emigrants. Department desires you to submit to it for its previous approval cases only of persons whose applications for visa you yourself approve. All others should be finally refused visa by you. You may refuse visas finally without referring to Department, if you consider there are sufficient reasons, or if you suspect, though without tangible evidence, the purpose of the journey. ...

Inform Consuls, including Consul at Helsingfors, if possible. Department is likewise telegraphing him, also Vladivostok, direct. ...

POLK

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *February 11, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received February 12, 1.40 a.m.]

1473. Am informed that Kamenev, People's Minister, member Military Revolutionary Committee, and Zalkind, First Assistant Foreign Minister, both officially acting under the instructions of Bolshevik government, arrived Stockholm February 8 for the purpose of spreading Bolshevik propaganda in Sweden, England, and France. Reported that they started to spread Bolshevik propaganda also in Germany but Smolny¹ government officially only named Sweden, England, and France. Smolny has appropriated five million rubles for spreading Bolshevik propaganda in foreign countries and it is supposed they have access to these funds. They arrived in Stockholm by boat from Mantyluoto in Finland. With reference to published Berlin reports regarding accomplished separate peace with Ukraine Kamenev in Swedish press states that Ukraine Rada delegates, who agreed to the peace, now cannot officially represent Ukraine because recently Ukraine Soviets overthrew Rada and are in absolute control there and peace must now be concluded from Smolny.

MORRIS

¹ Smolny Institute was used by the Bolsheviks as their headquarters.

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain (Page)

[Telegram—Extract]

WASHINGTON, *March 7, 1918, 3 p.m.*

6790. Under date of February 14, Embassy, Petrograd, reported that following Russian citizens had been given diplomatic passports by the Commissary of the People for Foreign Affairs: ... Passports were issued to enable them to proceed to Sweden, Norway, England, France, and the United States.

Embassy reported further that Swedish and Norwegian Legations at Petrograd had visaed passports and that British and French Embassies had done likewise on agreement that bearers would not engage in propaganda in their respective countries.

Foreign Office asked Embassy to visa passports for United States. Embassy replied that matter would have to be submitted to Washington and suggested that in order not to delay departure of holders of passports from Russia, Embassy would request that Department's decision be sent direct to London or Paris.

Please repeat the foregoing to missions in Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and France with instructions not to visa passports without explicit directions from the Department but to watch activities of the foregoing. Keep Department advised and should they present passports for visa state that no instructions had been received from the Department and offer to telegraph for same.

POLK

File No. 861.00/2936

[Document 691]

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *October 13, 1918, 1 p.m.*
[*Received 2.40 p.m.*]

2932. I am informed from reliable source that a quantity of Bolshevik literature has been sent to England and France for distribution.

Copy to London.

GRANT-SMITH

***The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in Great Britain
(Page)***

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *November 6, 1918, 5 p.m.*

2648. Referring telegram from Copenhagen dated October 13 regarding Bolshevik literature sent to England and France, Department believes much importance for the future attaches to sound efforts to counteract Bolshevik influence now and limit its scope. On this account this Government regards it of great importance to follow closely all efforts at Bolshevik propaganda both here and abroad. Please ascertain from Foreign Office its views and the measures it is taking; also ask Embassy Paris what is being done in France and report extent of Bolshevik present efforts in both countries.

LANSING

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *November 13, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[Received November 14, 3.27 a.m.]

1337. My telegram No. 1313, November 5.¹ British Chargé d’Affaires has telegraphed his Government recommending that the Associated Governments invite neutral governments to break off diplomatic relations with Bolsheviks and to control spread of Bolshevik propaganda, among other ways, by bringing pressure to bear on banks to cut off Bolshevik financial transactions. He further recommends that the Associated Governments formally inquire of neutral governments whether the latter will cooperate against Bolsheviks in Russia or remain neutral and in the latter [eventuality] that the Associated Governments threaten continued blockade pressure against neutrals and exclude them from the general reconstruction conference provided that it has been intended to admit them thereto.

I learn that conferences are at present taking place among Norwegian bankers to consider ways and means to eliminate any financial transactions involving Bolshevik funds and that the general feeling among the bankers is that something should be done in this direction as the most effective way of crippling Bolshevik activities. I expect to hear in a day or two what measures may be decided on.

I regard it as open to question whether it is expedient to bring about withdrawal of neutral diplomatic missions from Russia. My French colleague informs me that his Government desires continued presence of neutral legations there to protect foreign interests, there being a considerable number of French citizens still in Russia.

In any case it does not seem desirable that the United States should take part in any policy in this connection which involves bringing to bear on neutrals for the purpose indicated the kind of pressure contemplated in British Chargé d’Affaires’ recommendations to his Government.

Copy to London.

SCHMEDEMAN

¹ Not printed.

The Chargé in Great Britain (Laughlin) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

LONDON, *November 20, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received 4.24 p.m.]

3859. Tour 2648, November 6, 5 p.m. Very serious consideration is being given to this subject by British Government. The policy to be adopted has not yet been formulated in full detail, but certain measures have already been taken and are in operation at present, such as those providing for the continuance of employment and remuneration of labor from war industries and discharged soldiers. A careful watch is being maintained for such Bolshevik propaganda literature as may reach this country from abroad, in order that it may be intercepted and destroyed, and the same measures are being taken wherever possible in respect to inflammatory literature secretly printed at home. Counter-propaganda is meanwhile being conducted through the unostentatious distribution of pamphlets designed to educate the people as to the true significance of Bolshevism, and appropriate articles appear in the Sunday papers customarily read by the workingmen. This method is considered much more advisable than any attempt at conspicuous counter-propaganda. Financial institutes are working in cooperation to restrict the circulation of Bolshevik funds if any. It is expected in the near future that the King will visit the large industrial centers and speak to the shop stewards along carefully prepared lines, that the policy will be followed in the future of extending the appeal of the throne as far as possible among the laboring classes. Visits are also being arranged for the Prince of Wales to large munition factories where women workers are employed, in order that his undoubted popularity may be made use of and act as a check to the spread of anarchistic tendencies.

Apart from certain centers, notably the Clyde and South Wales, Bolshevism, as such, is innocuous for the present. The best-informed official opinion is that with care and diligence the spread of Bolshevism in this country may be effectually checked, at least for the next six months. Further sounder advances are meanwhile being devised to meet such contingencies as may develop later on.

A full report of Bolshevik activities in the United Kingdom will go forward by the next pouch. I shall telegraph the Foreign Office reply to my inquiries as soon as it is received.

LAUGHLIN

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *November 26, 1918, 8 p.m.*
[*Received 8.43 p.m.*]

1383. Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that representatives of Norway Foreign Office, Department of Justice, Secret Service and Legation at Petrograd have gone to Copenhagen to meet Swedish and Danish representatives with a view to working out a uniform policy in regard to Bolshevism.

In reply to a question Minister of Foreign Affairs stated that this Government does not anticipate an actual Bolshevik outbreak in Norway.

SCHMEDEMAN

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *November 26, 1918, 9 p.m.*
[*Received November 27, 1.15 a.m.*]

1382. British Chargé d’Affaires yesterday handed to the Minister for Foreign Affairs a *mémoire* to the effect that the British Government feels that it is not only in the interest of Norway and other countries primarily concerned but in the general interests of the world that steps be taken to prevent the spread of Bolshevik propaganda outside of Russia. British Government considers that the Norwegian and other Scandinavian Governments would be welcome [well advised] to take steps to prevent Scandinavian banks from facilitating transactions in rubles.

French and Italian Ministers have been authorized to make a similar communication to the Norwegian Government. Italian Minister has also been instructed, provided his associated colleagues are similarly instructed, to inform the Norwegian Government that food supplies to Norway will be cut off if drastic measures are not taken against Bolsheviks.

Official opinion here regarding Bolsheviks fluctuates from day to day but the Government is watching the situation closely and is prepared for energetic measures should they become necessary. Weekly meetings are held in Christiania by the extremist elements at which very radical if not revolutionary speeches are made but it is felt that the practical growth of Bolshevism here will be directly determined by developments in Germany.

SCHMEDEMAN

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *November 27, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received November 28, 4.17 a.m.]

3233. Am reliably informed that at a conference of Russian and Scandinavian Bolsheviks it has been decided to send Bolshevik delegates into Holland and Switzerland from where it is hoped to get agents into France and Belgium. The delegates are to be supplied with large sums of money with which to have printed the necessary propaganda and are to be provided with false Swedish passports which the Swedish Independent Socialists have agreed to furnish. One of the delegates is to be the well-known Russian Bolshevik Mikhailov.

It has been also decided to ask the Spartacus group of Socialists in Berlin to leave agents in the territory to be occupied by the Allied troops, which agents will be supplied with money by the Russian Bolsheviks.

Have drawn the attention of the Swedish Government to the question of false Swedish passports.

MORRIS

File No. 861.00/3284

[Document 698]

The Secretary of State to the Minister in Sweden (Morris)

[Telegram]

WASHINGTON, *December 2, 1918, 2 p.m.*

1331. Your 3233, November 27, 5 p.m. Repeat to Embassy at London and to Paris for Colonel House. Follow same procedure all similar reports to Department regarding Bolshevik activities. Please acknowledge.

LANSING

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 5, 1918, 4 p.m.*
[Received 11.25 p.m.]

3281. In a conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day, I pointed out to him the free access which Bolsheviks in Russia have had for their propaganda in Sweden and also the ability they had to use Sweden for transmitting the Bolshevik propaganda to the United States and the Associated Governments. The Foreign Minister informed me that the Swedish Government has been taking step towards Bolshevism in Sweden and preventing its being brought into Sweden itself and he confidentially informed me that Sweden had now withdrawn most of its representatives in Russia and that by the end of this week he expected to be in a position to stop the Bolshevik couriers coming into Sweden and also expected that other diplomatic relationship between the Bolsheviks and Sweden would be terminated at that time and they expected to get rid of Vorovski, the Bolshevik Minister here, and his associates.

I understand that Denmark is also withdrawing her officials and subjects from Russia and within the next few weeks expects them to have been withdrawn.

Repeated to Paris. Copy to London.

MORRIS

The Minister in Sweden (Morris) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

STOCKHOLM, *December 9, 1918, 5 p.m.*
[Received December 10, 3.17 a.m.]

3300. Referring to my cable 3281, of December 5, 4 p.m., forecasting a severance of diplomatic relations between Sweden and Bolsheviks, I quote below an official *communiqué* which has now been issued by Swedish Foreign Office:

In view of the present food difficulties in Russia, and owing to the state of insecurity due to the repeated closing of the frontiers, it has been found necessary to require Swedes living in Russia to return home and to reduce the Swedish representation there to a minimum. The personnel of the Legation at Petrograd and the Consulate General at Moscow have now left Russia with the exception of two officials left at the Legation.

It being furthermore established that Soviet government and its representatives have abused right granted them to send couriers in using these couriers as means of forwarding Bolshevik propaganda literature printed in various languages and designed for circulation in different countries, Minister Foreign Affairs to-day informed representative Soviet government to Sweden that diplomatic privileges he has hitherto enjoyed shall be withdrawn; viz., right to receive and dispatch couriers and state telegrams. In connection herewith, Minister Foreign Affairs declared that he expects representatives for Soviet government here to leave country unhindered. Return to Sweden of Swedes in Russia is naturally a condition for permission for Soviet representatives to leave country.

Repeated to Paris. Copy to London.

MORRIS

The Minister in Norway (Schmedeman) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

CHRISTIANIA, *December 14, 1918, 2 p.m.*
[*Received 4.55 p.m.*]

1451. Norwegian newspapers have reported that Norwegian Legation at Petrograd has left but the Minister of Foreign Affairs informs me that if so he has not received advice of its departure. Minister for Foreign Affairs anticipates departure at any time however. On the basis of press reports regarding departure of Norwegian Legation a meeting of Norwegian Bolsheviki took place last night at which resolutions were passed recommending to the workmen's party and to the secretariat of the trade-union organization a representative of "working Norway" be sent at once to Russia to take the place of the representative of "capitalistic Norway" and that a three days' strike be declared as soon as possible as a protest against the rupture with the Russian workmen's and peasants' republic.

American mission advised. Copy to London.

SCHMEDEMAN

The Chargé in Denmark (Grant-Smith) to the Secretary of State

[Telegram]

COPENHAGEN, *December 23, 1918, 6 p.m.*
[Received December 24, 9.35 a.m.]

3341. *Kobenhavn* of 22d instant publishes long interview with Harald Scavenius, former Danish Minister to Russia, who arrived in Copenhagen last week, as reported in my 3271, December 7, 5 p.m.,¹ in which he states that his departure from Petrograd should not be considered as a severance of diplomatic relations between the Bolsheviks and the Danish Government. He is strongly of the opinion that intervention in Russia by the Allies should be undertaken immediately and not postponed until spring and that if comprehensive measures are taken now it will be possible to control the situation but that scarcity of food and its consequences will drive the *bourgeoisie* into the hands of the Bolsheviks if steps are not taken without delay. While denying the rumor that Finland is threatened by the Bolshevik leaders, favors sole [Allied] occupation of Petrograd and Moscow which would deprive them of their bases. The Red Army in Petrograd only numbers 30,000, and he thinks it would be easy task for Allies to occupy both cities.

He asserts that any one who brings food into Russia will be received with open arms and that distribution of food would [secure?] Petrograd and Moscow. Scavenius states that the Bolshevik propaganda, headed by the Austrian Radek, is carried on by persons of many nationalities including even Indians and Chinese, but no Danes. Its purpose is to develop the communistic ideas already prevailing in various countries along lines which are suited to respective national characteristics. In Berlin 400 Russian propagandists are operating and missions have also been sent to France and England, which is to be the object of an attack through her outermost point, India. A school in Moscow which teaches Bolshevik doctrines recently sent a commission to India. M. Scavenius states each member of the Russian *bourgeoisie* is now receiving only one herring every other day and that this class is in imminent danger of starvation if no assistance is forthcoming. No less than 500 persons were shot at Petrograd in one night on the sole pretext that it was necessary.

GRANT-SMITH

¹ Not printed.

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